This document summarizes a study on the effectiveness of notifications in reducing the duration that websites remain compromised after being hijacked. The study analyzed 760,935 hijacking incidents identified between July 2014 and June 2015. It found that direct communication with webmasters increased the likelihood of cleanup by over 50% and reduced infection lengths by at least 62%. Browser warnings also correlated with faster remediation. However, 12% of sites fell victim to a new attack within 30 days, indicating some webmasters only addressed symptoms rather than the root cause. The study provides insights into how notifications can help webmasters remedy hijackings more quickly while also highlighting gaps in webmaster capabilities.
Case Study: Q2 2014 Global DDoS Attack Report | Akamai DocumentProlexic
The Brobot botnet that devastated banks with DDoS floods in 2013 may be back. And the techniques that built it – exploiting vulnerabilities in the software that powers websites and cloud companies – is all too alive. Get the full details about this cybercrime threat in the Akamai/Prolexic Q1 2014 DDoS attack report, available for a free download at http://bit.ly/1meTkfu
This document analyzes data from Google to estimate the number of internet users worldwide who are at risk from web browser vulnerabilities due to using outdated browser versions or plugins. The analysis finds that in June 2008, over 600 million users were using insecure browser configurations, representing the visible portion of the "Insecurity Iceberg". The document aims to quantify the global scale of the vulnerable web browser problem.
The document analyzes the prevalence and security impact of HTTPS interception by middleboxes and antivirus software. The researchers developed techniques to detect interception based on differences between the TLS handshake and HTTP user agent. Applying these techniques to billions of connections, they found interception rates over an order of magnitude higher than previous estimates, and that the majority (97-62%) of intercepted connections had reduced security, with 10-40% vulnerable to decryption. Testing of interception products found most reduced security and many introduced severe vulnerabilities. The findings indicate widespread interception negatively impacts security.
The National Audit Office published a report investigating the WannaCry cyber attack on the NHS in October 2017. The report found:
1) The NHS had shoddy IT systems and cybersecurity practices that made it vulnerable to the attack, such as unpatched Windows operating systems and a lack of firewalls.
2) The NHS had no effective breach response plan, resulting in confusion and a disorganized response when systems went down.
3) For real improvement, the NHS must implement rigorous cybersecurity drills, inspections, and consequences for non-compliance - but the disjointed structure of the NHS may prevent this.
CAMP is a content-agnostic malware protection system built into the Google Chrome browser. It determines the reputation of downloads locally using features extracted from the download without analyzing content, relying on server-side reputation data only when needed. Over a six-month evaluation with over 200 million users, CAMP processed millions of reputation requests daily with 99% accuracy compared to dynamic analysis. It detected approximately 5 million malware downloads per month that were not found by existing solutions like antivirus or blacklists.
Open Source Insight: Artifex Ruling, NY Cybersecurity Regs, PATCH Act, & Wan...Black Duck by Synopsys
This week’s news is dominated by fall-out and reaction from last week’s WannaCrypt/WannaCry attacks, of course, but other open source and cybersecurity stories you won’t want to miss, including an important open source ruling that confirms the enforceability of dual licensing, what New York’s new cybersecurity regulations mean for Financial Services and
the PATCH Act and the creation of a vulnerabilities equities process
State of Web Application Security by Ponemon InstituteJeremiah Grossman
This document summarizes the findings of a study on the state of web application security. The study found that while data theft is seen as the biggest threat, organizations are not allocating sufficient resources to secure critical web applications. Specifically:
- 70% of respondents said their organizations do not allocate enough resources for web application security.
- 34% of urgent vulnerabilities are not fixed in a timely manner.
- Proactive organizations spend more than twice as much (25% vs 12%) on web application security and are more likely to use firewalls and cloud-based solutions than reactive organizations.
Case Study: Q2 2014 Global DDoS Attack Report | Akamai DocumentProlexic
The Brobot botnet that devastated banks with DDoS floods in 2013 may be back. And the techniques that built it – exploiting vulnerabilities in the software that powers websites and cloud companies – is all too alive. Get the full details about this cybercrime threat in the Akamai/Prolexic Q1 2014 DDoS attack report, available for a free download at http://bit.ly/1meTkfu
This document analyzes data from Google to estimate the number of internet users worldwide who are at risk from web browser vulnerabilities due to using outdated browser versions or plugins. The analysis finds that in June 2008, over 600 million users were using insecure browser configurations, representing the visible portion of the "Insecurity Iceberg". The document aims to quantify the global scale of the vulnerable web browser problem.
The document analyzes the prevalence and security impact of HTTPS interception by middleboxes and antivirus software. The researchers developed techniques to detect interception based on differences between the TLS handshake and HTTP user agent. Applying these techniques to billions of connections, they found interception rates over an order of magnitude higher than previous estimates, and that the majority (97-62%) of intercepted connections had reduced security, with 10-40% vulnerable to decryption. Testing of interception products found most reduced security and many introduced severe vulnerabilities. The findings indicate widespread interception negatively impacts security.
The National Audit Office published a report investigating the WannaCry cyber attack on the NHS in October 2017. The report found:
1) The NHS had shoddy IT systems and cybersecurity practices that made it vulnerable to the attack, such as unpatched Windows operating systems and a lack of firewalls.
2) The NHS had no effective breach response plan, resulting in confusion and a disorganized response when systems went down.
3) For real improvement, the NHS must implement rigorous cybersecurity drills, inspections, and consequences for non-compliance - but the disjointed structure of the NHS may prevent this.
CAMP is a content-agnostic malware protection system built into the Google Chrome browser. It determines the reputation of downloads locally using features extracted from the download without analyzing content, relying on server-side reputation data only when needed. Over a six-month evaluation with over 200 million users, CAMP processed millions of reputation requests daily with 99% accuracy compared to dynamic analysis. It detected approximately 5 million malware downloads per month that were not found by existing solutions like antivirus or blacklists.
Open Source Insight: Artifex Ruling, NY Cybersecurity Regs, PATCH Act, & Wan...Black Duck by Synopsys
This week’s news is dominated by fall-out and reaction from last week’s WannaCrypt/WannaCry attacks, of course, but other open source and cybersecurity stories you won’t want to miss, including an important open source ruling that confirms the enforceability of dual licensing, what New York’s new cybersecurity regulations mean for Financial Services and
the PATCH Act and the creation of a vulnerabilities equities process
State of Web Application Security by Ponemon InstituteJeremiah Grossman
This document summarizes the findings of a study on the state of web application security. The study found that while data theft is seen as the biggest threat, organizations are not allocating sufficient resources to secure critical web applications. Specifically:
- 70% of respondents said their organizations do not allocate enough resources for web application security.
- 34% of urgent vulnerabilities are not fixed in a timely manner.
- Proactive organizations spend more than twice as much (25% vs 12%) on web application security and are more likely to use firewalls and cloud-based solutions than reactive organizations.
A global cyber attack exploited hacking tools believed to belong to the NSA that were leaked online last month. The attack spread a ransomware virus affecting over 57,000 systems in 99 countries. Some argue the attack reflects flaws in the US prioritizing offensive cyber capabilities over defense. While Microsoft had provided patches, many systems had not updated their software leaving them vulnerable. There are concerns intelligence agencies hoard vulnerabilities rather than quickly reporting them to be addressed.
Don’t let Your Website Spread Malware – a New Approach to Web App SecuritySasha Nunke
This document discusses how malware risks on websites are increasing and how traditional antivirus approaches are unable to detect zero-day malware attacks. It proposes a better approach to detecting website malware that involves behaviorally analyzing a website by running it on an instrumented virtual machine to watch for exploitation in real-time, allowing detection of zero-day malware. This approach is passive and safe for daily scans, unlike traditional vulnerability scanning. The document recommends using both passive malware scanning and active vulnerability scanning regularly to identify malware as well as vulnerabilities that could be exploited to infect a site or its users. This dual approach protects brands, revenue, and users from the impacts of malware and exploitation.
The most Common Website Security ThreatsHTS Hosting
The document discusses the most common security threats faced by websites, including SQL injection, credential brute force attacks, cross-site scripting (XSS), and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. It explains that websites store data on web servers accessed through the internet, making them vulnerable targets. The threats aim to steal information, abuse server resources, trick bots/crawlers, or exploit visitors. Proper web security is needed to prevent attacks and protect websites and their users.
Veterans Administration Hacked by foreign orgs, security needs standardizationMichael Holt
The Department of Veterans Affairs database has been hacked by at least eight foreign organizations, including the Chinese military. Testimony revealed an agency struggling to manage security across its vast IT systems, leading to breaches. A former VA information security officer said he encountered 15 years of unattended security vulnerabilities and eight foreign groups had compromised VA networks. The VA is working to standardize security through encryption and monitoring initiatives, but government watchdogs say there is still significant work to be done to protect veterans' sensitive information from unauthorized access.
Colby-Sawyer College faced security challenges from viruses, worms, and malware infecting the systems of its nearly 1,000 students. After widespread infections from viruses like Sasser crippled the network in 2004, the college hired Scott Brown to improve security. Brown deployed QualysGuard for continuous vulnerability scanning to identify and address security issues across the college's decentralized network of student and administrative systems. QualysGuard provided affordable and effective vulnerability management that reduced the college's workload and improved security.
The document discusses emerging cyber threats related to information manipulation, insecure supply chains, and mobile device security. Regarding information manipulation, it describes how attackers can influence search results and news feeds to spread propaganda or censor information. It also discusses how personalization of search results can lead to "filter bubbles" where users are isolated from diverse viewpoints. On supply chain security, it notes the difficulties in detecting compromised hardware and the high costs of securing against such threats. Finally, it outlines growing threats from malicious mobile apps and the need for better patching to fix vulnerabilities on devices.
Ransomware has become the most profitable malware type due to its use of strong encryption. Recent ransomware campaigns have increasingly targeted businesses and entire industries. Attackers now use vulnerabilities in servers and network infrastructure like JBoss to quietly spread ransomware through organizations. This allows them to encrypt large amounts of data and demand high ransom payments. Looking ahead, ransomware is expected to evolve new self-propagation abilities, increasing its impact. Organizations must improve patching of vulnerabilities, backup critical data, and develop incident response plans to address growing ransomware threats.
Lessons learned from 2017 cybersecurity incidents, 2018 and beyondAPNIC
This document discusses lessons learned from major cybersecurity incidents in 2017 and preparations for 2018. It begins with a review of major cyber attacks in 2017, including WannaCry, NotPetya, and data breaches at Equifax and Uber. It then discusses how these incidents could have been prevented through measures like patching systems, using up-to-date antivirus software, and implementing two-factor authentication. The document concludes by recommending best practices for operators to prevent future attacks, such as regular patching, disabling outdated protocols, and implementing awareness programs and security governance processes.
Content Management System Security.
How to secure your CMS?
Common rules:
+ Choose your CMS with both functionality and security in mind
+ Update with urgency
+ Use a strong password (admin dashboard access, database users, etc.)
+ Have a firewall in place (detect or prevent suspicious requests)
+ Keep track of the changes to your site and their source code
+ Give the user permissions (and their levels of access) a lot of thought
+ Limit the type of files to non-executables and monitor them closely
+ Backup your CMS (daily backups of your files and databases)
+ Uninstall plugins you do not use or trust.
This document discusses software security vulnerability analysis, with a focus on SQL injection vulnerabilities. It provides an overview of common web application vulnerabilities, describes the state of SQL injection and examples of how it works. It also discusses best practices for protecting against SQL injection, such as input validation and using prepared statements. The document examines SQL injection scanning tools and provides examples of their use.
The document discusses common web security threats like cross-site scripting (XSS) and cross-site request forgery (CSRF). It notes that over half of identity theft cases are internal and that the web remains vulnerable. The document recommends ways to prevent XSS like sanitizing user input and using nonces to prevent CSRF. Additional resources are provided for further information on XSS and CSRF.
AppSecUSA 2016: 'Your License for Bug Hunting Season'bugcrowd
You don’t need a license for bug hunting season anymore. Bug bounty programs are becoming well established as a valuable tool in identifying vulnerabilities early. The Department of Defense has authorized its first bug bounty program, and many vendors are taking a fresh look. While the programs are highly effective, many questions remain about how to structure bug bounty programs to address the concerns that vendors and researchers have about controlling bug hunters, security and privacy, contractual issues with bug hunters, what happens if there is a rogue hacker in the crowd, and liability and compliance concerns. This presentation will cover the best practices for structuring effective bug bounty programs.
Talk originally given at AppSecUSA 2016 | October 13, 2016
Penetration testing is a field which has experienced rapid growth over the yearsGregory Hanis
Sockstress is a denial of service attack that consumes server resources by opening many TCP connections. It was introduced in 2008 and targets vulnerabilities in how TCP handles connections. While tools exist to detect and prevent Sockstress, it remains a potential threat. The attack can be performed by one machine or multiple zombies to mask the source. Defenses include limiting connections per IP and dropping those with zero window responses. Monitoring server resources like RAM usage can also help detect Sockstress attacks. Penetration testing is needed to identify vulnerabilities like this and prove due diligence for organizations.
Bug Bounty Tipping Point: Strength in Numbersbugcrowd
Recorded on September 21, 2016, Casey Ellis, Bugcrowd CEO and Kymberlee Price, Sr. Director of Researcher Operations, explore current trends in the bug bounty market.
This document proposes a methodology to provide web security through web crawling and web sense. It involves maintaining a user browser history log table to track user activities online, rather than blocking sites based only on keywords. It also involves a configuration table with limits per user on daily internet usage based on their level/position. When a user visits a site, web sense monitors their activity, checks the log and configuration tables, and can block the user if they exceed the limits or access restricted sites. This aims to prevent illegal access while allowing access to sites that happen to contain blocked keywords but are not related to the restricted topic.
A cooperative immunization system for an untrusting internetUltraUploader
This document proposes a cooperative immunization system where nodes work together to defend against computer viruses and worms. It presents an algorithm called COVERAGE that has nodes share information about observed infection rates. Based on this shared information, each node probabilistically determines which viruses to respond to. Simulations show COVERAGE is more effective against viruses and more robust against malicious participants compared to existing approaches.
There have been reports such as ‘there is high rate of web application vulnerability’ as well as a range of ways in which web hackers attack web applications. Since the discovery that web applications convey the best content to users, there have been attempts to determine ways in which these systems can be hacked into through defacing, damage and defrauding. As the culture of conveying information across the internet continues to gain ground, there are increasing cases of vulnerabilities of these sites to cyber criminals.
This document proposes and evaluates a statistical approach to classify user login attempts as normal or suspicious based on multiple parameters. It aims to strengthen password-based authentication without changing user behavior. The key points are:
(1) It develops a statistical framework to identify suspicious login attempts based on features like source IP, location, browser, and time. This allows imposing additional verification steps only on suspicious attempts.
(2) It prototypes the system and evaluates it on real login data, finding it can prevent the majority of attacks while imposing additional friction on a small fraction of users.
(3) It considers potential attacks against the classifier and evaluates the system's resistance through experiments simulating attacks.
Significant factors for Detecting Redirection Spamijtsrd
This document discusses significant factors for detecting redirection spam. Redirection spam refers to techniques where users are redirected through multiple domains and pages until reaching a compromised page. The document reviews related work on redirection spam detection and identifies new factors that could help detect malicious redirections more accurately. These factors include the number of domains and script-generated redirections visited, the number of redirection hops, the delay in page refresh times, the HTTP status codes which indicate redirection, and the use of iframes. The identified factors provide criteria to design more robust approaches for detecting redirection spam.
IJRET : International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology is an international peer reviewed, online journal published by eSAT Publishing House for the enhancement of research in various disciplines of Engineering and Technology. The aim and scope of the journal is to provide an academic medium and an important reference for the advancement and dissemination of research results that support high-level learning, teaching and research in the fields of Engineering and Technology. We bring together Scientists, Academician, Field Engineers, Scholars and Students of related fields of Engineering and Technology.
Research Article On Web Application SecuritySaadSaif6
This Is The Totally Hand Written Research Article On
Web Application Security
(Improving Critical Web-based Applications Quality Through In depth Security Analysis)
This Research Article Was Made By Me After The Hard Working Of One Month. Its Best And Suitable For Your Research Paper And Also Used In Class For Present It And For Submission.
A global cyber attack exploited hacking tools believed to belong to the NSA that were leaked online last month. The attack spread a ransomware virus affecting over 57,000 systems in 99 countries. Some argue the attack reflects flaws in the US prioritizing offensive cyber capabilities over defense. While Microsoft had provided patches, many systems had not updated their software leaving them vulnerable. There are concerns intelligence agencies hoard vulnerabilities rather than quickly reporting them to be addressed.
Don’t let Your Website Spread Malware – a New Approach to Web App SecuritySasha Nunke
This document discusses how malware risks on websites are increasing and how traditional antivirus approaches are unable to detect zero-day malware attacks. It proposes a better approach to detecting website malware that involves behaviorally analyzing a website by running it on an instrumented virtual machine to watch for exploitation in real-time, allowing detection of zero-day malware. This approach is passive and safe for daily scans, unlike traditional vulnerability scanning. The document recommends using both passive malware scanning and active vulnerability scanning regularly to identify malware as well as vulnerabilities that could be exploited to infect a site or its users. This dual approach protects brands, revenue, and users from the impacts of malware and exploitation.
The most Common Website Security ThreatsHTS Hosting
The document discusses the most common security threats faced by websites, including SQL injection, credential brute force attacks, cross-site scripting (XSS), and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. It explains that websites store data on web servers accessed through the internet, making them vulnerable targets. The threats aim to steal information, abuse server resources, trick bots/crawlers, or exploit visitors. Proper web security is needed to prevent attacks and protect websites and their users.
Veterans Administration Hacked by foreign orgs, security needs standardizationMichael Holt
The Department of Veterans Affairs database has been hacked by at least eight foreign organizations, including the Chinese military. Testimony revealed an agency struggling to manage security across its vast IT systems, leading to breaches. A former VA information security officer said he encountered 15 years of unattended security vulnerabilities and eight foreign groups had compromised VA networks. The VA is working to standardize security through encryption and monitoring initiatives, but government watchdogs say there is still significant work to be done to protect veterans' sensitive information from unauthorized access.
Colby-Sawyer College faced security challenges from viruses, worms, and malware infecting the systems of its nearly 1,000 students. After widespread infections from viruses like Sasser crippled the network in 2004, the college hired Scott Brown to improve security. Brown deployed QualysGuard for continuous vulnerability scanning to identify and address security issues across the college's decentralized network of student and administrative systems. QualysGuard provided affordable and effective vulnerability management that reduced the college's workload and improved security.
The document discusses emerging cyber threats related to information manipulation, insecure supply chains, and mobile device security. Regarding information manipulation, it describes how attackers can influence search results and news feeds to spread propaganda or censor information. It also discusses how personalization of search results can lead to "filter bubbles" where users are isolated from diverse viewpoints. On supply chain security, it notes the difficulties in detecting compromised hardware and the high costs of securing against such threats. Finally, it outlines growing threats from malicious mobile apps and the need for better patching to fix vulnerabilities on devices.
Ransomware has become the most profitable malware type due to its use of strong encryption. Recent ransomware campaigns have increasingly targeted businesses and entire industries. Attackers now use vulnerabilities in servers and network infrastructure like JBoss to quietly spread ransomware through organizations. This allows them to encrypt large amounts of data and demand high ransom payments. Looking ahead, ransomware is expected to evolve new self-propagation abilities, increasing its impact. Organizations must improve patching of vulnerabilities, backup critical data, and develop incident response plans to address growing ransomware threats.
Lessons learned from 2017 cybersecurity incidents, 2018 and beyondAPNIC
This document discusses lessons learned from major cybersecurity incidents in 2017 and preparations for 2018. It begins with a review of major cyber attacks in 2017, including WannaCry, NotPetya, and data breaches at Equifax and Uber. It then discusses how these incidents could have been prevented through measures like patching systems, using up-to-date antivirus software, and implementing two-factor authentication. The document concludes by recommending best practices for operators to prevent future attacks, such as regular patching, disabling outdated protocols, and implementing awareness programs and security governance processes.
Content Management System Security.
How to secure your CMS?
Common rules:
+ Choose your CMS with both functionality and security in mind
+ Update with urgency
+ Use a strong password (admin dashboard access, database users, etc.)
+ Have a firewall in place (detect or prevent suspicious requests)
+ Keep track of the changes to your site and their source code
+ Give the user permissions (and their levels of access) a lot of thought
+ Limit the type of files to non-executables and monitor them closely
+ Backup your CMS (daily backups of your files and databases)
+ Uninstall plugins you do not use or trust.
This document discusses software security vulnerability analysis, with a focus on SQL injection vulnerabilities. It provides an overview of common web application vulnerabilities, describes the state of SQL injection and examples of how it works. It also discusses best practices for protecting against SQL injection, such as input validation and using prepared statements. The document examines SQL injection scanning tools and provides examples of their use.
The document discusses common web security threats like cross-site scripting (XSS) and cross-site request forgery (CSRF). It notes that over half of identity theft cases are internal and that the web remains vulnerable. The document recommends ways to prevent XSS like sanitizing user input and using nonces to prevent CSRF. Additional resources are provided for further information on XSS and CSRF.
AppSecUSA 2016: 'Your License for Bug Hunting Season'bugcrowd
You don’t need a license for bug hunting season anymore. Bug bounty programs are becoming well established as a valuable tool in identifying vulnerabilities early. The Department of Defense has authorized its first bug bounty program, and many vendors are taking a fresh look. While the programs are highly effective, many questions remain about how to structure bug bounty programs to address the concerns that vendors and researchers have about controlling bug hunters, security and privacy, contractual issues with bug hunters, what happens if there is a rogue hacker in the crowd, and liability and compliance concerns. This presentation will cover the best practices for structuring effective bug bounty programs.
Talk originally given at AppSecUSA 2016 | October 13, 2016
Penetration testing is a field which has experienced rapid growth over the yearsGregory Hanis
Sockstress is a denial of service attack that consumes server resources by opening many TCP connections. It was introduced in 2008 and targets vulnerabilities in how TCP handles connections. While tools exist to detect and prevent Sockstress, it remains a potential threat. The attack can be performed by one machine or multiple zombies to mask the source. Defenses include limiting connections per IP and dropping those with zero window responses. Monitoring server resources like RAM usage can also help detect Sockstress attacks. Penetration testing is needed to identify vulnerabilities like this and prove due diligence for organizations.
Bug Bounty Tipping Point: Strength in Numbersbugcrowd
Recorded on September 21, 2016, Casey Ellis, Bugcrowd CEO and Kymberlee Price, Sr. Director of Researcher Operations, explore current trends in the bug bounty market.
This document proposes a methodology to provide web security through web crawling and web sense. It involves maintaining a user browser history log table to track user activities online, rather than blocking sites based only on keywords. It also involves a configuration table with limits per user on daily internet usage based on their level/position. When a user visits a site, web sense monitors their activity, checks the log and configuration tables, and can block the user if they exceed the limits or access restricted sites. This aims to prevent illegal access while allowing access to sites that happen to contain blocked keywords but are not related to the restricted topic.
A cooperative immunization system for an untrusting internetUltraUploader
This document proposes a cooperative immunization system where nodes work together to defend against computer viruses and worms. It presents an algorithm called COVERAGE that has nodes share information about observed infection rates. Based on this shared information, each node probabilistically determines which viruses to respond to. Simulations show COVERAGE is more effective against viruses and more robust against malicious participants compared to existing approaches.
There have been reports such as ‘there is high rate of web application vulnerability’ as well as a range of ways in which web hackers attack web applications. Since the discovery that web applications convey the best content to users, there have been attempts to determine ways in which these systems can be hacked into through defacing, damage and defrauding. As the culture of conveying information across the internet continues to gain ground, there are increasing cases of vulnerabilities of these sites to cyber criminals.
This document proposes and evaluates a statistical approach to classify user login attempts as normal or suspicious based on multiple parameters. It aims to strengthen password-based authentication without changing user behavior. The key points are:
(1) It develops a statistical framework to identify suspicious login attempts based on features like source IP, location, browser, and time. This allows imposing additional verification steps only on suspicious attempts.
(2) It prototypes the system and evaluates it on real login data, finding it can prevent the majority of attacks while imposing additional friction on a small fraction of users.
(3) It considers potential attacks against the classifier and evaluates the system's resistance through experiments simulating attacks.
Significant factors for Detecting Redirection Spamijtsrd
This document discusses significant factors for detecting redirection spam. Redirection spam refers to techniques where users are redirected through multiple domains and pages until reaching a compromised page. The document reviews related work on redirection spam detection and identifies new factors that could help detect malicious redirections more accurately. These factors include the number of domains and script-generated redirections visited, the number of redirection hops, the delay in page refresh times, the HTTP status codes which indicate redirection, and the use of iframes. The identified factors provide criteria to design more robust approaches for detecting redirection spam.
IJRET : International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology is an international peer reviewed, online journal published by eSAT Publishing House for the enhancement of research in various disciplines of Engineering and Technology. The aim and scope of the journal is to provide an academic medium and an important reference for the advancement and dissemination of research results that support high-level learning, teaching and research in the fields of Engineering and Technology. We bring together Scientists, Academician, Field Engineers, Scholars and Students of related fields of Engineering and Technology.
Research Article On Web Application SecuritySaadSaif6
This Is The Totally Hand Written Research Article On
Web Application Security
(Improving Critical Web-based Applications Quality Through In depth Security Analysis)
This Research Article Was Made By Me After The Hard Working Of One Month. Its Best And Suitable For Your Research Paper And Also Used In Class For Present It And For Submission.
Johnson County Community College Cyber Security: A Brief Overview for Programmers by David Chaponniere discusses cyber security threats facing programmers as more devices connect to the internet. It outlines common attacks like phishing, use of vulnerable components, and cross-site scripting. The document recommends programmers prevent attacks through continuous education on latest threats, keeping code updated, testing for security flaws, and restricting access to sensitive code. With billions more devices expected to connect by 2020, protecting user privacy and data from attacks will be vital for technology to safely enhance daily life.
Want to know how to secure your web apps from cyber-attacks? Looking to know the Best Web Application Security Best Practices? Check this article, we delve into six essential web application security best practices that are important for safeguarding your web applications and preserving the sanctity of your valuable data.
The document discusses the development of a browser extension to detect phishing URLs. It proposes using machine learning models trained on datasets of legitimate and phishing websites to classify URLs in real time. The extension will analyze features of URLs like those in the address bar, for abnormalities, and in HTML/JavaScript to identify phishing sites. The project uses an iterative development process over 10 weeks to create a Chrome extension that complies with guidelines and notifies users of detected phishing URLs. It concludes the system can handle new attack methods and recommends expanding it to be cross-platform and take online user reports to improve accuracy.
Now a day’s risk of becoming a victim of spam and phishing attacks increases while accessing Internet. Many Web
sites exhibit violent and illegal content. Most of users are now unable to protect their networks and themselves also. However,
some countries have deployed systems for filtering the Web content. Since, the existing systems show high latency and overblocking.
Thus, an efficient method for Web filtering concept to protect users at the Internet service provider level is
presented. The proposed solution can detect and block illegal and threatening Web sites. The suggested scalable softwarebased
approach can examine Internet domains in wire speed without over-blocking. The Web filter serves as security measure
for all connected users, especially for users with limited IT expert knowledge. This solution is totally transparent to all
Network devices in the network. Setup, installation and maintenance can be created only by the Internet Service provider
administrator. So, the suggested security system is safe from attacks from users and from the network side.
The document proposes a ransomware protection method called "Hiding in the Crowd" that protects critical files from ransomware attacks by applying a camouflage and hiding strategy. The method hides files in directories that ransomware typically avoids encrypting and uses link files to allow convenient access to hidden files. The authors enhance the security of the method by implementing an encrypted database and linker to avoid exposing information about hidden files. Experiments show the method successfully protects files against real-world ransomware samples in a cost-effective manner.
With cybercrime (like denial of service, malware, phishing, and SQL injection) looming large in our digitized world, penetration testing - and code and application level security testing (SAST and DAST) - are essential for organizations to identify security loopholes in applications and beyond. We provide a guide to the salient standards and techniques for full-spectrum testing to safeguard your data - and reputation.
This document outlines a presentation on detecting phishing websites using machine learning. The goals of the project are to develop a machine learning model to identify phishing URLs and integrate it into a web application. It will discuss collecting and preprocessing data, selecting machine learning algorithms, developing the web app, and addressing challenges with existing phishing detection techniques. The project aims to help reduce online theft and educate users on phishing risks and countermeasures.
10 Ways For Mitigating Cybersecurity Risks In Project Management.docxyoroflowproduct
Each strategy discussed here will focus on a specific aspect of project management that can be vulnerable to cyber threats. From establishing strong access controls and user authentication mechanisms to ensuring regular data backups and robust incident response plans, these strategies will provide project managers with practical steps to enhance their project’s cybersecurity posture.
Take the first step today by requesting a demo of the Yoroproject, enabling you to proactively protect your business against cyber threats.
Ransomware has become the most profitable malware type due to its use of strong encryption that victims cannot easily decrypt. It is dominated by ransomware paid in bitcoin, which allows anonymous payments. Recent ransomware campaigns have targeted vulnerabilities in enterprise application software like JBoss to quietly encrypt networks. This threatens entire industries if left unpatched. While paying the ransom may decrypt files, there are risks of data loss, tampering or reinfection. Ransomware is expected to evolve further to propagate itself for even greater profitability. Organizations must back up critical data and prepare incident response plans.
This document provides an overview of a presentation on cyber security user access pitfalls. It discusses why user access is an important topic, highlighting that insider threats can pose a big risk. It also covers IT security standards, the high costs of data breaches, principles of least privilege access and problems with passwords. Specific examples of data breaches at Cox Communications and Sony Pictures are also summarized, highlighting lessons learned about securing systems and user access.
A Deep Learning Technique for Web Phishing Detection Combined URL Features an...IJCNCJournal
The most popular way to deceive online users nowadays is phishing. Consequently, to increase cybersecurity, more efficient web page phishing detection mechanisms are needed. In this paper, we propose an approach that rely on websites image and URL to deals with the issue of phishing website recognition as a classification challenge. Our model uses webpage URLs and images to detect a phishing attack using convolution neural networks (CNNs) to extract the most important features of website images and URLs and then classifies them into benign and phishing pages. The accuracy rate of the results of the experiment was 99.67%, proving the effectiveness of the proposed model in detecting a web phishing attack.
The document summarizes a cyberthreat report from April 2015. It discusses the growing risk of data breaches and malware attacks targeting businesses. Specifically, it highlights attacks targeting healthcare organizations for their valuable personal data, and the increasing use of web malware and macro malware to infiltrate enterprise networks. It provides statistics on prevalent web threats in Q1 2015 like exploit kits and malware focused on generating revenue through hijacking and scams. It emphasizes the ongoing challenge for IT administrators to keep security software updated on all systems to prevent exploits of known vulnerabilities.
Unit III AssessmentQuestion 1 1. Compare and contrast two.docxmarilucorr
Unit III Assessment:
Question 1
1. Compare and contrast two learning theories. Which one do you believe is most effective? Why?
Your response should be at least 200 words in length.
Question 2
1. Explain how practice helps learning. Give examples of how this has helped you.
Your response should be at least 200 words in length.
Running head: RANSOMWARE ATTACK 1
RANSOMWARE ATTACK 2
Situational Report on Ransomware Attack
Name
Institution
Date
Ransomware Attack-Situational Report
The current attack involves ransomware located inside the organizational network. The ransomware attacker has also raised the demand to $5000 in Bitcoin per nation-state. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin present significant challenges and has widespread financial implications. The malware was zipped and protected with a password. The affected hosts had executable files and also malicious artifacts. The malware dropped some items in the database. The malware also had to write privileges as it uploaded some files to the webserver (Johnson, Badger, Waltermire Snyder & Skorupka, 2016). The malware also retrieved some files from the server using the “GET” HTTP request. The file hash and requested passed onto the urls indicate a breach of security.
Security Incident Report / SITREP #2017-Month-Report#
Incident Detector’s Information
Date/Time of Report
15/02/2018 1.40 p.m.
First Name
Amanda
Last Name
Smith
OPDIV
Avitel/Information Security
Title/Position
System Analyst
Work Email Address
[email protected]
Contact Phone Numbers
Work 321-527-4477
Government Mobile
Government Pager
Other
Reported Incident Information
Initial Report Filed With (Name, Organization)
CISO, Avitel Analysts
Start Date/Time
15/02/2018
Incident Location
HR Office
Incident Point of Contact (if different than above)
Internal Ransomware
Priority
Level 2
Possible Violation of ISO/IEC 27002:2013
YES ISO/IEC 27002
Privacy Information - ISO 27000 (Country Privacy Act Law)
The incident violated ISO 27000. The attack is an indication of failure in the state of the corporate network or existing security policies.
The target suffered adversely by limiting the conference participants from accessing the network resources. The violation was intentional.
Incident Type
Alteration of information from the server. There are database queries indicating that the attack involved modifying some entries in the database.
US-CERT Category
Ransomware/ Unauthorized Access
CERT Submission Number, where it exists
The ransomware attack can be reported to the CCIRC Canadian Cyber Incidence Response Centre Team for an appropriate response to the incident.
Description
The ransomware makes it quite difficult to guess the password unless the conference participants pay the demanded amount. The Crypto-ransomware locks the system unless the system is unlocked via the password.
1. User asked to update links
2. User disables security controls
3. Malware opens a command prompt
4. The script u ...
Intelligent Web Crawling (WI-IAT 2013 Tutorial)Denis Shestakov
<<< Slides can be found at http://www.slideshare.net/denshe/intelligent-crawling-shestakovwiiat13 >>>
-------------------
Web crawling, a process of collecting web pages in
an automated manner, is the primary and ubiquitous operation used by a large number of web systems and agents starting from a simple program for website backup to a major web search engine. Due to an astronomical amount of data already published on the Web and ongoing exponential growth of web content, any party that want to take advantage of massive-scale web data faces a high barrier to entry. We start with background on web crawling and the structure of the Web. We then discuss different crawling strategies and describe adaptive web crawling techniques leading to better overall crawl performance. We finally overview some of the challenges in web crawling by presenting such topics as collaborative web crawling, crawling the deep Web and crawling multimedia content. Our goals are to introduce the intelligent systems community to the challenges in web crawling research, present intelligent web crawling approaches, and engage researchers and practitioners for open issues and research problems. Our presentation could be of interest to web intelligence and intelligent agent technology communities as it particularly focuses on the usage of intelligent/adaptive techniques in the web crawling domain.
-------------------
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Webmasterbreach
1. Remedying Web Hijacking: Notification
Effectiveness and Webmaster Comprehension
Frank Li
†
Grant Ho
†
Eric Kuan Yuan Niu
Lucas Ballard Kurt Thomas Elie Bursztein Vern Paxson
†∗
{frankli, grantho, vern}@cs.berkeley.edu {erickuan, niu, lucasballard, kurtthomas, elieb}@google.com
†
University of California, Berkeley Google Inc.
∗
International Computer Science Institute
ABSTRACT
As miscreants routinely hijack thousands of vulnerable web servers
weekly for cheap hosting and traffic acquisition, security services
have turned to notifications both to alert webmasters of ongoing in-
cidents as well as to expedite recovery. In this work we present the
first large-scale measurement study on the effectiveness of combi-
nations of browser, search, and direct webmaster notifications at
reducing the duration a site remains compromised. Our study cap-
tures the life cycle of 760,935 hijacking incidents from July, 2014–
June, 2015, as identified by Google Safe Browsing and Search
Quality. We observe that direct communication with webmasters
increases the likelihood of cleanup by over 50% and reduces infec-
tion lengths by at least 62%. Absent this open channel for com-
munication, we find browser interstitials—while intended to alert
visitors to potentially harmful content—correlate with faster reme-
diation. As part of our study, we also explore whether webmas-
ters exhibit the necessary technical expertise to address hijacking
incidents. Based on appeal logs where webmasters alert Google
that their site is no longer compromised, we find 80% of operators
successfully clean up symptoms on their first appeal. However, a
sizeable fraction of site owners do not address the root cause of
compromise, with over 12% of sites falling victim to a new attack
within 30 days. We distill these findings into a set of recommen-
dations for improving web security and best practices for webmas-
ters.
1. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of web threats such as drive-by downloads,
cloaked redirects, and scams stems in part from miscreants infect-
ing and subverting control of vulnerable web servers. One strategy
to protect users from this dangerous content is to present a warning
that redirects a client’s browser to safer pastures. Examples include
Safe Browsing integration with Chrome, Firefox, and Safari that
each week alerts over 10 million clients of unsafe webpages [11];
Google Search labeling hacked websites in search results [13]; and
Facebook and Twitter preventing users from clicking through mali-
Copyright is held by the International World Wide Web Conference Com-
mittee (IW3C2). IW3C2 reserves the right to provide a hyperlink to the
author’s site if the Material is used in electronic media.
WWW 2016, April 11–15, 2016, Montréal, Québec, Canada.
ACM 978-1-4503-4143-1/16/04.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2872427.2883039.
cious URLs [16,23]. While effective at reducing traffic to malicious
pages, this user-centric prioritization ignores long-term webmaster
cleanup, relegating infected pages to a dark corner of the Internet
until site operators notice and take action.
To facilitate remediation as a key step in the life-cycle of an in-
fection, security services have turned to notifications as a tool to
alert site operators of ongoing exploits or vulnerable software. This
new emphasis on webmaster hygiene mitigates the risks associated
with users clicking through security indicators [2]. Examples from
the research community include emailing webmasters of hijacked
properties [5, 24] or alerting servers vulnerable to Heartbleed and
DDoS amplification [6,17]. While these studies show that notifying
webmasters of hijacked or at-risk properties expedites remediation,
a question remains as to the best approach to reach webmasters and
whether they comprehend the situation at hand. This comprehen-
sion is critical: while browser warnings can overcome the lack of
security expertise among users via “opinionated" designs that use
visual cues to steer a user’s course of action to safe outcomes [8],
that same luxury does not exist for notifications, where webmasters
must be savvy enough to contend with a security incident, or reach
out to someone who can.
In this work, we present the first large-scale measurement study
on the effectiveness of notifications at inducing quick recovery
from website hijacking. As part of our study, we explore: (1) how
various notification techniques and external factors influence the
duration of compromise; (2) whether site operators can compre-
hend and address security threats; and (3) the likelihood that pre-
viously exploited websites quickly fall victim again. To conduct
our study, we rely on an 11-month dataset from July, 2014–June,
2015 of 760,935 hijacking incidents as identified by Safe Brows-
ing (drive-bys) and Google Search Quality (blackhat SEO). Each
of these incidents triggers a combination of an interstitial browser
warning, a search result warning, or a direct email notification that
alerts webmasters to hijacked properties with concrete examples of
injected code.
We find that 59.5% of alerted sites redress infections by the end
of our data collection window, with infections persisting for a me-
dian of two months. Breaking down this aggregate behavior, we
find Safe Browsing interstitials, paired with search warnings that
“this site may contain harmful content”, result in 54.6% of sites
cleaning up, compared to 43.4% of sites flagged with a search
warning alone. Above all, direct contact with webmasters increases
the likelihood of remediation to over 75%. We observe multiple
other influential factors: webmasters are far more efficient at clean-
ing up harmful content localized to a single directory compared to
systemic infections that impact every page on a site; while popular
2. sites (as captured by search ranking) are three times more likely to
clean up in 14 days compared to unpopular sites. Our results illus-
trate that webmasters benefit significantly from detailed, external
security alerts, but that major gaps exist between the capabilities of
small websites and major institutions.
To better understand the impact of webmaster comprehension
on overall remediation, we decouple the period before webmas-
ters receive a notification from the time spent cleaning a site. We
capture this behavior based on appeals logs that detail when web-
masters request Google to remove hijacking warnings from their
site, a request verified by a human analyst or crawler. We find that
80% of site operators successfully clean up on their first appeal at-
tempt. The remaining 20% require multiple appeals, spending a
median of one week purging attacker code. Equally problematic,
many site operators appear to address only symptoms rather than
the root cause of compromise: 12% of sites fall victim to hijacking
again within 30 days, with 10% and 20% of re-infections occurring
within one day for Safe Browsing and Search Quality respectively.
We distill these pain points into a path forward for improving reme-
diation. In the process, we highlight the tension between protecting
users and webmasters and the decentralized responsibilities of In-
ternet security that ultimately confound recovery.
In summary, we frame our key contributions as follows:
• We present the first large-scale study on the impact of diverse
notification strategies on the outcome of 760,935 hijacking
incidents.
• We model infection duration, finding that notification tech-
niques outweigh site popularity or webmaster knowledge as
the most influential factor for expediting recovery.
• We find that some webmasters struggle with the remedia-
tion process, with over 12% of sites falling victim to re-
compromise in 30 days.
• We present a path forward for helping webmasters recover
and the pitfalls therein.
2. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
Web services rely on notifications to alert site operators to se-
curity events after a breach occurs. In this study, we focus specif-
ically on website compromise, but notifications extend to account
hijacking and credit card fraud among other abuse. We distinguish
notifications from warnings where visitors are directed away from
unsafe sites or decisions (e.g., installing an unsigned binary). With
warnings, there is a path back to safety and minimal technical ex-
pertise is required; breaches lack this luxury and require a more
complex remedy that can only be addressed by site operators. We
outline approaches for identifying compromise and prior evalua-
tions on notification effectiveness.
2.1 Detecting Compromise
As a precursor to notification, web services must first detect
compromise. The dominant research strategy has been to iden-
tify side-effects injected by an attacker. For example, Provos et
al. detected hacked websites serving drive-by downloads based on
spawned processes [18]; Wang et al. detected suspicious redirects
introduced by blackhat cloaking [26]; and Borgolte detected com-
mon symptoms of defacement [3]. These same strategies extend
beyond the web arena to detecting account hijacking, where prior
work relied on identifying anomalous usage patterns or wide-scale
collusion [7, 22]. More recently, Vasek et al. examined factors
that influenced the likelihood of compromise, including the serving
platform (e.g., nginx) and content management system (e.g., Word-
press) [25]. They found that sites operating popular platforms such
as Wordpress, Joomla, and Drupal faced an increased risk of be-
coming compromised, primarily because miscreants focused their
efforts on exploits that impacted the largest market share. Soska
et al. extended this idea by clustering websites running the same
version of content management systems in order to predict likely
outbreaks of compromise [19]. We sidestep the issue of detection,
instead relying on a feed of known compromised pages involved in
drive-bys, spam, or cloaking (§ 3).
2.2 Webmaster Perspective of Compromise
Given a wealth of techniques to detect compromise, the pre-
eminent challenge that remains is how best to alert webmasters
to security breaches, assuming webmasters are incapable of run-
ning detection locally. StopBadware and CommTouch surveyed
over 600 webmasters of compromised websites to understand their
process for detecting compromise and remedying infection [21].
They found that only 6% of webmasters discovered an infection
via proactive monitoring for suspicious activity. In contrast, 49%
of webmasters learned about the compromise when they received a
browser warning while attempting to view their own site; another
35% found out through other third-party reporting channels, such
as contact from their web hosting provider or a notification from a
colleague or friend who received a browser warning.
Equally problematic, webmasters rarely receive support from
their web hosting providers. Canali et al. created vulnerable web-
sites on 22 hosting providers and ran a series of five attacks that
simulated infections on each of these websites over 25 days [4].
Within that 25-day window, they found that only one hosting
provider contacted them about a potential compromise of their
website, even though the infections they induced were detectable
by free, publicly-available tools. Similarly, the StopBadware and
CommTouch study found that 46% of site operators cleaned up
infections themselves, while another 20% reached out for profes-
sional help [21]. Only 34% of webmasters had the option of free
help from their hosting provider (irrespective of using it). These
two studies provide qualitative evidence of the struggles currently
facing webmasters and the potential value of third-party notifica-
tions.
2.3 Measuring the Impact of Notifications
A multitude of studies previously explored the impact of notifi-
cations on the likelihood and time frame of remediation. Vasek et
al. examined the impact of sending malware reports to 161 infected
websites [24]. They emailed each site’s owner (either via man-
ual identification or WHOIS information) and found 32% of sites
cleaned up within a day of notification, compared to 13% of sites
that were not notified. Cleanup was further improved by providing
webmasters with a detailed report on the infection type. Cetin et al.
extended this approach and found that the reputation of the sender,
not just the notification content, may also have some impact on
cleanup times [5]. They emailed the WHOIS contact of 60 infected
sites, with the From field indicating an individual researcher (low
reputation), university group, or anti-malware organization (high
reputation). They found 81% of sites that received a high reputa-
tion notifications cleaned up in 16 days, compared to 70% of sites
receiving low reputation notifications, though these results failed to
repeat for a separate set of 180 websites.
On a larger scale, Durumeric et al. conducted an Internet-
wide scan to identify 212,805 public servers vulnerable to Heart-
bleed [6]. They reached out to 4,648 WHOIS abuse contacts and
found 39.5% of notified operators cleaned up in 8 days compared
3. Figure 1: Google’s hijacking notification systems. Safe Brows-
ing and Search Quality each detect and flag hijacked websites (–).
From there, Safe Browsing shows a browser interstitial and emails
WHOIS admins, while both Safe Browsing and Search Quality flag
URLs in Google Search with a warning message (—). Additionally,
if the site’s owner has a Search Console account, a direct notifica-
tion alerts the webmaster of the ongoing incident. The hijacking
flag is removed if an automatic re-check determines the site is no
longer compromised. Webmasters can also manually trigger this
re-check via Search Console (˜).
to 26.8% of unnotified operators. Similarly, Kührer et al. identi-
fied over 9 million NTP amplifiers that attackers could exploit for
DDoS and relied on a public advisory via MITRE, CERT-CC, and
PSIRT to reach administrators. After one year, they found the num-
ber of amplifiers decreased by 33.9%, though lacked a control to
understand the precise impact of notification. Each of these studies
established that notifications decrease the duration of infections. In
our work, we explore a critical next step: whether combinations of
notifications and warnings reach a wider audience and ultimately
improve remediation.
3. METHODOLOGY
Our study builds on data gathered from two unique production
pipelines that detect and notify webmasters about compromise:
Safe Browsing, which covers drive-by attacks [18]; and Search
Quality, which protects against scams and cloaked gateways that
might otherwise pollute Google Search [9]. We describe each
pipeline’s detection technique, the subsequent notification signals
sent, and how each system determines when webmasters clean up.
A high level description of this process appears in Figure 1. We
note that our measurements rely on in situ data collection; we can-
not modify the system in any way, requiring that we thoroughly
account for any potential biases or limitations. We provide a break-
down of our final dataset in Table 1, collected over a time frame of
11 months from July 15th, 2014–June 1st, 2015.
3.1 Compromised Sites
When Safe Browsing or Search Quality detect a page hosting
harmful or scam content, they set a flag that subsequently trig-
gers both notifications and warnings. We group flags on the level
Dataset Safe Browsing Search Quality
Time frame 7/15/14–6/1/15 7/15/14–6/1/15
Hijacked websites 313,190 266,742
Hijacking incidents 336,122 424,813
Search console alerts 51,426 88,392
WHOIS emails 336,122 0
Webmaster appeals 124,370 48,262
Table 1: Summary of dataset used to evaluate notification effec-
tiveness and webmaster comprehension.
of registered domains (e.g., example.com), with the exception of
shared web hosting sites, where we consider flags operating on sub-
domains (e.g., example.blogspot.com). Both Safe Browsing and
Search Quality distinguish purely malicious pages from compro-
mised sites based on whether a site previously hosted legitimate
content; we restrict all analysis to compromised sites. For the pur-
poses of our study, we denote a hijacked website as any registered
or shared domain that miscreants compromise. We use the term hi-
jacking incident to qualify an individual attack: if miscreants sub-
vert multiple pages on a website, we treat it as a single incident
up until Safe Browsing or Search Quality verify the site is cleaned
(discussed in § 3.3).1
We treat any subsequent appearance of mali-
cious content as a new hijacking incident.
As detailed in Table 1, we observe a total of 760,935 such inci-
dents, with the weekly breakdown of new incidents shown in Fig-
ure 2. Our dataset demonstrates that miscreants routinely compro-
mise new websites, with a median of 8,987 new sites detected by
Search Quality and 5,802 sites by Safe Browsing each week. We
also find evidence of rare, large-scale outbreaks of compromise that
impact over 30,000 sites simultaneously.
We caution that our dataset is biased to hijacking threats known
to Google and is by no means exhaustive. From periodic manual re-
views performed by Google analysts of a random sample of hijack-
ing incidents, we estimate the false positive rates of both pipelines
to be near zero, though false negatives remain unknown. That said,
our dataset arguably provides a representative cross-section of hi-
jacked webpages around the globe. We provide a detailed demo-
graphic breakdown later in § 4.
3.2 Notification Mechanisms
Safe Browsing and Search Quality each rely on a distinct combi-
nation of notification and warning mechanisms to alert webmasters
either directly or indirectly of hijacking incidents. We detail each
of the possible combinations in Figure 1, spanning browser inter-
stitials, search page warnings, webmaster help tools (called Search
Console), and WHOIS emails. For all of these notification mecha-
nisms, we lack visibility into whether webmasters observe the alert
(e.g., received and read a message or viewed a browser interstitial).
As such, when we measure the effectiveness of notifications, we
couple both the distribution of the signal and the subsequent web-
master response.
Browser Interstitials: Safe Browsing reports all compromised
websites to Chrome, Safari, and Firefox users that opt for secu-
rity warnings. While browser interstitials primarily serve to warn
visitors of drive-by pages that cause harm, they also serve as an
indirect alerting mechanism to site owners: webmasters (or their
1
In the event multiple attackers compromise the same site simul-
taneously, we will mistakenly conflate the symptoms as a single
hijacking incident.
4. q
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20,000
30,000
Oct Jan Apr
Weeklyhijackingincidents
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Figure 2: Weekly breakdown of new website hijacking incidents as
detected by Safe Browsing (drive-bys) and Search Quality (scams,
blackhat SEO, cloaking).
peers) that encounter warnings for their compromised sites can take
action. However, this approach lacks diagnostic information about
how exactly to clean up the infection.
Search Result Annotation: Compromised sites detected by
Search Quality receive an annotation in search result pages with a
warning “This site may be hacked” [13]. Similarly, sites identified
by Safe Browsing all receive a flag “This site may harm your com-
puter” [14]. Additionally, sites may lose search ranking. As with
browser interstitials, these modifications primarily serve to protect
inbound visitors, but also serve as an indirect channel for alerting
webmasters of compromise.
Search Console Alerts: Both Safe Browsing and Search Quality
provide concrete details about infected pages, examples, and tips
for remediation via Google’s Search Console [12]. Only webmas-
ters who register with Search Console can view this information.
Notifications come in the form of alerts on Search Console as well
as a single message to the webmaster’s personal email address (pro-
vided during registration). This approach alleviates some of the
uncertainty of whether contacting the WHOIS abuse@ will reach
the site operator. One caveat is that a Search Console notification is
sent only if the Safe Browsing or Search Quality algorithm is con-
figured to do so.2
This behavior results in the absence of a Search
Console alert for some hijacking incidents, which we use as a nat-
ural control to measure their effectiveness.
Of hijacking incidents identified by Search Quality, 95,095
(22%) were sites where webmasters had registered with Search
Console prior to infection. The same is true for 107,581 (32%)
of Safe Browsing hijacking incidents. Of these, 48% of incidents
flagged by Safe Browsing triggered a Search Console alert, as did
93% of incidents identified by Search Quality. Because notified
and unnotified sites are flagged by different detection subsystems,
differences in the subsystems may result in a biased control pop-
ulation. However, the bias is likely modest since the differences
in detection approaches are fairly subtle compared to the overall
nature of the compromise.
WHOIS Email: In an attempt to contact a wider audience, Safe
Browsing also emails the WHOIS admin associated with each com-
promised site. Since Safe Browsing simultaneously displays warn-
ings via browser interstitials and search, we can only measure the
aggregate impact of both techniques on notification effectiveness.
2
Each detection pipeline combines a multitude of algorithms, of
which the majority also generate Search Console alerts.
3.3 Appeals & Cleanup
Safe Browsing and Search Quality automatically detect when
websites clean up by periodically scanning pages for symptoms of
compromise until they are no longer present. This approach is lim-
ited by the re-scan rate of both pipelines. For Safe Browsing, sites
are eligible for re-scans 14 days after their previous scan. This met-
ric provides an accurate signal on the eventual fate of a hijacking
incident, but leaves a coarse window of about 14 days during which
a site may clean up but will not be immediately flagged as such.
Search Quality reassesses symptoms each time Google’s crawler
revisits the page, enabling much finer-grained analysis windows.
As an alternative, both Safe Browsing and Search Quality pro-
vide a tool via Search Console where webmasters can appeal warn-
ings tied to their site. Safe Browsing webmasters have an additional
channel of appealing through StopBadware [20], which submits re-
quests for site review to Safe Browsing on behalf of the webmas-
ters who chose not to register with Search Console. The appeals
process signals when webmasters believe their pages are cleaned,
which analysts at Google (Search Quality) or automated re-scans
(Safe Browsing) subsequently confirm or reject. We use this dataset
both to measure the duration of compromise as well as the capabil-
ity of webmasters to clean up effectively, as captured by repeatedly
rejected appeals.
3.4 Limitations
We highlight and reiterate five limitations tied to our dataset.
First, as a natural experiment our study lacks a true control: the
systems under analysis notify all webmasters, where Google’s poli-
cies arbitrate the extent of the notification. For example, browser
interstitials are only shown for threats that may put site visitors
at risk, namely Safe Browsing sites. Webmaster notifications via
Search Console are sent only when a webmaster has registered
for Search Console and the specific detection pipeline is integrated
with the Search Console messaging platform. As such, we restrict
our study to comparing the relative effectiveness of various notifi-
cation approaches; previous studies have already demonstrated the
value of notifications over a control [5,6,24]. Second, our coverage
of hijacked websites is biased towards threats caught by Google’s
pipelines, though we still capture a sample size of 760,935 inci-
dents, the largest studied to date. Third, when victims are notified,
we lack visibility into whether the intended recipient witnesses the
alerts. As such, when we measure the impact of notifications, we
are measuring both the distribution of alerts and the ability of web-
masters to take action. Fourth, the granularity at which we measure
cleanup is not always per-day, but may span multiple days before
a site is rechecked. This may cause us to overestimate the time a
site remains compromised. We specifically evaluate compromise
incidents as continuous blacklisting intervals. Finally, our study
is not universally reproducible as we rely on a proprietary dataset.
However, given the scale and breadth of compromised websites and
notifications we analyze, we believe the insights gained are gener-
alizable.
4. WEBSITE DEMOGRAPHICS
As a precursor to our study, we provide a demographic break-
down of websites (e.g., domains) that fall victim to hijacking and
compare it against a random sample of 100,000 non-spam sites in-
dexed by Google Search. All of the features we explore originate
from Googlebot, Google’s search crawler [10]. We find that com-
promise affects webpages of all age, language, and search ranking,
with attackers disproportionately breaching small websites over
major institutions. We also observe biases in the sites that mis-
creants re-purpose for exploits versus scams and cloaked gateways.
5. (a) Site Age (b) Page Count (c) Search Rankings
Figure 3: Demographic breakdowns of sites flagged as hijacked by Safe Browsing and Search Quality.
Site Age: We estimate the age of a site as the time between Google-
bot’s first visit and the conclusion of our study in June, 2015. We
detail our results in Figure 3a. We find over 85% of Search Quality
sites are at least two years old at the time of compromise, compared
to 71% of Safe Browsing sites. Our results indicate that sites falling
victim to compromise skew towards newer properties compared to
the general population, more so for Safe Browsing.
Page Count: We estimate a site’s size as the total number of pages
per domain indexed by Googlebot at the conclusion of our study.
In the event a site was hijacked, we restrict this calculation to the
number of pages at the onset of compromise so as not to conflate
a proliferation of scam offers with prior legitimate content. Fig-
ure 3b shows a breakdown of pages per domain. Overall, if we
consider the volume of content as a proxy metric of complexity, we
observe that hijacking skews towards smaller, simpler sites com-
pared to larger properties run by major institutions.
Search Page Rankings: The search result ranking of a site repre-
sents a site’s popularity, as captured by a multitude of factors in-
cluding page rank and query relevance. We plot the distribution of
search ranking among sites in Figure 3c. As an alternative metric
to search ranking, we also calculate the Alexa ranking of hijacked
sites. We observe that Search Quality sites skew towards higher
search rankings compared to Safe Browsing, a bias introduced by
cloaking and scam-based attacks targeting sites more likely to draw
in visitors from Google Search. There are limits, however: we
find less than 5% of compromised properties appear in the Alexa
Top Million. Similarly, compared to our random sample, hijack-
ing disproportionately impacts lowly-ranked pages. Overall, 30%
of Search Quality sites and 50% of Safe Browsing sites rank low
enough to receive limited search traction. This suggests that search
result warnings may be ineffective for such properties due to lim-
ited visibility, a factor we explore later in § 5.
Language: For each site, we obtain Googlebot’s estimate of the
site’s primary language, shown in Table 2. We find that miscre-
ants predominantly target English, Russian, and Chinese sites, but
all languages are adversely affected. We observe a substantially
different distribution of languages than the work by Provos et al.,
which studied exclusively malicious properties [18]. Their work
found that miscreants served over 60% of exploits from Chinese
sites and 15% from the United States. This discrepancy re-iterates
that exploit delivery is often a separate function from web compro-
mise, where the latter serves only as a tool for traffic generation.
We observe other examples of this specialization in our dataset:
10% of Safe Browsing incidents affect Chinese sites, compared to
only 1% of Search Quality incidents. Conversely, Search Quality
Language Rnd. Sample Safe Browsing Search Quality
English 35.4% 46.9% 57.6%
Chinese 9.0% 10.0% 1.0%
German 7.2% 4.5% 2.5%
Japanese 6.0% 1.5% 4.6%
Russian 5.6% 9.9% 6.3%
Table 2: Top five languages for a random sample of websites ver-
sus sites falling victim to compromise. We find hijacking dispro-
portionately impacts English, Russian, and Chinese sites.
Software Rnd. Sample Safe Browsing Search Quality
WordPress 47.4% 36.9% 39.6%
Joomla 10.7% 11.6% 20.4%
Drupal 8.3% 1.7% 9.4%
Typo3 3.4% 0.5% 0.9%
Vbulletin 3.3 % 0.8% 0.4%
Discuz 1.0% 7.6% 0.4%
DedeCMS 0.2% 13.9% 1.4%
Table 3: Top five software platforms for hijacked websites and
significant outliers, when detected. We find attacks target all of the
top platforms. We note these annotations exist for only 10–13.8%
of sites per data source.
is far more likely to target English sites. These discrepancies hint
at potential regional biases introduced by the actors behind attacks.
Site Software: Our final site annotation consists of the content
management system (CMS) or forum software that webmasters
serve content from, when applicable. Of hijacked sites, 9.1% from
Safe Browsing and 13.8% from Search Quality include this annota-
tion, compared to 10.3% of sampled sites. We present a breakdown
of this subsample in Table 3. Wordpress and Joomla are both popu-
lar targets of hijacking, though this partly represents each system’s
market share. The popularity of DedeCMS and Discuz among Safe
Browsing sites might be unexpected, but as Chinese platforms, this
accords with the large proportion of Chinese Safe Browsing sites.
Studies have shown that historically attackers prioritize attacking
popular CMS platforms [25].
6. 5. NOTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
We evaluate the effect of browser warnings, search warnings,
and direct communication with webmasters on remediation along
two dimensions: the overall duration a site remains compromised
and the fraction of sites that never clean up, despite best efforts to
alert the respective webmaster. We also consider other influential
factors such as whether symptoms of compromise are localized to
a single page or systemic to an entire site; and whether language
barriers impede effective notification. To avoid bias from web-
masters with prior exposure to infection, we restrict our analysis
to the first incident per site.3
(We explore repeated hijacking inci-
dents later in § 6.) We reiterate that our experiments lack a control,
as outlined in § 3, due to our in situ measurements of a live sys-
tem that always sends at least some form of notification. As such,
we restrict our evaluation to a comparison between notification ap-
proaches and contrast our findings with prior work.
5.1 Aggregate Remediation Outcomes
To start, we explore in aggregate the infection duration of all
websites identified by Safe Browsing and Search Quality. We find
that over our 11-month period, webmasters resolved 59.5% of hi-
jacking incidents. Breaking this down into time windows, 6.6% of
sites cleaned up within a day of detection, 27.9% within two weeks,
and 41.2% within one month. Note that for the single-day cleanup
rate, we exclude Safe Browsing sites that were automatically re-
scanned and de-listed as we have no remediation information until
two weeks after an infection begins. This does not impact manually
appealed Safe Browsing incidents or any Search Quality incidents.
The 40.5% of sites that remain infected at the end of our collection
window have languished in that state for a median of four months,
with 10% of persistent infections dating back over eight months.
Our results indicate a slower remediation rate than observed by
Vasek et al., who found 45% of 45 unnotified hijacked sites and
63% of 53 notified sites cleaned up within 16 days [24].
We recognize these numbers may be biased due webmasters not
having enough time to redress infections occurring towards the tail
end of our collection window. If we repeat the aggregate analysis
only for hijacking incidents with an onset prior to January 1, 2015
(the first half of our dataset), we find the resulting cleanup rate
is 7% higher, or 66.7%. Breaking this down into time windows,
we find only a slight difference compared to our earlier analysis
of the entire dataset: 6.4% of sites cleaned up within a day after
detection, 28.2% within two weeks, and 42.1% within one month.
As such, given an infection that is older than a few months, we find
the likelihood of cleanup in the future tends towards zero.
5.2 Ranking Notification Approaches
We find that notification approaches significantly impact the like-
lihood of remediation. Browser warnings, in conjunction with
a WHOIS email and search warnings, result in 54.6% of sites
cleaning up, compared to 43.4% of sites only flagged in Google
Search as “hacked”. For webmasters that previously registered
with Search Console and received a direct alert, the likelihood of
remediation increases to 82.4% for Safe Browsing and 76.8% for
Search Quality. These results strongly indicate that having an open
channel to webmasters is critical for overall remediation. Further-
more, it appears that browser interstitials (in conjunction with pos-
sible WHOIS email contact) outperform exclusive search warnings.
Assuming the two compromise classes do not differ significantly
3
We filter sites who have appeared on the Safe Browsing or Search
Quality blacklists prior to our collection window. However, note it
may be possible that sites were previously compromised and unde-
tected. This filtering is best effort.
Figure 4: CDFs of the infection duration for Safe Browsing and
Search Quality sites that eventually recover, dependent on whether
they received Search Console messages or not. Direct communica-
tion with webmasters significantly reduces the duration of compro-
mise.
in remediation difficulty, this suggests that browser warnings and
WHOIS emails stand a better chance at reaching webmasters. This
is consistent with our observation in § 4 that the majority of hi-
jacked sites have a low search rank, impeding visibility of search
warnings. Another possible explanation is that browser interstitials
create a stronger incentive to clean up as Safe Browsing outright
blocks visitors, while Search only presents an advisory.
For those sites that do clean up, we present a CDF of infec-
tion duration in Figure 4 split by the notifications sent. We omit
the 37.8% sites that Safe Browsing automatically confirmed as
cleaned from this analysis as we lack data points other than at a
14-day granularity. We note that after 14 days, 8% more man-
ually appealed sites were cleaned compared to automatically ap-
pealed sites, indicating the latter population of site operators clean
up at a slightly slower rate. As with remediation likelihood, we
also observe that direct communication with webmasters decreases
the time attackers retain access to a site. Within 3 days, 50% of
Safe Browsing manually-appealed sites clean up when notified via
Search Console, compared to 8 days in the absence of Search Con-
sole alerts. We observe a similar impact for Search Quality: 50% of
webmasters resolve in 7 days, versus 18 days for unassisted sites.
This indicates that incorporating direct, informative messages ex-
pedites recovery.
5.3 Localized vs. Systemic Infections
Given the positive influence of notifications, an important ques-
tion remains whether the complexity of an infection influences the
time necessary to clean up. While Search Console provides remedi-
ation tips, webmasters may naturally require more support (and de-
tailed reports) to contend with systemic infections. To assess this,
we rely on detailed logs provided by Search Quality on whether
harmful content for hijacked properties was systemic to an entire
site or localized. In particular, Search Quality attempts to catego-
rize incidents into three groups: isolated incidents, where harmful
content appears in a single directory (N=91,472); dispersed inci-
dents that affect multiple URL paths and subdomains (N=21,945);
and redirection incidents, where sites become a gateway to other
harmful landing pages (N=21,627).
Figure 5 provides a breakdown of infection duration by hijacking
symptoms irrespective of whether webmasters received a Search
Console alert. This measurement also includes sites that have yet to
recover. We find that webmasters are both more likely and quicker
7. Figure 5: CDFs of the infection duration for different Search Qual-
ity incidents. We note curves do not reach 100% because we con-
sider the percentage over all sites, including those not yet clean
after 60 days. Cloaking (redirection) and systemic infections (dis-
persed) prove the most difficult for webmasters to contend with.
Language Search Quality Safe Browsing
English 24.7% 29.5%
Chinese 20.1% 2.7%
Russian 19.4% 22.3%
Spanish 24.6% 30.4%
German 22.9% 24.6%
French 20.9% 26.9%
Italian 25.8% 29.1%
Polish 26.4% 28.9%
Portuguese (Brazil) 24.1% 27.6%
Japanese 26.1% 28.2%
Table 4: Top 10 languages and remediation rates for Safe Browsing
and Search Quality, restricted to sites not registered with Search
Console. We find consistent rates despite languages differences,
with the exception of Chinese due to low Safe Browsing usage in
the region.
to clean up isolated incidents. Of all resolved and ongoing iso-
lated incidents, only 50% last longer than 27 days. In contrast,
over 50% of dispersed incidents persist for longer than 60 days.
The most challenging incident type relates to redirect attacks where
sites become cloaked gateways. Of these, only 12% recover within
60 days. One possible explanation for low cleanup behavior is
that redirect-based attacks cloak against site operators, preventing
webmasters from triggering the behavior [26]. Alternatively, redi-
rection attacks require far less code (e.g., .htaccess modification,
JavaScript snippet, meta-header) compared to attackers hosting en-
tirely new pages and directories. As such, it becomes more difficult
for webmasters to detect the modifications. In aggregate, our find-
ings demonstrate that webmasters impacted by systemic or redirect
incidents require far more effort to recover. We discuss potential
aids later in § 7.
5.4 Notification Language
To avoid language barriers and assist victims of a global epi-
demic, Search Console supports over 25 popular languages [1].
We investigate the impact that language translations might have
on recovery speeds, examining sites that received a Search Con-
sole message. Breaking down these hijacking incidents by site lan-
guage reveals only relatively small differences in the fraction of
sites cleaned after two weeks for the ten most popular languages. In
particular, remediation rates vary between 10% for Safe Browsing
and 7% for Search Quality, indicating that the message language
does not drastically influence cleanup.
To evaluate the influence of language for the other notification
vectors, we measure the cleanup rate for non-Search Console reg-
istrants. Table 4 lists the percentage of Search Quality and Safe
Browsing sites recovered after two weeks. For Search Quality, re-
mediation rates range 7%. Excluding Chinese sites, Safe Browsing
sites are also similar, varying between 9%. Thus, language or ge-
ographic biases do not play a major factor for browser interstitials
and search warnings, with the exception of Chinese sites.
Given Chinese sites present an outlier, we explore possible ex-
planations. Despite having the largest Internet population in the
world, China ranks 45th in the number of daily browser intersti-
tials shown, a discrepancy unseen for countries who speak the other
top languages. Since we find a significant number of Chinese sites
serving malware, we argue this discrepancy is due to lagging adop-
tion of Safe Browsing in China, and potentially explains the slow
Chinese remediation rate for Safe Browsing. However, it remains
unclear why Chinese Search Quality sites are comparable to other
languages. As there are popular search alternatives local to China,
Google’s search result warnings may have low visibility. Alter-
natively, it may be possible that Chinese sites flagged by Search
Quality are a different population that those for Safe Browsing; for
example, these may be Chinese language sites with a target audi-
ence outside of China and can benefit from external signals.
5.5 Site Popularity
We correlate a site’s popularity (e.g., search ranking) with 14-
day remediation rates for hijacking incidents. In particular, we sort
sites based on search ranking and then chunk the distribution into
bins of at least size 100, averaging the search ranking per bin and
calculating the median cleanup time per bin. We present our results
in Figure 6. We find more popular sites recover faster across both
Safe Browsing and Search Quality. Multiple factors may influence
this outcome. First, popular sites have a strong incentives to main-
tain site reputation and business. Additionally, with more visitors
and a higher search ranking, it is more likely that a site visitor en-
counters a browser interstitial or search page warning and informs
the webmaster. We find this reaches a limit, with Safe Browsing
and Search Quality cleanup rates converging for search rankings
greater than one million. Finally, site popularity may also reflect
companies with significantly higher resources and more technical
administrators. Regardless the explanation, it is clear that less pop-
ular websites suffer from significantly longer infections compared
to major institutions. As discussed in § 4, these lowly ranked sites
comprise the brunt of hijacked properties.
5.6 Search Console Awareness
Webmasters who proactively register with Search Console may
represent a biased, more savvy population compared to all webmas-
ters. As such, we may conflate the improved performance of Search
Console alerts with confounding variables. As detailed in § 3, not
all hijacking incidents trigger a Search Console alert, even if the site
owner previously registered with the service. We compare the like-
lihood of remediation for this subpopulation against the set of users
who never register with Search Console. After two weeks, 24.5%
of sites registered with Search Console and identified by Search
Quality cleaned up, compared to 21.0% of non-registrants. Sim-
ilarly for Safe Browsing, 28.4% of Search Console sites cleaned
up compared to 24.3% of non-registrants. While Search Console
registrants do react faster, the effect is small relative to the 15-20%
increase in remediation rate from Search Console messaging.
8. Figure 6: The percentages of sites clean after two weeks across
different search rankings. Cleanup rate increases for higher ranked
site, although the increase is stronger for Safe Browsing than
Search Quality, possibly due to browser interstitials being stronger
alert signals.
5.7 Modeling Infection Duration
Given all of the potential factors that impact infection duration,
we build a model to investigate which variables have the strongest
correlation with faster recovery. We consider the following dimen-
sions for each hijacking incident: detection source, Search Console
usage, whether a Search Console message was sent, and all of a
site’s demographic data including age, size, ranking, and language.
For site size and ranking, we use the log base 10. We exclude a
site’s software platform as we lack this annotation for over 86% of
sites. Similarly, we exclude systemic versus localized infection la-
bels as these annotations exist only for Search Quality. Finally, we
train a ridge regression model [15] (with parameter λ = 0.1) using
10-fold cross validation on the first hijacking incident of each site
and its corresponding remediation time, exclusively for sites that
clean up. Ridge regression is a variant of linear regression that ap-
plies a penalty based on the sum of squared weights, where λ is the
penalty factor. This brings the most important features into focus,
reducing the weights of less important features.
Overall, our model exhibits low accuracy, with an average fit
of R2
= 0.24. This arises due to the limited dimensionality
of our data, where sites with identical feature vectors exhibit
significantly different infection durations. Despite the poor fit, we
find Search Console alerts, search ranking, and Search Console
registration exhibit the largest magnitude weights, with weights
of -10.3, -6.1, and -3.3 respectively. This suggests that receiving
a Search Console alert reduces infection lengths by over 10 days
on average, a stronger effect than from other factors. Interpreting
these results, we argue that direct communication with webmasters
is the best path to expedited recovery, while popular websites
naturally benefit from increased warning visibility and potentially
more technically capable webmasters. Conversely, we find other
factors such as the corresponding notification’s language or a site’s
age and number of pages do not correlate with faster recovery. We
caution these are only weak correlations for a model with high
error rate, but as our prior analysis shows, they have the highest
discriminating power at determining the lifetime of an infection.
6. WEBMASTER COMPREHENSION
Webmasters that receive a warning or notification must be tech-
nically savvy enough to contend with the corresponding security
breach, or reach out to a third party that can help. Our dataset pro-
Figure 7: Number of manual appeals per hijacking incident. The
majority of site operators successfully appeal on their first attempt.
vides a lens into three aspects of webmaster comprehension: web-
masters incorrectly requesting the removal of hijacking flags for
their site when symptoms persist; sites repeatedly falling victim to
new hijacking incidents in a short time window; and whether the
duration that a site remains compromised improves after repeated
incidents, a sign of learning over time.
6.1 Cleanup Attempts Before Successful
Both Search Console and Safe Browsing provide webmasters
with a mechanism to manually appeal hijacking flags if webmasters
believe their site is cleaned up. This triggers a re-scan or manual
review by a Google analyst, after which the respective pipeline con-
firms a site is symptom-free or rejects the appeal due to an ongoing
incident. We focus on webmaster-initiated appeals, as opposed to
automated appeals that happen periodically, because the timestamp
of a manual appeal denotes when a webmaster is aware their site is
compromised and is taking action. Overall, 30.7% of Safe Brows-
ing and 11.3% of Search Quality webmasters ever submit a manual
appeal, of which 98.7% and 91.4% were eventually successful.
Figure 7 captures the number of webmaster cleanup attempts per
hijacking incident before a site was verified symptom-free. We find
86% of Safe Browsing sites and 78% of Search Quality sites suc-
cessfully clean up on their first attempt, while 92% of all site op-
erators succeed in cleaning up within two attempts. Our findings
illustrate that webmasters in fact possess the technical capabilities
and resources necessary to address web compromise as well as to
correctly understand when sites are cleaned. However, a small por-
tion of the webmasters struggle to efficiently deal with compro-
mise. For both Safe Browsing and Search Quality, at least 1% of
the webmasters required 5 or more appeals.
For webmasters that fail at least one appeal, we measure the total
time spent in the appeals process in Figure 8. We find the median
Safe Browsing site spends 22 hours cleaning up, compared to 5.6
days for Search Quality. The discrepancy between the two systems
is partially due to Search Quality requiring human review and ap-
proval for each appeal, as opposed to Safe Browsing’s automated
re-scan pipeline. Another factor is the fact that webmasters ad-
dressing Search Quality incidents tend to require more appeals than
Safe Browsing. Our findings illustrate a small fraction of webmas-
ters require a lengthy amount of time to manage their way through
the appeal process, with some still struggling after 2 months. In
the majority of these cases, a long period of time elapses between
subsequent appeals, suggesting that these users do not understand
how to proceed after a failed appeal or they give up temporarily.
9. Figure 8: Total time webmasters spend cleaning up, exclusively for
hijacking incidents where site operators submit multiple appeals.
6.2 Reinfection Rates
After webmasters remedy an infection, an important considera-
tion is whether the operator merely removed all visible symptoms
of compromise or correctly addressed the root cause. Webmas-
ters that fail to remove backdoors, reset passwords, or update their
software are likely to fall victim to subsequent attacks. Along these
lines, we measure the likelihood that a previously compromised site
falls victim to a second, distinct hijacking incident. To capture this
behavior, we analyze the subset of all hijacking incidents that web-
masters successfully cleaned and calculate what fraction Google
flagged as hijacked again within one month. Given Safe Brows-
ing and Search Quality detection operates on a per-day granularity,
our measurement requires a minimum of a one-day gap between
infection incidents.
We find that 22.3% of Search Quality sites and 6.0% of Safe
Browsing sites become reinfected within 30 days after their first
compromise incident. Figure 9 provides a CDF of the time gap be-
tween infections, restricted to those sites that become reinfected.
We observe attackers reinfect over 10% of Safe Browsing sites and
over 20% of Search Quality sites within a single day. After 15 days,
this increases to 77% of Safe Browsing sites and 85% of Search
Quality sites. Some webmasters may act too hastily during the first
infection incident and recover incompletely. To determine if this is
a significant effect, we correlate the first infection duration with re-
infection. We find minimal correlation, with a Pearson coefficient
of 0.07. Our findings demonstrate a non-negligible portion of web-
masters that successfully expunge hijacking symptoms fail to fully
recover or improve their security practices. These oversights thrust
them back into the remediation and appeals cycle yet again.
6.3 Learning and Fatigue
Webmasters facing reinfection can build on past experiences to
recover quicker. However, they may also tire of the remediation
struggles, and respond slower. We explore whether repeat vic-
tims of hijackings tend to improve (learn) or regress (fatigue) their
response. A limitation is our inability to determine whether two
incidents are caused by the same infection source and what ac-
tions were taken in recovery. Changes in remediation performance
may be due to varying difficulties in addressing different infections,
or conducting different cleanup procedures for the same infection
source that vary in time consumption. Thus, our analysis of learn-
ing and fatigue indicates the tendency of webmasters to improve
Figure 9: CDFs of fast reinfection times (within a month) for Safe
Browsing and Search Quality sites.
or regress their response times to subsequent infections, without
identifying the causes of such changes.
For each site with multiple compromise incidents, we compute
the rate at which remediation time increases or decreases for sub-
sequent reinfections. Specifically, per site, we generate a list of
infection durations, ordered by their occurrence number (e.g., first
incident, second incident, etc.). For each site, we then compute the
slope of the linear regression between occurrence numbers (x val-
ues) and infection durations (y values). A positive slope s indicates
fatigue: each subsequent infection tends to take s days longer to
redress than the previous infection. Conversely, a negative slope
indicates learning: each subsequent infection lasts s days shorter.
Overall, we found that 52.7% of sites with multiple infections
had a positive slope (indicating fatigue), while 36.1% had a nega-
tive slope (learning); the remaining 11.2% of sites had a slope of
zero, suggesting that prior infections did not influence the remedia-
tion times of later reinfections. These results indicate that sites are
more likely to fatigue than learn. Among the sites that exhibited
remediation fatigue, the median increase in infection duration was
9.7 days per subsequent infection. For sites that exhibited learning,
the median decrease in infection duration was 5.0 days. Thus, the
effects of learning or fatiguing can be quite substantial.
7. DISCUSSION
With over ten thousand weekly incidents, web compromise per-
sists as a major problem for Internet safety. Our findings demon-
strate that direct webmaster contact significantly improves reme-
diation, but that establishing a communication channel remains a
challenge. As a consequence, systems must fall back to less ef-
fective global warnings to reach a wide audience. We distill our
measurements into a set of potential directions for improving de-
tection and recovery, touching on the notion of responsible parties
and user- vs. webmaster-oriented defenses.
7.1 Protecting Users vs. Webmasters
Safe Browsing and Search Quality both pursue a user-centric se-
curity approach that puts the safety of visitors above the interests
of sites affected by hijacking incidents. Based on informal anal-
ysis of webmaster dialogues during the appeals and post-appeals
process, we find that webmasters often find hijacking to be a trau-
matic experience. This is exasperated in part by browser intersti-
tials and search warnings that potentially drive away visitors, re-
duce business, or mar site reputation. On the other hand, as we
have demonstrated, these very warnings serve as the side-channels
10. through which security services can communicate with webmas-
ters, spurring remediation. Indeed, a majority of webmasters ex-
pressed that they were unaware of a hijacking incident until they
were notified or saw a warning. Some webmasters requested that
any site-level hijacking flag not take affect until one week after no-
tification. However, such an approach both requires a direct notifi-
cation channel (thus ruling out interstitials or search warnings) and
also puts visitors at risk in the interim. These anecdotes highlight
the duality of security when it comes to web compromise and the
decision that web services must make in whose interests to priori-
tize.
7.2 Improving Remediation
Our study found that webmasters can significantly benefit from
early notification of infections, but that webmasters fail to redress
40.5% of hijacking incidents. We offer three approaches for im-
proving overall cleanup rates: increasing webmaster coverage, pro-
viding precise infection details, and equipping site operators with
recovery tools.
Notification Coverage: Our findings showed that direct Search
Console notifications outperformed global warnings, but that only
22% of Search Quality incidents and 32% of Safe Browsing inci-
dents had a corresponding webmaster registered with Search Con-
sole. This stems in part from the requirement that webmasters must
both know about Search Console and proactively register an ac-
count. While email may seem like an attractive alternative chan-
nel, we argue that identifying a point of contact remains the most
significant hurdle. Previous studies relied on WHOIS abuse con-
tacts, though it is unclear what fraction of recipients received or
opened the notification [5,6,24]. For our study, we were unable to
independently assess the efficacy of Safe Browsing’s email notifi-
cations due to their tight coupling with browser interstitials. How-
ever, given that webmasters cleaned up 51% more Safe Browsing
incidents when a Search Console email was triggered versus not, it
is clear that WHOIS-based emails often fall into the void. While
hosting providers are also well-positioned, the lack of a uniform
protocol or API to alert hosted sites remains a barrier to adoption.
Instead, we argue that notifications should expand to services with
broader reach among webmasters such as social networks and ana-
lytics or ads platforms.
Report Content: A common theme among webmaster appeals was
the desire for more detailed report logs of precisely what pages
served harmful content. As our analysis of appeals found, 14–22%
of webmasters lacked sufficient expertise or example code to clean
up on their first attempt. As Vasek et al. previously showed, includ-
ing more detailed reports expedites remediation [24]. Potential im-
provements might include screenshots of rogue pages, a tool for ac-
cessing a crawler’s perspective of injected content, or more detailed
diagnostic information. Alternatively, in the absence of a direct no-
tification, browser interstitials and search warnings could include
information targeted directly at webmasters rather than merely vis-
itors. This is a tacit recognition that global warnings play a key role
in recovery. That said, detailed logs may steer webmasters towards
addressing symptoms of compromise rather than the root cause,
yielding an increase in repeated hijacking incidents. We leave the
investigation of how best to improve reports for future work.
Recovery Tools: While our findings demonstrate that many web-
masters successfully recover, we are aware of few tools that help
with the process. Such tools would decrease the duration of com-
promise and likelihood of reinfection. However, a question remains
whether such tools generalize across attacks or not. Soska et al.
found that attackers commonly exploit the same vulnerable soft-
ware [19]. As such, it may be better to proactively notify sites of
outdated software rather than wait till a hijacking incident, side-
stepping the challenge of cleaning up specialized payloads.
7.3 Responsible Parties
The final challenge we consider is who should assume the re-
sponsibility for driving remediation. Site operators are best posi-
tioned to redress hijacking incidents, but our and prior work has
shown that webmasters are often unaware their site is compro-
mised until an outside alert. Alternatively, hosting providers own
the serving infrastructure for compromised sites, of which security
scanning could be a service. However, doing so comes at a finan-
cial cost or technical burden; today, few providers scan for harm-
ful content or vulnerabilities [4]. Finally, ISPs, browser vendors,
and search engine providers can enact incentives to spur action, but
ultimately they possess limited capacity to directly help with re-
mediation. These factors—representing the decentralized ideals of
the Internet—make web compromise more challenging to address
than account or credit card breaches where a centralized operator
responds. The security community must determine which parties
should bear the most responsibility for attending to compromised
sites; what actions the parties should and should not pursue; and
which mechanisms to employ to hold each accountable. Until then,
compromise will remain an ongoing problem.
8. CONCLUSION
In this work, we explored the influence of various notification
techniques on remediation likelihood and time to cleanup. Our re-
sults indicate that browser interstitials, search warnings, and direct
communication with webmasters all play a crucial role in alerting
webmasters to compromise and spurring action. Based on a sam-
ple of 760,935 hijacking incidents from July, 2014–June, 2015, we
found that 59.5% of notified webmasters successfully recovered.
Breaking down this aggregate behavior, we found Safe Browsing
interstitials, paired with search warnings and WHOIS emails, re-
sulted in 54.6% of sites cleaning up, compared to 43.4% of sites
flagged with a search warning alone. Above all, direct contact with
webmasters increased the likelihood of remediation to over 75%.
However, this process was confounded in part by 20% of webmas-
ters incorrectly handling remediation, requiring multiple back-and-
forth engagement with Safe Browsing and Search Quality to re-
establish a clean site. Equally problematic, a sizeable fraction of
site owners failed to address the root cause of compromise, with
over 12% of sites falling victim to a new attack within 30 days. To
improve this process moving forward, we highlighted three paths:
increasing the webmaster coverage of notifications, providing pre-
cise infection details, and equipping site operators with recovery
tools or alerting webmasters to potential threats (e.g., outdated soft-
ware) before they escalate to security breaches. These approaches
address a deficit of security expertise among site operators and
hosting providers. By empowering small website operators—the
largest victims of hijacking today—with better security tools and
practices, we can prevent miscreants from siphoning traffic and re-
sources that fuel even larger Internet threats.
9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank the Google Trust and Safety teams—Safe Browsing
and Search Quality—for insightful discussions and support in de-
veloping our data analysis pipeline. This work was supported in
part by NSF grants CNS-1237265 and CNS-1518921. Opinions
and findings are those of the authors.
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