» THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATIONAfter-action reviews id.docx

» THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATION
After-action reviews identify past mistakes but rarely
enhance future performance. Companies wanting to
fully exploit this tool should look to its master: the
U.S. Army's standing enemy brigade, where soldiers
learn and improve even in the midst of battle.
I
by Marilyn Darling, Charles Parry, and Joseph Moore
magine an organization that confronts constantly chang-
; competitors. That is always smaller and less well-
fUipped than its opponents. That routinely cuts its man-
power and resources. That turns over a third of its leaders
every year. And that still manages to win competition
after competition after competition.
The U.S. Army's Opposing Force {commonly known as
OPFOR), a 2,500-member brigade whose joh is to help
prepare soldiers for comhat, is just such an organization.
Created to be the meanest, toughest foe troops will ever
face, OPFOR engages units-in-training in a variety of
mock campaigns under a wide range of conditions. Every
month, a fresh brigade of more than 4tOOO soldiers takes
on this standing enemy, which, depending on the sce-
nario, may play the role of a hostile army or insurgents,
paramilitary units, or terrorists. The two sides battle on
foot, in tanks, and in helicopters dodging artillery, land
mines, and chemical weapons.

Stationed on a vast, isolated stretch of California desert,
OPFOR has the home-court advantage. But the force
that's being trained-called Blue Force, or BLUFOR, for
JULY-AUGUST 2005
the duration ofthe exercise-is numerically and techno-
logically superior. It possesses more dedicated resources
and better, more rapidly available data. It is made up of
experienced soldiers. And it knows just what to expect, be-
cause OPFOR shares its methods from previous cam-
paigns with BLUFOR's commanders. In short, each of
these very capable BLUFOR brigades is given practically
every edge. Yet OPFOR almost always wins.
Underlying OPFOR's consistent success is the way it
uses the after-action review (AAR), a method for extract-
ing lessons from one event or project and applying them
to others. The AAR, which has evolved over the past two
decades, originated at OPFOR's parent organization, the
National Training Center (NTC). AAR meetings became
a popular business tool after Shell Oil began experiment-
ing with them in 1998 at the suggestion of board member
Gordon Sullivan, a retired general. Teams at such compa-
LEARNING TO BE OPFOR
The nth Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), which has
played the Opposing Force {OPFOR) for more than a
decade, is a brigade of regular U.S. Army soldiers. In
the current environment, every Army unit that is de-

ployable has been activated - including the n t h ACRj
which is now overseas.
It will return. In the meantime, a National Guard
unit that fought side by side with the n t h ACR for
ten years has assumed the OPFOR mantle. This new
OPFOR faces even greater challenges than the regu-
lar brigade did. It is smaller. It comprises not profes-
sional soldiers but weekend warriors from such com-
panies as UPS and Nextel. And it recently gave up
its home-court advantage and traveled to BLUFOR's
home base when that unit-in-training's deployment
date was moved up.
Nonetheless, the Army is satisfied that this new
OPFOR - now one year into its role - is successfully
preparing combat units for deployment to the Middle
East. It has managed that, in large part, by leverag-
ing the after-action review (AAR) regimen it learned
from the n t h ACR, It is difficult to imagine a more
dramatic change than the wholesale replacement of
one team by another. That the new OPFOR has met
this challenge is powerful evidence of the AAR's effi-
cacy to help an organization learn and adapt quickly.
nies as Colgate-Palmolive, DTE Energy, Harley-Davidson,
and J.M. Huber use these reviews to identify both best
practices (which they want to spread) and mistakes
(which they don't want to repeat).
Most corporate AARs, however, are faint echoes ofthe
rigorous reviews OPFOR performs. It is simply too easy
for companies to turn the process into a pro forma wrap-
up. All too often, scrapped projects, poor investments, and
failed safety measures end up repeating themselves. Effi-
cient shortcuts, smart solutions, and sound strategies don't.

For companies that want to transform their AARs from
postmortems of past failure into aids for future success,
there is no better teacher than the technique's master
practitioner. OPFOR treats every action as an opportunity
for learning-about what to do but also, more important,
about how to think. Instead of producing static "knowl-
edge assets"to file away in a management report or repos-
itory, OPFOR's AARs generate raw material that the
brigade feeds back into the execution cycle. And while
OPFOR's reviews extract numerous lessons, the group
does not consider a lesson to be truly learned until it is
successfully applied and validated.
The battlefield of troops, tanks, and tear gas is very dif-
ferent from the battlefield of products, prices, and profits.
But companies that adapt OPFOR's principles to their
own practices will be able to integrate leadership, learn-
ing, and execution to gain rapid and sustained competi-
tive advantage.
Why Companies Don't Learn
An appreciation of what OPFOR does right begins with
an understanding of what businesses do wrong. To see
why even organizations that focus on learning often re-
peat mistakes, we analyzed the AAR and similar "lessons
learned" processes at more than a dozen corporations,
nonprofits, and government agencies. The fundamentals
are essentially the same at each: Following a project or
event, team members gather to share insights and iden-
tify mistakes and successes. Their conclusions are ex-
pected to flow-by formal or informal channels-to other
teams and eventually coalesce into best practices and
global standards.
Mostly though, that doesn't happen. Although the

companies we studied actively look for lessons, few leam
them in a meaningful way. One leader at a large manu-
facturing company told us about an after-action review
for a failed project that had already broken down twice
before. Having read reports from the earlier attempts'
AARs - whicb consisted primarily of one-on-one inter-
Marityn Darling {[email protected]), Charles Parry
([email protected]), and retired Colonel
Joseph Moore ([email protected]) are researchers and
consultants with Boston-based Signet Consulting Group.
Moore is a former commander ofthe 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment, the Opposing Force at the U.S. Army's National
Train-
ing Center in Fort Irwin, California.
86 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
L e a r n i n g i n t h e T h i c k o f I t
OPFOR treats every action as an opportunity for
learning-about what to do but also, more important,
about how to think.
views - she realized with horror after several grueling
hours that the team was "discovering" the same mistakes
ail over again.
A somewhat different problem cropped up at a telecom
company we visited. A team of project managers there
conducted rigorous milestone reviews and wrap-up AAR
meetings on each of its projects, identifying problems and
creating technical fixes to avoid them in future initiatives.
But it made no effort to apply what it was leaming to ac-

tions and decisions taken on its current projects. After
several months, the team had so overwhelmed the system
with new steps and checks that the process itself began
causing delays. Rather than improving leaming and per-
formance, the AARs were reducing the team's ability to
solve its problems.
We also studied a public agency that was running
dozens of similar projects simultaneously. At the end of
each project, team leaders were asked to complete a
lessons-learned questionnaire about the methods they
would or would not use again; what training the team had
needed; how well members communicated; and whether
the planning had been effective. But the projects ran for
years, and memory is less reliable than observation. Con-
sequently, the responses of the few leaders who bothered
to fill out the forms were often sweepingly positive-and
utterly useless.
Those failures and many more like them stem from
three common misconceptions about the nature of an
AAR: that it is a meeting, that it is a report, or that it is a
postmortem. In fact, an AAR should be more verb than
noun - a living, pervasive process that explicitly connects
past experience with future action. That is the AAR as it
was conceived back in 1981 to help Army leaders adapt
quickly in the dynamic, unpredictable situations they
were sure to face. And that is the AAR as OPFOR practices
it every day.
More than a Meeting
Much of the civilian world's confusion over AARs began
because management writers focused only on the AAR
meeting itself. OPFOR's AARs, by contrast, are part of a
cycle that starts before and continues throughout each
campaign against BLUFOR. (BLUFOR units conduct AARs

as well, but OPFOR has made a fine art of them.) OPFOR's
AAR regimen includes brief huddles, extended planning
and review sessions, copious note taking by everyone, and
the explicit linking of lessons to future actions.
The AAR cycle for each phase of the campaign begins
when the senior commander drafts "operational orders."
This document consists of four parts: the task (what ac-
tions subordinate units must take); the purpose (why the
task is important); the commander's intent (what the se-
nior leader is thinking, explained so that subordinates can
pursue his goals even if events don't unfold as expected);
and the end state (what the desired result is), lt might
look like this:
Task: "Seize key terrain in the vicinity of Tiefort
City...
Purpose:" ..so that the main effort can safely pass
to the north"
Commander's Intent: "I want to find the enemy's
strength and place fixing forces there while our as-
sauit force maneuvers to his flank to complete the
enemy'sdefeat.The plan callsforthatto happen here,
but if It doesn't, you leaders have to tell me where the
enemy is and which fiank is vulnerable."
End State: "In the end, I want our forces in control
of the key terrain, with all enemy units defeated or cut
off from their supplies,"
The commander shares these orders with his subordi-
nate commanders-the leadersinchargeof infantry, mu-
nitions, intelligence, logistics, artillery, air, engineers, and

communications. He then asks each for a "brief back"-a
verbal description of the unit's understanding of its mis-
sion (to ensure everyone is on the same page) and its role.
This step builds accountability: "You said it. 1 heard it."The
brief back subsequently guides these leaders as they work
out execution plans with their subordinates.
JULY-AUGUST 2005 87
Later that day, or the next morning, the commander's
executive officer (his second in command) plans and con-
ducts a rehearsal, which includes every key participant
Most rehearsals take place on a scale model ofthe hattle-
field, complete with hills sculpted from sand, spray-
painted roads, and placards denoting major landmarks.
The rehearsal starts with a restatement of the mission
and the senior commander's intent, an intelligence up-
date on enemy positions and strength, and a breakdown
ofthe battle's projected critical phases. Each time the ex-
ecutive officer calls out a phase, the unit leaders step out
onto the terrain model to the position they expect to oc-
cupy during that part of the action. They state their
groups'tasks and purposes within the larger mission, the
techniques they will apply in that phase, and the re-
sources they expect to have available. After some discus-
sion about what tactics the enemy might use and how
units will communicate and coordinate in the thick of
battle, the executive officer calls out the next phase and
the process is repeated.
As a result of this disciplined preparation, the action
that follows becomes a learning experiment. Each unit

within OPFOR has established a clear understanding of
what it intends to do and how it plans to do it and has
shared that understanding with all other units. The units
have individually and collectively made predictions about
what will occur, identified challenges that may arise, and
built into their plans ways to address those challenges. So
when OPFOR acts, it will be executing a plan but also ob-
serving and testing that plan. The early meetings and re-
hearsals produce a testable hypothesis: "In this situation,
given this mission, if we take this action, we will accom-
plish that outcome." OPFOR is thus able to select the cru-
cial lessons it wants to learn from each action and focus
soldiers' attention on them in advance.
Such before-action planning helps establish the agenda
for after-action meetings. Conversely, the rigor ofthe AAR
meetings improves the care and precision that go into the
before-action planning. As one OPFOR leader explained
to us; "We live in an environment where we know we will
have an AAR, and we will have to say out loud what worked
and what didn't. That leads to asking tough questions dur-
ing the planning phase or rehearsals so that you know you
have it as right as you can get it. No subordinate will let
the boss waffle on something for long before challenging
him to say it clearly because it will only come out later in
the AAR. As a consequence, AAR meetings create a very
honest and critical environment well before they begin."
The reference to AAR meetings-pma-is important.
While a corporate team might conduct one AAR meeting
at the end of a six-month project, OPFOR holds dozens of
AARs at different levels in a single week. Each unit holds
an AAR meeting immediately after each significant phase
of an action. If time is short, such meetings may be no more
than ten-minute huddles around the hood of a Humvee.

fM WAYS TO PUT AARs
t o WORK AT i/VORK
The U.S. Army's standing enemy brigade (referred
to as OPFOR) applies the after-action revievtf (AAR)
process to everything it does, hut That's not realistic
for most companies. Business leaders must act selec-
tively, with an eyetovifard resources and potential
payoffs. Don't even think about creating an AAR regi-
men without determining who is likely to learn from
it and how they v»/ill benefit. Build slowly, beginning
with activities where the payoff is greatest and where
leaders have committed to working through several
AAR cycles. Focus on areas critical to a team's mis-
sion so members have good reason to participate.
And customize the process to fit each project and
project phase. For example, during periods of intense
activity, brief daily AAR meetings can help teams co-
ordinate and improve the next day's activities. At
other times, meetings might occur monthly or quar-
terly and be used to identify exceptions in volumes
of operational data and to understand the causes. The
level of activity should always match the potential
value of lessons learned. Here are some ways you can
use AARs, based on examples from companies that
have used them effectively.
It is common for OPFOR's AARs to be facilitated by the
unit leader's executive officer. Virtually all formal AAR
meetings begin with a reiteration ofthe house rules, even
if everyone present has already heard them a hundred
times: Participate. No thin skins. Leave your stripes at the
door. Take notes. Focus on our issues, not the issues of
those above us. (The participants' commanders hold their
own AARs to address issues at their level.) Absolute candor
is critical. To promote a sense of safety, senior leaders stay
focused on improving performance, not on placing blame,

and are the first to acknowledge their own mistakes.
The AAR leader next launches into a comparison of in-
tended and actual results. She repeats the mission, intent,
and expected end state; she then describes the actual end
state, along with a brief review of events and any metrics
relevant to the objective. For example, if the unit had an-
ticipated that equipment maintenance or logistics would
be a challenge, what resources (mines, wire, ammo, vehi-
cles) were functioning and available?
The AAR meeting addresses four questions: What were
our intended results? What were our actual results? What
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
caused our results? And what will we sustain or improve?
For example:
Sustain: "Continual radio commo checks ensured
we could talk with everyone. That became important
when BLUFOR took a different route and we needed
to reposition many of our forces."
Sustain: "We chose good battle positions. That
made iteasiertoidentifyfriends and foes in infantry."
Improve:"When fighting infantry units, we need to
keep better track ofthe situation so we can attack the
infantry before they dismount."
lmprove:"How we track infantry. We look for trucks,

but we need to look for dismounted soldiers and un-
derstand how they'll try to deceive us."
One objective of the AAR, of course, is to determine
what worked and what didn't, to help OPFOR refine its
ability to predict what will work and what won't in the fu-
ture. How well did the unit assess its challenges? Were
there difficulties it hadn't foreseen? Problems that never
materialized? Yes, it is important to correct things; but it
is more important to correct thinking. (OPFOR has deter-
mined that flawed assumptions are the most common
cause of flawed execution.) Technical corrections affect
only the problem that is fixed. A thought-process correc-
t i o n - t h a t is to say, learning-affects the unit's ability to
plan, adapt, and succeed in future battles.
More than a Report
At most civilian organizations we studied, teams view the
AAR chiefly as a tool for capturing lessons and dissemi-
nating them to other teams. Companies that treat AARs
this way sometimes even translate the acronym as after-
action report instead of after-action review, suggesting
that the objective is to create a document intended for
other audiences. Lacking a personal stake, team members
may participate only because they've been told to or out
of loyalty to the company. Members don't expect to leam
something useful themselves, so usually they don't.
OPFOR's AARs, by contrast, focus on improving a unit's
own learning and, as a result, its own performance. A unit
may generate a lesson during the AAR process, but by
OPFOR's definition, it won't have learned that lesson until
its members have changed their behavior in response.
Furthermore, soldiers need to see that it actually works.
OPFOR's leaders know most lessons that surface during
the first go-round are incomplete or plain wrong, repre-

senting what the unit thinks should work and not what
really does work. They understand that it takes multiple
iterations to produce dynamic solutions that will stand up
under any conditions.
For example, in one fight against a small, agile infantry
unit, OPFOR had to protect a cave complex containing
a large store of munitions. BLUFOR's infantry chose the
attack route least anticipated by OPFOR's commanders.
Because scouts were slow to observe and communicate
the change in BLUFOR's movements, OPFOR was unable
to prevent an attack that broke through its defense
perimeter. OPFOR was forced to hastily reposition its re-
serve and forward units. Much of its firepower didn't
reach the crucial battle or arrived too late to affect the
outcome.
OPFOR's unit leaders knew they could extract many
different lessons from this situation. "To fight an agile in-
fantry unit, we must locate and attack infantry before sol-
diers can leave their trucks" was the first and most basic.
But they also knew that that insight was not enough to
ensure future success. For example, scouts would have
to figure out how to choose patrol routes and observation
positions so as to quickly and accurately locate BLUFOR's
infantry before it breached the defense. Then staffers
would need to determine how to use information from
observation points to plan effective artillery missions - in
the dark, against a moving target. The next challenge
would be to test their assumptions to see first, if they
could locate and target infantry sooner; and second, what
difference that ability would make to them achieving
their mission.
OPFOR's need to test theories is another reason the

brigade conducts frequent brief AARs instead of one large
wrap-up. The sooner a unit identifies targeting infantry as
a skill it must develop, the more opportunities it has to try
out different assumptions and strategies during a rota-
tion and the less likely those lessons are to grow stale. So
units design numerous small experiments-short cycles of
"plan, prepare, execute, AAR"-within longer campaigns.
That allows them to validate lessons for their own use and
to ensure that the lessons they share with other teams are
"complete"-meaning they can be applied in a variety of
future situations. More important, soldiers see their per-
formance improve as they apply those lessons, which sus-
tains the learning culture.
Not all OPFOR experiments involve correcting what
went wrong. Many involve seeing if what went right will
continue to go right under different circumstances. So, for
example, if OPFOR has validated the techniques it used to
complete a mission, it might try the same mission at night
or against an enemy armed with cutting-edge surveil-
lance technology. A consulting-firm ad displays Tiger
Woods squinting through the rain to complete a shot and
the headline:"Conditions change. Results shouldn't."That
could be OPFOR's motto.
In fact, rather than writing off extreme situations as
onetime exceptions, OPFOR embraces them as learning
opportunities. OPFOR's leaders relish facing an unusual
enemy or situation because it allows them to build their
repertoire."It's a chance to measure just how good we are,
as opposed to how good we think we are," explained one
OPFOR commander. Such an attitude might seem anti-
thetical to companies that can't imagine purposely hand-

Learning in the Thick of It
icapping themselves in any endeavor. But OPFOR knows
that the more challenging the game, the stronger and
more agile a competitor it will become.
More than a Postmortem
Corporate AARs are often convened around failed proj-
ects. The patient is pronounced dead, and everyone weighs
in on the mistakes that contributed to his demise. The
word "accountability" comes up a lot-generally it means
"blame" which participants expend considerable energy
trying to avoid. There is a sense of finality to these ses-
sions. The team is putting a bad experience behind it.
"Accountability" comes up a lot during OPFOR's AARs
as well, but in that context it is forward-looking rather
than backward-looking. Units are accountable for leam-
ing their own lessons. And OPFOR's leaders are account-
able for taking lessons from one situation and applying
them to others-for forging explicit links between past ex-
perience and future performance.
At the end of an AAR meeting, the senior commander
stands and offers his own assessment of the day's major
lessons and how they relate to what was learned and val-
idated during earlier actions. He also identifies the two or
three lessons he expects will prove most relevant to the
next battle or rotation. If the units focus on more than
a few lessons at a time, they risk becoming over-
whelmed. If they focus on lessons unlikely to be ap-
plied until far in the future, soldiers might forget.
At the meeting following the Infantry battle de-

scribed earl ier, for example, the senior commander
summed up this way: "To me, this set of battles
was a good rehearsal for something we'll see writ
large in a few weeks. We really do need to take
lessons from these fights, realizing that we'll have
a far more mobile attack unit. Deception will be an
issue. Multiple routes will be an issue. Our job is
to figure out common targets. We need to rethink
how to track movement. How many scouts do we
need in close to the objective area to see soldiers?
They will be extremely well-equipped. So one
thing I'm challenging everyone to do is to be pre-
pared to discard your norms next month. It's time
to sit down and talk with your sergeants about
how you fight a unit with a well-trained infantry."
Immediately after the AAR meeting breaks up, com-
manders gather their units to conduct their ovm AARs.
Each group applies lessons from these AAR meetings to
plan its future actions-for example, repositioning scouts
to better track infantry movements in the next battle.
OPFOR also makes its lessons available to BLUFOR:
The groups' commanders meet before rotations, and
OPFOR's commander allows himself to be "captured" by
BLUFOR at the conclusion of battles in order to attend
its AARs. At those meetings, the OPFOR commander ex-
plains his brigade's planning assumptions and tactics and
answers his opponents' questions.
Beyond those conferences with BLUFOR, formally
spreading lessons to other units for later application-the
chief focus of many corporate AARs - is not in OPFOR's
job description. The U.S. Army uses formal knowledge
systems to capture and disseminate important lessons to
large, dispersed audiences, and the Nationai Training Cen-

ter contributes indirectly to those. (See the sidebar "Doc-
trine and Tactics.") Informal knowledge sharing among
peers, however, is very common. OPFOR's leaders, for ex-
ample, use e-mail and the Internet to stay in touch with
leaders on combat duty. The OPFOR team shares freshly
hatched insights and tactics with officers in Afghanistan
and Iraq; those officers, in turn, describe new and un-
expected situations cropping up in real battles. And, of
Instead of producing static
"knowledge assets" to file away in a management report
or repository, OPFOR's AARs generate raw material that the
brigade
feeds back into the execution cycle.
JULY-AUGUST 2005 91
course, OPFOR's leaders don't stay out in the Mojave
Desert forever. Fvery year as part ofthe Army's regular ro-
tation, one-third move to other units, which they seed
with OPFOR-spawned thinking. Departing leaders leave
behind "continuity folders" full of lessons and AAR notes
for their successors.
In an environment where conditions change con-
stantly, knowledge is always a work in progress. So creat-
ing, collecting, and sharing knowledge are the responsi-
bility of the people who can apply it. Knowledge is not
a staff function.
The Corporate Version

It would be impractical for companies to adopt OPFOR's
processes in their entirety. Still, many would benefit from
making their own after-action reviews more like OPFOR's.
The business landscape, after all, is competitive, protean,
and often dangerous. An organization that doesn't merely
extract lessons from experience but actually learns them
can adapt more quickly and eifectively than its rivals. And
it is less likely to repeat the kinds of errors that gnaw
away at stakeholder value.
Most of the practices we've described can be cus-
tomized for corporate environments. Simpler forms of
operational orders and brief backs, for example, can en-
sure that a project is seen the same way by everyone on
the team and that each member understands his or her
role in it. A corporate version, called a before-action re-
view (BAR), requires teams to answer four questions be-
fore embarking on an important action: What are our in-
tended results and measures? What challenges can we
anticipate? What have we or others learned from similar
situations? What will make us successful this time? The
responses to those questions align the team's objectives
and set the stage for an effective AAR meeting following
the action. In addition, breaking projects into smaller
chunks, bookended by short BAR and AAR meetings con-
ducted in task-focused groups, establishes feedback loops
that can help a project team maximize performance and
develop a learning culture over time.
Every organization, every team, and every project vrill
likely require different levels of preparation, execution,
and review. However, we have distilled some best prac-
tices from the few companies we studied that use AARs
well. For example, leaders should phase in an AAR regi-
men, beginning with the most important and complex
work their business units perfonn. Teams should commit

to holding short BAR and AAR meetings as they go, keep-
ing things simple at first and developing the process
slowly - adding rehearsals, knowledge-sharing activities
and systems, richer metrics, and other features dictated by
the particular practice.
While companies will differ on the specifics they adopt,
four fundamentals ofthe OPFOR process are mandatory.
DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
The lessons produced and validated by the U.S.
Army's Opposing Force (OPFOR) and the units it
trains at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort
Irwin, California, contribute to the Army's two classes
of organizational knowledge. One class, known as
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), focuses
on how to perform specific tasks under specific cond i-
tions. It is the responsibility of each unit leader to
build her own library of TTP by learning from other
leaders as well as by capturing good ideas from her
subordinates. Two unit leaders in the same brigade
may need to employ different TTP to address differ-
ent conditions.
Sufficiently weighty, widely applicable, and rigor-
ously tested TTP may ultimately inform the Army's
other class of organizational knowledge: doctrine.
Doctrine - w h i c h rarely changes and is shared by the
entire Army - establishes performance standards for
the kinds of actions and conditions military units
commonly face. For example, many ofthe steps in the
doctrine for a brigade-level attack (such as planning
for mobility, survivability, and air defense) began life
as lessons from the NTC and other Army training
centers.

The difference between doctrine and TTP is a use-
ful one for businesses, some of which draw few dis-
tinctions among the types of knowledge employees
generate and about how widely diverse lessons should
be applied and disseminated.
Lessons must first and foremost benefit the team that ex-
tracts them. The AAR process must start at the beginning
ofthe activity. Lessons must link explicitly to future ac-
tions. And leaders must hold everyone, especially them-
selves, accountable for learning.
By creating tight feedback cycles between thinking
and action, AARs build an organization's ability to suc-
ceed in a variety of conditions. Former BLUFOR brigades
that are now deploying to the Middle East take with
them not just a set of lessons but also a refresher course
on how to draw new lessons from situations for which
they did not train - situations they may not even have
imagined. In a fast-changing environment, the capacity
to learn lessons is more valuable than any individual les-
son learned. That capacity is what companies can gain by
studying OPFOR. ^
Reprint R0507G; HBR OnPoint 1525
To order, see page 195.
Facing Poverty With a Rich Girl's Habits'
By SUKI KIMNOV. 21, 2004
QUEENS in the early 80's struck me as the Wild West. Our first

home there was the upstairs of a two-family brownstone in
Woodside. It was a crammed, ugly place, I thought, because in
South Korea I had been raised in a hilltop mansion with an
orchard and a pond and peacocks until I entered the seventh
grade, when my millionaire father lost everything overnight.
Gone in an instant was my small world, made possible by my
father's shipping company, mining business and hotels. Because
bankruptcy was punishable by a jail term, we fled, penniless, to
America.
The ugly house was owned by a Korean family that ran a dry
cleaner in Harlem. Their sons, Andy and Billy, became my first
playmates in America, though playmate was a loose term,
largely because they spoke English and I didn't. The first
English word I learned at the junior high near Queens Boulevard
was F.O.B., short for "fresh off the boat." It was a mystery why
some kids called me that when I'd actually flown Korean Air to
Kennedy Airport.
At 13, I took public transportation to school for the first time
instead of being driven by a chauffeur. I had never done
homework without a governess helping me. I also noticed that
things became seriously messy if no maids were around. Each
week, I found it humiliating to wheel our dirty clothes to a
bleak place called Laundromat.
One new fact that took more time to absorb was that I was now
Asian, a term that I had heard mentioned only in a social studies
class. In Korea, yellow was the color of the forsythia that
bloomed every spring along the fence that separated our estate
from the houses down the hill. I certainly never thought of my
skin as being the same shade.
Unlike students in Korean schools, who were taught to bow to
teachers at every turn, no one batted an eye when a teacher
entered a classroom. Once I saw a teacher struggle to pronounce
foreign-sounding names from the attendance list while a boy in
the front row French-kissed a girl wearing skintight turquoise
Jordache jeans. In Korea, we wore slippers to keep the school
floor clean, but here the walls were covered with graffiti, and

some mornings, policemen guarded the gate and checked bags.
My consolation was the English as a Second Language class
where I could speak Korean with others like me. Yet it did not
take me long to realize that the other students and I had little in
common. The wealthier Korean immigrants had settled in
Westchester or Manhattan, where their children attended private
schools. In Queens, most of my E.S.L. classmates came from
poor families who had escaped Korea's rigid class hierarchy,
one dictated by education level, family background and
financial status.
Immigration is meant to be the great equalizer, yet it is not easy
to eradicate the class divisions of the old country. What I recall,
at 13, is an acute awareness of the distance between me and my
fellow F.O.B.'s, and another, more palpable one between those
of us in E.S.L. and the occasional English-speaking Korean-
American kids, who avoided us as though we brought them
certain undefined shame. It was not until years later that I
learned that we were, in fact, separated from them by
generations.
We who sat huddled in that E.S.L. class grew up to represent
the so-called 1.5 generation. Many of us came to America in our
teens, already rooted in Korean ways and language. We often
clashed with the first generation, whose minimal command of
English traps them in a time-warped immigrant ghetto, but we
identified even less with the second generation, who, with their
Asian-American angst and anchorman English, struck us as even
more foreign than the rest of America.
Even today, we, the 1.5 generation, can just about maneuver our
anchor. We hip-hop to Usher with as much enthusiasm as we
have for belting out Korean pop songs at a karaoke. We
celebrate the lunar Korean thanksgiving as well as the American
one, although our choice of food would most likely be the
moon-shaped rice cake instead of turkey. We appreciate eggs
Benedict for brunch, but on hung-over mornings, we cannot do
without a bowl of thick ox-bone soup and a plate of fresh
kimchi. We are 100 percent American on paper but not quite in

our soul.
In Queens of the early 80's, I did not yet understand the layers
of division that existed within an immigrant group. I preferred
my Hello Kitty backpack to the ones with pictures of the
Menudo boys, and I cried for weeks because my parents would
not let me get my ears pierced. I watched reruns of "Three's
Company" in an attempt to learn English, thinking the whole
time that John Ritter was running a firm called Three's. I stayed
up until dawn to make sense of "Great Expectations," flipping
through the dictionary for the definition of words like "Pip."
More brutal than learning English was facing poverty with a
rich girl's habits and memory. In my neighborhood, a girl who
grew up with a governess and a chauffeur belonged to a fairy
tale. This was no Paris Hilton's "Simple Life," but the beginning
of my sobering, often-terrifying, never simple American
journey. I soon discovered that I had no choice but to adjust. I
had watched my glamorous mother, not long ago a society lady
who lunched, taking on a job as a fish filleter at a market.
Before the year was over, my parents moved us out of the
neighborhood in search of better jobs, housing and education.
As for the family who owned the house in Woodside, I did not
see any of them again until the fall of 2001, when Billy walked
into the Family Assistance Center at Pier 94, where I was
volunteering as an interpreter. He was looking for his brother,
Andy, who had been working on the 93rd floor when the first
plane crashed into the north tower.
Born -- South Korea, 1970 Arrived in New York -- 1983 Home -
- East Village
After-Action Reviews:
Linking Reflection and

Planning in a Learning Practice
Marilyn J. Darling and Charles S. Parry
Charles S. Parry
Principal
Signet Consulting Group
[email protected]
FEATURE
©�2001�by�the�Society�for�Organiza-
tional�Learning�and� the�Massachu-
setts�Institute�of�Technology.
T
he�US�Army’s�Center�for�Army�Lessons�Learned�(CAL
L),�founded�in�1985,�may�have
been�the�first�consciously�designed�organization�devoted
� to�knowledge�management
(KM).�CALL�defines�a�lesson�as�“learned”�when�and�
only�when:�(1)�it�actually�results�in�a
change�of�behavior,�and�(2)�the�lesson—
the�hypothesis�of�cause�and�effect—has�been�vali-
dated�(CALL,�1997).�This�definition�holds�a�hidden�but
�important�criterion�of�a�“lesson
learned”�that�is�missing�from�many�organizational�learni
ng�practices�and�KM�systems.�It
implies�that,�before�even�thinking�about�knowledge�tran
sfer,�the�team�itself�will�adjust�its
own�actions�and�then�validate�whether�or�not�this�adju
stment�produced�the�kind�of�result
predicted�by�the�hypothesis�implied�in�the�lesson.�This
�requires�a�repetition�of�the�action

context�over�time.�Lieutenant�Colonel�Joe�Moore,�a�sea
soned�army�practitioner�who�has
managed�and�trained�using�the�after-
action�review�(AAR)�for�15�years,�says:
In�a�complex�situation,�most�of�what�you�learn�from�
a�single�experience�is�the�wrong�an-
swer.�So�you�go�out�and�choose�a�different�answer�to
�the�problem,�and�it’s�wrong�too,�but
maybe�it’s�less�wrong.�.�.�.�You’ve�got�to�learn�in�s
mall�bites,�lots�of�them,�over�time,�and
they’ll�work,�eventually,�into�a�complete�solution�to�th
e�problem.�This�cannot�be�accom-
plished�in�a�one-
time�reflection�event�that�happens�only�after�a�project
�is�complete.
Retrospective versus AAR Practice
Most�reflective�processes�look�backward.�Whether�called
�a�critique,�a�post�mortem,�a�ret-
rospective,� lessons�
learned,�or�an�AAR,�there�are�several�characteristics�ty
pical�of�these
traditional�processes:
1.
They�are�done�once�in�the�life�of�a�project�or�event,
�after�it�is�completed�(and�long�after
the�time�when�the�team�has�the�ability�to�change�wha
t�it’s�doing�to�affect�the�result).
2. Focus�is�frequently�on�developing�
recommendations�to�be�implemented�by�people
other�than�those�making�the�recommendations.

3.
The�facilitator�produces�a�report�that�senior�managers�
might�use,�but�participants�do
not�see�it�as�relevant�to�their�current�projects.�If�“bes
t�practices”�are�identified,�there
is�rarely�an�effective�channel�between�the�knowledge�a
nd�future�users.
4.
Planning�for�the�reflective�processes�happens�after�the�
conclusion�of�the�project�or
event,�in�other�words,�as�an�afterthought�disconnected�
from�the�action.
5.
They�are�lengthy�sessions�with�mandated�attendance�of
�all�project�members,�even�if
their�current�challenges�or�workload�are�irrelevant.
6.
They�are�initiated�after�a�“failed”�project,�or�as�a�res
ult�of�significant�levels�of�intra-
team�conflict�and�stress,�and�tend�to�focus�more�on�d
issecting�past�performance�than
on�planning�for�future�success.
By�contrast,�in�the�AAR�practice�that�the�US�Army�h
as�evolved�during�the�past�19�years,
several�AAR�meetings�typically�take�place�through�the�
life�of�a�project,�rather�than�after
the�project�is�done�and�people�are�about�to�disperse�(
see�the�table).
Marilyn J. Darling
President
Signet Consulting Group

[email protected]
64
Volume 3, Number 2, REFLECTIONS
�These�sessions�are�generally�planned�into�the�project�
up�front�and�focus�on�behaviors
the�participants�can�implement.�A�true�AAR�practice�p
ays�attention�to�future�actions,�not
just�reflection�on�what�has�happened�to�date.�As�Lieut
enant�Colonel�Moore�describes�it:
You�get�more�real�learning�at�a�midway�point�in�the
�project�than�at�the�end.�What�are�you
going�to�fix?�What�are�you�going�to�sustain?�Same�c
onditions.�Same�team.�“We’re�part�way
through�the�project.�We’re�behind�schedule.�We’re�over
�budget.�How�do�we�fix�this?”�Now
you’re�starting�to�take�the�AAR�process�to�a�new�lev
el,�so�that�it�can�give�you�real�feed-
back—real�material�improvement.
This�distinction�is�widely�misunderstood�even�within�th
e�military,�where�the�acronym
“AAR”�sometimes�refers�to�“after-
action�report,”�which�displaces�the�emphasis�from�the
unit’s�learning�practice�to�the�physical�artifact�of�the�
event.�The�goal�from�the�team’s�own
future�learning�and�performance�becomes�the�transfer�of
� information�or�knowledge�to
another�team.�If�Moore�is�correct,�and�if�most�of�wha
t’s�produced�in�one-time�learning
events�is�wrong,�then�what�is�the�value�of�such�repor
ts�from�a�KM�perspective?�To�put�it

in�strong�relief:�What�faith�would�you�place�in�the�re
port�of�someone�whom�you�don’t
know,�based�on�a�one-time�experience?
Shift from Reflection to Planning
Most�learning�practices�in�the�corporate�world�start�wit
h�planning,�move�to�action,�and,
when�the�event�or�program�or�project�is�done,�
they�end�with�reflection.�Using�the�US
Army’s�AAR�practice�as�an�example,�we�are�proposing
�a�shift�in�emphasis�from�reflection
to�planning.�The�army’s�practice,�as�it�was�developed�
and�has�evolved�at�its�premiere
training�facility,�the�National�Training�Center�(NTC),�o
perates�with�a�different�flow.�The
process�starts�with�a�sort�of�“reflective�planning”�by�a
sking�the�group�to�articulate�its
planning�assumptions�based�on�past�experience.�Then,�a
fter�a�single�battle,�it�moves�back
to�reflection�and�planning�for�the�next�day.�And�so�o
n,�for�the�entire�two�weeks�that�the
brigade�is�“in�the�box”�(conducting�realistic�battlefield
�scenarios)�at�the�NTC.�The�result
is�reflection-planning,�brief�period�of�action,�reflection-
planning,�more�action,�and�so�on.
Reflection�and�planning�are�thus�closely�tied�
together,� interspersed�between�actions,
which�shortens�and�steepens�the�improvement�curve.
The US Army’s Practice
How�did�the�army�come�to�create�such�a�learning�pra
ctice?�The�Vietnam�War�led�the�US
Army�to�reflect�deeply�on�its�status:�civilian�perception
s�of�the�military�were�decidedly

negative;� the�morale�of�troops�was�at�a�low�point;�
the�army’s�preparedness�for�sudden
deployment�and�ability�to�fulfill�its�role�in�the�nationa
l�military�strategy�were�in�question.
This�period�of�deep�introspection�re-
energized�the�army.�It�was�clear�that�assigning�blame
was�less�important�than�setting�a�very�specific�course�
for�the�future.�The�concrete�result
was�a�major�effort�to�modernize�and�restructure�the�ar
my�to�meet�the�changing�chal-
lenges�and�threats�of�the�1980s�and�1990s�and�an�all-
volunteer�force.
As�part�of�its�modernization�effort,�the�army’s�senior�
leadership�determined�that�units
needed�to�be�able�to�train�in�a�realistically�stressful�e
nvironment�that�simulated�actual
combat�as�closely�as��possible.�This�vision�resulted�in
�the�creation�of�the�Combat�Training
Table�1 A�comparison�of�post-
mortem�and�living�learning�practices.
A�typical�retrospective A�living�AAR�practice
“Learning”�happens�at�the�end�of�the�project.
Learning�happens�throughout�the�project.
Called�for�after�“failure”�or�high�stress.
Planned�for�any�project�that�is�core�to�business�goals.
The�meeting�is�planned�after�the�project�or�event.
The�meeting�is�planned�before�the�project�or�event.
One�meeting�with�all�participants�in�one�room.
Meetings�with�smaller�task-focused�groups.
Reviews�the�entire�process.
Focuses�on�key�issues�relevant�to�going�forward.
Produces�a�detailed�report�leading�to�recommendations.

Produces�an�action�plan�participants�will�implement.
Focuses�more�on�dissecting�past�performance.
Focuses�more�on�planning�for�future�success.
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Y
Center�(CTC)�program.�Four�training�centers—
three�in�the
US�and�one�in�Europe—were�created�to�provide�
intensive
training�in�realistic�combat�environments.�The�first�of�t
hese
centers,�the�NTC�at�Fort�Irwin,�California,�came�on�li
ne�in
1981�to�give�soldiers�the�opportunity�to�experience�inte
nse,
realistic,�heavy�maneuver�warfare�in�desert�conditions.
At�the�NTC,�units�undergoing�training�are�designated
as�BLUFOR,�short�for�“blue�force.”�In�military�war�ga
mes,
“blue�force”�refers�to�the�friendly�force�fighting�agains
t�an
enemy�called�“opposing�force,”�or�OPFOR.�The�OPFOR
�is
a�highly�trained�cadre�in�residence�at�the�NTC.�BLUF
OR
units�experience�up� to�14�days�of� simulated�combat
against�this�thinking,�uncooperative�enemy.�During�this
time,�soldiers�may�get�four�hours�of�sleep�a�night�if
�they
are�lucky,�start�their�day�with�reconnaissance�missions�
at
midnight,�engage�in�force-on-
force�battle�before�the�sun�rises,�conduct�a�series�of�
AARs
by�early�afternoon�and,�finally,�plan�and�rehearse�for�t

he�next�day’s�engagement.
The�first�AARs�after�a�battle�are�conducted�platoon�b
y�platoon,�out�in�the�desert,�in
the�shade�of�the�unit’s�equipment.�Then�platoon�leaders
�gather�to�do�a�company-level
AAR,�after�which�company�commanders�gather�in�a�mo
bile�unit�to�do�their�review.�Finally,
by�the�end�of�the�day,�the�battalion�commanders�meet
�in�the�command�center�to�do�an
AAR�of�the�entire�battle.�AARs�at�the�platoon�level�
may�use�nothing�more�than�a�sand�map
of�the�battlefield,�littered�with�color-
coded�MRE�packets�(“Meals�Ready�to�Eat,”�or�rations)
to�illustrate�troop�placements.�As�the�afternoon�progress
es,� battle�statistics,�videos,� and
satellite-
assisted�maps�of�actual�troop�movements�and�“kills”�ar
e�compiled�to�help�the�unit
commanders�review�the�“ground�truth”�of�what�actually
�happened�to�facilitate�a�reflec-
tive�conversation�about�what�to�learn�from�the�day�an
d�what�to�do�tomorrow.
From�its�inception,�the�goal�of�the�NTC�has�been�to
�win�the�first�battle�of�the�next
war�(Chapman,�1997:�9).�Though�the�goal�has�remained
�the�same,�the�NTC’s�tools�and
practices�have�evolved�over�the�past�20�years.�The�NT
C�itself�is�an�idea�borrowed�from
the�air�force’s�Red�Flag�program,�which,�in�turn,�was
�borrowed�from�the�navy’s�famed
Top�Gun�program.�Top�Gun�was�created�in�response�t
o�navy�research�that�showed�that,
in�their�first�combat�engagement,�American�pilots�had�
only�a�60%�chance�of�survival,

as�opposed� to�a�90%�chance�after�ten�engagements�
(Chapman,�1997:�15).�Top�Gun
aimed�to�bring�pilots�up�to�a�90%�survival�rate�on�t
heir�first�live�engagement.
The AAR Meeting
AAR�meetings�at�army�CTCs�can�vary�in�structure�de
pending�on�what�kind�of�mission�is
being�reviewed,�where�the�AAR�is�being�held�(in�the
�desert,�in�a�mobile�unit,�or�in�a�head-
quarters�theater-
style�room),�its�timing�during�the�rotation,�the�skill�le
vel�of�the�unit,�and
the�preferences�and�experience�level�of�the�observer/con
troller�(O/C),�who�is�part�expert
observer,�part�team�coach,�part�facilitator.
An�AAR�as�conducted�at�the�army’s�CTCs�typically:
1. Reviews� first�what�the�unit� intended�
to�accomplish� (the�overall�mission�and
commander’s�intent).
2.
Establishes�the�“ground�truth”�of�what�actually�happene
d�by�means�of�a�moment-
by-moment�replay�of�critical�battlefield�events.
3.
Explores�what�might�have�caused�the�results,�focusing�
on�one�or�a�few�key�issues.
4. Gives�
the�unit�the�opportunity�to�reflect�on�what�it�should�l
earn�from�this�review,

including�what�they�did�well�that�they�want�to�sustain
�in�future�operations�and�what
they�think�they�need�to�improve.
5.
Concludes�with�a�preview�of�the�next�day’s�mission�a
nd�what�issues�might�arise.
The�following�AAR�represents�a�typical�well-
run�AAR�by�a�senior�O/C,�Lieutenant�Colo-
nel�Tim�Cherry.�The�AAR,�which�took�approximately�t
wo�hours�to�conduct,�was�held�in
a�theater-style�room�in�the�headquarters�for�that�CTC.
© Emily Sper
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After�the�O/C�checks�in�off-

line�with�the�commander�to�review�the�focus�for�this
AAR,�he�formally�opens�the�session.�He�shows�video�
clips�of�the�day’s�battle.�He�follows
this�with�war�footage�from�World�War�II�that�illustrat
es�the�power�of�indirect�artillery�fire
followed�by�direct�fire.�(The�O/C�and�the�unit�comma
nder�had�already�agreed�that�the
coordination�of�artillery�would�likely�be�a�primary�area
�of�focus�during�this�AAR.)
Following�this�introduction,�the�O/C�shows�a�series�of
�slides,� including�an�inspira-
tional�quote�on�soldiering,�a�review�of�“House�Rules”�
for�doing�AARs�(“It’s�important�to
remind�the�unit�leaders�at�this�point�that�it�is�their�
AAR,”�according�to�Cherry),�and�a
review�of�the�mission�statement,�
including�doctrinal�standard,�unit’s�orders,�and
commander’s�intent�(purpose,�key�tasks,�end�state).
This�is�followed�with�a�six-
minute�prerecorded�audiovisual�battle�summary�that�cov-
ers�the�key�points�of�the�battle.�The�summary�shows�
a�bird’s-eye�view�of�the�battlefield
map,�with�troop�and�vehicle�locations�superimposed�in�
red�and�blue.�The�O/C�entertains
questions�about�the�battle�summaries.
The�commander�of�the�OPFOR�reviews�his�mission,�ou
tlines�his�planning�assump-
tions,�and�describes�the�battle�from�his�perspective,�dis
closing�what,�in�retrospect,�he�did
and�didn’t�know.�He�entertains�questions.�This�discussio
n�is�followed�by�a�quick�factual
review�by�the�O/C�of�the�overall�battle�statistics�on�b
oth�sides.

After�the�unit�understands�what�actually�happened�durin
g�the�battle,�it�is�ready�to
discuss�why�problems�happened�and�what�to�do�to�pre
vent�recurrence.�This�sets�up�the
bulk�of�the�AAR,�which�consists�of�a�review�and�dis
cussion�of�key�issues�(for�example,
synchronizing�indirect�fire,�or�“battlefield�visualization”).
�This�is�where�the�most�impor-
tant�learning�takes�place.�Each�issue�discussion�begins�
with�battle�data�related�to�the�spe-
cific�issue,�an�audiovisual�recreation�of�defining�momen
ts�relevant�to�that�issue�from�the
simulated�combat,�a�discussion�of�causes,�a�request�for
�and�discussion�of�“sustains/im-
proves,”�and�summary�teaching�comments�by� the�O/C.
The�AAR�is�wrapped�up�with�a�preview�of�the�next�
mis-
sion,�a�safety�reminder,�and�a�closing�quote.
A�highlight�of�the�discussion� involved�why�the�unit
missed�opportunities� to�engage�the�main�body�of�the
OPFOR�at�a�southern�chokepoint�with�indirect�artillery
�fire
(in�order�to�take�out�the�OPFOR�subsequently�with�dir
ect
fire),�and�what�impact�that�had�on�the�outcome�of�the
mission.�They�concluded�that�a�significant�contributor�t
o
their�failure�was�that�they�did�not�establish�and�maint
ain
a�priority�for�their�indirect�fires.�But�the�discussion�di
dn’t
end�there.�Participants�observed�that�some�of�the�subor
dinate�unit�leaders�had�better
situational�awareness�than�the�commander,�including�a�s

cout�helicopter�that�was�posi-
tioned�to�see�the�whole�enemy�obstacle�breach�from�st
art�to�finish.�Simultaneously,�how-
ever,�a�fight�that�was�breaking�out�between�two�comp
anies�in�a�northern�sector�had
transfixed�the�commander’s�attention.�As�a�result,�“guys
�were� just�canceling�fire�mis-
sions,�shifting�here�and�there.”
Significantly,�after�some�discussion,�the�unit�commander
�spoke�up�in�a�nondefensive
tone�and�agreed,�“Maybe�I�blew�it.�It�dawned�on�me
�that�I�made�the�wrong�call.�I�got
caught�up�in�this�narrow�focus�and�lost�the�bubble�[s
ituational�awareness�of�the�whole
battlefield].�We�had�two�priority�missions,�and�I�divert
ed�that�focus.”�After�more�discus-
sion,�during�which�the�unit�commander�listened�as�muc
h�as�he�spoke,�Lieutenant�Colonel
Cherry�commented,�“The�key�point�here�is�that,�becaus
e�we�weren’t�able�to�influence�this
one�point,�the�enemy�was�able�to�breach�the�obstacle
�and�exploited�that�opportunity.”
This�is�an�example�of�how�complex�the�environment�o
f�the�battlefield�can�become
with�multiple�events�happening�simultaneously.�It�also�i
llustrates�how�much�value�the
unit�can�harvest�from�non-
confrontational�dialogue,�framed�by�a�question�such�as,
�“What
was�our�actual�performance�compared�to�our�intent,�an
d�what�do�we�think�caused�our
actual�results?”�The�quality�of�dialogue�is�especially�e
nhanced�when�the�leader�models
the�learningful�conversation�that�he�or�she�expects�of�

the�unit.
Lieutenant�Colonel�Cherry�maintains�
that�the�AAR�starts�long�before�the�actual
session:
After the unit understands what
actually happened during the battle,
it is ready to discuss why problems
happened and what to do to prevent
recurrence.
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My�technique�is�this.�I�get�with�my�battalion�comman
der�counterpart�throughout�the�whole
plan�and�prepare�and�execute�phases�of�the�operation.�
I�talk�to�my�counterpart�after�the�opera-
tions�order�briefing�and�again�after�the�unit�combined-

arms�rehearsal.�We�have�a�relationship.
What�emerges�prior�to�each�mission�are�some�key�issu
es�that�will�usually�play�out�during�the
execution.�Normally,�we�agree.�Meanwhile,�I’m�gatherin
g�data�from�my�O/Cs�in�preparation�for
my�AAR.�Prior�to�the�AAR,�I�ask�the�commander,�“
What�do�you�want�me�to�focus�on�during
the�AAR?�It’s�your�AAR.�I’m�just�here�to�support�w
hatever�you�want�to�talk�about.”
Adopting AARs in the Civilian Sector
Shell�Oil�may�be�the�first�civilian�adopter�of�the�AA
R�method.�With�General�Gordon
Sullivan�(retired)�on�their�board�of�directors,�Shell�star
ted�using�AARs� in�1994�during�a
dramatic�transformation�in�its�governance�structure—
a�time�of�significant�turmoil.�Then
CEO�Phil�Carroll�had�a�passion�for�learning.�AARs�w
ere�a�natural�fit�and�the�motivation
to�learn�was�high.�Since�then,�Shell�has�continued�to�
support�the�use�of�AARs�from�the
corporate�level.�Its�challenge�now�is�to�make�it�part�
of�the�culture�at�a�local�level.
Other�corporations,� such�as� Fidelity,�
IBM,�and�Harley-Davidson,�have�opera-
tionalized�an�on-
going�AAR�practice�in�a�particular�unit�of�the�busines
s.�This�has�often
been�under�the�leadership�of�an�ex-
army�officer.�IBM’s�Jack�Beach,�a�former�member�of
the�faculty�at�West�Point,�uses�AARs�with�his�
team�to�hone�a�leadership�development
program.�“There’s�not�a�lot�of�technology�involved,”�c
omments�Beach.�“It’s�just�us�sit-

ting�down�with�a�pad�of�paper,�an�open�mind,�and�a
�desire�to�get�better.”
Ted�Gee,�who�spent�eight�years�as�an�army�officer,�is
�using�an�AAR�practice�to�pre-
pare�for�new�model�introductions�at�Harley-
Davidson’s�Kansas�City�plant.�Gee�leads�his
team�in�three�pre-
builds�in�which�the�team�articulates�its�planning�assum
ptions,�sets�a
standard,�tests�its�processes�
in�the�production�setting,�conducts�a�series�of�AARs,�
and
then�repeats�the�process,�each�time�raising�the�standard
,�until�the�team�is�confident�that
it�can�perform�to�standard�at�product�launch.�Accordin
g�to�Gee,�“If�you�invest�the�time
to�go�through�this�process,�you’ll�get�deliverables�all�
the�time.�It’s�not�about�beating�re-
sults�out�of�people.�It’s�about�helping�them�to�grow.”
Steve�Danckert,�who�also�served�in�the�army�for�eight
�years,�including�six�months
in�the�Persian�Gulf,�is�now�operations�manager�at�Gee
rlings�&�Wade�(G&W),�a�wine�re-
tailer�and�distributor�operating�in�30�states�across�the�
US.�Danckert�uses�an�AAR�prac-
tice�to�manage�warehouse�operations.�Over�the�course�
of�his�past�three�jobs,�Danckert
has�perfected�his�own�approach�of�using�AARs�to�man
age�the�operations�function.
Danckert�conducts�formal,�quarterly�AARs�with�his�tea
m.�These�quarterly�AARs�are
conducted�by�phone�conference�and�focus�on�one�partic
ular�event�that�happened�over

the�quarter.�For�example,�the�focus�of�the�2000�fourth
-quarter�AAR�was�a�two-week�pre-
holiday�spike�in�orders.�The�spike�was�not�a�surprise
�to�anyone,�but�it�gave�the�team�a
chance�to�look�at�how�its�systems�function�under�stres
s:�“What�did�we�do�regarding�hir-
ing�and�training�temporary�help?�Did�we�have�the�pac
kaging�and�materials�that�we�were
supposed�to�have�when�we�were�supposed�to�have�the
m?”
�“Quarterly�AARs�are�a�discipline�for�me,”�says�Danc
kert.�Scheduled�quarterly�AARs
discipline�him�to�make�sure�that�this�is�an�ongoing�p
art�of�his�business�process.�“If�you
look�hard�enough,�you�can�find�an�event�every�quarter
�on�which�to�do�an�AAR.�It�might
be�a�slowdown�or�an�uptick�in�business.�Find�a�set�
of�events�that�you�can�focus�on.�Be-
cause�it’s�not�just�to�improve�that�event—
it’s�to�get�everyone�in�the�habit�of�analyzing
successes� and�failures.”�Danckert�has�seen�these�
formal�AARs�keep�a�team�of�people
thinking�and�learning�together,�which�is�critical�to�buil
ding�a�learning�culture,�he�feels.
Danckert�pairs� these�
formal,�quarterly�AARs�with�informal,�one-on-
one,�10�to�15
minute�“spot”�AARs.�As�an�example,�he�described�an�
AAR�he�had�just�completed�the�day
of�our�interview:
One�of�my�warehouse�managers�kicked�out�a�ton�of�o
rders�after�one�of�our�wines�had�been
on�back�order.�I�asked�him,�“How’d�you�do�that?”�Ev

en�if�he�tells�me�things�I�already�know,
it’s�still�important�to�say,�“Hey,�that�was�great.”�And
�you�never�know.�I�could�be�assuming
that�he’s�doing�what�everyone�else�has�done.�On�the�
other�hand,�maybe�he’s�refined�the
process�a�bit.�And�that’s�how�you�grow,�by�raising�th
e�bar�a�little�bit�at�a�time.
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The�quarterly�and�spot�AARs�reinforce�each�other.�Say
s�Danckert,�“Every�topic�in�a�for-
mal�AAR�has�been�covered�with�a�warehouse�manager
�in�advance.�So�the�formal�AAR
has�become�more�specific�and�grassroots-
driven.”�And�in�return,�he�notes,�the�discipline
of�the�quarterly�AARs�has�kept�him�from�turning�the�
spot�AARs�into�lectures:�“The�re-
sponse�has�been�uniformly�positive.�Never�once�have�I

�heard�or�felt�people�react�as�if�it’s
a�waste�of�time.”
At�least�within�Danckert’s�operation,�AARs�at�G&W�ar
e�taking�on�a�life�of�their�own.
According�to�Danckert,�“It’s�part�of�the�culture.�You’r
e�always�thinking,�‘What�can�I�learn
from�this?�OK,�we�didn’t�get�all�that�shipped�out�tod
ay.�Why�not?�What�could�we�have
done?’”�Warehouse�managers�are�taking�the�initiative�to
�call�him�about�events�to�review.
Their�willingness�to�do�so,�he�believes,�
comes�from�their�confidence�and�work�experi-
ence.�It�comes�down�to�a�desire—a�mindset—
to�improve,�and�a�collective�sense�that
things�will�improve�as�a�result�of�the�AAR.
Danckert�thinks�of�this�as�“the�humility�of�the�craftsm
an�before�his�task.”�Thinking
back�over�his�army�experience,�Danckert�observed:�“I�t
hink�the�typical�squad�leader�re-
ally�cares�about�how�well�his�men�do�against�their�m
ission,�no�matter�how�minor.
Whether�or�not�he�gets�promoted,�whether�or�not�his�
squad’s�proficiency�wins�the�war,
there�is�a�craftsman’s�approach�to�the�task�here.”�He�
sees�the�lack�of�this�attitude�as�a
huge�challenge�in�today’s�business�environment,�“where
�it�is�considered�to�be�‘entrepre-
neurial’�to�want�to�retire�at�age�35.”
Mary�Paul,�of�Harley-
Davidson,�described�a�similar,�very�simple,�and�straight
forward
learning�practice�that�her�team�conducted�when�she�wo
rked�with�the�Rider’s�Edge�prod-

uct�development�team,�which�was�new�at�the�time:�“W
e�know�that�we�are�going�to�make
mistakes.�There’s�so�much�we�don’t�know�yet.”�In�the
ir�weekly�team�meetings,�the�team
leader,�Lara�Lee,�
repeatedly�asked�the�simple�question,�“What�did�we�lea
rn?”�Then,�in
larger,�quarterly,�all-day�staff�meetings,� the�team�did�
larger,�more�formal�AARs.� In�the
process,�Lee�created�a�simple,�yet�consistent�learning�d
iscipline�focused�on�learning�from
the�work�within�the�team’s�scope.�As�Paul�described�t
he�practice,�“For�our�group,�it’s�like
exercising�every�day.”
Emergent Learning
Each�iteration�of�this�simple�learning�practice�may�loo
k�somewhat�inconsequential.�But
because�each�practice�is�actually�a�learning�infrastructur
e,�these�simple�learning�events
quickly�build�on�one�another�until,�as�Lieutenant�Colon
el�Moore�describes� it,�perfor-
mance�starts�to�“go�vertical.”�As�he�describes�
it,�“You’ll�only�fix�so�much�in�one�AAR,
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and�then�you’ll�do�it�again,�and�then�you’ll�do�it�ag
ain�and�again,�and�all�of�a�sudden�that
curve�starts�to�go�vertical�as�it�gets�
into�your�subordinate�organization,�so�that�they’re
doing�AARs�concurrently.”�What�does�it�look�like�in�
practice�when�learning�“goes�verti-
cal”?�From�Moore’s�perspective,�“Probably�the�most�ob
vious�thing�you�notice�is�that�the
outfit�stops�
‘doing�it�the�same�old�way’�all�the�time.�They�don’t
�use�that�same�excuse,
and�they�rarely�repeat�the�mistake�the�same�way�twice
.�That�does�not�mean�they�get�it

right,�but�they�don’t�repeat�an�error.”�If�a�unit�uncov
ers�a�problem�in�an�AAR,�and�if�that
problem�is�then�acted�on�by�their�commander,�Moore�
has�observed�that�“they�lose�a�good
part�of�the�‘we-
they’�attitude�and�do�not�fight�change�anymore,�probab
ly�because�they’ve
bought�into�the�change�through�repeated�AARs.”
We�have�come�to�describe�this�as�“emergent�learning.”
�Emergent�learning�is�a�prac-
tice�that�a�team�or�business�unit�uses�to�improve�its�
planning�and�performance.�The�prac-
tice� is� simple�and�repeated;� the�team�uses�
its�own�current�challenges�as� its� field� for
learning;�and�the�team�relies�on�tapping�into�its�own�
experiences�and�shared�thinking�as
the�primary�vehicle�for�improvement.�With�such�a�prac
tice,�learning�“emerges”�from�the
team’s�own�work,�rather�than�(or�in�addition�to)�comi
ng�from�the�traditional�method�of
classroom�education.�An�emergent�learning�practice�creat
es�immediate�performance�gains
while�simultaneously�building�a�team’s�capacity�for�imp
rovement�and�generating�as�a
second-
level�artifact�a�body�of�validated�“lessons�learned.”
Simply�put,�emergent�learning�is�about�getting�better�at
getting�better�by�weaving�learning�into�ongoing�work.
AARs�are�the�best�example�we�have�uncovered�of�a
long-lived�(more�than�19�years)�emergent�learning�prac-
tice.� It�
is�our�study�of�this�practice�from�which�we�have
adopted�this�article�(Darling�and�Parry,�2000).

Can�such�a�simple�learning�tool�result�in�true�organiza
tional�learning?�According�to
Mitchel�Resnick,�
the�field�of�emergence�focuses�on�“how�complex�pheno
mena�can
emerge�from�simple�interactions�among�simple�componen
ts”�(Resnick,�1996).�If�complex
phenomena�can�emerge�from�simple,�local�interactions,�
what�might�emerge�through�the
iteration�of�a�simple,�
local�learning�structure,�such�as�the�disciplined�applicati
on�of�af-
ter-action�reviews?
We�have�observed,�as�have�others�in�the�field�of�orga
nizational�learning,�that�train-
ing�programs�alone�tend�to�result�in�a�conceptual�unde
rstanding�that�can�be�difficult�to
apply�in�daily�work�processes.�By�themselves,�AARs�c
annot�“teach”�organizational�learn-
ing�principles.�We�have�observed,�however,�that�teams�
that�apply�such�practices�over
time�develop�an�intuitive�grasp�of�some�of�the�basic�
concepts�and�values�of�organiza-
tional�learning,�such�as�the�importance�of�inquiry�and�
of�articulating�assumptions;�that
there�is�no�outside;� that�the�greatest�
leverage�point�to�solving�a�problem�may�be
counterintuitive;�and�that�there�may�be�delays�in�the�s
ystem’s�response�to�any�interven-
tion.�Emergent�learning�practices�can�provide�the�groun
ding�and�the�“pull”�for�training.
In�our�experience,�teams�that�are�applying�practices�lik
e�the�AAR�are�more�open�to�learn-
ing�the�tools�of�organizational�learning�because�they�in

tuitively�understand�their�value
and�have�developed�their�own�learning�laboratory�in�w
hich�to�apply�them.
Jim�Tebbe�of�Shell�Exploration�and�Production�Compan
y�reported�that�a�team�had
become�“hooked”�on�the�AAR�process�after�he�helped
�them�apply�it�as�the�US�Army
does—
before�the�event�to�plan,�during�the�event�to�attend�t
o�anticipated�issues,�and�af-
ter�the�event�to�reflect�and�plan�for�the�next�one.�Af
ter�holding�an�initial�AAR�halfway
through�an�annual�planning�process�and�a�“before-
action�review,”�as�Tebbe�termed�it,�to
take�what�they�had�learned�and�apply�it�in�the�next�
phase,�the�team�asked�him�to�sched-
ule�a�follow-
up�AAR��without�prompting.�“These�meetings�are�actua
lly�increasing�the�ca-
pacity�of�the�team�to�learn�and�improve�the�process,”
�observes�Tebbe.
Relationship of the Tool to a Learning Infrastructure
Why�do�so�many�practitioners�make�the�error�of�treati
ng�the�AAR�as�a�one-time�retrospec-
tive�event?�In�our�view,�it�is�part�and�parcel�of�the
�error�of�focusing�on�the�tool,�not�the
practice�or�the�structure�that�surrounds�it.�When�Steven
�Spear�and�H.�Kent�Bowen�stud-
ied�the�Toyota�Production�System,�they�came�away�wit
h�a�very�different�perspective�about
Emergent learning is about getting
better . . . by weaving learning into

ongoing work.
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what�makes�it�tick�(Spear�and�Bowen,�1999).�Its�succe
ss�does�not�lie�in�kanbans�or�andon
cards�or�specific�inventory�methods�that�are�commonly
�replicated.�As�Spear�and�Bowen
explain,�“Observers�confuse�the�tools�with�the�system�i
tself.�.�.�.�The�key�is�to�understand
that�the�Toyota�Production�System�creates�a�community
�of�scientists.�Whenever�Toyota
defines�a�specification,�it�is�establishing�sets�of�hypoth
eses�that�can�be�tested.”�Their
observation�was�validated�by�Fujio�Cho,�Toyota’s�presid
ent�(Cho�and�Ohba,�1999).
So�it�is�with�the�US�Army’s�after-
action�review.�Those�who�replicate�the�AAR�meet-

ing�and�thereby�expect�
to�replicate�the�team�learning�successes�
they�have�observed�at
the�army’s�National�Training�Center�will�be�disappointe
d.�And�so,�we�believe,�it�is�with
corporations�implementing�knowledge�management�systems
.�KM�systems� that�are
treated�as�an�entity�unto�themselves�become�an�orphan.
�In�each�case,�adopters�make�the
error�of�placing�the�tool�at�the�center�of�the�solution,
�not�the�people�and�processes�and
systems�for�which�these�tools�are�created.�If�the�appro
priate�focus�is�maintained,�then
when�and�how�to�integrate�these�tools�into�a�team’s�p
ractice�and�how�to�create�a�learn-
ing�infrastructure�becomes�much�more�obvious.
We�might�look�at�the�US�Army’s�doctrine�as�a�count
erexample�to�this�common�er-
ror.�We�have�observed�that�army�officers�have�a�very
�different�perspective�on�the�role�and
value�of�doctrine�than�those�in�the�civilian�world�mig
ht�imagine.�General�Sullivan�(re-
tired)�describes�doctrine�as�a�“professional�dialogue�abo
ut�how�to�conduct�operations.”
To�him,�doctrine�is�“not�what�to�think�but�how�to�th
ink”�(Sullivan�and�Harper,�1997).
Doctrine�does�not�exist�
independent�of�the�learning�system�that�created�it.�Lieu
tenant
Colonel�Jay�Simpson�described�doctrine�as�beginning�wi
th�imperfect�plans�and�experi-
mentation.�Simpson�described�his�experience�at�the�NTC
:
Exceptions�work�their�way�into�doctrine.�Counter-

reconnaissance�is�an�example.�We�used�to
just�set�up�a�couple�of�observation�points.�The�bad�g
uys�regularly�infiltrated�it.�One�com-
pany�took�on�the�task�of�aggressively�finding�and�killi
ng�OPFOR�reconnaissance.
Their�success,�he�explains,�made�its�way�into�doctrine.
�One�of�the�jobs�of�army�trainers,�in
fact,�is�to�be�on�the�lookout�for�new,�innovative�solu
tions�to�sticky�problems.�Without�be-
ing�too�sentimental�about�this�process,�it�is�not�unlike
�the�national�dialogue�citizens�main-
tain�with�the�US�Constitution.��It�is�used�within�an�i
nfrastructure�that�supports�the�dialogue
between�the�Constitution�itself�and�the�people�by�who
m
and�for�whom�it�was�created.
In�our�work�with�client�organizations,�the�focus�be-
gins�not�with�trying�out�a�new�technique,�but�with�un
der-
standing�the�business�team�and�designing�a�learning�an
d
knowledge� infrastructure�that�fits�with�their�business
challenges,�their�work�processes,�and�their�existing�prac
-
tices�and�work�habits.�This�learning�infrastructure�does
not�have�to�be�big�or�complex.�It�may�not�even�
last�for
longer�than�a�few�weeks,�depending�on�the�team’s�goa
ls.
Then,�emergent�learning�techniques�such�as�the�AAR�a
re�introduced,�if�needed,�into�that
structure�in�such�a�way�that�makes�intuitive�sense�to�
the�people�who�will�be�responsible
for�implementing�them.

Civilian�adopters�would�do�well�to�understand�and�ado
pt�not�just�the�AAR�meeting,
but�the�AAR�practice�that�supports�it.�A�well-
constructed�AAR�practice�gives�a�group�of
people�the�structure�to�learn�iteratively�from�their�own
�experience,�focusing�on�their�own
compelling�challenges.�In�the�process�of�producing�imm
ediate�performance�improve-
ments,�they�also�develop�an�intuitive�understanding�of�
the�larger�system�in�which�they
operate.�This,�
in�turn,�causes�new,�strategically�relevant�knowledge—
validated�knowl-
edge�that�is�linked�to�action—
to�emerge�within�a�complex�and�dynamic�environment.
References
�“A�Guide�to�the�Services�and�the�Gateway�of�the�C
enter�for�Army�Lessons�Learned.”�CALL�Guide-
book�No.�97-
13.��(Ft.�Leavenworth,�KS:�US�Army�TRADOC,�1997):
�1.
Chapman,�A.�The�Origins�and�Development� of�
the�National� Training�Center,�1976-1984.� (Ft.
Leavenworth,�KS:�US�Army,�TRADOC�Historical�Monog
raph�Series,�1997):�9.
A well-constructed AAR practice gives
a group of people the structure to
learn iteratively from their own
experience.

72
A
f
t
e
r
-
A
c
t
i
o
n
R
e
v
i
e
w
s
ï
D
A
R
L
I
N

G
A
N
D
P
A
R
R
Y
Cho,�F.�and�H.�Ohba.�“Letter�to�
the�Editor.”�Harvard�Business�Review�77�(November-
December
1999):�189.
Darling,�M.J.�and�C.S.�Parry.�“From�Post-
Mortem�to�Living�Practice:�An�In-
Depth�Study�of�the�Evo-
lution�of�the�After�Action�Review”�(Boston,�MA:�Signe
t�Consulting�Group,�2000).
Resnick,�M.�“The�Use�of�Biological�Metaphors�in�Thin
king�about�Learning:�Some�Initial�Thoughts
about�‘Emergent�Learning’”�(Cambridge,�MA:�MIT�Medi
a�Laboratory,�November�13,�1996).
Spear,�S.�and�H.K.�Bowen.�“Decoding�the�DNA�of�the
�Toyota�Production�System.”�Harvard�Business

Review�77�(September-October�1999):�96-106.
Sullivan,�G.�and�M.�Harper.�Hope�Is�Not�a�Method�(
New�York:�Broadway�Books,�1997):�10,�96.
Commentary
by John R. O’Shea
The principle reference for this article is the study, “From Post-
Mortem to Living Practice,” a work
that represents an exhaustive examination of the role of the
after-action review (AAR) in the US
Army’s organizational learning strategy. While many have
written about the AAR, no other authors
have uncovered the dynamics of the process as have Marilyn
Darling and Charles Parry. Indeed, their
study may provide a source for method improvement as the
army goes through a historic transfor-
mation from a Cold War force to one structured to meet the
challenges of asymmetric conflict.
At the core of their analysis is the concept of the AAR as a
living process that is ongoing, inter-
nalized by the participants, and simultaneously retrospective,
while also being current and future
oriented. This protean style of visualizing the future by
examining the past did not come easy nor
can it be sustained without an investment of time and energy
guided by disciplined performance.
The result—achievement of goals—becomes the strength of the
process.
Some organizations rush to implement an AAR program and, as
a consequence, focus only on
the mechanical sequence of activities used in an AAR. But, as

Darling and Parry caution, such ac-
tion causes the participants to focus on the tool, not on the
practice. Beyond merely being a retro-
spective as a post-mortem, the AAR practice is one of discovery
learning and continuous
improvement. As Darling and Parry say, the people, processes,
and systems for which the AAR was
created need to be at the center of the solution.
In a systems sense, the AAR begins with a clear, unambiguous
goal that is understood and ac-
cepted by all and against which performance can be objectively
measured. As the event proceeds,
the team will periodically stop and retrospectively examine
performance against the goal to be
achieved. It is during the examination of results against this
standard and concurrent discussion
that system dynamics reveal themselves and allow the discovery
learning process to unfold. The
army has come to see one-time improvements made to “correct”
failures, minus the discovery pro-
cess, as a lost opportunity.
Well-led teams that work together over time share both
triumphs and disappointments. Through
those shared experiences, they develop a level of empathy that
becomes an enabler of discussion
and discovery learning. As these teams learn to perform better,
their successes from this process
encourage continued use of the AAR until it does become a
living practice. Those of us who see the
value of the AAR will well appreciate the contribution to the
field of learning by the Darling and
Parry study.
Colonel John R. O’Shea

US Army, Retired
Director, Defense Education
Reserve Officers Association
[email protected]

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