Briefly discusses the elaborate rules of safekeeping and movement of files in governments in India and the simple and safe subterfuges that make losing files, replacing and adding content a breeze.

1. The Myth of Security of Government Files in India
Shantanu Basu
The Ishrat Jahan missing file episode is a familiar tale in the Govt. of India (and States too). The
DoPT/MHA/CVC has issued innumerable instructions on custody and circulation of files. For
the uninitiated, here’s a relatively simplified version of the modus operandi of file custody and
movement in government.
1. Each file, with each page and volume numbered (continuation files must have all details
of preceding files recorded on the cover) is required to be entered on a sectional census of
files and this register is in the custody of the Section Officer. This register is created on
the basis of list of files maintained by each sectional Assistant and any
additions/destruction is required to be recorded both in the List and the Register. Both
these documents are handed over to the successor whenever an incumbent Section
Officer/Assistant is transferred.
2. Each section is required to maintain a duty list of each assistant showing specific duties
allocated each by the Section Officer. Accordingly, the custody of individual files is
vested in incumbent assistants.
3. The chain of command is equally impressive. A proposal is birthed with the assistant
jotting his notes, followed by the Section Officer, US/DS and Director, thereon to the
JS/AS (often both), SS/Secy and finally to the Minister empowered to convey a final
decision/approval. At each stage, commencing with the Section Officer, sections and
personal assistants are required to maintain an inward and outward diary of files received
from various levels that are sent back and forth, after being duly entered in a transit
register where the receiving clerk has to record his signature in token of receipt (back)
from higher echelons.
4. It is not as if files move vertically only. They do so horizontally too. For instance, a
proposal is initiated by an administrative division that moves from the JS-in-charge to the
JS/AS&FA, then back to the JS in-charge before moving vertically via the AS/SS to
Secy. or the Minister, when required as determined by the prescribed delegation of
financial and administrative powers. Not just this, files also move for inter-Ministerial
(mostly in separated premises) consultations/opinions to other Ministries/Depts.
following the same trajectory as in this and other paragraphs above. In both events, a file
could move multiple times answering often irrelevant queries, often only for rent-
seeking, raised at different levels.
5. Following a final decision, the file descends to the originating section that now prepares a
bill on that file to disburse public funds (in cases where payments/orders are to be placed)
and sends it to the JS/AS &FA who, in turn, will mark it to the Pr. CCA of the Ministry
for payment action. Once the bills are passed for payment, after an endorsement on the
file (cheque/e-payment no. and date) returns it to the originating section.
With such elaborate British-created check posts, how do files go missing and how difficult is it
to facilitate such missing/replacement? The reasons are not far to seek as detailed below:

2. 1. With personnel shortages and frequent, mostly unjustified transfers of personnel, duty
lists are seldom updated and reallocation of duties recorded. Thus the trace of who is
responsible for custody of an individual file is not difficult to obfuscate. If however, a
junior assistant is to suffer for the foibles of a burrah babu/mantri, duty lists and list of
files can be written overnight and the paper pressed with a hot iron to give it an aged
yellow look. The same process holds true for replacement of pages of ‘sensitive’ files.
Likewise, file movement registers (outward and downward) can be safely doctored that
even radio carbon dating cannot establish since decisions are often reversed in matter of
days and weeks. Similarly, an average file ordinarily would pass through 25-30 personnel
at different levels including personal assistants and diarizing clerks) within a
Ministry/Dept. and maybe double that for inter-Ministerial ‘consultations’. I have
detected (with my own methods that must remain a trade secret) records created
overnight by Ministries/Depts. for audit scrutiny, even for CBI investigators.
2. There are no norms either for photocopying of pages from sarkari files. Files are often
piled high in unguarded areas for copying by a menial employee, often a daily wage
laborer. The only log maintained is of the numerical recording meter of the copier. There
are few secured copiers; even these can be operated by anyone in possession of a
password and are incapable of recording the contents of copies made.
3. Notwithstanding huge advances of technology, few files, if any at all (even secret/top
secret) are bar coded or have RFID tags. There are no RFID readers in the corridors of
government offices that would leave trail of the movement of files from one level to
another. Paper that is used for notes and correspondence is freely available (including for
use as paper napkins and plates for samosas) and not dispensed through automated
dispensers in a group of sections that would watermark each A4 sheet dispensed with the
GOI emblem and a unique number to that sheet. Moreover, dispensers should allow
access to them via passwords for each user and create a log file for each user. In fact, any
photocopy of this paper should distinctly show the word “COPY” prominently across
each copy.
At the core of this issue of custody of files, is the planting of entire sets of compromised
personnel (including officers) given the entirely opaque method of their appointment at all levels
and infiltration all Ministries/Depts. by outsiders via such compliant appointees. Needless to add,
their loyalty to a generous master is their only consideration for appointment to sensitive posts
and prolonged retention therein for facetious reasons. There are large numbers of very senior
officers in the GOI that have moved between sensitive Ministries/Depts. only during their entire
careers.
Then why blame a small-time flunkey for a missing Ishrat Jahan file? Remember how chhota
babus were fixed in, leaks from the Union Petroleum Minister’s office about 18 months back?
And I have not even touched more than the tip of the iceberg. Things have not changed radically
in recent times.
The author is a senior public policy analyst and commentator