The Vargas Tragedy of 1999 in Venezuela was caused by unusually heavy rains in December that triggered thousands of landslides and debris flows along mountainsides north of Caracas. These flows swept down into populated coastal areas, killing an estimated 10,000 to 50,000 people and leaving over 150,000 homeless. Infrastructure like roads, bridges, and ports were destroyed, crippling transportation and the economy. In the aftermath, authorities established new organizations to oversee reconstruction, installed sediment control dams and early warning systems, and rebuilt damaged infrastructure over the following decade, though thousands remained homeless and the full recovery was still ongoing years later.

1. GOVERNMENT ENGINEERING COLLEGE,
BHARUCH
PowerPoint presentation as partial fulfillment of team work in disaster management
(2150003)
Topic Name – Vargas Tragedy 1999
Submitted by - Mithaiwala Nachiketa R.
Enrollment No. – 1801431.6010
Applied Mechanics Department

2. INTRODUCTION
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
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1 Before starting our presentation
THE EVENT- HOW OCCURED2 How it will happen time by time
THE IMPACTS3 How much affect the disaster
LATER-ON CONSEQUENCES4 Some disaster make another disaster
ANALYSIS5 Immediate response, Reasons & measures of disaster

3. INTRODUCTION
The Vargas Disaster

4. 4
Vargas
Disaster Causes
First two weeks of December 1999
saw an unusually high amount of
precipitation (40-50% above normal
rainfalls)
Political corruption – allowing
shanty-towns to be built on steep
slopes surrounding Caracas

5. THE EVENT
HOW OCCURED
Time To Time Event

6. THE EVENT HOW OCCURED
Heavy rains fell in December 1999 along the north-central coast of Venezuela,
culminating in a period of extreme intensity from 14 to 16 December.
Starting around 8 PM local time on 15 December, runoff entered channels and
rushed towards the sea, picking up and depositing sediments on its way.
Generally after this first wave of flooding, from the coast to just past the crest of the
Sierra de Avila, these rains triggered thousands of shallow landslides that stripped
soil and rock off of the landscape and sent them slipping down the mountainside.
Additional water liquefied these landslides into debris flows, which are granular
flows in which water mixes with high concentrations of rock and mud.
The final debris flows were reported between 8 and 9 AM on 16 December. 6

7. 7
CONTINUE…
Many catchments released multiple debris flows, some of which carried large
boulders and tree trunks onto the alluvial fan deltas.
Starting between 7 and 9 AM on the 16th and continuing until late that
afternoon, a new wave of floods occurred.
These floodwaters were less concentrated in sediment and were therefore
able to entrain new material and incise new channels into the flood and debris
flow deposits from the previous days.
The debris flows moved rapidly, and many of them were highly destructive.
These rapid flows resulted in much of the observed destruction

8. THE IMPACTS
On Lives As Well As Financial

9. THE IMPACTS
Rains triggered mudslides, landslides and flash floods which claimed the lives of
10,000 -50,000 (unknown accurately as most people were buried under mud or
swept to sea) in between the mountains and the Caribbean Sea
150,000 were left homeless by landslides and floods in the states of Vargas and
Miranda.
Bridges, roads, factories, crops, telecommunications and the tourism industry (in the
immediate future) were destroyed. The international airport in Caracas was closed.
Containers at the seaport of Maiqueita were damaged. Hazardous material leaked
out of these containers. Operations at the port were halted and hampered efforts to
bring in emergency supplies. The economic damage was estimated at $3billion
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10. 10

11. LATER-ON
CONSEQUENCES
Some Disaster Make Another Disaster

12. LATER-ON CONSEQUENCES
The mudslides significantly altered more than 60 kilometres (37 miles) of the coastline in Vargas
Over 70% of the population of the state of Vargas was affected by the disaster
Public services, like water, electricity, phone lines, and land transportation (roads and bridges)
completely disappeared in some places
There were no supplies of food and water for months, so most of the population had to be
evacuated. Looting and sacking sprouted up everywhere, forcing the military to implement martial
law for more than one year
By 2006, the state was back to its pre-disaster population level, and projects were slowly being
carried out to rebuild damaged infrastructure
Nine years after the event, thousands remained homeless.
The value of real estate in zones untouched by the floods declined by as much as 70%, due to the
destruction of infrastructure
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13. ANALYSIS
Immediate response, Reasons & measures of disaster

14. Measures : Immediate Reaction
05.01.2000: a new Office was created to centralize the process for reconstruction (AUTORIDAD
UNICA). The former Science Minister was designated for this service.
- 08.06.2000: a state - controlled corporation was created in order to proceed with the financial
issues (CORPO-VARGAS).
- In less than a year, several projects where developed by a team of 200 high-level specialists
(“Autoridad Única” ) focusing on:
1. urban planning,
2. watersheds management
3. Hydraulic protection
4. disaster prevention
5. rebuild of damage infrastructure
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15. Measures: CORPOVARGAS
2003: ordered structural measures for
retention and storage of sediments,
and control channels
 Construction of 35 sediment control
dams, most of them were open-style.
 Intervention works in 25 basins (of 33
along the coastline)
 Most of sediment control dams were
constructed by stone-gabions, instead
of concrete or even with stand piping.
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16. Measures: CORPOVARGAS
 Flash-Flood Early-Warning System:
installation of 33 pluviometry stations
and 9 hydrometric stations
 Corpovargas was finally closed in
2010.
 After 2011 the stations belonging to
the Early Warning System do not offer
real-time data, due to lack of
maintenance.
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17. REFERENCES
http://landslides.usgs.gov/landslide.html
NLIC@usgs.gov Alluvial fan hazards
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/all/
The Venezuela disaster, see http://pr.water.usgs.gov/public/venezuela
Lelys Bravo de Guenni, , Rafael Hernández, Isabel Llatas and Abraham Salcedo
(Universidad Simón Bolívar y Universidad central de Venezuela): “Developing a Community
Based Early Warning System in Vargas State, Venezuela”
https://iwhw.boku.ac.at/idrim2010/docs/presentations/session%20%236/1_Bravo_de_Guenni.
pdf
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ANY QUESTIONS?
THANK YOU !