This document provides information about summarizing a hematologic disorder document using a concept map template. It instructs the reader to select a hematologic disorder and complete fields in the concept map template including the pathophysiology, etiology, clinical manifestations, and treatment of the disorder. It also instructs the reader to support their findings with at least one scholarly source and to cite sources using APA format.

1. Using the concept map, select a hematologic disorder and
complete the fields included on the map.
1. Include the pathophysiology of the hematologic disorder
2. Explain the etiology of the hematologic disorder
3. Describe the clinical manifestations of the hematologic
disorder
4. Provide the treatment for the hematologic disorder
Use at least one scholarly source to support your findings.
Examples of scholarly sources include academic journals,
textbooks, reference texts, and CINAHL nursing guides. Be sure
to cite your sources in-text and on a References page using APA
format.
See Template on next page down
Disease Process Name
Etiology:
Clinical Manifestations:
Treatment:

2. Pathogenesis:
C-96
CASE 9
Samsung
Overtaking Philips, Panasonic, and Sony as the Leader
in the Consumer Electronics Industry
During the past century, industry leadership in the global
consumer electronics industry (e.g.,
radios, TVs, movie and music players, etc.) has changed, with
Philips (Netherlands), Panason-
ic, Sony (Japan), and Samsung (Korea) emerging as leaders at
different times. Indeed, each
company achieved leadership with a different international
strategy, a different organization
design, and a different set of organizational capabi lities. Philips
built a worldwide federation

3. of independent national organizations able to gain access to the
company’s renowned tech-
nological prowess and then to apply and adapt it to meet local
market needs. Philips was the
worldwide leader in consumer electronics from the early 1900s
until the late 1970s. During the
1980s, Panasonic used overseas expansion to leverage its
centralized, highly efficient opera-
tions in Japan, exploiting global-scale economies in R&D and
production to offer lower-cost
products and overtake Philips as the world leader in consumer
electronics. In similar fashion,
Sony leveraged its centralized operations in Japan to produce
standardized products around
the globe. Sony invested far more in R&D than Panasonic did,
though, and it was typically the
technological and innovation leader in the industry, if not the
sales leader, from 1980–2005. By
2009, Samsung had seemingly come out of nowhere to become
the world leader in consumer
electronics, however. Like Sony, Samsung made large
investments in R&D so that it emerged
as a technological leader in TVs, DVD players, and smart
phones. But rather than just making
standardized products that were sold around the globe, Samsung
took a more decentralized
approach than Panasonic and Sony, which allowed it to do some
customizing of products for
specific markets. By 2014, Samsung’s lead continued to grow.
Observers wondered whether the
pattern of leader replacement would continue or if Samsung was
on top to stay.
Philips Leadership Era: 1900–1980
Philips was founded in 1891 in Eindhoven, Netherlands, by
Dutch engineer Gerard Philips and

4. his brother, Anton. The two brothers initially focused on the
light bulb business, with Gerard
in charge of product development and Anton in charge of sales.
Gerard and Anton began a
friendly competition in which Gerard would try to produce more
than Anton could sell and vice
versa.1 The two agreed that strong basic R&D and product
development efforts where vital to
the success of Philips, so the company made R&D and product
development high priorities.
The Philips emphasis on research and product development
helped it to become a leader in its
field, rivaling General Electric in the early 1900s in the electric
lamp industry.
In 1914, Philips established its first research laboratory
dedicated to developing break-
through technologies in lighting. This investment helped the
company create some of the
world’s leading innovations in lighting, such as the tungsten
metal filament bulb—a superior
Philips Leadership Era: 1900–1980 C-97
advancement over the common carbon-filament lamps.
Moreover, the Philips emphasis on
research led the company to experiment and develop new
technologies that allowed it to
expand its product portfolio. For example, in 1918, Philips
started to produce electronic vacuum
tubes, and soon after that, it was producing X-ray tubes, electric
shavers, and small generators.
Philips’ most successful new products were arguably its radios,
which, by 1936, a mere ten

5. years after the device’s introduction, had captured a nearly 20
percent world market share.2
Due to the small size of the Netherlands, Philips was forced to
expand internationally
in order to leverage its investment in R&D and develop
economies of scale in production. By
the early 1900s, Philips had begun selling in a wide range of
countries, including the United
States, France, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Australia, and Japan.3
With such a diverse group of inter-
national operations, Philips decided to adopt English as the
company language, requiring its
use across all of its management ranks. In anticipation of what
would become World War II,
Philips shifted assets away from the Netherlands and further
decentralized management con-
trol to the national organizations (NOs) in each country. Anton
Philips and much of the top
management team fled to the United States, and its main
research lab was moved to England.
The decentralization of Philips during the war enabled the NOs
in each country to become more
independent, thus allowing them to respond to their local
market conditions. Each of the larger
country NO presidents controlled multiple functions for their
countries, including R&D, prod-
uct design, manufacturing, and sales and distribution (see
Exhibit 1). In order to succeed in
each local market, the NOs tailored the Philips products to meet
consumer preferences in each
different country market. For example, some countries, such as
the United States, preferred
large furniture-encased television sets, but other countries, such
as India, demanded inexpen-
sive, small TVs—often placed inside closable shutters to keep

6. the dust away. Additionally, dif-
ferent countries had different ways to penetrate the market, such
as through establishing a TV
rental business or selling through department stores or discount
retailers.4 The NOs had the
flexibility to address the local market as they saw fit while
drawing upon Philips’s technology
and financial resources. For example, Philips of Australia made
the first stereo TV, and Philips of
the United Kingdom created the first TV with teletext.5 Other
countries could then access those
technologies and adapt them to their local markets.
As time went on, Philips matured into its postwar organization.
Fourteen product
divisions (PDs) with responsibility for each product’s
development, production, and global
distribution were established in Eindhoven. The product
divisions were created to better
coordinate across country markets. But the real power remained
with the NOs.6 The NOs were
highly autonomous and reported directly to the management
board (often sending proxies
CEO and Management
Board
National Organizations
(U.S., U.K., Germany,
Japan, etc.)
R&D
Product
Development

7. Manufacturing Marketing
Product Divisions
Development
Production
Distribution
International Concern
Council
Administration
-Finance, Legal HR
EXHIBIT 1 Philips Organization Structure in the 1950s
C-98 Samsung
to represent their interests). But after the European Common
Market broke down trade bar-
riers during the 1960s and 1970s, Philips’ competitors—
especially Panasonic (then named
Matsushita) and Sony—started to gain the upper hand. Products
started to become more
standardized across markets. Whereas Panasonic and Sony were
producing large volumes
of standardized products in low-wage countries in Asia, Philips
was producing smaller vol-
umes of more tailored products in many different countries.
Over time, Philips products could
not compete with the products of its Japanese competitors on
price or reliability. As a result,

8. Philips’s market share in various consumer electronics products
started to fall. The company
made numerous attempts to centralize the company in order to
compete against its large-scale
competition. Such attempts included consolidating production to
a smaller number of high-
volume plants called international production centers, closing
inefficient operations, shifting
production to low-wage countries, and reorganizing the
company into core and noncore busi-
nesses. But Philips’s market share and profitability continued to
decline.
Other problems outside of production also arose for Philips as a
result of its decentral-
ized organization structure. In the 1970s, Philips lost the battle
as the provider of the preferred
videocassette technology when its V2000 format had to be
abandoned due to its North
American NO deciding to license and sell Panasonic’s VHS
format (originally developed by JVC,
a subsidiary of Panasonic).7 Despite being a technologically
superior format, V2000 was unable
to capitalize on world market demand because it sold only in
Europe on the PAL standard,
whereas its Japanese competitors sold globally. VHS would
eventually become the market’s
preferred format, surpassing both Philips’s V2000 and Sony’s
Beta formats, and it would lead
Panasonic to the top of the consumer electronics industry in the
1980s.8 By 1987, Philips was
one of only two non-Japanese consumer electronics companies
in the world’s top ten (the
other was General Electric). Its profit margins of 1 to 2 percent
lagged behind its Japanese
competitors’ 4 to 6 percent (see Exhibit 2).

9. Between 1990 and 2005, Philips continued to reorganize to
centralize operations in an
attempt to gain greater efficiencies. In the early 1990s, CEO Jan
Timmer reduced headcount by
68,000, or 22 percent, earning him the nickname “The Butcher
of Eindhoven.”9 Due to European
E X H I B I T 2 Philips Group Summary Financial Data,
1970–2016
In millions of dollars: 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2013
2014 2015 2016
Net Sales $4,163 $16,993 $32,996 $35,253 $25,628 $19,228
$31,209 $33,423 $29,335 $29,664
SG&A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $556 $1,270 $9,173 $8,499
$8,147
Cost of Sales N/A N/A N/A N/A $4,006 $3,968 $6,789 $20,602
$17,409 $16,824
As % of net sales N/A N/A N/A N/A 16% 21% 22% 61.6%
59.3% 56.7%
R&D Expenses N/A N/A N/A N/A $2,152 $1,192 $2,318 $2,555
$1,463 $1,022
As % of net sales 8.4% 6.2% $0 7.6% 5.0% 3.4%
Advertising Expenses N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $1,235 $1,355
$1,427 $1,210
Income Before Taxes N/A N/A −1414 2814 1500.0% 1562.0%
$2,664 $759 $754 $1,681

10. Net Income 123 247 −2631 N/A 1097.0% 1085.0% $1,568 $642
$797 $1,804
As % of net sales 3% 2% −8% N/A 4.3% 5.6% 5% 1.9% 2.7%
6.1%
Total Assets $5,273 $18,440 $30,530 $35,885 $28,551 $24,409
$35,530 $44,300 $37,481 $39,087
Employees (in thousands) 359 373 273 219 159 119 116
1,12,959 1,13,678
Labor Costs 1,627 7,134 10,404 7,895 5,760 N/A N/A
As % of total employees 39% 42% 32% 22% 23% 24% N/A
Net Income Per Employee $13,761
Exchange Rate (fiscal period
end; guilder or euro/dollar)
3.62 2.15 1.69 1.074 1.186 1.322 1.25 1.25 1.1 1.1
Source: Annual reports.
Panasonic and Sony Leadership Era: 1980–2000 C-99
laws that require substantial compensation for layoffs (typically
15 months of pay), the first round
of 10,000 layoffs cost Philips $700 million. However, after
three years of cost cutting, a McKinsey
study estimated that the value added per hour in Japanese
consumer electronic factories was still

11. 68 percent above that of European plants. In 1996, Cor Boonstra
replaced Timmer and announced
that “There are no taboos, no sacred cows” and “The bleeders
must be turned around, sold, or
closed.”10 Within three years, he sold off 40 of Philips’ 120
major businesses, including well-known
units such as Polygram and Grundig. While closing 100 of the
company’s 356 factories worldwide,
he argued, “How can we compete with the Koreans [new
competitors Samsung and LG]? They
don’t have 350 companies all over the world. Their factory in
Ireland covers Europe and their
manufacturing facility in Mexico services North America.” He
also increased advertising by 40 per-
cent to raise awareness of the Philips brand and de-emphasize
most of the other 150 brands it
supported worldwide—from Magnavox TVs to Norelco shavers
to Marantz stereos (many of these
local brands had been acquired to strengthen Philips’s position
in specific local markets). These
and other actions helped Philips become more efficient and
improved profitability from losses in
the early 1990s to profit margins typically in the 4-6 percent
range from 2000–2010 (see Exhibit 2).
During the first decade of the new century Philips continued the
trend of closing fac-
tories in high wage countries, outsourcing most of the
production of its consumer electronics
lines and moving in house production to China, Poland, or
Mexico. Still, by 2012, Philips had
118 production plants in 24 countries
In addition to looking for savings in manufacturing, Philips also
cut back on its advertising
budget and focused its channel management on 200 large chains

12. (as opposed to 600 prior to
2001). These moves bore fruit as Philips’ net margins increased
to 4.3% in 2005 and 5.6% in
2010, but the increasingly intense competition cut their margins
to 1.9% in 2014. In response,
Philips increased its advertising but cut its R&D budget by 60%
by 2016. That revived the
bottom line, bringing it up to 6.1% in 2016, but at what cost for
a firm that was known for its
innovation? The cost turned out to be very steep indeed.
Philips decided to restructure its company in fundamental ways.
In 2011 net profit
had dropped 85% and in response Philips laid off 4,500 workers
and vowed to cut costs by
$1.1 billion dollars.11 To meet that goal, they sold their
television manufacturing operations12, their
audio and video businesses13, consumer electronic
operations14, and even divested themselves of
their lighting business15 - the business that launched Philips in
1891. This move was highlighted
by a change in the name from Philips Electronics to just
Philips16. Their new focus was on medical
equipment, consumer lifestyle products17, and products for
emerging markets (e.g.; they acquired
Preethi, a leading India-based kitchen appliance firm in 2011).
Philips had gone from being the
un disputed market leader in consumer electronics and lighting
to exiting both businesses. With
such fundamental change it was anyone’s guess as to whether
Philips could turn things around.
Panasonic and Sony Leadership
Era: 1980–2000
In 1918, a 23-year-old Osaka Electric Company inspector named
Konosuke Matsushita (affec-

13. tionately known as “KM”) invested a mere 100 yen to start
Matsushita Electric Industrial
(MEI). KM started MEI in a two-room house with his wife,
brother-in-law, and two employees.
The company’s first product was a light bulb attachment plug,
and KM aimed to produce
products 30 percent cheaper than its competition. MEI was
effective at efficient production,
and, by 1931, it had grown to employ 1,200 people in 10 plants,
producing more than 200 prod-
ucts. KM argued that “what manufacturers should aim for is to
produce as abundantly and
as cheaply as tap water; when this is achieved poverty will be
conquered from the face of the
earth.” A public offering in 1935 allowed Panasonic to diversify
further into domestic fans, light
bulbs, small motors, and a variety of domestic appliances. Soon
the wave of new products
became a flood: black-and-white TV sets in 1958; transistor
radios in 1959; color TVs, dishwash-
ers, and electric ovens in 1960. By 1968, Panasonic produced
5,000 products compared to
C-100 Samsung
80 for Japanese rival Sony. Capitalizing on this broad product
line, the company opened
25,000 domestic retail distribution outlets. With more than six
times the number of outlets than
Sony, the ubiquitous “National Shops” represented about 40
percent of all appliance stores in
Japan in the late 1960s.
Panasonic’s Organization Structure

14. KM organized MEI into product divisions and forced each
division to become self-sufficient in
various activities including product development, production,
and marketing (see Exhibit 3).
This structure allowed KM to easily measure each division’s
profit performance because each
was a semiautonomous business unit. If a division needed
additional funding, it needed to
make a loan request to headquarters; a loan request was then
received and reviewed, and,
if granted, it was accompanied by an interest rate comparable to
market rates. Headquarters
received 60 percent of each division’s earnings and expected
high performance from its division
managers (a drop in operating profits to below 4 percent of
sales for two consecutive years
led to the replacement of the product division general manager).
As a result, internal rivalry
among the 36 divisions was intense—a characteristic that was
believed to fuel the company’s
focus on efficiency and rapid growth. Even the central R&D
laboratory was underfunded, which
forced it to go directly to the product divisions to ask for R&D
projects that would be funded by
the product divisions. These management practices helped MEI
efficiently produce low-cost
products, and by the 1960s, MEI was a dominant player in
Japan. As the company looked for
growth options, it decided to expand internationally and
leverage economies of scale from
its large-volume factories in Japan. It wasn’t long before MEI
was exporting a diverse set of
products, including transistor radios, color TVs, dishwashers,
and electric ovens under the
Panasonic brand.

15. As MEI expanded internationally, the strategic direction and
product development for the
company remained closely regulated by its headquarters in
Japan. For the most part, prod-
ucts were researched, designed, and manufactured in Japan, and
then foreign managers
came and tried to negotiate for changes to accommodate the
products for their region’s pref-
erences. Headquarters, however, ultimately had the final say as
to whether these proposed
changes were approved. In order to ensure efficient control of
international operations, the
Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd (MEI)
Matsushita Electric
Trading Co. (METC)
Tape
Recorder
Division
Radio
Division
Europe
Department
Middle East and
Africa Department
Planning
Department
Foreign Relations

16. Department
Asia I
Department
Asia II
Department
Latin America
Department
Overseas
Advertising
Department
Overseas
Sales
Companies
(ex. N. America)
Overseas
Sources
Companies
Overseas Sales
And Manufacturing
Companies
North America
Sales
Companies

17. North America
Department
Television
Division
Corporate
Overseas
Management (COM)
Personnel
Division
Financial and
Accounting
Division
EXHIBIT 3 Panasonic’s (Matsushita) Headquarters
Organization for International Companies in 1987
Source: Adapted from Sumantra Ghoshal and Christopher A.
Bartlett, “Matsushita electric industrial (MEI) in 1987,”
Harvard
Business School Case 9-388, 1990.
Panasonic and Sony Leadership Era: 1980–2000 C-101
company sent hundreds of expatriate Japanese managers and
technicians abroad to oversee
international operations and to report back candidly on the state
of the company in their
assigned areas. As one senior executive noted, “Even if a local

18. manager speaks Japanese, he
would not have the long experience that is needed to build
relationships and understand our
management processes.”18 As such, Panasonic maintained
centralized control of local opera-
tions around the globe.
Panasonic Overtakes Philips
The birth of the videocassette recorder (VCR) propelled
Panasonic into first place in the
consumer electronics industry during the 1980s. In 1975, Sony
introduced the technically
superior “Betamax” format VCR, and the next year JVC (a
subsidiary of Panasonic) launched
a competing “VHS” format. Whereas Sony decided to maintain
full control over its Betamax
format, Panasonic aggressively licensed the VHS format to a
host of other manufacturers,
including Hitachi, Sharp, Mitsubishi, GE, RCA, Zenith, and,
eventually, Philips. The company
quickly built production facilities to meet its own needs as well
as those of OEM customers,
such as GE, RCA, and Zenith, who decided to outsource
production to Panasonic or other
Japanese manufacturers. Between 1977 and 1985, capacity
increased 33-fold to 6.8 million
units. Leveraging the distribution channels and brand names
the company had established
with earlier products (e.g., Panasonic, National, JVC), the new
VCRs met with huge success
abroad. Panasonic’s overseas sales growth increased a
remarkable 52 percent in 1980 and then
by a further 35 percent in 1981. In 1985, VCR sales comprised
an estimated 43 percent of over-
seas revenue. Increased volume enabled Panasonic to slash
prices 50 percent within five years

19. of product launch, while simultaneously improving quality. By
the late 1980s, VCRs accounted
for 30 percent of Panasonic’s sales and 45 percent of profits.
It wasn’t until the late 1980s and a change in CEO that
Panasonic looked to move toward
a more decentralized strategy. CEO Toshihiko Yamashita
launched “Operation Localization” in
hopes of dispersing innovation development and increasing
local customization of products;
however, for a company so entrenched in a centralized
mentality, the change was met with
resistance. By 1995, only 250 of the company’s 3,000 R&D
scientists and engineers were located
outside of Japan, and this was viewed as a problem given the
emergence of lower-cost sources
of high-quality engineers and scientists outside of Japan.
Panasonic did establish numerous
factories in countries such as Malaysia where wage rates were
significantly lower than they
were in Japan.
Due to low cost competition and Panasonic’s difficulty in
decentralizing operations,
Panasonic spent nearly 20 years in decline. Overall profit
margins were 3.9% in 1990 but
steadily declined until they hit rock bottom at −9.8% in 2013
(see exhibit 4). The decline in
profits were accompanied by exiting the analog TV business
(30% of Panasonic’s TV business) in
200619, exiting the HDTV segment in 200820, and much of the
rest of its television manufacturing
businesses in 201121. CEO Kazuhiro Tsuga stated in its annual
report, “Our status is one of deep
crisis. If we fail to act now, we will lose our standing in the
eyes of the world.”

20. In 2009 Panasonic merged with Sanyo in a bid to increase
market share22. It did increase
sales temporarily but resulted in overlapping businesses.
Panasonic laid off 40,000 workers in
201123 and another 10,00024 in 2012 after their stock dropped
to its lowest point since 197525.
Clearly something was not working.
Finally, Panasonic made the decision to build more plants in
low wage countries,
starting with a factory in Vietnam in 201326. Following that
move, Panasonic began a series of
projects and joint ventures including a stake in a Slovenian
household appliance business27,
the acquisition of a video surveillance service28, a joint
venture to make personalized digital
store signs29, entry into Africa30, an indoor vegetable growing
factory in Singapore31 and the
acquisition of a satellite communication service provider32.
The jewel of the scattered approach to recovery was the 2014
announcement of a joint
venture with Tesla to build a “GigaFactory” in the U.S. to
manufacture batteries for Tesla’s electric
cars33. This joint venture went so well that in June 2016 Tesla
named Panasonic its sole supplier
of batteries34. In response Panasonic raised $3.86 billion in
bonds to complete the Gigafactory35.
C-102 Samsung
Despite the scattered approach, all of these moves, particularly
the alliance with Tesla, revived

21. Panasonic’s fortunes. Profit margins slowly rose. By the end of
2016 they were at 2.5 percent (see
exhibit 4). And perhaps the cherry on top of the cake was that
in 2016 Panasonic was able to
re-enter the television market with a transparent TV36.
Both Philips and Panasonic had been leaders in consumer
electronics. Both suffered deep
losses and, in order to survive, ended up divesting themselves
of consumer electronics and
re-creating themselves in other businesses. While Philips
focused on a few businesses where it
was a market leader, Panasonic struck out in dozens of
directions from vegetables to satellites.
Which approach will pay off? Or will both companies decline
again?
Sony Enters the Fray
In 1946, Masaru Ibuka and Akio Morita launched Sony
(originally Totsuko) as a radio repair
business and short-wave converter manufacturer.37 Although
the company had humble
beginnings, during the inauguration of the company, Ibuka
prophetically declared that the
company would create technologies that large corporations
could not match. Ibuka said, “The
reconstruction of Japan depends on the development of dynamic
technologies.”38 The found-
ers then set out to use the surplus of electricity left by the
wartime factories to create consumer
electronics. The founders hired engineers with a desire to create
new products and focused
the company on innovation. Some products, such as the
vacuum-tube voltmeter and the
electrically heated cushion, “sold like hotcakes,” but others,
including the primitive electric rice

22. cooker, were memorable failures.39 The company learned from
its successes and failures, how-
ever, as the founders guided their employees with the slogan
“Research Makes the Difference.”
Sony’s focus on innovation motivated its leaders to invest a
much higher percentage
of their revenues on R&D, an amount typically estimated to be
2-3 times higher than that
invested by Panasonic. The innovations that followed included
Japan’s first transistor radio,
E X H I B I T 4 Panasonic Summary Financial Data, 1970–
2016
In millions of dollars: 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2012
2013 2014 2015 2016
Net Sales $2,589 $13,690 $37,755 $70,864 $73,847 $89,373
$80,889 $73,497 $64,035 $69,494
SG&A N/A N/A N/A N/A $18,890 $22,723 $11,945 $17,029
$14,989 $16,459
R&D Expenses N/A $479 $2,176 $5,107 $5,220 $5,747 $5,363
$4,549 $3,795 $4,138
As a % of net sales 6.2% 5.9% 6.0%
Advertising Expenses N/A N/A N/A N/A $207 N/A $21,000*
Cost of Sales $53,569 $45,876 $49,128
As a % of net sales 72.9% 71.6% 70.7%
Income Before Taxes $408 $1,521 $3,597 $2,126 $2,093 −$349

23. $451 $1,959 $1,514 $1,997
Net Income $194 $587 $1,484 $971 $492 −$2,060 −$7,961
$1,144 $1,490 $1,769
As % of net sales 7.6% 4.3% 3.9% 1.4% 0.7% −2.3% −9.8%
1.6% 2.3% 2.5%
Total Assets $2,042 $11,638 $49,377 $77,233 $68,280 $100,699
$68,052 $49,523 $49,443 $51,492
Employees (units) 78,924 107,057 198,299 290,448 334,752
384,586 293742 271789 254084
Overseas Employees N/A N/A 59,216 143,773 184,110 231,733
175000 150000 147387
As % of total employees N/A N/A 30% 50% 55% 60% 59.6%
55.2% 58.0%
Exchange Rate (fiscal
period end; yen/dollar)
360 213 159 103 118 83 0.0125 0.0103 0.0095 0.0083 0.0092
* Advertising Expenses are for 2012.
Note: Data prior to 1987 are for the fiscal year ending
November 20; data from 1988 and after are for the fiscal year
ending March 31.
Source: Morningstar.com & Panasonic Annual Reports
Source for Advertising Expenses:
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Panasonic_Corporation_(PC)/D
ata/Advertising_Expenses/2010
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Panasonic_Corporation_(PC)/D
ata/Advertising_Expenses/2010

24. http://Morningstar.com
Panasonic and Sony Leadership Era: 1980–2000 C-103
the first all-transistor TV, the first VCR (Betamax), the first
personal stereo (Walkman), the first
CD player, the PlayStation game system, Blu Ray, and many
other products.40 Panasonic was
usually content to reverse engineer Sony’s products and to be a
fast follower with a “me-too”
product that was lower priced. Consequently, Panasonic would
wait and see how the market
responded to Sony’s new products before imitating them.41
Sony, on the other hand, was an
industry pioneer. Sony’s innovative new products allowed it to
successfully expand on a global
scale, particularly to major industrialized nations looking for
innovations, such as the United
States. In 1960, Sony established Sony Corporation of America
(SONAM) in the United States
and Sony Overseas, S.A., near Zurich, Switzerland.42 Sony
followed that with overseas product
development and production facilities in San Diego, California,
and Bridgend, Wales. How-
ever, these represented a small percentage of Sony’s product
development and production
activities because Sony’s operations, like Panasonic’s, were
largely centralized and conducted
in Japan. The main difference between the two companies was
that Sony’s R&D focused more
on breakthrough technologies that would lead to new products,
whereas Panasonic’s focused
more on process technologies that allowed for low -cost and
reliable production of products.

25. Although Sony and Panasonic were leaders in the industry in
1990, the following ten years
brought new challenges. Most significantl y, Japan’s domestic
market for consumer electronics
collapsed due to a recession—from $42 billion in 1989 to $21
billion in 1999. Excess capacity
drove down prices, and profits evaporated (see Exhibits 4 & 5
for Panasonic and Sony financial
information). Although offshore markets were growing, the rise
of new competition—first from
Korea, then China—created worldwide overcapacity. Samsung
had become a particularly
effective new competitor by focusing on design and innovation
as a way to differentiate its
products. By 2005, Samsung was rivaling Sony as a leader in
innovation and design and its
brand had …
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