Too nice to fail? EU external action towards Africa
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 7 September 2016 Damien Helly, Deputy Head of Programme, EU External Action, ECDPM
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Too nice to fail? EU external action towards Africa
- 1. Damien Helly, Deputy Head of Programme, EU External Action, ECDPM Too nice to fail? EU external action towards Africa Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 7 September 2016
- 2. 1. A few words about ECDPM 2. A simple framework to approach a complex topic 3. 2008-2014. Continental drift or widening cracks? 4. 2014-2016: When the crises strike 5. Scenarios for Africa-Europe relations Content ECDPM Page 2
- 3. 1. Think and do tank working on Europe Africa relations and European development policies 2. Funded by 9 European governments 3. Around 60 staff 4. HQ in Maastricht & office in Brussels 5. Regularly on mission in Africa 1. A few words about ECDPM ECDPM Page 3
- 4. 1. Key factors to look at in Africa-Europe relations (development policy-making covered under these factors): a. Economy b. Governance & politics c. Security d. Multilateralism 2. Critical junctures a. Africa-EU summits b. Significant events affecting the 4 key factors above (conflict, elections, international conference) 2. A simple framework to approach a complex topic ECDPM Page 4
- 5. Confidence and commitments to (re)build 1. Economy 2. Governance & politics 3. Security 4. Multilateralism 3. 2008-2014: Continental drift of widening cracks? ECDPM Page 5
- 6. • Trade trends show decrease of Europe. • FDI concentrated in 12 countries • EPAs didn't really deliver • Chinese investments competition • Growth driven by extractives (Chinese growth) – high prices of raw materials • food/agricultural products (wheat) creates South- South tensions • Inclusive growth not seen jointly as priority • some kind of global opening of African economies 3. 2008-2014: Continental drift of widening cracks? Economy ECDPM Page 6
- 7. • Increased EU interventionism until Chad and then African solutions to African problem • Common push on APSA for different reasons • Germany string supporter • But failure of prevention: Sudan , but also and foremost Arab Spring. • And the Sahel: terrorism & organised crime. • SSR-: long lasting efforts in DRC but competition and no collective political weight. 3. 2008-2014: Continental drift of widening cracks? Security ECDPM Page 7
- 8. • Africans became more self-confident. • Regional hegemons as donor darlings raised questions: Ethiopia, Nigeria, and then Angola. • Weakening of pan-africanism (including in South Africa) • Politics in the relation still dominated by large former colonial powers: West Africa, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Mali. • North Africa: France, Spain, Italy • Schizophrenia in democracy support • ICC became contentious, the LGBT. Cultural goods as well. 3. 2008-2014: Continental drift of widening cracks? Governance & politics ECDPM Page 8
- 9. • CPA - Cotonou • Paris, Busan principles • MDGs mixed results • R2P • ICC • COP 21yes but 19 & 20 more difficult • EU AU UN triangle failed to deliver in sustainable funding for security (Product & Obasanjo reports) • Transit phase that last quite long and decreases engagement from both sides on security ? 3. 2008-2014: Continental drift of widening cracks? Multilateralism ECDPM Page 9
- 10. “Need to rebuild confidence and commitments” at the EU-AU 2014 summit 3. 2008-2014: Continental drift of widening cracks? ECDPM summary ECDPM Page 10
- 11. • Global meltdown • Greek crisis & lengthy EU decisions on financial crisis undermine its image • Less Chinese growth, imports & investments • Less trade • African resilience to financial shocks • Domestic resource mobilisation debates start, announcing the return of conditionality • EPAs finally seen as political issue in EU. Deadlines and some get signed but also perhaps more flexibility? No clear impact yet 4. 2014-2016: When the crises strike - Economy ECDPM Page 11
- 12. • Arab Spring • Somalia • Sudan • Sahel • Ebola • Libya • Terrorism in Africa (an African terrorism?) • Syria • Where is CSDP ? (Nicholas Westcott, EEAS Africa) • And where is the comprehensive approach? 4. 2014-2016: When the crises strike - Security ECDPM Page 12
- 13. • EU unable to influence positively post-Arab springs dynamics (i.e. Egypt) • Middle Eastern & Arab & islamic conflicts expand into Africa • Europe’s loss of credibility in its governance of migration flows • Renewed Barroso Commission followed by Juncker with very realistic ambitions (Growth, jobs & youth) + Mogherini as HR/VP show lack of collective political ambition • Towards renationalisation of Foreign Policy? 4. 2014-2016: When the crises strike – Governance & politics ECDPM Page 13
- 14. Cracks within continents and the continental drift seem to keep widening • AU chairperson election & Zuma agenda – few common Africa positions? • Willingness to decrease Africa Peace Facility contribution to APSA • Francophone Anglophone divide • French/British burden sharing in Africa continues to some extent • Sahel shows new EU (but also UN) engagement from several member States but for various reasons • COP21, SDGs seen as success, but it is all about implementation. 4. 2014-2016: When the crises strike- multilateralism ECDPM Page 14
- 15. 5. Scenarios for the future of Africa- Europe relations ECDPM Page 15
- 16. 1. The end of high growth rates in Europe? 2. No optimistic scenarios for the size of African economy (even if diverse) in global economy 3. Trade will go on with or without or with slow EPA 4. Change in African agriculture will be key to feed exploding population + adaptation to climate change 5. Africa may rise but unequally – archipelagos of wealth in oceans of poverty 6. Migration push to remain 7. Necessity to manage migration, employment in a more collective way to have impact 5. Scenarios for the future of Africa- Europe relations - Economy ECDPM Page 16
- 17. 1. EU strategic scenarios • Generous donor but political dwarf • Normative power & political power • Declining power 10 key factors (from economy to internal politics, balance between large Member States, voting procedures & quality of institutional policy making) Brexit not good for EU foreign policy and security policy. But cooperation will continue at different levels. Question is how good a lobbyist will the UK be? 5. Scenarios for the future of Africa- Europe relations – Security (1) ECDPM Page 17
- 18. 1. African security challenges are numerous and diverse 2. Prevention is necessary and its success are invisible but has to be done 3. Future threats include: • organised crime of all kinds, • urban theatres, • Youth & violence, • virtual & technological spaces for conflict, • terrorism, • maritime but also air contexts (growth of air line traffic). 5. Scenarios for the future of Africa- Europe relations – Security (2) ECDPM Page 18
- 19. 1. Highly unpredictable societies (see Arab Spring, but also Ukraine…) 2. Youth in Africa can bring change quickly 3. If European governance standards are lowered down (violation of Human Rights, undemocratic forces coming to power) -> not encouraging for African activists and risk of dialogues between authoritarian rulers. 5. Scenarios for the future of Africa- Europe relations – governance & politics ECDPM Page 19
- 20. 1. Direct coercion in multilateral fora works less well than before… 2. ACP – Cotonou and its limits: debates & ECDPM scenarios 3. Regional integration in Africa also takes different shapes – AU & RECs but not only. Alphabet soups (& Spaghetti bowls) 4. Strong institutions are needed, but too many institutions is not good either 5. Role of ideologies & visions: pan-Africanism, but also pan-Europeanism. (A European 2063 agenda?) 6. If bilateral relations are tense, joint multilateral actions will be more difficult to achieve. 5. Scenarios for the future of Africa- Europe relations – multilateralism ECDPM Page 20
- 21. 1. Direct coercion in multilateral fora works less well than before… 2. Regional integration in Africa also takes different shapes 3. Strong institutions are needed, but too many institutions is not good either 4. Role of ideologies & visions: pan-Africanism, but also pan-Europeanism. (A European 2063 agenda?) 5. If bilateral relations are tense, joint multilateral actions will be more difficult to achieve. Too nice to fail? Towards debate ECDPM Page 21
- 22. Thank you ! www.ecdpm.org Damien Helly www.slideshare.net/ecdpm Page 22
- 23. • Many reasons (often mixed) • Protect life and liberty (desperation migration/forced migration due to conflict, war, natural disasters etc.) • Pursue enhancement of livelihoods and lifestyles (moving out of choice for new lifestyles) ‘economic migration’ Often difficult to identify single reason for moving yet often for seeking employment Reasons for migration ECDPM Page 23
- 24. Why do we talk about migration and development.... And what do we mean by it? ECDPM Page 24
- 25. Migration Development ECDPM Page 25 “... Migration is the original strategy for people seeking to escape poverty, mitigate risk, and build a better life. It has been with us since the dawn of mankind, and its economic impact today is massive.“ (Peter Sutherland, UN Special Representative for International Migration)
- 26. ECDPM Page 26 Migration Development + - Social cohesion Fiscal stress MDGs Education Health gender Poverty Reduction Social impact/ well- being Economic • Labour Market • Inequality
- 28. Migration and Development ECDPM Page 28 Remittances National Level • Increase national income (if formally transferred) • gain creditworthiness • stabilize national balance of payments accounts • Rise in inflation • Aggravation of regional inequalities between receiving and non-receiving areas • No benefit to long- term growth Household level • Afford basic needs (food, education, etc.) – Poverty reduction • Potentially increase local capital for investment Negative: • Increase on prices (of land) etc.
- 29. • Food Security To what degree is heightened mobility related to problems of food insecurity? Food security shocks and chronic food insecurity as major motives for migration for income-generating opportunity. For those with less resources may lead to further fragility/insecurity. • Climate Change – Migration as adaptation strategy Changes in migration patterns can be responses to both extreme weather events and longer-term climate variability and change and migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy. IPCC, UNFCCC increasingly recognize this link • Peace&Security Livelihood strategy in post-conflict societies (Pakistan, Nepal) Pressure on social systems and social cohesion Taking account of ‘returning’ migrants in peace- and statebuilding Link with development dimensions ECDPM Page 29
- 30. 8 Point Plan 1. Protect the human rights of all migrants 2. Reduce the costs of labour migration 3. Eliminate migrant exploitation including human trafficking 4. Address the plight of stranded migrants 5. Improve public perceptions of migrants 6. Integrate migration into the development agenda 7. Strengthen the migration evidence base 8. Enhance migration partnerships and cooperation UN High Level Dialogue 2013 ECDPM Page 30 International and Post-2015
- 31. Goal 8 Sustainable economic growth/ decent work • Promote labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments of all workers, including migrant workers, particularly women migrants… Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries • Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies • By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5% Post-2015 OWG Text ECDPM Page 31 International and Post-2015
- 32. • separate debate on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), • responsibility sharing and solidarity among MS • Fight against irregular migration & “Fortress Europe” without providing safe & legal channels (MS) Exacerbating the situations of irregular migrants • External dimension of migration and internal management inextricably linked EU agenda – Internal issues ECDPM Page 32 European Union Internal Debate on CEAS
- 33. ECDPM Page 33 “Money should not be spent building the walls in Europe [...] but to dismantle the walls in countries [of the South]” “Equally important is the need to work on the link between migration and development” “Legal migration is a fence against illegal migration ”
- 34. • 2006 Migration Policy Framework for Africa M&D: Brain Drain, Diaspora, Remittances • Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking of Human Beings • African Common Position on Migration and Development • “Migration as effective tool for development” • Post-2015 CAP notes migration and development • RECs Free labour migration provisions, e.g. EAC Common Market Protocol Article 10 “free movement of workers” – progress but difficult to fully implement; SADC region more restrictive African Union & RECs ECDPM Page 34 African Union, RECs
- 35. What implications for ECDPM work on migration and development issues? ECDPM Page 35
- 36. Page 36ECDPM European Union External Policy Agenda Internal Debate on CEAS EU MS African Union Policy Agenda RECs RECs RECs RECs Practice International and Post- 2015 ECDPM
- 37. Page 37ECDPM European Union External Policy Agenda Internal Debate on CEAS EU MS African Union Policy Agenda RECs RECs RECs RECs Practice International and Post- 2015 Future ECDPM work?
- 38. Risks ECDPM Page 38 • Policy Momentum stays at the global level but no traction nationally • Topic of migration remains politically sensitive in many countries in South and North • Funding: • Already Existing research by ACP- OBS • Larger scale research (e.g. OECD) Opportunities • Increased momentum • Integration of migration in development planning recognised more widely
- 39. • In which ECDPM areas do you see scope for future ECDPM engagement in the topic of migration and development? • What are the opportunities and challenges to look more at the level of practice and feed experiences back to policy level? • From the perspective of various programmes, where do you see the dimension of migration as being relevant? Discussion ECDPM Page 39
- 41. According to World Bank 73 million forced migrants Forced Migrants (international&national) ECDPM Page 41 33.3 21.9 16.7 1.2 Migrants in Mio. IDPs - conflict IDPs natural disaster Refugees Asylum Seekers Many more undocumented?
Editor's Notes
- Globally there are 232 million international migrants in the world, representing 3.1 per cent of the global population. 48 per cent of all international migrants are women, who are increasingly migrating for work. Most international migration today is related to seeking employment. More than 90per cent of all international migrants are workers and their families. In 2013, Asians represented the largest diaspora group residing outside their major area of birth. Currently, the world´s largest corridor of international migration is between the United States and Mexico. It is estimated that one in eight migrants are between the ages of 15 and 24.
- „Migrant remittances exceed the value of all overseas development aid combined, to say nothing of the taxes that migrants pay, the investments they make, and the trade they stimulate.“ Migration is first and foremost a human reality and cannot be considered good or bad for development – There is often no clear causal link between migration and development processes but it of course has a variety of effects on development. The two enter a complex, contested and nuanced relationship. Impacts depend on what level of development we look at – Household vs. Macroeconomic development of a country. It also depends on what dimension of development we focus on: economic development?, social development? Well-being? Income, education, equality? power relations within households? It has many interlinkages with development processes, both at the micro and at the macro level. Typically, development experts regard migration as a sign of failure: if development policies work, people should not want to move. Accordingly, migration has been viewed as a problem to be solved – not as a solution to a problem.
- Some examples of the migration –development link (non-exhaustive)
- Most attention is usually paid to remittances due to their scale and because they are a lifeline to many poor households. In Bangladesh, for example, just 13% of households that receive remittances from abroad are below the poverty line, compared to 34% of non-remittance-receiving households. Evidence from Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere shows that remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty, and that the additional income is disproportionately spent on education and health. In rural Pakistan, remittances are associated with higher school enrollment, especially for girls. The list goes on. Remittances are a lifeline to poor people – they directly promote poverty reduction by increasing income of remittance receivers
- Migration can be thought of as a financial strategy to diversify household risk. That strategy requires people to absorb up-front investment costs in order to generate stream of further revenue. Viewed through this lens, migration is an investment in human capital that aims to help households manage risk and vulnerability, and remittances are the pay-out from that capital. Migration is often considered a livelihood strategy and a household investment to improve its long term social and economic status. Internal and international migration can have a crucial insurance function by protecting people from the destabilizing and exclusionary effects of absent or ill-functioning markets, inequality, corruption and authoritarianism, failing state policies, and a lack of state-provided social security and basic public services such as education and health care.. Spending and investment of remittances can also have substantial positive effects on economic growth in origin communities and regions, from which (poorer) non-migrants can also benefit to a certain extent through ‘multiplier’ effects. From a perspective of human development that focuses on the well-being and capabilities of people, this constitutes progress and should be seen in a positive light. However, migration and remittances cannot overcome more structural development constraints such as misguided macroeconomic policies, socioeconomic inequalities, authoritarianism, corruption, and legal insecurity. Evidence shows that the extent to which migration can play a positive (or negative) role in social, economic and political change in origin-countries depends on broad development conditions. In contexts that are unfavorable to human and social development, migration may actually reinforce existing inequalities. High poverty and inequality often mean that international migration (particularly to wealthy countries) remains a privilege of the more affluent groups in origin communities and societies. Such strong ‘‘selection’’ is reinforced by immigration policies that discriminate in favor of the skilled and against the low-skilled.
- Food Security issues are linked with migration both because migration is seen as major income generating opportunity for food insecure households, secondly because heightened mobility, especially to urban areas, needs to be taken into account in food security planning. A climate and land based adaptation lens IPCCC Report 2014 on adaptation Changes in migration patterns can be responses to both extreme weather events and longer-term climate variability and change and migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy UNFCCC Cancun Adaptation Framework 2010 C{16/Paragraph 14F “Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to cc induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate at the national, regional and international levels UNCCD COP 2015 Turkey land-based adaptation and resilience There are also a number of links between migration, situations of fragility as well as peace and security. Beyond the fact that conflict is one of the major reasons for displacement, migration can also put additional pressure on social cohesion and act as trigger for existing tensions (e.g. between ethnicities). Moreover in the policy area of peace and statebuilding and development planning migration migration aspects may play a role.
- Migration received significant attention throughout the nine days of negotiations, with many delegations speaking broadly to the important role of migrants in sustainable development. This understanding is evident in the strong presence that migration has retained in the final outcome document, as framed by a reference in its chapeau to the Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. The inclusion of these targets is a testament to the ongoing support of delegations throughout OWG sessions, while their exact placement and wording reflect significant discussion during the final round of negotiations. Support for Goal 8’s target on migrant worker rights remained strong during each read-through of the goal. A last-minute proposal to include a reference to women migrants received positive feedback and was quickly incorporated into the text. Delegations also expressed broad support for migration-related targets within Goal 10, with two clarifying interventions requested from IOM. In response to a question regarding the basis for the use of “5%” for transfer costs of remittances, IOM noted that while this was a benchmark agreed by the G20 in 2011, World Bank data indicates the possibility of further reduction. Momentum on the issue continued into the second read-through of the goal, when a group of over ten In other cases, language on migration was not met with consensus. After a dedicated target on reducing the number of internally displaced persons and refugees worldwide was deleted from the Zero Draft, twenty member states called for the reinsertion of language on forced migration. Nevertheless, a troika of states raised strong opposition, noting the sensitive nature of the issue and the importance of unique national and regional contexts. Additionally a proposal to create a dedicated section on migration within Goal 17 was never picked up by the Co-Chairs or commented on by other delegations. These visionary statements by the Open Working Group are the signs of a big shift over the last decade and a half. Development policy makers are thinking about how to harness the power of migration for global development and plan for a mobile world. This is exactly the right thing to do and decades of social science show that there is no alternative. If the SDGs are to be a serious roadmap for global development policy, they must seriously engage with migration policy.
- Mogherini: Equally important is the need to work on the link between development and migration. The international community has pledged to put people at the centre of the post-2015 development agenda. I believe that, as requested by the EU-Africa Summit, global partnerships on migration and human mobility should be a core component of the post 2015-development agenda as a key factor for sustainable development. The EU’s strategic framework for human rights and democracy does not talk about migration. It should. When forced migrants leave their countries because of human rights abuses, the EU should intervene early on, mainstreaming human rights, with specific reference to migration, in its development policy. Neven Mimica: Money should not be spent building the walls in Europe […] but to dismantle the walls in countries of origin”. During his hearing, Mimica outlined a nuanced approach to migration noting that the majority of African migrants migrate within the African continent. He added, legal migration options should be improved as well as addressing the social and economic conditions within Africa. Piebalgs announced 10 Million Project “Rights of Migrants in Action” focusing on South-South Migration and migrants’ rights- Commissioner Piebalgs said: “This project proposes an innovative approach focusing on migration between developing countries. It shows the EU’s genuine and firm commitment to address human trafficking and forced labour, some of the worst forms of modern slavery, and our will to improve migrants’ rights more generally. And it’s clear for us that we need to work with civil society to make sure that migrants' dignity is respected".
- As a summary, we do see some policy momentum and if the migration targets remain in the post-2015 agenda also some pressure from a higher level to have concrete outcomes on these targets. I want to frame the discussion in what could be a way forward for ECDPM to engage and do more research on on migration and development issues. And I want to do that by looking at the picture of the policy agendas again to show how we have so far looked at the issue and where new angles could be in the future.
- For now we have mainly engaged in the areas marked by a red triangle. We have looked at Policy Coherence for Development, first from an EU angle and then also wrote a paper of PCD on migration and development in more universal terms. We have engaged with migration and development and its importance for the post-2015 development agenda through various publications. We have published papers on diaspora within the EU. Before I started working at ECDPM Henrike has also done work on the African Union and EU Policy Framework. Through blogs and smaller items we published on the issue of the Joint Africa EU Strategy on Migration Mobility and Employment Partnership. Most of the work has been focused on the Policy agendas and on EU related issues.
- The question is now how the center can engage more strategically with the topic of migration and also integrate the migration dimension in some of the work we do where it is relevant. I think from SEEA perspective it makes sense to build on the PCD work but more more towards strengthening EU integrated approaches following up on the great statements that we have heard from the incoming Commission – This will include accompanying the Migration Partnership and the Dialogue between the AU and the EU on these topics. But beyond that to me the value lies in looking much more at the level of practices surrounding migration whether governed or not and its links with development dynamics and feeding information back to the policy level (either EU or elsewhere). Another possibility is to look more closely to the barriers and interests and other political economy factors around regional mobility and whether the formal policy frameworks actually serve and are able to govern what is often largely informal migration practice. International or Regional policy objectives, such as reducing the immense costs of labour migration, could still be an entry point in looking at migration practices that determine the factors of why it may be costly. How do migrants in certain regions react to the existing or non-existing governance spaces. What factors exactly make migration costly? What are the experiences of those migrating and those staying behind – Are policies in place to provide assistance? How do migration dynamics affect other local policy objectives, e.g. employment creation? What are some effects of formal policies aiming to govern informal movements? How do migrants experience their moving? What are the actors and their interests in organizing migration? These are a lot of questions and need to be further broken down to specific cases to look at. But one of the reasons why it may be good to start looking into such type of research is that we can build a base from there to feed these experiences back to the policy level. I think there is worth in taking into account the migration dimension in other work that we do and haere it is really about breaking down some of the policy silos. For example . if we talk about youth employment or food (in)security. The same if we talk about conflict and fragility and livelihood strategies related to migration. For example in some post-conflict regions in Nepal and Pakistan households have few livelihood opportunities available to them and perceive little state presence. Migration for work (either nationally) or internationally – often appears to be the only option available, especially to young people – this then creates new development dynamics a state has to respond to. A second option is again to look more at the implementation level of existing policies and trying to find solutions to unblock some of the political economy factors hindering it. That may however be quite ambitious – often very similar political considerations than we see in the EU when talking about international migration play a role.
- 73 million forced migrants IDPs (33.3 million due to conflict and violence, 21.9 million due to natural disasters) Refugees 16.7 million Asylum seekers 1.2 million Forced Migration: It should be noted that in many instances it is very difficult to identify a single reason for moving and to determine whether movement is voluntary or forced. Forced migrants change from one type of displacement to another, and in some instances flows are mixed.