The Human in the Loop

THE
HUMAN
IN THE
LOOPby David Taudevin
Essentia White Papers | July 2015

| The Human in the Loop
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About Essentia
Essentia Analytics is a cloud-based software solution that uses behavioral
data analytics to help professional investors to make more skilled investment
decisions.
Essentia’s platform enables both hedge and traditional active fund managers
to capture richer data about their own behavior and its context, to understand
where their individual skills and weaknesses lie, identify patterns, and apply that
enhanced self-awareness to achieve improved performance.
Investment excellence demands a feedback loop. Essentia supplies one.
Learn more about us, request a demo and subscribe to our white paper series
at www.essentia-analytics.com.
The author, David Taudevin, is founder
of WingPro, a UK-based technology and
consultancy start-up. With clients in corporate
aviation, the military and air display teams,
WingPro works to enhance human performance
and operational risk management in critical
environments.
He originally trained as a fast jet pilot in the
Royal Air Force where he was the receipient of
several accreditations, including the Queen’s
Medal in 2009 and the Sword of Honour as
top graduate of his course at the RAF College,
Cranwell. On leaving the RAF he joined and led
the commercial team at a financial technology
firm producing accounting and risk management
software for hedge funds.
Email: david@wingpro.io
LinkedIn: uk.linkedin.com/in/davidtaudevin
Twitter: @davidtaudevin

The Human in the Loop | Page 3
Foreword
At Essentia, we’re very interested in how behavioral science is being applied to
improving performance and reducing losses in industries outside of finance.
As you read this paper about how military organizations like the UK’s Royal Air
Force (RAF) have embraced the practice of optimizing “the human in the loop”,
I suspect you’ll note many parallels between fighter pilots and investment
decision-makers.
You might consider, therefore, if your own organization can take a leaf from the
RAF’s book:
• Do you have processes in place to recognize and mitigate behavioral risk?
Does this form part of the formal training being offered to new traders,
analysts and portfolio managers?
• To what extent is your pre-trade investment process captured through data,
and analyzed for behavioral patterns?
• How is error treated within your organization? Are there cultural or personal
factors which make it difficult for people to put their hand up and admit to
errors or perceived weakness?
• What self-improvement loops do your investment decision-makers have in
place?
• To what extent are data and feedback brought back into the risk
management program, so that it can be improved and updated to better
reflect the real drivers of error or underperformance ?
We hope you enjoy this whitepaper and look forward to discussing it with you.
Clare Flynn Levy
Founder and CEO
Essentia Analytics

VIDEO: Demonstration of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s extreme
agility. www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoVGz9xai1M
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The Human in the Loop
Fast jet flying is an inherently complex and
demanding activity that remains dependent
on the mindset and decision-making ability of
the pilot. Recognizing the need to optimize
this human performance in order to achieve its
operational goals, the RAF has initiated a culture
of self-improvement with dynamic feedback loops
that seek out and capture the real sources of
underperformance for consistently better outcomes.
Man and machine
Aviation technology and design has seen unprecedented advances in recent
years and few aircraft represent this so well as the Eurofighter Typhoon.
First launched by a consortium of European manufacturers in 2011 and now
being adopted by airforces around the world, the single-seater Typhoon is
generally recognized as one of the most innovative fighter jets on the planet.
Built from advanced composite materials with a surface that is only 15% metal,
the jet has a radar-resistant airframe that is light but also strong enough to
support highly agile maneuvering at speeds of up to MACH2.

The Striker Helmet - visor and movement-tracking diodes.
Photo: BAE Systems
Inside, gone are the numerous levers, dials, analogue gauges that used to
populate a cockpit. Instead, the Typhoon boasts technology that would be at
home in Google’s test labs with four powerful onboard computers powering a
range of performance and flight management functions.
Height, speed and tracking data are displayed directly onto the visor of the
pilot’s “Striker” helmet. Each helmet, individually tailored to the pilot’s head,
also displays live views from cameras positioned around the outside of the
aircraft.
Much like an alternative reality simulator, when the pilot turns his head,
movement in the diodes on the back of the helmet is captured by sensors
within the cockpit so the aircraft always know where the pilot is looking in and
which camera view to display. If the pilot looks down, he sees not his lap and
feet but the sky and passing fields below the aircraft.
Control of the £90m ($130m) jet is through voice command and an ergonomic
24-function fingertip control throttle. To determine the coordinates of anything
he sees, the pilot simply nudges the throttle and aligns the dynamic crosshairs
seen on his visor with the object. Pulling the trigger then directs intelligent
weaponry to the target without any need for the pilot to orient the aircraft
towards it.
Onboard technology also supports the jet’s Flight Control System. ‘Carefree
Handling’ constantly monitors the aircraft’s limits, optimizing aeronautical
performance and even stabilizing the aircraft at the touch of a button should the
pilot become disorientated or start to blackout.
Such advances throw an obvious spotlight on the role played by the individual
sitting at the heart of all this. Indeed, if aviation technology and automation can
now do so much, why do we even still need a pilot?
The Typhoon
boasts
technology
that would be
at home in
Google’s test
labs.

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In considering this question, the military has been at the forefront of the trend
towards an increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Controlled from the ground or autonomously following a pre-programmed
mission, devices such as drones can be effective for surveillance or operations
where the repetitive or prolonged nature of the sortie would be compromised
by human fatigue issues. They are also attractive for military planners seeking to
reduce cost and casualty rates.
Such unmanned operations, however, remain only a small part of military
aviation’s total range of activities. This is because when it comes to highly
dynamic environments involving complexity or combat, there remains
consensus that a human pilot is still the most effective form of flight
intelligence; no other resource is so effective at analyzing a changing situation
and translating this into tactical (and ethical) decisions.
The flipside to this human involvement is that even the most experienced
pilots can be prone to underperformance or poor decision-making; some
70% of aviation accidents have been found to result from human error – a risk
exacerbated by the increased operational tempo seen since 9/11 and the
pressure on resources caused by defense budget cuts.
In managing this human risk (and thus leveraging more effectively the
investment made in hardware like the Typhoon jet), the RAF’s leadership has
been forced to consider how to best optimize this highly capable, though error-
prone, resource, namely ‘the human in the loop’.
Old and bold?
Based on experience and understanding that has evolved since the First World
War, the RAF now adopts a broad, multi-disciplinary approach to understanding
the drivers of pilot performance.
2007 saw the opening of the RAF’s Human Factors Centre where aviation
psychologists carry out human performance research on how humans interact,
reason and respond in order to reduce performance variability and improve
safety. No subject is off-limits if it helps explain pilot behavior and Human
Factors analysis, more broadly, now spans areas as diverse as psychology,
behavioral science, communications and ergonomics.
The lessons learned from these disciplines are then fed into a continuous
and embedded self-improvement loop that is supported by the RAF’s strong
performance ethos and a willingness to embrace error or failure as an indicator
of where change may be needed.
The organizational and individual self-awareness demanded by these initiatives
is far from the bravado and swagger of Top Gun’s Maverick and Goose. But as
Even the most
experienced
pilots can
be prone to
poor decision-
making.

Major General G R Coward OBE has shrewdly noted, “The old adage recalls
that there are old pilots and bold pilots but very few old and bold pilots. If it is
the bold that take risks, I would suggest that it is the old who have considered
these risks and taken measures to minimize them.”
1
Game face
Research into the psychology of fast jet flying has shown that the single seat
fighter cockpit is an acute laboratory for exploring human performance and the
principles of decision-making behavior.
Despite advances in technology, fast jet pilots are regularly pushed to the limits
of their ability to cope as they engage in high levels of tasking and tactical
thinking where the smallest decision error can end in disaster.
They do this an unforgiving environment in which their senses are bombarded
by multiple information streams and physiological stresses. (G-force, for
example, ranging from -3G to 9G in a Typhoon, can impact sight and
consciousness to the point of momentary black out).
Not surprisingly, the UK’s fast jet training program is famously rigorous. Only the
best RAF pilot trainees – aged between 18 and 25 – are streamed to take part in
the £12 million ($17m), four year course. The training is exhaustive in the detail
of its assessment processes; flying skills are tested and honed through over
400 hours supervised flying time with additional training and testing in flight
simulators.
Unlike other areas of the military where a willingness to follow orders is
essential, the RAF needs to develop the tactical, decision-making capabilities
of their pilots. Even when flying in formation with other aircraft, a fighter pilot’s
role is predominantly a solo one where there is huge pressure on the individual
to perform.
Fast jet trainees are trained to carry out independent evaluations of external
factors (wingmen, weather, threats, etc) and determine their own actions using
decision-making models such as RAPDAR (Recognize, Analyze, Prioritize,
Decide, Act, Review).
Human Factors research and its incorporation into RAF training means that
trainee pilots are also schooled in the psychological aspects of flying.
Well-established psychometric tests such as the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator
(MBTI) and Strength Deployment Inventory (SDI) are used by RAF instructors
to support their evaluation of how pilots perform and any blind spots or
personality traits that may be displayed. (Interestingly in Sweden, trainee pilots
have their MBTI personality type printed on the back of their helmet so that
an instructor sitting behind them can also evaluate their performance in this
Fast jet pilots
are regularly
pushed to the
limits of their
ability to cope.

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psychological context)
2
.
A pilot’s self-awareness of his state of mind when flying is also developed so he
can understand and manage the effect this can have on his decision-making
and flying performance.
Below, I review some of the main behavioral factors that are explored in
the training and which are material to fast jet flying throughout an airman’s
career. As you’ll see, some of the awareness and performance management
approaches are often more commonly associated with non-military fields such
as elite sports.
Behavioral factors in fast jet flying
Visualization
Also called guided imagery, mental rehearsal and performance meditation,
visualization is now an important technique used by many pilots as they prepare
for a sortie. After the pre-flight briefing, pilots will move to a designated area on
base which is free from distraction and interruption and where they can get in a
‘Mission Bubble’ and ready themselves mentally for the operation ahead.
Pilots are also known to ‘arm-chair fly’, sometimes with their hands in the
positions they will be when flying. It’s not unusual to see pilots sitting quietly in
the cockpit in the minutes before take off, visor down, quietly going through the
mission they are about to perform.
Going back as far as the 1920’s, professional investors have been
aware of the importance of psychology and behavioral factors
in determining successfully they invest. More recently, academic
research begun to quantify that impact.
Yet the financial services industry has been very slow to look at how
to best optimize the “highly capable, though error-prone, resource”
that is the trader or fund manager.
The natural inclination of investors is to focus on the behavior of
other market participants. But as the RAF has recognized, in what
is ultimately a solo pursuit, managing the ‘inner game’ is of critical
importance, as is the disciplined implementation of an intelligent
and comprehensive feedback loop.

Tracking Juice
Once in the air, pilots are trained to recognize that their ability to perform at the
highest levels is limited and needs to be managed carefully. Known colloquially
as ‘Tracking Juice’, the mental and physical concentration with which a fighter
pilot can pursue and accurately keep in his sights an enemy jet is known to be
as low as 15 minutes when pilots first start their training. After this surprisingly
short time, pilots typically display a marked weakening in their tracking
sharpness and aircraft handling. With greater experience and more measured
self-control, concentration levels - whilst remaining finite - can be significantly
extended.
Stress vs. Arousal
Stress and fear can be triggered by air-to-air combat as well as the risk of attack
from the ground. It also has non-combat sources: control displays can suddenly
go blank, landing gear can fail, fuel may leak or birds be ingested in an engine,
partially destroying it.
Because stress is a key risk in pilot performance, instructors focus a lot on the
‘spare mental capacity’ a pilot has at a given moment and how this affects their
ability to respond correctly to any threats or conditions that confront them.
A degree of stress - or arousal - is useful in keeping sharp a pilot’s observation
and responses to such events. Too much stress, however, and judgement will be
blurred, compromising performance and potentially escalating to panic.
Just how well a pilot performs under pressure is understood to be a function of
the Arousal Curve. This is derived from the Yerkes Dodson Law
3
, which states
that optimal task performance occurs at an intermediate level of arousal, with
relatively poorer performance at both lower and higher arousal levels. This
leads to an inverted U relation between arousal and performance, with the
proposition that the peak occurs at a lower level of arousal for easy than for
difficult tasks.
Graph: the relationship between arousal and performance.
The ability to
perform at
the highest
levels is limited
and needs to
be managed
carefully.

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In training, pilot stress can be addressed and better understood through
coaching techniques. For instance, if a student pilot is getting too stressed and
overwhelmed, the instructor sitting in the seat behind may remove one or more
tasks from the student (such as radio communication and navigation) allowing
the student to focus on just one or two aspects.
When flying solo, pilots are taught to monitor and be aware of their emotional
state. The onus is on the pilot to recognize if he is becoming overwhelmed and
to prioritize according to a set and well-ingrained priority hierarchy known as
‘Aviate-Navigate-Communicate’:
• AVIATE: Fly the aeroplane first and make sure you’re safe,
ignoring everything else if need be – (after all, if you crash or lose
control then everything else is moot). Then…
• NAVIGATE: Think about where you’re going and what you need
to do - this is the next level of safety. Then, when you’ve got
yourself together…
• COMMUNICATE: Talk to air traffic control, your formation, or
whatever is required.
This order of actions is necessary because a natural reaction under stress is to
have trouble prioritizing what needs doing. The Aviate-Navigate-Communicate
hierarchy prevents, for example, a pilot from talking to someone (eg air traffic
control) when they haven’t first properly controlled their aircraft.
Atul Gawande has documented in The Checklist Manifesto (Profile Books, 2010)
how checklists have been used extensively in aviation since the Second World
War when a new generation of increasingly complex jet engines entered into
service.
In his work analyzing the risk-taking behavior of traders
4
, John
Coates, of Cambridge University, has found a similar “ -shaped
dose–response curve”. His studies show that “traders experience a
rise in testosterone when their trades make money, which increases
their confidence and appetite for risk, so that in the next round of
trading they put on even larger trades. If they win again, as they
are likely to during a rising market, their profits will increase their
testosterone once more, until at some point confidence becomes
overconfidence, trading positions grow to a dangerous size and the
risk–reward profiles of the trades start to stack the odds against
them”.
U
A natural
reaction under
stress is to
have trouble
prioritizing what
needs doing.

A checklist will often contain items that a pilot would ordinarily be expected to
remember but, in times of high stress, they are effective because they ease the
path to responding semi-automatically and in the right way.
Fatigue
Whilst procedural or routine activities are relatively resistant to the effects of
fatigue, those which require creative thinking or real-time evaluation are more
susceptible to the detrimental effects of fatigue and therefore the risk of error.
The military generally makes an effort to select people with a certain degree of
fatigue resistance but this resilience can be easily stretched beyond its limits in
situations of unrelenting operational activity with little down time to recuperate.
Tours in hot countries also bring the de-energizing effects of dehydration and
heat stress
5
.
In managing this, pilots are expected to monitor their own condition and
consider the risks created by their fatigue. Unless in a total war scenario, it’s
totally accepted that a pilot will flag when he feels unfit to fly. (Indeed, a wider
awareness of the operational importance of sleep is reflected in RAF initiatives
to provide better on-base sleeping accommodation for pilots and encourage
power-napping during the day when needed).
Sensory detachment
Whilst the increased sophistication in the range and digital presentation of
data has clear advantages, it also creates the risk of negative side effects such
as sensory detachment and information saturation; every pilot will know the
feeling of being drawn into the screens and losing awareness of what’s going on
around them.
Risk Tolerance
Prolonged exposure to operational action can become a risk in itself. Once
deployed, pilots can quickly adapt to the norms of their new environment and
Pilots pilots are
expected to
monitor their
own condition
and consider
the risks created
by their fatigue.
Compared to military aviation, the risk for commercial airline pilots
is very often the opposite: the risk of too-low arousal. Accident
investigators have discovered that, due to autopilot functionality,
pilots are often very calm at the moment before they realize there is
a danger. As a result, their arousal levels increase very – too – quickly
and they go past the point of medium arousal to panic. (Avoiding
this risk-exaggerating lethargy is why commercial pilots tend to
rotate every 1.5 to 2 hours).

Even when flying on a mission with other aircraft, there can be
intense pressure on the individual pilot. Photo: Geoffrey H. Lee
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become anaesthetized to risk, often failing to notice a progressive shift towards
becoming more comfortable with greater and possibly unacceptable risks.
Cognitive Bias
Recent developments in behavioral science have also found their way into
aviation.
Behavioral science is the systematic analysis and investigation of human
behavior. Cognitive science, a subset, focuses on how information is
represented, processed, and how decisions are made.
Research has revealed the presence of cognitive biases which can filter the
perception of information and hinder our ability to make accurate or rational
decisions. Such biases are unconscious and can be triggered or exacerbated by
environmental, physiological or psychological cues.
Trainee pilots are taught about aviation specific cognitive biases and this is
ingrained through refresher courses and continuous peer reviews.
Below are listed some of the more well-known cognitive biases known to exist
within military aviation
6
:
Awareness of
cognitive biases
is ingrained
through
education and
continuous peer
review.

Table: Cognitive biases common to commercial and military aviation. Source: Capt Shem Malmquist
Ambiguity effect
Describes where a person is more likely
to select something that has an intuitively
clear risk as opposed to one that seems
relatively less certain. This could lead
someone to choosing a more risky option,
albeit a more certain risk.
Attentional bias
Humans pay more attention to things that
have an emotional aspect to them. This
may lead to a person making a decision
based on a perceived threat which is due to
a past experience or ‘thermal scar’.
Attentional tunnelling
The focus and allocation of attention to a
particular channel of information, diagnostic
hypothesis, or task for a duration that is
longer than optimal, given the expected
cost of neglecting other events or tasks.
Confirmation bias
Describes a situation where a person
ignores facts or information that do not
conform to their preconceived model or
understanding of the situation.
Automation bias
Automated aids and decision-support tools
are rapidly becoming indispensable tools in
high-technology cockpits and replacing a
cognitively vigilant information seeking and
processing, leaving one more exposed to
making errors.
Availability heuristic
Describes how people will over-estimate
the likelihood of an event based upon the
emotional influence the event may have
had, or how much personal experience
a person may have had with that type
of event. This can lead to incorrect
assessments of risk.
Optimism bias
This is a situation in which people are overly
optimistic about outcomes. This can be a
common issue in aviation where pilots may
have seen many bad situations turn out
“okay”. As a result, their sense of urgency
and risk can be reduced when it is not
warranted by the circumstances at the time.
Plan continuation
This might be considered a subset of
confirmation bias. Describes a strong
tendency to continue to pursue the same
course of action once a plan has been
made. May also be influenced by some
of the issues behind the ‘sunk cost effect’,
where there is a greater tendency to
continue an endeavour once an investment
in money, effort, or time has been made.
The Debrief
In creating and maintaining awareness of these and other behavioral factors,
one piece of old-school RAF process is critical: the debrief.
It is during their training that fighter jet pilots first learn the value of this
structured feedback loop. For every hour flown, pilots can expect a debrief that
will last twice as long with every aspect of their aircraft handling and mission
management passed under an unforgiving microscope.
Using visual aids, video footage, and comments from instructors and peers, the
intensely granular review process exists to identify mistakes and performance
issues with a big emphasis on ‘lessons learnt’ and the Human Factor aspects of
the sortie.

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The Birth of Military Human Factors
Early insights into the impact of pilot mindset were realized during
World War One when aerial warfare was first used both in a
concentrated way and as a tactical military tool.
James Birley, a wartime pilot, neurologist and early pioneer of
aviation psychology, observed that psychological effects could be
just as important as the physical in determining whether a pilot was
fit to fly. Flyers, he observed, became ‘stale’ or ‘burnt out’ if not
properly rested, with a negative impact on their ability to maneuver
and perform other tasks.
One factor generating stress in those early days of aviation was
the sheer strain caused in trying to control poorly designed and
temperamental aircraft. As aircraft flew higher, other stresses were
introduced such as the effect of cold and hypoxia (lack of oxygen).
Combat brought additional pressures. Though often far from the
dangers of the front line, airmen worked alone under extreme
pressure and lacked the comradeship and inspiration that came from
leading men. Allan English wrote about the extreme contrasts in a
pilot’s life: long spells of idle waiting on base punctured by urgent
calls to action and dogfights during which pilots reported feeling
“moments of intense fear”
7
.
World War Two saw marked advances in aviation technology, with
increases in speeds, altitudes, mission ranges and bomber payloads.
These brought commensurate increases in the risks faced by pilots.
However, by this time, understanding about their impact on pilot
performance had widened from concerned individuals to the RAF
itself. It was now accepted that pilots could be pushed beyond their
limits; studies at the time concluded that ‘human error’ accounted
for 70-80% of all aircraft accidents and shortages of men deemed
men fit to fly became a real issue as the war progressed.
Allied Jenny biplanes in World War One.
During the
1914-18 War,
awareness
grew that
psychological
factors were
critical in
determining
whether a pilot
was fit to fly.

VIDEO: The success of the debrief as an appraisal tool means
it is now used in non-aviation sectors. In this video, Flt Lt Simon
Stevens, a former Red Arrows pilot, talks about how it is used
to improve performance. www.vimeo.com/86602145
The debrief typically takes place in a private room and is organized as a
rankless forum in which everyone can speak. The flat structure is a significant
precondition because it allows lower-ranking airman to comment openly on
the performance of more senior officers without fear of punishment. Criticism
is encouraged and accepted because this is a forum dedicated to improving
the safety and performance of both the individual pilot and the squadron as a
whole.
The debriefs become less granular once a pilot has passed his training but
remain a key tool in maintaining awareness of process and behavioral risks.
Embracing Error
Fundamental to these Human Factor initiatives is the RAF’s willingness to
identify and explore performance risk wherever it exists.
Historically, there was little or no ‘organizational self-awareness’ of this kind;
non-mechanical accidents were typically attributed to ‘pilot error’, with the pilot
closest to the event sanctioned as a warning to others against making the same
mistake.
However, with developments in psychology, ergonomics and aeronautics, the
RAF gradually came to a more refined understanding of why accidents and
underperformance occur. Rather than seeing them isolation, the RAF now
tackles such performance weakness by looking for information about the chain
of contributing factors that led to it – factors which need to be understood and
managed before consistently better outcomes can be achieved.
The formal framework in which this feedback loop operates is the RAF’s
Safety Management System (SMS). Increasingly adopted by organizations in
non-aviation sectors looking to improve their performance, the SMS is based
The RAF has
emerged as an
organization
that is willing
to identify
and explore
performance
risk wherever it
exists.

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on four key components, or pillars: Policy, Risk management, Assurance and
Promotion. Together, these components define a dynamic risk management
approach that continuously refines itself to take account of new information and
performance data:
A Just Culture
Central to the success of this approach is the RAF’s ability to capture good data
about where underlying performance risk and error occur.
Collecting such information comes with very real challenges. In all organizations,
there is some degree of stigma and fear attached to coming clean about
mistakes and admitting the real reasons for underperformance. This is especially
Below: Graphical representation of the RAF’s Safety Management System.
Risk management is an area of utmost importance to the
investment management industry, not least due to the rising tide of
regulatory requirements. But how rich a picture are risk managers
actually seeing? And to what extent are data and feedback
brought back into the risk management program, so that it can be
improved and updated to better reflect the real drivers of error or
underperformance?
POLICY
RISK
MANAGEMENT
ASSURANCE
Establishes the organiza-
tional commitment to
continually improving
performance and safety;
defines processes and
resources available to
achieving this.
Promotion and training that creates
a risk-aware, performance-oriented
mindset within the organization. This whole process is enabled by an
operational culture in which people
feel comfortable admitting to error
or areas of performance weakness -
aka a ‘Just Culture’.
Builds a framework by
which underperformance
and Error Promoting
Conditions (EPCs) can be
measured and understood.
Initiates preventative
measures to control their
impact.
Evaluation, using data and
feedback, of implemented
risk control strategies.
Identification of new
hazards.
PROMOTION

the case when those reasons may be personal in nature, involve an admission of
perceived weakness of impact negatively on relations with colleagues.
The RAF has sought to tackle this through its adoption of a ‘Just Culture’.
Developed by James T. Reason, a Just Culture is characterized by the principle
that members of an organization should feel comfortable and safe about raising
their hand when they have made a ‘bad decision’ or see a mistake being made.
Negligence or deliberate mistakes are not excused in this environment but
neither is there blame for ‘honest errors’. Consequently, through transparency
at the individual and team level, an organization can hope to gather the
information it needs to identify the real causes of collective underperformance,
as well as monitor previously hidden or developing occurrence trends.
How receptive are the confident and invariably competitive pilots to this kind
of culture? RAF fast jet trainees are told from the beginning that they are the
best but it’s also drilled into them - through activities such as the Debrief and a
highly visible internal communications program - that there is always room for
improvement and ‘incremental gains’.
This also chimes with the disciplined, respectful approach to risk and
developing skill that is found throughout the more elite echelons of the military.
Andy McNab said it well when he observed that the SAS weren’t looking for
James Bond types but rather the kind of person who was “obsessive about their
craft”.
8
Trainee pilots
are told that
they are the
best but that
there is always
room for further
improvement.
“The dichotomy we face is the long held view that good
commanders are the bold leaders that take risk in order to achieve
success. Military history is littered with the accounts of distinguished
commanders who were known for their apparent disregard for
danger and who took great risks in the course of achieving success.
However, this view may, in many situations, be an over simplification.
I would suggest that in many cases it was less their daring that
brought about success, but more their innate understanding of the
risks involved.”
1
Major General G R Coward, OBE

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The adoption of a culture where there is an open identification and
review of ‘honest errors’ is far easier said than done, particularly in
an industry as traditionally opaque as investment management. As
the RAF has found, however, it starts with conveying constantly and
visibly the message that self-reflection and an ethos of continuous
improvement are to be lauded.
Conclusion
Despite impressive levels of innovation, military aviation remains an essentially
human endeavor – one that is dependent on the psychology and decision-
making ability of the individual pilot.
In optimizing this performance (and mitigating its inherent risk), the RAF has
over time come to adopt a shrewd and realistic understanding of the physical
and behavioral principles driving human performance.
A major part of this is the implementation of a culture in which error and
underperformance - in all its varied and often hidden forms - can be examined
and incorporated into an effective, systematic feedback loop. One can note
that, just as the RAF looked to elite sports and cognitive science for some of
its self-improvement techniques, so elements of its own organizational outlook
and approach are now being adopted by businesses in non-aviation sectors,
including investment management.
What will the future hold? Technology always advances and conceivably we
could soon see widespread adoption of aircraft handling through eye-tracking
or gesture control. Augmented reality is finding increasingly real-word
applications and maybe pilots will come to be assisted by digital avatars that
assist them with their decision-making.
However, even with this deepening of the relationship between man and
machine, the human remains very much in the loop. Technology allows us to do
more - how successfully it is exploited can still be very dependent on our own
performance.

References & Sources
1. Risk Appetite in Enduring Operations - by Major General G R Coward OBE,
Commander Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) - Defence Aviation Safety
Centre Journal 2008.
2. The Swedish Flying Training Philosophy - by Lt Col Robert Persson, Head
of Flight Safety, Swedish Armed Forces - Air Clues Magazine / Issue
15 - http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/6547C11A_5056_A318_
A8E29A8B2A7F8407.pdf
3. http://wikiofscience.wikidot.com/quasiscience:yerkes-dodson-law
4. The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk-taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology
of Boom and Bust - by John Coates - Published in 2012 by Fourth Estate (UK)
5. Fatigue and Human Performance - by Dr David Stevenson Colonel, USAF
(Rtd) - Air Clues Magazine / Issue 1 (October 2009) - http://www.raf.mod.uk/
rafcms/mediafiles/807515EC_5056_A318_A81019921CF3F852.pdf
6. I’m grateful to Captain Shem Malmquist, Air Safety and Accident
Investigator, for his work in compiling examples of some of the
cognitive bias found to be active in military and commercial aviation.
His excellent survey on behavioral factors and related aviation incidents
can be found at https://airlinesafety.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/
the-role-of-cognitive-bias-in-aircraft-accidents/
7. Cream of the Crop Canadian Aircrew, 1939-1945 - by Allan D. English -
Published 1996 by McGill-Queen’s University Press.
8. The Good Psychopath’s Guide to Success - by Andy McNab & Professor
Kevin Dutton - Published 2014 by the Bantam Press.

Despite the dramatic technological advances of recent years,
military aviation still faces the challenge of getting the most
from its pilots whilst also respecting their psychological limits.
In this Essentia white paper, David Taudevin, former RAF
fighter pilot, explores the psychological pressures faced by
elite military aviators and examines some of the cultural and
organisational initiatives taken to optimise their flying skill and
decision-making performance.
www.essentia-analytics.com

The Human in the Loop

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