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Cyber Security: User
Access Pitfalls
March 9, 2016
1
Agenda
1. Why is a discussion about user access important?
2. Insider Threats vs. External Threats
3. IT Security Standard Setters
4. Cost of a Breach
5. User Access Rights
6. Cloud Apps
7. Problems with Passwords
8. Data Breaches and Lessons Learned
9. Password Emerging Trends
10.Wrap Up
2
Why is a discussion about user access
important?
3
Why Talk About User Access?
SECURITY IS A NEGATIVE GOAL.
 There are exactly two keys to information security
 Configure the system and network correctly and keep it that way
 Know the traffic coming into and out of your network
 Network security tasks
 Protection – configure as correctly as possible
 Detection – quickly identify configuration changes or traffic issues
 Reaction – respond as quickly as possible
4
Defense in depth
 Security defensive lines and countermeasures to protect the integrity of
information assets
 Five architectures to develop defense in depth
1. Perimeter Defense - Firewalls for segregating internal trusted zones from
the internet
2. Network Defense - Subdividing the internal network into trusted zones
3. Host Defense - Identify and locate information assets that need
protection
4. Application Defense - Prioritize the information assets to be protected
5. Data Defense - Role based access controls
 Cryptography is the only remaining protection for information assets when
defense in depth fails.
5
6
Keys to implementing network security
1. Access,
Authentication,
Authorization (AAA)
2. Separation of duties,
separation of services
3. Endpoint security and
ubiquitous computing
4. Service-oriented
architecture (SOA)
7
Questions to keep in mind throughout
our discussion
 Where are most threats to your information assets coming from?
 What is your network access password change policy?
 Which IT Guidance/Frameworks are you predominantly working with
now? COSO and/or COBIT and/or ISO and/or PCI?
 Does your company perform an periodic user access review? Are
all user accounts reviewed, including B2B, generic/system, cloud
apps and 3rd party vendors?
 Does your organization have a proven system for monitoring user
access activity?
8
Insider Threats vs External Threats
9
Disgruntled employees and insiders pose
big hacking risk
 73% of organizations considered insider threats—both
accidental data leakage by employees and
malicious breaches to be the greatest risk.
 64% reported that manual processes, limited visibility into
security policies and poor change management
practices posed the greatest challenge to effective
management of network security devices.
 one in five said that aligning priorities and plans between
development, security and operations teams created
the greatest obstacle
 60% stated that their data center includes more than 50
critical business applications, 20% have more than 500.
 142 information security professionals and
application owners state that current security
management processes make balancing
access to the rapidly rising number of business
critical applications and reducing system
vulnerability increasingly challenging
10
http://www.algosec.com/en/resources/network_security_2014
Annual reports on – insider threats11
89% - More at risk
from insider threats
Editor – 2 months w/access AFTER
TERMINATION
12
IT Community Comments13
IT Security Standard Setters
14
Notable IT standard setters
1. International Organization for Standardization
(ISO)
2. PCI Security Standards Council, LLC (PCI-DSS)
3. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO)
4. ISACA (COBIT)
15
Cost of a Breach!
16
Cost of a Data Breach
17
https://securityintelligence.com/cost-of-a-data-breach-2015/
User Access Rights
18
Principle of Least Privilege Access
 Defined as the practice of limiting access to the minimal
level that will allow normal functioning and is applied to both
human and system user access
Originated by the US Department of Defense in the 1970’s
to limit potential damage of any accidental or malicious
security breach
It is the underlying principle and the predominate strategy
used to assure confidentiality within a network
 Role-based access was developed to group users with
common access needs, simplifying security and security
maintenance
19
Users with Elevated Access
 By default systems will process commands based on the level of access the
user who initiated the command has.
 System and domain administrators pose unique problems within a software
application.
20
Group Description Default user rights
Administrators
Members of this group have full control of all domain
controllers in the domain. By default, the Domain
Admins and Enterprise Admins groups are members
of the Administrators group. The Administrator
account is also a default member. Because this group
has full control in the domain, add users with caution.
Access this computer from the network; Adjust memory quotas for a process; Back up
files and directories; Bypass traverse checking; Change the system time; Create a
pagefile; Debug programs; Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for
delegation; Force a shutdown from a remote system; Increase scheduling priority;
Load and unload device drivers; Allow log on locally; Manage auditing and security
log; Modify firmware environment values; Profile single process; Profile system
performance; Remove computer from docking station; Restore files and directories;
Shut down the system; Take ownership of files or other objects.
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc756898%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
Cloud Apps
21
Number of Cloud Apps a Company is Using
The cloud is nothing more than someone
else’s computer.
 Survey results released by Netskope, February 2016 revealed
that
 On average 917 apps are in use within each enterprise with the top
categories being marketing, human resources, collaboration, storage
and finance / accounting
13.6% of cloud app users currently use compromised account credentials
at work.
4.1% of enterprises have sanctioned apps that are laced with malware
Sanctioned apps are typically less than 5% of the total apps in use by an
enterprise.
22
https://resources.netskope.com/h/i/213041061-february-2016-worldwide-cloud-report
https://www.netskope.com/press-releases/netskope-survey-majority-of-companies-have-changed-cloud-security-strategies-as-a-result-of-ceo-and-board-level-discussions/
Top Cloud Apps Identified by Netskope
23
Top Cloud Activities24
HR Apps BI Apps Finance Apps
1 Share - 6 shares for every login Upload Share - 2 shares for every
upload
Edit
2 View Download -users downloading
sensitive employee data from
HR apps, then uploading the
data to cloud storage
View Create
3 Download - 2 downloads for
every one upload
View Upload View
Audit download activity and
ensure that only individuals with
proper privileges are executing
the downloads and shares. If
the data includes personally
identifiable information, it could
represent violations to serveral
regulations.
Understand the nature of
the data being shared. Will
it compromise the strategic
plan or competitive
advantages.
Cloud finance apps are
becoming more business-
critical by offering new ways
to track revenue, authorize
payments, pay employees,
execute subscription renewals,
etc.*
Understanding Risk and Auditing User Activity
Both activities highlight the
importance of communicating
and enforcing policy at both the
activity (manual), system and
data level
Cloud Storage
Problems with passwords
25
Problems with Passwords
 People, process and technology are all needed to adequately secure a system
 When left on their own, people will make the worst security decisions
 Without any security training, people can be easily tricked into giving up their
passwords
 Passwords can be insecure
 People will choose easily remembered and easily guessed/cracked passwords
 Passwords can be easily broken
 Free programs are available on the Internet that can “crack” passwords
 Passwords are inconvenient
 Computer generated passwords can be difficult to remember and are written down
 Passwords do not have any authority
 Use of a password does not confirm the identity of the user entering the password
26
Passwords - Cloud Apps and Remote
Contractors
 Cloud apps and remote contractors represent a significant risk to the
overall security of the company’s information assets because:
 Cloud apps can be implemented and remote contractors can be engaged
without any knowledge from IT
 Most companies do not have one central point of authority for cloud apps and
remote contractors
 There is a general lack of understanding of the scope of work for cloud apps and
remote contractors so elevated access is generally granted without any
consideration of the risks
 User access cannot be validated against active directory or there are
exceptions to the company’s password policy granted
 One user account is shared among multiple users
27
Data Breaches and Lessons Learned
28
 2014, Cox was hacked by "EvilJordie," a
member of the "Lizard Squad" hacker
collective.
 The FCC's investigation found that by
posing as a Cox IT staffer, the hacker
convinced a customer service
representative to enter their user ID and
password into a fake website.
 Under the terms of the settlement, Cox
will pay the fine, identify all victims of the
breach, notify them and give them a
year of credit monitoring. The agreement
also requires Cox to conduct internal
system audits, internal threat monitoring,
penetration testing and other security
measures to prevent further hacks
29
FCC fines Cox Communications
 Nov 24 2014 – News breaks that Sony Pictures has been hacked.
 The “Guardians of Peace” obtained 100 terabytes of data from the servers
 Nov 27 2014 – 4 yet to be released films were uploaded to an online file
share site
 Dec 1 2014 – pre-bonus salaries of 17 top Sony executives are leaked
 Dec 2 2014 – Sony chiefs confirm the breach, and employee information
was included in the compromised data
 Dec 16 2014 – Sony receives emails threatening to attack movie theaters
that show The Interview http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2788710/
 Dec 17 2014 – Sony cancels the release of The Interview
 Dec 19 2014 – The FBI confirms that North Korea was behind the cyber
attack
30
Sony Hack: A Timeline
http://deadline.com/2014/12/sony-hack-timeline-any-pascal-the-interview-north-korea-1201325501/
Sony continued – How the hack happened
 The hackers gained access to Sony’s network by obtaining the login
credentials of a high-level systems administrator. Once hackers obtained
the credentials, they were granted “keys to the entire building,” according
to a U.S. official.
 They hacked into one server that was not well protected, and escalated
the attack to gain access to the rest of the network.
 Sony’s network was not layered well enough to prevent breaches occurring
in one part from affecting other parts. In addition, the password “password”
was used in 3 certificates.
 A combination of weak passwords, lack of server layering, not responding
to alerts or setting up alerts, inadequate logging and monitoring, and lack
of Security Education Training and Awareness all contributed to the Sony
Breach.
31
32
 Nov 27 – Dec 15 2013 - data hack at Target stores exposes as many as 40 million
credit- and debit-card customers to potential fraud and compromised 70 million
customer records
 Dec 18 2013 - News of the breach is reported by data and security blog
KrebsOnSecurity.
 Dec 19 2013 - Target acknowledges the breach of information publicly
 Dec 22 2013 - Traffic at Target stores takes a hit in the wake of the security
breach, with transactions down by 3-4% on the last weekend of holiday
shopping
Target Hack: Timeline
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2013/12/27/targets-data-breach-timeline/
Target continued – how the hack happened
 The initial intrusion was traced back to
network credentials that were stolen from
a third-party vendor, Fazio Mechanical
Services a provider of HVAC systems
 Multiple sources told Krebs that the
credentials were stolen in an email
malware attack at Fazio that began at
least two months before thieves started
stealing card data from Target cash
registers.
 Two sources said the malware was the
Citadel — a password-stealing bot
program
 Fazio stated that its data connection to
Target was exclusively for electronic billing,
contract submission and project
management.
 Target did not specify which apps Fazio
could access but a former Target
employee said nearly all contractors
access Ariba, an external billing system,
the project management and contract
submissions portal - Partners Online, and
Target’s Property Development Zone portal
33
Home Depot Hack: Timeline
 Sep 2 2014 - Home Depot became aware of a large data breach that
started April 2014
 Banks and law enforcement notified Home Depot that there were signs that their
network had been compromise.
 Sep 8 2014 - Home Depot confirmed that their payment security systems
had been breached
 Nov 25 2014 – Home Depot was hit with 44 civil lawsuits
34
Home Depot continued – how the hack happened
 Criminals used a 3rd party vendors user name
and password to enter the perimeter of Home
Depot’s network.
 While the vendor credentials did not allow
access to the POS, the hackers acquired
elevated access rights allowing them to deploy
malware on the self-checkout system in the US
and Canada
 Source close to the investigation stated that at
least some store registers had been infected
with a new variant of “BlackPOS” (a.k.a.
“Kaptoxa”), a malware strain designed to
siphon data from cards that are swiped on the
infected point-of-sale system running Microsoft
Windows.
 The malware was reported as using XOR
encryption, a simple symmetric cipher that is
used in many applications where security is not
a defined requirement, making the malware
undetectable to IDS/IPS or Antivirus signatures
 Krebs also identified that the perpetrators
appeared to be the same group of Russian and
Ukrainian hackers that compromised Target,
Sally Beauty, P.F. Chang’s, and others.
35
Password Emerging Trends
36
Single Sign-On and Password Emerging
Trends
 Single sign-on is an authentication process that allows users to enter
one user name and password to access multiple applications they
have been given rights to.
 Two-factor authentication requires additional factors to establish a users
identity such as, a password and a pin number and/or a fingerprint,
and/or a retina scan (in any combination)
 Password managers that encrypt and store login information for auto
login
 Establishing complex user names, such as K$@ssEr
 Establishing meaningful, easy to remember complex passwords
t3chRock$ or $omething2about!
37
Benefits of Complex Passwords38
http://gizmodo.com/5753868/how-long-it-takes-hackers-to-crack-your-password
t3chRock$ - 9 characters / $omething2about! – 19 characters
Securing an environment of Windows platforms from
abuse - external or internal - is akin to trying to install
sprinklers in a fireworks factory where smoking on the
job is permitted. — Gene Spafford
An American professor of computer science at Purdue University and a leading
computer security expert.
39
The mantra of any good security engineer
is: 'Security is a not a product, but a process.' It's
more than designing strong cryptography into a
system; it's designing the entire system such that all
security measures, including cryptography, work
together. — Bruce Schneier
An American cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer
Questions to keep in mind throughout
our discussion
 Where are most threats to your information assets coming from?
 What is your network access password change policy?
 Which IT Guidance/Frameworks are you predominantly working with
now? COSO and/or COBIT and/or ISO and/or PCI?
 Does your company perform an periodic user access review? Are
all user accounts reviewed, including B2B, generic/system, cloud
apps and 3rd party vendors?
 Does your organization have a proven system for monitoring user
access activity?
40
Win your very own copy of Friggin’
Bean Counters
Who can tell me the
name of the hacker
collective that EvilJordie
belongs to?
41
The Lizard Squad
42
 Largely responsible for denial of service attacks on social media websites
and gaming related services
 Known members are teens and young adults
Wrap Up
43
Are there solutions?
Security is a negative goal.
People need to be considered a part of
the security design
 End User Information Security Awareness Training
 A robust password policy and strict adherence to that policy
 Establish a central point of contact to manage contractors and other
3rd party access
 Changes to established roles are done through a change
management process.
44
Best Practices for Administrative Accounts
 Segregate and secure administrative passwords
 Create a decoy admin account
 Limit the number of service admin accounts
 Separate admin and user accounts for admins
 Assign trustworthy staff
 Limit admin rights to only those rights needed
 Control the admin logon process
 Secure admin workstations
45
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700835.aspx
Data breaches may cost less than the
security to prevent them
 Benjamin Dean presented a hard to disagree with defense of why things
security-wise "ain't gonna change" soon
 By examining the actual expenses from the Sony, Target and Home Depot
breaches, the total amounts to less than 1% of each company's annual
revenues
Target – Gross breach $252 million after insurance and tax deductions
$105 million, less than .01% of gross revenues
Home Depot – Net breach $28 million after a $15 million insurance
reimbursement, .01% of gross revenues
Sony - $35 million for the fiscal year ending March 31, represent from 0.9%
to 2% of Sony's total projected sales for 2014
46
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-breaches-may-cost-less-than-the-security-to-prevent-them/
Additional Resources
 CYBERSECURITY – WHAT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS NEEDS TO ASK
 https://na.theiia.org/special-promotion/PublicDocuments/GRC-Cybersecurity-
Research-Report.pdf
 5 Top Regulatory Compliance Concerns for Financial Services
 https://www.roberthalf.com/management-resources/blog/5-top-regulatory-
compliance-concerns-for-financial-services
47
Community & Sharing48
Join Our LinkedIn Group
COSO Framework Discussion &
Webinars
Technical Community sharing Ideas ,Templates,
WEBINARS, Advise and Learn from others implementing
new framework.
Share your latest templates here!
https://www.linkedin.com/groups/COSO-
Implementation-4888186/about
Community & Sharing
49
Join our LinkedIn group:
Friggin’ Bean Counters
Accounting, Project Management and IT
Professionals come together to share
ideas, learn from each other, or if
necessary, vent frustrations.
https://www.linkedin.com/groups/6985169
Information Security Best practices and
Standard of Care
50
Monthly
QuarterlyAnnual
Weekly
51Compliance Made Simple ™
User Access Procedure Diagnostic
Email us for 5 SPOTS ONLY:
Info@avivaspectrum.com
SUBJECT: USER ACCESS
Internal
Threat
Analysis
BenchmarkIn-take
51
52Compliance Made Simple ™
Aviva Spectrum is HIRING
1. SOX 404 – Senior Internal Auditors
2. IT auditors
3. SEC Reporting Managers
4. Cybersecurity consultants
Email: Careers@avivaspectrum.com
52
Questions?53
54Compliance Made Simple ™
Speaker Contacts
Karla Sasser, Senior Associate, Aviva Spectrum
Connect: www.linkedin.com/in/karlasasser
e-mail: Karla.Sasser@avivaspectrum.com
PHONE: (818) 384-8846
54

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User_Access_IIA-LA_3-9-2016

  • 1. Cyber Security: User Access Pitfalls March 9, 2016 1
  • 2. Agenda 1. Why is a discussion about user access important? 2. Insider Threats vs. External Threats 3. IT Security Standard Setters 4. Cost of a Breach 5. User Access Rights 6. Cloud Apps 7. Problems with Passwords 8. Data Breaches and Lessons Learned 9. Password Emerging Trends 10.Wrap Up 2
  • 3. Why is a discussion about user access important? 3
  • 4. Why Talk About User Access? SECURITY IS A NEGATIVE GOAL.  There are exactly two keys to information security  Configure the system and network correctly and keep it that way  Know the traffic coming into and out of your network  Network security tasks  Protection – configure as correctly as possible  Detection – quickly identify configuration changes or traffic issues  Reaction – respond as quickly as possible 4
  • 5. Defense in depth  Security defensive lines and countermeasures to protect the integrity of information assets  Five architectures to develop defense in depth 1. Perimeter Defense - Firewalls for segregating internal trusted zones from the internet 2. Network Defense - Subdividing the internal network into trusted zones 3. Host Defense - Identify and locate information assets that need protection 4. Application Defense - Prioritize the information assets to be protected 5. Data Defense - Role based access controls  Cryptography is the only remaining protection for information assets when defense in depth fails. 5
  • 6. 6
  • 7. Keys to implementing network security 1. Access, Authentication, Authorization (AAA) 2. Separation of duties, separation of services 3. Endpoint security and ubiquitous computing 4. Service-oriented architecture (SOA) 7
  • 8. Questions to keep in mind throughout our discussion  Where are most threats to your information assets coming from?  What is your network access password change policy?  Which IT Guidance/Frameworks are you predominantly working with now? COSO and/or COBIT and/or ISO and/or PCI?  Does your company perform an periodic user access review? Are all user accounts reviewed, including B2B, generic/system, cloud apps and 3rd party vendors?  Does your organization have a proven system for monitoring user access activity? 8
  • 9. Insider Threats vs External Threats 9
  • 10. Disgruntled employees and insiders pose big hacking risk  73% of organizations considered insider threats—both accidental data leakage by employees and malicious breaches to be the greatest risk.  64% reported that manual processes, limited visibility into security policies and poor change management practices posed the greatest challenge to effective management of network security devices.  one in five said that aligning priorities and plans between development, security and operations teams created the greatest obstacle  60% stated that their data center includes more than 50 critical business applications, 20% have more than 500.  142 information security professionals and application owners state that current security management processes make balancing access to the rapidly rising number of business critical applications and reducing system vulnerability increasingly challenging 10 http://www.algosec.com/en/resources/network_security_2014
  • 11. Annual reports on – insider threats11 89% - More at risk from insider threats
  • 12. Editor – 2 months w/access AFTER TERMINATION 12
  • 14. IT Security Standard Setters 14
  • 15. Notable IT standard setters 1. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 2. PCI Security Standards Council, LLC (PCI-DSS) 3. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 4. ISACA (COBIT) 15
  • 16. Cost of a Breach! 16
  • 17. Cost of a Data Breach 17 https://securityintelligence.com/cost-of-a-data-breach-2015/
  • 19. Principle of Least Privilege Access  Defined as the practice of limiting access to the minimal level that will allow normal functioning and is applied to both human and system user access Originated by the US Department of Defense in the 1970’s to limit potential damage of any accidental or malicious security breach It is the underlying principle and the predominate strategy used to assure confidentiality within a network  Role-based access was developed to group users with common access needs, simplifying security and security maintenance 19
  • 20. Users with Elevated Access  By default systems will process commands based on the level of access the user who initiated the command has.  System and domain administrators pose unique problems within a software application. 20 Group Description Default user rights Administrators Members of this group have full control of all domain controllers in the domain. By default, the Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins groups are members of the Administrators group. The Administrator account is also a default member. Because this group has full control in the domain, add users with caution. Access this computer from the network; Adjust memory quotas for a process; Back up files and directories; Bypass traverse checking; Change the system time; Create a pagefile; Debug programs; Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation; Force a shutdown from a remote system; Increase scheduling priority; Load and unload device drivers; Allow log on locally; Manage auditing and security log; Modify firmware environment values; Profile single process; Profile system performance; Remove computer from docking station; Restore files and directories; Shut down the system; Take ownership of files or other objects. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc756898%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
  • 22. Number of Cloud Apps a Company is Using The cloud is nothing more than someone else’s computer.  Survey results released by Netskope, February 2016 revealed that  On average 917 apps are in use within each enterprise with the top categories being marketing, human resources, collaboration, storage and finance / accounting 13.6% of cloud app users currently use compromised account credentials at work. 4.1% of enterprises have sanctioned apps that are laced with malware Sanctioned apps are typically less than 5% of the total apps in use by an enterprise. 22 https://resources.netskope.com/h/i/213041061-february-2016-worldwide-cloud-report https://www.netskope.com/press-releases/netskope-survey-majority-of-companies-have-changed-cloud-security-strategies-as-a-result-of-ceo-and-board-level-discussions/
  • 23. Top Cloud Apps Identified by Netskope 23
  • 24. Top Cloud Activities24 HR Apps BI Apps Finance Apps 1 Share - 6 shares for every login Upload Share - 2 shares for every upload Edit 2 View Download -users downloading sensitive employee data from HR apps, then uploading the data to cloud storage View Create 3 Download - 2 downloads for every one upload View Upload View Audit download activity and ensure that only individuals with proper privileges are executing the downloads and shares. If the data includes personally identifiable information, it could represent violations to serveral regulations. Understand the nature of the data being shared. Will it compromise the strategic plan or competitive advantages. Cloud finance apps are becoming more business- critical by offering new ways to track revenue, authorize payments, pay employees, execute subscription renewals, etc.* Understanding Risk and Auditing User Activity Both activities highlight the importance of communicating and enforcing policy at both the activity (manual), system and data level Cloud Storage
  • 26. Problems with Passwords  People, process and technology are all needed to adequately secure a system  When left on their own, people will make the worst security decisions  Without any security training, people can be easily tricked into giving up their passwords  Passwords can be insecure  People will choose easily remembered and easily guessed/cracked passwords  Passwords can be easily broken  Free programs are available on the Internet that can “crack” passwords  Passwords are inconvenient  Computer generated passwords can be difficult to remember and are written down  Passwords do not have any authority  Use of a password does not confirm the identity of the user entering the password 26
  • 27. Passwords - Cloud Apps and Remote Contractors  Cloud apps and remote contractors represent a significant risk to the overall security of the company’s information assets because:  Cloud apps can be implemented and remote contractors can be engaged without any knowledge from IT  Most companies do not have one central point of authority for cloud apps and remote contractors  There is a general lack of understanding of the scope of work for cloud apps and remote contractors so elevated access is generally granted without any consideration of the risks  User access cannot be validated against active directory or there are exceptions to the company’s password policy granted  One user account is shared among multiple users 27
  • 28. Data Breaches and Lessons Learned 28
  • 29.  2014, Cox was hacked by "EvilJordie," a member of the "Lizard Squad" hacker collective.  The FCC's investigation found that by posing as a Cox IT staffer, the hacker convinced a customer service representative to enter their user ID and password into a fake website.  Under the terms of the settlement, Cox will pay the fine, identify all victims of the breach, notify them and give them a year of credit monitoring. The agreement also requires Cox to conduct internal system audits, internal threat monitoring, penetration testing and other security measures to prevent further hacks 29 FCC fines Cox Communications
  • 30.  Nov 24 2014 – News breaks that Sony Pictures has been hacked.  The “Guardians of Peace” obtained 100 terabytes of data from the servers  Nov 27 2014 – 4 yet to be released films were uploaded to an online file share site  Dec 1 2014 – pre-bonus salaries of 17 top Sony executives are leaked  Dec 2 2014 – Sony chiefs confirm the breach, and employee information was included in the compromised data  Dec 16 2014 – Sony receives emails threatening to attack movie theaters that show The Interview http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2788710/  Dec 17 2014 – Sony cancels the release of The Interview  Dec 19 2014 – The FBI confirms that North Korea was behind the cyber attack 30 Sony Hack: A Timeline http://deadline.com/2014/12/sony-hack-timeline-any-pascal-the-interview-north-korea-1201325501/
  • 31. Sony continued – How the hack happened  The hackers gained access to Sony’s network by obtaining the login credentials of a high-level systems administrator. Once hackers obtained the credentials, they were granted “keys to the entire building,” according to a U.S. official.  They hacked into one server that was not well protected, and escalated the attack to gain access to the rest of the network.  Sony’s network was not layered well enough to prevent breaches occurring in one part from affecting other parts. In addition, the password “password” was used in 3 certificates.  A combination of weak passwords, lack of server layering, not responding to alerts or setting up alerts, inadequate logging and monitoring, and lack of Security Education Training and Awareness all contributed to the Sony Breach. 31
  • 32. 32  Nov 27 – Dec 15 2013 - data hack at Target stores exposes as many as 40 million credit- and debit-card customers to potential fraud and compromised 70 million customer records  Dec 18 2013 - News of the breach is reported by data and security blog KrebsOnSecurity.  Dec 19 2013 - Target acknowledges the breach of information publicly  Dec 22 2013 - Traffic at Target stores takes a hit in the wake of the security breach, with transactions down by 3-4% on the last weekend of holiday shopping Target Hack: Timeline http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2013/12/27/targets-data-breach-timeline/
  • 33. Target continued – how the hack happened  The initial intrusion was traced back to network credentials that were stolen from a third-party vendor, Fazio Mechanical Services a provider of HVAC systems  Multiple sources told Krebs that the credentials were stolen in an email malware attack at Fazio that began at least two months before thieves started stealing card data from Target cash registers.  Two sources said the malware was the Citadel — a password-stealing bot program  Fazio stated that its data connection to Target was exclusively for electronic billing, contract submission and project management.  Target did not specify which apps Fazio could access but a former Target employee said nearly all contractors access Ariba, an external billing system, the project management and contract submissions portal - Partners Online, and Target’s Property Development Zone portal 33
  • 34. Home Depot Hack: Timeline  Sep 2 2014 - Home Depot became aware of a large data breach that started April 2014  Banks and law enforcement notified Home Depot that there were signs that their network had been compromise.  Sep 8 2014 - Home Depot confirmed that their payment security systems had been breached  Nov 25 2014 – Home Depot was hit with 44 civil lawsuits 34
  • 35. Home Depot continued – how the hack happened  Criminals used a 3rd party vendors user name and password to enter the perimeter of Home Depot’s network.  While the vendor credentials did not allow access to the POS, the hackers acquired elevated access rights allowing them to deploy malware on the self-checkout system in the US and Canada  Source close to the investigation stated that at least some store registers had been infected with a new variant of “BlackPOS” (a.k.a. “Kaptoxa”), a malware strain designed to siphon data from cards that are swiped on the infected point-of-sale system running Microsoft Windows.  The malware was reported as using XOR encryption, a simple symmetric cipher that is used in many applications where security is not a defined requirement, making the malware undetectable to IDS/IPS or Antivirus signatures  Krebs also identified that the perpetrators appeared to be the same group of Russian and Ukrainian hackers that compromised Target, Sally Beauty, P.F. Chang’s, and others. 35
  • 37. Single Sign-On and Password Emerging Trends  Single sign-on is an authentication process that allows users to enter one user name and password to access multiple applications they have been given rights to.  Two-factor authentication requires additional factors to establish a users identity such as, a password and a pin number and/or a fingerprint, and/or a retina scan (in any combination)  Password managers that encrypt and store login information for auto login  Establishing complex user names, such as K$@ssEr  Establishing meaningful, easy to remember complex passwords t3chRock$ or $omething2about! 37
  • 38. Benefits of Complex Passwords38 http://gizmodo.com/5753868/how-long-it-takes-hackers-to-crack-your-password t3chRock$ - 9 characters / $omething2about! – 19 characters
  • 39. Securing an environment of Windows platforms from abuse - external or internal - is akin to trying to install sprinklers in a fireworks factory where smoking on the job is permitted. — Gene Spafford An American professor of computer science at Purdue University and a leading computer security expert. 39 The mantra of any good security engineer is: 'Security is a not a product, but a process.' It's more than designing strong cryptography into a system; it's designing the entire system such that all security measures, including cryptography, work together. — Bruce Schneier An American cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer
  • 40. Questions to keep in mind throughout our discussion  Where are most threats to your information assets coming from?  What is your network access password change policy?  Which IT Guidance/Frameworks are you predominantly working with now? COSO and/or COBIT and/or ISO and/or PCI?  Does your company perform an periodic user access review? Are all user accounts reviewed, including B2B, generic/system, cloud apps and 3rd party vendors?  Does your organization have a proven system for monitoring user access activity? 40
  • 41. Win your very own copy of Friggin’ Bean Counters Who can tell me the name of the hacker collective that EvilJordie belongs to? 41
  • 42. The Lizard Squad 42  Largely responsible for denial of service attacks on social media websites and gaming related services  Known members are teens and young adults
  • 44. Are there solutions? Security is a negative goal. People need to be considered a part of the security design  End User Information Security Awareness Training  A robust password policy and strict adherence to that policy  Establish a central point of contact to manage contractors and other 3rd party access  Changes to established roles are done through a change management process. 44
  • 45. Best Practices for Administrative Accounts  Segregate and secure administrative passwords  Create a decoy admin account  Limit the number of service admin accounts  Separate admin and user accounts for admins  Assign trustworthy staff  Limit admin rights to only those rights needed  Control the admin logon process  Secure admin workstations 45 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700835.aspx
  • 46. Data breaches may cost less than the security to prevent them  Benjamin Dean presented a hard to disagree with defense of why things security-wise "ain't gonna change" soon  By examining the actual expenses from the Sony, Target and Home Depot breaches, the total amounts to less than 1% of each company's annual revenues Target – Gross breach $252 million after insurance and tax deductions $105 million, less than .01% of gross revenues Home Depot – Net breach $28 million after a $15 million insurance reimbursement, .01% of gross revenues Sony - $35 million for the fiscal year ending March 31, represent from 0.9% to 2% of Sony's total projected sales for 2014 46 http://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-breaches-may-cost-less-than-the-security-to-prevent-them/
  • 47. Additional Resources  CYBERSECURITY – WHAT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS NEEDS TO ASK  https://na.theiia.org/special-promotion/PublicDocuments/GRC-Cybersecurity- Research-Report.pdf  5 Top Regulatory Compliance Concerns for Financial Services  https://www.roberthalf.com/management-resources/blog/5-top-regulatory- compliance-concerns-for-financial-services 47
  • 48. Community & Sharing48 Join Our LinkedIn Group COSO Framework Discussion & Webinars Technical Community sharing Ideas ,Templates, WEBINARS, Advise and Learn from others implementing new framework. Share your latest templates here! https://www.linkedin.com/groups/COSO- Implementation-4888186/about
  • 49. Community & Sharing 49 Join our LinkedIn group: Friggin’ Bean Counters Accounting, Project Management and IT Professionals come together to share ideas, learn from each other, or if necessary, vent frustrations. https://www.linkedin.com/groups/6985169
  • 50. Information Security Best practices and Standard of Care 50 Monthly QuarterlyAnnual Weekly
  • 51. 51Compliance Made Simple ™ User Access Procedure Diagnostic Email us for 5 SPOTS ONLY: Info@avivaspectrum.com SUBJECT: USER ACCESS Internal Threat Analysis BenchmarkIn-take 51
  • 52. 52Compliance Made Simple ™ Aviva Spectrum is HIRING 1. SOX 404 – Senior Internal Auditors 2. IT auditors 3. SEC Reporting Managers 4. Cybersecurity consultants Email: Careers@avivaspectrum.com 52
  • 54. 54Compliance Made Simple ™ Speaker Contacts Karla Sasser, Senior Associate, Aviva Spectrum Connect: www.linkedin.com/in/karlasasser e-mail: Karla.Sasser@avivaspectrum.com PHONE: (818) 384-8846 54