In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist
leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and
the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, another coalition,
the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and ‘sealed’ by embezzling
$ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January
2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by
another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded
political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of
Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.
Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the general elections, development of the nongovernmental sector has become slower. Although several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is much worse than in Moldova). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that critical socio-economic situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform process may reverse undesirable patterns and change socio-economic situation in Moldova, increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan achievements in democratization and development of civil society.
Authored by: Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz
Published in 2003
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) developed Radiography of attacks against non-governmental organizations from the Republic of Moldova, which aimed at discrediting CSOs and deteriorating their environment for activity.
The Eurozone Crisis and the Democratic DeficitMiqui Mel
This document summarizes a conference on the democratic deficit and Eurozone crisis. It includes summaries of papers presented at the conference on topics related to the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions and policy responses to the crisis. One paper argues that greater political union is needed to legitimately and effectively address the crisis, while others fear this could compound economic and political problems given differences between member states. The introduction provides context on the conference and debates issues of democracy, solidarity and diversity in the EU framework.
This document summarizes trends in Eastern Europe and Russia's neighboring regions. It discusses the failure of projects to integrate Eastern Europe, the rise of nationalism, and multi-speed integration in the region. It also analyzes political instability and clashes between clans in countries like Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. The document presents several scenarios for Ukraine's future and prognostications of continued instability and civil war. It concludes by noting other risks to stability like pressure on Central Asia from ISIS and conflicts in the Caucasus.
Polish Printed Media Coverage and Evaluation of the Polish Presidency in the ...Agnieszka Stępińska
The document discusses a study analyzing Polish print media coverage of Poland's first presidency of the European Union Council in 2011. It examines how four daily newspapers (Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Nasz Dziennik, and Fakt) and three weekly magazines (Polityka, Wprost, and Uważam Rze. Inaczej pisane) portrayed and evaluated the presidency. The study found that while the newspapers' political biases could have led to differing evaluations, most coverage was neutral. Gazeta Wyborcza and Fakt had the highest levels of neutral assessments at 67% and 57%, while Rzeczpospolita and Nasz D
This document summarizes a study on immigrant voting behavior in Finland. It provides background information on immigration trends and laws granting political rights to immigrants in Finland. Survey results show that turnout among immigrants in local elections has remained below 20% and they are underrepresented as political candidates. Interviews revealed obstacles to political participation like a lack of information and language barriers. The conclusion is that while laws have expanded immigrant rights, unequal participation still exists in practice.
Non governmental organizations have been active in Moldova since 1989, but a civil society started its today’s formation as a result of radical reforms in economic and political areas only after the country became independent in 1991. Since that time the establishment of a transitional civil society in Moldova is under way. However, starting from 2001, when the Communist Party won the general elections, development of the nongovernmental sector has become slower. Although several positive patterns evident at the end of the nineties indicate progress in the development of Moldovan non-governmental sector, there is a number of sensitive issues (e.g., freedom of media, human rights protection) in relation to which certain regress has been observed especially in the last two years. Media market in Moldova is far from being free, and protection of human rights remains to be a problem (in all respects, situation of non-governmental sector in Transnistria is much worse than in Moldova). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that critical socio-economic situation seems to be the main threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. This is because further significant economic decline can provide fertile ground for non-democratic political forces and extremists. Economic collapse could be a real threat to the achievements in the area of democratization and civil society development. Thus, only results of a successful economic reform process may reverse undesirable patterns and change socio-economic situation in Moldova, increase income of population, decrease poverty, guarantee stability and irreversibility of Moldovan achievements in democratization and development of civil society.
Authored by: Jacek Cukrowski, Radzislawa Gortat, Piotr Kazmierkiewicz
Published in 2003
Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.
The key persons – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) developed Radiography of attacks against non-governmental organizations from the Republic of Moldova, which aimed at discrediting CSOs and deteriorating their environment for activity.
The Eurozone Crisis and the Democratic DeficitMiqui Mel
This document summarizes a conference on the democratic deficit and Eurozone crisis. It includes summaries of papers presented at the conference on topics related to the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions and policy responses to the crisis. One paper argues that greater political union is needed to legitimately and effectively address the crisis, while others fear this could compound economic and political problems given differences between member states. The introduction provides context on the conference and debates issues of democracy, solidarity and diversity in the EU framework.
This document summarizes trends in Eastern Europe and Russia's neighboring regions. It discusses the failure of projects to integrate Eastern Europe, the rise of nationalism, and multi-speed integration in the region. It also analyzes political instability and clashes between clans in countries like Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. The document presents several scenarios for Ukraine's future and prognostications of continued instability and civil war. It concludes by noting other risks to stability like pressure on Central Asia from ISIS and conflicts in the Caucasus.
Polish Printed Media Coverage and Evaluation of the Polish Presidency in the ...Agnieszka Stępińska
The document discusses a study analyzing Polish print media coverage of Poland's first presidency of the European Union Council in 2011. It examines how four daily newspapers (Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Nasz Dziennik, and Fakt) and three weekly magazines (Polityka, Wprost, and Uważam Rze. Inaczej pisane) portrayed and evaluated the presidency. The study found that while the newspapers' political biases could have led to differing evaluations, most coverage was neutral. Gazeta Wyborcza and Fakt had the highest levels of neutral assessments at 67% and 57%, while Rzeczpospolita and Nasz D
This document summarizes a study on immigrant voting behavior in Finland. It provides background information on immigration trends and laws granting political rights to immigrants in Finland. Survey results show that turnout among immigrants in local elections has remained below 20% and they are underrepresented as political candidates. Interviews revealed obstacles to political participation like a lack of information and language barriers. The conclusion is that while laws have expanded immigrant rights, unequal participation still exists in practice.
The document summarizes the rise of populist and extremist parties in Hungary and Austria. It discusses how Hungary transitioned to democracy in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, with liberal parties like Fidesz emerging. Fidesz and its leader Viktor Orban initially supported European integration. However, after winning elections in 2010 with a supermajority, Fidesz enacted authoritarian reforms that concentrated power and conflicted with EU values. The document also examines the rise of the far-right populist party Jobbik in Hungary and compares it to the Freedom Party of Austria led by Jorg Haider, which rose by promoting anti-immigration and Euroskeptic messages.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The document analyzes trends in media coverage of socio-political events in Ukraine from 2014 to 2017 based on monitoring by NGO Detector Media. It finds that for many years, the political views expressed by private Ukrainian TV channels have been defined by the interests of their oligarchic owners rather than objective journalism. Following Ukraine's 2014 revolution, some channels began transforming into public broadcasters, but oligarchic media groups still dominate the landscape. The monitoring found violations of journalism standards increased in news coverage, especially invited commentary that censored opposing views. Overall the analysis shows oligarchic influence and lack of strong public media have hampered quality coverage of political issues important to Ukrainian society.
The impact of the crisis in Ukraine on its western regionsDonbassFullAccess
The document summarizes observations from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine regarding the impact of developments in Crimea and eastern Ukraine on the western regions of Ukraine. It finds that the western regions have seen a rise in patriotism and civil society engagement since Maidan, but also growing dissatisfaction with the government and concerns over corruption and the economic impact of the conflict. It notes the emergence of self-defense groups after Maidan to provide security, and their evolution into political and aid organizations. It also examines reactions to military mobilization and the perception of the conflict among communities in the western regions.
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...gordana comic
This document summarizes the decline of democracy in the Western Balkans over the past decade according to various indices. It finds that countries in the region have become hybrid regimes or flawed democracies, with weak, compromised democratic institutions that autocratic leaders have exploited to consolidate power. While the EU integration process was meant to foster democracy in the region, the EU has tolerated this dynamic by prioritizing stability and viewing regional leaders as partners. However, the status quo poses risks such as further democratic backsliding, more geopolitical tensions, and declining EU support among citizens. A more decisive engagement from the EU is needed to address the democratic crisis.
Civil society under Russia’s threat: building resilience in Ukraine, Belarus ...DonbassFullAccess
This document summarizes a research paper on civil society resilience in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in response to threats from Russia. It finds the top three vulnerabilities for each country are:
For Ukraine - high insecurity from the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine; turbulence in its predatory and fractured political environment; and susceptibility to Russian disinformation.
For Belarus - its structural dependence on Russia economically, in energy, geopolitically and socio-culturally; issues with national identity and the Russian language; exposure to Russian information warfare.
For Moldova - strong linkages between politics, media and the Orthodox Church that allow Russian propaganda to dominate; low trust in institutions due to this undermining
This article discusses an instance of case-specific self-inflicted partial media capture, acknowledging the chilling effect of legislation consistent with partial
state capture. In general, this case illustrates the ethical and legal dilemmas in the
reporting of a specific type of large-scale corruption in the media, which involves
the denial of all accusations by most sources and a controversial stand by state authorities and politicians on the issue, forcing the media to primarily report rumors or
contradictory claims and denials (after controversial files regarding the corruption
were made public anonymously on the internet) or desist from reporting altogether
(before the files were made public on the internet, due to possible libel threats). The
findings question the normative expectations expressed in democratic theory related
to the role of the media as a watchdog, in the specific context of large-scale corruption
in post-communist states. Moreover, this paper suggests the need to re-examine the
methodological aspects of quantitative content analysis of media coverage of corruption. This paper has also attempted to update the emerging theory on media capture
with the term partial case-specific media capture.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 5, June 2016Lina Grau
The document discusses several recent political events in Moldova:
1) The IMF mission to Moldova discussed issues in the banking sector and progress was made, but more negotiations are needed on reforms. An IMF agreement is important for Moldova to access external financing.
2) The EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee met and said Moldova needs to remove vulnerabilities to stagnate European integration. The EU has suspended financial aid until confidence is restored after a billion dollar bank theft.
3) The EU and US expressed concerns over recent developments in Moldova's justice system and a lack of independence.
4) Official 5+2 negotiations on Transnistria resumed in Berlin after a two-year break
Brazil and Regional Integration in South America: Lessons from the EU’s CrisisFGV Brazil
Social Sciences article by Elena Lazarou, Head of the Center for International Relations at FGV and Assistant Professor at FGV’s School of Social Sciences (CPDOC).
http://ri.fgv.br/en
Russia and the Visegrad Group: The Ukrainian ChallengeRussian Council
The Eastern Partnership policy that triggered the Ukrainian crisis has provided ample opportunity to reflect on Russia–EU relations, alongside with evaluating cooperation between Russia and the Visegrad Group countries (also called the Visegrad Four or V4). The Visegrad Four have taken on responsibility for the eastward enlargement of the European Union having become its members.
The document criticizes a report by Transparency International Sweden on political corruption. It alleges that TIS and its researchers have failed to properly study Swedish political culture and practices, relying too heavily on global surveys. It argues their methodology is flawed and the report's conclusions are unreliable and contradicted by important studies they failed to consider. The document suggests political corruption is systemic in Sweden, especially regarding how civil servants implement policy regardless of laws. It aims to illustrate how TIS report is an example of this type of "vertical political corruption" in Sweden.
This document summarizes a research paper on cooperation between Finland, Hungary, and Estonia based on their shared Finno-Ugric ethnic links. It discusses the foreign policy narratives of the three countries and how their shared cultural and linguistic heritage with Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia has led to some institutionalized cooperation. However, the paper finds that while there is rhetoric of cooperation, there is limited evidence of substantial cooperation in influencing the EU's policies towards Russia or in advocating for the rights of Finno-Ugric minorities in Russia. The paper aims to analyze whether shared ethnic backgrounds can facilitate foreign policy cooperation between EU member states.
The results of the first decade of economic transition are very uneven and are distributed according to a sub-regional pattern. The group of "leading reformers" consists of middle-income countries of democratic capitalism of the Central Europe and Baltic region (CEB). The second group of less advanced reformers includes mainly lower- and lower-middle-income countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) where both capitalism and democracy are still immature and sometimes heavily distorted.
This differentiation can be explained mainly by the adopted transition strategies and political factors determining them. Also the perspective of the European integration has played an important leveraging role. Fast reforms allowed for shortening the period of a temporary system vacuum, breaking down the inertia of the old system, and exploiting maximally the initial political window of opportunity.
The ability of individual countries to follow the effective (i.e. fast) reform strategy was determined by the scale of the initial political changes and further developments in the sphere of institutional and political reform. Generally, a very strong correlation between the progress in political and economic reforms could be observed.
Looking at the role of specific institutional solutions one must underline the advantage of the parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential regime over the presidential or presidential-parliamentary system. The former helped to build the transparent and relatively stable system of the political parties while the latter contributed to political fragmentation, irresponsible legislature and oligarchic capitalism.
Authored by: Marek Dabrowski, Radzislawa Gortat
Published in 2002
European Council on Foreign relations Policy Memory Ukraine after the Timoshe...Fund for Good Politics
The trial and sentencing of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko generated criticism and placed agreements between Ukraine and the EU in doubt. The memo argues the EU should pursue a dual approach: keep the agreements alive but don't formally sign them until Ukraine meets democratic standards, while also imposing sanctions on those responsible for democratic backsliding. President Yanukovych has rolled back democracy in Ukraine to consolidate power through tactics like tax intimidation and abusive trials of political opponents including Tymoshenko. The EU needs to both maintain pressure through red lines and sanctions, while also keeping agreements that matter for Ukraine's long term reform.
Ged Mirfin is a 51-year-old Conservative councilor who has served on Ribble Valley Borough Council since 2011. He has extensive committee experience and currently serves in leadership roles for the Ribble Valley Conservative Association. Mirfin has campaign experience managing online campaigns in the Hyndburn constituency. He has published several papers on topics related to politics, including on political arrogance, inertia, and authenticity. Mirfin's work has received media attention and some of his papers are among the most widely viewed on their topics.
This document summarizes a master's thesis about conflict potential and the role of youth in the Ferghana Valley region. The valley is located at the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and has a risk of conflict due to cross-border issues related to borders drawn by Stalin. Socioeconomic conditions are worst in Tajikistan, followed by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with high unemployment especially among youth. In June 2010, ethnic violence broke out in southern Kyrgyzstan's Osh region, where over 400 people died. While the violence occurred along ethnic lines, the underlying causes included poor socioeconomic conditions and a power vacuum after Kyrgyzstan's revolution in
Germany government (legislative and judiciary branch) 2John Ver Sosas
The document provides information about the cabinet and parliament of Germany. It discusses the Bundeskabinett (Cabinet of Germany), which is the chief executive body consisting of the Chancellor and cabinet ministers. It also outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Bundestag (German parliament), including its legislative functions, election of the Chancellor, and permanent committees. Additionally, it summarizes the structure and role of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany.
The document summarizes Moldova's political system. It describes Moldova as a parliamentary representative democratic republic led by a Prime Minister. Legislative power is shared by the government and parliament, while the judiciary is independent. Key issues include relations with Transnistria and Romania and EU entry. The 101-seat unicameral parliament is elected every 4 years and appoints the President. The Prime Minister leads the government and requires parliamentary approval. Current political parties in parliament are also outlined.
Strategic Outlook
Mongolia is on the verge of defaulting on its foreign debt obligations. This dire economic
circumstance will likely continue unless the government acts in a highly effective and quick
manner to increase foreign direct investment and improve budget discipline. Foreign investment
into long-awaited large-scale mining, energy and infrastructure projects can have a significant
positive impact on the economy, helping overcome the debt crisis and leading to higher economic
growth. The Mongolian public is increasingly becoming intolerant of a failure of political
leadership. Pressures will likely mount on the government to deal with the crisis in 2017.
Oligarchic groups (consisting of businessmen, politicians and state officials) have a significant
influence on the country’s politics and wealth distribution and their conflicts may jeopardize the
country’s continued political stability and development. The following policy measures would
likely prove helpful to successfully advance the socioeconomic transformation:
1. The Mongolian parliament needs to act decisively to improve the accountability of public
office holders and curb political elite-driven corruption in order to restore public trust in
the government and political institutions. Supporting the independence of the judiciary
should be key to achieving this objective.
2. While re-attracting foreign investment is a key priority for the government, it is crucial to
develop and implement a comprehensive, long-term policy to support the development of
the public sector and improve the stability and competitiveness of domestic companies
operating in non-mining sectors such as agriculture, organic food, textile, tourism and IT.
The document summarizes the rise of populist and extremist parties in Hungary and Austria. It discusses how Hungary transitioned to democracy in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, with liberal parties like Fidesz emerging. Fidesz and its leader Viktor Orban initially supported European integration. However, after winning elections in 2010 with a supermajority, Fidesz enacted authoritarian reforms that concentrated power and conflicted with EU values. The document also examines the rise of the far-right populist party Jobbik in Hungary and compares it to the Freedom Party of Austria led by Jorg Haider, which rose by promoting anti-immigration and Euroskeptic messages.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The document analyzes trends in media coverage of socio-political events in Ukraine from 2014 to 2017 based on monitoring by NGO Detector Media. It finds that for many years, the political views expressed by private Ukrainian TV channels have been defined by the interests of their oligarchic owners rather than objective journalism. Following Ukraine's 2014 revolution, some channels began transforming into public broadcasters, but oligarchic media groups still dominate the landscape. The monitoring found violations of journalism standards increased in news coverage, especially invited commentary that censored opposing views. Overall the analysis shows oligarchic influence and lack of strong public media have hampered quality coverage of political issues important to Ukrainian society.
The impact of the crisis in Ukraine on its western regionsDonbassFullAccess
The document summarizes observations from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine regarding the impact of developments in Crimea and eastern Ukraine on the western regions of Ukraine. It finds that the western regions have seen a rise in patriotism and civil society engagement since Maidan, but also growing dissatisfaction with the government and concerns over corruption and the economic impact of the conflict. It notes the emergence of self-defense groups after Maidan to provide security, and their evolution into political and aid organizations. It also examines reactions to military mobilization and the perception of the conflict among communities in the western regions.
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...gordana comic
This document summarizes the decline of democracy in the Western Balkans over the past decade according to various indices. It finds that countries in the region have become hybrid regimes or flawed democracies, with weak, compromised democratic institutions that autocratic leaders have exploited to consolidate power. While the EU integration process was meant to foster democracy in the region, the EU has tolerated this dynamic by prioritizing stability and viewing regional leaders as partners. However, the status quo poses risks such as further democratic backsliding, more geopolitical tensions, and declining EU support among citizens. A more decisive engagement from the EU is needed to address the democratic crisis.
Civil society under Russia’s threat: building resilience in Ukraine, Belarus ...DonbassFullAccess
This document summarizes a research paper on civil society resilience in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in response to threats from Russia. It finds the top three vulnerabilities for each country are:
For Ukraine - high insecurity from the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine; turbulence in its predatory and fractured political environment; and susceptibility to Russian disinformation.
For Belarus - its structural dependence on Russia economically, in energy, geopolitically and socio-culturally; issues with national identity and the Russian language; exposure to Russian information warfare.
For Moldova - strong linkages between politics, media and the Orthodox Church that allow Russian propaganda to dominate; low trust in institutions due to this undermining
This article discusses an instance of case-specific self-inflicted partial media capture, acknowledging the chilling effect of legislation consistent with partial
state capture. In general, this case illustrates the ethical and legal dilemmas in the
reporting of a specific type of large-scale corruption in the media, which involves
the denial of all accusations by most sources and a controversial stand by state authorities and politicians on the issue, forcing the media to primarily report rumors or
contradictory claims and denials (after controversial files regarding the corruption
were made public anonymously on the internet) or desist from reporting altogether
(before the files were made public on the internet, due to possible libel threats). The
findings question the normative expectations expressed in democratic theory related
to the role of the media as a watchdog, in the specific context of large-scale corruption
in post-communist states. Moreover, this paper suggests the need to re-examine the
methodological aspects of quantitative content analysis of media coverage of corruption. This paper has also attempted to update the emerging theory on media capture
with the term partial case-specific media capture.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 5, June 2016Lina Grau
The document discusses several recent political events in Moldova:
1) The IMF mission to Moldova discussed issues in the banking sector and progress was made, but more negotiations are needed on reforms. An IMF agreement is important for Moldova to access external financing.
2) The EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee met and said Moldova needs to remove vulnerabilities to stagnate European integration. The EU has suspended financial aid until confidence is restored after a billion dollar bank theft.
3) The EU and US expressed concerns over recent developments in Moldova's justice system and a lack of independence.
4) Official 5+2 negotiations on Transnistria resumed in Berlin after a two-year break
Brazil and Regional Integration in South America: Lessons from the EU’s CrisisFGV Brazil
Social Sciences article by Elena Lazarou, Head of the Center for International Relations at FGV and Assistant Professor at FGV’s School of Social Sciences (CPDOC).
http://ri.fgv.br/en
Russia and the Visegrad Group: The Ukrainian ChallengeRussian Council
The Eastern Partnership policy that triggered the Ukrainian crisis has provided ample opportunity to reflect on Russia–EU relations, alongside with evaluating cooperation between Russia and the Visegrad Group countries (also called the Visegrad Four or V4). The Visegrad Four have taken on responsibility for the eastward enlargement of the European Union having become its members.
The document criticizes a report by Transparency International Sweden on political corruption. It alleges that TIS and its researchers have failed to properly study Swedish political culture and practices, relying too heavily on global surveys. It argues their methodology is flawed and the report's conclusions are unreliable and contradicted by important studies they failed to consider. The document suggests political corruption is systemic in Sweden, especially regarding how civil servants implement policy regardless of laws. It aims to illustrate how TIS report is an example of this type of "vertical political corruption" in Sweden.
This document summarizes a research paper on cooperation between Finland, Hungary, and Estonia based on their shared Finno-Ugric ethnic links. It discusses the foreign policy narratives of the three countries and how their shared cultural and linguistic heritage with Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia has led to some institutionalized cooperation. However, the paper finds that while there is rhetoric of cooperation, there is limited evidence of substantial cooperation in influencing the EU's policies towards Russia or in advocating for the rights of Finno-Ugric minorities in Russia. The paper aims to analyze whether shared ethnic backgrounds can facilitate foreign policy cooperation between EU member states.
The results of the first decade of economic transition are very uneven and are distributed according to a sub-regional pattern. The group of "leading reformers" consists of middle-income countries of democratic capitalism of the Central Europe and Baltic region (CEB). The second group of less advanced reformers includes mainly lower- and lower-middle-income countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) where both capitalism and democracy are still immature and sometimes heavily distorted.
This differentiation can be explained mainly by the adopted transition strategies and political factors determining them. Also the perspective of the European integration has played an important leveraging role. Fast reforms allowed for shortening the period of a temporary system vacuum, breaking down the inertia of the old system, and exploiting maximally the initial political window of opportunity.
The ability of individual countries to follow the effective (i.e. fast) reform strategy was determined by the scale of the initial political changes and further developments in the sphere of institutional and political reform. Generally, a very strong correlation between the progress in political and economic reforms could be observed.
Looking at the role of specific institutional solutions one must underline the advantage of the parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential regime over the presidential or presidential-parliamentary system. The former helped to build the transparent and relatively stable system of the political parties while the latter contributed to political fragmentation, irresponsible legislature and oligarchic capitalism.
Authored by: Marek Dabrowski, Radzislawa Gortat
Published in 2002
European Council on Foreign relations Policy Memory Ukraine after the Timoshe...Fund for Good Politics
The trial and sentencing of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko generated criticism and placed agreements between Ukraine and the EU in doubt. The memo argues the EU should pursue a dual approach: keep the agreements alive but don't formally sign them until Ukraine meets democratic standards, while also imposing sanctions on those responsible for democratic backsliding. President Yanukovych has rolled back democracy in Ukraine to consolidate power through tactics like tax intimidation and abusive trials of political opponents including Tymoshenko. The EU needs to both maintain pressure through red lines and sanctions, while also keeping agreements that matter for Ukraine's long term reform.
Ged Mirfin is a 51-year-old Conservative councilor who has served on Ribble Valley Borough Council since 2011. He has extensive committee experience and currently serves in leadership roles for the Ribble Valley Conservative Association. Mirfin has campaign experience managing online campaigns in the Hyndburn constituency. He has published several papers on topics related to politics, including on political arrogance, inertia, and authenticity. Mirfin's work has received media attention and some of his papers are among the most widely viewed on their topics.
This document summarizes a master's thesis about conflict potential and the role of youth in the Ferghana Valley region. The valley is located at the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and has a risk of conflict due to cross-border issues related to borders drawn by Stalin. Socioeconomic conditions are worst in Tajikistan, followed by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with high unemployment especially among youth. In June 2010, ethnic violence broke out in southern Kyrgyzstan's Osh region, where over 400 people died. While the violence occurred along ethnic lines, the underlying causes included poor socioeconomic conditions and a power vacuum after Kyrgyzstan's revolution in
Germany government (legislative and judiciary branch) 2John Ver Sosas
The document provides information about the cabinet and parliament of Germany. It discusses the Bundeskabinett (Cabinet of Germany), which is the chief executive body consisting of the Chancellor and cabinet ministers. It also outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Bundestag (German parliament), including its legislative functions, election of the Chancellor, and permanent committees. Additionally, it summarizes the structure and role of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany.
The document summarizes Moldova's political system. It describes Moldova as a parliamentary representative democratic republic led by a Prime Minister. Legislative power is shared by the government and parliament, while the judiciary is independent. Key issues include relations with Transnistria and Romania and EU entry. The 101-seat unicameral parliament is elected every 4 years and appoints the President. The Prime Minister leads the government and requires parliamentary approval. Current political parties in parliament are also outlined.
Strategic Outlook
Mongolia is on the verge of defaulting on its foreign debt obligations. This dire economic
circumstance will likely continue unless the government acts in a highly effective and quick
manner to increase foreign direct investment and improve budget discipline. Foreign investment
into long-awaited large-scale mining, energy and infrastructure projects can have a significant
positive impact on the economy, helping overcome the debt crisis and leading to higher economic
growth. The Mongolian public is increasingly becoming intolerant of a failure of political
leadership. Pressures will likely mount on the government to deal with the crisis in 2017.
Oligarchic groups (consisting of businessmen, politicians and state officials) have a significant
influence on the country’s politics and wealth distribution and their conflicts may jeopardize the
country’s continued political stability and development. The following policy measures would
likely prove helpful to successfully advance the socioeconomic transformation:
1. The Mongolian parliament needs to act decisively to improve the accountability of public
office holders and curb political elite-driven corruption in order to restore public trust in
the government and political institutions. Supporting the independence of the judiciary
should be key to achieving this objective.
2. While re-attracting foreign investment is a key priority for the government, it is crucial to
develop and implement a comprehensive, long-term policy to support the development of
the public sector and improve the stability and competitiveness of domestic companies
operating in non-mining sectors such as agriculture, organic food, textile, tourism and IT.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 6, June 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
Topics of the edition:
1. Signe Burgstaller: The systemic high level corruption is a major obstacle for the political and economic development
2. Nicu Popescu: Brexit - any internal weakening of the EU has a negative effect on the Eastern European geopolitics
3. Iulian Groza: The current political climate is not favouring an advancement in the relations with the EU
European Integration Index 2013 for Eastern Partnership CountriesGhenadie Sontu
This document provides an overview of developments in Eastern Partnership countries in 2012-2013. It summarizes the results of national elections that tested young democracies and notes some countries made progress with reforms while others experienced backsliding. It also discusses how the EU's transformative power depends on domestic political will, and how the EU is applying a "more for more" approach to incentivize reforms through its funding and agreements. The conclusion of association agreements including DCFTAs at the 2013 Vilnius summit would mark an important step on these countries' European integration path.
The document summarizes the spread of anti-democratic practices across Europe and Eurasia in recent years. It notes that incumbent leaders in the region are undermining democratic institutions and norms to consolidate power, often learning from one another. Hungary and Poland have seen the most severe declines, systematically cracking down on the judiciary, media, civil society, and minorities. They have also begun exporting their anti-democratic models and justifications to other countries. Russia too has deepened its autocratic control, leaving democratic governance at its lowest point according to the report's measurements. Overall democracy has deteriorated in most countries covered by the Nations in Transit assessment over the past four years.
The document discusses geopolitical visits to Moldova following parliamentary elections in November 2010. It summarizes that Russia and Western countries attempted to influence the formation of Moldova's new government according to their geopolitical interests. Russia preferred a coalition including pro-Russian parties, visiting Moldova and meeting with the Communist and Democratic parties. In response, European foreign ministers visited in support of Moldova's pro-Western direction and met longer with parties favoring EU integration. The document argues these visits showed the ongoing geopolitical competition for influence in Moldova between Russia and the West.
The Regional Development of Democratization and Civil Society: Transition, Co...Przegląd Politologiczny
Different starting points, similar processes and different outcomes can be identified when comparing East Central Europe and East and South Asia. The two regions face similar global challenges, follow regional patterns of democratization and face crises. In communist times, East Central Europe was
economically marginalized in the world economy, while some parts of Asia integrated well in the global
economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization and a favorable external environment encouraged the
former communist countries to opt for the Western-style rule of law and democracy. Different external
factors helped the Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, which benefited
from the support of the United States and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships to
develop their human rights culture and democracy while facing their totalitarian counterparts, namely the
People’s Republic of China and North Korea. The very different positions Taiwan and Hungary have in
their respective regions follow from the different capacities of their transformation management since
1988–1989. Taiwan preserved its leading role and stable democracy despite the threat to its sovereignty
from the People’s Republic of China. Hungary never had such an influential and problematic neighbor
and was ensured security and welfare partnership by the European Union, which Taiwan lacked. While
Taiwan was less secure, economic and social conditions were more favorable for democratization than
those in Hungary. Hungary, in turn, held a leading position in democratization processes in the period of
post-communist transition which was lost during the crisis and conflicts of the last decade (after 2006 and
especially since 2010). Despite the fact that liberalization prepared the way for peaceful transition in both
countries and resulted in similar processes of democratic consolidation in the 1990s, Hungary joined the
‘loser’ group in its region, whereas Taiwan is among the top ‘winning’ countries in its region. Taiwan at the
moment is starting comprehensive reform processes toward enhanced democracy, civil rights and the rule
of law, and Hungarian development is criticized by many external and internal analysts as straying from the
path of European-style consolidated democracies towards illiberal trends and hybridization. Western global
concepts of democratization may help to identify similarities and differences, and compare stronger and
weaker factors in the democratic transitions in Asia and Europe within the Third Wave democracies.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 7, July 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
Topics of the edition:
1. The British Ambassador to Chisinau, Phil Batson: Taking business out of politics is one of the major challenges for the future of the Republic of Moldova
2. Executive Director of IDIS Viitorul, Igor Munteanu: A federalization model would disintegrate the Republic of Moldova rather than strengthen in.
3. “Elections in Transnistria –are they going to change the situation?” – an editorial by Ernest Vardanean.
This document analyzes the success of Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) and the failure of Rita Verdonk's Proud of the Netherlands movement in Dutch politics between 2006-2010. It establishes both Wilders and Verdonk as populist politicians based on their anti-establishment rhetoric and emphasis on representing ordinary people. However, Wilders is characterized as a "half-hearted populist" due to his background as a professional politician. Verdonk more clearly embodies characteristics of populism such as distrust of elites and emphasis on direct democracy. The document seeks to explain why Wilders was able to grow his party while Verdonk failed to win any seats in the 2010 election.
Report Scenarios Moldova Ukraine 2024.pdfPRDepartment
This paper assesses potential outcomes of the 2024 presidential and 2025 parliamentary elections in Moldova, focusing on government formation for 2025-2029. It critically examines the performance of potential coalition governments concerning their Euro- Atlantic stance, especially regarding key bilateral issues in security, economy, diplomacy, and social matters amid the ongoing phase of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
Carrots or Sticks: The Choice and Impact of EU Democratic Sanctions and AidPaulina Pospieszna
Both the provision of democracy aid and the imposition of sanctions are tools to promote
democracy. Yet, it is unclear under which conditions states choose to set positive or negative
incentives. In order to answer which tool—democracy aid or democratic sanctions—is more
effective, one has to analyse the actual form of the provision of aid. Sanctions and democracy aid
can also be employed at the same time. The goal of this study is to determine their joint effect on
democratization in recipient countries. We argue that sending civil society aid or democracy aid
channeled through NGOs and the civil society when sanctions are in place, enhances the
effectiveness of sanctions as a democracy promotion tool because the civil society can be
empowered to introduce democratic changes in its country—so additionally to the top-down
pressure created by sanctions, there is bottom-up pressure exerted by the civil society. Our results
suggest that democratic sanctions are more likely to be successful if democracy aid bypasses the
government in a target state. Conversely, other forms of aid provision tend to decrease the
effectiveness of sanctions. In order to precisely explain the joint impact of positive and negative
incentives on democratization, we employ a new comprehensive dataset on economic sanctions
for the period between 1989 and 2015 which integrates and updates the Threats and Imposition of
Economic Sanctions and the GIGA sanctions data sets, merged with disaggregated OECD aid data
and V-Dem as well as PolityIV democracy scores.
The role and scope of the state’s activities in the field of social security
are quite often problematic. This is related both to the attitude of citizens and to the
use of social slogans, particularly in election campaigns. One could say that the electoral struggle is a kind of race, in which the winner is the politician or party whose
promises are best suited to their voters. In order to address social security, politicians
manipulate economic data. But above all, the influence of electoral promises (usually
narrowed down to matters of welfare) on the evolution of the political system is not
considered, despite the fact that this influence is considerable and very often neglected, as exemplified by the situation in the Republic of Poland after 2015.
Morocco Program 2014-2015 - Academic Magazine (digital)Anass EL Yamani
This article analyzes the effect of government policies on female political participation in Morocco using Dahl's five criteria of democracy. While women have legal rights to participate, cultural and religious factors constrain effective participation. Quotas have increased the number of women in politics but they mainly occupy lower levels and decision-making positions remains low. Education initiatives have improved political knowledge but control of the political agenda remains limited due to their positions. Overall, government policies have made some progress but more is needed to achieve equality and overcome constraints to fully realize democratic participation for women.
This document discusses trends in Ukraine after the 2010 presidential election and makes recommendations for democracy assistance. It notes that political stability is seen as essential for democracy consolidation but that the country's stability remains fragile. It also finds that the separation of powers has been undermined and space for media and NGOs is shrinking. The document recommends supporting civil society development through enabling environments, partnerships, and democracy education. It also calls for assisting independent media and political parties while maintaining a focus on human rights.
Elderfield 7SCORE = 94Social Media and Political Activity.docxjack60216
Elderfield 7
SCORE = 94%
Social Media and Political Activity: Considering the Implications
It is impossible to completely predict all of the different effects that one phenomenon will have on another. This is especially true when one of the phenomena in question is as deep and complex as political activity and the other as new and fluid as social media. Because the phrase “political activity” is vague and could be used to describe any number of different actions, in the context of this essay it will be defined as any action that is intended to concern both a federal or local governmental body and one or more of its citizens. The meaning of “social media” is somewhat standard, but to avoid any confusion it will be defined as any form of media that facilitates real-time communication between two or more people. Many reputable scholars have devoted a great deal of time and other resources to the study of the interaction between social media and political activity. In a recent article entitled “The Political Power of Social Media”, Clay Shirky, Professor of New Media at New York University, discusses the different effects that social media has had on national and international politics and the varying degrees of success that it has created (1-12). In examining some of the more United States-centric effects of social media on political activity, Michael McGrath, the editor of The National Civic Review, discusses the effects of social media on political participation within minority groups in an article entitled “Technology, Media, and Political Participation” (41-44). Finally, taking a more cynical approach to the interaction between social media and political activity, Evgeny Morozov, a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, takes a closer look at the role of social media in political revolutions and how authoritarian governments are adapting to the rise of social media in an article entitled “Technology’s Role in Revolution: Internet Freedom and Political Oppression” (18-21). While these three articles all look at the interaction between social media and political activity from differing perspectives, they all lead to an overlapping set of conclusions. While the core components of political activity have not been changed by the effects of social media, the scope of its occurrence has. These changes are pressuring non-democratic governments to acknowledge and respond to the opinions and wishes of their citizens more than ever before. As a result, authoritarian regimes are now adjusting their policies and actions with social media in mind.
While social media has influenced many aspects of society, at its core, political activity has remained unchanged. Clay Shirky observes that, “Just as [Martin] Luther adopted the newly practical printing press to protest against the Catholic Church, and the American Revolutionaries synchronized their beliefs using the postal service that Benjamin Franklin had designed, today’s dissident movements will use an ...
This document discusses the need for reforms to create a more social and democratic European Union. It argues that the current EU integration process overly favors market liberalization at the expense of social regulation and democracy. The institutional architecture of the EU multi-level system creates an imbalance that undermines fundamental social rights and weakens member states' social models. The document proposes using the concept of social democracy as a blueprint for reform. Specifically, it identifies three key policy areas for reform: establishing an "open" EU constitution, setting social minimum standards, and strengthening the fiscal capacities of member states.
This document provides a summary of a study titled "Politics and Society in North Africa and the Middle East between Reform and Conflict. Trends in Development up to the Year 2010". The study analyzes political, economic, and social developments in the region, and identifies key risk factors and areas of potential conflict. It finds that governments have largely been unwilling or unable to implement reforms to modernize their economies and societies. Socioeconomic challenges like unemployment, poverty and lack of resources could trigger further conflicts. Ideological debates around cultural and religious identity have also intensified and may hinder reforms. The study concludes that without concerted long-term strategies to promote structural reform and modernization, socio-political conflicts in the region will likely continue
This document summarizes a case study about collusion between a journalist from the Slovak daily Pravda, Vanda Vavrova, and a top Slovak politician and Member of Parliament, Robert Kaliňák. The study examines wiretapped phone conversations that show Kaliňák trying to pressure Vavrova into publishing damaging information about one of his political rivals. While the media criticized the wiretapping, they downplayed the collusion between the journalist and politician. The document provides context on media ownership in Slovakia and analyzes the content of the conversations, as well as the initial media coverage of the scandal.
The document provides an overview of Moldova's relations with the EU and its progress towards visa liberalization. It discusses Moldova's participation in programs like the Eastern Partnership and its negotiations of agreements like the Association Agreement. It also examines Moldova's implementation of reforms in priority areas for visa liberalization like border management, security, and documents. Support for EU integration among Moldovans is high, though Russia is still seen as a key strategic partner due to historical and ethnic ties. Overall progress has been made but inconsistencies remain in some reform areas.
This document summarizes Peter Dahlgren's presentation on the contingencies of political participation via social media. Some key points:
1) Dahlgren argues that political participation through social media is shaped by various contingencies including political economy, technology, and socio-cultural patterns. These factors both enable and constrain online participation.
2) He examines how the commercial logic and data collection practices of major tech companies like Google and Facebook can undermine democracy by collecting personal information without transparency and sluicing users towards certain sites.
3) Socio-cultural currents online often promote individualized consumerism and entertainment over political engagement, which can subvert alternative politics and civic participation. Navigating these
Similar to The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova after the “Twitter Revolution” – the policy of integration or desintegration? (20)
This paper aims to examine the activity of the Mamy Głos Foundation [We
have a voice], an organization founded in 2015 by junior high school students from
a handful of towns in Poland. For this purpose, a review of available materials about
this organization will be carried out and information will be collected using in-depth
interviews with the founders of the organization. The main research question concerns
the motivation behind young people’s activity in the foundation, the methods used to
achieve the goals of the organization and its founders’ profiles. Their activity will be
presented in the context of political activism among young people, including gender
differentiation.
The United Kingdom joined the EEC/EU in 1973. Its membership has been
one of the thorniest issues in British politics over the last forty-five years. The United
Kingdom was one of the most Euroskeptic member states in the EU. The ‘added
value’ brought by London to the EU was the English language, which successively
supplanted French from the function of working language of the EU. English is not
only the official language of the EU (it is one of 24 official languages), but primarily
has a dominant position in the EU. It is used for communication between the EU and
the world, between European institutions and during informal meetings. The purpose
of this article is to analyze the position of English in the EU, to show its strengths, and
finally to answer the question of whether the present status of English in the EU will
remain after the UK leaves.
This article aims to identify the major cores of the 15-M Movement mindset
and explain how particular historical factors shaped it. The research problems are to identify the types of relations the movement established between the people and the ruling
elites in its political manifestos, and the sources of these discursively created relations.
The research field encompasses the content of political manifestos published between
the Spanish general election on March 9, 2008 and immediately after the demonstrations
held on May 15, 2011. To solve these problems, the research applies source analysis of
the political manifestos. These are: (1) The Manifesto of ¡Democracia Real YA!; (2) The
Manifesto of the Puerta del Sol Camp, and (3) The Manifesto “May 68 in Spain.” The
research uses the technique of relational qualitative content analysis to determine the
relations between the semantic fields of the major categories of populism, ‘the people’
and ‘the elites,’ as well as to identify the meanings formed by their co-occurrence. The
tool used is a content analysis instruction whose major assumption is to identify all the
attempts to create images of ‘the people,’ ‘the elites,’ and relations between them.
The article analyzes the structure, content, properties and effects of the
Russian-Ukrainian ‘hybrid war’ in its non-military dimension. Particular emphasis is
placed on the aspect of the information and propaganda war, as well as activities in
cyberspace. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is described in the context of the new war
strategy of General Valery Gerasimov. Contemporary practice of hybrid actions in the
conflict in Ukraine has revealed that, for the first time, a stronger opponent, Russia,
uses the full spectrum of hybrid interaction on an opponent who is weak and unable
to defend the integrity of its territory. The military conflict of 2014 showed not only
the weakness of the Ukrainian state, but also, more importantly, the inefficiency of the
organizations responsible for ensuring international security: NATO, OSCE and the
UN. In the longer term, it should be noted that the escalation of hybrid activities in
Ukraine clearly threatens the states on the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The analysis conducted refers to the problem defined in the form of questions: what
is the essence of hybrid operations? What is the nature of non-military hybrid operations? What was the course of these activities in Ukraine? How was international law
interpreted in relation to this conflict?
The article has three dimensions: methodological, theoretical, and empirical. A point of departure for the methodological remarks is a characterization of the
three main approaches in the vibrant interdisciplinary research field dealing with the
phenomenon of conspiracy theories. In this context, the content analysis method is
discussed as a promising approach to gain new data on conspiracy narratives. On the
theoretical level, the concept of conspiracy narratives is discussed in reference to the
popular understanding of the conspiracy theory. The main aim of the empirical part is
determining to what extent the media are saturated with different kinds of conspiracy
narratives. The analysis covers over 200 articles from two popular Polish news magazines (Sieci and the Polish edition of Newsweek) which occupy positions on opposite sides of the political divide in a society polarized, inter alia, by a conspiratorial
suspicion that in 2010 an airplane carrying President Lech Kaczyński on board was
deliberately crashed in Russia.
: The main goal of the studies described in this article may be defined as an
analysis of the promotional processes of regional and traditional products executed with
the use of symbols regulated by European law: Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG),
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI).
The analysis presented here and the trends in promotional activities deducted from
it, primarily result from the specifics of the goods. The shape of the information system is also influenced by social and cultural factors decisive for the recognizability
and renown of the products, which have been confirmed by the results of the questionnaire conducted for the study. What is worth noting is the correlation between quality
and tradition, reflected, among other things, in declarations regarding the reasons for
the choice of these products: the sense of pride and the willingness to continue the
traditions were chosen by 45% of the survey participants. The Traditional Speciality
Guaranteed (TSG) has proven to be the most recognizable European symbol (38%).
This paper looks at the proposals of the European Commission for the
Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027, and explores how to achieve a better
future for Europe by ensuring compliance with the legally binding values and objectives of the EU: democracy, equality, the rule of law, economic, social and territorial
cohesion and solidarity between the member states.
It is argued that introducing progressivity, a reform of the EU’s finances involving
a paradigm shift in the financing of policies with redistributive effects and a reform of
the system of the EU’s ‘own resources,’ would ensure that solidarity becomes a matter
of the rule of law and not of governance through conditionalities and fines.
It is pointed out that, unless the EU undertakes an effective reform of its redistributive policies to ensure that progressivity and solidarity in the EU become a matter
of the rule of law, the Union will bear less and less resemblance to a democracy and
will increasingly look like an empire with an economically stronger and more rapidly
developing ‘core,’ and an economically weaker ‘periphery’ in the East and the South
lagging behind the ‘core.’
What is needed is collective action by the member states most immediately interested in a reform to make the system of EU’s ‘own resources’ less regressive and to
introduce progressivity in the financing of the policies of the EU. It would take significant skill for those countries to organize themselves as a group and to act together
in the course of the adoption of the legislative proposals for the next MFF in order to
make the EU more equitable.
Contemporary diplomacy has evolved into a network involving various
new actors, including international sports organizations. The article is dedicated to the
issue of the sports diplomacy of international bodies which are in charge of international sporting competitions, particularly the International Federation of Association
Football (FIFA), an organization that manages football on a global level.
The research presented in this article is a case study dedicated to the issue of the
influence of international sports organizations on the governments of sovereign states,
specifically FIFA. The objective of the research is to investigate whether international
sports organizations are able to make governments change their political decisions.
The hypothesis that has been investigated states that international sports governing
bodies are diplomatic actors capable of influencing states.
One of the first laws adopted by the new political leadership in Ukraine
in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was the new concept of local
governance reform and the organization of territorial authority in Ukraine. The aforementioned law, as well as official declarations by top politicians on the necessity of
empowering Ukrainian citizens to take part in the decision-making process and shape
their local communities, led to positive expectations regarding the transformation of
local governance in Ukraine. Therefore, this article addresses the issue of the legal
basis framing the functioning of civil society in Ukraine, focusing on major attempts
to conduct reform and on the main outcomes of implemented actions. Additionally,
emphasis is placed on the current state of cooperation between social and political
actors, and the trends in civil participation in the decision-making process regarding
decentralization and local governance reform in Ukraine.
This document discusses how illiberal democracy in Hungary from 2010-2014 negatively influenced the effectiveness of lobbying control in the country. It defines key terms like lobbying, interest groups, and liberal vs illiberal democracy. Illiberal democracies differ from liberal democracies in that they do not strictly follow the rule of law, lack independent oversight of the government, have more corrupt political elites, less free media, and do not fully protect civil rights and minorities. The document analyzes how Hungary met the criteria of an illiberal democracy during this period and repealed its lobbying law, diminishing transparency and accountability in the lobbying process.
The article is based on an analysis of national and European legal acts,
documents and source literature and its aim is to describe education and information
in consumer policy in Poland. The protection of consumer rights within the scope
of information and education is presented as a prime objective of the consumer policy strategy of the European Union and government programs of consumer policy
in Poland. Certain aspects of information and education policy of the government
are investigated, which are included in the Consumer Policy Strategy 2014–2018.
The competencies of consumer authorities in the institutional context are thoroughly
discussed in terms of education and information in Poland. Moreover, the consumer
identity of information and education policy between Poland and the European Union
is indicated.
Agrarianism was founded in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth
century, but it exercised the greatest influence in the predominantly agricultural countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Central European agrarianism was the ideology
of peasants and it proclaimed that land was the greatest wealth of the nation, agriculture was the most important branch of economy, and peasants were the morally
healthiest and thus the most valuable part of the society. Agrarianism was a personalist
ideology, which proclaimed a conception of man as a subject of social and economic
life. It criticized both extreme liberalism and totalitarian political ideology and advocated the concept of a ‘third way of development’ – between capitalism and communism. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the formation and development
of Polish agrarianism, and the related process of transfer and reception of knowledge.
The analysis focuses on the concept of land, man and labor, formulated by the representatives of the mainstream of agrarianism. In the 1930s, the Polish agrarians voiced
demands for land reform and the development of smallholder agriculture which, in
their opinion, made an optimal use of the land, capital and labor, that is, the most
important resources available to interwar Poland.
Using a proprietary computer program, simulations of voting in the Council
after Great Britain’s withdrawal from the EU were carried out. In the case of some of
them, a methodological innovation consisting in departing from the assumption that
the emergence of each possible coalition is equally probable was used. The analysis
conducted indicates that after Brexit the ability of the Council members to form small
minimally blocking coalitions will change significantly. At the same time, the assessment of the ability of states to block decisions in the Council and made on the basis
of the Preventive Power Index, differs fundamentally from the results of the analysis
focusing on building small minimally blocking coalitions.
This research is funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, under project no.
UMO-2016/23/D/HS5/00408 (SONATA 12 grant) entitled “The Impact of Brexit and
Unconditional Introduction of the ‘Double Majority’ Voting System on DecisionMaking in the Council of the European Union.”
Teoretycy i praktycy storytellingu koncentrują się zazwyczaj na formalnych właściwościach przekazu, upatrując klucza do jego perswazyjnej skuteczności w realizacji strukturalnych cech opowiadania. Niniejszy artykuł kładzie natomiast
nacisk na poznawczy aspekt relacji komunikat-odbiorca, upatrując w nim ważnego
czynnika determinującego siłę perswazyjnego oddziaływania storytellingu. W pierwszej części tekst analizuje psychologiczne przesłanki skuteczności perswazyjnej narracyjnego komunikatu. Część kolejna stanowi teoretyczną propozycję w jaki sposób
zwiększyć skuteczność jego oddziaływania, uwzględniając budowę, właściwości
i funkcje schematów poznawczych oraz w oparciu o model poznawczych reakcji na
perswazję.
The author examines the nexus between international law and the concept
of human security that emerged in the 1990s. The article proceeds in three parts. Part
one outlines the concept of human security, its genesis and contents. Part two examines the nexus between human security and international law and briefly considers the
most representative aspects of international law, including international jurisprudence,
that, in the author’s opinion, reflect human security imperatives. Finally, conclusions
provide answers to the questions posed and indicate the increased value of the human
security concept. The questions read as follows: How can human security strengthen
international actions (actions based on international law)? Where in international law
is human security reflected? In other words, what aspects of international law reflect
a human security-centered approach? What is the role of international law in human
security? Taking all this into account, what is the added value of adopting the concept
of human security? This article is inevitably interdisciplinary, as it combines the perspectives of international law and international relations.
Najważniejszą barierą rozwoju małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw
(MŚP) jest ograniczony dostęp do źródeł finansowania. W fazie startu wykorzystują
one zwykle środki własne, rodziny i przyjaciół. Następnie zaś sięgają one po kredyt bankowy, którego otrzymanie jest trudne ze względu na brak historii finansowej,
gwarancji i ekonomiczną ich słabość. Nieliczne mogą korzystać z grantów rządowych i wsparcia międzynarodowych organizacji (np. Unii Europejskiej). Pomocnymi mogą być alternatywne źródła finansowania takie jak venture capital, mezzanine,
crowdfunding, emisja obligacji oraz publiczna emisja akcji (Initial Public Offering:
IPO). Ten ostatnio wymieniony sposób finansowania może przynieść znaczne korzyści dla MŚP; umocnić ich pozycję rynkową i umożliwić ekonomiczną ekspansję, ale
związany jest z wieloma barierami. Do najważniejszych należą trudność spełnienia
kryteriów notowania na giełdzie lub specjalnych platformach, nawet jeśli są one łagodniejsze niż dla dużych firm, wysokie koszty, brak wiedzy o rynku kapitałowym
i niska płynność akcji MŚP. Dlatego niezbędne jest podjęcie przez rządy, organizacje
międzynarodowe i krajowe oraz interesariuszy działań zmierzających do likwidacji
lub ograniczenia tych barier.
Dyskusje i badania polskiego członkostwa w strefie euro są w obecnych, dynamicznie zmieniających się warunkach obarczone dużą dozą niepewności,
stąd ograniczać się mogą jedynie do kreślenia scenariuszy. Niniejsze opracowanie
skupia się na aspektach gospodarczych decyzji o: 1) definitywnej rezygnacji z wprowadzenia wspólnej waluty w Polsce, 2) szybkiej akcesji do strefy euro oraz 3) odsunięciu w czasie udziału Polski w tej strefie. Każdy z wariantów rodzi inne skutki polityczno-ekonomiczne i tym samym wyznacza inne ścieżki długookresowego rozwoju
polskiej gospodarki.
Artykuł prezentuje wyniki badań nad traumą społeczno-kulturową
w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Do weryfikacji teorii traumy zostały wykorzystane reprezentatywne dane sondażowe z Białorusi, Bułgarii, Węgier, Rumunii, Polski,
Rosji i Ukrainy. Prowadzone analizy pokazały, że społeczeństwo postkomunistyczne
negatywnie oceniło zmiany systemu gospodarczego i politycznego. Źródłem traumy był spadek poziomu życia oraz wzrost przestępczości. Respondenci uważali, że
w wyniku transformacji stracili na zmianach i pod wpływem powstałej traumy pesymistycznie oceniali przyszłość. Rekcją na pojawiającą się traumę była nostalgia za
socjalizmem i bezpieczeństwem społecznym przezeń oferowanym. Czynnikami łagodzącymi szok w społeczeństwie postkomunistycznym było wykształcenie, młodszy
wiek i orientacja proeuropejska.
Zasadniczym celem artykułu jest przybliżenie prób reformy systemu
wyborczego do Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy podejmowanych w okresie przypadającym
po Euromajdanie. Analizie zostały poddane rozwiązania prawne zawarte w zarejestrowanych i poddanych pod głosowanie w parlamencie projektach ordynacji wyborczych. Przybliżono także stanowisko poszczególnych sił politycznych wobec potrzeby reformy systemu wyborczego, na co pozwoliła analiza programów wyborczych,
zapisów umowy koalicyjnej zawartej w RN VIII kadencji, jak również wyników
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z wariantów systemu wyborczego jest najbardziej pożądany przez ukraińskie społeczeństwo.
Mołdawia jest państwem, które z jednej strony podejmuje wysiłki
zmierzające ku demokratyzacji i europeizacji jej systemu politycznego i prawnego,
z drugiej – działania te są chaotyczne, brak im konsekwencji i są uwarunkowane
bieżącą sytuacją polityczną. Jednym z obszarów podlegających takim politycznym
przesileniom jest samorząd terytorialny. Cele artykułu są dwojakie: po pierwsze, periodyzacja i charakterystyka kolejnych etapów kształtowania się modelu samorządu
lokalnego w Mołdawii, po drugie – charakterystyka aktualnie obowiązujących rozwiązań i wskazanie podstawowych problemów istotnie wpływających na jego funkcjonowanie.
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The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova after the “Twitter Revolution” – the policy of integration or desintegration?
1. DOI 10.14746/ssp.2018.3.6
Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca
Kazimierz Wielki University
The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova
after the “Twitter Revolution”
– the policy of integration or desintegration?
Abstract: In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist
leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alli-
ance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the As-
sociation Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and
the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alter-
native to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon’s Party of Socialists, another coalition,
the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and ‘sealed’ by embezzling
$ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January
2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by
another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded
political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parlia-
mentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of
Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predeces-
sors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.
Key words: Moldova, pro-European coalition, corruption, parliamentary elections in
the Republic of Moldova in 2018
Introduction
Since 1990, eighteen cabinets have ruled or ‘appeared’ in the Republic
of Moldova (if we recognize the one of Valeriu Muravschi and Mircea
Druca; two terms by Ion Sturza and Iurie Leancă; the cabinet of Chiril
Gaburici and Valeriu Streleţ – this one received a vote of confidence from
the Parliament on July 30, 2015; and the cabinet of Pavel Filip, appointed
on January 20, 2016), and early elections have been held several times.
The party scene is constantly evolving (Sikora-Gaca, 2013, pp. 10, 16,
170), as evidenced by the resignation of Prime Minister Chiril Gaburici,
following the vote of no confidence for the Streleţ government on October
2. 82 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
29, 2015, by the rise and activity of the Civic Platform Dignity and Truth
and by a new political party, the European People’s Party created by Iurie
Leancă (July 27, 2015 was the date of the founding congress of the party),
or by the arrest of Vlad Filat on October 15, 2015, and by ongoing social
protests and unprecedented accumulation of power in the hands of one
oligarch – Vlad Plahotniuc. These intense measures of power, especially
after 2009, demanded a number of coalitions and established political and
business relations which de facto mostly grew on close relations with Vo-
ronin, and after his fall, took the form of individual political projects. The
analysis of the created coalitions and established political and business
relations is the basic objective of the research initiated in this article.
Thus, in the Republic of Moldova the times that followed after the
Twitter Revolution1
can be divided into two distinct periods: until 2012,
when the launched pro-European coalition, working on integration with
the European Union, led to the election of President Nicolae Timofti; and
the years after 2013, when a quasi-change stage is observable, and dis-
putes within the coalition, over time, begin to take on the form of open
‘civil war,’including open conflict between the major oligarchs (Zdaniuk,
2016, pp. 194–195); the Socialist Party wins the parliamentary elections
of November 30, 2014, and in 2015, the banking crisis is linked to the
Banca de Economii and Banca Sociala.
Therefore, the subject matter of this article is the governing coalitions
in the Republic of Moldova, initiated after the aforementioned Twitter
Revolution. The main research hypothesis assumes that they played an
important role in shaping the Moldovan political and party leadership,
mainly because of the fact that the communists were removed from pow-
er. However, the main research problem has been based on the follow-
ing statement: in the ‘decommunized’ Moldovan political system, which
was introduced after 2009, there are more disintegrating phenomena than
examples of integration. The article uses mixed methods of theoretical
research (Nowak, Głowiński, 2013, pp. 136–146), useful in both empiri-
cal and theoretical cognition, including: analysis, synthesis, induction and
deduction.
1
The Twitter Revolution is defined as the social protests initiated in the Republic
of Moldova in 2009. They were organized by a journalist Natalia Morar, who, with
the help of the Twitter social networking site, gathered several thousand protesters
in front of the Moldovan Parliament. As a result of the Twitter Revolution in the
Republic of Moldova, the communists were removed from power and a coalition, the
Alliance for European Integration, was formed.
3. ŚSP 3 ’18 The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova... 83
The political context – the parliamentary elections of 2010 and 20142
Moldovan pluralism is said to have a geopolitical base, but equally
often it is attributed a personal, political or social nature (Munteanu,
2010, p. 13). These lines of division – although in many cases described
as marginal – are important in shaping the party scene. In the systems
of many countries, the ruling elites hold an important position and they
largely represent the political and economic oligarchy of the country (Bo-
dio, 2010, p. 18). In the Republic of Moldova these include the rule of
the ‘three Vlads’ (Oleksy, 2015, pp. 90–96) – Voronin, Filat and Plahot-
niuc, of Igor Dodon, or businessman Renato Usatîi – the current mayor of
Balti. Their consequence is a specific system of clan corporatism in which
the integration of state institutions with business structures is very deep
(Całus, 2015, pp. 1–9; Afeltowicz, 2010, pp. 69–104). In Moldova, this
system is also the cause of numerous transformation problems, including
destabilizing factors, among which the main roles are played by the con-
flict in Transnistria, negative consequences of the economic transforma-
tion, institutional instability, unstable internal reforms and, above all, the
lack of national project around which the society could be consolidated
(Sikora-Gaca, 2015b, pp. 89–104).
To analyze the entire political context of current affairs in the Repub-
lic of Moldova, the last two parliamentary rivalries should be discussed.
On the one hand, they sanctioned (2010) a certain balance of power exist-
ing since 2009, and on the other one they introduced new partners into
political activity (2014). The results of these parliamentary elections are
a perfect reflection of the impact of geopolitical factors on the develop-
ment of statehood. 2010 confirmed the results of the political avalanche
triggered by the wave of the Twitter Revolution, by the pro-European
governments initiated by the Alliance for European Integration and the
role of Moldova promoted by the European Union through the Eastern
Partnership. Meanwhile, 2014 emphasized the role of Russia in the re-
gion, whose interests were threatened by the Association Agreement rati-
fied by the Moldovan Parliament (June 27, 2014). The support granted to
Igor Dodon’s Socialist Party, and the appearance of Renato Usatîi’s Patria
2
This article uses source materials elaborated for the project Geopolitical Di-
lemmas. Poland and Germany and the Processes and Challenges of Europeaniza-
tion in the Eastern Europe and Caucasia on the importance of geopolitical factors in
the development of Moldovan statehood in 2014 and 2015 (See: Sikora-Gaca, 2015,
pp. 157–173).
4. 84 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
Party on the political scene, were to halt the huge step initiated towards
further Europeanization.
Early elections were held on November 28, 2010. The election thresh-
old was reduced from 5% to 4% (for a coalition of two parties – 7%, for
coalitions of three or more parties – 9%). Voter turnout was 63.35%. The
Our Moldova Alliance won only 2.05% of the votes, thus not exceeding
the election threshold. Since the elections in 2010, the Alliance for Euro-
pean Integration was constituted by only three parties: the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, the Democratic Party of Moldova and the Liberal Party. In
2011, the communists tried to bring Zinaida Greceanîi to the election as
President, however Nicolae Timofti was chosen head of state (March 16,
2012). Mihai Ghimpu proposed his candidacy. Filat accepted it fairly
quickly, because Timofti was unable to threaten his leadership within the
ruling structure. The election of the President was made possible thanks
to Igor Dodon – a former member of the Communist Party, who sup-
plied the ruling coalition with the missing votes. Dodon – a supporter of
modern social democracy, held the position of Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Economy under Voronin. In 2011, he came second in the
election for the mayor of Chisinau, which initiated his further successful
political activity. In the same year, Dodon headed the non-parliamentary
Party of Socialists. Since then, his political influence has been growing
steadily (Luft, 2014, pp. 80–81).
In 2013, based on the disputes between the two major oligarchs and
political leaders, Vlad Filat and Vlad Plahotniuc, there was an attempt to
introduce a mixed system (the bill was soon nullified) in the Republic of
Moldova, the electoral threshold was once again raised (from 4% to 6%
for political parties, 9% for coalitions of two parties, 11% for coalitions of
three or more parties) (Całus, Nowy rząd w Mołdawii…). On February 13,
2013, Vlad Filat broke the coalition agreement. Marian Lupu’s and Vlad
Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party asked for a vote of no confidence for the
government, which was voted for in an agreement, with the opposition of
the communists. President Timofti entrusted the dismissed Prime Minis-
ter Filat with the duties of acting head of government and designated him
Prime Minister of the new government. The leader of the liberals, Mi-
hai Ghimpu, filed an application to the Constitutional Court to recognize
the decision of the President as non-compliant with the Constitution, al-
though the majority of the deputies of his party expressed their readiness
to support the next government headed by Filat (Luft, 2014, pp. 81–82).
On April 22, 2013, by the decision of the Constitutional Court, Filat was
5. ŚSP 3 ’18 The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova... 85
prevented from further participation in political life, due to corruption al-
legations (Całus, Mołdawski Sąd Konstytucyjny…).3
With the votes of the
deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party and the Party of Communists,
the parliament’s speaker Marian Lupu was dismissed, as well as the At-
torney General, who was considered to be close to Plahotniuc. The Prime
Minister was statutorily assigned with his office to fight corruption and
given the possibility of recalling the members of the Constitutional Court
by the Parliament at any time. The latter two decisions provoked outrage
in Brussels (Luft, 2014, pp. 82–83).
The new Prime Minister, Iurie Leancă, was appointed on April 22,
2013. On May 30, 2013, an agreement was signed to form a new majority
coalition called the Coalition for Pro-European Governments (including
the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova, the Democratic Party (PDM)
and seven former members of the Liberal Party). On the same day the Par-
liament, by the votes of MPs in favor of the coalition (53 + 5 independent
MPs), gave a vote of confidence to the new cabinet composed of person-
nel slightly different from the previous government of Filat (Luft, 2014,
p. 83). Igor Corman became the new Speaker of the Parliament, replacing
Marian Lupu (both from PDM). The new government was appointed in
fear of early elections. Its main task was to maintain the almost completed
negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU and to wait for its
signing. The culmination of the procedure was the ratification (minimum
majority – 53 votes) of theAgreement on June 27, 2014, at a special meet-
ing of the Parliament. Signing the Association Agreement was a major
step for Moldova towards integration with Community structures.
The political encounter of November 30, 2014 was played out be-
tween the Liberal Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Democratic
Party of Moldova, the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
and the Party of Socialists. Before the election, due to the accusation of
financing from abroad, Renato Usatîi’s Patria Party was eliminated. Pre-
election polls indicated that approx. 13% of Moldovan society identified
with Patria and its anti-European views (Sikora-Gaca, 2015a, pp. 175–
186). Meanwhile, the pro-European parties saw representations of Rus-
sia’s interests in Moldova in it. On the other hand, many commentators
share the opinion that Filat and Plahotniuc feared oligarchic competition
in the implementation of particular interests.
3
There were no prosecution proceedings against V. Filat. It turned out that 4 of
6 judges who delivered the judgment were appointed according to the political key.
6. 86 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
The election rivalry of 2014 was won by the Party of Socialists, with
20.51% of votes with 25 seats in Parliament. Second place in the elec-
tion was taken by one of the representatives of the Coalition for the pro-
European Governments – the Liberal Democratic Party – 20.16% with
23 seats. The next were as follows: the Party of Communists – 17.48%
with 21 seats in Parliament, the Democratic Party of Moldova – 15.8%
with 19, and the Liberal Party – 9.67% with 13.
The parliamentary elections of 2014 changed the balance of power
on the Moldovan political scene. A minority coalition of two parties was
established on January 23, 2015: the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM)
and the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), under the name of the Po-
litical Alliance for European Moldova (APME). An informal base for the
coalition is the Party of Communists (PCRM). The Liberal Party of Mihai
Ghimpu was not allowed to gain power. Iurie Leancă was prohibited from
taking the position of Prime Minister. Thanks to the votes of the PCRM,
Adrian Candu became the Chairman of Parliament – he is the godson of
Plahotniuc. On February 18, the government of Chiril Gaburici was ap-
pointed (associated with both Filat and Voronin) (Całus, 2015, pp. 1–3).
On June 12, 2015, Prime Minister Gaburici resigned. On June 22 the
same year, Natalia Gherman, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration,
the daughter of the first President of Moldova Mircea Snegur, became the
acting Prime Minister of Moldova. The date for the appointment of a new
government was set for September 12, 2015.
“The theft of the century” – 2015
At the turn of 2014 and 2015, the unstable state of Moldova survived
the banking crisis associated with the threatened collapse of Banca de
Economii and Banca Sociala, called by the media the “theft of the centu-
ry.” The Moldovan Central Bank introduced a commissary administration
in both banks, finding numerous irregularities. These institutions were
controlled by Ilan Shor – a millionaire connected with Russian business.
The Moldovan banking scandal referred to two important names from the
political system – Filat4
(Cate 30 de…) and Plahotniuc. The first is said to
4
Filat’s relatives were arrested – Ion Rusu and Vladimir Rusu, and two people
connected with the company called Caravita – Igor and Tatiana Chizhova Rosioru on
charges of financial mismanagement – non-payment of loans taken out in Banca de
Economii.
7. ŚSP 3 ’18 The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova... 87
be responsible for the crisis of Banca de Economii, the latter for that of
Banca Sociala (Oleksy, 2015, pp. 90–91). Therefore, the pro-European
parties did not expect too much success in local elections, the outcome of
which, due to political instability and the protests of the Civic Platform
Dignity and Truth, was unpredictable.
“The theft of the century” took the form of an international financial
scandal, in which the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment was also involved. It refers, first and foremost, to a letter sent by
the Vice President of the EBRD – Philip Bennett, to Prime Minister Na-
talia German, in which he criticizes the actions taken by the Moldovan
authorities. In 2015, the Moldovan Parliament voted to amend the law on
financial institutions which blocked the EBRD to acquire an additional
stake in Victoriabank – one of the biggest commercial banks in Moldova5
(Поправка пошла на…).
It should also be noted that the financial crisis associated with the
‘withdrawal’ of Moldovan money is not limited to the banks. The prac-
tice has been extended to all possible industries, which is visible after an
analysis of the loss of Moldovan state-owned enterprises, which in 2014
amounted to 3 billion lei, five times more than in 2013. According to
many experts, the enterprises and companies belonging to the Moldovan
state budget, in many cases, exist only in order to launder dirty money
and generate income for the state officials employed there. Most energy
companies (including Moldovagaz, Moldelectrica, Energocom) lost over
2.5 billion lei in 2014. The losses of Moldovan railway are now estimated
at approx. 101 million lei. Nepotism, cronyism or over-employment were
common. All of this had a catastrophic impact on the Moldovan financial
situation. For example, the company MoldATSA generated a 48 million
lei profit in 2013, and in 2014 it had a 29 million lei loss. The profits of
Moldtelecom or AirMoldova have fallen several dozen times (from more
than 60 million lei to approx. 2 million)6
(Как в Молдове…).
Both the “theft of the century” and the situation of the Moldovan pre-
state enterprises, as described above, are the effects of a ‘tradition’ of
inefficient management on which subsequent governments and oligarchs
5
Victoriabank was founded at the turn of the 1980s and 90s. It was the first com-
mercial bank in Moldova. Since 1995, it has established cooperation with the EBRD.
In 2006, one of the shareholders of the bank, among others, was Vlad Plahotniuc.
6
In 2013, the losses of the entities referred to amounted to 600 million lei, in
2014 it was already 3 billion. Their debt increased by 50% – from 26.7 to 39.9 million
lei, and their revenues increased by only 10%.
8. 88 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
controlling the state make their money. The Banca de Economii man-
agers earned 60,000 lei per month. Members of the Supervisory Board,
exercising their function for just two months, received annual salaries in
advance. The remuneration of Moldtelecom Chief Executive was 50,000
lei per month, while company profits fell three times. Deputy Minister
of Economy – Octavian Calmic, as a representative of the state in the
supervisory boards of five companies (Banca de Economii, Metalferos,
Moldexpo, UNIC and Moldovagaz) received 620,000 lei per month. An-
other politician received approx. 500,000 lei for being a member of super-
visory boards in 9 companies. Director of the Civil Aviation Department
– Iurie Armas has put the state budget on a loss of 800,000 lei. These are
just some of the examples of power abuse that are ruining the Moldovan
state. Moldovan officials use every opportunity to earn money at the ex-
pense of the state (Глава Органа гражданской…). It should be noted
that the average salary in Moldova is approx. 4,500 lei. Privatization ap-
pears to be the only remedy, but in the context of widespread pillaging of
the Moldovan state, there is a significant concern that it will only become
a tool for accumulating private fortunes.
On June 11, 2015, 50% of the entire banking sector of Moldova was
placed under official supervision. The decision to nationalize Banca de
Economii blocked the launch of a new credit line for Moldova by the
IMF (Mołdawia: wybory lokalne…), and this led to a series of subsequent
events. The World Bank also stopped the payment of credit funds. For
a long time, the European Union has also been considering blocking the
flow of finance, as the political situation in Moldova, after signing the As-
sociation Agreement, is highly unsatisfactory.
Sandu, Streleţ and the foundation of the AEI-3 – July coalition
negotiations
On July 23, 2015, Minister of Education – Maia Sandu – was nomi-
nated for the position of Moldova’s Prime Minister on behalf of the Lib-
eral Democratic Party of Moldova. The candidacy was defined as good,
due to her non-involvement in corruption scandals (which is an incred-
ible rarity among Moldovan politicians) and the support of the interna-
tional environment (in the years 2010–2012 Sandu worked for the World
Bank) (Ex-World Bank…). On the same day, Vlad Filat, Marian Lupu
and Mihai Ghimpu signed a coalition agreement – the Alliance for Euro-
9. ŚSP 3 ’18 The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova... 89
pean Integration (AEI-3). Party leaders declared their common desire to
elect a new Prime Minister by the end of July 2015 (Лупу подтвердил:
Майя…). Filat declared the need to reform legal institutions that should
not be subjected to any political influence. He also stressed the need for
support from the European Union and the United States. Yet on July 23,
the President of Romania – Klaus Iohannis, gave his support to Sandu; on
July 24 Igor Dodon criticized the democratic liberals’ candidate, stating
that she would not receive the Socialists’ support.
AEI-3 submitted the following priorities for their action: continua-
tion of the pro-European course of state policy, establishment of the rule
of law and independent judiciary, elimination of corruption from public
administration and social mentality, release of state institutions from the
vested interests of political clans. The liberal democrats received 6 min-
istries and the liberals 4. Reform of the prosecutor’s office in consulta-
tion with the European Commission was also proposed (Михай Гимпу
раскритиковал…).
On July 24, 2015, Maia Sandu presented the conditions under which
she agreed to hold the position of Prime Minister. She demanded the res-
ignation of the head of the National Bank – Dorin Dragutanu and of the
Attorney General – Corneliu Gurin. She blamed both for the “theft of the
century” and a withdrawal of 1 billion lei from Moldovan banks. Unfor-
tunately, Sandu’s requests, by which she wanted to prove to the public the
sincere intentions of her future government, weakened her negotiating
position. Plahotniuc stood up against her. Ghimpu called the PM candi-
date a “whimsical doll” and said that her demands went beyond the Alli-
ance (Михай Гимпу раскритиковал…). Renato Usatîi was also outraged
by the candidate’s demands. He said: “Sandu is not a queen, and Moldova
is not a monarchy” (Ренато Усатый выступил…; Бывшие обещают
светлое…).
Three days later, the Alliance introduced a new candidate for Prime
Minister – the vice chairman of the LDPM – Valeriu Streleţ. On July
27, President Tomofti signed the official nomination. To obtain a vote of
confidence for Streleţ’s Cabinet, the Alliance needed 51 votes, the coali-
tion partners held 52 seats in Parliament (out of 101) (Ренато Усатый
выступил…; Бывшие обещают светлое…). Therefore, nobody ex-
pected any negative scenarios, even though one should always remember
about the margin of error in Moldovan politics.
The first task of the new Prime Minister was to negotiate a new agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund, for Moldova to effectively
10. 90 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
regain 3 billion lei of frozen foreign aid. Experts said that signing this
agreement would only increase corruption, because in Moldova each
money transfer process serves the political groups, not the state (Чем вла-
деет кандидат…). The financial aid received by Moldova in 2010–2013
did not change the structure of the Moldovan economy.
Valeriu Streleţ is one of the richest MPs in the Moldovan Parliament.
He manages the Bioprotekt SRL company, which is one of the biggest
Moldovan importers and distributors of phytosanitary products. His part-
ner – Aurelia Bregutse owns the Dezwoltarii company. Streleţa’s nomina-
tion was a clear signal that the ruling elites have no intention of changing
anything within the oligarchic political system. Sandu showed too bold
independence in her demands, Streleţ promised obedience to the Alli-
ance’s discipline. On July 30, his government won a vote of confidence
from the Moldovan Parliament (Чем владеет кандидат…) with the
votes of the coalition. Socialists, communists and members of the Leancă
group voted against.
Dissolution of the Streleţ government, further coalition talks,
Pavel Filip’s cabinet
On October 29, 2015, the Moldovan Parliament passed a vote of no
confidence for the coalition government of Valeriu Streleţ. The proposal
was supported by 65 out of 101 Members, including politicians from the
Party of Socialists, the Communist Party and the coalition partner – the
Democratic Party (PDM). A vote of no confidence was filed on suspicion
of corruption and political-business ties with Vlad Filat, who was arrested
on October 15. Streleţ’s request to dismiss Viorel Chetraru, head of the
National Anti-Corruption Center (VTS), considered to be a protégé of
Plahotniuc, brought no results (Андреев, Нехотя уходи: Валериy…).
Following the dismissal of the government, the chairman of the Demo-
cratic Party (PDM) – Marian Lupu announced the start of negotiations on
the rebuilding of the pro-European coalition with the Liberal Democratic
Party (PLDM), the Liberal Party (PL) and the deputies associated with
Iurie Leancă (Całus, Mołdawia: upadek rządu…). Filat’s arrest triggered
a strong crisis in the state and numerous social protests, and, as a result,
the breakdown of AEI-3. Removing Streleţ from the Prime Minister’s
function was a deliberate political act aimed at establishing Plahotniuc’s
dominance on the political scene, who himself aspired to this position
11. ŚSP 3 ’18 The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova... 91
(Андреев, Как в вотум…). President Timofti appointed Gheorghe Brega
as the acting Prime Minister (the decree on this matter was signed on Oc-
tober 30) until the appointment of the new government (Либерал Георге
Брега…). For Marian Lupu, the best candidate for the post of the Prime
Minister was Iurie Leancă, especially because of the numerous contribu-
tions that this politician has made to the consolidation of Moldova’s in-
tegration into the European Union. Discussions on the creation of Lupu’s
new alliance were already launched on October 30. However, they were
postponed due to the unspecified stand on this issue of the members of
the Liberal Democratic Party (Андреев, Бег по кругу…). Concerns over
the events in the Republic of Moldova were expressed by representatives
of the international community, including David McAllister (Депутат
Европарламента: Молдавские…).
On November 4, 2015, the Liberal Democratic Party, by an absolute
majority of the party’s political council’s votes, decided not to partici-
pate in coalition negotiations to create a new parliamentary majority.
The PLDM justified its position with the fact that it did not recognize
the Democratic Party (PDM) as pro-European, because the party was
aiming only and exclusively at the takeover of state institutions. On
November 4, 2015, the Liberal Democratic Party announced their move
to the opposition. The Democratic Party was also in talks with the Com-
munist Party, seeking to create the largest coalition in the history of
the independent Republic. The Liberal Party and Iurie Leancă were
against the participation of the communists (Андреев, Игра навылет:
ЛДПМ…). PLDM parliamentarians, in connection with the dismissal
of Streleţ’s government, asked the Constitutional Court for comment.
It was noted that the vote of no confidence was based on suspicions,
rather than on any evidence of criminal activity (Андреев, ЛДПМ
опротестовала в…).
The essence of the collapse of the AEI-3 coalition was a personal
conflict and the struggle for a sphere of political influence that had been
in progress since 2009, between Filat and Plahotniuc. Filat’s sudden ar-
rest, justified by his entanglement in the “theft of the century,” became
a direct consequence of the rejection of Streleţ’s government. The lack
of majority in Parliament reintroduced Moldova’s policy into the zone
of personal influence and personal actions of individual parliamentar-
ians. Both the Party of Socialists and the Party of Communists were
opposed to the call for early elections, which is why they both became
advocates of a broad coalition. Also, the Democratic Party preferred
12. 92 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
to avoid early elections and therefore negotiated with both the left and
the right wings. By the end of 2015, 13 liberals, 24 socialists, 21 com-
munists, 19 democrats and 19 liberal democrats were in the Moldovan
Parliament (despite his arrest, Vladimir Filat had the opportunity to sign
legislative initiatives with the help of a proxy) and 5 independent Mem-
bers. According to Moldovan law, the new government has to be set up
within the following three months. Otherwise, the President must dis-
solve the Parliament and call for new elections. However, according to
the Constitution of the Republic, the Parliament cannot be dissolved six
months before the end of the President’s term of office, which ended on
March 23, 2016. Therefore, until then, the Parliament could have been
dissolved only if President Timofti had resigned, and if the attempt to
choose a new head of state failed twice (Андреев, Пасьянс за евроин-
теграцию…). On November 10, further coalition talks were launched.
The parties were mobilized by the need to sign an agreement with the
International Monetary Fund and Romania (for the issue of 150 mil-
lion euros), so successive tranches of money for Moldova from external
partners depended on these negotiations.
On December 21, 2015, President Nicolae Timofti entrusted the
mission of creating a government to former Prime Minister Ion Sturza.
However, he did not receive a vote of confidence, and the President
once again refused to nominate Vlad Plahotniuc as Prime Minister. In
return, he suggested Ion Păduraru, who did not, however, take up this
challenge (for reasons that are unclear to this day) (Całus, Mołdawia:
od pluralizmu…). The candidacy of Pavel Filip for the Prime Minister
was a compromise.
On January 20, 2016, the government of Pavel Filip was established.
It was supported by 57 out of 101 deputies, including members of the
Democratic Party (PDM), the Liberal Party (PL) and partly of the Lib-
eral Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Party of Communists. The ap-
pointment of new authorities was accompanied by numerous protests,
including an attempt to invade the Parliament building. There were over
20,000 people protesting in the streets of Chisinau. They demanded the
resignation of the government and the organization of early elections.
The appointment of Pavel Filip’s government has consolidated Vlad
Plahotniuc’s dominant position on the Moldovan political scene, not
only due to the fact that one of his closest associates became Prime
Minister, but that he is also fully dependent on him (Całus, Mołdawia:
nowy rząd…).
13. ŚSP 3 ’18 The ruling coalitions in the Republic of Moldova... 93
* * *
The years of rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition
led the Republic of Moldova to a profound redevelopment of the politi-
cal system. Vlad Plahotniuc has led, through his actions, to the arrest of
his main opponent – Vlad Filat, thereby taking over his influence. He
managed to have Pavel Filip – one of his most important associates, to
be elected to the position of Prime Minister. He took control over the
judiciary and anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and
the economic structures. In this way, Plahotniuc consolidated the un-
precedented political and business influences in the history of Moldova
after 1991. The Moldovan system of political power, monopolized by
one political center, is now becoming more and more unstable (Całus,
Mołdawia: od pluralizmu…). In this situation, we are dealing with the
autocracy of one oligarch – Plahotniuc. In fact, clear authoritarian ten-
dencies are observable.
Conclusions
Former Finance Minister, Veaceslav Negruta, in an interview with the
News Maker from July 23, 2015, used a few accurate statements that pre-
cisely describe the socio-political and economic situation that has devel-
oped in the Republic of Moldova, and which subsequent coalitions have
to face. Taking power by new ruling groups is the first test of competence,
and also the way of checking their actual intentions of governance. So
far, the Moldovan authorities have treated reforms as an obligation estab-
lished by outside partners, and not as the political will of the rulers and
the general public. The state is too heavily bureaucratic and the number
of levels of corruption seems to have no end. The process of governing is
nothing but a process of obtaining benefits, which is directed by political
clans. Thus, the current form of the reform procedures show that indi-
vidual and group interests of the elites and lobbying are endless (Альянс
и ныне…; ЛДПМ, ДПМ и…; Источник: ЛДПМ выдвинула…). The big-
gest challenge for Moldova is therefore to understand the basic recipe for
successful transitions – the country needs reforms, not for those who give
money but for its own sake. These arguments clearly show the reason for
the difficulties in stabilizing the political situation and thus, the related
deepening of oligarchic tendencies.
14. 94 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
The IMF’s recommendations should not be implemented only in order
to secure further financial aid transfers. The political situation in Moldova
in 2017 could be described as stabilizing (with an unchanging corporate-
clan system) but certainly not as stable. Bureaucracy and corruption of all
levels of power lead to a lower effectiveness of successive coalitions. The
pro-European coalition government is worth as much as the number of
zeros of the financial aid that will be given to the Republic of Moldova by
the IMF, the World Bank or the European Union. In addition, the problem
in question is characteristic not only for the Republic of Moldova, but
also for many political systems of the post-Soviet area.
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Koalicje rządzące w Republice Mołdawii po „rewolucji twitterowej”
– polityka integracji czy dezintegracja?
Summary
W 2009 roku stworzono w Republice Mołdawii alternatywę dla komunistycznego
przywództwa. W 2013 roku, w miejsce „Sojuszu na rzecz Integracji Europejskiej”
powołano „Koalicję na rzecz Rządów Proeuropejskich”, co zabezpieczyło dwie kwe-
stie: podpisanie umowy stowarzyszeniowej między Republiką Mołdawii a Unią Eu-
ropejską oraz interesy lokalnych oligarchów. Po wyborach parlamentarnych w 2014
roku alternatywą dla rosnącej w siłę Partii Socjalistów Igora Dodona stała się kolejna
z koalicji „Sojusz polityczny na rzecz Europejskiej Mołdawii”, „przypieczętowana”
defraudacją 1 mld USD z mołdawskich banków (12,5% PKB). Powołana w styczniu
2015 roku koalicja już w lipcu tego samego roku została zastąpiona przez ponownie
zainicjowany do życia „Sojusz na rzecz Integracji Europejskiej”, a w styczniu 2016
roku przez kolejną z koalicji, bez bliżej określonej nazwy. Ta niezwykle rozbudowa-
na działalność polityczna jest tłem dla fasadowej demokracji i kolejnych wyborów
18. 98 Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca ŚSP 3 ’18
parlamentarnych zaplanowanych w 2018 roku. Koalicje proeuropejskie w Republice
Mołdawii skompromitowały się przed społeczeństwem równie mocno jak poprzedni-
cy (komuniści), wywołując stan ogólnej dezintegracji.
Słowa kluczowe: Mołdawia, koalicja proeuropejska, korupcja, wybory parlamentar-
ne w Republice Mołdawii w 2018 roku