This document provides definitions and explanations of key terms related to the concept of war. It begins by defining war as an armed conflict between two or more opposing entities aimed at achieving a geopolitical goal. Various types of war are described, including civil wars and proxy wars. Motivations for war are discussed, including imperialism, misperceptions between sides, and three universal reasons according to the Talmud: economic reasons, power/pride/personal reasons, and ideology/religion. Economic theories for the causes of war are also outlined, suggesting wars can arise from pursuit of markets and resources. The document serves as an introductory chapter establishing definitions and concepts to understand the discussion of war that will follow.

1. CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
Has our understanding of the phenomenon of war changed of recent? Should we attempt
to explore new ways of conceptualizing, theorizing, and synthesizing? Evidently, certain
discontinuities mark the era that has followed the end of the Cold War: So-called
humanitarian interventions have been multiplying; the considerable widening of the
concept of security gave rise to the dissemination of the notion of war, which now
embraces as heterogeneous discourse fields as preemptive war, terrorism, war on drugs,
wars of civilizations, and post-national war, to mention just a few; furthermore, the
ruptures are manifest in the Western world’s novel military technology, which has
spurred the professionalisation of the military and – as a corollary – the fading away of
the republican ideal of the soldier-citizen, whereas mass war is still prevailing in the
Third World; the unipolar and hegemonic world order seems to facilitate the emergence
of new armed conflicts; the spreading and putting into practice of the neo-liberal ideology
has caused the partial privatization of war, stretching from subcontracting of non-
combatant tasks by private firms to the “new mercenaries” and introducing a new
articulation of the relationship among public power, political legitimacy, and (material
and human) cost externalization. At the same time, in the periphery of the world system,
neo-patrimonialism and clientism are increasingly gaining ground through the violent
rent seeking appropriations by warlords and local militias (e.g. in the gold or diamond
mines, narcotics, etc.); wars linked to ethnic or religious identities are burgeoning; the
proliferation of peace keeping missions leads to the “gendarmisation” of the military; the
nuclear strategies, which have been predominant during the Cold War, appear to have
been relegated to second stage.
Notwithstanding, not all aspects are completely new. The total number of armed conflicts
has stayed roughly stable (forty simultaneously) - the immense majority comprising of
intra-national (civil) war or of armed conflict between a state and a non-state actor. Inter-
national war, the frame of reference of political philosophy, public international law, and
political theory of international relations, remain the exception. Likewise, the influence of
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2. the military-industrial complex has certainly not diminished, and imperialist wars did not
disappear.
Challenged by the new complexity of the phenomenon of war, some theoretical
approaches, considered to be mono-causal, have been outmoded, e.g. Malthusian inspired
theories for example the pollogie - which confound (demographic) cause and effect.
Other theories, such as just war ethics, game theory, and Clausewitzan and Aronian
driven approaches, which had been very popular a few years ago, seem to suffer from
fatigue and failure to renew. The legal utopias promising to regulate organized violence
by means of the rule of law and the progressive criminalization of war are no longer
unanimously shared. At present, the traditional philosophy of war appears increasingly
incapable of comprehending the new realities. Filling the void and mark the
contemporary debate are constructivist theorizing, postmodern and feminist
deconstructions, some neo-Gramscian approaches or the combination of post-modernism
with neo-Marxism, as well as the grand (and worrisome) return of the Schmittan
dichotomies.
The main objective of this essay is not just to chronicle the situation and bring out new
streams of reflection within the three disciplines of political science, philosophy, and law.
More importantly, the ultimate goal is to compare the disciplinary perspectives, and, to
the extent possible, “crossbreed” them. Faced with the considerable impending
challenges of the phenomenon of war, disciplinary compartmentalization proves, indeed,
unproductive.
Finally, this work is arranged in four (4) chapters. The first chapter introduces the work
based on general concept of politics, philosophy and moral laws of war. It also expands
on definition and explanations of terms to be understood in the character of this essay.
Chapter two (2) focuses on the laws of war and rules of peacekeeping as well as
justification of just war and its consequences, demands for peacekeeping. While in
chapter three (3), we tried to expand on the military chaplain as a sign of theological
contradiction and the position of the Catholic Church in particular reference to war and
peace.
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3. Finally, in chapter four (4), we draw a conclusion with synthesis based on suggestion
looking at the church and issues of peacekeeping operation and mission and the role of
the United Nations in peacekeeping operation and mission respectively. This
consequently is followed by references and bibliographies.
1.1. DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF KEY TERMS:
1.1.2. CONCEPT OF WAR:
War is a reciprocated, armed conflict between two or more non-congruous entities,
aimed at reorganising a subjectively designed, geo-politically desired result. In his book
On War, Prussian military theoretician Carl Von Clausewitz calls war the "continuation
of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[1]
War is an interaction in which two or three or more opposing forces have a “struggle of
wills”.[2]
The term is also used as a metaphor for non-military conflict, such as in the
example of Class war.
War is not necessarily considered to be the same as occupation, murder, or genocide
because of the reciprocal nature of the violent struggle, and the organized nature of the
units involved.[3]
A civil war is a war between factions of citizens of one country, or else a dispute between
two nations that were created out of one formerly-united country. A proxy war is a war
that results when two powers use third parties as substitutes for fighting each other
directly.
War is also a cultural entity, and its practice is not linked to any single type of political
organization or society. Rather, as discussed by John Keegan in his History of Warfare,
war is a universal phenomenon whose form and scope is defined by the society that
wages it.[4]
The conduct of war extends along a continuum, from the almost universal
tribal warfare that began well before recorded human history, to wars between city states,
nations, or empires.
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4. In the organised military sense, a group of combatants and their support is called an army
on land, a navy at sea, and an air force in the air. Wars may be conducted simultaneously
in one or more different theatres. Within each theatre, there may be one or more
consecutive military campaigns.
A military campaign includes not only fighting but also intelligence, troop movements,
supplies, propaganda, and other components. A period of continuous intense conflict is
traditionally called a battle, although this terminology is not always applied to conflicts
involving aircraft, missiles or bombs alone, in the absence of ground troops or naval
forces. Also many other actions may be undertaken by military forces during a war, this
could include weapons research, prison internment, assassination, occupation, and in
some cases genocide may occur.
As the strategic and tactical aspects of warfare are always changing, theories and
doctrines relating to warfare are often reformulated before, during, and after every major
war. Carl Von Clausewitz said, 'Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting
conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.'[5]
.
War is not limited to the human species; Ants engage in massive intra-species conflicts
which might be termed warfare, and chimpanzee packs will engage each other in tribe
like warfare. It is theorized that other species also engage in similar behavior.
1.1.2.i. Motivations towards War:
Motivations for war may be different for those ordering the war than for those
undertaking the war. For a state to prosecute a war it must have the support of its
leadership, its military forces, and its people. For example, in the Third Punic War,
Rome's leaders may have wished to make war with Carthage for the purpose of
eliminating a resurgent rival, while the individual soldiers may have been motivated by a
wish to make money. Since many people are involved, a war may acquire a life of its
own from the confluence of many different motivations. Any case, the most important
motivation to war is, in several ways, the imperialism.
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5. In Why Nations Go to War, by John G. Stoessinger, the author points out that both sides
will claim that morality justifies their fight. He also states that the rationale for beginning
a war depends on an overly optimistic assessment of the outcome of hostilities (casualties
and costs), and on misperceptions of the enemy's intentions.
The Jewish Talmud derives in his commentary to the fight between Cain and Abel
(BeReshit Rabba XXII:7 to ) three universal reasons for wars: They are i) economic, ii)
power/pride/love (personal) reasons and iii) ideology/religion.
1.1.2.ii. Economic theories:
One school of thought argues that war can be seen as a growth of economic competition
in a competitive international system. In this view wars begin as a pursuit of markets for
natural resources and for wealth. While this theory has been applied to many conflicts,
such counter arguments become less valid as the increasing mobility of capital and
information level the distributions of wealth worldwide, or when considering that it is
relative, not absolute, wealth differences that may fuel wars. There are those on the
extreme right of the political spectrum who provide support, fascists in particular, by
asserting a natural right of the strong to whatever the weak cannot hold by force. Some
centrist, capitalist, world leaders, including Presidents of the United States and US
Generals, expressed support for an economic view of war.
"Is there any man, is there any woman, let me say any child here that does not know that the seed
of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry?" - Woodrow Wilson,
September 11, 1919, St. Louis.[6]
1.1.2.iii. Evolutionary psychology:
A distinct branch of the psychological theories of war are the arguments based on
evolutionary psychology. This school tends to see war as an extension of animal
behaviour, such as territoriality and competition. Animals are naturally aggressive, and in
humans this aggression manifests itself as warfare. However, while war has a natural
cause, the development of technology has accelerated human destructiveness to a level
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6. that is irrational and damaging to the species. The earliest advocate of this theory was
Konrad Lorenz.[7]
These theories have been criticized by scholars such as John G. Kennedy, who argue that
the organized, sustained war of humans differs more than just technologically from the
territorial fights between animals. Ashley Montagu[8]
strongly denies such universalistic
instinctual arguments, pointing out that social factors and childhood socialization are
important in determining the nature and presence of warfare. Thus while human
aggression may be a universal occurrence, warfare is not and would appear to have been
a historical invention, associated with certain types of human societies.
1.1.2.iv. Behavioral theories:
Some psychologists such as E.F.M. Durban and John Bowlby have argued that human
beings are inherently violent.[9]
This aggressiveness is fueled by displacement and
projection where a person transfers their grievances into bias and hatred against other
races, religions, nations or ideologies. By this theory the nation state preserves order in
the local society while creating an outlet for aggression through warfare. If war is innate
to human nature, as is presupposed and predetermined by many psychological theories,
then there is little hope of ever escaping it.
The Italian psychoanalyst Franco Fornari, a follower of Melanie Klein, thought that war
was the paranoid or projective “elaboration” of mourning. Fornari thought that war and
violence develop out of our “love need”: our wish to preserve and defend the sacred
object to which we are attached, namely our early mother and our fusion with her. For the
adult, nations are the sacred objects that generate warfare. Fornari focused upon sacrifice
as the essence of war: the astonishing willingness of human beings to die for their
country, to give over their bodies to their nation.
While these theories may have some general explanatory value about why war exists,
they do not explain when or how they occur. Nor do they explain the existence of certain
human cultures completely devoid of war.[10]
If the innate psychology of the human mind
is unchanging, these variations are inconsistent. A solution adapted to this problem by
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7. militarists such as Franz Alexander is that peace does not really exist. Periods that are
seen as peaceful are actually periods of preparation for a later war or when war is
suppressed by a state of great power, such as the Pax Britannica.[11]
An additional problem with theories that rest on the will of the general population, is that
in history only a tiny fraction of wars have originated from a desire for war from the
general populace.[12]
Far more often the general population has been reluctantly drawn
into war by its rulers. One psychological theory that looks at the leaders is advanced by
Maurice Walsh.[13]
He argues that the general populace is more neutral towards war and
that wars only occur when leaders with a psychologically abnormal disregard for human
life are placed into power. War is caused by leaders that seek war such as Napoleon,
Hitler, and Stalin. Such leaders most often come to power in times of crisis when the
populace opts for a decisive leader, who then leads the nation to war.
1.1.2.v. Sociological theories:
Sociology has long been very concerned with the origins of war, and many thousands of
theories have been advanced, many of them contradictory. Sociology has thus divided
into a number of schools. One, the Primat der Innenpolitik (Primacy of Domestic
Politics) school based on the works of Eckart Kehr and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, sees war as
the product of domestic conditions, with only the target of aggression being determined
by international realities. Thus World War I was not a product of international disputes,
secret treaties, or the balance of power but a product of the economic, social, and political
situation within each of the states involved.
This differs from the traditional Primat der Außenpolitik (Primacy of Foreign Politics)
approach of Carl von Clausewitz and Leopold von Ranke that argues it is the decisions of
statesmen and the geopolitical situation that leads to peace.
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8. 1.1.2.vi. Demographic theories:
Malthusian theories see expanding population and scarce resources as a source of violent
conflict.
Pope Urban II in 1095, on the eve of the First Crusade, wrote, "For this land which you
now inhabit, shut in on all sides by the sea and the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your
large population; it scarcely furnishes food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you
murder and devour one another, that you wage wars, and that many among you perish in
civil strife. Let hatred, therefore, depart from among you; let your quarrels end. Enter
upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from a wicked race, and subject it to
yourselves."
This is one of the earliest expressions of what has come to be called the Malthusian
theory of war, in which wars are caused by expanding populations and limited resources.
Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) wrote that populations always increase until they are
limited by war, disease, or famine.
1.1.2.vii. Rationalist theories:
Rationalist theories of war assume that both sides to a potential war are rational, which is
to say that each side wants to get the best possible outcome for itself for the least possible
loss of life and property to its own side. Given this assumption, if both countries knew in
advance how the war would turn out, it would be better for both of them to just accept the
post-war outcome without having to actually pay the costs of fighting the war. This is
based on the notion, generally agreed to by almost all scholars of war since Carl von
Clausewitz, that wars are reciprocal, that all wars require both a decision to attack and
also a decision to resist attack. Rationalist theory offers three reasons why some countries
cannot find a bargain and instead resort to war: issue indivisibility, information
asymmetry with incentive to deceive, and the inability to make credible commitments.[14]
Issue indivisibility occurs when the two parties cannot avoid war by bargaining because
the thing over which they are fighting cannot be shared between them, only owned
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9. entirely by one side or the other. Religious issues, such as control over the Temple Mount
in Jerusalem, are more likely to be indivisible than economic issues.
A bigger branch of the theory, advanced by scholars of international relations such as
Geoffrey Blainey, is that both sides decide to go to war and one side may have
miscalculated.
Some go further and say that there is a problem of information asymmetry with
incentives to misrepresent. The two countries may not agree on who would win a war
between them, or whether victory would be overwhelming or merely eked out, because
each side has military secrets about its own capabilities. They will not avoid the
bargaining failure by sharing their secrets, since they cannot trust each other not to lie and
exaggerate their strength to extract more concessions. For example, Sweden made efforts
to deceive Nazi Germany that it would resist an attack fiercely, partly by playing on the
myth of Aryan superiority and by making sure that Hermann Göring only saw elite troops
in action, often dressed up as regular soldiers, when he came to visit.
The American decision to enter the Vietnam War was made with the full knowledge that
the communist forces would resist them, but did not believe that the guerrillas had the
capability to long oppose American forces.
Thirdly, bargaining may fail due to the states' inability to make credible commitments.[15]
In this scenario, the two countries might be able to come to a bargain that would avert
war if they could stick to it, but the benefits of the bargain will make one side more
powerful and lead it to demand even more in the future, so that the weaker side has an
incentive to make a stand now.
Rationalist explanations of war can be critiqued on a number of grounds. The
assumptions of cost-benefit calculations become dubious in the most extreme genocidal
cases of World War II, where the only bargain offered in some cases was infinitely bad.
Rationalist theories typically assume that the state acts as a unitary individual, doing what
is best for the state as a whole; this is problematic when, for example, the country's leader
is beholden to a very small number of people, as in a personalistic dictatorship.
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10. Rationalist theory also assumes that the actors are rational, able to accurately assess their
likelihood of success or failure, but the proponents of the psychological theories above
would disagree. Rationalist theories are usually explicated with game theory, for
example, the Peace War Game, not a wargame as such, rather a simulation of economic
decisions underlying war.
1.1.2.viii. Political science theories:
The statistical analysis of war was pioneered by Lewis Fry Richardson following World
War I. More recent databases of wars and armed conflict have been assembled by the
Correlates of War Project, Peter Brecke and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
There are several different international relations theory schools. Supporters of realism in
international relations argue that the motivation of states is the quest for security. Which
sometimes is argued to contradict the realist view, that there is much empirical evidence
to support the claim that states that are democracies do not go to war with each other, an
idea that has come to be known as the democratic peace theory. Other factors included
are difference in moral and religious beliefs, economical and trade disagreements,
declaring independence, and others.
Another major theory relating to power in international relations and machtpolitik is the
Power Transition theory, which distributes the world into a hierarchy and explains major
wars as part of a cycle of hegemons being destabilized by a great power which does not
support the hegemons' control.
1.3. Types of Warfare:
Conventional warfare is an attempt to reduce an opponent's military capability through
open battle. It is a declared war between existing states in which nuclear, biological, or
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11. chemical weapons are not used or only see limited deployment in support of conventional
military goals and maneuvers.
The opposite of conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, is an attempt to achieve
military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of
an existing conflict.
Nuclear warfare is a war in which nuclear weapons are the primary method of coercing
the capitulation of the other side, as opposed to a supporting tactical or strategic role in a
conventional conflict.
Civil war is a war where the forces in conflict belong to the same nation or political entity
and are vying for control of or independence from that nation or political entity.
Asymmetric warfare is a conflict between two populations of drastically different levels
of military capability or size. Asymmetric conflicts often result in guerrilla tactics being
used to overcome the sometimes vast gaps in technology and force size.
Intentional air pollution in combat is one of a collection of techniques collectively called
chemical warfare. Poison gas as a chemical weapon was principally used during World
War I, and resulted in an estimated 91,198 deaths and 1,205,655 injuries. Various treaties
have sought to ban its further use. Non-lethal chemical weapons, such as tear gas and
pepper spray, are widely used, sometimes with deadly effect.
1.4. Effects of war:
Based on 1860 census figures, 8% of all white males aged 13 to 43 died in the American
Civil War, including 6% in the North and 18% in the South.[16]
Of the 60 million
European soldiers who were mobilized in World War I, 8 million were killed, 7 million
were permanently disabled, and 15 million were seriously injured.[17]
During Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, more French soldiers died of typhus than were
killed by the Russians.[18]
Felix Markham thinks that 450,000 crossed the Neman on 25
June 1812, of whom less than 40,000 recrossed in anything like a recognizable military
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12. formation. More soldiers were killed from 1500-1914 by typhus than from all military
action during that time combined. In addition, if it were not for the modern medical
advances there would be thousands of more dead from disease and infection.
Many wars have been accompanied by significant depopulations. During the Thirty
Years' War in Europe, for example, the population of the German states was reduced by
about 30%. The Swedish armies alone may have destroyed up to 2,000 castles, 18,000
villages and 1,500 towns in Germany, one-third of all German towns.
Estimates for the total casualties of World War II vary, but most suggest that some 60
million people died in the war, including about 20 million soldiers and 40 million
civilians. The Soviet Union lost around 27 million people during the war, about half of all
World War II casualties. The largest number of civilian deaths in a single city was 1.2
million citizens dead during the 872-day Siege of Leningrad.
Once a war has ended, losing nations are sometimes required to pay war reparations to
the victorious nations. In certain cases, land is ceded to the victorious nations. For
example, the territory of Alsace-Lorraine has been traded between France and Germany
on three different occasions.
Typically speaking, war becomes very intertwined with the economy and many wars are
partially or entirely based on economic reasons such as the American Civil War. In some
cases war has stimulated a country's economy (World War II is often credited with
bringing America out of the Great Depression) but in many cases, such as the wars of
Louis XIV, the Franco-Prussian War, and World War I, warfare serves only to damage
the economy of the countries involved. For example, Russia's involvement in World War
I took such a toll on the Russian economy that it almost collapsed and greatly contributed
to the start of the Russian Revolution of 1917.
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13. 1.5. MORALITY OF WAR:
Throughout history war has been the source of serious moral questions. Although many
ancient nations and some modern ones have viewed war as noble, over the sweep of
history, concerns about the morality of war have gradually increased. Today, war is seen
by some as undesirable and morally problematic. At the same time, many view war, or at
least the preparation and readiness and willingness to engage in war, as necessary for the
defense of their country and therefore a just war. Pacifists believe that war is inherently
immoral and that no war should ever be fought.
The negative view of war has not always been held as widely as it is today. Heinrich von
Treitschke saw war as humanity's highest activity where courage, honour, and ability
were more necessary than in any other endeavour. Friedrich Nietzsche also saw war as an
opportunity for the Übermensch to display heroism, honour, and other virtues.
Another supporter of war, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, favoured it as part of the
necessary process required for history to unfold and allow society to progress. At the
outbreak of World War I, the writer Thomas Mann wrote, "Is not peace an element of
civil corruption and war a purification, a liberation, an enormous hope?" This attitude has
been embraced by societies from Sparta and Rome in the ancient world to the fascist
states of the 1930s.
International law recognizes only two cases for a legitimate war:
1. Wars of defense: when one nation is attacked by an aggressor, it is considered
legitimate for a nation along with its allies to defend itself against the aggressor.
2. Wars sanctioned by the UN Security Council: when the United Nations as a
whole acts as a body against a certain nation. Examples include various
peacekeeping operations around the world.
The subset of international law known as the law of war or international humanitarian
law also recognises regulations for the conduct of war, including the Geneva Conventions
governing the legitimacy of certain kinds of weapons, and the treatment of prisoners of
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14. war. Cases where these conventions are broken are considered war crimes, and since the
Nuremberg Trials at the end of World War II the international community has established
a number of tribunals to try such cases.
A nation's economy is often stimulated by government war-spending. When countries
wage war, more weapons, armor, ammunition, and the like are needed to be created and
sold to the armies, thus their economies can enter a boom (or war economy) reducing
unemployment. However war is often followed by a recession.
1.6. CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING:
Peacekeeping, as defined by the United Nations, is "a way to help countries torn by
conflict create conditions for sustainable peace." It is distinguished from both
peacebuilding and peacemaking.
Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-
combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Such assistance
comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing
arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social
development. The United Nations Charter gives the United Nations Security Council the
power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and
security. For this reason, the international community usually looks to the Security
Council to authorize peacekeeping operations.
Most of these operations are established and implemented by the United Nations itself,
with troops serving under UN operational control. In these cases, peacekeepers remain
members of their respective armed forces, and do not constitute an independent "UN
army," as the UN does not have such a force. In cases where direct UN involvement is
not considered appropriate or feasible, the Council authorizes regional organizations such
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West
African States, or coalitions of willing countries to undertake peacekeeping or peace-
enforcement tasks.
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15. The United Nations is not the only organization to have authorized peacekeeping
missions. Non-UN peacekeeping forces include the NATO mission in Kosovo and the
Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula.
1.6.i. Nature of peacekeeping:
Peacekeeping is anything that contributes to the furthering of a peace process, once
established. This includes, but is not limited to, the monitoring of withdrawal by
combatants from a former conflict area, the supervision of elections, and the provision of
reconstruction aid. Peacekeepers were not at first expected to ever fight. As a general
rule, they were deployed when the ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict
had given their consent. They were deployed to observe from the ground and report
impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace
agreement. This gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the
underlying causes of conflict.
Thus, a distinction must be drawn between peacekeeping and other operations aimed at
peace. A common misconception is that activities such as NATO's intervention in the
Kosovo War are peacekeeping operations, when they were, in reality, peace enforcement.
That is, since NATO was seeking to impose peace, rather than maintain peace, they were
not peacekeepers, rather peacemakers.
1.6.ii.Process and structure:
Once a peace treaty has been negotiated, the parties involved might ask the United
Nations for a peacekeeping force to oversee various elements of the agreed upon plan.
This is often done because a group controlled by the United Nations is less likely to
follow the interests of any one party, since it itself is controlled by many groups, namely
the 15-member Security Council and the intentionally-diverse United Nations Secretariat.
If the Security Council approves the creation of a mission, then the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations begins planning for the necessary elements. At this point, the
senior leadership team is selected. The department will then seek contributions from
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16. member nations. Since the UN has no standing force or supplies, it must form ad hoc
coalitions for every task undertaken. Doing so results in both the possibility of failure to
form a suitable force, and a general slowdown in procurement once the operation is in the
field. Romeo Dallaire, force commander in Rwanda during the genocide there, described
the problems this poses by comparison to more traditional military deployments:
He said: “the UN was a 'pull' system, not a 'push' system, because the UN had absolutely no pool
of resources to draw on. You had to make a request for everything you needed, and then you had
to wait while that request was analyzed...For instance, soldiers everywhere have to eat and drink.
In a push system, food and water for the number of soldiers deployed is automatically supplied.
In a pull system, you have to ask for those rations, and no common sense seems to ever apply."
(Shake Hands With the Devil, Dallaire, pp. 99-100)
While the peacekeeping force is being assembled, a variety of diplomatic activities are
being undertaken by UN staff. The exact size and strength of the force must be agreed to
by the government of the nation whose territory the conflict is on. The Rules of
Engagement must be developed and approved by both the parties involved and the
Security Council. These give the specific mandate and scope of the mission (e.g. when
may the peacekeepers, if armed, use force, and where may they go within the host
nation). Often, it will be mandated that peacekeepers have host government minders with
them whenever they leave their base. When all agreements are in place, the required
personnel are assembled, and final approval has been given by the Security Council, the
peacekeepers are deployed to the region in question.
United Nations peacekeeping was initially developed during the Cold War as a means of
resolving conflicts between states by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military
personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to areas where warring
parties were in need of a neutral party to observe the peace process. Peacekeepers could
be called in when the major international powers (the five permanent members of the
Security Council) tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening regional
stability and international peace and security. These included a number of so-called
"proxy wars" waged by client states of the superpowers.
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17. The UN Charter stipulates that to assist in maintaining peace and security around the
world, all member states of the UN should make available to the Security Council
necessary armed forces and facilities. Consequently, developing nations tend to
participate in peacekeeping more than developed countries. This may be due in part
because forces from smaller countries avoid evoking thoughts of imperialism.
1.7. Reconciliation and conflict
In the last few years, reconciliation has become one of the "hottest" topics in the
increasingly "hot" field of conflict resolution. It refers to a large number of activities that
help turn the temporary peace of an agreement which ends the fighting into a lasting end
to the conflict itself. Through reconciliation and the related processes of restorative
and/or transitional justice, parties to the dispute explore and overcome the pain brought
on during the conflict and find ways to build trust and live cooperatively with each other.
1.7.i. What is Reconciliation:
Reconciliation is a rather new concept in the new field of conflict resolution. As is the
case with any new concept, there is no standard definition that all scholars and
practitioners rely on. However, almost everyone acknowledges that it includes at least
four critical components identified by John Paul Lederach -- truth, justice, mercy, and
peace.
Lederach's use of the term "mercy" suggests that the ideas behind reconciliation have
religious roots. It is a critical theological notion in all the Abrahamic faiths and is
particularly important to Evangelical Christians as part of their building a personal
relationship with God. For those who ask "what would Jesus do," reconciliation is often
not just an important issue, but the most critical one in any conflict.
In recent years, reconciliation has also become an important matter for people who
approach conflict resolution from a secular perspective. For them, the need for
reconciliation grows out of the pragmatic, political realities of any conflict resolution
process.
17

18. Conflict resolution professionals use a number of techniques to try to foster
reconciliation. By far the most famous of them is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission that held hearings into the human rights abuses during the apartheid era and
held out the possibility of amnesty to people who showed genuine remorse for their
actions. Since the TRC was created in 1995, as many as 20 other such commissions have
been created in other countries, which experienced intense domestic strife. These projects
bring people on both sides of a conflict together to explore their mutual fear and anger
and, more importantly, to begin building bridges of trust between them. Despite the
violence in the region since 2000, some of the most promising examples of this kind of
reconciliation have occurred between Israelis and Palestinians. For more than a decade,
Oases of Peace (Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salaam) have been bringing together students
and teachers from both sides of the divide. Similarly, the Seeds of Peace summer camp in
Otisfield, Maine (U.S.) has served as a "safe place" for Israeli and Palestinian teenagers
to spend extended periods of time together. Yet others have tried more unusual strategies.
At Search for Common Ground, we make soap operas with conflict resolution themes for
teenagers aired on radio in Africa and on television in Macedonia. Similarly, Benetton
sponsored a summer camp for teenage basketball players from the former Yugoslavia,
one of many examples in which people have tried to use sports to build bridges,
ironically, in part through competition. Last but by no means least, it should be obvious
from the above that many people have used religion as a vehicle to help forge
reconciliation. Thus, the Rev. John Dawson has made reconciliation between blacks and
whites the heart of his 20-year ministry in South Central Los Angeles. Similarly,
Corrymeela is an interfaith religious retreat center, which has spent the last 25 years
facilitating meetings between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.
There is at least one common denominator to all these approaches to reconciliation. They
all are designed to lead individual men and women to change the way they think about
their historical adversaries. As a result, reconciliation occurs one person at a time and is
normally a long and laborious process.
18

19. 1.7.ii.Why Reconciliation Matters:
Reconciliation matters because the consequences of not reconciling can be enormous. In
Fen Osler Hampson's terms, too many peace agreements are "orphaned."[19] That is, the
parties reach an agreement that stops the fighting but does little to take the parties toward
what Kenneth Boulding called stable peace, which can only occur when the issues that
gave rise to the conflict in the first place are addressed to the satisfaction of all. [20]
Without reconciliation, the best one can normally hope for is the kind of armed standoff
we have seen in Cyprus for nearly 30 years. In 1964, the rival Turk and Greek forces
agreed to a cease fire, a temporary partition of the island, and the introduction of United
Nations Peacekeeping forces. Since then, little progress has been made toward conflict
resolution; in fact, it is all but impossible for Greek Cypriots to visit the Turkish part of
the island and vice versa.
At worst, without reconciliation, the fighting can break out again, as we have seen since
the tragic beginning of the second Intifada in Israel/Palestine since 2000. Despite Oslo
and other agreements and despite some serious attempts at reconciliation at the grassroots
level, the parties made little progress toward achieving stable peace until 2000 when
Palestinian frustrations finally boiled over in a new and bloodier round of violence.
Most examples fall somewhere between Cyprus and Israel/Palestine. For instance,
because Catholics and Protestants have not made much progress toward reconciliation,
every dispute between them since 1998 has threatened to undermine the accomplishments
of the Good Friday Agreement which put at least a temporary end to "the troubles" in
Northern Ireland.
1.7.iii. What Individuals Can Do:
At the most basic level, reconciliation is all about individuals. It cannot be forced on
people. They have to decide on their own whether to forgive and reconcile with their one-
time adversaries.
19

20. Nothing shows this better than the remarkable documentary, "Long Night's Journey into
Day" which chronicles four cases considered by the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Committee. [21]The final one involves a young black man who had been a
police officer and helped lure seven activists into a trap in which they were all killed by
the authorities. The last scene of the sequence shows a meeting he held with the mothers
of the seven boys in which he begs for their forgiveness. It is clear that, unlike one of his
white colleagues who is interviewed earlier, his confession and his remorse are heart-felt.
Still, at first the mothers, whose pain remains raw more than a decade after the murders,
refuse to forgive him. Then, one of them asks if his first name means "prayer" and when
he says it does, you can literally watch the mothers draw on their own Christianity and
find the mental "space" to forgive the former officer.
1.7.iv. What States Can Do:
By its very nature, reconciliation is a "bottom up" process and thus cannot be imposed by
the state or any other institution. However, as the South African example shows,
governments can do a lot to promote reconciliation and provide opportunities for people
to come to grips with the past.
In South Africa, the TRC heard testimony from over 22,000 individuals and applications
for amnesty from another 7,000. The TRC's success and the publicity surrounding it have
led new regimes in such diverse countries as East Timor and Yugoslavia to form truth
commissions of one sort or another. The idea of restorative justice, in general, is gaining
more widespread support, especially following the creation of the International Criminal
Court. And, truth commissions need not be national. A number of organizations in
Greensboro, North Carolina, have come together to try to achieve reconciliation in a city
which has been at the forefront of many violent racial incidents since the first sit-ins there
in 1960.
1.7.v. What Third Parties Can Do:
It is probably even harder for outsiders to spark reconciliation than it is for governments.
20

21. Most successful efforts at reconciliation have, in fact, been led by teams of "locals" from
both sides of the divide. Thus, the TRC was chaired by Desmond Tutu, a black
clergyman, while its vice president was Alex Boraine, a white pastor. Both were
outspoken opponents of apartheid, but they made certain to include whites who had been
supporters of the old regime until quite near its end.
The one exception to this rule is the role that NGOs can play in peace building. The
Mennonite Central Council, in particular, has focused a lot of its work in Central and
South America on reconciliation. And even though it rarely uses the term, Search for
Common Ground develops news programs and soap operas with conflict resolution
themes in such countries as Macedonia and Burundi.
1.7.vi. Resolution Isn't Cozy:
Even though reconciliation mostly involves people talking to each other, it is not easy to
achieve. Rather it is among the most difficult things people are ever called on to do
emotionally. Victims have to forgive oppressors. The perpetrators of crimes against
humanity have to admit their guilt and, with it, their arrogance.
But perhaps the difficulty of reconciling can best be seen in the case of the former police
officer and the seven mothers mentioned above. Most of them broke down and had to be
escorted out of the room during the hearing at the TRC on the request for amnesty by two
of their killers. And, their pain and anger are inescapable at the beginning of their
meeting with the officer. It is clear that it is not easy for them to forgive him; but it is also
abundantly clear how far doing so relieves them of the pain they have carried inside them
for years.
1.8. Military Chaplain:
Chaplains are nominated in different ways in different countries. A military chaplain can
be an army-trained soldier with additional theological training or a priest nominated to
the army by religious authorities. In the United Kingdom the Ministry of Defence
employs chaplains but their authority comes from their sending church. Royal Navy
21

22. chaplains undertake a 16 week bespoke induction and training course including a short
course at Britannia Royal Naval College and specialist fleet time at sea alongside a more
experienced chaplain. Naval Chaplains called to service with the Royal Marines
undertake a gruelling 5 month long Commando Course, and if successful wear the
commandos' Green Beret. British Army chaplains undertake seven weeks training at The
Armed Forces Chaplaincy Centre Amport House and The Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst. Royal Air Force chaplains must complete 12 weeks Specialist Entrant course
at the RAF College Cranwell followed by a Chaplains' Induction Course at Armed Forces
Chaplaincy Centre Amport House of a further 2 weeks.
1.8.i. Roman Catholic Church:
Roman Catholic chaplains are generally organized into military ordinariates, such as the
Archdiocese for the Military Services, USA. Potential Roman Catholic chaplains must
seek permission from their diocesan bishop or religious superior to serve as a military
chaplain. While serving as a chaplain, the priest or deacon remains incardinated in his
home diocese, but is temporarily under the direction of the prelate of the ordinariate for
the duration of his service.
1.8.ii. NONCOMBATANT STATUS:
The Geneva Conventions are silent on whether chaplains may bear arms, however they
do state (Protocol I, 8 June 1977, Art 43.2) that chaplains are noncombatants: they do not
have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
It is generally assumed that during WWII chaplains were unarmed. Crosby describes an
incident where a US chaplain became a trained tank gunner and was removed from the
military for this "entirely illegal, not to mention imprudent" action (1994, pxxi). At least
some UK WWII chaplains serving in the Far East, however, were armed: George
MacDonald Fraser recalls (1995, p109) "the tall figure of the battalion chaplain, swinging
along good style with his .38 on his hip" immediately behind the lead platoon during a
battalion attack. Fraser asks "if the padre shot [an enemy], what would the harvest be ...
apart from three ringing cheers from the whole battalion?" (1995, p110).
22

23. In recent years both the UK and US have required chaplains, but not medical personnel,
to be unarmed. Other nations, notably Norway, Denmark and Sweden, make it an issue of
individual conscience. There are anecdotal accounts that even US and UK chaplains have
at least occasionally unofficially borne weapons: Chaplain (then Captain) James D.
Johnson, of the 9th Infantry Division, Mobile Riverine Force in Vietnam describes
(Combat Chaplain: A Thirty-Year Vietnam Battle) carrying the M-16 rifle while
embedded with a combat patrol. Since 1909 US Chaplains on operations have been
accompanied by an armed 'Chaplain Assistant'[22],however perhaps on this occasion it
was felt that an unarmed uniformed man would draw unwelcome attention.
Captured chaplains are not considered Prisoners of War (Third Convention, 12 August
1949, Chapter IV Art 33) and must be returned to their home nation unless retained to
minister to prisoners of war.
Military Chaplains are normally accorded officer status, although Sierra Leone had a
Naval Lance Corporal chaplain in 2001. In most navies, their badges and insignia do not
differentiate their levels of responsibility and status. By contrast, in Air Forces and
Armies, they typically carry ranks and are differentiated by crosses or other equivalent
religious insignia. However, United States military chaplains in every branch carry both
rank and Chaplain Corps insignia.
The current form of military chaplain dates from the era of the First World War. A
chaplain provides spiritual and pastoral support for service personnel, including the
conduct of religious services at sea or in the field. In the Royal Navy chaplains are
traditionally addressed by their Christian name, or with one of many nick-names (Bish;
Sin-Bosun; Devil Dodger; Sky-Pilot; God Botherer etc). In the British Army and Royal
Air Force, chaplains are traditionally referred to (and addressed) as padre or as
Sir/Ma'am.
In the Royal Navy chaplains have no rank other than "chaplain" while in the British
Army they hold commissioned executive rank. On the foundation of the Royal Air Force
Chaplains' Branch an attempt was made to amalgamate these differing systems creating
23

24. "Relative Rank", where rank is worn but without executive authority. In practice
chaplains of all three services work in similar ways using what influence and authority
they have on behalf of those who consult them or seek their advice.
During World War II the head of Chaplaincy in the British Army was an (Anglican)
Chaplain-General, (a Major-General), who was formally under the control of the
Permanent Under-Secretary of State. An Assistant Chaplain-General was a Chaplain 1st
class (full Colonel) and a senior Chaplain was a Chaplain 2nd class (Lieutenant Colonel).
All chaplains are commissioned officers and wear uniform. British Army and Royal Air
Force chaplains bear ranks and wear rank insignia, but Royal Navy chaplains do not,
wearing a cross and the officers' cap badge as their only insignia.
Chaplains in the armed forces were previously all Christian or Jewish. The first Jewish
chaplain was appointed in 1892 and some 20 to 30 were commissioned during World
War II. In recent times, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has employed only Christian
chaplains, with the Jewish community providing an honorary chaplain under long-
standing arrangements, although Jewish chaplains have served in the Territorial Army. In
October 2005 the Ministry of Defence appointed four civilian chaplains to the military;
one each from the Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh faith communities.
24

25. CHAPTER TWO
2.1. The Laws of War and the Rules of Peacekeeping:
This chapter is aimed specifically at raising some moral and ethical challenges that arise
in the context of military operations in support of peacekeeping, and proposing some
institutional formalism to help limit the potential negative consequences of dealing with
these challenges.
2.1.1. Principal assertions:
The future of peacekeeping missions will be focused on activities and objectives not
anticipated by the framers and developers of traditional Laws of War. It is becoming
clear that:
1. Most situations for which modern peacekeeping missions are proposed do not fit
the mold of "conflict" for which the laws of war and associated protocols were
developed. Because these situations result primarily from ethnic and cultural
differences, rather than from economic or territorial ambitions, the concepts of
sovereignty and legitimacy on which distinctions among participants are based
under traditional formalities are not applicable.
2. The demand for peacekeepers is outstripping the supply; the definition, therefore,
of when the international peace has been breached will be modified by "ground
truth", if not by diplomatic exigencies. This will lead to new interpretations of
when Chapters VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes") and VII ("Actions with
respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression")
of the U.N. Charter, and the 1994 Brussels Summit extensions of NATO, can be
used as the basis for intervention.
3. The conventions of war on which traditional international law is based are being
overrun by the realities of cheap chemical and biological weapons, ample flows of
rapid fire and highly accurate conventional weapons, a plenitude of mines of all
sorts, and an adoption of unconventional force tactics as ordinary practice by
belligerents.
25

26. The future of peacekeeping organization and control will be framed in terms of what the
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies has called "The New Peacekeeping
Partnership"...a working arrangement among military forces, humanitarian aid agencies,
"governance" officials, non-government organizations, and civilian police. The traditional
laws of war cannot contain the activities of such arrangements.
A new instrument of international law must be developed to make it possible for military
commanders to function responsibly and effectively in peacekeeping roles. I use the term
instrument to indicate a standard format document to be "filled in" by the international
body which raises and directs the employment of a peacekeeping force. This instrument
will include concepts drawn form the laws of war, but will also include some from
international criminal law. As bad as it sounds to one steeped in the U.S. military
tradition, I think peacekeepers must learn to function under rules similar to those imposed
on civil law enforcement in most western nations- i.e. the requirements for a showing of
probable cause for action, and rules on the escalation to and use of deadly force.
2.2. The concept of "just war" and its consequences for planning and
managing peacekeeping operations:
Events and developments occurring in the latter part of the 20th Century have called into
question the legitimacy of war as an instrument of international policy. War has become
far more destructive and brutal with the reliance on airpower and stand-off weaponry,
mines, and greater firepower for the individual soldier. As the nature of war has changed
[¹] since WWI, the standards by which the morality of military action is judged has also
changed. The diminished legitimacy of war as an option for attaining the objectives of a
state power has not diminished, however, the threat of violence. Internecine and localized
struggles based on ethnic, religious, and cultural schisms have increased the likelihood
that there will be outbreaks of bloodshed that threaten international peace and moral
rectitude. Response to these threats must be managed according to standards and
protocols that maintain not only the appearance, but also the substance of impartiality and
justice.
26

27. Western military policy is based on the concept of just war. As all scholars of the subject
are aware, under the concept of just war there are two distinct standards of action and
four premises of instantiation by which the planning and prosecution of a military action
are examined[²]. The first standard is that of jus ad bellum, the just initiation of combat.
This standard requires that military combat be an instrument of last resort - military
action is justified only when diplomacy has failed in gaining protection for important
national interests. The second standard is that of jus in bello, the just prosecution of war -
when combat begins, fight with efficiency and discrimination so as to win with a
minimum of destruction and suffering.
The premises of instantiation are used to determine the justification for a specific military
act of one state against another, short of war. A premise is referred to by a state initiating
military action as justification for that action. These premises are:
1. Retorsion, which includes acts done in response to unfriendly, though not
necessarily illegal acts of another state;
2. Reprisal, which includes all acts done in response to illegal acts of another state,
with the intention of obtaining reparation or satisfaction for such illegal acts;
3. Intervention, which is a "catch all" including all acts with violate the sovereignty
of another state is response to:
a. threats to the safety of the nationals of the intervenor,
b. previous or threatened unlawful intervention by the other state,
c. chronic disregard by a state of its international obligations,
d. the needs of self-defense or self-preservation,
e. a collective decision (by an appropriate body of states) to put an end to
inhumane treatment by a government of all or some of its own nationals.
and;
4. Proportionality, which is a requirement that only that force that is necessary to
obtain the stated objectives be utilized.
27

28. The legality of humane intervention has been debated for a century or more, but the
practice of states and international bodies seems to have erased such doubts [3]
. The
legitimacy of intervention to assist a state in responding to an armed uprising of its own
citizens is still highly debatable, however [4]
, as is the use of intervention to respond to
state-sponsored terrorism [5]
.
2.3. The expansion of demand for peacekeeping forces and the
resulting "amendment" of international law:
The post-cold war world has seen military conflict removed from the purview of dueling
superpowers and returned to "the people" as an option for resolving age-old perceived
inequities. As according to the Morrises:
[As] transnational and sub-national groups, rogue states, and breakaway republics,
civil warmongers and tinhorn dictators, ethnic purists, and religious
fundamentalists all see the inchoate environment of the post-cold-war world as an
opportunity to seize or increase power. The result is an environment of spreading
destabilization that can be characterized as chaos [6]
.
This chaos has resulted in a growing demand for international and regional organizations
to provide military forces to ensure that those embroiled in the chaos do not, of necessity,
breach the fragile peace possible with the reduction of tensions among the superpowers.
To effectively respond to this chaos, however, the redefinitions of the "roles and missions
of not only militaries but diplomatic corps and international entities such as the United
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the role of the
United States as world leader and the single remaining superpower, are critical lest
chaotic destabilization erode the credibility of the international community to maintain
order and the rule of law."[7]
Lawyers, by nature, abhor chaos. They view such circumstances as an opportunity to
show that order, like beauty, is in the mind of the beholder. When international legal
scholars attempt to fit a specific set of facts into an existing rule of law to determine
appropriate action under an existing treaty or agreement, they follow a logical process
that generally includes the principles stated in Latin as rebus sic stantibus, ceteris
paribus, and mutatis mutandis. The first principle says that, if it can be shown that there
28

29. has been such a fundamental change in circumstances as to obviate the intention of the
parties to the treaty or agreement, the parties must either amend the pact or one of them
can declare it null and void. The second principle implies that, if one can show that, with
a noted change in interpretation of either the facts or the pact, the obligations of the
parties can be clearly maintained, the pat is still valid. The third stated principle is a
catch-all that implies that, under an appropriate change in interpretation of the facts, the
rule of law is still applicable to the parties to the pact. Needless to say, the commander of
a military peacekeeping force in the field finds it at least irritating to stall decisions about
the use of force to protect his or her troops from an armed band of "former belligerents"
while the lawyers sort all this out.
The problems for the peacekeeper lie in the nexus between the traditional laws of war and
the premises of instantiation, and the growing body of international humanitarian law.[8]
This nexus has grown out of the reality that most of the conflicts that are likely to be the
subject of modern peacekeeping operations are not characterized by the clear
specifications of legitimate state authorities and responsibilities assumed by traditional
international law to be available for satisfying human rights considerations.
Based on such declarations as Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [9]
, human rights law was traditionally
focused on the peacetime relationship between states and their own nationals.
Increasingly, with the distinction between internal and external conflicts being blurred by
the acts of those pursuing "wars of self determination" and "wars of national liberation,"
the norms of humanitarian law are being applied regardless of the official status of
persons involved in a conflict (combatant or non-combatant). The reality is that few of
the conflicts are between or among "states" as anticipated by traditional laws of armed
conflict. They are, instead, prosecuted by persons with tribal, religious, cultural, or
economic objectives that are not contained with political boundaries [10]
. The
contingencies likely to be faced by peacekeepers will not fit nicely into the formalisms of
traditional international law.
29

30. These contingencies...are characterized by the absence of an easily identifiable
adversary who can be isolated and attacked; by the intermingling of combatants
and non-combatants; by limited U.S. stakes that diminish our tolerance for high
costs and friendly fatalities; and by a desire to ... [minimize] the damage, death,
and lingering bitterness resulting from "peace enforcement" operations. [11]
This nexus of the laws of war and humanitarian law become most problematical when
military personnel become involved at the fine line between peacekeeping and peace
enforcement.
Colonel James H. Allen, a retired Canadian Army officer and highly experienced
peacekeeper has stated unequivocally that:
Once violence erupts the peacekeeper must often wait until the smoke of battle
clears and the parties have agreed to their first steps toward conflict resolution. In
cases where the fighting does not stop and a decision is taken to intervene
regardless, we are no longer talking about peacekeeping, but rather enforcement,
intervention, or plain old war. Whatever we call it, we are in a totally different
province from peacekeeping. [12]
This distinction is workable only so long as one abides by a definition of peacekeeping
that may no longer be meaningful. For Allen," peacekeeping" must be limited to
situations where:
1. the operation is conducted with a broad consensus within the international
community,
2. the international community gives the peacekeepers a clear mandate which is
accepted by the parties concerned, and which is practicable in the situation
existing on the ground,
3. the parties to the conflict consent to the establishment of the UN mission,
4. the parties are consulted about the countries providing peacekeepers,
5. there is no interference in the internal affairs of host countries,
6. the parties are expected to provide freedom of movement and other facilities
required by the peacekeepers,
7. the peacekeepers have no rights of enforcement,
30

31. 8. military personnel are provided by member states voluntarily and come under
command of a representative of the international community in all operational
matters,
9. the operation is conducted on a sound financial basis, and
10. the peacekeepers' tasks are to stop or contain hostilities and thus create conditions
in which diplomatic peacemaking can prosper, or to supervise implementation of
a settlement negotiated by the peacemakers.[13]
Allen's essential elements of a successful peacekeeping operation are in general accord
with proponent of "new approaches" for peacekeeping operations undertaken by the U.S.
[14]
, and the U.N. [15]
Allen rues the blurring of the distinction between peacemaking and peacekeeping typified
by such policies as that espoused by the 1992 Agenda for Peace, promulgated by U.N.
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali16
, with "peacemaking" distinguished as diplomatic
activities, and all other functions and operations entailed in "peacekeeping." This
characterization allows only distinctions among peacekeeping missions where the
military involved have a right of enforcement, and where they do not. In recounting his
own experiences as a peacekeeper, Allen clearly attests that this blurring of missions has
made military planning, command, and control within peacekeeping extraordinarily
difficult, if not impossible.
The U.N. has officially maintained as late as 1990 that it would stringently observe the
distinctions between peacekeeping and enforcement. [17]
Further, a major thinker on U.N.
peacekeeping policy has listed the requirements for successful peacekeeping as:
1. consent of the parties,
2. continuing strong support by the Security Council,
3. a clear and practicable mandate,
4. nonuse of force, except as a last resort in self-defense,
5. willingness of troop-contributing countries to provide adequate numbers of
capable military personnel,
31

32. 6. willingness of member states to make available the necessary financial and
logistical support.[18]
In forming the concepts under which NATO and the WEU will cooperate to attain
stability and peace throughout the trans-Atlantic community, the diplomats and drafters
did not specifically mention peacekeeping as a mission. The promulgation of the
Strategic Concept for cooperation took place in May, 1992. It was not until late June that
agreement could be reached on how NATO would provide support to the Council on
Security and Cooperation in Europe "on a case by case basis" for peacekeeping activities.
Even after issuance of a communiqué in December, 1992, confirming that NATO was
prepared to cooperate fully in peacekeeping operations with the WEU, there was still no
agreement of the "practical options and modalities" for conducting such operations, as
had been called for in June.[19]
Based on the U.N.'s recent record of peacekeeping missions nearly all of the stated
essential elements of a peacekeeping operation will be non-attainable in any actual
circumstances. [20]
The military commanders on the ground will be forced to deal with
political ambiguities which must be translated into military contingency plans, with a real
potential for disaster. Too often, the very people that peacekeepers are sent in to protect
become incensed when the peacekeepers, acting pursuant to their stated mandate, refuse
to make peace a zero-sum game, with no clear winners or losers. [21]
The dilemma for the military as stated by one writer is that "Forces must not cross the
impartiality divide from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be taking
sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby
prejudicing its security22
." That distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement
has caused the greatest difficulties for U.S. forces involved in peacekeeping, because
they, like personnel from most Western nations, bring a specific set of assumptions,
beliefs, and perspectives with them into a peacekeeping operation:
32

33. As Adda Bozeman put it: Increasingly American perspectives have become
blurred by the assumption that our paramount values are shared by human beings
everywhere, and that the United States is therefore justified - even entitled - to
insist that the governments of foreign sovereign states (at least the weaker ones)
must install those values promptly in their respective societies. [23]
Bozeman goes on to point out that the collection of presumptions that Western
civilization is imbued with are carried into every involvement with non-Western cultures.
In short, the West has brought forth a magical but very complex cluster of ideas.
The primary supposition is the focus on the individuality of a person's mind and
its capacity to make decisions and conclude voluntary accords. The second,
perhaps equally significant presupposition ensues from the mutuality of promises,
implicit in such contract, to do or refrain from doing something later on. In this
sense contract projects confidence in the future as well as confidence in the good
faith of the other party, be this another human being, a corporate entity, or a state.
[24]
These ideas culminate in a belief in the virtue of "progressive" societies, which are
focused on change and development. In most of the non-Western world, people hold to a
polar principle - that societies exist to protect status, not develop it.25
Bozeman quotes, for
example, President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq, the late President of Pakistan who said
"[Western] democracy is a bitter pill to swallow."26
President Zia made that comment in
discussing how the requirement to share political power with those intending to change a
government, and accommodating speech and behavior inimical to social norms
established by a religious and cultural majority were so hard to manage in a post-colonial
nation.
Western diplomats and military commanders planning a peacekeeping operation may
thus be faced with a determined reluctance to embrace one of the main elements of a
successful peace - a willingness on the part of the parties to the conflict to change the
status quo so that the reasons underlying the conflict are eliminated.
The U.N. has demonstrated that peacekeeping operations conducted under it's aegis will
henceforth pay less attention to the clear distinctions among peacekeeping and peace
enforcement.[27]
NATO, while showing great concern for establishing "effective civil-
military relationships", has not clearly dealt with this issue.[28]
In establishing the
33

34. Combined Joint Task Force to meet peacekeeping requirements, the drafters made a
distinction between peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, but not between
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[29]
If the shift from the traditional distinction between peacemaking as a diplomatic function,
peacekeeping as a observational function without enforcement responsibilities, and peace
enforcement as a collective military operation ab initio, the set of Western moral and
cultural "perquisites" can be the source of enormous difficulties for the individual soldier,
sailor, marine, or airman, regardless of his or rank or position, when thrust into a
peacekeeping mission planned, executed, and managed under traditional international
legal premises.
Because operations other than war, including peacekeeping missions conducted under the
premises of the U.N.'s Agenda for Peace, will bring Western troops into conflict with
cultural and historical antecedents which we a), do not comprehend, and b) tend to
ignore, we may cede to the belligerents much of the arguments about discrimination and
proportionality. Problems will occur when Western-bred commanders and troops,
operating under generalized mandates and vague rules of engagement that do not account
for the actual uncertainties on the ground. Military personnel, no matter how well
prepared, may resort to moral relativism and parochialism in resolving uncertain
situations. Moral relativism can cause a military commander to determine that "immoral"
acts committed by a belligerent justifies an "exceptional" response by peacekeepers.[30]
The question then becomes whether basing action on a just war foundation "merely
serves as a rationalization" for whatever the states convening the peacekeeping force
determine to do.[31]
Attempts at maintaining strict formalities as to the use of force can
cause terrible unforeseen consequences, as stated by a leading scholar on the application
of the just war paradigm.
The language of good and evil, just and unjust may...turn people out as judges
who sometimes become executioners. [32]
Short of fostering a Mai Lai incident, however, placing military commanders in
circumstances calling for them to make moral decisions between strict adherence to Rules
34

35. of Engagement and the safety of his or her forces in circumstances not anticipated by the
authorities convening a peacekeeping operation can lead to horrific outcomes.
Although the U.S. war in Viet Nam was not a peacekeeping operation (if one overlooks
the fact that it was ostensibly begun as a "police action"), it involved a number of
examples of the consequences of setting up decision environments wherein operational
leaders are faced with the legitimate concern for the effectiveness and safety of people
under their command, and with externally imposed constraints subject to frequent
interpretation and amendment. Such constraints not only complicate the mission but also
unnecessarily imperil the military forces. As a recent article put it, "[Military leaders in
these circumstances] face two realities. First, they do not have a lot of options. Second,
none of the options are attractive. [33]
A perfect example is the saga of General John D.
Lavelle, commander of U.S. Air Forces toward the end of the war.[34]
When General Lavelle inherited the Rules of Engagement in August, 1971, they
maintained a presidential imposed constraint on when U.S. aircrews could attack enemy
aircraft or weapons systems. Essentially, there could be no engagement unless a U.S.
aircrew was under imminent threat. (This is the same constraint imposed on coalition
aircrews operating in Iraq and Bosnia today.) This implies that there must be evidence
that a specific SAM site “activates" against a specific aircraft before armed response
could given. This constraint was intended to foster the ongoing peace talks in Paris, and
to prevent any claim that the U.S. was taking armed response against "non-combatants"
who might be living near a SAM site. When the NVA integrated its early warning,
surveillance, tracking, and guidance radars and communications, they were able to launch
missiles with out warning or detection by the aircrews targeted. Lavelle decided that the
entire system was constantly "activated." He attempted to get the ROE amended to reflect
reality. The changes were denied. The result was a terrible loss of life as U.S. aircrews
were brought down by undetected SAM's. Lavelle then had to make a choice between the
ROE and the safety of his aircrews. He chose the latter. He directed that aircrews report
detecting "fan song" (detection) and "fire can" (tracking) radar engagements, and then
used those reports to direct "retaliatory" strikes. Lavelle was made the subject of
35

36. Congressional inquiry and Air Force Inspector General investigation. He was demoted to
Major General and forcibly retired in April, 1972.
General Lavelle's decisions and his handling of the consequences affected his entire
command. Command integrity deteriorated with the effect that personnel up and down
the command chain believed that it was OK to submit false reports and intelligence. After
a while, no one believed any official statement about anything.
Future peace operations will be further complicated by the increasing involvement of
non-military Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's), such As the International Red
Cross, and relief organizations such As OXFAM. These groups will assume massive
importance in the actual care and feeding of the victims of cultural conflict and political
warfare. The difficulty for the military personnel in this arrangement is that:
Humanitarian interventions are complicated by multiple relief groups whose
presence may predate military intervention and whose protection may have been
the proximate cause of that intervention. They may need the military for security,
but cooperate only reluctantly, and they have pre-existing security arrangements
with local "protectors" who may be reluctant to give up this source of income. [35]
Such a consequence arose during U.S. humanitarian operations in Somalia. In October,
1993, the world was presented with television images of the desecration of dead
Americans in the streets of Somalia. The events that lead up to those scenes were
predicated on decisions made by military officers on the ground who perceived that their
forces were in imminent danger from rogue armed gangs who had developed a symbiotic
relationship with the agencies dispensing food and medicine. These gangs, in the absence
of any constituted civil authority, contracted with aid agencies to provided "security" for
persons and stores of supplies. (In Chicago, we call this the protection racket.) Control of
the flow of this aid became a source of power for the warlords. When U.S. military forces
began providing "impartial" security for aid workers and supplies, the warlords retaliated
in small ways - slashed tires, small fires, and random shots fired. As time went by, the
threat of more violent retaliation was registered. U.S. policy makers and diplomatic
authorities were unable to establish clearly how the ROE could be interpreted in the face
of such a threat. The U.S. commanders requested specific and public guidance, but none
36

37. was forthcoming. The result was the mounting of the ill-fated missions to capture Adlib
As an example to the other warlords. As in the situation with General Lavelle, the
military officers who acted to protect their troops from a threat not anticipated by the
ROE, this time based on a peacekeeping mandate (no use of force except when under an
actual attack); found themselves with no good choices. The image of the U.S. elite forces
was unnecessarily tarnished, and promising careers were ended prematurely.
In his 1990 book, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next
Century,[36]
Colonel Rod Paschall, U.S. Army retired, and a highly experience former
Special Forces operator and planner, laid out sound reasons for acknowledging that
military activities in peacekeeping were something supportive of, but distinctly different
from the diplomatic definition of peacekeeping. Col. Paschall suggests that military
activities in peacekeeping are designed to maintain conditions which foster a state of
peace, and should properly be called stability operations. The formula for Paschall is
peacekeeping + any measure of enforcement= stability operations. [37]
Such are
operations are a sub-set of low intensity conflict; and that, should hostilities on the
ground escalate to combat between regular armed force - e.g. between regular organized
forces, continuously in the field, using coordinated maneuver and fire to gain identified
military objective - then the mission has become war, As limited geographically and
technologically As the conflict may be. This formulation is even applicable to
humanitarian intervention where there may not be a pre-existing cease-fire, or consent of
all parties, and, as we have seen in Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere:
Increasingly ... one faction or another often comes to believe that the interdiction
of humanitarian supply lines can serve its military and political objectives. When
this happens, the humanitarian forces seeking to protect the civilians eventually
become a party to the conflict.[38]
This formulation also makes more sense than current U.S. Army doctrine which defines
peace operations as entailing support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace
enforcement; with "military humanitarian assistance" tagged on as "an area of
concern."[39]
It is far better, in terms of defining roles and missions for military forces to
establish that some level of conflict is likely to be encountered in every peacekeeping and
37

38. humanitarian intervention activity. Such a formulation allows us to make much better use
of the topologies and categorizations of peacekeeping tasks that thoughtful writers have
given us.
Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Books agree with the Morris that "widespread intervention
will play a growing role in future U.S. policy."[40],[41]
They go on to note that the
interaction of feasibility, desirability, and cost yields three categories of potential U.S.
action for what others call peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian activities. The
categories and characterizations given by Kanter and Brooks are: [42]
THREAT TO
INTERESTS
AVAILABILITY OF
ASSETS
APPROPRIATE
RESPONSE
1 - "Mandatory"
Action
CLEAR HIGH CLEAR
2 - "Unwarranted"
Action
LOW N/A UNCLEAR
3 - "Discretionary"
Action
UNCLEAR MIXED UNCLEAR
There is nothing magic about this table, but it does clearly lay out the issues that must be
dealt with in determining whether a peace operation is feasible and practicable. What this
formulation means is that, when the threat to "important" interests are at stake, there
assets available to prosecute a mission, and the appropriate response to the situation on
the ground is clear, military action is mandated by international and domestic political
and humanitarian standards. For such situations, a standardized contingency can be
implemented to guide the operation. If the threat to such interest is low or the appropriate
response is unclear, no response is warranted or advisable. If the threat, the availability of
assets, and the appropriate response are all unclear, then discretion must intervene, and a
unique answer to the situation must be formulated. This is very much like the conditions
for Preplanned and Contingency operations that all military planners recognize. It is also
consonant with the elements that must be present for any significant United States
involvement in the kinds of expanded peacekeeping operations envisioned by the Agenda
for Peace, which have been stated as:
38

39. 1. The ability to commit sufficient forces to achieve our clearly defined political and
military objectives;
2. A clear intention to decisively achieve [those] objectives; and
3. The commitment on the part of the U.N. to continually reassess and adjust
objectives and [the] composition of the force.[43]
While they insist on maintaining
the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, William J Durch
and J. Matthew Vaccaro discuss what they call "multidimensional peacekeeping,"
which includes not only reduction of tensions between and among former foes,
but also implementation of a peace accord that addresses the underlying causes of
conflict, with an implementation schedule and a timeline.[44]
They go on to say that "[b]ecause multi-dimensional peacekeeping primarily involves
settlement of internal conflicts, it operates in a much more complex domestic political
environment that traditional peacekeeping," and include "sizable civilian components in
the peacekeeping force. [45]
Based on the evidence that I have presented above, I submit that this "multi-dimensional"
peacekeeping will be the norm, and not the exception for future peace operations. I also
submit that Rod Paschall's formulation of such operations as "stabilization operations" if
far more instructive as to the true nature of the military activities involved.
To develop both pre-planned “standard” packages for either type 1 and type 3 responses
to peacekeeping situations, one must shave a clear idea of what tasks are involved. I find
the task lists presented by Durch and Vaccaro to be a good starting point.[46]
They list
tasks that are:
1. Not common in traditional combat operations
o Negotiate tactical Status of Forces Agreements with local leaders.
o Mediate or act as an intermediary in disputes between factions.
o Arbitrate local disputes or fights.
o Administer local justice codes.
o Prevent refugee flows.
39

40. o Conduct resettlement.
o Administer humanitarian relief operations.
2. Common combats tasks which need modification for peacekeeping operations.
o Coordinate military activities with international agencies, private
organizations, and local factions.
o Establish static defenses.
o Collect intelligence.
o Disarm local factions.
o Cordon and search.
o Seize buildings. And
o Uniquely mixed tasks required for peacekeeping operations, which make
force structure and utilization different from that found in combat
missions.
 Guarding facilities.
 Self-protection in static positions.
 Escorting and guarding convoys.
 Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and diffusion of tension.
 Civic action.
 Providing humanitarian assistance.
 Psychological and informational operations.
 Police duties.
 Providing logistics support to nonmilitary organizations.
 Civil affairs interaction in local political processes.
 Area and route reconnaissance.
It seems clear that what I follow Rod Paschal in calling stabilization operations entail
tasks that are new to the traditional military planner, and familiar tasks that must be
"rethought" to make them applicable in these new mission areas. It also seems clear that
there must be a standardized way of adjusting the mix of tasks and forces as the
diplomatic and political actors "continually reassess and adjust objectives and the
composition of the force" once the operation is on the ground. Of particular concern is
40

41. how to adjust the ROE and the distribution and commitment of firepower as the
contingencies faced unfold. This will require a clear and documented presentation to the
authority convening the operation, I think, of facts calling for the intended changes, and
of the expected results of such changes. If the presentation convinces the authorities, the
military commander should then be permitted to make adjustments. If the commander is
denied the changes, there should be a clearly defined process whereby the commander
can remove his forces from the perceived threat that prompted the request for change.
Most importantly, if a situation arrives whereby the commander, or anyone in the force,
exceeds the level of deadly force permitted under the ROE, by either type or volume,
there should be a clearly defined process for conducting an investigation into the
conditions under which the excessive use of force occurred. This investigation should not
be conducted by the commander or the convening authority. It should be done under the
aegis of a body such As the proposed International Criminal Court, [47]
to insure that there
is not only actual impartiality, but apparent impartiality in the findings of the
investigation.
To create a workable system whereby the facts underlying the decision to convene a
stabilizing operation are well documented (As per the Kanter/Brooks topology); that the
appropriate mix of tasks and forces are laid out (As per Durch and Vaccaro); and, that the
ROE are logically adjusted As the situation on the ground unfolds, and exceptions to the
ROE are properly documented and investigated, the international community should
adopt a standardized formality on which these considerations are proposed, discussed,
and documented. I suggest that something analogous to the notifications protocols in use
by the arms control community would be most suitable. These protocols provide standard
formats for messages and documents which declare and validate the production,
movement, storage, and destruction of weapons subject to the various arms treaties. A
similar system of protocol and standard formats, together with a clearly planned
organization structure and process for generating notifications of changes in the
objectives and adjustment of the force. This arrangement will require that the diplomatic
corps be somewhat more open as the actual status of an operation, and the military corps
be somewhat less parochial and defensive about making necessary changes in force
41

42. structure and tasks allocation. As a stabilization operation unfolds, however, there would
be a greater likelihood of effective and efficient prosecution of stabilization missions, and
a diminished likelihood of the sorts of moral dilemmas that have plagued these operations
in the past, and threaten to arise in the future.
CHAPTER THREE
42

43. 3.1. THE MILITARY CHAPLAIN: A THEOLOGICAL CONTRADICTION:
In his opinion, William H. Privett asserts that: Military chaplains should weigh moral
implications in their joint military exercise. Is it morally permissible to participate in an
immoral act out of compassion? As John Lasker points out, “the Iraq War had been
opposed by Pope John Paul II as not morally justifiable, and the U. S. bishops.”
The implications of this are clear; morally unjustifiable war is mass homicide.
Nonetheless, he reports, “Serving in a war that the church has condemned is not an issue
for [Fr.] Barkemeyer. ‘For me as a Catholic priest and chaplain, my mission is to serve
soldiers,’ he says. ‘The moral question of ‘should we be fighting this particular war’ isn’t
at the heart of what I do.”
According to former Abu Ghraib interrogator (and later conscientious objector) Joshua
Casteel, chaplains are considered by the military as “combat multipliers,” preparing
troops to return to battle. So the Rev. Marian Gardocki says: “I tell them — listen to your
staff sergeant and follow orders.”
It is not surprising that Catholic priests provide such advice. The Army Field Manual
requires that religious beliefs and values must reinforce, not contradict, Army values—
that is, your religious beliefs will be subservient to the Army values.
Former Catholic chaplain George Zabelka offers a different path. Zabelka blessed pilots
who dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed 200,000 civilians in
direct contradiction of the Christian Just War moral principle to spare noncombatants.
Zabelka says he never raised larger moral questions until he saw children whose eyes had
been melted. He later became an ardent opponent of war. According to the Rev.
Emmanuel Charles McCarthy, “The intentional unjust killing of a person in Catholic
moral theology is always the intrinsically grave evil of murder, never morally permitted.”
McCarthy quotes St. Alphonsus Liguori, patron saint of moral theologians and
confessors, who said it as clearly and unequivocally, and it morally holds in traditional
Catholic Just War moral theology to this hour: “Where a soldier understands a war to be
43

44. unjust, he may not receive absolution for his sin unless he seeks, as quickly as possible,
dismissal from the military and in the interim refrains from hostile acts.”
Apparently Jesus’ explicit teachings: “Lay down your sword,” “Love your enemy,”
“Forgive 70 times 7,” “Blessed are the peacemakers,” “Love one another as I have loved
you” and St. Paul’s exhortation, “If your enemy is hungry give him food, thirsty give him
something to drink,” are not presented.
If, as theologian Paul Ramsey taught, the use of proportionate and discriminate armed
force can be an exercise of moral responsibility in service to one's neighbor, then the
chaplain is an essential part of a rightly-ordered military force: not because he conducts
seminars in just war theory, but because he puts himself in harm's way for the sake of
others who are doing just that, going in harm's way for others' sake.
First and foremost, chaplains of every faith, land and culture must solidly agree and promote
the basic dignity of every human being, believer and nonbeliever, ally or enemy, combatant
or civilian, prisoner or free, general or private.
It can be taken as a given that where there are inhumane living conditions for soldiers or their
families there is not an effective chaplaincy; perhaps there is no chaplain, perhaps the
chaplain is restricted, perhaps the chaplain is poorly trained or lacking in courage. Where
there is an acceptance of direct killing of noncombatant civilians for instance, there is no
chaplaincy worth its name. Where torture is justified in eliciting prisoner information,
chaplaincy is ineffective or nonexistent.
The "new warfare" involving terrorist insurgents carrying out attacks in civilian dress against
an organized government should and must, I believe, require the development and refining of
traditional just war principles. Further, when interrogators question captured terrorists, the
importance of obtaining critical information soon brings on the moral distinction between
licit techniques of interrogation and torture.
In some cases torture is easily recognizable and condemnable. The vicious and utterly
barbaric treatment of individuals in the American Abu Ghraib prison leaves no doubt as to
the barbaric extremes to which human beings can resort, especially in times of war. It is
44

45. significant, perhaps, that this prison did not have an assigned chaplain, though Army
regulations required one.
Not only should chaplains be expected to act to stop such cases of torture but should be
called upon as well in individual cases to judge licit interrogation techniques (standing at
attention for one hour) from torturous methods (sleep deprivation for 24 hours). To do this
objectively and fairly not only should the chaplains be prudent and experienced in matters of
ethical treatment of captives but should have developed guidelines and principles to turn to a
field that now, more than ever, needs development.
Torture is not easy to define, but common sense usually knows torture when one sees it.
Similarly, proportionality questions rose in the 2003 course on matters such as long-distance
bombing, or so-called "sterilized combat," need guidelines and informed technical judgments
based on clear ethical principles which must evolve with ever more complicated
technologies.
Chaplains must be looked to and respected for being the voice of the little man, the small cog
in the big military wheel. He must be the voice of conscience, not intimidated by rank or
power in speaking out differentially but unambiguously on the nuances of ius ad bellum, ius
in bello and ius post bellum. Where ethical questions arise which are complex and involve
military technicalities the chaplain should be the convener of minds in effective dialogue.
The chaplain must be the voice of the convinced minority conscience, well-versed in an
effective in communicating the meaning of primacy of conscience.
Chaplains should be assured of the full support of their civilian ecclesial superiors, who for
their part should intervene publicly if necessary if a chaplain is the object of unfair treatment
in carrying out his duties.
Among all other religious groups our Catholic tradition demands a rigorous philosophical,
theological, spiritual and pastoral formation of their priests. Bishops and religious superiors
must ensure that the clergy to whom they entrust the ministry of military chaplains must
reflect that solid formation. Such a priest chaplain will more securely dialogue with chaplains
of other traditions as well as with superior commanders of every faith in those matters of
ethical, spiritual and humanitarian concern. Similarly, such a Catholic chaplain will not be
45

46. uncomfortable when being directed by qualified chaplains and leaders of differing faith
traditions.
Every chaplain must respect the instinctive hunger for the transcendent in every human
being, leading such faith journeys humbly, prayerfully, respectfully and no intrusively.
Regardless of rank or power or position, the chaplain must see himself primarily as a man of
God and not as an agent of the state. To put it another way, he must wear his uniform and his
rank on his body and not on his soul. And how privileged every chaplain should view himself
as one invited to witness his belief in a loving God to a uniquely youthful and impressionable
population ever in search of role models.
It is especially (but not exclusively) to the young uniformed personnel with inadequately or
ill-formed consciences that the chaplain must play a principal role in time of "peace
missions" which can easily develop to armed force. How rarely do the young confront what
for some is an implicit contradiction between the Fifth Commandment and the real possibility
of having to shoot a weapon in defense of self or others? How practical for the military is
Christ's counsel to turn the other cheek?
The chaplain must guide sensitive consciences in those matters and recognize and support the
person whose conscience reaches the final conclusion that bearing arms is an un-Christian act
for him.
Like civilian priests but possibly fraught with more complexities, the chaplain must draw a
clear line in his own mind between internal and external forums and then do all in his power
to explain this distinction clearly to those in command and those who seek his counsel. Such
explanations should be presented in the general description of the chaplain's place in the
chain of command, but also prior to his involvement in individual cases when tasked by
command to speak with victims and/or accused.
Confessional matters aside, the chaplain are morally bound to professional secrecy as well:
information that reaches him during counseling sessions or information committed to him as
professional officer. When such information involves potential serious injury or death of
another or proposed actions in serious conflict with humanitarian law, he should be able to
report the wrongdoing to an official ombudsman designated by the military to handle such
46

47. serious matters of conscience. Where no such office exists or is unable to be reached, justice
dictates that some other prudent action is taken to minimize or avoid the evil threatened.
Where the inhumane treatment of noncombatants, wounded soldiers or prisoners is in
question the Catechism of the Catholic Church clearly states (No. 2313):
"Actions deliberately contrary to the law of nations and to its universal principles are crimes,
as are the orders that command such actions. Blind obedience does not suffice to excuse
those who carry them out."
The chaplain, who might come across such crimes (outside the confessional), is obliged to
make them known to the appropriate authority with as much discretion as possible.
An increasingly common and complicated humanitarian dilemma presents itself in the
presence of female warriors. In most countries females were accepted, such as in World War
II, as noncombatants: nurses, counselors, social workers or "desk jockeys" far removed from
military action. Some were increasingly permitted to engage in peace missions. Today,
however, the line between peace missions and some form of necessary armed intervention is
very thin indeed as the number of female war casualties attests in modern-day interventions.
Similarly, in my country virtually all females are armed (15 percent to 20 percent of the
armed forces), receive the same combat training as their male counterparts and patrol side by
side with them in conflict situations. Female combat immunity was once an assumption in the
Christian West, based on the high regard for and nurturing role of women. It is to be hoped
that the ethical and moral basis for that assumption could be reopened, researched and
refined, if necessary, with respect to present realities.
More common as well and surely a humanitarian issue is the close military lifestyle of male
and female. Some countries have unisex ships and barracks, and even where restrictions are
in place, the reality offers a high probability of illicit and immoral sexual activity, with young
people placed in those situations not of their own choosing.
The revealing of statistics regarding out-of-wedlock pregnancies and abortions might force
open discussion on these difficulties, but "political correctness" usually prevents such an
honest, humanitarian assessment.
47

48. Much more could be said. Indeed, not only is the issue of great importance but of the widest
magnitude as well. The humanitarian role of all chaplains includes responsibilities in
promoting the dignity of human life, whether involving ally or enemy as well as the
chaplains' comrades in his own armed forces.
Finally, this would seem to offer a fruitful area for ongoing ecumenical and interfaith
collaboration as well as round-table exchanges among appropriate U.N. bodies, Red
Crescent, Red Cross and Magen David Adom.
3.1.1. Sign of contradiction:
Asked if it isn't ironic for those in the military to be talking about peace, Parker said,
"That is a challenge and an opportunity."
He added: "Chaplains are a sign of contradiction. We are in the armed forces as a sign of
peace, a reminder that war is not the answer. We are a witness to a peace that is beyond
what we are currently seeing. That is a strong motivation for most chaplains."
Asked if that is a change from the past, Parker said that in previous wars, chaplains often
generally started out with the hope of seeing a quick end to the war. "They believed in
reconciliation, but the prayers of the chaplains sometimes became less pacifistic as the
war went on. We are now more alert to the spiritual danger of demonizing the enemy.
The chaplain's role is to remind soldiers that we want victory but that the line between
good and evil does not fall between nations but through each individual."
Parker said this is not so much a drastic change in approach as a shift along a continuum.
"Like the police, we try to resolve every situation with a minimum use of force, but we
will use force if necessary. And this remained an option even when we were serving as
peacekeepers."
Parker described the war in Afghanistan as a "three-block war" -- within the space of
three blocks, the same troops may "use force, distribute humanitarian aid, and build
bridges of reconciliation," and troops are constantly shifting back and forth between
roles.
48

49. Parker cited the example of Trevor Green, a reservist from Vancouver who had been in
the same unit as Parker. Green was "doing what is culturally sensitive, showing respect
by sitting and talking with local Afghan elders" when he was suddenly struck in the head
by a young man wielding an axe. The man who attacked Green was immediately shot and
killed. Parker said, "That is the reality of how we work. At any time, the role may shift."
3.1.2. Not exclusively Christian
Parker said the chaplaincy service is not exclusively Christian anymore, but the chaplains'
motto, 'Called to Serve,' remains in force.
This means, he said, that all chaplains "agree to work side by side, to respect each other's
traditions, and to work within pluralism and diversity." All chaplains are committed to
serving all those in the Canadian military, and if they cannot help someone, they will pass
that person on to someone who can. For instance, if a Roman Catholic soldier comes to a
Protestant chaplain with a question about the Catholic sacraments, the chaplain will refer
the soldier to a Catholic chaplain. However, if a Roman Catholic soldier comes to a
Protestant chaplain and wants to know about Protestantism, the chaplain is free to tell
him -- but he has to wait to be asked.
Parker added, "There is no confusion that I am a Christian chaplain. I have probably had
more serious discussions about religion with young soldiers than I have had in church."
Some large bases have both Protestant and Catholic chaplains, but usually one chaplain
are assigned to a unit of 500 soldiers and serve everybody in the unit. Parker said this
works well for most pastoral needs: "Prayer is prayer, a wife leaving is a wife leaving,
and problems with children often just require wise counsel."
The chaplains live with the soldiers and go on deployment with them. "This is a
workplace ministry," said Parker. "They know us a religious people, sometimes as wise
people, and as people who care about them."
Parker said chaplains deal with "a full range of social issues, all of the things that are part
of people's lives." However, there are also some unique problems that soldiers face.
49

50. One is that the military life involves long absences and frequent moves, which puts extra
pressure on families and individuals. "It is like going to university. There are leaving
home issues and being with people different from those you grew up with."
There are also issues of life and death -- beyond just the possibility of being killed. "The
bigger issue is what if I kill someone," Parker says. "A lot of people, when given the
opportunity, wouldn't pull the trigger."
Chaplains, Parker said, "believe strongly in the just war tradition." When a soldier is
uncertain of his role, it is the chaplain's job to remind him of the importance of the
mission he is on and that he is not just an individual taking the law into his own hands.
"But it is not saying that you are just doing your job. You must deal with it on a deep
moral basis." He said there are a lot of resources in the Christian tradition for this, from
Augustine and Aquinas to Grotius and Vittoria.
Parker said, "the general conviction is that you go to war in order to have peace.
Augustine said the only reason to wage is to bring about a more just peace afterward."
3.2. The Catholic Church on War and Peace:
Among true worshipers of God those wars are looked on as peacemaking which are
waged neither from aggrandizement nor cruelty but with the object of securing peace, of
repressing evil and supporting the good.
—St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II, IIae, 40.1
Since the mind of man runneth not to the contrary, the instruction of the Catholic Church
on war and peace has been conveyed through the idea of the just war. Until recently at
least, the venerable tradition has dominated theological speculation within virtually all
Christian sects and strongly influenced other religious traditions as well. Many of its
tenets have made their way into positive law and into the curricula of Western war
colleges, especially in the United States. Despite some defections of late, particularly
among mainline Protestant thinkers, one would be hard-pressed to name another
Christian social teaching that has endured largely unchanged or to greater effect over so
long a period.
50

51. The just-war concept traces its roots to ancient Hebraic and Stoic thought, but its
specifically Christian lineage begins with St. Augustine's argument in Book XIX of The
City of God. Augustine there considers the conditions under which a Christian might
resort to force. While it is clearly better for a Christian to suffer injury than to requite evil
with evil, he says, the moral responsibility of rulers, who must see to the safety and
security of their subjects, is broader than that of the individual citizen. Pacifism may be a
desirable and, in certain circumstances, a compelling individual Christian response to
violence or the threat of violence, but it cannot suffice as the governing moral criterion
for a magistrate, who owes a duty in charity and justice to his subjects to protect them
against the designs of evil men. Because rulers are also subject to the moral law, their
war-making must be guided by its proper end—not peace per se but tranquilitas ordinis,
the peace that springs from the just ordering of human affairs. How then to cabin the
private use of force and justify its public use while yet constraining the passions that give
rise to it? Is it possible to legitimate war without giving license to self-serving or
unbridled violence on the part of public authorities?
The just-war tradition, which emerges as the fully elaborated reflection on these
questions, responds to those who see war as an ungovernable human passion and to those
who see it as irredeemably immoral or unnecessary. A "realist" might argue that the idea
of just war is simply convenient sophistry that arbitrarily exonerates certain kinds of
violence. Much the same argument is advanced by pacifists, albeit for different reasons.
In the end, the first critique reduces to the proposition that might makes right, while the
second makes civil society a high-risk enterprise. The former cannot distinguish between
a just ruler and a thug; the latter affirms the rightness of the tranquilitas ordinis but, by
default, gives thugs free rein.
The idea of the just war is perhaps best understood as a kind of mean between the claims
of realpolitik and those of pacifism. It seeks to temper the passions that lead to war and,
by distinguishing just from unjust causes, directs them to the pursuit of noble ends—
hence the dual requirement of a morally credible rationale both for the initiation of war
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52. (ius ad bellum) and for the manner of its execution (ius in bello).
Augustine's argument was later amplified, most notably by St. Thomas Aquinas, who
specified three criteria for the ius ad bellum: (1) Only legitimate public authority may
declare war. (2) It may be waged only for a just cause (originally thought to encompass
the rectification of wrongs, but now largely confined to self-defense). (3) It requires a
right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil, as opposed to hatred,
revenge, or the pursuit of glory and power). Later refinements of the Thomistic argument
have elaborated four additional criteria, as set forth in the Catechism of the Catholic
Church: (4) The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations
must be lasting, grave, and certain. (5) All other means for putting an end to it must be
shown to be impractical or ineffective (often referred to as "last resort"). (6) There must
be serious prospects of success. (7) The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders
greater than the evil to be eliminated.
Once these conditions are satisfied, the ius in bello criteria of proportionality and
discrimination must be considered. The former holds that only such force may be used as
is necessary to vindicate the just cause, while the latter prohibits intentional infliction of
harm upon non-combatants.
In the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, to have listened to President Bush, or to his
principal civilian and military advisors, was to learn how profoundly just-war thinking
has influenced the leadership of the world's most powerful nation. One may of course
disagree with their conclusions, but one has to be impressed by the evident care they took
to provide moral justification for their actions. Measured by any objective standard,
Operation Iraqi Freedom plausibly met all the criteria for just war—which is different
from saying that the relevant moral issues were not debatable. The central issue, however,
was not whether American policy might receive the unanimous consent, say, of the
College of Cardinals, but whether a serious, good faith effort was made to subject
American policy to rigorous moral scrutiny. Just-war doctrine, rightly understood, is not
some sort of moral multiple-choice test keyed to only one set of correct answers. The
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53. Catechism of the Catholic Church recognizes as much. After setting forth the specific
criteria for just war, it declares: "The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy
belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have the responsibility for the common
good."
This prudential aspect of the decision to disarm Saddam Hussein seems to have escaped
the attention of diverse churchmen at home and abroad, who treated just-war criteria like
a solution to an algebra problem, each and every step of which had to be executed in
accordance with a pre-determined formula of which they, and they alone, were the
exclusive proprietors. To take the noisiest example, the National Council of Churches
took out full-page ads that questioned not only the factual predicates of the
administration's Iraqi policy but the president's religious sincerity as well, arguing that no
true Christian could possibly justify the forcible disarmament of the Iraqi regime. In so
many words, the ads urged the president to do what Jesus would do, and mirabile dictu it
turned out that what Jesus would do bore a striking resemblance to the editorial
recommendations of the New York Times.
What surprised many observers was the extent to which similar, if somewhat less
strident, versions of the same arguments were voiced by senior officials of the Roman
Curia. Their number included Cardinal Angelo Sodano, the Holy See's Secretary of State;
Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, Secretary for Relations with States; Archbishop Renato
Martino, for many years the Vatican's permanent observer at the United Nations and now
head of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace; Cardinal Pio Laghi, former papal
nuncio to the U.S., who was called from semi-retirement in February to undertake a
special embassy to President Bush; and Joaquin Navarro-Valls, the omnipresent Vatican
press spokesman.
Their criticisms, which were echoed by many bishops throughout the world, coincided
with an unusually energetic display of diplomatic activity in opposition to war. Numerous
prime ministers and foreign ministers were received by the pope even as special
emissaries were dispatched by him to Washington, Baghdad, and other capitals.
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54. Meanwhile, editorial rants indistinguishable from those dominating the secular press of
"Old Europe" appeared in the pages of quasi-official Vatican publications such as
L'Osservatore Romano and La Civiltà Cattolica.
In contrast to many of these statements, those of John Paul II, while passionate in their
appeals for peaceful resolution, were characteristically high-toned, profoundly spiritual,
and free of political rhetoric. It is unlikely that the pope had particular knowledge of or
gave specific approval to the rhetorical excesses of diverse Vatican representatives. The
Roman Catholic Church, after all, is a very large and complicated organization whose
convoluted bureaucratic customs give special meaning to the idea of plausible deniability.
One must be wary about equating opinions of spokesmen, with or without portfolio, with
the opinions of the pope, much less with the teaching of what comedian Mort Sahl once
described as "the only 'The Church.'"
Even so, the breadth and intensity of the Holy See's diplomatic offensive were unusual
and would not have occurred without the pope's general approval. The Church's position
appears to have been animated by six interrelated concerns about the consequences of an
American-led incursion into Iraq: (1) a significant increase in terrorist activity; (2)
escalation into a broader "clash of civilizations" between Islam and Christianity; (3)
possible retribution against the tiny, vulnerable Christian communities in the Middle
East; (4) injury to the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process," especially as it relates to
protection of the Holy Land; (5) letting loose the dogs of pre-emptive or preventive war;
and (6) legitimating American "unilateralism" at the expense of the United Nations.
These are all serious concerns, but the Vatican was hardly alone in raising them. And in
any event, does not their resolution properly fall within the realm of prudent statesmen?
Interestingly, with the possible exception of the third item, we have every reason to
believe that all were weighed and debated by the Bush Administration before deciding
upon war.
The unusually harsh tone of certain curial officials was certainly notable, but more
troubling than that was the extent to which their interpretation of just-war criteria
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55. reflected the influence of pacifist sentiment. This would be officially denied, of course,
but it could be argued that the Church has already moved toward pacifism without
explicitly saying so. Support for this proposition may be found in the preliminaries to the
Gulf War of 1990-91, which was opposed by the Vatican on the ground that it appeared
to entail excessive use of force. (One is tempted to ask whether the proportionality
principle would have been satisfied if 200,000 rather than 500,000 troops had been
deployed, or if only 10,000 rather than 20,000 air sorties had been planned, but let that
pass.)
On at least two occasions in recent years, John Paul seemed to go out of his way to deny
that the Church was pacifist; but the mere fact that he felt it necessary to say so only
served to underscore the widespread inference that the Church is moving along that path.
The truth seems to be that while the Church continues to embrace traditional just-war
criteria, its understanding of those criteria and how they ought to be applied is being
reexamined. (Archbishop Martino, for example, strongly implied that just-war principles
are being modified in a manner analogous to the Church's recent reevaluation of the
morality of capital punishment.)
It is possible, of course, to read too much into recent Vatican pronouncements; it may be
that they merely reflect particular fears about the propensity toward violence in the
Middle East and the potential for escalation into wider conflict. It may be, in short, that
there is no pacifist turn. On the other hand, the Church's position on Iraq seems to have
deeper roots, which trace to major Church pronouncements on war and peace during the
1960s. Conspicuous among these are John XXIII's much-cited 1963 encyclical, Pacem in
terris, and Gaudium et spes, the 1965 declaration issued by the Second Vatican Council.
Although these documents addressed multiple issues, both were centrally concerned with
the threat to peace posed by modern technology, particularly nuclear weapons. Both
documents questioned whether it any longer made sense to speak of just war if indeed
war might lead to annihilation of a considerable portion of the human race.
The twofold practical thrust of Pacem in terris and Gaudium et spes was a) that nuclear
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56. disarmament was not only a moral desideratum but a moral necessity, and b) that a
serious effort to disarm would sooner or later require a critical reevaluation of the nation-
state structure—in the direction of some new form of international governance. While
neither document made specific policy recommendations on either point, both coincided
with and gave moral support to two major items on the liberal internationalist agenda—
arms control in the mold of what later became the SALT negotiations, and the campaign
to expand the authority of the United Nations.
That these propositions involved highly debatable moral and policy issues did not deter
religious figures, within and without the Catholic Church, from embracing them with
doctrinal fervor. During the 1970s and '80s, for example, arms control became a major
enthusiasm of the U.S. Catholic bishops, as well as other national episcopal conferences,
who had much to say on the subject. Had President Reagan followed their
recommendations, we might still be negotiating with the masters of the Kremlin. It was
precisely Reagan's departure from the traditional "nuclear-disarmament" model so
favored by his predecessors (and by the bishops) that brought the USSR to its knees.
Other factors were in play to be sure, but insofar as U.S. nuclear strategy was concerned
(e.g., SDI and the decision to install Pershing missiles in Europe), it was Reagan's
courageous statesmanship rather than the moral instruction of the bishops that brought the
Cold War to an end.
Concerning the role of the U.N., which figures so prominently in contemporary Vatican
statements, one can perhaps understand the fears animating those who decry American
"unilateralism"; but, on the record, its structure and history provide scant hope that it
could possibly bear the expanded authority that many religious figures would thrust upon
it in the name of advancing peace. Its peacekeeping efforts, such as they are, depend
decisively on the active involvement of the United States, and absent that support,
amount to almost nothing. Its internal structure, particularly the Security Council, reflects
the status of forces in 1945, which is why (as the Iraqi confrontation shows to a fare-thee-
well) it cannot effectively advance the cause of peace in 2003.
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57. While various Vatican spokesmen were lamenting the failure of the U.S. to seek an 18th
(!) U.N. resolution before seeking to disarm Saddam, President Bush acted, bringing the
first taste of freedom to millions of Iraqis who had suffered under the tyrant's boot. What
U.N., one wonders, were these well-placed bishops thinking about? The U.N. whose
European members stood idly by while 300,000 people were "ethnically cleansed" on
their doorstep in the Balkans? The U.N. whose "peacekeepers" were only a short distance
away but did nothing when 10,000 human beings were slaughtered within a few days at
Sbrenica? The U.N. that looked the other way while Rwanda was turned into a charnel
house? The U.N. whose disarmament commission was, until recently, headed by Iraq?
Whose human rights commission is chaired by Libya? The U.N. that would not bring
itself to enforce any of its own resolutions purporting to discipline Saddam? The U.N.
that annually pocketed a billion dollars (or more) for administering the "oil-for-food"
program while Saddam grew rich and his subjects starved? To place any hope for
international peace in the United Nations as currently constituted is an idea too
preposterous to be entertained by anyone wishing to be considered a thoughtful moral
commentator.
The same could not be said about reservations concerning the use of preemptive military
force, which are serious. A number of senior Vatican officials argued pointedly that the
just-war tradition recognizes no such concept. It is true that the idea is not literally
specified among just-war criteria; but considering the ends toward which the tradition is
directed, a plausible, even compelling argument says that under carefully delineated
conditions, preemptive force may be not only morally defensible but desirable.
And it may also be argued that the regime of Saddam Hussein presented precisely the
paradigmatic case. Consider: (1) Operation Iraqi Freedom was in fact not a preemptive
war at all, but merely the continuation of hostilities that began with Saddam's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. The 1991 agreement forced Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait, but
war continued, albeit in muted form. (2) Saddam adamantly refused to comply with the
peace terms he signed in 1991, and thumbed his nose at 17 U.N. resolutions that found
him in violation of those terms. (3) He systematically engaged in multiple other
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58. documented violations of international law. (4) He directed a regime conspicuous for its
barbaric cruelty, one that used rape, torture, and murder as routine instruments of policy.
(5) He twice invaded other countries and gave every indication that he would do so again
whenever an inviting opportunity presented itself. (6) Undisputed evidence indicated that
he had not only acquired weapons of mass destruction, but had used them against his own
citizens. (7) Reliable evidence indicated that he had retained such weapons and was
actively engaged in an effort to produce or procure others, including nuclear weapons. (8)
Reliable evidence indicated that he was harboring international terrorists and had entered
into agreements with them to advance their mutual interests.
The true casus belli in Iraq had nothing to do with any American quest for empire, and
everything to do with the tyrannical impulses of Saddam Hussein's soul. The oldest
political wisdom of the West teaches that when such impulses cannot be tamed from
within, they must be forcibly constrained (if at all possible) from without. One would
have thought that the Catholic Church, as a potent institutional repository of ancient
wisdom, might have had something important to say about that understanding, which lies
at the very heart of the just-war tradition. In the event, it did not, and that has to be
marked as a very great failure.
Nothing was so disappointing in pre-war Vatican statements as their curious silence about
the unrelieved barbarity of Saddam Hussein's regime, notwithstanding that it grievously
oppressed (indeed murdered) millons of innocent people and threatened the good order of
the world. That silence was no doubt dictated by prudential concerns, but, at the very
least, an equivalent prudence might have dictated a benevolent silence about U.S.
intentions. Vatican officials instead indulged repeated criticisms of American policy, and
in so doing wandered precipitously close to the border of moral equivalency. They did
not mean to do so, of course, and would be repelled by the very thought that they had.
Nevertheless, their animadversions against what they perceived to be undue American
muscularity caused them to fret endlessly about the legal formalism of just-war principles
and virtually not at all about their substance.
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59. The case for American intervention was certainly debatable on prudential grounds, but no
one knew that better than the president himself. No doubt he would say that the only risks
greater than those flowing from intervention would be the risks of not intervening. That,
too, is certainly debatable, but the question is who is better equipped to render such a
decision—the President of the United States or a dozen clerics? And who would have
borne the responsibility had Saddam acquired nuclear weapons (as we have every reason
to beleve he was attempting to do)? Had Saddam's regime been allowed to survive in
possession of weapons of mass destruction, which bishop armed with what argument
could have persuaded him not to use them? The unvarnished truth of the matter is that
Saddam's regime presented a clear and present danger to the preservation of peace, not
only in the Mideast but in the larger world. The further truth is that the United States is
the only force that stands between half the world and its descent into barbarism or
tyranny. That so many senior officials of the Curia could have blinded themselves to
those facts is very troubling. When the Vatican's foreign minister begins to sound more
like Dominique de Villepin than he does St. Augustine, we have a great deal to worry
about indeed.
As for the future of the just-war tradition, this much needs to be said: A just-war teaching
that is incapable of dealing effectively and decisively with the likes of Saddam Hussein is
a teaching that will not long command the attention of serious statesmen interested in
preserving peace. If it fails to accommodate just-war principles to the threat of Islamic
terrorism, the Catholic Church will yield the international stage to well-meant or
cowardly pacifists on the one hand, and on the other to men who think that talk of
tranquilitas ordinis is so much pious twaddle. That is precisely the dilemma that just war
was designed to prevent. The Church could provide no better service than to reconsider
the ways in which the time-honored principles of the grand tradition can be brought to
bear on the most pressing problem now facing the world.
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60. CHAPTER FOUR
4.1. CONCLUSION:
4.1.i. Church and Peacekeeping Mission:
A LEADING priest, Bishop Reverend William E. Swing, says: “The 20th century was
the bloodiest one in terms of religious persecution. More people were killed in the name
of religion and faith than any other single source. The next century will be the same
unless we change the way we think and shift moral and religious paradigms.”
A cursory glance at the present scenario of insecurity and the crippling social and
political order of most nations reveals that we have no other option but to accept what the
Christian leader observes. Today, an environment of threat and insecurity has been
created to keep the rift and tension alive. Such designs are closely guarded and
developed.
Hence, in such an era of instability and insecurity, any effort to find a solution to acute
problems through any peaceful means becomes all the more difficult. The ongoing
conflict and threats to peace are creating awareness among the people that peace will not
be wholly safeguarded or achieved by politicians, technocrats, military men or the
government. This responsibility must be shared by the church also, as with its traditional
duty the church is believed to uphold the moral and ethical values of a society.
The problems of war and peace have been universally recognized as an ethical issue. The
attainment of peace and stability has remained the ardent desire of the people over
centuries.
The desire for peace has become a major subject for debate all over the world. The
church is no exception. The various wars fought for grabbing resources and territories
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61. have made it clear that the time has come to raise a collective voice against the
exploitative and colonizing designs of the developed world. The oppressed must be given
their due share and the oppressors condemned and punished. The core issue of political
and economic inequality remains the centre of the church’s activity.
In the early days, the church was purely pacifist in its performance. But with the growing
popularity of other religions, church policies underwent some drastic changes. Its original
pacifist approach was overshadowed by the fear of losing domination and supremacy.
And, therefore, it adopted such a strategy in which militarization was not completely
ruled out. The church now believes that to safeguard its own boundaries and influence, it
must keep pace with the changing social and political order. This drift from total pacifism
to somewhat relaxation in dealing with mundane matters varies from country to country,
depending on the social and moral issues of that particular country. With the penetration
of politics in group interests, the churches were somewhat politicized. The doctrine of
‘just war’ has been the centre of the church’s stand on war and peace. In the words of the
UPPSALA Conference of 1983: “The traditional doctrine of the just war has always
begun with a moral persuasion against war.”
The actual Christian teaching rejects war of all sorts. But now, the opinion of the church
regarding the question of war and peace varies distinctly. On the one hand, it is against
war, while on the other, it is actively involved in promoting arms buildup and the politics
of creating anger and hatred. This is not true of all churches, but the difference in
approach and practice is widely viewed within intellectual circles.
The issue of war and peace has been dealt very specifically by the churches. It has
certainly paved the way for various nationalistic uprising in Europe. The case of the
Polish struggle is an example of the church’s role as a guide for the nationalist
movement. The Solidarnose succeeded with the mass support of Catholic churches all
over Poland.
In several countries, church leadership is closely associated with the political authorities
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62. — the Church of England, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Greek Orthodox Church
and the Nordic Folk Church are examples, while Quakers are exceptions to the general
rule of ecclesiastical nationalism.
The history of disarmament and arms control reflects the struggle of the church both at
national and international levels. In many European countries as well as in America,
churches have been raising voice against defense strategies and the budget allocated for
military purposes. These churches have now gained powerful mass support against the
strategies of arms-producing nations.
But here also the churches are not fully united. Some of them support the national
security policies while others out rightly reject the armament race.
The national conference of Catholic bishops of the US in 1983 circulated a pastoral letter
on war and peace. This is an example of the church’s defined and distinct outlook on
today’s conflictual war hazards and its extreme concern to maintain peace in the world.
The US churches, with a defined liberal capitalist outlook of the American society,
display their views without any compulsion. And for this reason their total rejection of
President Reagan’s nuclear policy did not come as a surprise.
The church strongly supported the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The bishops called
for the use of conventional arms to safeguard security measures rather than the use of
nuclear weapons.
Churches all over the world have criticized the political circles and top military
complexes that they accuse of being the main players behind the war games.
With rising awareness and growing differences between the rich and poor nations, now
the realization has gained mass support that the enormous imbalance is the main cause of
today’s insecurity and instability.
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63. Here also, the church is playing a very positive role in bringing the issue of economic
disparity and has raised voice for a change in the present world order. The church is no
longer isolated and alienated from the prevailing political and social setup, and continues
to raise voice against gross injustices.
Public rallies are held by churches from time to time against weapons of mass
destruction. They have come to realize that security problems should be tackled by taking
bold steps and reconciliatory measures rather than by military adventurism.
The World Council of Churches, ever since it’s founding, has continuously condemned
war and always favored political solutions to conflicts. Another important platform for
social change was the establishment of Ecumenical Network in 1988. The idea behind
this network was that the reality must be faced without making any compulsion.
Churches all over Europe stress the importance of detente as the only source of peace in
the world. They firmly hold the view that unless conflicts are resolved through dialogue
and diplomacy, war cannot be avoided.
To a certain degree, churches are very skilled to provide a platform for a new social and
moral thinking. But, at present, there is a lack of coordination and unity among them. Rift
among the churches has weakened its status as peacekeepers. The actual cause of division
is the over-dominating attitude to gain more power and strength.
4.1.ii. The Role of the United Nations in Peacekeeping Mission
Peacekeeping is a term mainly used to describe actions sponsored by the UN.
Peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council, endowed by the UN
Charter with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The
Congo intervention was the only occasion where the UN tried to act as an independent
power in its own right.
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64. A traditional peacekeeping operation is established when parties to a conflict, typically
two states, agree to the interposition of UN troops to uphold a ceasefire. Limited numbers
of lightly armed troops are introduced and situated between the combatants, and they
provide a symbolic guarantor of the peace. The Security Council maintains authority over
the operation, expressed through the Secretary-General of the UN and the military
commander, authorized under Chapter 6 of the Charter, although the term ‘peacekeeping’
is conspicuous by its absence. UN troops, voluntarily provided by member states, can use
force in self-defence or in defence of their mandate. They are to be impartial throughout
the operation and derive their legitimacy from representing the international community
as a whole.
Examples of traditional peacekeeping operations include the operations in Cyprus, which
have separated the Greek and Turkish communities (UNFICYP, established in 1964) ; in
the state of Jammu and Kashmir, disputed by India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, 1949) ; and
in the Golan Heights, between Israel and Syria (UN Disengagement Observer Force,
1974). Often referred to as ‘Blue Berets’ or ‘Blue Helmets’, the military units in
peacekeeping operations remain members of their own national armies with their own
command and control, but serve under a UN-appointed local commander. For a
peacekeeping operation to succeed, it needs to secure not only the co-operation of the
conflicting parties, but also of the international community, including regional and non-
governmental organizations, donors, and member states.
Since 1948 there have been 49 UN peacekeeping operations, the majority since 1988.
Over 750, 000 military personnel and thousands of civilians have served in peacekeeping
operations, while approximately 1, 500 peacekeepers have lost their lives while serving in
missions. The funding for peacekeeping operations is handled separately from the overall
UN budget. The 1997-8 peacekeeping budget was approximately US $1.3 billion, which
was a significant reduction from the previous few years.
Since the end of the Cold War, superpower constraints no longer hinder effective
execution of policy at the UN and international intervention now encompasses the issues
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65. of common concern and collective security as originally intended in the UN Charter.
Concurrently there has been a drastic increase in civil conflicts, with 90 per cent of deaths
being civilian. This increase in civil conflicts has prompted member states to request
involvement in a range of disputes that would have been considered distinctly domestic
during the Cold War, although not in all of them for financial and political reasons.
Correspondingly, the number of Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping around the
world has also increased significantly. In the 41 years between 1947 and 1988 there were
a total of 348 resolutions on peacekeeping, an average of 8.5 per year, while in the short
six-year time span covering 1989 to 1994, there were 296 resolutions, or 49 per year.
Peacekeeping today therefore comprises a wider range of activities, which has prompted
the introduction of new terms in military, political, and academic circles. The evolution
began with the Namibian operation (the UN Transition Assistance Group, 1989), which
was mandated with more authority than previous missions. UNTAG monitored the
withdrawal of South African troops, registered voters, and managed the 1989 elections,
which led to Namibia's independence.
Subsequent operations have used even more robust rules of engagement, often in
situations where there is neither ceasefire nor a peace to keep. Here, the term ‘peace
enforcement’ has been used to describe these operations, complying with the notion of
‘collective security’, as described in Chapter 7, Article 42, of the UN Charter: ‘the
Security Council … may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of
the United Nations’. Peace enforcement thus takes place when the Security Council
authorizes member states to use ‘all necessary means’ to prohibit or check acts of
aggression, and deal with armed conflict or threats to peace, and not always with the
consent of the parties on the ground. Examples include one Cold War exception, Korea
(1950), and more recently in Kuwait (1991), at the Iraq-Kuwait border (UNIKOM, 1991),
Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR, 1992),
Somalia (UNITAF, 1992; UNOSOM II, 1993), Georgia (UNOMIG, 1993), Haiti
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66. (UNMIH, 1993), Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993), Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993), and Tadjikistan
(UNMOT, 1994).
Some peace-enforcement missions have been controlled by leading states, as the USA
initially did in Haiti and Somalia, or France in Rwanda. Peace enforcement operations are
authorized by the Security Council only as a last resort, when all other peaceful means
have been exhausted. Command and control issues become more critical, as does co-
ordination with a wide array of actors, and can account for success or failure of a mission,
as was learned in Somalia during UNOSOM II.
Today's complex missions incorporate political, military, and humanitarian activities—
depending on the needs and mandate of the operation—which have built upon traditional
UN peacekeeping. UN troops now have increased responsibility to undertake tasks as
diverse as preventing the outbreak of hostilities, as in Macedonia (UNPREDEP 1995) ;
disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating troops to secure the conflict area, creating
buffer zones, and monitoring troop withdrawals as in Somalia, Mozambique (ONUMOZ
1992), and Cambodia (UNTAC 1992) ; providing security for repatriation of refugees
and for elections, and helping to rebuild infrastructure as in Cambodia, El Salvador
(ONUSAL 1991), Haiti, Mozambique, and Namibia; protecting and delivering
humanitarian relief as in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia; guaranteeing free access or
denying such access to belligerents, as in Somalia and Bosnia; and clearing landmines as
in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Somalia. Civilian police trainers, electoral observers,
human-rights monitors, and others have also joined military UN peacekeepers in some
operations, and they too participate in peace-building and peacemaking activities.
In 1996, the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western
Sirmium (UNTAES), was mandated to reintegrate ‘the territory and people of Eastern
Slavonia into the sovereign institutions of Croatia’. UNTAES successfully accomplished
its mandate before shutting down in January 1998. In some respects, UNTAES resembled
the Trusteeship period when the UN administered colonies during the transition to
independence. Since the end of the Cold War the UN has been reluctant to assume such
66

67. responsibility. Responsibilities like UNTAES are rarely part of UN peace-enforcement
operations and are accepted only in exceptional circumstances.
Another term that is used to describe the current array of military options in complex
political environments that require several simultaneous responses is ‘peace-support
operation’. This term subsumes traditional Chapter 6 peacekeeping operations and
Chapter 7 peace-enforcement operations, since many missions now incorporate both. A
final term utilized to describe operations that are situated between defensive
peacekeeping and intensive peace enforcement is ‘peace maintenance’. This term
incorporates political negotiations, humanitarian assistance, the use of force, and the
rebuilding of civil society.
67

68. A. References/Bibliographies to Chapter One:
1. Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton University Press) p.87
2. Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976) p.77
3. Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton University Press) p.77 "war is
the collision of two living forces" and "total nonresstance would be no war at
all"
4. Keegan, John, (1994) "A History Of Warfare", (Pimlico)
5. Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton University Press) p.593
6. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1990), vol. 63, pp. 45–46.
7. Lorenz, Konrad On Aggression 1966
8. Montagu, Ashley (1976), "The Nature of Human Aggression" (Oxford
University Press)
9. Durbin, E.F.L. and John Bowlby .Personal Aggressiveness and War 1939.
10. Turnbull, Colin (1987), "The Forest People" (Touchstonbe Books)
11. Alexander, Franz. "The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace." 1941
12. Blanning, T.C.W. "The Origin of Great Wars." The Origins of the French
Revolutionary Wars. pg. 5
13. Walsh, Maurice N. War and the Human Race. 1971.
14. Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International
Organization 49, 3: 379-414.
15. Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." Annual
Review of Political Science 5: 1-30.
16. Mayer, E. (2000) "World War II" course lecture notes on Emayzine.com
(Victorville, California: Victor Valley College)
17. Coleman, P. (1999) "Cost of the War," World War II Resource Guide (Gardena,
California: The American War Library)
18. The New York Times, 9 February 1946, Volume 95, Number 32158.
19. Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
20. Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978.
21. Long Night's Journey into Day, a documentary film written and directed by Frances
Reid and Deborah Hoffmann, produced by Frances Reid, Iris Films. Information
about the film and a lot of associated information can be found at
http://www.irisfilms.org/longnight/index.htm
22. Rev Brumwell, P. Middleton C.B.E., M.C., K.H.C. The Army Chaplain The
Royal Army Chaplains' Department The Duties of Chaplains and Morale Adam
& Charles Black 1943
68

69. • Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War: Ends and Means (Potomac Books,
Revised second edition by Angelo Codevilla, 2006) ISBN-X
• Angelo M. Codevilla, No Victory, No Peace (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005)
ISBN
• Barzilai Gad, Wars, Internal Conflicts and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy
in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
• Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton
University Press)
• Fry, Douglas P., 2005, The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological
Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence, Oxford University Press.
• Gat, Azar 2006 War in Human Civilization, Oxford University Press.
• Gunnar Heinsohn, Söhne und Weltmacht: Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der
Nationen ("Sons and Imperial Power: Terror and the Rise and Fall of Nations"),
Orell Füssli (September 2003
• Fabio Maniscalco, (2007). World Heritage and War - monographic series
"Mediterraneum", vol. VI. Massa, Naples. ISBN.
• Keegan, John, (1994) "A History Of Warfare", (Pimlico)
• Kelly, Raymond C., 2000, Warless Societies and the Origin of War, University of
Michigan Press.
• Small, Melvin & Singer, David J. (1982). Resort to Arms: International and Civil
Wars,. Sage Publications. ISBN.
• Otterbein, Keith, 2004, How War Began.
• Turchin, P. 2005. War and Peace and War: Life Cycles of Imperial Nations. New
York, NY: Pi Press. ISBN
• Van Creveld, Martin The Art of War: War and Military Thought London: Cassell,
Wellington House
• Fornari, Franco (1974). The Psychoanalysis of War. Tr. Alenka Pfeifer. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Press. ISBN: . Reprinted (1975)
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN
• Walzer, Michael (1977) Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books)
• Keeley, Lawrence. War Before Civilization, Oxford University Press, 1996.
• Zimmerman, L. The Crow Creek Site Massacre: A Preliminary Report, US Army
Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, 1981.
• Chagnon, N. The Yanomamo, Holt, Rinehart & Winston,1983.
• Pauketat, Timothy. North American Archaeology 2005. Blackwell Publishing.
• Wade, Nicholas. Before the Dawn, Penguin: New York 2006.
• Rafael Karsten, Blood revenge, war, and victory feasts among the Jibaro Indians
of eastern Ecuador (1923).
• S. A. LeBlanc, Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest, University of
Utah Press (1999).
• Duane M. Capulla, War Wolf, University of Pili (2008)
69

70. B. References/Bibliographies to Chapter Two:
1. Martin Van Creveld, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR, Free
Press/Macmillan, New York, NY, USA, 1991, especially Chapter VII.
2. Henkin, Pugh, Schachter & Smit, eds; INTERNATIONAL LAW, West
Publishing, St. Paul, MN, 1980, Also, THE LAWS OF WAR, Howard,
Adndreopoulos & Shulman, eds; Yale University Press, New Haven, CN, 1994.
3. Karen A. Mingst & Margaret P. Karns, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-
COLD WAR ERA, Westview Press, 1995, at pp. 1-4.
4. THE LAWS OF WAR, Howard, Andreopolus & Shulman, at pp. 211-13
5. Lt. Col. Richard J. Erickson, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, Air
University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1989.
6. "Weapons of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare, and Airpower
in the Age of Chaos," Chris Morris, Janet Morris, and Thomas Baines,
AIRPOWER JOURNAL, Vol. IX, No. 1, Spring, 1995, pp. 15-30, at pp. 15,16.
7. Ibid, at p. 17.
8. Ibid, pp. 220-25
9. G.A.Res.217A (III), U.N.Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
10. Van Crevald, op.cit. at pp. 198-218
11. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, eds., U.S. INTERVENTION POLICY FOR
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD,W.W. Norton & Co., New York, NY, 1994, at
p. 27.
12. PEACEKEEPING: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer, James H. Allen,
Praeger, Westport, CN, 1996
13. Allen, Ibid at p. 3, citing The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations
Peacekeeping, the United Nations, New York, NY, 1990, pp.8-9
14. "The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations," William J. Durch and J.
Matthew Vaccaro, in PEACE OPERATIONS: DEVELOPING AN AMERICAN
STRATEGY, Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, eds., National
Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1995, at pp. 24-30.
15. Mingst and Karns, THE UNITED STATES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA,
op.cit. at pp. 68-76.
16. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Untied Nations, New York, NY, 1992
17. THE BLUE HELMETS, op.cit. At p.4.
18. A LIFE IN PEACE AND WAR, Brian Urquhart, Harper and Row, New York,
NY, 1987, at p. 198.
19. NATO FROM BERLIN TO BOSNIA: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition, S.
Nelson Drew, McNair Paper 35, National Defense University Press, Washington,
DC, 1995, pp.8-10.
20. See "Idealism Gives Way to Disenchantment," FINANCIAL TIMES, April 1994,
p. 15; Brian Hall, "The World's Cops, Kicked Around," NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE, January 2, 1994, p. 16; and Paul Lewis, "Reluctant Peacekeepers,"
NEW YORK TIMES, December 12, 1993, p.22.
70

71. 21. "GIs in Bosnia face new tensions," CHICAGO TRIBUNE, November 10, 1996, at
A-11.
22. "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," Max R. Berdal,
SURVIVAL, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 5-6, cited by Allen, Ibid. at p. 12.
23. "American Policy and the Illusion of Congruent Values", in STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE AND STATECRAFT: Selected Essays, Adda B. Bozeman,
Brassey's (US), Inc., New York, NY, 1992, at p. 213.
24. Adda Bozeman, Ibid. at p.215.
25. Read: Ancient Law, Sir Henry S. Maine, 1861; Cultural Patterns and Technical
Change, Margaret Mead, 1955; The Nature of the Non-Western World, Margaret
Mead, 1958; Traditional Values, and Socio-Economic Development, J.J. Spengler,
et. al., 1961; or Progress and Disillusion, Raymond Aron, 1968. Adda Bozeman,
op.cit. At p.221.
26. See Agenda for Peace, op. cit.
27. "The Military dimensions of Collective Security," Barry Blechman, in R. Choate,
ed., U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Twentieth
Century Fund Press, New York, NY, 1994, at pp. 67-88.
28. DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, issued
by the NATO Council in Brussels, Belgium, NATO Press Communique M-1
(94)3, 11 January 1994. See also CENTRAL EUROPEAN CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS and NATO EXPANSION, McNair Paper 39, Jeffrey Simon,
National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1995.
29. "Small Wars and Morally Sound Strategy", Major H.F. Kuenning, U.S. Army, in
ETHICS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, James C. Gaston and Janis Bren Hietala,
eds; National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1993, at pp. 187-222.
30. Joseph L. Allen, WAR: CRUSADES; PACIFISM; JUST WAR, Abingdon Press,
Nashville, TN, 1991, at p. 48.
31. "Just War Theory", in Jean Bethke Elstain, ed., READINGS IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, 1990, at p. 330.
32. "Leadership Between a Rock and a Hard Place", Major Lee E. DeRemer, USAF,
AIRPOWER JOURNAL, Volume X, No. 3, Fall, 1996, pp. 87-94.
33. The following discussion of General Lavelle's command is based on Major
DeRemer's article, Ibid.
34. PEACE OPERATIONS, op.cit. at p. 28-29
35. LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century,
Rod Paschall, Brassey's (US), Inc., Washington, DC, 1990.
36. Ibid, at p.130-131
37. PEACE OPERATIONS: DEVELOPING AN AMERICAN STRATEGY, op.cit.
At p. 28.
38. Pamphlet issues by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA,
citing Army Field Manual No. 100-23, Peace Operations, at p. 1.
39. U.S. INTERVENTION POLICY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: New
Challenges and Responses, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY, 1994, at
p. 17.
40. Morris, Morris & Baines, op.cit. at p.22.
41. PEACE OPERATIONS, op.cit. at p. 24.
71

72. 42. The Evolving U.S. Policy for Peace Operations," Colonel James P. Terry,
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 19, Fall, 1994,
pp. 118-124, at p. 122.
43. Ibid. at pp. 25-27.
44. Ibid
45. PEACE OPERATIONS, op.cit. at pp. 32-35.
46. REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 25 March
-12 April, 1996; GA U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1
47. The Laws of War & the Rules of Peacekeeping, Baines, January, 1997
C. References to Chapter Three:
1. William H. Privett is regional coordinator for Pax Christi WNY.
2. George Weigel is a senior fellow of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in
Washington, D.C.
D. References/Bibliographies to Chapter Four:
1. Michael M. Uhlmann, The Use and Abuse of Just-War Theory War Is Not The
Answer! —Yard sign, Winter 2002-2003, Posted June 4, 2003 This article appeared in the
Summer 2003 issue of the Claremont Review of Books.
2. Bellamy, Christopher, Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace
(London, 1997).
3. Chopra, Jarat (ed.), The Politics of Peace-Maintenance (New York, 1998).
4. Mackinlay, John (ed.), A Guide to Peace Support Operations, Thomas J. Watson,
Jr. (Institute for International Studies, London, 1996).
5. UN, Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (3rd edn., New
York, 1996)
72