The Soviet forces defeated the Wehrmacht through a combination of political, tactical, strategic, and logistical factors: 1) Hitler made several strategic blunders that weakened the Wehrmacht, including interfering with its structure and issuing brutal orders targeting civilians. 2) Stalin's purges had decimated the Red Army officer corps but survivors later proved effective commanders. 3) Stalin was able to rally the Soviet people to total war through patriotic speeches and brutal policies, mobilizing the entire nation and limiting German gains. 4) The Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg tactics were ineffective in prolonged campaigns, and it suffered heavy attrition and equipment losses on the vast Eastern Front.

1. How did the Soviet forces defeat the Wehrmacht?
In the early morning of 22nd
June 1941, the Wehrmacht commenced Operation Barbarossa. Taking the
Soviets completely by surprise, the Wehrmacht smashed through entire divisions of the Red Army, in a
series of major victories. However, the sheer size of the Soviet Union and the number of troops that the
Germans had to fight took their toll, with the Wehrmacht finally halted at the gates of Moscow. From
the summer of 1941 to the spring of 1945, the Wehrmacht was engaged in some of the fiercest fighting
seen in modern history, ultimately ending in defeat for the Germans. This essay will examine how the
Soviets managed to claw back a victory by examining the political, tactical, strategical, and logistical
factors that led to the Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht.
One of Hitler's first blunders which severely affected the German capability to wage war against the
U.S.S.R was his interference with the structure of the Wehrmacht. Despite the desire to attack the
Soviets, a large number of infantry divisions were disbanded after the campaign in the Low Countries,
only to be hurriedly reformed again with a massive influx of inexperienced troops several months later.
Robert Kershaw writes that “Rapid expansion diluted quality. The German infantry of 1941 differed
little from that in 1939. Practically none of the reforms suggested at the end of the French campaign
were carried out. The Panzer divisions were more numerous, had more medium tanks... but were
weaker than their 1939 counterparts”1
. Hitler's decision to create and reorganise may have to look
good on paper, however, the expansion of the Waffen-SS, panzer, motorised, and airborne divisions in
the period before Operation Barbarossa led to a large number of confused and mediocre units being
created, diluting the overall fighting quality of the Wehrmacht.
A further blunder on Hitler's part were the numerous orders dedicated to wiping out Jews and
Bolsheviks in conquered territories, including the infamous Commissar Decree. Hitler's insistence of
the liquidation of all Soviet party members and political officers who were “the originators of the
barbaric, Asiatic fighting methods” as well as revoking the combatant status of Soviet political officers
created not only a feeling of revulsion in many of the German officer corps, at least at a lower level,
but also encouraged soviet units to fight to the bitter end2
. The continued use of Einsatz Gruppen,
already having proved their brutality in Poland, as well as the Ordnung-Polizei using extreme measures
as part of the Barbarossa Order, which allowed any German forces to treat “enemy civilians who
interfere with military operations should be dealt with the utmost severity”3
. Richard Evans writes
1
Robert Kershaw, “War Without Garlands. Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942”, (Ian Allan Publishing: Chatham, 2009)
pp. 45
2
Mark Mazower, “Hitler's Empire. Nazi Rule In Occupied Europe”, (Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 2009) pp. 142
3
Mazower, M, “Hitler's Empire”, pp. 142

2. further that “the inclusion of ill-defined categories such as 'propagandists' and 'agitators' [groups
included amongst enemy civilians] was an open invitation to kill all male Jews, since Nazi ideology
considered in principle that all Jewish men fell into this group”4
. By following these orders and
summarily executing thousands of innocent civilians, the Nazi's began to feed Soviet propaganda,
turned the potentially friendly populations of some Eastern European nations against them, as well as
proving to be a logistical and psychological drain on the Wehrmacht.
Political interference was not limited solely to Hitler and the Wehrmacht. The purges that had shaken
the Red Army over a four-year period had reduced the Soviet officer corps to half of its original
strength. Glantz and House claim that “Right up to the German invasion, Soviet officers disappeared
with alarming frequency. Of an estimated 80,000 officers in the armed forces, at least 30,000 were
imprisoned or executed... [while] another 10,000 were dismissed from the service”. If this was not
devastating enough, those executed included “3 out of 5 marshals, all 11 deputy defence commissars,
every military district commander, the C-in-C of both the Navy and Air Force, 90 percent of all army
commanders, 60 corps commanders, 136 divisional commanders... and 50 percent of all regimental
commanders”5
. This effectively decapitated the Soviet military before war had even been declared. A
small number of commanders who were imprisoned were released and immediately placed in
command positions, some, such as K. Rokossovsky, being highly skilled6
. While inexperienced, the
graduates of the Soviet General Staff college from 1937-41 were immediately placed in positions of
influence where they later proved to be effective.
Despite Stalin's disastrous interference with the Soviet military, he was able to steer his nation away
from total disaster by appealing to the people to mobilise for total war. Although conducted in a brutal
way, Stalin's July orders galvanised the Soviet people into making the Germans pay for ground. Stalin's
speech on 3rd
July began unusually with the sentimental declaration of “Comrades, citizens, brothers
and sisters” before stating that “the whole Soviet people must fight for every inch of Soviet soil, fight to
the last drop of blood”.7
His order that the entire nation would be put on a war footing, his demand
that retreating units implement a scorched earth policy, as well as ordering the formation of partisan
groups to harry the Germans, limited the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities in the long run. The
implementation of the “Not One Step Back Order No. 227” served to encourage less than eager Soviet
4
Richard J. Evans, “The Third Reich At War. How The Nazi's Led Germany From Conquest to Disaster”, (Penguin
Books: St Ives plc, 2009), pp. 177-178
5
David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, “When Titans Clashed. How The Red Army Stopped Hitler” (University Press
Kansas: Witchita, 1995), pp. 11-12
6
Antony Beevor, “Stalingrad”, (Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 1999), pp. 23-396
7
Kershaw, R,“War Without Garlands”, pp. 249

3. troops through guilt by association8
. The order was so effective that one German officer despaired that
“The German Army in fighting Russia is like an elephant attacking a host of ants. The elephant will
kill... millions... but in the end their numbers will overcome him, and he will be eaten to the bone”9
.
This prophecy turned out to be accurate as the Wehrmacht had already suffered approximately one
million casualties by December 1941.
A further problem faced by the Wehrmacht was that the very organisation was tactically unsuited to
prolonged land campaigns. Blitzkrieg, while proven to be effective in France and the Low Countries,
often relied on surprise and tactical brinkmanship to work. The Panzers were also in need of constant
maintenance. In Russia, a short campaign was not possible. One Panzergrenedier complained, “In three
days I have slept for two hours and one attack has followed the other”10
. Such conditions would
inevitably lead to a drop in combat effectiveness and would result in greater casualties. An SS trooper
in September 1941 stated “[we march] on roads that have been washed away, in pouring rain,
carrying...all our equipment, we fight our way against enemy resistance. We are at the end of our
strength”11
. This statement was made only three months into the campaign, indicating the level of
attrition that the Wehrmacht had to battle against. Hitler's desire to capture major cities such as
Stalingrad also put the Panzers at a disadvantage. Already having suffered debilitating losses against
Soviet armoured units, Panzers deployed to assist in street fighting could be easily destroyed. In one
position “whenever Panzers approached... the men scattered to the attic or cellar from where they
could engage the Panzers at close range. The Panzer crews could not elevate their main armaments
sufficiently to fire back [sic]”12
.
By the winter of 1941, the Soviets realised that human-wave attacks conducted without support were
costly and futile. Reverting back to Russian tactical and strategic thoughts of the 1930's, the forgotten
concept of Deep Battle and Deep Operation – the utilising of infantry, artillery, and armour to
neutralise an enemy's defences to the maximum and then rapidly exploiting it – became popular once
again13
. The creation of Shock Armies allowed for the faster exploitation of breakthroughs while
massive artillery offensives would precede any advance. Glantz and House write “Using artillery in
this manner was little more than common sense... the very fact that the Stavka had to issue such
directives indicates the abysmal ignorance of some junior commanders”14
. Although extremely crude,
8
Andrew Roberts, “Storm of War”, (Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 2009) pp. 161
9
Alan Clark, “Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict 1941-1945”, (Cassell: Chatham, 2005) pp.55
10
Kershaw, R,“War Without Garlands” pp. 173
11
James Lucas, “Das Reich. The Military Role of 2nd
SS Division”, (Cassell: Chatham, 1991) pp.68
12
Beevor, A ,“Stalingrad”, pp. 198
13
Glantz, D. and House, J. “When Titans Clashed”, pp. 99
14
Glantz, D and House, J. “When Titans Clashed”, pp. 100

4. the offensives manage to create deep salient in the German line and sapped the Germans strength. The
Soviets also adopted the tactic of Defence-in-Depth which was utilised at Leningrad, Stalingrad, and
Kursk. Loyd Clark states that at Kursk “Attacking units disappeared into a cloud of explosions and
smoke... The Soviet second line ate up the Wehrmacht's young men hour after hour”15
. By successfully
utilising a multi-layered defence, the German offensive quickly ground to a halt, resulting in massive
attrition for the Wehrmacht with negligible results.
Throughout the period of fighting on the Eastern Front from 1941-1943, the Germans set themselves a
series of strategic goals that if reached, would supposedly knock Russia out of the conflict. While
Army Group Center's drive on Moscow in 1941 and Army Group South's thrust into the Crimea were
viewed as strategically sound when first envisaged, Hitler's decision to meddle in strategic planning
had dire consequences. His first order to attack Leningrad and then besiege the city instead of storming
it caused much consternation amongst the OKW, as well as the controversial decision to strike Kiev
instead of pushing onto Moscow. Already aware that the campaign had started a month late, Generals
Bock and Guedarian complained that “critical momentum would be lost in the drive on the Russian
capital”16
. Kershaw confirms this opinion and states “The Russians, with space to react, were given
time to learn. They had already noted the difficulty of matching the infantry pace to Panzers... By
destroying material and inflicting casualties [during night attacks] the Russians could cause a
significant impact [on the German advance]”17
. By harassing the Germans, the Soviet force were able
to bleed the Wehrmacht of strength and delay them from reaching their objectives where they would be
defeated by the cold and massive Soviet reserves.
Hitler made a similar mistake in 1942 and again in 1943, first with his decision to strike the Caucus Oil
Fields and Stalingrad simultaneously, as well as his decision to delay the Kursk Offensive. Beevor
writes that when the orders were received that “[Field Marshal List] could only conclude that Hitler
possessed intelligence confirming the collapse of the Red Army which had not been passed down [such
was the underestimation of Russian forces]”18
. Furthermore, Hitler did not foresee the difficulties in
ordering his already overstretched Army Group to seize not only the Caucasus but also the entire
eastern seaboard of the Black Sea, as well as taking and holding Stalingrad while re-deploying elite
units and replacing them with sub-standard foreign troops. The costly stalemate at Kursk was Hitler's
next blunder that was ultimately of his own doing. Effectively forced to launch a counter-offensive
owing to the massive territorial gains made by the Russians after Stalingrad, Hitler placed too much
15
Lloyd Clark, “Kursk. The Greatest Battle”, (Headline Publishing: St Ives plc, 2012), pp. 308
16
Roberts, A, “Storm of War”, pp. 166
17
Kershaw, R, “War Without Garlands” pp. 361
18
Beevor, A, “Stalingrad”, pp. 80

5. confidence in new Panzer technology which would take time to build up in quantity. Evans writes
“Manstein wanted to move quickly, before the Red Army could make its preparations but was frustrated
by problems... of getting reinforcements to the front... Hitler, therefore, delayed the attack while his
armies gathered strength... But the vulnerability of the Kursk bulge was obvious to all and allowed the
Red Army to bring in massive reinforcements”19
. By stalling the attack, Hitler allowed the Russians to
set up a defence-in-depth which ultimately led to a stalemate that the Germans could not recover from.
Despite the image of mass mechanisation, the commencement of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941
saw the Wehrmacht still relying on horse-drawn transport to cater to its logistical needs. As well as the
panzers who required continual re-supply, the mainstay of the Wehrmacht were the infantry divisions
that had to march on Soviet cities. The problem soon arose that the further the Germans advanced, the
harder it became to resupply the forward units. An officer in the German General Staff complained of
Army Group Center push “The time factor favours them [the soviets], as they are near their own
resources, while we move farther and farther away from ours”20
. Owing to the problems already
caused by Blitzkrieg, the Wehrmacht now had an even shorter timeframe in which to secure victory. As
time went on, the logistical situation grew worse. At Stalingrad, despite Sixth Army requiring 700
tonnes a day of supplies to operate, High Command could only promise to supply 350 tonnes at most
and frequently failed to deliver21
. At Kursk, General Model complained that to successfully conduct
the operation he needed “More tanks! More officers! More artillery!”22
. The constant supply shortage
meant that any action undertaken by the Wehrmacht would be limited and later result in severe
privation.
Despite Operation Barbarossa having severely affected the Soviet economy from 1942, the Russians
were able to improve not only their economy but also their logistical system as well. Manpower was
never an issue for the Soviets, General Halder stating “if we smash a dozen [soviet divisions], the
Russians simply put up another dozen”23
. Unnerving as this was, by the end of 1941 the Russians had
lost production of “coal by 57 percent, pig iron by 68 percent, steel by 58 percent aluminium by 60
percent, and grain by 38 percent”24
. This lead to a staggering reduction in Russian industry, prompting
the use of unsupported infantry attacks. However, keen to have another ally fighting Hitler, both the
USA and the British Commonwealth began supplying the Soviets with a huge amount of raw materials
and other supplies. By the spring of 1942, the allies were supplying Russia with enough materials
19
Evans, R, “The Third Reich At War”, pp. 485
20
Roberts, A, “Storm of War”, pp. 166
21
Beevor, A, “Stalingrad”, pp. 270
22
Clark, L, “Kursk”, pp. 192
23
Kershaw, R,“War Without Garlands” pp. 258
24
Clark, A, “Barbarossa”, pp.195

6. “thereby allowing Soviet manufacturing to recover much more rapidly than might otherwise be the
case”. As well as this, the Lend-Lease programme led to the Soviets receiving 409,000 trucks, 47,000
jeeps, almost 12,000 railcars. Glantz and House state that “without trucks, each soviet offensive from
1943-1945 would have come to a halt after a shallower penetration, allowing the Germans time to
reconstruct their defences and force the Red Army to launch more assaults”25
. Owing to this constant
supply of materials as well as the majority of Russian factories in the Urals, well out of range of the
Germans, the Russians were able to launch massive assaults with well-supplied troops. The Germans,
having no strong economic allies, could not sustain their much-reduced forces, even in retreat.
With the fall of the U.S.S.R, contemporary historians began to examine Russian archives on the subject
of the Great Patriotic War. While no-one can deny the huge sacrifice made by the Soviets, many
questioned the accuracy of the communist version of events. Grantz and House claim that the Soviet
record shows that “the standard Soviet estimate of Lend-Lease is that it only 4 percent of Soviet
production, but in reality it is much greater”26
. The Russian archives also show that the allied armour
sent to Russia was sub-standard. While true, Russian historians also gloss over the ineptitude of their
own early armour commanders as well as the massive logistical impact the allies had on the Soviet war
effort. However, Lloyd Clark points out that at its greatest height “560 Soviet divisions fought 235
German divisions over a 2,000 mile front... compared to 91 allied divisions in France fighting 65
German divisions”27
. Thus, the significance of the Eastern Campaign cannot be ignored.
Although the Wehrmacht's failure to capture Moscow in the winter of 1941 meant that Germany had
lost it's first and possibly last opportunity at snatching victory on the Russian front, it was by no means
a death knell for the Germans. However, the Soviet doctrine of “Deep Battle”, unlimited Soviet
reserves, and strategic decisions made on a whim for political purposes by Hitler caused the
Wehrmacht to enter into a war of total annihilation where it was ground down and utterly defeated in a
series of devastating engagements. Evans concludes that “[German] defeat came not through
disorganisation or inefficiency but through the military and economic superiority of the Red Army”28
.
While the political hierarchy of both the Nazi and Soviet states caused numerous problems which
hampered their own goals, the Soviets were able to defeat the Wehrmacht so absolutely thanks to the
sheer weight troops and their logistical system. The Germans, having built their economy and their
entire armed forces around the concept of Blitzkrieg could simply not afford to conduct strategic
operations in an area the size of the Russian front. Despite the superior training and equipment that the
25
Glantz, D and House, J. “When Titans Clashed”, pp.150
26
Glantz, D and House, J. “When Titans Clashed”, ibid
27
Clark, L, “Kursk”, pp. xvi
28
Evans, R, “The Third Reich At War”, pp. 497

7. Germans possessed, in a conflict of resources, the Wehrmacht was no match for the Red Army.

8. Bibliography
Books
Beevor, A., “Stalingrad”, (Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 1999)
Clark, A., “Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict 1941-1945”, (Cassell: Chatham, 2005)
Clark, L., “Kursk. The Greatest Battle”, (Headline Publishing: St Ives plc, 2012)
Evans, R.J., “The Third Reich At War. How The Nazi's Led Germany From Conquest to Disaster”,
(Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 2009)
Glantz, D.M., and House, J., “When Titans Clashed. How The Red Army Stopped Hitler” (University
Press Kansas: Witchita, 1995)
Kershaw, R., “War Without Garlands. Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942”, (Ian Allan Publishing:
Chatham, 2009)
Lucas, J., “Das Reich. The Military Role of 2nd
SS Division”, (Cassell: Chatham, 1991)
Mazower, M., “Hitler's Empire. Nazi Rule In Occupied Europe”, (Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 2009)
Roberts, A., “Storm of War”, (Penguin Books: St Ives plc, 2009)