The imf supervision and crisis management in recent financial crises
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The document discusses the IMF's supervision and crisis management in response to recent financial crises. It begins with a review of past crises since the Great Depression. It then criticizes the IMF's effectiveness, noting analytical and organizational weaknesses. However, the IMF has responded by boosting lending capacity, increasing flexible lending facilities, and implementing governance reforms to better represent emerging markets. While lessons show the need for improved surveillance, the IMF has expanded its crisis management role as a global financial partner and supervisor.
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The imf supervision and crisis management in recent financial crises
- 1. ECON 1102 Regulatory Institutions of the World Economy Mr Mark Ho Group 4: 1. Tran Long 000752445 2. Duan Ming Xuan 000777713 3. Shi Peng Supervision and Crisis management in recent financial crises
- 2. 1. Review of Past & Present financial crises 2. Criticisms of the effectiveness of IMF’s supervision 3. IMF’s response to manage the crises 4. Conclusion 5. Recommendations Content Group presentation 4: ‘The frequency and severity of recent financial crisis raise doubts about the effectiveness of the IMF’s supervision and crisis management policies.’ Discuss with the reference to the continuing market crises from 2008 onwards
- 3. Crises and Occurring New Structures are Continuous and Permanent economic crisis rapid and dramatic price rise production reducing expansion significant unemployment rise substantial income decrease sharp securities devaluation Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 4. The Great Depression 1929 1997 2012-2013 Asian financial crisis Icelandic financial crisis 2008 Greek Government- debt crisis 2010 Cypriot financial crisis Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 5. Trigger: Unsecured loans to US home owners Regulation Failures Inflated Expectations of Returns Imprudent in incentive systems/risk management Macro-economic imbalances Aggravating factors Weakness in coordination: IMF, World bank, G7 Underestimation of systemic risks Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 6. IMF at a glance July 1944 responsibilities promote monetary cooperation promote exchange stability assist a multilateral system of payments make resources available 188 country members functions surveillance review country policies provide advice to members conditionality financial support
- 7. Criticisms about the effectiveness of the IMF’s supervision & crisis management policies
- 8. Analytical Weaknesses failed to provide early warnings issues in processes and decision-making groupthink and other cognitive biases analytical approaches & knowledge gaps available data were ignored or misinterpreted too focused on bilateral and ignored multilateral issues
- 9. Organizational Weaknesses & Internal Problems staff didn’t share information or seek advice outsideof their units the financial sector experts were not sufficiently appreciate incentives didn’t foster the open exchange of ideas weakaccountability difficult to integrate multilateral with bilateral surveillance
- 10. The governance of the IMF & Political Constraints IMF’s governance was dominated by the major members country authorities could influence the IMF’s policy initiatives IMF’s advice on member’s economic policy was ignored Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 11. IMF has not implemented its mandate consistently IMF focused exclusively on inflation targeting, capital flows liberalization IMF ignoredits mandate to sustain growth and employment IMF opposed capital controls not easy to get IMF’s emergency loans IMF credit outstanding was $100 billion in 2005, but declined to $10billion in 2008 no longer had a major role as a lender Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 12. Issues in implementation of crisis management policies Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 13. What has the IMF done to enhance its supervision & crisis management policies?
- 14. Boost the lending capacity increase quota subscriptions of members securing large temporary borrowing agreements from members total quotas US$360 billion committed resources: US$1 trillion loans committed US$226billion Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 15. Step up crisis lending IMF lending over SDR 1 billion (in millions of SDRs), October 2008-April 2009. Source: www.imf.org Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 16. Iceland Greece Cyprus $2.1 billion dramatic tightening of monetary policy bank restructuring stop the fall of the Icelandic krona 240billioneuros of bailout loans radical spending cuts tax rises labour market and pension reforms 10billion euros bailout Save the banking sector Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 17. Changes to the IMF’s conditionality regimes greater degree of flexibility in the IMF’s approach to crisis management Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) Standby Credit Facility (SCF) Flexible Credit Line (FCL) Colombia, Mexico, and Poland Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) Precautionary and Liquidity Line Macedonia and Morocco granted more policy autonomy to countries with IMF facilities approved temporary capital controls for member states Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations Extended Credit Facility (ECF)
- 18. Helping the world’s poorest sharp increase in concessional lending to low- and middle-income countries $3.8billion in 2009 debt relief amounted to $268million in 2010 Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 19. sharpening analyseson linkages between the real economy and the financial sector mapping the implicationsof rising interconnectedness for surveillance and lending working closely with governments and other international institutions Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 20. Governance Reforms at the IMF increase the importance of emerging markets a 6%point shift in quota share to emerging and developing countries a doublingof quotas protectingthe voting shares of the poorest member a more representative, fully- elected Executive Board Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 21. Conclusion
- 22. Lessons of Crises for IMF’s supervision and crisis management the buildup of systemic risk was not adequately capturedby IMF’s surveillance framework IMF’s legitimacy and relevance has been undermined IMF’s crisis management responsibilities expanded with a series of crises Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations call for radical reform of the Fund
- 23. Supervisory Role in the World Economy setting up global surveillance systems an intellectual leader during the crises policy advice and technical assistance efforts policy responses development better coordination with the international financial institutions flexible financial partner immediatecrisis control through lending global central bank in the future Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 24. strengthen the IMF’s working environment and analytical capacity improve the follow-up of the IMF’s advice continuously enhance a more flexibleapproach to crisis management in borrowing members reinforce IMF’s governance to fully reflect changes in the world economy Review of financial crises | Criticisms| IMF’s responses | Conclusion |Recommendations
- 25. • Aiginger, K. 2009. ‘The Current Economic Crisis: Causes, Cures and Consequences’, WIFO Working Papers No. 431, August, Osterreichisches Institut für Wirtshaftschung. • Azar, K. G. and Mansoori, M. (2011) 2008 Economic Crisis Analysis (The Macroeconomic Approach). Urmia: Urmia University. • BBC (2003) Q&A: Cyprus deal 28 March 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21922110 [Accessed 26 March 2013] • Broome, Andre, 2010, “The International Monetary Fund, Crisis Management and the Credit Crunch,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 1 (February), pp. 37–54. • Carey, D. (2009), “Iceland: The Financial and Economic Crisis”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 725, OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/221071065826 [Accessed 26 March 2013] • Chojna-Duch, E. (2012) Challenges for the IMF during the financial crisis 2008-2012: The ability to take measures to restore stability of the financial environment. National Bank of Poland, University of Warsaw. • David, B. (2009) IMF Says It Battled Crisis Well. The Wall Street Journal. September 28; page A14. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125409459507644953.html [Accessed 26 March 2013] • IEO (2011) IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis IMF Surveillance in 2004–07. Washington: Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund. • IMF (2013a) Factsheet: The IMF at a glance. March 29, 2013. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm[Accessed 25 March 2013]. • IMF (2013b) Factsheet: IMF’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis. March 29, 2013. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm[Accessed 26 March 2013]. • IMF (2013b) Factsheet: IMF Lending. April 2, 2013. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm [Accessed 26 March 2013]. References
- 26. Thank you for listening
Editor's Notes
- Overview about economic crises What is crisis? Crisis is one of the serious processes of the actual risk. Necessity of structural changes is to prevent similar crises repetition or other crises. Crisis lead to new theories and also these theories create new structures. So, theories are result of crises and on the other hand, they are facing to the theoretical and practical challenges and crises. It is clear that theoretical challenges affects to new structures and newer structures occur. So, this process is continuous and permanent. Crises and Occurring New Structures are Continuous and Permanent. Source: ( Azar and Mansoori, 2011) In the economic field, it involves rapid and dramatic rise of prices, production expanded reducing, sharp rise of unemployment, a sharp reduction in income, sharp reduction in the value of securities and etc. In the 20 th century, the Great Depression is the most severe economic failure in most countries of the world that lasted from 1929 until World War II . It began in the US when the New York Stock Exchange fell which led to bank failures and job loss. Before the 2008 global crisis, the Asian financial crisis caused by overvalued exchange rates, structural weaknesses in the financial sector and excessive short-term borrowing leading to asset price inflation, speculation and increases in non-performing loan (Reinhart and Felton , 2009).
- Continuing market crises from 2008 Recent global crisis started from the American Housing. This recession rapidly spread to other economic sectors and shortly infected Europe and Japan, and also influenced other countries with respect to their dependence on America’s economy (Azar and Mansoori, 2011). Iceland Iceland who had sovereign debt at above 80% experienced a severe banking crisis in late 2008, when the country’s highly leveraged three main banks (accounting for 85 percent of the banking system) collapsed within a week. (Broome, 2010) Greece Greece was living beyond its means even before it joined the euro. After it adopted the single currency, public spending soared. When the global financial downturn hit - and Greece's hidden borrowings came to light - the country was ill-prepared to cope. Debt levels reached the point where the country was no longer able to repay its loans. Cyprus Before 2008, Cyprus was seen to have a healthy economy, but the island's banking sector grew rapidly. By 2011, their assets - which include all the loans they have made - were equivalent to 835% of GDP. Cypriot had made loans to Greek borrowers worth 160% of Cypriot GDP. When Greece became engulfed in crisis in 2010, Cypriot banks were hit hard, and the government did not have the money to bail them out itself. Government finances have been further weakened by slow economic growth and international lenders have stopped offering loans.
- The causes The roots of the crisis can be traced further back a decade ago. When the stock markets began a steep decline in 2000 and the global economy started to slide into a recession, the United States Federal Reserve and other central banks sharply lowered interest rates to limit the economic damage. The sustained lower interest rates fuelled a mortgage-borrowing boom , while also encouraging millions of homeowners to refinance their existing mortgages. In 2005, the price of housing started to grow and for gaining more profit, the banks inclined to housing and provided applicants with lots of facilities . With the burst of price bubbles, strong reduction of prices occurred in the housing market and the loan recipients did not have any motives to repay their loans . Therefore, the banks that had given lots of facilities to the housing sector faced crisis, noticeably with the failure of Lehman Brothers. In addition to the literature on the failure of the sub-prime mortgage market, there is by now a relatively large literature on the causes of the current economic and financial crisis.
- IMF at a glance The IMF , also known as the “ Fund ,” was formed on July 1944 as a response to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The IMF’s responsibilities / Mandate: The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the global financial stability with promoting international monetary cooperation; promoting exchange rate stability; assisting a multilateral system of payments making resources available (with adequate safeguards) to members experiencing balance of payments difficulties. Membership: 188 countries Headquarters: Washington, D.C. Executive Board: 24 Directors representing countries or groups of countries Staff: Approximately 2,503 from 144 Resources: The IMF’s resources are provided by its member countries, primarily through payment of quotas , which broadly reflect each country’s economic size. FUNCTIONS Surveillance: To maintain stability and prevent crises in the international monetary system, the IMF reviews country policies through a formal system known as surveillance . Under the surveillance framework, the IMF provides advice to its 188 member countries , encouraging policies that foster economic stability, reduce vulnerability to economic and financial crises, and raise living standards. Conditionality: Conditions for providing financial support (IMF, 2013a)
- Analytical Weaknesses Before the 2008 global crisis, the IMF also failed to provide early warnings (United Nations, 2009). Firstly, issues in processes and decision-making with groupthink and other cognitive biases made IMF staffs believed that market discipline and self-regulation would be sufficient to address serious problems in financial institutions and crises were unlikely to happen in advanced economies. Secondly, t he choice of analytical approaches and important knowledge gaps also played a role in the failure to identify risks and vulnerabilities. Much available data were ignored or misinterpreted. The multilateral surveillance has been criticized as being less than fully effective, too focused on bilateral issues (Weiss, 2008).
- Organizational Weaknesses & Internal Problems Staff tend not to share information or to seek advice outside of their units . IMF macroeconomists, particularly in area departments, did not sufficiently appreciate the skills and experience of financial sector experts (IEO, 2011). Incentives were not well aligned to foster the open exchange of ideas that is needed for good surveillance. It also found gaps in oversight and weak accountability. These behaviors made it difficult to integrate multilateral with bilateral surveillance, to link macroeconomic and financial developments, and to draw lessons from cross-country experience.
- The governance of the IMF & Political Constraints The governance of the IMF continued to be dominated by the major members , in particular the United States and the European countries, which undermined the legitimacy of the institution in a changing world (Truman, 2009). Analysts argue that developed countries have long ignored IMF advice on their economic policy, while at the same time pressuring the IMF to use its role in patrolling the exchange rate system to support their own foreign economic goals (Weiss, 2008). In a multilateral organization like the IMF , it is natural for country authorities to influence the launching and design of policy initiatives (IEO, 2011). A country’s adoption of economic adjustment programs in connection with IMF financial assistance is politically controversial (Truman, 2009).
- The IMF has not implemented its mandate consistently It has focused exclusively on inflation targeting, the liberalization of capital flows —as the key risk to global stability and largely ignored its mandate to sustain growth and employment evidence pointing to other risks (United Nations, 2009). The IMF has generally opposed capital controls, which can help governments stem the loss of reserves, currency crashes, and other problems associated with large capital outflows (Weisbrot et al. 2009). The IMF has long been criticized for driving too hard a bargain for emergency loans , requiring countries to privatize industries, liberalize markets and sharply tighten budget deficits -- and for sometimes making the economic situation worse (David, 2009). Many observers argued that the IMF no longer had a major role to play as a lender or in helping to guide the global economy and financial system . IMF credit outstanding peaked at almost $100 billion in 2005, but had declined to about $10 billion in 2008 (Truman, 2009).
- Issues in implementation of crisis management policies The IMF’s enforcement of the exchange-rate policies has been weak . Members accepted the obligation to “avoid manipulating exchange rates in the international monetary system to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.” But there has been a lack of shared consensus about what this obligation means and how it should be policed (Truman, 2009). Uncoordinated national policy responses have made the task it faces all the more difficult (United Nations, 2009). Public outcries in Pakistan and the Kyrgyz Republic over the ending of energy input subsidies and the Hungarian government’s public quarrel with the IMF over program conditionality was especially notable, illustrating the unease within governments to work under the Fund’s rules (Khan, 2011) .
- B oost the lending capacity & Step up crisis lending. It has done so both by obtaining commitments to increase quota subscriptions of member countries —the IMF's main source of financing—and securing large temporary borrowing agreements from member countries . Total quotas: US$360 billion (as of 3/14/13) Additional pledged or committed resources: US$1 trillion Loans committed (as of 3/7/13): US$226 billion
- The processing of new IMF loan applications in the current financial crisis has so far been rapid . Over this seven month period, approved IMF loans to these 12 countries alone totalled SDR 98.5 billion (approximately US$148 billion).
- ICELAND The Fund package with Iceland totaled $2.1 billion. The main initial focus of the economic program that Iceland agreed with the IMF centred on a dramatic tightening of monetary policy and commencing a process of bank restructuring . IMF policy prescription was used to stop the fall of the Icelandic krona to ward off the potential of massive defaults in foreign denominated currency. Greece From 2010, the EU and IMF provided 240bn euros of bailout loans to Greece to help the government pay its creditors. In return for all this help, the EU and IMF required that Greece’s actions with radical spending cuts, tax rises, and labour market and pension reforms . Cyprus Cyprus has agreed a 10bn euros bailout with the EU and IMF in an attempt to stave off the collapse of its banking sector and the wider economy.
- Changes to the IMF’s conditionality schemes The IMF has introduced a number of new financial programs to support members in allocating their loan/policy structures. Each facility has its own conditions, term structures, borrowing capacity and availability ( Cho jna-Duch, 2012) . New instruments include (IMF, 2013c): • Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) – emergency support with limited conditionality • Standby Credit Facility (SCF) – addresses short-term and defensive needs • Extended Credit Facility (ECF) – medium-term support and flexibility program . • Flexible Credit Line (FCL) – support for Balance of Payments pressures for countries with strong macroeconomic track records; no ex post conditionality. Colombia , Mexico , and Poland have been provided combined access of over $100 billion under the FCL. • Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) – lower standards of qualification than for the FCL; less ex ante qualifications, but stronger ex post conditionality. • The Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) is designed to meet the liquidity needs of member countries with sound economic fundamentals but with some remaining vulnerabilities— Macedonia and Morocco have used the PLL. • Exogenous Shocks Facility doubled the borrowing limits for low-income economies (Weiss, 2008). IMF also granted more policy autonomy to countries with IMF facilities , the Fund has approved temporary capital controls for member states experiencing severe balance of payments crises, so long as restrictions are non-discriminatory and do not include multiple currency practices (Khan, 2011). Its support for the judicious use of exchange controls in a capital account crisis such as Iceland has experienced does indicate a somewhat greater degree of flexibility in the IMF’s approach to crisis management than in the past.
- Helping the world’s poorest. The majority IMF’s response to the crisis was built around a sharp increase in the amount of concessional lending to low- and middle-income countries (Khan, 2011) . The IMF’s concessional lending to low-income countries amounted to $3.8 billion in 2009, an increase of about four times the historical levels (IMF, 2013b). Establishment of a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief (PCDR) Trust . This allows the IMF to join international debt relief efforts for very poor countries that are hit by the most catastrophic of natural disasters. PCDR-financed debt relief amounted to $268 million in 2010 (IMF, 2013b).
- Reforming Global Surveillance. Sharpening analyses on linkages between the real economy, the financial sector, and external stability . Work has also been done on mapping and understanding the implications of rising financial and trade interconnectedness for surveillance and for lending to strengthen the global financial safety net (IMF, 2013b). The key findings and policy advice from the various multilateral products the Global Policy Agenda, Integrated Surveillance Decision, Triennial Surveillance Review, an External Sector Report (IEO, 2011) . The IMF is working closely with governments and other international institutions to try and prevent future crises. Firstly , countries are required to provide the IMF with information and to consult with the IMF upon its request. The IMF staff generally meets each year with each member country regarding the country’s current fiscal and monetary policies, the state of its economy, its exchange rate situation, and other relevant concerns. Secondly , there are efforts to increase cooperation with the international financial standard setters as the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), as well as in various international working groups such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Weiss, 2008).
- Governance Reforms at the IMF To strengthen its legitimacy, in 2010, the IMF agreed on wide-ranging governance reforms to i ncrease the importance of emerging market countries . The reforms includes a doubling of quotas , which will result in more than a 6 percentage point shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and developing countries while protecting the voting shares of the poorest member countries . The reform will also lead to a more representative, fully-elected Executive Board (IMF, 2013b).
- Lessons of Crises for IMF’s supervision and crisis management The root cause of this crisis was the buildup of systemic risk due to regulatory and supervisory failure that was not adequately captured by the Fund’s surveillance framework (Xafa, 2010). The Fund’s legitimacy and relevance has been undermined in recent years (Truman, 2009). The IMF’s crisis management responsibilities expanded via its involvement with a series of international economic crises , which led to widespread calls for radical reform of the Fund including: improve the existing framework for assessing financial stability reinforce early warning capabilities in the advanced countries as well as globally. improved monitoring of cross-country spillover risks and their potential macroeconomic impact (Xafa, 2010).
- Supervisory Role in the World Economy IMF is responsible for setting up global surveillance systems as an intellectual leader during the crises (Lagarde, 2011). It is helping build a stronger global economy, through its policy advice and technical assistance efforts to identify contingent risks that threaten global economic and financial stability and to develop policy responses (Xafa, 2010). It increased surveillance of the global economy through better coordination with the international financial regulatory agencies (Weiss, 2008) . In collaboration with other international standard-setters and regulators, the Fund has supported the implementation of the policy lessons from the crisis with its analysis and monitoring . It has been a flexible financial partner with immediate crisis control through balance of payments lending to emerging market and less-developed countries (Weiss, 2008) and reforming its lending instruments (Lagarde, 2011; Khan, 2011) . Although these changes to loan accessibility and borrowing limits are unlikely to satisfy IMF critics, these policy shifts do indicate that the IMF’s process of institutional learning and policy experimentation is continuing, at a moderate pace (Broome, 2010). It is predicted that with its resources of more than 1 trillion US Dollar, IMF will take the role of global central bank in the future if it can manage to establish an unconditional financial safety net (Turhan, 2010).
- It is rather to strengthen the IMF’s working environment and analytical capacity to better allow it to discern risks and vulnerabilities and alert the membership in time to prevent or mitigate the impact of a future crisis. Create an environment that encourages candor and diverse/dissenting views. A common theme across this report’s recommendations is the need to address weaknesses in IMF internal governance. The IMF needs to establish better mechanisms for monitoring implementation and a clear accountability framework. (IEO, 2011) The follow-up of the IMF’s advice must be improved with Delivering a clear, consistent message to the membership on the global outlook and risks (IEO, 2011). The IMF has now said that the follow-up of advice and recommendations will become a permanent feature of the annual country reviews (Wickman-Parak, 2012). IMF should continuously develop and improve a more flexible approach to crisis management in borrowing member states. Changes include a greater tolerance for unorthodox policies such as short-term capital controls, greater differentiation in the treatment of borrowers based on their economic circumstances, easier access to precautionary IMF financing for prime borrowers, and more flexibility in the use of loan conditionality (Broome, 2010). To strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of the IMF, its governance must be enhanced to ensure that it fully reflects changes in the world economy. Emerging and developing economies, including the poorest, should have greater voice and representation. On this basis, major reforms in the governance of this institution, including giving greater voice to developing countries and greater transparency, have to be accelerated (United Nations, 2009).
- Khan, H. (2011) Constructing Global Governance of Global Finance: Towards a Hybrid Global Financial Architecture . Denver: University of Denver. Lagarde, C. (2011) Challenges and Opportunities for the World Economy and the IMF . New York: C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics Blundell-Wignall, A., Atkinson P. and Lee, S. H. (2008) The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues . OECD, FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS – ISSN 1995-2864. Reinhart, C. and Felton, A. (2009) The first global financial crisis of the 21st century: Part II, June-December, 2008 . Maryland: University of Maryland. Truman E. M. (2009) “ The IMF and the Global Crisis: Role and Reform ”. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Turhan, I. M. (2010) Beyond the global financial crisis: central banking in a new global financial system . Istanbul: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Middle East Economic Association. United Nations (2009) Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System . NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES. Weisbrot, M., Cordero, J. and Sandoval, L. (2009) Empowering the IMF: Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund’s Resources? . Washington, CEPR Center for Economic and Policy Research. Weiss, M. A. (2008) The Global Financial Crisis: The Role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Congressional Research Service report for Congress. Wickman-Parak, B. (2012) The IMF’s role – new thinking in the wake of the financial crisis . Stockholm: Global Challenge. Xafa, M. (2010) Role of the IMF in the Global Financial Crisis. Cato Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall 2010).