President Michel Temer took advantage of the escalation of violence that reaches Rio de Janeiro to carry out military intervention aimed at raising the level of his popularity and the government itself. The success of the military intervention in the fight against violence in Rio de Janeiro would make possible his candidacy for presidential reelection, which is a sine qua non condition for having a privileged forum and not responding to the crimes of corruption he is accused of. This is the real reason for the decision taken by the Temer government to intervene militarily in Rio de Janeiro. The social pacification sought by the great majority of the population will only be realized with social reparation and access to the equipment and policies of the Brazilian state by the majority of population, and not by a policy of military intervention such as that adopted by the Temer government in Rio de Janeiro.

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THE MEANING OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN RIO DE JANEIRO
Fernando Alcoforado *
President Michel Temer signed a decree of federal intervention in public security in the
state of Rio de Janeiro on February 16, 2018, in the Planalto Palace. The measure
predicts that Army General Walter Souza Braga Netto, of the Eastern Military
Command, will be the intervenor in Rio de Janeiro. He assumes until December 31,
2018 responsibility for the command of the Secretariat of Security, Civil and Military
Police, Fire Brigade and the prison system in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The
intervention is already in force, but the decree must be approved by the National
Congress to continue working. In a speech on solemnity, Temer compared organized
crime in Rio de Janeiro to a metastasis and, therefore, the federal government made the
decision to intervene in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
President Michel Temer said that the moment called for an "extreme" measure. He
pointed out that the government will give "firm" answers to defeating organized crime.
He also said that federal intervention is aimed at "restoring order". He said that "we
cannot passively accept the death of innocents, and it is intolerable that we are burying
fathers and mothers of families, workers, police, youth and children, and seeing entire
besieged neighborhoods, schools under rifles and avenues transformed into trenches".
That's why he said he's coming, that's enough because we will not accept that they kill
our present or continue to murder our future.
President Michel Temer took advantage of the escalation of violence that reaches Rio de
Janeiro to carry out military intervention that may contribute to raise the level of its
popularity and of the government itself whose actions have been characterized by the
adoption of policies contrary to the interests of the nation and of the vast majority of the
population. Temer's purpose of achieving the success of military intervention in the
fight against violence in Rio de Janeiro through repression would be to contribute to the
increase of his popularity and of his government and, consequently, to make his
candidacy for presidential reelection possible. It should be noted that Temer would need
to make his re-election possible as a "sine qua non" condition to have a privileged
forum and not to respond for the crimes of corruption he is accused of. This is the real
reason for the decision taken by the Temer government to intervene militarily in Rio de
Janeiro.
It should be noted that violence in Rio and Brazil is a reflection of a continuous
deepening of social inequalities, the absence of historical social reparations, and a series
of misguided policies to combat violence implemented by the rulers in Brazil. Brazil
recorded 59,080 homicides in 2015. That means 28.9 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.
The numbers represent a change in the level in this indicator in relation to 2005, when
48,136 homicides occurred. The information is in the Atlas da Violência 2017 (Atlas of
Violence 2017), produced by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute of
Applied Economic Research- Ipea) in partnership with the Fórum Brasileiro de
Segurança Pública (Brazilian Forum of Public Security - FBSP). The study analyzes the
numbers and rates of homicide in Brazil between 2005 and 2015 and details the data by
regions, Federation Units and municipalities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants.

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The states of Brazil that presented a growth of more than 100% in homicide rates in the
analyzed period are located in the North and Northeast regions. This means that if you
have to confront violence in Brazil, military intervention would have to cover mainly
the North and Northeast of Brazil. Rio Grande do Norte recorded the highest growth
(232%). In 2005, the homicide rate in the state of Rio Grande do Norte was 13.5 per
100,000 inhabitants. By 2015, that number has risen to 44.9. Next are Sergipe (134.7%)
and Maranhão (130.5). Pernambuco and Espírito Santo, in turn, reduced the homicide
rate by 20% and 21.5%, respectively. However, the most significant reductions were in
Southeast states: in São Paulo, the rate fell 44.3% (from 21.9 to 12.2), and in Rio de
Janeiro, 36.4% (from 48.2 to 30.6).
The O Atlas da Violência 2017 (Atlas of Violence 2017) analyzed data from the
Mortality Information System (SIM) of the Ministry of Health, referring to the interval
from 2005 to 2015, and also used information from the police records published in the
10º Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (10th Brazilian Yearbook of Public
Safety), of the FBSP. In order to list the 30 most violent and less violent municipalities
in Brazil in 2015, the study considered deaths from aggression (homicide) and violent
deaths due to undetermined cause (MVCI). Altamira, in Pará, leads the relationship of
the most violent municipalities, with a homicide rate added to MVCI of 107. Next,
Lauro de Freitas appears in Bahia (97.7); Nossa Senhora do Socorro, in Sergipe (96.4);
São José de Ribamar, in Maranhão (96.4); and Simões Filho, also in Bahia (92.3). The
North and Northeast regions add 22 municipalities in the ranking of the 30 most violent
in 2015. Among the 30 most peaceful, 24 are municipalities in the Southeast. However,
the first two of the list are in Santa Catarina: Jaraguá do Sul (3.7) and Brusque (4.1).
Next, they appear in Americana (4.8) and Jaú (6.3), both in São Paulo, Araxá, Minas
Gerais (6.8), and Botucatu (7.2), also in São Paulo.
More than 318,000 youths were murdered in Brazil between 2005 and 2015. In 2015
alone, there were 31,264 homicides of people aged 15-29. Young men continue to be
the main victims: more than 92% of homicides affect this part of the population. In
Alagoas and Sergipe, the homicide rate of young men reached 233 and 230.4 deaths per
100,000 young men, respectively, in 2015. Every 100 people murdered in Brazil, 71 are
black. Over the past 30 years, homicide victims in Brazil have reached more than 1
million people. The data are collected in 27 Federative Units, 33 Metropolitan Regions,
27 capitals and 5564 municipalities in the country, using information from the Ministry
of Health, Public Safety, Offices, Police and other public agencies [See article Violência
no Brasil: pior que Iraque, Angola e Afeganistão (Violence in Brazil: worse than Iraq,
Angola and Afghanistan) published on the website
<http://blogdotas.terra.com.br/2011/12/28/violencia-no-brasil-pior-que-iraque-angola-e-
afeganistao/>). To make clear the absurdity of the number of violent deaths in Brazil, it
is enough to compare with other places that live in an extreme situation like Angola, a
country in civil war for 27 years (550,000 victims, practically half of the victims here in
the same period). That is, the war in Brazil is bloodier than in those already bloody
places on the planet.
This harsh reality serves to challenge categorically the thesis of some people that the
response to crime is militarization and access to arms by the population. If those who
are "prepared" to face criminality and who are authorized to walk armed and use them,
are key elements in the increase of violence, how can this expansion be the solution to
the problem? The only possible way to reduce violence is the adoption of policies to

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reduce social inequalities with the provision by the Brazilian state of the social classes
less favored by its institutional apparatus. Marginalized people need to be socially
included with access to quality education, health, basic sanitation, urbanization, culture
and leisure.
The social pacification sought by the vast majority of the population will only be
achieved through social reparation and access to the equipment and policies of the
Brazilian state by the majority of the population, and not by a policy of military
intervention such as that adopted by the Temer government in Rio de Janeiro. The
demilitarization and the humanization of the police are also essential for success in
reducing violence. And last but not least, the economic and financial elites of the
country should give up at least a small portion of their wealth so that the country can
finally get out of the state of war where it has been for decades.
*Fernando Alcoforado, 78, membro da Academia Baiana de Educação e da Academia Brasileira Rotária
de Letras – Seção da Bahia, engenheiro e doutor em Planejamento Territorial e Desenvolvimento
Regional pela Universidade de Barcelona, professor universitário e consultor nas áreas de planejamento
estratégico, planejamento empresarial, planejamento regional e planejamento de sistemas energéticos, é
autor dos livros Globalização (Editora Nobel, São Paulo, 1997), De Collor a FHC- O Brasil e a Nova
(Des)ordem Mundial (Editora Nobel, São Paulo, 1998), Um Projeto para o Brasil (Editora Nobel, São
Paulo, 2000), Os condicionantes do desenvolvimento do Estado da Bahia (Tese de doutorado.
Universidade de Barcelona,http://www.tesisenred.net/handle/10803/1944, 2003), Globalização e
Desenvolvimento (Editora Nobel, São Paulo, 2006), Bahia- Desenvolvimento do Século XVI ao Século XX
e Objetivos Estratégicos na Era Contemporânea (EGBA, Salvador, 2008), The Necessary Conditions of
the Economic and Social Development- The Case of the State of Bahia (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller
Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, Saarbrücken, Germany, 2010), Aquecimento Global e Catástrofe
Planetária (Viena- Editora e Gráfica, Santa Cruz do Rio Pardo, São Paulo, 2010), Amazônia Sustentável-
Para o progresso do Brasil e combate ao aquecimento global (Viena- Editora e Gráfica, Santa Cruz do
Rio Pardo, São Paulo, 2011), Os Fatores Condicionantes do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
(Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2012), Energia no Mundo e no Brasil- Energia e Mudança Climática
Catastrófica no Século XXI (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2015), As Grandes Revoluções Científicas,
Econômicas e Sociais que Mudaram o Mundo (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2016) e A Invenção de um novo
Brasil (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2017).