This historiographical essay examines scholarship on Major General William Tecumseh Sherman's 1864 campaign, 'march to the sea,' from 1952 to 2003, highlighting varying perspectives from historians over the decades. Key works include Earl Miers' balanced views, Richard Harwell's emphasis on Sherman's intent to instill fear, and Edmund Drago's exploration of the campaign's effects on slaves and southern whites. Overall, the document illustrates the evolving understanding and the complex legacy of Sherman's methods and the broader implications of his campaign.

1. PRELIMINARY HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY:
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN’S
TOTAL WAR
Kristian Que
24 April 2013

2. This historiographical study is devoted to scholarship published between 1952 and 2003,
which examined Major General William Tecumseh Sherman‟s “March to the Sea” campaign
from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia in 1864.
Historians have been examining General Sherman‟s campaign through Georgia for over a
century. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, historians
have examined different aspects and points-of-view of General Sherman‟s campaign, providing a
more comprehensive understanding of the impact of General Sherman‟s campaign to the people
of Georgia and how this event influenced future warfare.
1952-1956
In 1952, a prolific historian of the Civil War, Earl Schneck Miers, published his account
of General Sherman‟s campaign in The Georgia Historical Quarterly, titled “The General who
Marched to Hell. William Tecumseh Sherman and his March to Fame and Infamy.” Miers‟ work
included over 100 published books, most dedicated to the American Civil War. Miers was born
in New York and received honorary degrees from Lincoln College and Rutgers University.1
Miers endeavored to capture the significance of the campaign to both sides as reflected in
letters, newspapers, diaries, and eyewitness accounts. Though largely unbiased, Miers‟ Northern
roots may have led him to justify more of General Sherman‟s actions than he condemned.Miers
accepted that the burning of Atlanta was a horrific event to Southerners who witnessed it. The
1
Earl S. Miers, “The General who Marched to Hell.William Tecumseh Sherman and his March to Fame and
Infamy.”The Georgia Historical Quarterly(June 1952): 195-196.

3. march to Savannah was largely fear mongering spread by Southerners themselves and General
Sherman only helped to perpetuate it.2
Miers included accounts from Emma Florence LeComte,
a daughter of a college professor in Columbia, and described her fears of General Sherman‟s
soldiers –and specifically, his “Marauders.”3
Miers leads the reader to believe that although the
events at Atlanta were horrific for Southerners, that fear was employed by General Sherman to
reduce further loss of life and eased his march to Savannah.
Richard Barksdale Harwell was a librarian, bibliographer, and historian, who was also
interested in the March. Harwell published and edited several books on the topic of the
American Civil War, especially in pertaining to the Confederacy. In 1955, Harwell edited
General Richard Taylor‟s Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late
War. Harwell, through General Taylor‟s memoirs, confirmed Miers‟ statement that Sherman
brought about absolute fear in Atlanta. Harwell, however, through General Taylor, viewed the
remainder of the march differently than Miers. General Taylor quoted General Sherman‟s
correspondence with the mayor and councilmen of Atlanta, “…If the people raise a howl against
my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity –seeking. If they want
peace, they and their relations must stop the war.”4
General Taylor acknowledged that General
Sherman did, in fact, try to reduce the loss of life in Atlanta by ordering the evacuation of
Atlanta of all civilian population prior to his assault.5
General Sherman received a reply from
the mayor urging him to reconsider the efficacy of his evacuation order, because the sick, the
pregnant, the very young, and the very old were unable to leave the city. General Taylor noted
that General Sherman refused to belay his orders, again quoting General Sherman:
2
Miers, 195-196.
3
Miers,196.
4
Taylor, 194.
5
Taylor, 192-194.

4. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that
will be occasioned, and yet shall not revoke my orders, because they were not
intended to meet the humanities of the case. You might as well appeal against the
thunderstorm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable; and
the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet
at home is to stop the war, which can only be done admitting that it began in error
and is perpetuated in pride.6
General Taylor argued through General Sherman‟s own words that Sherman was not only
interested in a quick, decisive victory, but was determined to punish Georgia as well.Prior to
General Sherman‟s departure from Atlanta, Harwellfurther reiterated General Sherman‟s
intentions through a telegram General Sherman sent to General Ulysses S. Grant describing the
extent of destruction: “Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to occupy it; but the
utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. I can make
this march, and make Georgia howl.”7
Harwell emphasized General Sherman‟s malevolence
through primary sources –specifically, through General Sherman‟s words.
Both Miers and Harwell used primary sources to capture the events surrounding General
Sherman‟s march through Georgia; despite efforts at objectivity, their studies were slightly
skewed to each historian‟s predisposition. Miers and Harwell (through his selection of material
written by General Taylor) balanced the ethical actions of General Sherman while also
advancing a subtle argument against, or in favor, of General Sherman‟s decisions.
In 1956, Ellis Merton Coulter, a professor at the University of Georgia, chair of the
history department, and the editor of the Georgia Historical Quarterly, published “Father
Sherman‟s „March to the Sea‟” in The Georgia Review.8
Despite being a Southerner, Coulter
relied on a first-hand account to argue that General Sherman‟s march through Georgia not as
6
Taylor, 195.
7
Taylor, 152.
8
E. Merton Coulter, “Father Sherman’s ‘March to the Sea’.” The Georgia Review (Winter 1956): 375-393.

5. horrific as it was portrayed by both Miers and Taylor. Coulter wrote that “He [S.A.
Cunningham, the Editor of the Confederate Veteran]declared that a few years after the war he
had accompanied General Sherman privately on a trip over the route from Chattanooga to
Atlanta and that they were received everywhere cordially and courteously –and it was announced
ahead of time that they were coming.”9
General Sherman‟s warm reception by the people of
Georgia and the editor of the Confederate Veteranshowed no animosity whatsoever, suggesting
that perhaps the brutality of General Sherman‟s march may have been exaggerated.
Coulter further defended Sherman‟s campaign by attributing the spread of fear to the
press‟s fear mongering. Coulter wrote that, “The newspapers were the ones who stirred up this
storm and they were the ones who kept it going.”10
Coulter also quoteda headline from the
Atlanta Evening News (unspecified date):
FATHER SHERMAN UNDER CAVALRY ESCORT WILL MARCH “FROM
ATLANTA TO THE SEA” SON OF MAN WHO BURNED CITY TO PAY
GEORGIA A VISIT. HERE IN A FEW DAYS TO SEE BATTLE FIELDS.
PROPOSED TRIP OF NOTED PRIEST WILL RECALL THE DAYS OF ‟64,
WHEN HIS FATHER, THE OLD SOLDIER, SAID “WAR IS HELL.”11
As Coulter pointed out, the newspaper not only demonized General Sherman, but extended this
treatment to General Sherman‟s son.
1960-1970
During this timeframe, no significant research was found.
1971-1980
9
Coulter, 380.
10
Coulter, 381.
11
Coulter, 381.Headline capitalization in original.

6. More than ten years after Coulter‟s article, in 1973, more than a dozen years after
Coulter‟s article, William Tecumseh Sherman, a biography by James M. Merrill, a professor of
History at the University of Delaware, published William Tecumseh Sherman.12
Merrill
specialized in military history. Merrill considered General Sherman as a two sided man; each
side in stark contrast of the other. William Tecumseh Sherman portrayed General Sherman as a
kind and loving family man, who was also a fierce, ruthless, officer in the battlefield.
Merrill, through previously unexamined personal correspondence by General Sherman to
his family, depicted the General as a caring family man. Although the book focused mainly on
General Sherman‟s family life, Merrill dedicated a chapter of the book to General Sherman‟s
Georgia campaign and his personal beliefs. On General Sherman‟s personal beliefs, Merrill
wrote that General Sherman believed in a natural aristocracy and hierarchy among people.13
Merrill quoted General Sherman‟s views of Negroes, stating that the Negro “has to be subject to
the white man or he must amalgamate or be destroyed.”14
Furthermore, Merrill quoted Sherman
to illustrate his racist opinion of American Indians: “I don‟t care about interesting myself too far
in the fate of the poor devils of Indians, who are doomed from the causes inherent in their nature
or from the natural and persistent hostility of the White Race.”15
Although Merrill dedicated
only one chapter of his book to the Georgia Campaign, and that was just a chronicle of events,
Merrill‟s view on General Sherman‟s character is an interesting factor that may affect future
historians and research.
12
James M. Merrill, William Tecumseh Sherman. (1973).
13
Merrill, 141.
14
Merrill, 142.
15
Merrill, 317.

7. Also in the Fall of 1973, Edmund L. Drago published “How Sherman‟s March Through
Georgia Affected The Slaves” which appeared in The Georgia Historical Quarterly.16
Drago
received his Bachelor‟s degree at the University of Santa Clara in 1964 and his Master‟s in 1966
from the University of California, Berkley. In 1969, Drago was commissioned as an officer in
the US Army and served until 1973 when he left as a Captain. This journal article was written
shortly after Drago left the Army. In 1975, Drago received his Ph.D. at the University of
California, Berkley. From 1975, he taught and researched US History, the American Civil War,
and Pre Modern and Modern World History with an emphasis on gender, race, children, and
family. He currently teaches at the College of Charleston.
Drago‟s “How Sherman‟s March Through Georgia Affected The Slaves” focused on the
effects of General Sherman‟s Georgia Campaign on the slaves, the black community thereafter,
and to some extent, the white Southerners of that era.17
Drago considered differing views the slaves had of Sherman‟s march. The most obvious
and common view was that most slaves were enthusiastic and ready to join General Sherman‟s
troops. Drago explained, “The submerged desire for freedom among the slaves quickly rose to
the surface. Mass desertions occurred. Some 19,000 blacks left the plantations to follow
Sherman‟s army.”18
For some, this enthusiasm placed General Sherman and his troops extended
into a divine intervention to be praised. As Drago wrote, “As their liberators, Sherman and his
army became for Preacher Simms and countless other blacks the Almighty Instrument of God.
16
Edmund L. Drago, “How Sherman’s March Through Georgia Affected The Slaves” The Georgia Historical
Quarterly (Fall 1973): 361-365.
17
Drago, 363.
18
Drago, 363.

8. These blacks considered themselves a chosen people whose day of deliverance was now at
hand.”19
Many were indeed, grateful and enthusiastic to be, at last, freed from their bondage.
Despite the many thousands of happily freed slaves, there are others who did not share
this view and Drago explored these varying thoughts. Drago further examines the slaves that
saw General Sherman and his men as just another set of white men and were indifferent to their
efforts to free them. Moreover, not only were some indifferent to the “white men passing
through,” but, as Drago continues, “not deeply concerned with, perhaps even hostile to, their
well-being.”20
Furthermore, Drago explained that not all slaves wanted to be freed by General
Sherman and his men. Drago wrote, “Not all fled the plantations. According to the Rev. E.R.
Carter, a black biographer of successful Atlanta Negroes, some remained behind with their
masters because of past kindness. Many were the older slaves and those with families. On a
plantation in Clarke County it was they who grieved at the news of their freedom.”21
Drago also considered how white Southerners reacted to General Sherman‟s campaign.
Drago argued that many slave holders refused to have their slaves conscripted to fight with the
confederacy. Drago considered the hesitation of the Southerners to defend their land and
remarked, “The opposition of the planters to the conscription of their slaves is understandable.”22
In contrast to care that some slave holders have shown, other Southern whites became more
resentful of blacks as Drago quoted Louis Manigault, “This has taught us the perfect
impossibility of placing the least confidence in any Negro. In too numerous instances those we
esteemed the most have been the first to desert us. House servants, from their constant contact
with the family become more conversant with passing events are often the first to have their
19
Drago, 364.
20
Drago, 364.
21
Drago, 364.
22
Drago, 362.

9. minds polluted with evil thoughts.”23
Using newspapers, letters and diaries, Drago further
examines and notes that in 1863, there was a significant increase of backlash received by the
Negroes in Georgia --eighteen blacks in Hancock County alone, were hung for attempting to
incite insurrection.24
Merrill and Drago both explored new dimensions in General Sherman‟s campaign.
Merril, although dedicating only a chapter to the march itself, explores the depths of General
Sherman‟s character and family relationships. Drago has a more comprehensive approach on yet
another dimension of General Sherman‟s campaign. Drago analyzes the effects of General
Sherman‟s march on the Southerners –both his direct effects on the Negroes and whites, as well
as the indirect effects.
In 1978, Richard Wheeler published Sherman’s March: An Eyewitness History of the
Cruel Campaign that Helped End a Crueler War. Wheeler is a former U.S. Marine, historian
and author of over seventeen books of military book, of which, eleven are of the Civil War. In
1976, 2 years before Sherman’s March: An Eyewitness History of the Cruel Campaign that
Helped End a Crueler War was published25
, Wheeler published Voices of the Civil War, his book
which earned him the New York City Civil War Round Table‟s Fletcher Pratt Award.
Wheeler‟s work is reminiscent of work from the previous era. Wheeler argued through
correspondences that General Sherman was sincere and is the first mention of giving General
Sherman credit for the concept of “total war.” Wheeler explains that Sherman was sincere in his
offer to the confederates if they were to lay down their arms and join the Union. Furthermore,
Wheeler argues that General Sherman applied this new method of warfare without remorse –and
23
Drago, 362.
24
Drago. 362.
25
Richard Wheeler, Sherman’s March: An Eyewitness History of the Campaign that Helped End a Crueler
War.(1978).

10. that the South deserved the punishment for starting the war and quotes General Sherman‟s
famous “War is Hell.”
Wheeler‟s works is in stark contrast of his contemporaries, Merrill and Drago. Wheeler‟s
research is closely resembles Miers‟ works. This return to previous writing methodology is
uncharacteristic of the era and is one of the earliest mentions of the term “total war.”
1980-1990
During this timeframe, no significant research was found.
1990-2003
After over decade of void in significant research into General Sherman‟s march to the
sea, Lee Kennett published “Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians
during Sherman‟s Campaign,” featured in the The American Historical Review in 1996.26
Lee
Kennett was a Professor of History at the University of Georgia, specializing in military history.
Kennett received numerous awards as an historian and writer including the University of Georgia
Research Award; a position of visiting lecturer at the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Aeronautical Section in Moscow; and awarded by the French Government as Chevalier, Ordre
des PalmesAcademiques.
Kennett reviewed many secondary sources and critiques them in his article. He examined
closely the relationships of blacks towards other blacks and explores the debate over General
26
Lee Kennett, “Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman’s Campaign” The
American Historical Review (1996): 1626-1627.

11. Sherman‟s method of warfare. Kennett argues that historians have given little thought to
interrelationships between blacks. Kennett acknowledges that there were, indeed, pro-
Confederate blacks and were considered “minorities within a minority”27
and that they caused
tension amongst the black community. Furthermore, Kennett argues that insufficient research
has been devoted to how the “rank-and-file blacks responded to pro-confederate blacks.”28
Although Kennett himself does not examine these interrelationships, he nevertheless, brings
attention to these topics.
Kennett did however, examine how General Sherman re-popularized after decades of
long debates (prior to 1930) and a slow decrease in General Sherman‟s campaign‟s popularity
due to his excessive “barbarism.”29
Kennett explains that the idea of Total War being credited
to General Sherman has its roots in the 1930s. Kennett expanded on this explanation stating that
historians were influenced by the horrors of the First World War. Kennett wrote that these
historians, “viewed his campaign as part of a new strategy, designed to terminate a horribly
destructive war, thereby reducing rather than continuing devastation and death.”30
This link to the
idea of Total War and why it was credited to General Sherman was a novel approach to two
existing arguments of General Sherman‟s march.
Seven years later, Anne Bailey published “War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the
Savannah Campaign” in the Journal of Military History.31
Bailey addressed several issues that
surrounded General Sherman‟s campaign. A previous argument about General Sherman‟s
doctrine of foraging was revisited. Bailey addressed the total disregard of the 4th
Amendment
and “due process” when General Sherman issued orders to forage for food and supplies, stating
27
Kennett, 1626.
28
Kennett, 1626.
29
Kennett, 1626.
30
Kennett, 1626.
31
Anne Bailey, War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign. (2003).

12. “Sherman turned a blind eye to pillaging and looting.”32
This created resentment from the South.
Southerners feared for their property, as Bailey wrote, “Local citizens had buried „a great many
things to keep them from the „vandals‟‟.”33
Furthermore, the greatest fear was directed towards
General Sherman‟s cavalrymen. Bailey wrote, “Without doubt, much of the damage in this
region came from cavalrymen burning corncribs, cotton gins, barns, and houses. Unlike the
infantry, which was under more strict control, the horsemen laid the land to waste.”34
Not only
Union troopers did all the pillaging, but Rebel horsemen as well. Bailey argued that Wheeler‟s
troopers of about 1800 cavalrymen sent out details to search “for rations, annoying local
citizenry…”35
This had an enormous impact on the mindset of the citizenry of Georgia as Bailey
wrote, “the psychological effects of such anxieties could be as draining as the actual event;
Sherman did not have to devastate the landscape to evoke a terrified response.”36
Bailey studied the root of the fear brought on by General Sherman and his men more
comprehensively than ever before, providing depth to this previously lightly researched
dimension.
Also published in 2003 was Elissa R. Henken‟s, “Taming the Enemy: Georgian
Narratives about the Civil War” featured in the Journal of Folklore Research.37
Although not a
historian, Henken is an English professor at the University of Georgia, Athens. Henken
specializes in the study of Folklore and study of persons with legendary status such as General
Sherman.
32
Bailey, 78.
33
Bailey, 83.
34
Bailey, 85.
35
Bailey, 85.
36
Bailey, 54.
37
Elissa R. Henken, “Taming the Enemy: Georgian Narratives about the Civil War” Journal of Folklore Research
(2003): 289-307.

13. Henken studied how General Sherman rose to legendary status and becomes infamous in
the South, in particular, Georgia. Henken wrote, “In Georgia and other parts of the South, his
name has become an epithet and analogy of opprobrium; no worse could be said of a person.”38
Henken explained that perhaps, the hatred towards General Sherman, “felt by the vanquished,
smarting from wartime hardship and post-war humiliation…”39
was a product of General
Sherman‟s ability to bring “…the war back to their homes.”40
Henken further argued that General Sherman did not, in fact, intended to be hated by the
white Southerners, that called him “Devil Sherman.” General Sherman was disturbed by this and
rumors spread of his alleged cruelty, as Henken quoted General Sherman‟s letter to his wife
stating, “They no longer call my army „cowardly Yanks but have tried to arouse the sympathy of
the civilized world by stories of the cruel barbarities of my army.”41
Myths and stories of
General Sherman‟s cruelty grew to biblical proportions. Henken examined these myths of
General Sherman. Henken wrote of a particular legend which tells of General Sherman
“quartering at the home of Girl Scout founder Juliette Gordon Low when she was still a little
girl. She went up to the man of whom she had heard so much evil and asked where was his
tail.”42
These unintended consequences of General Sherman‟s Total War were extensively
studied by Henken as none other before her. Henken, like Kennett and Bailey, expanded the
dimensions on the study of General Sherman‟s campaign and the efficacy of his Total War
doctrine. Although these dimensions has been known, obscure details and of these dimensions
38
Henken, 290.
39
Henken, 290.
40
Henken, 290.Emphasis in original.
41
Henken, 291.
42
Henken, 291.

14. have been more fully researched creating a more comprehensive understanding to General
Sherman‟s campaign and the consequences of Total War, intended and unintended.
War is Hell. The study of General Sherman‟s campaign and debates over the efficacy of
Total War doctrine may benefit mankind. Reduction in the loss of life and speedy end to any
war may ensure a short visit, rather than a prolonged stay in Hell.

15. Bibliography
Bailey, Anne J. "War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign." 2003.
Coulter, E. Merton. "Father Sherman's "March to the Sea"." The Georgia Review, Winter 1956: 375-393.
Drago, Edmund L. "How Sherman's March Through Georgia Affected The Slaves." Georgia Historical
Quarterly, Fall 1973: 361-375.
Henken, Elissa R. "Taming the Enemy: Georgian Narratives about the Civil War." Journal of Folklore
Research, 2003: 289-307.
Kennett, Lee. "Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman's
Campaign." The American Historical Review, 1996: 1626-1627.
Merrill, James M. "William Tecumseh Sherman." Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 1973.
Miers, Earl S. "The General who Marched to Hell. William Tecumseh Sherman and his March to Fame
and Infamy." The Georgia Historical Quarterly, June 1952: 195-196.
Nichols, Roy F., Sherman, W.T. "William Tecumseh Sherman in 1850." The Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Bibliography, 1951: 424-435.
Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction; Personal Experiences of the Late War. Edited by Richard
B. Harwell. New York: Longmans, Green, 1955.
Wheeler, Richard. Sherman's March: An Eyewitness History of the Cruel Campaign that Helped End a
Crueler War. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1978.