The document discusses the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest, even using deadly force if necessary. It provides historical examples from 17th century England establishing this right, and discusses two late 19th/early 20th century US Supreme Court cases (Plummer v. State and John Bad Elk vs. U.S.) that affirmed an individual has the right to use any means necessary, including lethal force, to resist an unlawful arrest by a government agent. The document argues this common law right to forcibly resist unlawful arrest still exists in the US today.
Private International Law and Crucial Role of Personal Connecting FactorsFadzliRohami1
Private International Law encompasses both conflicts of law and the unification of substantive law. The issues addressed cover a broad variety of legal concerns. They cover a wide range of subjects, such as child abduction, wills and trusts, sales contracts, negotiable instruments, the enforcement of foreign judgments and the taking of evidence abduction
Private International Law and Crucial Role of Personal Connecting FactorsFadzliRohami1
Private International Law encompasses both conflicts of law and the unification of substantive law. The issues addressed cover a broad variety of legal concerns. They cover a wide range of subjects, such as child abduction, wills and trusts, sales contracts, negotiable instruments, the enforcement of foreign judgments and the taking of evidence abduction
The Constitution is an Enforceable Contractable1appeal
The US Constitution is a contract between the governement and the US Citizen enforceable by a court of law.
See the Constitution here: http://www.constitution.org/constit_.htm
We often hear people talk of their rights, but rarely do I hear .docxendawalling
We often hear people talk of their rights, but rarely do I hear someone speaking who could actually explain from where these “rights” are emanating.
Often we hear “I know my rights” and most often that person might have the vaguest grasp of what is contained within the Constitution. But now let us explore the SOURCE of these unalienable rights. Do you think it is the Bill of Rights (BoR)?
Does the BoR spell out to the people what rights are being granted and is this the source of these rights?
What “rights” are given specifically to the people in any of the first ten amendments of the U. S. Constitution?
Do the words actually say, or can you prove it was the intent of the writers, that these ten phrases are speaking to the people, or are they directed possibly someone else?
We would know which are rights granted here in the document, by reading the words of the Bill of Rights and observing if any of them speak to “the people” and say “you get this right that is specifically named here”. Shall we look to see how many there are actually being granted by this part of the document? and how many are assumed but not explicitly enumerated?
Is there a right found here? Read it carefully before responding
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Is there a right granted here? Carefully read because it doesn’t say way what you may think. The instruction, the take away, the writing was not directed at the people was it?
A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
This one doesn’t read like a Right as much as it does a rule about what the government may not do, as restriction on power, not and extension or granting of a right to the people.
Seems like the rights are assumed
and that this document was just a list of the 10 most troubling things the founders were concerned about while forming a new government.
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Pretty sure this one was written to the government about what they cannot do to the people. Not written to the people talking about a right.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This one is laundry list of what the government may not do to a person:
No secret
indictments; 1.5 Allowing for temporary suspension of that restriction during times of war or ...
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The Constitution is an Enforceable Contractable1appeal
The US Constitution is a contract between the governement and the US Citizen enforceable by a court of law.
See the Constitution here: http://www.constitution.org/constit_.htm
We often hear people talk of their rights, but rarely do I hear .docxendawalling
We often hear people talk of their rights, but rarely do I hear someone speaking who could actually explain from where these “rights” are emanating.
Often we hear “I know my rights” and most often that person might have the vaguest grasp of what is contained within the Constitution. But now let us explore the SOURCE of these unalienable rights. Do you think it is the Bill of Rights (BoR)?
Does the BoR spell out to the people what rights are being granted and is this the source of these rights?
What “rights” are given specifically to the people in any of the first ten amendments of the U. S. Constitution?
Do the words actually say, or can you prove it was the intent of the writers, that these ten phrases are speaking to the people, or are they directed possibly someone else?
We would know which are rights granted here in the document, by reading the words of the Bill of Rights and observing if any of them speak to “the people” and say “you get this right that is specifically named here”. Shall we look to see how many there are actually being granted by this part of the document? and how many are assumed but not explicitly enumerated?
Is there a right found here? Read it carefully before responding
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Is there a right granted here? Carefully read because it doesn’t say way what you may think. The instruction, the take away, the writing was not directed at the people was it?
A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
This one doesn’t read like a Right as much as it does a rule about what the government may not do, as restriction on power, not and extension or granting of a right to the people.
Seems like the rights are assumed
and that this document was just a list of the 10 most troubling things the founders were concerned about while forming a new government.
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Pretty sure this one was written to the government about what they cannot do to the people. Not written to the people talking about a right.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This one is laundry list of what the government may not do to a person:
No secret
indictments; 1.5 Allowing for temporary suspension of that restriction during times of war or ...
The Law Of The Land
The Land Act Of 1913 Essay
Public Law And Private Law Essay
The Supreme Law Of The Land
Land Law 19th Century
Easements Land Law
Landlord Tenant Laws And Tenants Essay
Land Law Procedures in Kenya
Alien Land Law Dbq Analysis
What Law Means To Me Essay
Land Law
Land Act Mauritius
Electronic Conveyancing ( E Conveyancing )
Land Law Reform
An Objective Behind The Land Law
The Logic Of English Land Law
Why Study Law Essay
Land Law and Tenant
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1. The Right to Forcefully Resist Unlawful Arrest
(Using Deadly Force, if Necessary)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The fact of the matter that the “A DECLARATION” of July 4th
, 1776, historically and deliberately, being falsified as "The Declaration of
Independence" to the American people, by the 13 Black British colonial corporate statehoods, is beside the point. See, e.g.,
https://www.slideshare.net/ernestrauthschild/a-declaration-50969989.
United States Supreme Court case laws dates back beyond 1721, which clearly means there was both a “United States” and “United States
Supreme Court” long before the so-called: “August 2nd
, 1776 “Declaration of Independence” by the Black British colonies.
(https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/volume).
“There was no territory within the (original) United States” Harcourt v. Gaillard, 6 L.Ed 216, 12 Wheat at 523, Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 4
Cranch at 212: “original United States”. The King recognized the 1762 United States Supreme Court in the matter of The King
vs. Lukens, 1 US 5, and The King vs. Haas, 1 US 92, 1764; and “The style of the confederation was changed from “United Colonies” to
“United States” on September 16th 1776”. Penhallow vs. Doane, 1 L.Ed 507, 3 Dall at 75. The King and the Thirteen United States of
North America, signed a contract at Versailles July 16, 1782 (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr-1782.asp); and the
Black British Colonist George Washington was appointed and annexed under the Black Aboriginals of North America’s Sovereign
Government in 1791. See, e.g., George Washington's 1789 Inauguration speech, Monuments of Washington's Patriotism, 1789 pp. 77 &
79.
So, who is Trump representing while occupying the bankrupt White House?
I’ll tell you who I am, I’m the “Original”, and as the “Creditor” so written in Article VI § I, of the “Original Constitution” I have “original
jurisdiction” [> Title 4, U.S.C.S., § 108].; therefore, the right to demand property, debt and taxes, pursuant Title 31, U.S.C.S. §§ 3544,
3545, et seq.
Sincerely,
H.E. HRH Ernest Rauthschild
Royal Prime Minister 8216-8217
The United States of North America – The Republic of North America
2. Definition of Liberty:
Liberty. 1. Exemption from slavery, bondage, imprisonment, or control of another. 2. Freedom from
external restraint or compulsion (Webster”s New Collegiate Dictionary).
Liberty. Freedom; exemption from extraneous control. The power of the will to follow the dictates of
its unrestricted choice, and to direct the external acts of the individual without restraint, coercion, or
control from other persons. (Black”s Law Dictionary – 3rd Edition)
**********
Beginning with the Magna Carta, the governments in Britain and later the United States of America
have recognized the right of the people to forcefully resist unlawful arrest by the government agents
(including police), using deadly force if necessary.
It was long recognized as a Natural and Common Law right of not only the person being arrested, but
also of one’s fellow countrymen trying to assist him in resisting such an unlawful arrest. (Common
Law supersedes statutory law – which is “private law” – unless an individual knowingly and freely
consents to waive his natural “unalienable” and Common Law rights and consents to submit to
statutory or contractual policy.
I say “statutory policy” because, strictly speaking, “LAW” refers only to the public Common Law,
whereas legislative acts (as statutes, acts, codes, regulations, ordinances, etc.) are “private law” whose
jurisdiction is extremely limited. (One might draw the analogy of a man who joins a private club or
buys a house in a neighborhood controlled by a private homeowners’ association.
The club or association has the right to determine the rules for its members, along with the penalties for
breaking those rules.
Strictly speaking, these rules (often called “by-laws” are NOT true “law”; they are so-called “private
law” — that is, the rules or policies apply ONLY to members of this private group.
The man is not forced to join the club or association; he does so through his voluntary consent in a
contract, in which commercial law applies. He pays his “dues” in exchange for being a member of the
club/association, with its attendant duties-obligations and benefits-privileges – thus “consideration” is
exchanged.
As a member, the man has consented to the jurisdiction of the club/association in club/association-
related matters only. A non-member who is not inside the club/association’s buildings, on its land or
attending some private event staged by the club/association, is NOT bound by the rules or policies of
the club/association.
However, should a non-member voluntarily consent to abide by the club-association’s rules/policies in
exchange for being allowed inside the club-association’s building along with other benefits and
privileges, that non-member has therein contracted with the club-association and is under its
jurisdiction regarding rules/policies of conduct – at least as long as he remains within the club-
association’s building and/or is enjoying some other benefits and privileges normally associated with
membership in that club-association.
3. Such rules and policies created under a private contract are known as “private law” – in this case,
“commercial law” (as well as “contract law” ) which evolved from “merchant law” or the “law of the
seas”. (The “mer” in the word merchant is derived from the Phoenecian/Caananite-Latin-French word
of “mer” or sea.)
In short, “law” refers to public Common Law – the “law of the land”. “Commercial law” (contract law,
equity law, merchant law, maritime law, statutes and acts, the “law of the seas”, and more recently
Uniform Commercial Code – UCC) is “private law” created through voluntary contracts.
As such, “commercial law” is, in fact, NOT law at all, but private policy (rules of conduct) applicable
only to the parties to that contract. In Britain and America the primary law remains Common Law.
“Commercial or statutory law” is inferior to Common Law and no man is subject to “commercial-
statutory law” jurisdiction UNLESS he contracts into it (as did our man above who join voluntarily
contracted to be club-association member) or he, as a non-member, voluntarily accepts some of the
benefits and privileges of membership in exchange for agreeing to its rules and obligations (as did our
non-member guest above).
This non-member example still falls under private “commercial law”, since the agreement between the
non-member and the club also constituted a contract in which consideration was exchanged.
The primary point is that, in Britain and America, Common Law supercedes “commercial-contract
law” or “statutory law”, unless that man voluntarily waives his rights under Common Law and places
himself under the jurisdiction of private “commercial law” or “statutory law” — that is, POLICIES
established by legislative statutes, acts, codes, regulations, ordinances, etc.
Around 1670 in Britain, the Queen’s Bench ruled that forceful resistance to unlawful arrest by police
was a right of the people. (the Hopkin Huggett’s Case) Huggett and his friends had come to the aid of
a man who had been arrested by a constable named Berry. Huggett demanded to see the arrest warrant.
When Berry produced a clearly spurious document, Huggett drew his sword and demanded the
prisoner’s release. Berry refused, and finished second in the ensuing swordfight. The wrongfully
arrested man in that case (who was threatened with impressment into the military) did nothing to resist
his abduction.
It wasn’t clear that Huggett knew the man, or had even met him prior to the incident. Yet the Queen’s
Bench ruled that Huggett’s actions were justified, since a situation in which a “man [is] unduly arrested
or restrained of his liberty … is a provocation to all other men of England, not only his friends but
strangers also[,] for common humanity’s sake.”
In 1710. the Queen’s Bench ruling re-confirmed the common law right to forcefully resist an unlawful
arrest. Queen v. Tooley (1710). Anne Dekins was quietly walking down the street when Police Officer
Samuel Bray saw her on the street and began to haul her away.
Apparently Dekins had a used rather forceful language in past encounters with Officer Bray. Dekins
forcefully resisted and screamed for help, resulting in the intervention of a group of men who witnessed
the entire incident, led by a man named Tooley. They confronted Bray and demanded to know what he
was doing to the woman. The Officer Bray produced his official credentials and insisted that he was
4. making a lawful arrest for “disorderly conduct.” When witnesses disputed that description, Bray called
for backup.
Tooley and his associates ordered Bray to release the woman, and then took action to enforce that
lawful order. After Bray’s partner was killed in the ensuing struggle, Tooley and his associates were
arrested for murder. The trial court threw out the murder charge, ruling that the warrant was defective.
Since the arrest was unlawful, the court pointed out, Dekins had a right to resist – and bystanders
likewise had a right, if not a positive duty, to assist her. The defendants were eventually found guilty of
manslaughter by jury trial, but quickly freed by the court.
The court ruled that, in trying to enforce an invalid warrant, Bray “did not act as a constable, but a
common oppressor”. Tooley and the other bystanders were properly “provoked” by the act of
aggressive violence against Anne Dekins, and their forceful but measured response – first demanding
that the abductor release the hostage, then exercising defensive force to free her – was entirely
appropriate. Lawless violence against the helpless, the Court continued, “is a sufficient provocation to
all people out of compassion” in any circumstance, “much more where it is done under a colour of
justice, and where the liberty of the subject is invaded….”
Such an act carried out by a law enforcement official is nothing less than “a provocation to all the
subjects of England.” Every Englishman “ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the laws. And if
any one against the law imprison a man, he is an offender against Magna Charta.”
The Hopkin Huggett’s Case and Queen v. Tooley confirmed the long-recognized Common Law right to
resist unlawful arrest (as judged by the people; not the government agents); and this right applies not
only to the person being arrested, but also to other people who intervene on the victim’s behalf.
Simply put: When a police officer commits the crime of unlawful arrest, the citizens who intervene are
acting as peace officers entitled to employ any necessary means – including lethal force – to liberate the
victim. As Algernon Sidney wrote”the violence of a wicked magistrate who, hav[ing] armed a crew of
lewd villains would otherwise inflict his will on innocent and helpless people with impunity”.
This same Common Law right still exists in America today. Until 1942, when the Interstate
Commission on Crime published the Uniform Arrest Act, every state recognized and protected the right
to resist.
The first major case regarding the right to forcefully resist unlawful arrest was decided by the Supreme
Court of Indiana in 1893. In Plummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 N.E. 968 (1893) the defendant
Plummer was convicted in trial court of manslaughter of a police officer.
The Supreme Court of Indiana ruled that, by the judge not giving adequate instructions to the jury
regarding self-defense and the alternatives of conviction on a lesser charge or even acquittal, the trial
court erred; and Plummer’s manslaughter conviction was reversed.
The Supreme Court of Indiana stated that, although the police officer may or may not have held the
authority to make a lawful, warrantless arrest of Plummer for a misdemeanor not witnessed by the
police officer, for purposes of argument in reaching a decision the court would assume the worst-case
scenario possible for this defendant – that is, that the police officer had the lawful authority to make the
5. arrest. The court then stated that a police officer, in effecting an arrest, is allowed to use force, but only
that force which is necessary.
The defendant Plummer had not resisted or behaved violently, as he had not even been told by the
police officer that he was under arrest. Plummer had merely walked toward his home with a revolver in
his hand and told the officer to keep away. Since the police officer (specifically, the marshal of the
town) shot a pistol and then struck the defendant Plummer a with a nightstick before even telling
Plummer he was under arrest, the police officer had committed a battery by the use of excessive force.
Pistols shots were exchanged resulting in the death of the police officer. Plummer was indicted and
convicted of manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that defendant Plummer had “a
clear right to defend himself, even to taking the life of his assailant.”
To fully understand the implications and precedent established by the Plummer case, it is vital to
understand the assumptions on which the court was operating.
Both British and American courts had long ago confirmed the right under Common Law of a man to
forcefully resist an unlawful arrest AND to resist such as arrest with all the violence needed (matching
violence for violence) to secure his freedom – even to the extreme of killing the arresting officer. Four
possible scenarios exist during an arrest:
1.) The arrest is lawful and no excessive force is used by the officer; (worst-case scenario for a defense)
2.) The arrest is lawful and excessive force is used by the officer.
3.) The arrest is unlawful and no excessive force is used by the officer;
4.) The arrest is unlawful and excessive force is used by officer. (best-case scenario for a defense)
The assumption of the court was to review each of these scenarios. As illustrated by the order of the
scenarios above, of greatest importance is the fact that under Common Law, unlawful arrest carried far
more weight in terms of an affirmative defense than did the use of excessive police by the police.
Under Common Law a defendant clearly has the least defense if worst-case defense scenario #1 is true,
i.e., the arrest is lawful and no excessive force is used by the officer.
Also under Common Law a defendant has an absolute affirmative defense if best-case defense scenario
#4 is true, i.e., the arrest is unlawful and excessive force is used by officer.
The court reasoned that since scenario #3 provided a stronger defense than scenario #2 , if scenario #2
provided a defense for the defendant Plummer, then the stronger defense offered in scenario #3 (which
included the “unlawful arrest” component) need not even be considered by the court. Again, the
component of “unlawful arrest” carried far greater weight than “excessive police force” in a defense
under Common Law.
The court’s ruling in Plummer that the defendant was justified in his actions under scenario #2 (arrest is
lawful and excessive force is used by the officer) meant that the much stronger defense offered by
scenario #3 need not even be considered.
In short, since Plummer was justified in resisting arrest if excessive police force was used in a lawful
arrest (scenario #3), then Plummer would have even greater justification in resisting arrest if NO
6. excessive police force was used during an unlawful arrest (scenario #3). By implication, defendant
Plummer would possess the strongest justification for forcefully resisting arrest under scenario #4 in
which excessive police force is used in an unlawful arrest. It is this distinction that modern courts have
misunderstood or ignored: that the most important factor under Common Law for the right to forcefully
resist arrest is whether the arrest was lawful or unlawful – NOT whether or not the police used
excessive force! “Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officer’s life if
necessary.” (Plummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 N.E. 968 (1893). — the Supreme Court of Indiana).
In 1900 the Supreme Court of the United Stats mirrored and affirmed the earlier 1893 Plummer v. State
ruling by the Supreme Court of Indiana. Under the still-controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
John Bad Elk vs. U.S,. 177 U.S. 529, 44 L.Ed. 874, 20 S.Ct. 729, (1900) and subsequent court
decisions, aman faced with the prospect of unlawful arrest – that is, an armed abduction – has a lawful
right to use any appropriate means, including lethal force, to defend himself.
Further, other people witnessing an unlawful arrest possess the same Common Law right to prevent
such an arrest, using lethal force if necessary – even if the Plummer v. State man being arrested has not
contested or resisted his own arrest.
The Bad Elk case was unusual in that the killing occurred on Indian tribal land (the Pine Ridge Indian
reservation, in South Dakota) and involved two members of that tribe, both of whom were tribal police
officers. The defendant had killed a man and was convicted in a jury trial of first-degree murder.
Despite the fact that tribal lands and tribe members fall under “federal zone” jurisdiction similar to U.S.
territories where, strictly speaking, the protections of the Constitution do NOT apply, these issues were
avoided.
Similarly, the issues of each Indian man as a “sovereign’ and the Indian tribes as “sovereign nations”
was also avoided.
Instead, the case ultimately was decided based on the trial judge’s faulty jury instructions regarding the
jury’s option of conviction for a lesser charge, based on the Common Law rights to self-defense and to
resist an unlawful arrest.
The Court stated: “Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies
an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when
the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right [to make the
arrest, i.e., an unlawful arrest]. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than
manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed.”
As in Plummer, the Supreme Court in Bad Elk emphasized that the most important factor under
Common Law for the right to forcefully resist arrest is whether the arrest was lawful or unlawful –
NOT whether or not the police used excessive force!
Subsequent court decisions gradually whittled away at the Common Law right to forcefully resist an
unlawful arrest; citing the Plummer and Bad Elk cases but with emphasis on the police officer’s use of
excessive force as the factor allowing resistance, instead of the unlawful nature of the arrest. Wilson v
State , 842 N.E.2d at 447 (citing Fields v. State, 382 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978);
7. WHARTON’S at § 126. The Wilson court in particular noted that a person may not resist an unlawful
arrest where the officer does not use unlawful force. Other cases citing Plummer likewise noted that
while a person may defend himself against an officer’s unlawful use of force, they may not resist an
unlawful arrest being made peaceably and without excessive force; in affect, turning these Common
Law rights on their heads.
In recent years the court decisions have “bounced around” on the issues of “the use of excessive force
during an arrest” versus “the unlawfulness of an arrest” as the primary justification for forcefully
resisting arrest; and in so doing, these courts appear to have shunted aside the Common Law rights and
substituted statutory “privileges”. (See the NOTES below for these cases.) By 1995, citing Plummer
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals clearly attempted to transmute these Common Law rights into
“privileges” granted by the state. That court the privilege exists “not because its use is necessary to
protect him from an unlawful arrest, but because it is the only way in which he can protect himself
from death or serious bodily harm.” Gibbons v. Higgins, 73 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
decision).
Until the late 1960s, most states recognized – albeit grudgingly – the Common Law right to resist
arrest. By 1969, that right had been transmuted – not by statute or Constitutional amendment, but
through judicial activism – into a revocable “privilege” – one that had to be dispensed with to serve the
interests of the police and the state in securing convictions. The Alaska State Supreme Court (Terry
Glenn Miller v. State of Alaska) was one of the first states to suppress this right, stating, “It is argued
that if a peace officer is making an illegal arrest but is not using force” – something that could not
occur, given that an arrest, by strict definition, an act of armed coercion – “the remedy of the citizen
should be that of suing the officer for false arrest, not resistance with force.” Illogically, that same
ruling also stated, “The weight of authoritative precedent supports a right to repel an unlawful arrest
with force…. This was the rule at common law. It was based on the proposition that everyone should be
privileged to use reasonable force to prevent an unlawful invasion of his physical integrity and personal
liberty.” In short, the court ruled that people have a long-recognized common law right to resist, but
they cannot exercise that right.
A few years later the Idaho State Supreme Court also attempted to nullify the right to resist.
(Richardson v. Idaho) John Richardson was convicted of resisting arrest through violence and
sentenced to five years in prison. Richardson and his ex-wife, who were having dinner in a restaurant,
got into an argument, and were asked to leave when the latter became loud and profane. Two off-duty,
uniformed police officers escorted them outside, and then tried to arrest Richardson for “disorderly
conduct” after he became annoyed by their unwarranted intrusion. Richardson kicked one of the police
officers, then grabbed one of their pistols, which he fired into the air, rather than at his assailants (as he
was entitled to, both morally and – under the Supreme Court’s still-valid 1900 Bad Elk precedent –
legally).
Citing the Miller decision in Alaska, the Idaho Supreme Court stated “More than one state has, without
legislative action, modified the traditional common law rule and has adopted the rule that a private
citizen may not use force to resist a peaceful arrest,” – despite the fact that any arrest entails the use of
force. “We are of the opinion that the trend is, and should be, away from the traditional common law
rule, and therefore we hold that if a person has reasonable ground to believe he is being arrested by a
8. peace officer, it is his duty to refrain from using force or any weapon in resisting arrest regardless of
whether or not there is a legal basis for the arrest.” The Idaho Supreme Court in a 2008 ruling (State of
Idaho v. Lusby) again eviscerated the right to resist even an illegal invasion and search of one’s home
by police officers. The trial court had ruled the evidence from the illegal search to be inadmissible and
had dismissed all charges against Lusby.
But, in a bizarre twisting of logic, the Idaho State Supreme Court, while admitting that the search was
illegal, insisted that Lusby’s resistance to the illegal invasion of her home retroactively legalized the
unconstitutional search. Therefore, without any enabling legislation, contrary to the still-controlling
U.S. Supreme Court precedent (John Bad Elk vs. U.S.), and contrary to hundreds of years of common
law, the Idaho State Supreme Court created out of thin air a “Duty to Submit to Arrest” – a police
officer’s privilege to commit criminal acts for the purpose of nullifying the Exclusionary Rule –
something the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged. In short this court said that any police officer can
nullify the Fourth Amendment anytime he pleases, simply by claiming that the victim committed the
supposed crime of resisting.
According to centuries of common law and the still-controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent of John
Bad Elk, the American people today still possess the right to resist unlawful arrest by government
agents, Paul Chevigny in a 1969 Yale Law Journal essay made the critical distinction between “power”
and “authority”: that while a police officer may have the physical power to abduct or abuse an innocent
person, citizens have a lawful authority to prevent that crime. “The right to resist unlawful arrest
memorializes one of the principal elements in the heritage of the English revolution: the belief that the
will to resist arbitrary authority in a reasonable way is valuable and ought not to be suppressed by the
criminal law,” However, it must be said that the courts themselves, in emphasizing privileges granted
under statutes over Common Law rights, have placed a potential arrestee in a less-than-favorable
position in relation to the police – especially compared to Common Law rights affirmed in the Tooly-
Dekins and Hopkin Huggett cases of three or more centuries ago. In America we see to be moving
“backwards” with regard to rights and freedoms. That this ancient right to forcefully resist state-
licensed criminal violence during unlawful arrest by government agents – as determined by
the man being arrested and his neighbors witnessing the arrest – is ignored and suppressed by
prosecutors and the lower courts does not extinguish that right.
********************
NOTES:
“Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officer’s life if necessary.”
Plummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 N.E. 968 (1893) — Supreme Court of Indiana. This premise was
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case: John Bad Elk vs. U.S,. 177 U.S. 529, 44
L.Ed. 874, 20 S.Ct. 729, (1900) The Court stated: “Where the officer is killed in the course of the
disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very
different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does
if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than
manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed.” [Note that the
9. John Bad Elk v U.S. decision remains the controlling precedent to this day, although many judges,
prosecutors and even juries ignore it.]
“An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a
crime is within jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. lf the
arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary
manslaughter.” Housh v. People, 75 111. 491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452;
State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v.
Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.
“When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he
may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his
assailant is killed, he is justified.” Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1.
“These principles apply as well to an officer [police officer or other government agent] attempting to
make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary
force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence.”
Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.
“An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has
the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery.”
(State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).
“Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the arrest
stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self- defense.”
(State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).
“One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being
assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful
custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance.” (Adams
v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).
“Story affirmed the right of self-defense by persons held illegally. In his own writings, he had admitted
that ‘a situation could arise in which the checks-and-balances principle ceased to work and the various
branches of government concurred in a gross usurpation.’ There would be no usual remedy by changing
the law or passing an amendment to the Constitution, should the oppressed party be a minority. Story
concluded, ‘If there be any remedy at all … it is a remedy never provided for by human institutions.’
That was the ‘ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply
force against ruinous injustice.’” (From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard Jones, Oxford University
Press, 1987, an account of the reading of the decision in the case by Justice Joseph Story of the
Supreme Court.
As for grounds for arrest: “The carrying of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly manner, concealed
on or about the person, is not a breach of the peace. Nor does such an act of itself, lead to a breach of
the peace.” (Wharton’s Criminal and Civil Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W. Va. 628,
41 S.E. 197)
10. “Common as the event may be, it is a serious thing to arrest a citizen, and it is a more serious thing to
search his person; and he who accomplishes it, must do so in conformity to the law of the land. There
are two reasons for this; one to avoid bloodshed, and the other to preserve the liberty of the citizen.
Obedience to the law is the bond of society, and the officers set to enforce the law are not exempt from
its mandates.” Town of Blacksburg v. Bean 104 S.C. 146. 88 S.E. 441 (1916): Allen v. State, 197 N.W.
808, 810-11 (Wis 1924)
“Where officers do not conform to the ‘law of the land’ [Common Law] they have no authority and the
right to resist them exists. A Public Officer, as with a citizen, who unlawfully threatens life or liberty, is
susceptible to be injured or killed; for by such acts ‘they draw their own blood upon themselves’ As
stated in some cases, ‘where a peace officer has no right to make an arrest without warrant he is a
trespasser and acts at his own peril.” 6A CJS (Corpus Juris Secundum), “Arrest” Section 16 page 30; A
sheriff who “acts without process,” or “under a process void on its face, in doing such act, he is not to
be considered an officer but a personal trespasser.” Roberts v. Dean, 187 So. 571, 575 (Fla. 1939)
[The reader should note that the CJS confirms that the “law of the land” (i.e., Common Law) is the
standard by which an officer and potential arrestee are to be judged – NOT statutory law. The natural
right under Common Law to self-defense against unlawful arrest is NOT subject to limitations or
restrictions imposed by legislative statutes or acts – unless that man voluntarily agrees to waive his
rights in Common Law jurisdiction and freely subjects himself to jurisdiction under such statutes. Note
that almost every court decision refers to the right of self-defense against an “unlawful” arrest, rather
than an “illegal” arrest. In these courts decisions, the term “unlawful” means contrary to Common Law
only. Conversely, the terms “illegal” and “legal” encompass only legislative acts/statutes, as the word
LEGal is derived from LEGislative. Formerly in America arrests were usually carried out by “peace
officers” such as sheriffs, who were duty-bound by Common Law to enforce the peace. As commercial
law (e.g., statutory law, UCC-based acts/statutes and codes) began to subsume Common Law, “peace
officers” were replaced by “police officers” (“policy officers”), appropriately named because they
enforce private POLICY created by legislative ACTS (statutes) rather than the public LAW (i.e.,
Common Law).]
“A person has a lawful right to resist an arrest by an unlawful authority, i.e., an officer without a valid
warrant.” Franklin, 118 Ga. 860, 45 S.E. 698 (1903)
“What of the resistance to the arrest? The authorities are in agreement that since the right of personal
property is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, any unlawful interference
with it may be resisted and every person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest. * * * and, in preventing
such illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use such force as may be necessary.” City of Columbus v.
Holmes, 152 N.W. 2d, 301, 306 (Ohio App. 1058) “It is the law of self defense and self preservation
that is applicable. “One has an “unalienable” right to protect his life, liberty or property from unlawful
attack or harm.” “* * * it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even
though he may have submitted to such custody without resistance.” Adams v. State, 121 Ga 163, 48
S.E. 910 (1904)
11. “An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has
the same right, and only the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any
other assault and battery.” State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 Atl, 2nd.260, 262 (1950)
“A citizen illegally arrested “cannot initiate the use of force” and neither do “words alone justify an
assault.” However, “when the officer initiates the assault by physical contact, which is usually the case,
and there is an unlawful arrest, the citizen has the right to protect his liberty to the extent of killing the
officer.” See Green v. Kennedy, 48 N.Y. Rep. 653, 654 (1871) and/or Hicks v. Matthews, 266 S.W. 2nd.
846, 849 (Tex. 1954) “What rights then has a citizen in resisting an unlawful arrest? An arrest without
warrant is a trespass, an unlawful assault upon the person, and how far one thus unlawfully assaulted
may go in resistance is to be determined as in other cases of assault. Life and liberty are regarded as
standing substantially on one foundation; life being useless without liberty, and the authorities are
uninformed that where one is about to be unlawfully deprived of his liberty he may resist the
aggressions of the officer, to the extent of taking the life of the assailant, if that be necessity to preserve
his own life, or prevent infliction upon him of some great bodily harm.” State v. Gum, 68 W. Va. 105,
69 S.E. 463, 464 (1910)
“It is the law that a person illegally arrested by an officer may resist that arrest, even to the extent of the
taking of life if his own life or any great bodily harm is threatened.” State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash. 2nd,
92, 241 P. 2nd. 447, 449 (1952); Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 52 S.E. 283, 287 (1905); see also State v.
Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2nd 100, 102 (1954); Wilkinson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711,
712-13 (1926); American Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed., “Arrest”, Section 94, pp. 778-780; Thomas v. State,
91 Ga. 204, 18 S.E. 305 (1892); Presley v. State, 75 Fla. 434, 78 So. 532, 534 (1918); Burkhard v.
State, 83 Tex. Crim. 228, 202 S.W. 513; Mullins v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E. 2nd. 91 (1943); Ownes
v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 261, 125 S.W. 405 (1910); Caperton v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 652, 655, 225
S.W. 481, 481 (1920)
In the Texas Penal Code, Sec. 9.31 (C):
Sec. 9.31 (C) The use of force to resist arrest or search is justified:
(1) If, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or
attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest; and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect
himself against the peace officer”s (or other person”s) use or attempted use of greater force than
necessary.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Supreme Court ruling in 1900
JOHN BAD ELK, , v. UNITED STATES.
177 U.S. 529 (20 S.Ct. 729, 44 L.Ed. 874)
JOHN BAD ELK, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES.
No. 350.
Decided: April 30, 1900.
The right to forcefully resist an unlawful arrest by government agents (police)
12. • opinion, Peckham [HTML] Messrs. Thos. B. McMartin and S. B. Van Buskirk for plaintiff in error.
Assistant Attorney General Boyd for defendant in error.
________________________________________
Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff in error was convicted in April, 1899, in the circuit court of the United States, in South
Dakota, of the murder on March 13, 1899, of John Kills Back at the Pine Ridge Indian reservation, in
South Dakota, and sentenced to be hanged. The case is brought here on writ of error to the circuit court.
Both the deceased and the plaintiff in error were Indians and policemen, residing on the reservation at
the time of the killing.
Upon the trial it appeared that the plaintiff in error, on March 8, 1899, while out of doors, fired a couple
of shots from his gun at or near the place where he resided. Soon after the firing, one Captain Gleason,
who stated that he was what is called an ‘additional farmer’ on the same reservation, having heard the
shots, and meeting the plaintiff in error, asked him if he had done that shooting, and he said that he had;
that ‘he had shot into the air for fun;’ to which Gleason responded by saying to him, ‘Come around to
the office in a little while, and we will talk the matter over.’ Thereupon they separated. As he did not
come to the office, Gleason, after waiting several days, gave verbal orders to three of the Indian
policemen to go and arrest plaintiff in error at his mother’s house near by and take him to the agency,
some 25 miles distant. No reason for making the arrest was given, nor any charge made against him.
The policemen, one of whom was the deceased, went to the house where the plaintiff in error was
stopping, and came back and reported to Gleason that he was not there, and they were then ordered to
return and wait for him and to arrest him. They returned to the house, but came back again and reported
that the plaintiff in error said that he would go with them to the agency in the morning; that it was too
late to go with them that night. Gleason then told them to watch him and see that he did not go away,
and in the morning to take him to the Pine Ridge agency.
The policemen then again went back to the house where plaintiff in error was staying and met him
coming towards his mother’s place. He went into the house, and one of their number followed him;
found him smoking, and told him that they had come to take him to the agency at Pine Ridge. Plaintiff
in error refused to go, and the policeman went outside. Another of them then went into the house, and
in a few minutes both he and the plaintiff in error came out, and the latter saddled his horse and went
over to the house of a friend, and they followed him. It was getting dark when he came back to his
mother’s house, still followed by them, and while following the plaintiff in error to his house on this
last occasion they were joined by others, so that when he went into the house there were four or
five men standing about it. In a short time the plaintiff in error came out, and asked of those outside,
‘What are you here bothering me for?’ The deceased said: ‘Cousin, you are a policeman, and know
what the rules and orders are.’ To which plaintiff in error replied: ‘Yes; I know what the rules and
orders are, but I told you I would go with you to Pine Ridge in the morning.’ Then, according to the
evidence for the prosecution, the plaintiff in error, without further provocation, shot the deceased, who
died within a few minutes.
The policemen had their arms with them when they went up to where the plaintiff in error was at the
time the shooting was done.
13. This is substantially the case made by the prosecution.
There is an entire absence of any evidence of a complaint having been made before any magistrate or
officer charging an offense against the plaintiff in error, and there is no proof that he had been guilty of
any criminal offense, or that he had even violated any rule or regulation for the government of the
Indians on the reservation, or that any warrant had been issued for his arrest. On the contrary, Gleason
swears that his orders to arrest plaintiff in error were not in writing, but given orally. Indeed, it does not
appear that Gleason had any authority even to entertain a complaint or to issue a warrant in any event.
The plaintiff in error testified in his own behalf, and said that during the day he had been looking after
the schools along the creek near the station; that that was his duty as a policeman; that he arrived at his
mother’s house about half past four in the afternoon, and soon afterwards an Indian named High Eagle
came into the house, staid a minute or two, but did not speak, then went out doors, and Lone Bear came
in, and said that he was directed to take the plaintiff in error to Pine Ridge to Major Clapp. To which
the plaintiff replied: ‘All right, but my horse is used up, and I shall have to go to my brother’s, Harrison
White Thunder’s, and get another horse.’ Lone Bear said all right. Then the plaintiff in error started for
his brother’s, and when he got there found that the horses were out on the range, and when they came
in his brother promised to bring one of them down to him. In this he was corroborated by his brother,
who testified that he brought the horse over about dark. On his way back to his mother’s the plaintiff in
error stopped at a friend’s and got a Winchester rifle for the purpose, as he said, of shooting prairie
chickens. When he went back to his mother’s he was there but a short time when the deceased and two
or three others came to his house to arrest him, and the plaintiff in error went out, and according to his
testimony the following was what occurred: ‘I asked John Kills Back and High Eagle what they were
there bothering me all the while for. John Kills Back said: ‘You are a policeman, and know what the
rules are.’ I said: ‘Yes, I know what the rules are, but I told you that I would go to Pine Ridge agency in
the morning.’ Then the deceased moved a little forward, and put his hand around as if to reach for his
gun. I saw the gun and shot; then I shot twice more, and John Kills Back and High Eagle ran off. John
Kills Back fell after he had gone a short distance. I shot because I knew that they (John Kills Back and
High Eagle) would shoot me. I saw their revolvers at the time I shot.’ This was in substance all the
evidence.
Counsel for plaintiff in error asked the court to charge as follows:
‘From the evidence as it appears in this action, none of the policemen who sought to arrest the
defendant in this action prior to the killing of the deceased, John Kills Back, were justified in arresting
the defendant, and he had a right to use such force as a reasonably prudent person might do in resisting
such arrest by them.’
The court denied the request and counsel excepted.
The court charged the jury, among other things, as follows:
‘The deceased, John Kills Back, had been ordered to arrest the defendant; hence he had a right to go
and make the attempt to arrest the defendant. The defendant had no right to resist him. It is claimed on
the part of the defendant that he made no resistance, and he was willing to go with the officer in the
14. morning. I charge you, of course, that the officer, John Kills Back, had a right to determine for himself
when this man should go to the agency with him.
* * * * * ‘In this connection I desire to say to you, gentlemen of the jury, that the deceased, being an
officer of the law, had a right to be armed, and for the purpose of arresting the defendant he would have
had the right to show his revolver. He would have had the right to use only so much force as was
necessary to take his prisoner, and the fact that he was using no more force than was necessary to take
his prisoner would not be sufficient justification for the defendant to shoot him and kill him. The
defendant would only be justified in killing the deceased when you should find that the circumstances
showed that the deceased had so far forgotten his duties as an officer, and had gone beyoud the force
necessary to arrest defendant, and was about to kill him or to inflict great bodily injury upon him,
which was not necessary for the purpose of making the arrest.’
This charge was duly excepted to.
We think the court clearly erred in charging that the policemen had the right to arrest the plaintiff in
error, and to use such force as was necessary to accomplish the arrest, and that the plaintiff in error had
no right to resist it.
The evidence as to the facts immediately preceding the killing was contradictory; the prosecution
showing a killing when no active effort was at that very moment made to arrest, and the defendant
showing an intended arrest and a determination to take him at that time at all events, and a move made
by the deceased towards him with his pistol in sight, and a seeming intention to use it against the
defendant for the purpose of overcoming all resistance. Under these circumstances the error of the
charge was material and prejudicial.
At common law, if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant and who had no right to arrest
him, and if in the course of that resistance the officer was killed, the offense of the party resisting arrest
would be reduced from what would have been murder if the officer had had the right to arrest, to
manslaughter. What would be murder if the officer had the right to arrest might be reduced to
manslaughter by the very fact that he had no such right. So an officer, at common law, was not
authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not committed in his presence.
1 Arch. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 7th Am. ed. 103, note (1); also page 861 and following pages; 2 Hawk. P. C.
129, § 8; 3 Russell on Crimes, 6th ed. 83, 84, 97; 1 Chitty’s Crim. L.* p 15; 1 East, P. C. chap. 5, p.
328; Derecourt v. Corbishley, 5 El. & Bl. 188; Fox v. Gaunt, 3 Barn & Ad. 798; Reg. v. Chapman, 12
Cox C. C. 4; Rafferty v. People, 69 Ill. 111, 18 Am. Rep. 601; S. C. on a subsequent writ, 72 Ill. 37. If
the officer had no right to arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no
more force than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest. 1 East,
supra.
We do not find any statute of the United States or of the state of South Dakota giving any right to
these men to arrest an individual without a warrant, on a charge of misdemeanor not committed in their
presence. Marshals and their deputies have in each state, by virtue of § 788, Revised Statutes of the
United States, the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as sheriffs and their deputies
in such state may have by law in executing the laws thereof. This certainly does not give any power to
an officer at the Pine Ridge agency to arrest a person without warrant, even though charged with the
15. commission of a misdemeanor. These policemen were not marshals nor deputies of marshals, and the
statutes have no application to them.
By § 1014 of the Revised Statutes, the officers of the United States named therein and certain state
officers may, agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state, order the arrest of
an offender for any crime or offense committed against the United States. This section has no
application.
Referring to the laws of South Dakota, we find no authority for making such an arrest without warrant.
The law upon the subject of arrests in that state is contained in the Compiled Laws of South Dakota
1887, § 7139, and the following sections, and it will be seen that the common law is therein
substantially enacted. The sections referred to are set out in the margin.
No rule or regulation for the government of Indians upon a reservation has been cited, nor have we
found any, which prohibits the firing of a gun there, ‘for fun,’ nor do we find any law, rule, or
regulation which authorizes an arrest, without warrant, of an Indian not charged even with the
commission of a misdemeanor, nor does it anywhere appear that Gleason had authority to issue a
warrant for an alleged violation of the rules or regulations.
It is plain from this review of the subject that the charge of the court below, that the policemen had the
right to arrest this plaintiff in error, without warrant, and that, in order to accomplish such arrest, they
had the right to show and use their pistols so far as was necessary for that purpose, and that the plaintiff
in error had no right to resist such arrest, was erroneous. That it was a material error, it seems to us, is
equally plain. It placed the transaction if a false light before the jury, and denied to the plaintiff in error
those rights which he clearly had. The occasion of the trouble originated in Gleason’s orders to arrest
him, and in the announced intention on the part of the policemen, which they endeavored to
accomplish, to arrest the plaintiff in error that night and take him to the agency, and all that followed
that announcement ought to be viewed in the light of such proclaimed intention. And yet the charge
presented the plaintiff in error to the jury as one having no right to make any resistance to an arrest by
these officers, although he had been guilty of no offense, and it gave the jury to understand that the
officers, in making the attempt, had the right to use all necessary force to overcome any and all
opposition that might be made to the arrest, even to the extent of killing the individual whom they
desired to take into their custody. Instead of saying that plaintiff in error had the right to use such force
as was absolutely necessary to resist an attempted illegal arrest, the jury were informed that the
policemen had the right to use all necessary force to arrest him, and that he had no right to resist. He, of
course, had no right to unnecessarily injure, much less to kill, his assailant; but where the officer is
killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the
law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the
arrest, from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might
be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been
committed.
The plaintiff in error was undoubtedly prejudiced by this error in the charge, and the judgment of the
court below must therefore be reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.
Sec. 7139. An arrest may be either——
16. 1. By a peace officer, under a warrant;
2. By a peace officer, without a warrant; or,
3. By a private person.
Sec. 7141. If the offense charged is a felony, the arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the
day or night. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made at night, unless upon the direction of the
magistrate indorsed upon the warrant.
Sec. 7144. The officer must inform the defendant that he acts under the authority of the warrant, and
must also show the warrant if required.
Sec. 7145. If, after notice of intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer
may use all necessary means to effect the arrest.
Sec. 7148. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person——
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed it.
4. On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.
Sec. 7150. He may also at night, without a warrant, arrest any person whom he has reasonable cause for
believing to have committed a felony, and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appear
that the felony had not been committed.
Sec. 7151. When arresting a person without a warrant, the officer must inform him of his authority and
the cause of the arrest, except when he is in the actual commission of a public offense, or is pursued
immediately after an escape.
Sec. 7153. When a public offense is committed in the presence of a magistrate, he may, by a verbal or
written order, command any person to arrest the offender, and may thereupon proceed as if the offender
had been brought before him on a warrant of arrest.
Sec. 7154. A private person may arrest another——
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed it.
Sec. 7155. He must, before making the arrest, inform the person to be arrested of the cause thereof, and
require him to submit, except when he is in the actual commission of the offense, or when he is arrested
on pursuit immediately after its commission.
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