3 on february 28, 2018, a school shooting occurred at marjo

3
On February 28, 2018, a school shooting occurred at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida that
resulted in the death of 17 people. Conduct research on the
disaster and analyze the following:
1. Discuss the response and recovery efforts and their
effectiveness.
2. Assess the usefulness and need for crisis management.
3. Did the school have an emergency plan for all-hazards?
4. Assess the security measures that would have prevented the
active shooter incident.
Your paper should be 3-4 pages in length and formatted to APA
formatting. In addition to the textbook, cite at least three
scholarly sources. Factual articles written about the incident can
also be used
Additional Reading Information:
In this module, we concentrate our focus on Kotter’s steps 1 and
2: establishing a sense of urgency and creating the guiding
coalition.
An important question for us to keep in mind is, why is
establishing a sense of urgency in a change effort so critical to
success? The answer is that inertia is hard to overcome. People
in organizations tend to do work and perform processes as they
have in the past, and often they do not see any reason to change.
Employees tend to get in their comfort zone and want to stay
there. So it is the responsibility of the leader to engage
employees in the change effort, particularly related to why it
must occur. When we reflect on change efforts we have seen,

this is often missing, as a decision to change is made at the top
of the organization, the targeted change is announced, and
everyone else is expected to implement the change. This is the
reason for many failed change efforts. The communication of
the rationale for the organizational change by the leader is
critical for success. The rationale usually takes one of two
forms: (a) a reactive position of weakness and (b) a need for
proactive positioning. The following is an example of “a
reactive position of weakness”: “We need to make this change
because we are behind our competitors and if we do not make
this change now, the following problematic outcomes will
occur.” An example of “a need for proactive positioning” would
be the following: “We need to make this change because of
what we see on the horizon in the near future to position our
organization to not only survive, but to have a competitive
advantage over our competitors, and if we do not make this
change now, the following problematic outcomes will occur.”
To employees, the most important communicator of this is the
employee’s direct supervisor. The direct supervisor needs to be
prepared to answer questions from employees about the urgency
of the change effort, particularly why it is needed, what changes
it will mean for the department and the individual employee,
and what is required of the employee to take steps toward
making the change a reality in the near future.
In a real sense, a sense of urgency should be established with
great care. As leaders, we are trying to create a readiness for
change, but we have to provide the outlet and aligned channel
for employee efforts toward that targeted change. Without
providing clarity on what role an employee is to take on and
expectations for the employee to perform to get there, leaders
can stir the pot and get everyone wound up, but no true action
forward will occur. It is our job as leaders to ensure that this
does not happen.
Creating the Guiding Coalition
Most leaders never take the time to develop a powerful guiding
coalition, and this is a mistake. Attempting to drive a change

effort from an isolated position or going solo is an easy way to
fail, as leaders will fall prey to many “blind spot” problems that
could have been avoided by having a strong guiding coalition
team. Kotter identifies four key characteristics that should be
used as criteria for potential members of the guiding coalition.
These characteristics are (a) position power, (b) expertise, (c)
credibility, and (d) leadership (Kotter, 2012). These are very
important characteristics in selecting an individual for the team.
The additional characteristics of the ability to influence others
in the organization and the ability to listen to the tone of the
dialogue about the change effort in the organization could also
be added.
Kotter (2012) likes to have a balance between proven leaders
and managers who meet the criteria for the team, and this is
good advice. Some like using a proportion of one-third leaders,
one-third managers, and one-third informal leaders within the
organization. The addition of the informal leaders adds value in
two primary ways: (a) They have earned their credibility and
position of influence in their work group, hence they can
influence that work group and others who know them in the
organization, and (b) they are usually the most knowledgeable
about day-to-day operational processes to produce work, and
that is extremely valuable in driving an organizational change
effort, in avoiding pitfalls not seen by upper-level decision-
makers regarding the change effort, and in the planning and
implementation of the change effort, especially where “tweaks”
need to occur. Embracing the shared vision of the change and
working as a team toward that goal, with earned trust in place,
makes for a strong guiding coalition team. Having stated that,
the underlying question for you as a leader is, who should be on
the guiding coalition team and why? Answering the “why”
question is critical. The rationale for selection may go outside
of the considerations previously stated, and that is fine;
however, be sure that the rationale is legitimate. Loading a
guiding coalition team with likeminded individuals who support
the leader’s position and who will drive through a change that

nobody wants or believes in is a recipe for disaster. A key
ingredient in a strong guiding coalition team is everyone on the
team listening to the dialogue about the change in the
organization on a daily basis and intervening as needed to
support the change and remove obstacles.
Reference
Kotter, J. P. (2012). Leading change. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press.
W14722
ALASKA AIRLINES: NAVIGATING CHANGE
Bruce J. Avolio, Chelley Patterson and Bradford Baker wrote
this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The
authors do
not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of
a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain
names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized
or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without
the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this
material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction
rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to
reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business

School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t)
519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com.
Copyright © 2015, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation
Version: 2017-07-20
In the autumn of 2007, Alaska Airlines executives adjourned at
the end of a long and stressful day in the
midst of a multi-day strategic planning session. Most headed
outside to relax, unwind and enjoy a bonfire
on the shore of Semiahmoo Spit, outside the meeting venue in
Blaine, a seaport town in northwest
Washington state.
Meanwhile, several members of the senior executive committee
and a few others met to discuss how to
adjust plans for the day ahead. This group included Bill Ayer,
president and chief executive officer (CEO);
Brad Tilden, executive vice-president (EVP) of finance and
chief financial officer; Glenn Johnson, EVP of
airport service and maintenance & engineering; the company’s
chief counsel and executives from
Marketing and Planning, Strategic Planning and Employee
Services. They were concerned that the airline
was steadily draining its reserves of customer loyalty and
goodwill, which until recently had seemed
abundant — even boundless.
Alaska Airlines had recovered from an all-time operational low,
where only 60 per cent of flights were on
time and seven bags per 1,000 passengers were reported as
having been mishandled (defined by the
Department of Transportation as checked baggage that was lost,

pilfered, damaged or delayed). The airline
was now back to the lower end of its pre-crisis status quo of 70
to 75 per cent on-time flights and four
mishandled bags per 1,000 passengers.1 Both these important
metrics continued to vary from one day to the
next. Although the situation on the ramp was stable for the time
being, it was still fragile, with the ground
crew handling baggage and also performing ground service in
between flights. After focusing many
resources on operations to improve the airline’s operational
results, the executives wondered what might
happen if performance were to slip again. Would the airline slip
farther and faster than before? What would
it take to again recover to the current status quo? Would
customers continue to be forgiving? Would this
mediocre level of improvement be sufficient?
Below is the agenda created that night for the next day’s
discussions, when the full group would again
convene:
1 Aviation Consumer Protection and Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Air Travel Consumer Report,
2012,
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/, accessed July 7, 2013.
This document is authorized for use only by Marie Copeland in
OL-663-X1653 Leading Change 21TW1 at Southern New
Hampshire University, 2021.
Page 2 9B14C059

9:00–11:00 a.m. 2008 Plan Discussion
Setup: No room for failure; tiger by the tail; you have 12
months to fix the operation sustainably and no
severance. What would the Carlyle group do if it purchased
Alaska Airlines?
posals would you
accept and why?
The following morning, the top executive team posed a tough
question to the group, about 25 in all. One
executive recalled the framing of the activity the next day as
follows:
What would a Carlyle2 or a Warren Buffet do? Imagine a big
conglomerate has just come in and
bought the airline. We’re a $3 billion 3 company making little
money; our reputation with our
customers has taken a beating; we’ve had major problems with
Seattle, our main hub; and we’ve had
problems with two large groups of employees. What would
Carlyle do because [it is] emotionally
unattached to this?
The assembled executives divided into groups to discuss
different elements of the problem. One executive
recalled the experience and the outcome of that day as “one of
the ugliest sessions I’ve ever been a part of.
Yet, we came out of there joined at the hip saying that the
biggest challenge we faced was our operation

and it had to be fixed, and it had to be fixed now.”
Indeed, a three-pronged recommendation emerged:
1. We need to fix the Seattle hub first before trying to fix the
whole system.
2. We need a higher-level person to devote 100 per cent of time
to fixing the Seattle hub.
3. This person needs to be able to cross boundaries and break
through silos.
A few weeks later, the executive leadership did two things.
First, it appointed the staff vice-president (VP)
of operations to the new role of VP of Seattle Operations.
Previously, the Seattle station had been run by
the individual managers of each functional operational unit
(e.g., ticket counter, maintenance, inflight, flight
operations), each working within his or her silo. As the
executive leadership explained to the new VP of
Seattle Operations, “Carlyle would come in and assign someone
to fix Seattle and [it would] say either you
fix it or you’re gone.” That was the message. Second, the
executive leadership told everyone at the Seattle-
Tacoma International or Sea-Tac Airport that, in addition to
reporting to his or her functional manager, each
now had a dotted-line reporting relationship to the new VP of
Seattle Operations and were expected to fully
support him.
The new VP brought all the leaders of Seattle together and
instituted a data-driven process, which involved
identifying standard processes: a detailed timeline for the time
between aircraft arrival and departure, using
scorecards to measure how well Alaska was following its
intended processes. Over time, standard work
processes were defined, and daily scorecards provided visibility

about performance for each step in the
aircraft turn. Process improvement efforts were applied to
remove wasted steps.
2 Carlyle Group was a global asset management firm that began
investing in corporate private equity in 1990 through
investments in leveraged buyout transactions. These
transactions involved finding and investing in underperforming,
loss-
making businesses that had potential for growth, then selling
them after exercising management and financial restructuring to
turnaround these “down-and-out” businesses. One of Carlyle’s
turnaround strategies was to place its own choice of CEO at
the helm of a troubled acquisition and to create greater
ownership among management.
3 All currency amounts are shown in U.S. dollars unless
otherwise noted.
Page 3 9B14C059
This rigour led to a dramatic and sustained turnaround in
Department of Transportation rankings for on-
time departures, J.D. Power’s standings,4 mishandled bag rates
(MBR) and operating margins from 2005
to 2010 with 2008 being a pivotal year (see Exhibit 1). Indeed,
Alaska Airlines achieved the number-one
ranking in J.D. Power for customer satisfaction in year one
(2008) following the initiation of the change

effort and for the next five years. In year two of the change
effort, under a company-wide oversight team
led by the new VP of Seattle Operations, the Seattle work
processes were standardized throughout the
system. Financial and operational performance received an
additional boost when the company transitioned
its MD-80 aircraft out of the fleet. Modelled after Southwest
Airlines’ aircraft strategy, an all-Boeing 737
fleet promised greater fuel efficiency and fleet reliability, and
required only Boeing parts in inventory and
simplified training for maintenance staff and crew.
To understand the dramatic changes and root causes that were
addressed between autumn 2007 and mid-
year 2010, it is necessary to go back before 2006, when
passengers were angered by mishandled bags and
wait times at the carousel, sometimes to the extent that airport
police had to be called to the baggage claim
area to intervene. Indeed, insight into contributing causes could
be traced back prior to 2005, when the
pilots, demoralized as a result of pay cuts, resisted efforts to
improve operational performance, were
comparatively slow to taxi and often reported maintenance
problems at the last minute, resulting in what
some executives saw as an unnecessary work slowdown. Other
contributing causes included rocky contract
negotiations with other labour groups, which affected the
engagement of other employee groups, and ramp
management’s hands-off approach to ramp operations oversight,
which resulted in a lack of operational
understanding. One executive noted that root causes stemmed
back to 1999, when the airline was
“succeeding despite themselves due to fortuitous fuel costs and
a good economy.” The following is an
overview of the history, culture and events leading up to the
2007 decision to create the role of VP of Seattle

Operations; also included is a more detailed account of what
occurred between 2007 and 2010 to fix the
airline’s largest hub, including a look at the root causes and
subsequent solutions necessary for analyzing
the changes and leadership driving this rapid turnaround.
THE HISTORY OF ALASKA AIRLINES: EIGHTY YEARS IN
THE AIR
Alaska Air Group traced its roots to McGee Airlines, founded in
Alaska in 1932 by bush pilot Mac McGee.
The airline merged with Star Air Service in 1934, making it the
largest airline in Alaska with 22 planes;
however, many of these planes were small bush planes and
would eventually be decommissioned as the
airline grew. At the 10-year mark in 1942, the company was
purchased and the name changed to Alaska
Star Airlines, with a final name change in 1944. By 1972, the
company was struggling but was salvaged by
new leadership, which focused on improving operations and
taking advantage of the rich opportunities that
came with the construction of the trans-Alaska Pipeline. The
following year, 1973, marked the first of 19
consecutive years of profitability, aided in part by industry
deregulation in 1979, which enabled the 10-
plane airline to expand throughout the West Coast, beyond its
previous service to 10 Alaskan cities and to
Seattle, its single destination in the “lower 48 states.” By the
end of the 1980s, Alaska Airlines (Alaska)
had tripled in size, in part as a result of having joined forces
with Horizon Air and Jet America. Its fleet had
increased five-fold and the route map now included flights to
Mexico and Russia.
As of mid-2010, the airline employed roughly 8,650 with an

additional 3,000 or so employed in Horizon
Air. Approximately 160 to 170 of the airline’s employees were
at the director level and above (including
4 J.D. Power is an American-based global market research firm
founded in 1968 and purchased in 2005 by McGraw Hill
Financial for inclusion in its Information and Media Group. The
firm conducts consumer opinion and perception research about
customer satisfaction with product and service quality in a
variety of industries including travel. J.D.Power produces
ratings
and awards based on its research that aid consumers in making
informed purchase decisions. Awards are sought after by
corporations for their endorsement value.
Page 4 9B14C059
directors, managing directors and VPs). The two airlines, at this
point, shared many backroom services such
as accounting and planning. Exhibit 2 provides some basic
operating data for the period 2002 to 2010.
PERFORMANCE: A CULTURE OF “JUST GOOD ENOUGH”
Throughout the 1990s, Alaska was typically in the middle of the
pack in terms of most airline performance
indices, such as on-time departures. Falling in the middle range
of performance without significant

motivation for change appeared to be based on the mentality
that, “it’s OK to be late, so long as we’re nice.”
This viewpoint could partially be attributed to the leadership of
Ray Vecci, the CEO from 1990 to 1995,
who openly fought the adoption of mandatory Departure on
Time (DOT) reporting requirements, saying
that Alaska was different because of its operating environment.
Vecci’s attitude led to a general tendency
to “blame the system” rather than confront the fact that Alaska
was rarely on time. Alaska’s employees
prided themselves on having the best customer service in the
industry, which they defined as being nice —
not necessarily as being efficient. Indeed, Alaska enjoyed a
great deal of customer loyalty and a significant
reserve of goodwill from its customers.
LABOUR RELATIONS: A LONG AND HARRIED HISTORY
In 1945, the pilots were the first of Alaska’s employee groups
to form a union, followed in 1959 and 1961,
by the organization of mechanics and flight attendants,
respectively. In 1972, customer service, baggage
handlers and other operational employees followed suit.
As for many of the major carriers and for smaller, older airlines,
such as Alaska, labour negotiations
(sometimes marked by strong contentions, slowdowns, strikes
and flight cancellations) were a routine and
costly aspect of the airline business. Even when settlements
were reached through negotiation or binding
arbitration, resentments could last for years, affecting both
morale and productivity. An airline could be in
almost constant negotiations as employment contracts lasted
from three to five years (depending on the
union), and as many as six collective bargaining agreements

could be in play.
For Alaska, despite a strong employee-customer bond, the
relationship between labour and management
fell short of being ideal for many years. An International
Association of Machinists (IAM) strike in 1985
lasted for three months, during which time replacement workers
were hired.5 In 1993, a flight attendants’
intermittent strike, the suspension of 17 flight attendants and a
subsequent federally ordered reinstatement
suggested the tip of a larger iceberg of labour-management
problems looming ahead. The flight attendants’
strike was a unique form of “intermittent strike” called CHAOS
(and still used today by Association of
Flight Attendants), which Alaska management viewed as illegal
job action. In 1998, contentious contract
negotiations between the company and members of the Aircraft
Mechanics Fraternal Association began
and were not settled until the middle of 1999. As in the case of
the pilots’ union agreement of the prior year,
this new agreement called for third-party binding arbitration in
the event that future agreements could not
be reached in 120 days. In the fall of 1999, the IAM,
representing clerical workers and customer service
agents, reached an agreement after more than two years of
protracted negotiation.
By the end of 1999, contract settlements had been reached with
four out of six unions, leading to a new
wave of contract negotiations beginning about 2003. Under
normal circumstances, these negotiations could
5 “Mechanics Pact Ends 3-Month Strike against Alaska
Airlines,” Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1985,
http://articles.latimes.com/1985-06-04/news/mn-6533_1_alaska-

airlines, accessed July 7, 2013.
Page 5 9B14C059
be daunting enough; however, no one could predict what would
unfold in the industry or for Alaska over
the next 24 months.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDUSTRY SHOCKS: NO PAIN,
NO GAIN?
At the turn of the new millennium, two successive airline-
related tragedies affected Alaska in very different
ways. On January 31, 2000, an Alaska Airlines MD-80 jet
carrying 88 passengers and crew from Puerto
Vallarta, Mexico, to San Francisco crashed into rough seas 64
km (40 miles) northwest of Los Angeles,
shortly after reporting mechanical problems. Among the
passengers of Flight 261 were 12 working and off-
duty employees and 32 family members and friends of Alaska
employees. Because half the victims had a
connection with the airline, the event would forever and
uniquely alter Alaska’s collective self-concept.
The accident truly shook the morale of everyone working for
Alaska.
And then came 9/11. Ensuing changes in security and boarding
procedures in the third quarter of 2001, and

into 2002, interrupted airline operations industry-wide. Demand
for travel plummeted. Exhibit 3 shows the
epidemic of airline bankruptcies from 2002 to 2008. Though
Alaska was not immune to the nationwide
grief and industry turmoil in the wake of 9/11, the impact on
Alaska may have been tempered because of
the prior tragedy of Flight 261. The following is one executive’s
reflection on the two events:
From an employee perspective, no matter where you were in the
organization, [the accident was] a
failure. The press wasn’t awfully kind, so from an employee
basis there was probably a little bit of
shame associated with it. I think it had a greater impact than
9/11. 9/11 was shocking, but it was
that way for everyone. Even if you didn’t work for an airline, if
you worked in an office building,
9/11 was shocking. [The Flight 261 accident] was more
personal.
Perhaps a testament to Alaska’s resilience in the face of
adversity, when almost all other airlines across the
United States began immediate furloughs, Alaska’s leaders
intentionally chose not to lay off employees.
This strategic move by management restored much of the faith
employees had in the company, as it
appeared that the leadership was betting on its employees to
keep the airline aloft. Alaska was able to bank
away from the disaster in 2001 because of two actions: the
airline’s cutting of the flight schedule by 13 per
cent as a cost-cutting measure and the injection of $79.9 million
in compensation from the federal
government as part of an industry-wide program to cover losses
related to September 11th. Alaska’s annual

passenger traffic dropped 5.6 per cent in 2001 compared with
the industry-wide decline in domestic
passenger travel of 19 per cent. The airline attributed this
difference to its dominant market position; strong
customer loyalty and less falloff in demand for air travel by
people living on the West Coast and in the state
of Alaska (see Exhibit 4).
SOARING COSTS — WORRISOME LOSSES
Partly the result of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) supply management
policies, oil prices had been on the rise since 1999 (see Exhibit
5). Crude oil prices affected the airline
industry directly through higher fuel costs, which could account
for 15 to 35 per cent of the cost of operating
an airline, and indirectly through the resulting global economic
downturn of 2000/01. Alaska Airlines’
annual fuel and oil expenditures peaked in 2008, as did its fuel
expense as a percentage of operating revenue
for the years 2002 to 2010. With the added economic impact of
the dot-com debacle and post-9/11 travel
slowdown, Alaska lost $118.6 million in 2002.
Page 6 9B14C059
In 2002, salaries and benefits accounted for 39 per cent of costs,
which was the biggest proportion of the

typical airline’s operating expenses.6 Several major and
competing airlines filed for bankruptcy, which
allowed them to renegotiate their labour contracts and thereafter
operate with a lower overhead than Alaska.
This situation created a potentially significant competitive
disadvantage for Alaska.
Meanwhile, some of Alaska’s unionized employees — the
pilots, flight attendants and ramp workers —
were among the highest paid in the industry.7 Alaska and
Horizon Airlines had a combined annual payroll
of approximately $1 billion in 2004. Of that, Alaska pilots’ pay
and benefits (excluding Horizon) totalled
roughly $350 million. Management determined that the pilots at
Alaska alone earned in the range of $70
million to $90 million over other airlines, when taking into
account the industry restructuring in the years
since 9/11. Alaska’s salaries represented a consi derable labour
cost disadvantage, relative to the industry
average.
Analysts projected that if losses and costs continued unabated
into 2003 and 2004, the entire company could
go under. Alaska could have taken the route of filing for
bankruptcy, as many other airlines had done, and
then undergone restructuring. However, Alaska chose not to
pursue this option for several reasons.
Fundamentally, the Alaska executives, led by Bill Ayer, viewed
filing for bankruptcy as being
reprehensible. Alaska was committed to its shareholders, and
filing for bankruptcy would mean wiping
them out. Bankruptcy was tantamount to admitting defeat, an
act utterly incongruent with Alaska’s
courageous spirit. Furthermore, Alaska executives believed,
perhaps naïvely, that management could
convince employees of the need for reductions, and those

employees would voluntarily agree to make
personal sacrifices to save the company. Moreover, executives
had other ideas for reducing costs that
represented a viable alternative. They were willing to trust that,
if a collective bargaining agreement could
not otherwise be reached between the pilot’s union and the
company, a contract reached through binding
arbitration would be a better alternative than bankruptcy.
LABOUR: THE 2010 PLAN
Forging ahead in difficult times, Alaska’s strategic planning
efforts in 2003 resulted in leadership creating
the 2010 Plan, a long-term restructuring agenda focused on
employees, customers and shareholders. As
part of this plan, in the fall of 2004, the company took several
actions to reduce its biggest expense, labour
costs: offering a voluntary severance package to management,
the closure of a maintenance base in
Oakland, the closure of the Tucson station, consolidation of
operations in Spokane,8 the outsourcing of
three small work groups (fleet service, which performed aircraft
cleaning; facilities maintenance; and
ground service vehicle maintenance) in several cities and
closing Alaskan ticket offices in Juneau and
Anchorage and Washington state ticket offices in Seattle and
Bellevue. Because the company felt that it
was crucial to have Alaska employees in customer-facing roles,
non-customer-facing work groups were the
focus for attaining possible savings. In those cases, a cost-
benefit analysis was performed. Combined, these
moves cut nearly 900 of the roughly 10,000 employees.

6 Scott Mayerowitz, “Airline Fuel Costs Force Fares Higher,”
The Post and Courier, June 5, 2011,
www.postandcourier.com/article/20110605/PC05/306059966,
accessed July, 7, 2013.
7 Call centre employees, customer service agents, mechanics
and dispatchers were also unionized but their wages were not
under scrutiny at this time.
8 Idaho Transportation Department, “Alaska to Lay Off 40 in
Spokane,” Today’s News Briefs, September 14, 2004,
http://apps.itd.idaho.gov/Apps/MediaManagerMVC/NewsClippi
ng.aspx/Preview/3569, accessed July 7, 2013.
Page 7 9B14C059
The challenge with the 2010 Plan was that each action had a
different driver:
August 2004 and offered through spring
2005, was implemented to reduce the number of managers by
about 9 per cent and aimed to improve
communication and cut between $5 million and $10 million in
overhead expenses.9
ements were
made in response to an “FAA Action Plan”
that flowed from investigations into the tragedy of Flight
261.10

jobs in September 2004 was part of a
decision to increase efficiency by outsourcing heavy
maintenance checks at the Oakland location and
consolidating the remaining in-house maintenance in Seattle.11
facilities maintenance was pursued to allow the
company to focus on its core competencies with customer
service at the forefront.
Just as the drivers of each action differed, the downstream
consequences also differed. For instance, the
Oakland closure was a difficult and emotional exercise that left
the remaining employees feeling bitter and
concerned. The voluntary management severance, considered
generous by the company, had two
unintended downstream consequences: 12 talented people with
tribal knowledge left; and many of the
vacated management positions were replaced over a short time,
rather than cut entirely, so that the overall
management labour costs began to rise again after 2007, though
still remaining below 2005 numbers.
LABOUR: THE PERFECT STORM
In addition to the previously stated changes, the union contracts
for the flight attendants, ramp workers
(IAM) and pilots (ALPA) were all open for re-negotiation at the
same time, creating a labour relations
“perfect storm.” Management was working feverishly to reduce
wages and gain agreement on other
concessions in an effort to enable Alaska to compete with the

other airlines that had already reduced their
labour costs dramatically under the terms of bankruptcy
protection.
The flight attendants’ negotiations started in summer 2003,
reached a tentative agreement that failed by a
huge margin and ended in mediation the following summer. The
pilots’ union (ALPA) negotiations, which
focused on bringing wages down to the new market level, had a
deadline of December 15, 2004. Although
the pilots were attracted to the promise of growth, they did not
agree to reduce their wages. Since the 1990s,
Alaska’s pay scale for Boeing 737 pilots was one of the highest
in the nation. Most pilots had built lifestyles
dependent on this compensation level. Alaska remained firm
that wage cuts were necessary.
After long negotiations with no agreement in sight, the parties
entered into binding arbitration as stipulated
by contract. Ultimately, the arbitrator’s decision cut pilot wages
significantly beyond the company’s last
contract proposal, and pilots experienced a decrease of up to 30
per cent in their annual salaries with an
average decrease of just over 16 per cent (see Exhibit 6).
9 “Alaska Airlines to Reorganize Management,” August 20,
2004, www.airliners.net/aviation-
forums/general_aviation/read.main/1707734/, accessed July 7,
2013.
10 Correspondence with General Council for Alaska Air Group,
accessed November 14, 2013.
11 David R. Baker, “Alaska Air Shuts Oakland Base/340
Maintenance Workers Laid Off by Troubled Carrier,” San
Francisco
Chronicle, September 10, 2004,

www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Alaska-Air-shuts-Oakland-
base-340-maintenance-
2726556.php, accessed July 7, 2013;
“Alaska Airlines Closes Oakland Maintenance Base,” San
Francisco Business Times, September 9, 2004,
www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2004/09/06/daily26.html,
accessed July 7, 2013.
12 Effects have causes; effects can, and usually do, become
causes of another effect(s); as a result, a large number of cause-
and-effect “chains” can be created from a single casual event.
Thus, cause yields effect. Effect becomes cause, which yields
downstream effects (second-order effects).
Page 8 9B14C059
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union (IAM). These “rampers” in Seattle were a powerful,
senior group, and management had persistently
struggled to set and enforce acceptable performance
expectations. As a result, productivity was very low.
Alaska initially sought to cut pay by 15 to 20 per cent, which
was rejected by the ramp union. Anticipating
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EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed
on 9/30/2021 10:25 AM via SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE
UNIVERSITY
AN: 674958 ; Cohen, Dan S..; The Heart of Change Field Guide
: Tools And Tactics for Leading Change in Your Organization
Account: shapiro.main.eds
2

Copyright
Copyright 2005 Deloitte Development LLC
All rights reserved
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in, or
introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or
by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise), without the prior permission of the publisher.
Requests for
permission should be directed to [email protected] or mailed to
Permissions, Harvard Business School Publishing, 60
Harvard Way, Boston, Massachusetts 02163.
First eBook Edition: November 2005
ISBN: 978-1-59139-775-5
EBSCOhost - printed on 9/30/2021 10:25 AM via SOUTHERN
NEW HAMPSHIRE UNIVERSITY. All use subject to
https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
3
To Corrie and Evan,
the pride and joy of my life,
who have taught me
the true meaning of change.

4
CONTENTS
Copyright
Foreword
INTRODUCTION
Leading Organizational Change
A Systematic Approach to Leading Organizational
Transformation
The Nature of Change and the Eight Steps
Two Approaches to Change
Using This Field Guide
Chapter Structure
Acknowledgments
PART I
Creating a Climate for Change
STEP 1

Increase Urgency
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
Key Implementation Challenges
Gauging Effectiveness
Suggestions for Improvement
Communicating in This Step
Stories to Remember from Step 1 of The Heart of Change
More Resources
STEP 2
Build Guiding Teams
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes

Stories to Remember from Step The Heart of Change
More Resources
STEP 3
Get the Vision Right
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
5
Checkpoint: Move Forward or Revisit Prior Steps?
Stories to Remember from Step 3 The Heart of Change

More Resources
PART II
Engaging and Enabling the Whole Organization
STEP 4
Communicate for Buy-In
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
Checkpoint: Move Forward or Revisit Prior Steps?
More Resources
STEP 5
Enable Action
Purpose
Approach

Outcomes
More Resources
STEP 6
Create Short-Term Wins
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
More Resources

PART III
6
Implementing and Sustaining the Change
STEP 7
Don’t Let Up
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
Checkpoint Before Moving to the Final Step
More Resources

STEP 8
Make It Stick
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
More Resources
STEP 9
The Final Module— Change Readiness
Purpose
Approach
Outcomes
Key Challenges
Gauging Change Readiness

Reporting Change Readiness Assessment Results
Final Thoughts
About the Author
7
FOREWORD
In 1996, I published a book titled . Based on work done over the
previous decade, it examined why change efforts soLeading
Change
often failed to live up to expectations. It reported common
errors organizations made while implementing new strategies,
adding new
IT systems, reorganizing, acquiring and integrating other firms,
or attempting to change their cultures. The book presented an
eight-step pattern that illustrated and explained how some
enterprises succeed while so many others fail to achieve their
goals. The
pattern starts with creating a sense of urgency and ends with
institutionalizing change in the organization’s culture.
Within three or four years, the book had achieved some notable
success, but many of the people using the “formula” from
were asking for more advice and help. Deloitte Consulting
suggested we jointly conduct additional research, withLeading
Change

Dan Cohen acting as project head on the Deloitte side. We did
so by sending a team of people to find concrete stories about
significant
organizational change efforts. Interviews were conducted in
close to one hundred organizations from around the world. We
published
what we learned in 2002 as —a book containing not only
analysis but real-life stories reported by real peopleThe Heart of
Change
dealing with very real problems within all kinds of
organizations.
More than any other single finding, we discovered in this
second project that people changed less because of facts or data
that
shifted their thinking than because compelling experiences
changed their feelings. This emotional component was always
present in
the most successful change stories and almost always missing in
the least successful. Too many people were working on the
mind
without paying sufficient attention to the heart.
Two years later, we were told the formula was being used by
more organizations in North America than anyLeading Change
other single change model. We were also told that additional
concrete tools, tactics, and advice would be helpful. So, Dan
and Deloitte
launched a third project. This time they developed many
practical methods, assessments, and diagnostics, based on their
experiences in
their own consulting assignments. The book you’re reading
presents those tools and represents a practical companion to the
original
two books.

The takes the insights from the earlier research projects, adds a
wealth of experience that theHeart of Change Field Guide
Deloitte people have had with many change projects, and
translates all this into a deeper level of actionable material. It
provides the
reader with questionnaires to assess problems and challenges. It
offers very specific issues a team needs to address. It’s filled
with
checklists. It has a level of how-to that is much more specific
than that of the first two books.
It is hard for me to believe that anyone coping with change, and
most certainly anyone who has read the original books, cannot
find something here of clear and substantial value. In some
ways, this book is like a thesaurus or dictionary for a writer.
You don’t use
all of it all the time, but it is an essential companion.
Since the vast preponderance of evidence says that the rate of
change will only continue to increase, it is also hard to conceive
that the tools in this field guide won’t be even more helpful five
years from now.
—John Kotter
Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 2005
8
INTRODUCTION

Leading Organizational Change
Change remains the crucial challenge for organizations. Since
was published in 2002, I have traveled around theThe Heart of
Change
world talking with leaders about changes they are making in
their organizations. Universally, they tell me that the pace,
amount, and
complexity of change only continue to increase, with no sign of
letting up. They also admit that successful change almost
always
requires more of their time than they anticipate. In fact, a
number of them indicated that during a major change effort,
they spend
upwards of 40 percent of their time focused on the initiative.
Moreover, when we discussed the emotional side of change,
they
wholeheartedly agreed on the vital role that emotional
investment plays, not only during implementation but also in
sustaining the
change for the long haul.
During our discussions, leaders told me that the flexible
framework of the eight steps in , as opposed to aThe Heart of
Change
more conventional, rigid approach, helped them in planning and
designing their change programs. The real-life stories offered as
a part
of each step also helped them to really how emotions help in
successfully navigating change. Many suggested that a guide
offeringsee
templates as well as diagnostic tools to help them structure their
approach would be invaluable in bringing the eight steps to life.
This guide is intended to help anyone involved in or planning a

change effort to design an initiative that utilizes the eight steps
of
change. It can be viewed as the third installment of the eight-
step change process introduced by John Kotter in 1996 wi th
Leading
and followed by ( John Kotter and Dan Cohen) in 2002. The
intent of the prior two books was, first, toChange The Heart of
Change
introduce the eight steps and then to offer real-life examples of
how the steps have been applied in organizations. This “field
guide” is
meant to go even further, to provide readers with the concrete
tools, templates, advice, and insights for successfully achieving
lasting
change in their own organizations.
The is literally meant to be a , not a workbook. With its many
questions, diagnostics, and frameworks, it’sField Guide guide
meant to help individuals and teams plan and execute a change
by providing insights into the process of change rather than a
detailed
recipe. It should be used as a catalyst to provoke thoughtful
discussion and action that will ensure the success of a change
initiative
rather than be seen as a rigid set of procedures and practices.
A Systematic Approach to Leading
Organizational Transformation
Before going into greater detail about how this guide can be
used, it may be useful to provide an overview of the eight-step
model for
change. The model suggests that successful change is most often
achieved by following a rolling eight-step process. Our
additional

field work and research at Deloitte has shown that these eight
steps may be usefully grouped into three major phases in a
transformation: (1) creating the climate for change, (2)
engaging and enabling the whole organization, and (3)
implementing and
sustaining the change. (See figure I-1 for a visual representation
of the model.)
FIGURE I-1
Eight-step process for leading successful change
9
Creating a Climate for Change
The first phase involves building the needed level of energy to
get the change off the ground.
1. Increase Urgency
In this first step, change leaders must build a sense of urgency
about the needed change by heightening energy and motivation.
To
do this, they will need to reduce the fear, anger, and
complacency that may have built up in their organizations.
2. Build Guiding Teams
The next step is to mobilize leaders who are focused,

committed, and enthusiastic and can lead the change because
they:
Have a deep understanding of the why, what, and how of the
change.
Model the “right” behavior.
Hold both themselves and others accountable for results.
3. Get the Vision Right
Step 3 involves creating a clear, inspiring, and achievable
picture of the future. The vision must describe the key behavior
required in the future state so that strategies and key
performance metrics can be created to support the vision.
Engaging and Enabling the Whole Organization
The second phase is all about getting all of the stakeholders
involved in the change by demonstrating leadership.
4. Communicate for Buy-In
During this phase, change leaders must deliver candid, concise,
and heartfelt messages about the change in order to create the
trust, support, and commitment necessary to achieve the vision.
5. Enable Action
In this step, leaders must bust the barriers that hinder people
who are trying to make the vision work by developing and
aligning
new programs and designs, and by identifying processes that are
ineffective.

6. Create Short-Term Wins
During this step, leaders must reenergize the organization’s
sense of urgency by achieving visible, timely, and meaningful
performance improvements to demonstrate that progress is
occurring.
Implementing and Sustaining the Change
The final phase is centered around insuring that the change is
lasting by leaders being tenacious.
7. Don’t Let Up
This step is critical to ensure that the guiding teams are
persisting, monitoring and measuring progress, and not
declaring victory
prematurely.
8. Make It Stick
In this final step, leaders must recognize, reward, and model the
new behavior in order to embed it in the fabric of the
organization and make the change “the way we do business
here.”
The Nature of Change and the Eight Steps
A few key principles govern the use of the eight-step model:
Every step is necessary. Each step in the process establishes a
solid foundation on which to build change. Therefore, few
change efforts will progress very far if any one of the steps is
omitted.
The process is dynamic. Although the preceding statement may

suggest that creating change is a linear process, large-scale
10
transformation is never that straightforward. The process of
change is, by nature, dynamic. As a result, the change process
might start in the middle, with creating a team or establishing a
few short-term wins in order to boost urgency. Alternatively, it
may be necessary for leaders to increase urgency (step 1) while
also enabling action (step 5) and creating short-term wins (step
6) to energize the organization and create the climate for
change. Short-term wins are also essential for creating
credibility and
momentum so that the organization is totally engaged in the
change.
Several of the steps can happen simultaneously and
continuously. Some steps, such as communicating or increasing
urgency,
are typically executed continuously during the change process
to generate the energy needed to make the change a reality.
Change is an iterative process. The change process frequently
requires retracing steps in order to successfully move forward.
Some steps, such as building a sense of urgency or creating
guiding teams, will be revisited several times in the course of a
transformation.
Two Approaches to Change

As illustrated in , two approaches generally can be used in
change efforts: and The Heart of Change analysis-think-change
see-feel
. The work that led to that book showed us, however, that
changing behavior is less a matter of giving people to-change
analysis
influence their thoughts than it is helping them to a truth that
will influence their feelings. Both thinking and feeling are
essential,see
and both are found in successful organizations, but the true
heart of change is in our emotions. The flow of see-feel-change
is more
powerful than that of analysis-think-change.
Table I-1 compares these two approaches side by side.
Understanding the distinctions between analyzing and seeing is
critical
because, for the most part, in the business world we use
analysis-think-change much more frequently, competently, and
comfortably
than we use see-feel-change. Shifting our focus to the see-feel-
change approach takes a very conscious effort.
Using This Field Guide
Each of the eight steps described inspires change by speaking to
people’s emotions. This field guide offers guidance,
approaches, and
tools to lead change by gauging what the people in the
organization see and feel. By design, you will not see many
methods here that
involve analyzing statistics. What you will see are systematic
approaches to addressing people’s fears, concerns, anger,
complacency,
excitement, or motivation. This is what this guide is all about:

helping you keep urgency and energy up so that resistance stays
down.
If the energy that urgency generates is not maintained, the effort
needed to be successful in the other steps will fall short, and the
fruits
of the change will not be realized.
TABLE I-1
Two approaches to change: logic and emotion
Analysis-Think-Change See-Feel-Change
1. Give people analysis.
Information is gathered and analyzed,
reports are written, and presentations
are made about problems, solutions, or
progress in solving urgency, teamwork,
communication, momentum slippage, or
other key problems within the eight steps.
1. Help people see.
Compelling, eye-catching, dramatic
situations are created to help others
visualize problems, solutions, or progress
in solving complacency, strategy,
empowerment, or other key problems
within the eight steps.
As a result … As a result …
2. Data and analysis influence how we think.
The information and analysis change
people’s thinking. Ideas inconsistent
with the needed change are dropped
or modified.

2. Seeing something new hits the emotions.
The visualizations provide useful ideas that
hit people at a deeper level than surface
thinking. They evoke a visceral response
that reduces emotions that block change
and enhances those that support it.
3. New thoughts change behavior or reinforce changed behavior.
3. Emotionally charged ideas change behavior or reinforce
changed behavior.
Source: Reprinted with permission from John P. Kotter and Dan
S. Cohen, The Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How
People Change Their Organizations
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), 11.
Whom is this guide meant to help? It is written for just about
anyone responsible for or significantly involved in an
organizational
change effort. More specifically, by offering a framework for
creating successful transformation, this guide provides guidance
and
tools to leaders, teams, and organizations:
It supports and guides of organizational transformation by
defining a systematic approach for leading change andleaders
providing tools for evaluating the effectiveness of their change
efforts.
It provides working on change initiatives with practical
guidelines on how to effect successful change.teams

11
It offers a consistent approach to leading change, in both
language and method, that serves as a foundation
fororganizations
capturing and leveraging experiences from diverse initiatives
within an organization.
The overall approach used in this guide has three distinguishing
characteristics:
It is It focuses on asking questions, offering suggestions and
alternatives, and exploring potential challenges. Thisdiagnostic.
approach helps visualize problems, solutions, or progress in the
change effort in order to affect people’s emotions and evoke
action. It is a framework to guide and support change leaders
through important aspects of leading change.
It is The approach can be used to lead organization-wide
transformation as well as focused changes specific to a
unitscalable.
within the organization. It provides checkpoints that help
leaders tailor the process to suit their needs.
It is It can be tailored and adapted to reflect the unique aspects
of each change initiative and each part of theflexible.
organization.
The guide is best used to:
Plan the approach for achieving each step in the change process.
Identify what factors will enable or hinder the success of the

change effort.
To increase effectiveness of the steps, integrate your use of this
guide with other ongoing efforts that:
Focus on communication throughout the entire change process.
Attempt to capture the learning from both successes and failures
to leverage your experience.
Measure the progress of the change.
Get constant feedback on your approach. Use a coach or
colleague as a sounding board for new ideas and practices.
Chapter Structure
As in , each chapter in the describes a step in the change
process. In the interest of providing an evenThe Heart of
Change Field Guide
more practical and hands-on guide to help implement the eight-
step process, I’ve broken down each chapter into the following
logical
and easy-to-understand parts:
Purpose: Defines the nature and aim of the step within the
change process.
Approach: Describes the key activities involved in the step.
Outcomes: Identifies the optimal results of the step.
Key Implementation Challenges: Explores the challenges that
may emerge in the implementation of this step.
Gauging Effectiveness: Provides a diagnostic tool for assessing

the effectiveness of each step as it is implemented.
Suggestions for Improvement: Suggests approaches for
successfully navigating the step.
Communicating in This Step: Defines the focus and challenges
for communicating and getting feedback at each step.
Stories to Remember fromThe Heart of Change: Provides
challenging questions regarding change initiatives by referring
back to some vivid stories from .The Heart of Change
More Resources: Offers suggestions for where to learn more
about the step.
Since this eight-step process is dynamic, and each step in this
book is framed more or less as a self-contained module, feel
free to
turn directly to the step you are interested in reading about. If
you have an interest in learning more about short-term wins
before how
to get your vision right, go straight to the section on short-term
wins. If, however, you are coming to the eight steps for the first
time, it
makes sense to read the chapters in order so you can better
understand the logic and cumulative power of the entire
process. (In fact,
read and as the natural and best introduction to the overall
process.)The Heart of Change Leading Change
Now, on to step 1, increasing urgency!
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

12
The is the result of the work of many of Deloitte Consulting’s
current and past Change Leadership practitioners. InField Guide
particular I would like to thank Lori Paschal, who spent many
hours working with me on the and whose suggestions andField
Guide
insights have proved invaluable. In addition, I would like to
thank Jay Kacholiya, Andrea Heaberg, Gordon Cooper, Adriaan
Jooste,
Kelly Tompkins, Tammy Shaffer, Milt Hakel, Sid Chapon,
Gerry Pulvermacher, and Ronnie Cohen as well as the editorial
staff at
Harvard Business School Press, led by Jeffery Kehoe, for their
assistance in reviewing the manuscript and providing valuable
comments, which assisted me in further organizing the guide.
Finally, I would like to thank Mike Fucci, Jeff Schwartz, Doug
Lattner,
and Ainar Aijala for their support while the was being
written.Field Guide
https://www.ebsco.com/ terms-of-use
13
PART I
Creating a

Climate for
Change
an organization decides to undertake change is to begin
planning immediately forA COMMON SCENARIO WHEN A
LEADER OF
the tactical implementation. Most leaders are quick to devote
time, energy, and resources to redesigning new work processes
or
preparing new technology. However, little energy, if any, is
spent getting the people within the organization ready for
change.
Since the release of , I have traveled around the world talking
with top organizational leaders aboutThe Heart of Change
transformation. Most agree that the most common reason their
initiatives failed was that they did not address the people-
related
challenges—not that they didn’t get the processes right or that
the technology was not ready. If leaders acknowledge that
projects fail
for people-related reasons, why don’t they do something about
it from the beginning of their transformation effort? The answer
is
simple—it takes a lot of time and energy. So instead, they focus
on the aspects that are more tactical and expect people to get on
board.
You’ve probably heard a leader say something like, “This is the
direction we are going, and you just need to accept it and move
on.”
Rarely does this approach result in lasting change.
This is why the first three steps are so important in the eight-
step model—they work collectively to create a climate for
change

within an organization. Without a high degree of energy and
urgency for change at all levels, the workforce will never
embrace
change, and lasting transformation will be harder, if not
impossible, to achieve. By moving beyond the typical project
steering
committee to building multiple guiding teams in all levels of the
organization, you create momentum and build commitment.
Finally,
the third step helps create a climate for change by providing a
vision that people can rally around.
If you fail to create a climate for change, you are putting your
transformation at risk. You give those individuals who choose
to
resist the change effort a solid platform from which to recruit
others—people who would have been supporters if the proper
climate
had been set. Furthermore, even if the change is achieved, it
takes much longer and is more costly in terms of both budget
and effort.
To help you understand how to move through the first three
steps, I encourage you to read the next three chapters, which
focus
exclusively on creating a climate for change within your
organization. As you read these chapters, keep in mind that
maintaining a
climate for change requires you to periodically revisit the
principles from these first three steps throughout the
transformation to
ensure that people do see and feel a supportive climate.

14
1.
2.
3.
STEP 1
Increase Urgency
In successful change efforts, the first step is making sure
sufficient people act with sufficient urgency—with on-your-toes
behavior that looks for
opportunities and problems, that energizes colleagues, that
beams a sense of “let’s go.” Without enough urgency, large-
scale change can become
an exercise in pushing a gigantic boulder up a very tall
mountain.
—from Step 1 of The Heart of Change
Purpose
To bring about significant change, an organization needs
significantly more than the usual effort and commitment from
its people.
Everybody involved needs to believe that change is critical
before they’ll feel motivated to contribute to the effort. In
addition,
creating a clear sense of urgency around the needed change is
crucial to gaining cooperation and sustaining the momentum of

change.
But leaders are often tempted to skip this step. Creating a sense
of urgency takes time and energy, and if the leader has already
developed a concrete business case for the change, why bother?
Our research and practice has shown us time and time again that
while
a concrete business case may be necessary, alone it is not
enough to successfully change behavior; people first have to
and then see
the need to change. To change behavior, leaders need to know
where any fear, anger, or complacency might have built up
withinfeel
the organization, and these emotions must be addressed in the
approach to change. If they are not, the change effort will be in
jeopardy
of not making it out of the gate, and certainly the urgency
needed to sustain the change will not persist in the later stages
of the
process. To jump ahead without the needed level of urgency is
like trying to fly a plane without fuel. Do not make this
mistake!
The dangers are partly built in. Being part of a large and
successful organization may create complacency about the need
for
change and continuous adaptation to changing external
conditions. People often make the natural and human mistake of
believing that
current preeminence in the market will ensure future success.
Ford, Xerox, and IBM were successful leaders in their market
for several
years. It took a Toyota, Canon, and Microsoft to steer them
toward major organizational transformation. To motivate people
to change,

organizations need to instill and maintain a sense of urgency
about the difficulty of maintaining a leadership position in their
market.
In addition, employees need to see that change is not a one-time
event but a continuous process of growth.
Approach
Generating a …
In the final project, you will be developing a change plan for
the "Alaska Airlines: Navigating Change" case study. In The
Heart of Change Field Guide: Tools and Tactics for Leading
Change in Your Organization, Cohen explains what is required
from the leader and other parts of the organization to
incorporate Kotter's steps successfully as a change intervention.
Review the case study "Alaska Airlines: Navigating Change"
and then complete the following: (a) State what actually
occurred in the case regarding Kotter's first two steps of
establishing a sense of urgency and creating the guiding team in
a change effort and (b) address each of the critical elements for
Section II parts A and B in your change effort analysis. Make
sure to include your recommendations for implementing Kotter's
steps 1 and 2.
This milestone will help you build Section I parts A and B of
your final project.
A. Create Urgency (Include all questions in your paper as
headers)
1. Describe a plan to create urgency within the organization and
convince stakeholders that this change needs to take place.
2. What processes currently exist for implementing change?
How will these processes need to be updated for the proposed
change?
3. Describe the strategy you will use to get support from your
employees. How will this strategy be effective?
B. Build a Guiding Coalition (Include all questions in your

paper as headers)
1. Identify who should be involved in this guiding coalition.
Provide rationale for each choice. Kotter likes 50% leaders
(CEO, COO) and 50% managers (Ops, HR) with experience,
while others prefer the composition to be 33% leaders (Shift
supervisors, Pilots), 33% managers, and 33% informal leaders
(baggage handlers, flight attendants), but you can assemble the
guiding coalition as you see fit.
2. Determine steps you can take to ensure commitment from
those involved. Describe those steps.
Submission:
Your paper must be submitted as a 3–6-page Microsoft Word
document with double spacing, 12-point Times New Roman
font, one-inch margins, and at least three sources cited in APA
format. (Include all questions in your paper as headers)

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