This document discusses various approaches to reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) and evaluates their adherence to the SAE RCM Standard. It summarizes the development of RCM since its inception in 1978, the standardization efforts through the SAE, and issues with "streamlined" derivative approaches that claim to achieve similar results faster but omit or change critical steps. The document concludes that streamlined approaches do not fully comply with the SAE Standard and carry risks from an output that is not defensibly derived through the proven RCM process.
Design of modern aircraft structure and the role of ndiDinesh Kumar C
1) The document discusses the design of modern aircraft structure and the role of non-destructive inspection (NDI).
2) Regulations have increasingly required damage tolerance and inspection programs to prevent fatigue cracks and catastrophic failures.
3) Modern designs use principles like multiple load paths and NDI to detect cracks before they spread, allowing inspection intervals and repair.
The document provides a Program Management Plan (PMP) for conducting mid-life maintenance and modernization availabilities on Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) class ships from 2016-2024. Key objectives are to upgrade combat and engineering systems to extend the ships' service lives to 40 years. The PMP establishes an organizational structure and process led by a Program Management Team to plan, coordinate, and execute the availabilities. Major actions include developing Ship Change Documents and installation drawings, conducting condition assessments, and managing risks to modernize seven LHDs within budget and on schedule.
Daedalus Presentation Apa Seminar 2011 AirworthinessMarvalous Health
This presentation was given for a South American audience at the Aeronautical Engineering Seminar held on 18th of March 2011 at the Air Warfare College in Santiago de Chile
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a proven, logical, sensible approach that helps companies improve reliability.
Yet most companies are not getting the return they expected. They see RCM as too much trouble for too little reward.
So that’s why we decided to publish this new report. Find out why RCM doesn’t work, what needs to change and how to put RCM to work at your company so it doesn’t become another Resource Consuming Monster.
Petrolog Limited has clearly defined policies, procedures, and documentation to support its safety management system. This includes a health, safety, environment, and quality policy with objectives and procedures. Management is committed to safety and environmental excellence and strives to continually improve performance. Safety and environmental performance is monitored through key performance indicators and targets are discussed at management meetings onboard and ashore.
The document provides details on an offshore supply vessel including its name, IMO number, country of registration, gross tonnage, date delivered, vessel type, and normal operating region. It lists the vessel's various operational capabilities and includes information on its operator such as the operator's name, address, telephone, and email. The document is a report template for collecting vessel particulars and inspection details following an offshore vessel inspection.
This document discusses recent developments in aging airplane maintenance programs. It provides background on aging concerns as aircraft accumulate flight hours and cycles. Recent regulatory actions include the widespread fatigue damage rule and aging airplane safety rule. Program developments aim to ensure structural airworthiness as fleets age, through supplemental inspections, corrosion prevention, and addressing combined damage from fatigue and corrosion.
Fall Protection Program for Terminal 7DDwayne Kipple
This document establishes a fall protection program for Ports America Terminal 7-D in Tacoma, Washington. It defines responsibilities for a program administrator, competent and qualified persons to oversee fall hazard assessments, training, procedures, equipment inspections, investigations and program evaluations. Specific procedures are outlined for when personnel need to work at heights, including inspections of fall arrest gear, briefings, tie-off points, communication methods and rescue procedures. Incident investigations, equipment checks, and annual program reviews are also addressed to continuously improve fall protection.
Design of modern aircraft structure and the role of ndiDinesh Kumar C
1) The document discusses the design of modern aircraft structure and the role of non-destructive inspection (NDI).
2) Regulations have increasingly required damage tolerance and inspection programs to prevent fatigue cracks and catastrophic failures.
3) Modern designs use principles like multiple load paths and NDI to detect cracks before they spread, allowing inspection intervals and repair.
The document provides a Program Management Plan (PMP) for conducting mid-life maintenance and modernization availabilities on Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) class ships from 2016-2024. Key objectives are to upgrade combat and engineering systems to extend the ships' service lives to 40 years. The PMP establishes an organizational structure and process led by a Program Management Team to plan, coordinate, and execute the availabilities. Major actions include developing Ship Change Documents and installation drawings, conducting condition assessments, and managing risks to modernize seven LHDs within budget and on schedule.
Daedalus Presentation Apa Seminar 2011 AirworthinessMarvalous Health
This presentation was given for a South American audience at the Aeronautical Engineering Seminar held on 18th of March 2011 at the Air Warfare College in Santiago de Chile
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a proven, logical, sensible approach that helps companies improve reliability.
Yet most companies are not getting the return they expected. They see RCM as too much trouble for too little reward.
So that’s why we decided to publish this new report. Find out why RCM doesn’t work, what needs to change and how to put RCM to work at your company so it doesn’t become another Resource Consuming Monster.
Petrolog Limited has clearly defined policies, procedures, and documentation to support its safety management system. This includes a health, safety, environment, and quality policy with objectives and procedures. Management is committed to safety and environmental excellence and strives to continually improve performance. Safety and environmental performance is monitored through key performance indicators and targets are discussed at management meetings onboard and ashore.
The document provides details on an offshore supply vessel including its name, IMO number, country of registration, gross tonnage, date delivered, vessel type, and normal operating region. It lists the vessel's various operational capabilities and includes information on its operator such as the operator's name, address, telephone, and email. The document is a report template for collecting vessel particulars and inspection details following an offshore vessel inspection.
This document discusses recent developments in aging airplane maintenance programs. It provides background on aging concerns as aircraft accumulate flight hours and cycles. Recent regulatory actions include the widespread fatigue damage rule and aging airplane safety rule. Program developments aim to ensure structural airworthiness as fleets age, through supplemental inspections, corrosion prevention, and addressing combined damage from fatigue and corrosion.
Fall Protection Program for Terminal 7DDwayne Kipple
This document establishes a fall protection program for Ports America Terminal 7-D in Tacoma, Washington. It defines responsibilities for a program administrator, competent and qualified persons to oversee fall hazard assessments, training, procedures, equipment inspections, investigations and program evaluations. Specific procedures are outlined for when personnel need to work at heights, including inspections of fall arrest gear, briefings, tie-off points, communication methods and rescue procedures. Incident investigations, equipment checks, and annual program reviews are also addressed to continuously improve fall protection.
Lighter Capital provides $50,000 to $2 million in long-term growth capital to early stage SaaS, software, and technology services companies through RevenueLoans that are more flexible and entrepreneur-friendly than traditional bank loans or venture capital. RevenueLoans have flexible payment terms linked to revenue growth, impose minimal controls, involve no dilution of ownership, and can be obtained within 4 weeks to help companies scale quickly before needing to raise additional equity funding.
El documento presenta un plan de estudios sobre el mercado y el dinero. Resume los siete puntos principales que incluyen: 1) introducir el tema del mercado, 2) definir el concepto de mercado, 3) describir los componentes de oferta y demanda, 4) explicar los elementos que influyen en la oferta y la demanda, 5) describir el equilibrio del mercado, 6) distinguir entre competencia perfecta e imperfecta, y 7) señalar problemas comunes del mercado como las externalidades.
El documento habla sobre el bullying y cómo afecta a la sociedad. Explica que el bullying ocurre en muchos ámbitos como escuelas, lugares de trabajo y relaciones personales. También discute cómo las víctimas de bullying a menudo se sienten tan abusadas que se vuelven violentas, como ocurrió en la masacre de la Universidad de Virginia Tech. Finalmente, critica el bullying que los ciudadanos de Bogotá han sufrido a manos de políticos corruptos que han fallado en proporcionar servicios básicos como transporte público efect
Este documento presenta una clase introductoria sobre conceptos económicos básicos. La clase tiene como objetivo identificar los principales conceptos que sirven a la economía. La ruta de trabajo incluye introducir conceptos básicos de la economía a través de dos actividades. También se discuten conceptos asociados a la geografía económica como la pobreza y el desarrollo económico entre países. Finalmente, se definen varios conceptos económicos clave como mercado, beneficio, producción, productividad, inflación e invers
Inkjet Printers Linearization Using 3D Gradation Curvesatsidaev
This document discusses using gradation curves to linearize inkjet printers. It proposes using 3D gradation trajectories constructed from measuring color fields on test prints at different ink densities. The maximum curvature point of each trajectory determines the optimal maximum ink supply. An algorithm is presented where linearization involves displacing target color points along the trajectories based on the selected linearization parameter, such as maximum curvature. An experiment was conducted on a Mimaki printer printing cyan, magenta, and yellow tones. Comparison to traditional methods showed gradation trajectories can effectively linearize inkjet printing systems and are invariant to the paper-ink combination.
The presentation introduced tools from Perfecto for accelerating mobile and web application development. It covered using Perfecto's cloud lab with Android Studio and DevTunnel for code development. It also discussed integrating Perfecto into continuous integration pipelines with Jenkins using REST APIs or a Jenkins plugin to run Espresso and XCTests on Perfecto. Finally, it explained how Perfecto optimizes the delivery pipeline to improve quality and velocity through visibility, traceability, and fast analysis with DigitalZoom reports.
When working for Petrobras at PRSI (Pasadena Refining System Inc.) I had this opportunity to share my experience as a Maintenance Manager in Brazil with PRSI operators and maintenance crew.
Este documento presenta información sobre la enfermedad gingival. Explica que la gingivitis es la inflamación de la línea de la encía y puede avanzar hasta el hueso y ligamento periodontal. Entre las causas principales se encuentran la placa dental, mala higiene, lesiones por alimentos, tabaquismo, ciclo menstrual, pubertad y diabetes. Describe los signos y síntomas como encías hinchadas, rojas y sangrantes. Finalmente, recomienda el cepillado dental, uso de hilo dental y controles regul
Este documento presenta una guía sobre los problemas sociales y culturales en la sociedad colombiana. Explora temas como las familias de un solo padre, el abuso de drogas y alcohol, la violencia en las escuelas, el materialismo y la obesidad. El objetivo es comprender los desafíos actuales y promover un debate sobre cómo mejorar la calidad de vida.
This document introduces NUTAS, a non-invasive ultrasound tumor ablation system developed through a joint venture between an Indian and Chinese company. NUTAS provides a breast-conserving alternative to surgery for treating breast cancer tumors. It uses high-intensity focused ultrasound to coagulatively necrosis tumor cells without damaging surrounding tissue. Over 138 patients in Delhi have been successfully treated with NUTAS, which can treat tumors across stages and offers benefits like no scarring or risk of infection compared to surgery.
This document provides information about purchasing a 3Com 3C13634A router from Launch 3 Telecom. It describes the product, payment and shipping options, warranty, and additional services offered by Launch 3 such as repairs, maintenance contracts, and equipment deinstallation. Customers can purchase the router by phone, email, or online form and receive same-day shipping with tracking for orders placed before 3PM EST.
The asquith group case study some statisticsasalarsson
According to statistics, 21% of young Australians do not complete secondary school, and those who do not finish are far more likely to be unemployed. In 2011, 35% of 20-24 year olds in Victoria whose highest level was Year 11 or below were unemployed or not in the workforce. Youth unemployment rates are at their highest since the 1990s in Australia and Victoria. Disengagement from education and unemployment among youth are costly, estimated to cost Australia $2.6 billion per year in higher social welfare, health, and crime prevention costs as well as lower tax revenue and productivity. Inner metropolitan areas of Melbourne also experience issues, with the Education Engagement Partnership encountering 40% of young people they assisted in 2014
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a proven, logical, sensible approach that helps companies improve reliability. Yet most companies are not getting the return they expected. They see RCM as too much trouble for too little reward.
So that’s why we decided to publish this new report. Find out why RCM doesn’t work, what needs to change and how to put RCM to work at your company so it doesn’t become another Resource Consuming Monster.
Nowlan and Howard Heap published “Reliability Centered Maintenance”, the ground-breaking study that changed maintenance forever. Yet myth, mystery and confusion about RCM still abound.
So let’s begin with the basic truths. To paraphrase RCM practitioner, Doug Plucknette, of GPAllied, RCM is a structured process developed to ensure the designed safety and reliability capabilities of a process or piece of equipment. The beauty of understanding the RCM process is it can be applied to virtually any physical asset in any plant around the world.
RCM’s roots go back to the early 1960’s, when the commercial airline companies were considering buying the new jumbo jet, the Boeing 747. At the time, the airlines religiously practiced time-based preventive maintenance. Why? Because the conventional wisdom was that equipment wears out over time. So that meant taking planes out of service for maintenance every 1,000, 5,000 or 10,000 hours.
But the problem with the 747’s was the amount of maintenance specified by federal regulators was three times more than the maintenance required for Boeing 707’s. That meant more time in maintenance, more time out of service, and a huge disruption to operations.
Clearly, the airlines’ traditional approach to maintenance would not be economically feasible for the new jumbo jets.
So the airlines had two choices: Either buy a larger fleet of planes or develop a more economical approach to maintenance.
That’s why United Airlines led a task force to re-evaluate the concept of preventive maintenance and determine the most economic strategy, without compromising safety. The result was the process that we now know as RCM, which was successfully employed on the 747 and all subsequent jet aircraft.
The document discusses the evolution and development of reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) over time. It describes how early RCM practices in the US aviation industry led to the development of decision diagrams and maintenance programs. This includes the influential Nowlan and Heap report that introduced the term RCM. It then outlines key publications and standards that helped refine and apply RCM methods more broadly across industries and countries throughout the 1980s-2000s.
This document discusses remediation and repair techniques for offshore structures. It begins by introducing structural integrity management and how strengthening, modification, and repair is part of that process. It then discusses various remediation and repair techniques that can be used for offshore structures, including local repairs that do not change the load path and global repairs that do change the load path. Specific techniques are mapped to different types of defects that may be present. Factors to consider when selecting a repair technique include technical feasibility, operational impacts, and cost-effectiveness. The document provides an overview of assessment and evaluation processes to determine if repair is necessary and the appropriate scope of work.
The Australian Defence Force engaged Baines Simmons to help prepare for the transition to adopting the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs) within its Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASRs) by 2018. Baines Simmons provided training to over 50 Defence staff to aid understanding of EMAR 21 and differences from the European Aviation Safety Agency requirements. They also assisted the Directorate General Technical Airworthiness with customizing EMAR 21 implementation and supported defence organizations to develop documentation required for approval under the new regulations. Initial training phases helped stakeholders better understand principles of the regulations and their application in the military domain.
1) IEC 61508 is an international standard for functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic safety-related systems. It standardizes safety requirements and assessment methodologies that can be applied across industries.
2) The nuclear industry could benefit from using components certified to IEC 61508, as it offers advantages in technical rigor and economics. Components certified as SIL 2 or higher have undergone reliability and correctness assessments that align with nuclear industry needs.
3) IEC 61508 certification of individual components, like sensors, controllers, and actuators, remains compatible with existing nuclear safety system requirements and could facilitate commercial-grade dedication or suitability evaluations for digital equipment.
This document discusses how to make root cause failure analysis (RCFA) a successful business improvement strategy. It notes that while many companies adopt RCFA, they often abandon it when they do not see benefits. RCFA is more effective at finding systematic causes of problems and improving business systems rather than solving individual problems. The document outlines how RCFA works best when the learnings are used to improve broader business processes, not just fix single issues. It provides an example of how taking learnings from an RCFA and implementing them company-wide can prevent numerous future failures and significantly improve performance and profits over the long run.
Lighter Capital provides $50,000 to $2 million in long-term growth capital to early stage SaaS, software, and technology services companies through RevenueLoans that are more flexible and entrepreneur-friendly than traditional bank loans or venture capital. RevenueLoans have flexible payment terms linked to revenue growth, impose minimal controls, involve no dilution of ownership, and can be obtained within 4 weeks to help companies scale quickly before needing to raise additional equity funding.
El documento presenta un plan de estudios sobre el mercado y el dinero. Resume los siete puntos principales que incluyen: 1) introducir el tema del mercado, 2) definir el concepto de mercado, 3) describir los componentes de oferta y demanda, 4) explicar los elementos que influyen en la oferta y la demanda, 5) describir el equilibrio del mercado, 6) distinguir entre competencia perfecta e imperfecta, y 7) señalar problemas comunes del mercado como las externalidades.
El documento habla sobre el bullying y cómo afecta a la sociedad. Explica que el bullying ocurre en muchos ámbitos como escuelas, lugares de trabajo y relaciones personales. También discute cómo las víctimas de bullying a menudo se sienten tan abusadas que se vuelven violentas, como ocurrió en la masacre de la Universidad de Virginia Tech. Finalmente, critica el bullying que los ciudadanos de Bogotá han sufrido a manos de políticos corruptos que han fallado en proporcionar servicios básicos como transporte público efect
Este documento presenta una clase introductoria sobre conceptos económicos básicos. La clase tiene como objetivo identificar los principales conceptos que sirven a la economía. La ruta de trabajo incluye introducir conceptos básicos de la economía a través de dos actividades. También se discuten conceptos asociados a la geografía económica como la pobreza y el desarrollo económico entre países. Finalmente, se definen varios conceptos económicos clave como mercado, beneficio, producción, productividad, inflación e invers
Inkjet Printers Linearization Using 3D Gradation Curvesatsidaev
This document discusses using gradation curves to linearize inkjet printers. It proposes using 3D gradation trajectories constructed from measuring color fields on test prints at different ink densities. The maximum curvature point of each trajectory determines the optimal maximum ink supply. An algorithm is presented where linearization involves displacing target color points along the trajectories based on the selected linearization parameter, such as maximum curvature. An experiment was conducted on a Mimaki printer printing cyan, magenta, and yellow tones. Comparison to traditional methods showed gradation trajectories can effectively linearize inkjet printing systems and are invariant to the paper-ink combination.
The presentation introduced tools from Perfecto for accelerating mobile and web application development. It covered using Perfecto's cloud lab with Android Studio and DevTunnel for code development. It also discussed integrating Perfecto into continuous integration pipelines with Jenkins using REST APIs or a Jenkins plugin to run Espresso and XCTests on Perfecto. Finally, it explained how Perfecto optimizes the delivery pipeline to improve quality and velocity through visibility, traceability, and fast analysis with DigitalZoom reports.
When working for Petrobras at PRSI (Pasadena Refining System Inc.) I had this opportunity to share my experience as a Maintenance Manager in Brazil with PRSI operators and maintenance crew.
Este documento presenta información sobre la enfermedad gingival. Explica que la gingivitis es la inflamación de la línea de la encía y puede avanzar hasta el hueso y ligamento periodontal. Entre las causas principales se encuentran la placa dental, mala higiene, lesiones por alimentos, tabaquismo, ciclo menstrual, pubertad y diabetes. Describe los signos y síntomas como encías hinchadas, rojas y sangrantes. Finalmente, recomienda el cepillado dental, uso de hilo dental y controles regul
Este documento presenta una guía sobre los problemas sociales y culturales en la sociedad colombiana. Explora temas como las familias de un solo padre, el abuso de drogas y alcohol, la violencia en las escuelas, el materialismo y la obesidad. El objetivo es comprender los desafíos actuales y promover un debate sobre cómo mejorar la calidad de vida.
This document introduces NUTAS, a non-invasive ultrasound tumor ablation system developed through a joint venture between an Indian and Chinese company. NUTAS provides a breast-conserving alternative to surgery for treating breast cancer tumors. It uses high-intensity focused ultrasound to coagulatively necrosis tumor cells without damaging surrounding tissue. Over 138 patients in Delhi have been successfully treated with NUTAS, which can treat tumors across stages and offers benefits like no scarring or risk of infection compared to surgery.
This document provides information about purchasing a 3Com 3C13634A router from Launch 3 Telecom. It describes the product, payment and shipping options, warranty, and additional services offered by Launch 3 such as repairs, maintenance contracts, and equipment deinstallation. Customers can purchase the router by phone, email, or online form and receive same-day shipping with tracking for orders placed before 3PM EST.
The asquith group case study some statisticsasalarsson
According to statistics, 21% of young Australians do not complete secondary school, and those who do not finish are far more likely to be unemployed. In 2011, 35% of 20-24 year olds in Victoria whose highest level was Year 11 or below were unemployed or not in the workforce. Youth unemployment rates are at their highest since the 1990s in Australia and Victoria. Disengagement from education and unemployment among youth are costly, estimated to cost Australia $2.6 billion per year in higher social welfare, health, and crime prevention costs as well as lower tax revenue and productivity. Inner metropolitan areas of Melbourne also experience issues, with the Education Engagement Partnership encountering 40% of young people they assisted in 2014
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a proven, logical, sensible approach that helps companies improve reliability. Yet most companies are not getting the return they expected. They see RCM as too much trouble for too little reward.
So that’s why we decided to publish this new report. Find out why RCM doesn’t work, what needs to change and how to put RCM to work at your company so it doesn’t become another Resource Consuming Monster.
Nowlan and Howard Heap published “Reliability Centered Maintenance”, the ground-breaking study that changed maintenance forever. Yet myth, mystery and confusion about RCM still abound.
So let’s begin with the basic truths. To paraphrase RCM practitioner, Doug Plucknette, of GPAllied, RCM is a structured process developed to ensure the designed safety and reliability capabilities of a process or piece of equipment. The beauty of understanding the RCM process is it can be applied to virtually any physical asset in any plant around the world.
RCM’s roots go back to the early 1960’s, when the commercial airline companies were considering buying the new jumbo jet, the Boeing 747. At the time, the airlines religiously practiced time-based preventive maintenance. Why? Because the conventional wisdom was that equipment wears out over time. So that meant taking planes out of service for maintenance every 1,000, 5,000 or 10,000 hours.
But the problem with the 747’s was the amount of maintenance specified by federal regulators was three times more than the maintenance required for Boeing 707’s. That meant more time in maintenance, more time out of service, and a huge disruption to operations.
Clearly, the airlines’ traditional approach to maintenance would not be economically feasible for the new jumbo jets.
So the airlines had two choices: Either buy a larger fleet of planes or develop a more economical approach to maintenance.
That’s why United Airlines led a task force to re-evaluate the concept of preventive maintenance and determine the most economic strategy, without compromising safety. The result was the process that we now know as RCM, which was successfully employed on the 747 and all subsequent jet aircraft.
The document discusses the evolution and development of reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) over time. It describes how early RCM practices in the US aviation industry led to the development of decision diagrams and maintenance programs. This includes the influential Nowlan and Heap report that introduced the term RCM. It then outlines key publications and standards that helped refine and apply RCM methods more broadly across industries and countries throughout the 1980s-2000s.
This document discusses remediation and repair techniques for offshore structures. It begins by introducing structural integrity management and how strengthening, modification, and repair is part of that process. It then discusses various remediation and repair techniques that can be used for offshore structures, including local repairs that do not change the load path and global repairs that do change the load path. Specific techniques are mapped to different types of defects that may be present. Factors to consider when selecting a repair technique include technical feasibility, operational impacts, and cost-effectiveness. The document provides an overview of assessment and evaluation processes to determine if repair is necessary and the appropriate scope of work.
The Australian Defence Force engaged Baines Simmons to help prepare for the transition to adopting the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs) within its Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASRs) by 2018. Baines Simmons provided training to over 50 Defence staff to aid understanding of EMAR 21 and differences from the European Aviation Safety Agency requirements. They also assisted the Directorate General Technical Airworthiness with customizing EMAR 21 implementation and supported defence organizations to develop documentation required for approval under the new regulations. Initial training phases helped stakeholders better understand principles of the regulations and their application in the military domain.
1) IEC 61508 is an international standard for functional safety of electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic safety-related systems. It standardizes safety requirements and assessment methodologies that can be applied across industries.
2) The nuclear industry could benefit from using components certified to IEC 61508, as it offers advantages in technical rigor and economics. Components certified as SIL 2 or higher have undergone reliability and correctness assessments that align with nuclear industry needs.
3) IEC 61508 certification of individual components, like sensors, controllers, and actuators, remains compatible with existing nuclear safety system requirements and could facilitate commercial-grade dedication or suitability evaluations for digital equipment.
This document discusses how to make root cause failure analysis (RCFA) a successful business improvement strategy. It notes that while many companies adopt RCFA, they often abandon it when they do not see benefits. RCFA is more effective at finding systematic causes of problems and improving business systems rather than solving individual problems. The document outlines how RCFA works best when the learnings are used to improve broader business processes, not just fix single issues. It provides an example of how taking learnings from an RCFA and implementing them company-wide can prevent numerous future failures and significantly improve performance and profits over the long run.
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a proven, logical, sensible approach that helps companies improve reliability. Yet most companies are not getting the return they expected. They see RCM as too much trouble for too little reward. So that’s why we decided to publish this new report. Find out why RCM doesn't work, what needs to change and how to put RCM to work at your company so it doesn't become another Resource Consuming Monster.
We know RCM works however I wanted to share with you the 5 Biggest Mistakes people make using Reliability Centered Maintenance. Love to hear your comments or tell us what you have seen work and not work.
This document discusses best practices for applying risk-based inspection (RBI) as part of plant integrity management. It was commissioned by the UK Health and Safety Executive to define the RBI process, requirements, and methods, and to provide guidance and an audit tool to evaluate RBI implementation. The report applies RBI principles to pressure equipment and hazardous material systems regulated in the UK. It views RBI as one component of broader integrity management and evaluates RBI practices in the current regulatory context, focusing on management rather than specific techniques. Key themes discussed include identifying what is known versus unknown about equipment, and validating the quality and accuracy of available information.
The formation of the Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG) in September 2007 was designed
to meet the need for an effective framework for interaction between industry, trade unions and
the COMAH Competent Authority (CA); a framework in which they could carry out a dialogue to
jointly develop, progress and implement meaningful, effective recommendations and practices that
improve safety in our industries.
This report and its recommendations represent the outcome of a tremendous amount of work by
the industry, trade unions and the regulator. I would like to thank them for all their efforts, tenacity
and input. Our work can and will make a significant contribution to improving process safety – the
challenge for all of us now is to deliver!
The drilling company was struggling with regulatory compliance for its offshore drilling fleet in Australia. A inspection found the company to be out of compliance, which could result in rig shutdowns costing $1.5 million per day. The company partnered with Life Cycle Engineering to develop performance standards and maintenance plans to improve safety and compliance. As a result of this partnership, the drilling company's maintenance system was transformed from non-compliant to world class within a year, avoiding potential shutdowns.
This document summarizes a paper that proposes a new methodology called Failure Modes, Mechanisms and Effects Analysis (FMMEA) to enhance traditional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The standard FMEA process does not identify failure mechanisms or models, limiting its usefulness. FMMEA identifies high priority failure mechanisms and models to help control operational stresses and test product reliability. It was applied to an electronic circuit board assembly in an automotive underhood environment. The full paper discusses the limitations of FMEA and how identifying failure mechanisms can help with virtual qualification, root cause analysis, accelerated testing, and remaining life assessment.
This document discusses an evaluation of alternative approaches to reliability centered maintenance (RCM). It begins with an introduction to RCM and its classical approach. It then discusses five categories of RCM alternatives identified from literature: 1) mixes of approaches, 2) simplification of analysis, 3) optimization methods, 4) broad alternative methodologies, and 5) mathematical models. The document outlines several specific alternative approaches that fall into each of these categories. It then describes the methodology used to evaluate the alternative approaches based on parameters developed from literature expectations of maintenance strategies.
Operations research (O.R.) is commonly misunderstood as only involving mathematical tools, but it actually takes a broader, systematic approach to problem solving using analytical tools. While O.R. has received some criticism, examples demonstrate its effectiveness in improving productivity across various applications, including production planning, gasoline blending, scheduling flexible manufacturing systems, fleet assignment for airlines, and enhancing customer service and productivity in banking. The chapter urges industrial engineers to study O.R. to understand how it can improve productivity.
Operational discipline in practices - Build the safety cultureRonachai Fuangfoong
The document discusses various methods to improve operational discipline in chemical process industries, including conducting floor level meetings to identify risks, performing job cycle checks to ensure standard operating procedures are followed, conducting daily safety audits to identify hazards, and incorporating consequence analyses into work instructions to understand safe operating limits and emergency response. It provides examples of completed forms for a floor level meeting, job cycle check, risk assessment, daily safety audit, and consequence analysis to demonstrate how these methods can be implemented.
This document discusses implementing lean philosophy in aircraft maintenance to eliminate waste. It first reviews literature on lean implementation in various industries. It then describes the problem environment of aircraft maintenance processes and provides an overview of lean philosophies, including defining value-adding, non-value-adding and necessary but non-value adding activities. It presents a case study of an aircraft industry in India and discusses observed non-value adding activities like frequent inspections increasing service time and long set-up times of components. Finally, it proposes using value stream mapping to visualize the current process and identify sources of waste to guide improving the future state.
This document discusses implementing lean philosophy in aircraft maintenance to eliminate waste. It reviews literature on applying lean principles in manufacturing. The author proposes using value stream mapping to visualize non-value added activities in a maintenance organization's processes. A case study of an aircraft industry applying lean is described. The paper concludes lean implementation can optimize maintenance operations with minimal investment.
This document provides copyright information for the book "Reliability-Centered Maintenance" including details on the publisher, years of publication, rights reserved, and printing details. It acknowledges the book is dedicated to Edith and lists the table of contents which covers topics such as functions, failure modes and effects analysis, failure consequences, proactive maintenance tasks, and implementing RCM recommendations.
The document provides guidance on leak detection techniques for above-ground storage tanks. It describes 10 different leak detection methods including gas detection within the tank bund, liquid point detectors around the tank base or in the bund floor, and interface detectors in sumps or interceptors. The techniques provide potential benefits like early detection of leaks to reduce risks from vapour clouds or pool fires. Considerations include positioning of detectors and limitations of certain techniques. Claiming risk reduction requires justification of response procedures.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Manual.
- The role and function of FMEA.
- Concepts and techniques of Design FMEA and how to apply it.
- Concepts and techniques of Process FMEA and how to apply it.
- The role and function of FTA.
- Concepts of Zero Quality Control and Mistake Proofing and its implications for FMEA.
This document discusses Hydro-Quebec's efforts to optimize the preventive maintenance program at their Gentilly-2 Nuclear Power Plant. It describes developing an integrated equipment reliability process focused on rationalizing preventive maintenance tasks based on criticality and cost-effectiveness. The document outlines applying a preventive maintenance optimization approach based on reliability centered maintenance principles and tools like the EPRI PM Basis Database. This involves analyzing existing tasks, critical equipment, failure modes and setting optimized task frequencies. It also discusses integrating performance monitoring and continuous improvement to form a comprehensive, living equipment reliability process meeting regulatory requirements.
Open Channel Flow: fluid flow with a free surfaceIndrajeet sahu
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reach in time. Our project will provide an optimum solution to this draw back. A piezo electric
sensor can be used as a crash or rollover detector of the vehicle during and after a crash. With
signals from a piezo electric sensor, a severe accident can be recognized. According to this
project when a vehicle meets with an accident immediately piezo electric sensor will detect the
signal or if a car rolls over. Then with the help of GSM module and GPS module, the location
will be sent to the emergency contact. Then after conforming the location necessary action will
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The case against streamlined rcm
1. The Case Against Streamlined RCM
By John Moubray
In 1978, a report1
was prepared for the US Department of Defense describing the then current
state of the process. The report was written by F Stanley Nowlan and Howard Heap of United
Airlines. It was entitled "Reliability-centered Maintenance", or RCM. It formed the basis of the
maintenance strategy formulation process called MSG32
. MSG3 was first promulgated in 1980,
and in slightly modified form, it is used to this day by the international commercial aviation
industry. In the early 1980's, RCM as described by Nowlan and Heap also began to be used in
industries other than aviation.
It soon became apparent that no other comparable technique exists for identifying the true,
safe mini-mum of what must be done to preserve the functions of physical assets. As a result,
RCM has now been used by thousands of organizations spanning nearly every major field of
organized human endeavour. It is becoming as fundamental to the practice of physical asset
management as double-entry bookkeeping is to financial asset management.
The growing popularity of RCM has led to the development of numerous derivatives. As we
see later in this paper, some of these derivatives are refinements and enhancements of
Nowlan and Heap's original RCM process. However, less rigorous derivatives have also
2. emerged, most of which are attempts to ‘streamline' the maintenance strategy formulation
process. This paper reviews some of the most common forms of streamlining. It concludes by
suggesting that from the viewpoints of risk and the defensibility of the output, there is simply no
place for shortcuts in the formulation of maintenance strategies.
In order to place a review of these techniques in context, the next two sections of this paper
consider the recently-published SAE RCM Standard3
and recent developments in the
regulatory world.
2 The SAE RCM Standard
As mentioned above, various derivatives of Nowlan and Heap's RCM process have emerged
since their report was published in 1978. Many of these derivatives retain the key elements of
the original process. However the widespread use of the term "RCM" led to the emergence of
a number of processes that differ significantly from the original, but that their proponents also
call "RCM". Many of these other processes either omit key steps of the process described by
Nowlan and Heap, or change their sequence, or both. Consequently, despite claims to the
contrary made by the proponents of these processes, the output differs markedly from what
would be obtained by conducting a full, rigorous RCM analysis.
A growing awareness of these differences led to an increasing demand for a standard that set
out the criteria any process must comply with in order to be called "RCM". Such a standard
was published by the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) in 1999. An article4
by Dana
Netherton, Chairman of the SAE RCM Committee, described the evolution of RCM between
1978 and 1990, and then went on to describe the evolution of the SAE Standard as quoted in
the italicised paragraphs below:
The Need for a Standard: the 1990s
Since the early 1990's, a great many more organisations have developed variations of the
RCM process. Some, such as the US Naval Air Command with its ‘Guidelines for the Naval
Aviation Reliability Centered Maintenance Process (NAVAIR 00-25-403)5
' and the British Royal
Navy with its RCM-oriented Naval Engineering Standard (NES45)6
, have remained true to the
process originally expounded by Nowlan and Heap. However, as the RCM bandwagon has
started rolling, a whole new collection of processes has emerged that are called "RCM" by
their proponents, but that often bear little or no resemblance to the original meticulously
researched, highly structured and thoroughly proven process developed by Nowlan and Heap.
As a result, if an organisation said that it wanted help in using or learning how to use RCM, it
could not be sure what process would be offered.
Indeed, when the US Navy recently asked for equipment vendors to use RCM when building a
new ship class, one US company offered a process closely related to the 1970 MSG-2
process. It defended its offering by noting that its process used a decision-logic diagram. Since
RCM also uses a decision-logic diagram, the company argued, its process was an RCM
process.
3. The US Navy had no answer to this argument, because in 1994 William Perry, the US
Secretary of Defense, had established a new policy about US military standards and
specifications, which said that the US military would no longer require industrial vendors to use
the military's ‘standard' or ‘specific' processes. Instead it would set performance requirements,
and would allow vendors to use any processes that would provide equipment that would meet
these requirements.
At a stroke, this voided the US military standards and specifications that defined "RCM". The
US Air Force standard was cancelled in 1995. The US Navy has been unable to invoke its
standards and specifications with equipment vendors (though it continues to use them for its
internal work) - and it was unable to invoke them with the US company that wished to use
MSG-2.
This development happened to coincide with the sudden interest in RCM in the industrial
world. During the 1990s, magazines and conferences devoted to equipment maintenance have
multiplied, and magazine articles and conference papers about RCM became more and more
numerous. These have shown that very different processes are being given the same name,
"RCM". So both the US military and commercial industry saw a need to define what an RCM
process is.
In his 1994 memorandum, Perry said, "I encourage the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology) to form partnerships with industry associations to develop non-
government standards for replacement of military standards where practicable." Indeed, the
Technical Standards Board of the SAE has had a long and close relationship with the
standards community in the US military, and has been working for several years to help
develop commercial standards to replace military standards and specifications, when needed
and when none already existed.
So in 1996 the SAE began working on an RCM-related standard, when it invited a group of
representatives from the US Navy aviation and ship RCM communities to help it develop a
standard for Scheduled Maintenance Programs. These US Navy representatives had already
been meeting for about a year in an effort to develop a US Navy RCM process that might be
common between the aviation and ship communities, so they had already done a considerable
amount of work when they began to meet under SAE sponsorship. In late 1997, having gained
members from commercial industry, the group realised that it was better to focus entirely on
RCM. In 1998, the group found the best approach for its standard, and in 1999 it completed its
draft of the standard, and the SAE approved it and published it.
After a brief discussion about the practical difficulties associated with attempting to develop a
universal standard of this nature, Netherton went on to say:
The standard now approved by the SAE does not present a standard process. Its title is,
"Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) Processes (SAE JA1011)."
This standard presents criteria against which a process may be compared. If the process
meets the criteria, it may confidently be called an "RCM process." If it does not, it should not.
(This does not necessarily mean that processes that do not comply with the SAE RCM
4. standard are not valid processes for maintenance strategy formulation. It simply means that
the term "RCM" should not be applied to them.)
The italicised paragraph below quotes Section 5 of the Standard, which summarises the key
attributes of any RCM process as follows.
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM)-Any RCM process shall ensure that all of the
following seven questions are answered satisfactorily and are answered in the sequence
shown below:
a. What are the functions and associated desired standards of performance of the asset
in its present operating context (functions)?
b. In what ways can it fail to fulfil its functions (functional failures)?
c. What causes each functional failure (failure modes)?
d. What happens when each failure occurs (failure effects)?
e. In what way does each failure matter (failure consequences)?
f. What should be done to predict or prevent each failure (proactive tasks and task
intervals)?
g. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found (default actions)?
To answer each of the above questions "satisfactorily", the following information shall be
gathered, and the following decisions shall be made. All information and decisions shall be
documented in a way which makes the information and the decisions fully available to and
acceptable to the owner or user of the asset.
Subsequent sections of the Standard list the issues that any true RCM process must address
in order to answer each of the seven questions "satisfactorily". However, the key words in
Section 5 of the Standard are in the first sentence. They are: ‘any', ‘all' and ‘in the sequence
shown below'. They mean that if any process that does not answer all the questions in the
sequence shown (and which does not answer them satisfactorily in compliance with the rest of
the standard), then that process is not RCM.
None of the streamlined "RCM" processes comply fully with the requirements of section 5 of
the SAE Standard. The implications of this point are discussed in more detail later.
3 Regulatory Issues
The reaction of society as a whole to equipment failures is changing at warp speed as we
move into the 21st century. However, it has attracted surprisingly little comment within the
5. physical asset management community so it is worth reviewing some of the highlights.
The changes began with sweeping legislation governing industrial safety, mainly in the 1970's.
Among the best known examples of such legislation are the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 in the United States and the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 in the United
Kingdom. These Acts are fairly general in nature, and similar laws have been passed in nearly
all the major industrialised countries. Their intent is to ensure that employers provide a
generally safe working environment for their employees.
These Acts were followed by a series of more specific safety-oriented laws and regulations
such as OSHA Regulation Nº 1910.119: "Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals" in the United States and the "Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
Regulations" in the United Kingdom. Both of these regulations were first promulgated in the
early to mid-1990's. They are noteworthy examples of a then-new requirement for the users of
hazardous materials to perform formal analyses or assessments of the associated systems,
and to document the analyses for subsequent inspection if necessary by regulators.
These two sets of developments represent a steady increase in legal requirements to exercise
- and to be able to show that we are exercising - responsible custodianship of the assets under
our control. They have placed a significant burden on the managers of the assets concerned.
However, they reflect the steadily rising expectations of society in terms of industrial safety and
we have no choice but to comply as best we can.
It would be nice if it all ended there, but unfortunately this tide has not stopped rising. The late
1990's have seen even more changes, this time concerning the sanctions that society now
wishes to impose if things go wrong. Until the mid-90's, if a failure occurred whose
consequences were serious enough to warrant criminal proceedings, these proceedings
usually ended at worst with a substantial fine imposed on the organisation found to be at fault,
and the matter - at least from the criminal point of view - usually ended there. (Occasionally,
the organisation's permit to operate was withdrawn, as in the case of the ValuJet airline after
the crash in Florida on 11 May 1996. This effectively put the airline out of business in its then-
current form.)
However, following recent disasters, a movement is now developing not only to punish the
organisations concerned, but also to impose criminal sanctions on individual managers. In
other words, under certain circum-stances, individual managers can be sent to prison in
connection with equipment failures that have sufficiently nasty consequences.
Following the Paddington rail crash7
that occurred in 1999, the Law Commission of the United
Kingdom has proposed that the laws governing involuntary manslaughter be revised to cover
three new categories of crime, one of which is to be called ‘corporate killing'8
. Depending on
the circumstances, any one of these categories may be invoked in the event of an industrial
accident that results in the death of a person. Penal-ties range from permanent disqualification
from acting in a management role in any undertaking carrying on a business or activity in the
UK, to life imprisonment.
6. In the United States, following the outcry about the accidents involving tire tread separation on
SUV's, section 30170 of the "Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Defect Notification Act" was
revised in October 2000 to include prison sentences of up to 15 years for "directors, officers or
agents" of vehicle manufacturers who commit specified offences in connection with vehicles
that fail in a way that causes death or bodily injury.
There is considerable controversy about the reasonableness of these initiatives, and even
some doubt about their ultimate enforceability. However, from the point of view of people
involved in the management of physical assets, the issue is not what is reasonable, but that we
are increasingly being held personally accountable for actions that we take on behalf of our
employers. Not only that, but if we are called to account in the event of a serious incident, it will
be in circumstances that could culminate in jail sentences.
Perhaps the most startling legislative developments of all were triggered by an industrial
accident that occurred in Australia. Following the Longford disaster9
in September 1998 in the
state of Victoria, the Victorian State Parliament on 13 November 1998 added a new section to
the State of Victoria Evidence Act of 1958 which reads as follows:
"19D. Legal professional privilege
(1) Despite anything to the contrary in this Division, if a person is required by a commission to
answer a question or produce a document or thing, the person is not excused from complying
with the requirement on the ground that the answer to the question would disclose, or the
document contains, or the thing discloses, matter in respect of which the person could claim
legal professional privilege.
(2) The commissioner may require the person to comply with the requirement at a hearing of
the commis-sion from which the public, or specified persons, are excluded in accordance with
section 19B."
In essence, this amendment suspended attorney/client confidentiality for the purposes of the
Longford - and subsequent - official inquiries.
Not only this, but state governments of Victoria and Queensland are considering legislation to
deal with "Industrial Manslaughter (Vic)" and "Corporate Culpability (Qld)" as both
governments believe that their current legislation does not deal adequately with industrial
incidents causing death or serious injury. Victoria is leading the way after the Longford
incident. These proposed laws go further than the laws in the UK and the USA, in that the
concept of "aggregation of negligence" is introduced. This allows the aggregation of actions
and omissions of a group of employees and managers to establish that an organisation is
negligent. Both governments have made it clear that if managers and/or a management
system fails to prevent workplace death or serious injury, then the responsible manager and/or
management team is likely to face criminal prosecution. If the legislation proceeds, penalties of
over $500,000 and 7 years imprisonment are proposed.
The message to us all is that society is getting so sick of industrial accidents with serious
consequences that not only is it seeking to call individuals as well as corporations to account,
but that it is prepared to alter well-established principles of jurisprudence to do so. Under these
7. circumstances, everyone involved in the management of physical assets needs to take greater
care than ever to ensure that every step they take in executing their official duties is beyond
reproach. It is becoming professionally suicidal to do otherwise.
4 Streamlined RCM
The author and his associates have helped companies to apply true RCM on more than 1 500
sites spanning 44 countries and nearly every form of organised human endeavour. We have
found that when true RCM has been correctly applied by well-trained individuals working on
clearly defined and properly managed pro-jects, the analyses have usually paid for themselves
in between two weeks and two months. This is a very rapid payback indeed.
However, despite this rapid payback, some individuals and organisations have expended a
great deal of energy on attempts to reduce the time and resources needed to apply the RCM
process. The results of these attempts are generally known as ‘streamlined' RCM techniques.
This section of this paper outlines the main features of some of the most widely touted
‘streamlined' approaches to RCM. In all cases, the proponents of these techniques claim that
their principal advantage is that they achieve similar results to something which they call
‘classical' RCM, but that they do so in much less time and at much lower cost. However, not
only is this claim questionable, but all of the streamlined techniques have other drawbacks,
some quite serious. These drawbacks are also highlighted in the following paragraphs.
4.1 Retroactive RCM approaches
The most popular method of ‘streamlining' the RCM process starts not by defining the
functions of the asset (as specified in the SAE Standard), but starts with the existing
maintenance tasks. Users of this approach try to identify the failure mode that each task is
supposed to be preventing, and then work forward again through the last three steps of the
RCM decision process to re-examine the consequences of each failure and (hope-fully) to
identify a more cost-effective failure management policy. This approach is what is most often
meant when the term ‘streamlined RCM'10
is used. It is also known as "backfit" RCM11
or "RCM
in reverse".
Retroactive approaches are superficially very appealing, so much so that the author tried them
himself on numerous occasions when he was new to RCM. However, in reality they are also
among the most dangerous of the streamlined methodologies, for the following reasons:
- they assume that existing maintenance programs cover just about all the failure modes that
are reasonably likely to require some sort of preventive maintenance. In the case of every
maintenance program that I have encountered to date, this assumption is simply not valid. If
RCM is applied correctly, it transpires that nowhere near all of the failure modes that actually
require PM are covered by existing maintenance tasks. As a result, a considerable number of
tasks have to be added. Most of the tasks that are added apply to protective devices, as
discussed below. (Other tasks are eliminated because they are found to be unnecessary, or
8. the type of task is changed, or the frequency is changed. The nett effect is usually a reduction
in perceived overall PM workloads, typically by between 40% and 70%.)
- when applying retroactive RCM, it is often very difficult to identify exactly what failure cause
motivated the selection of a particular task, so much so that either inordinate amounts of time
are wasted trying to establish the real connection, or sweeping assumptions are made that
very often prove to be wrong. These two problems alone make this approach an extremely
shaky foundation upon which to build a maintenance program.
- in re-assessing the consequences of each failure mode, it is still necessary to ask whether
"the loss of function caused by the failure mode will become evident to the operating crew
under normal circum-stances". This question can only be answered by establishing what
function is actually lost when the fail-ure occurs. This in turn means that the people doing the
analysis have to start identifying functions anyway, but they are now trying to do so on an ad
hoc basis halfway through the analysis (and they are not usually trained in how to identify
functions correctly in the first place because this approach considers the function identification
step to be unnecessary). If they do not, they start making even more sweeping - and hence
often incorrect - assumptions that add to the shakiness of the results.
- retroactive approaches are especially weak on specifying appropriate maintenance for
protective devices. As stated by the author in his book12
: "at the time of writing, many existing
maintenance programs provide for fewer than one third of protective devices to receive any
attention at all (and then usually at inappropriate intervals). The people who operate and
maintain the plant covered by these programs are aware that another third of these devices
exist but pay them no attention, while it is not unusual to find that no-one even knows that the
final third exist. This lack of awareness and attention means that most of the protective devices
in industry - our last line of protection when things go wrong - are maintained poorly or not at
all." So if one uses a retroactive approach to RCM, in most cases a great many protective
devices will continue to receive no attention in the future because no tasks were specified for
them in the past. Given the enormity of the risks associated with unmaintained protective
devices, this weakness of retroactive RCM alone makes it completely indefensible. (Some
variants of this approach try to get around this problem by specifying that protective systems
should be analysed separately, often outside the RCM framework. This gives rise to the
absurd situation that two analytical processes have to be applied in order to compensate for
the deficiencies created by attempts to streamline one of them.)
- more so than any of the other streamlined versions of RCM, retroactive approaches focus on
maintenance workload reduction rather than plant performance improvement (which is the
primary goal of function-oriented true RCM). Since the returns generated by using RCM purely
as a tool to reduce maintenance costs are usually lower - sometimes one or two orders of
magnitude lower - than the returns generated by using it to improve reliability, the use of the
ostensibly cheaper retroactive approach becomes self defeating on economic grounds, in that
it virtually guarantees much lower returns than true RCM.
4.2 Use of generic RCM analyses
9. A fairly widely-used shortcut in the application of RCM entails applying an analysis performed
on one system to technically identical systems. In fact, one or two organizations even sell such
generic analyses, on the grounds that it is cheaper to buy an analysis that has already been
performed by someone else than it is to perform your own. The following paragraphs explain
why generic analyses should be treated with great caution:
• operating context: In reality, technically identical systems often require completely different
maintenance pro-grams if the operating context is different. For example, consider three
pumps A, B and C that are technically identical (same make, model, drives, pipework,
valvegear, switchgear, and pumping the same liquid against the same head). The generic
mindset suggests that a maintenance program developed for one pump should apply to the
other two.
However, Pump A stands alone, so if it fails, operations will be affected sooner or later. As a
result the users and/or maintainers of Pump A are likely to make some effort to anticipate or
prevent its failure. (How hard they try will be governed both by the effect on operations and by
the severity and frequency of the failures of the pump.)
However, if pump B fails, the operators simply switch to pump C, so the only consequence of
the failure of pump B is that it must be repaired. As a result, it is likely that the operators of B
would at least consider letting it run to failure (especially if the failure of B does not cause
significant secondary damage.) On the other hand, if pump C fails while pump B is still working
(for instance if someone cannibalizes a part from C), it is likely that the operators will not even
know that C has failed unless or until B also fails. To guard against this possibility, a sensible
maintenance strategy might be to run C from time to time to find out whether it has failed. This
example shows how three identical assets can have three totally different maintenance policies
because the operating context is different in each case. In the case of the pumps, a generic
program would only have specified one policy for all three pumps.
Apart from redundancy, many other factors affect the operating context and hence affect the
maintenance programs that could be applied to technically identical assets. These include
whether the asset is part of a peak load or base load operation, cyclic fluctuations in market
demand and/or raw material supplies, the availability of spares, quality and other performance
standards that apply to the asset, the skills of the operators and maintainers, and so on.
• maintenance tasks: different organizations - or even different parts of the same organization
- seldom employ people with identical skillsets. This means that people working on one asset
may prefer to use one type of proactive technology (say high-tech condition monitoring), while
another group working on an identical asset may be more comfortable using another (say a
combination of performance monitoring and the human senses). It is surprising how often this
difference does not matter, as long as the techniques chosen are cost-effective. In fact, many
maintenance organizations are starting to realize that there is often more to be gained from
ensuring that the people doing the work are comfortable with what they are doing than it is to
compel everyone to do the same thing. (The validity of different tasks is also affected by the
operating context of each asset. For instance, think how background noise levels affect checks
10. for noise.) Because generic analyses necessarily incorporate a "one size fits all" approach to
maintenance tasks, they do not cater for these differences and hence have a significantly
reduced chance of acceptance by the people who have to do the tasks.
These two points mean that special care must be taken to ensure that the operating context,
functions and desired standards of performance, failure modes, failure consequences and the
skills of the operators and main-tainers are all effectively identical before applying a
maintenance policy designed for one asset to another. They also mean that an RCM analysis
performed on one system should never be applied to another without any further thought just
because the two systems happen to be technically identical.
4.3 Use of generic lists of failure modes
‘Generic' lists of failure modes are lists of failure modes - or sometimes entire FMEA's -
prepared by third parties. They may cover entire systems, but more often cover individual
assets or even single components. These generic lists are touted as another method of
speeding up or ‘streamlining' this part of the maintenance program development process. In
fact, they should also be approached with great caution, for all the reasons discussed in the
previous section of this paper, and for the following additional reasons:
• the level of analysis may be inappropriate: It is possible to ‘drill down' almost any number
of levels when seeking to identify failure modes (or causes of failure). The point at which this
process should stop is the level at which it is possible to identify an appropriate failure
management policy, and this can vary enormously depending once again on the operating
context of the system. In other words, when establishing causes of failure for technically
identical assets, it may be appropriate in one context to ask ‘why' it fails once, and in another it
may be necessary to ask ‘why' seven or eight times. However, if a generic list is used, this
decision will already have been made in advance of the RCM analysis. For instance, all the
failure modes in the generic list may have been identified as a result of asking ‘why' four or five
times, when all that may be needed is level 1. This means that far from streamlining the
process, the generic list would condemn the user to analysing far more failure modes than
necessary. Conversely, the generic list may focus on level 3 or 4 in a situation where some of
the failure modes really ought to be analysed at level 5 or 6. This would result in an analysis
that is too superficial and possibly dangerous
• the operating context may be different: The operating context of your asset may have
features which make it susceptible to failure modes that do not appear in the generic list.
Conversely, some of the modes in the generic list might be extremely improbable (if not
impossible) in your context.
• performance standards may differ: your asset may operate to standards of performance
which mean that your whole definition of failure may be completely different from that used to
develop the generic FMEA.
These three points mean that if a generic list of failure modes is used at all, it should only ever
be used to supplement a context-specific FMEA, and never used on its own as a definitive list.
11. 4.4 Skipping elements of the RCM process
Another common way in which the RCM process is "streamlined" is by skipping various
elements of the process altogether. The step most often omitted is the definition of functions.
Proponents of this methodology start immediately by listing the failure modes that might affect
each asset, rather than by defining the functions of the asset under consideration. They do so
either because they claim that, especially in the case of "non-safety-critical" plant, identifying
functions does not contribute enough relative to the amount of time it takes13
, or because they
simply appear not to be aware that defining all the functions and the associated desired
standards of performance of the assets under review is an integral part of the RCM process14
.
In fact, it is generally accepted by all the proponents of true RCM that in terms of improved
plant performance, by far the greatest benefits of true RCM flow from the extent to which the
function definition step transforms general levels of understanding of how the equipment is
supposed to work. So cutting out this step costs far more in terms of benefits foregone than it
saves in reduced analysis time.
From a purely technical point of view, the identification of functions and associated desired of
perform-ance also makes it far easier to identify the surprisingly common situations (failure
modes) where the asset is simply incapable of doing what the user wants it to do, and
therefore fails too soon or too often. For this reason, eliminating the function definition step
further reduces the power of the process.
The comments in the second sub-paragraph in section 4.1 above also apply here.
4.5 Analyse only "critical" functions or "critical" failures
The SAE Standard stipulates inter alia that a true RCM analysis should define all functions,
and that all reasonably likely failure modes should be subjected to the formal consequence
evaluation and task selection steps. The shortcuts embodied in some of the streamlined RCM
processes try to analyse ‘critical' functions only, or to subject only ‘critical' failure modes to
detailed analysis. These approaches have two main flaws, as follows:
- the process of dismissing functions and/or failure modes as being ‘non-critical' necessarily
entails making assumptions about what a more detailed analysis might reveal. In the personal
experience of the author, such assumptions are frequently wrong. It is surprising how often
apparently innocuous functions or failure modes are found on closer examination to embody
elements that are highly critical in terms of safety and/or environmental integrity. As a result,
the practice of prematurely dismissing functions or failure modes results in much riskier
analyses, but because the analysis is incomplete, no-one knows where or what these risks are
- many of the streamlined processes that adopt this approach incorporate elaborate additional
steps designed to ‘help' identify what functions and/or failure modes are critical or non-critical.
In a great many cases, applying these additional steps takes longer and costs more than it
would take to conduct a rigorous analysis of every function and every reasonably likely failure
mode using true RCM, yet the output is considerably less robust.
12. 4.6 Analyse only "critical" equipment
An approach to maintenance strategy formulation that is often presented as a ‘streamlined'
form of RCM suggests that the RCM process should be applied to ‘critical' equipment only.
This issue does not fall within the ambit of the SAE Standard, because the Standard does not
deal with the selection of equipment for analysis. It defines RCM as a process that can be
applied to any asset, and it assumes that decisions about what equipment is to be analysed
and about system boundaries have already been made when the time comes to apply the
RCM process defined in the Standard. There were two reasons why the equipment selection
process was omitted from the Standard:
- different industries use widely differing criteria to judge what is ‘critical'. For instance, the
ability of assets to produce products within given quality limits is a major issue in
manufacturing operations, and hence features prominently in assessments of criticality.
However, this issue barely figures at all with respect to equipment used by military
undertakings. This means that there is an equally wide range of techniques used to assess
criticality - so wide that it is impossible to encompass this issue in one universal standard.
- there is a growing school of thought (with which the author of this paper has some sympathy)
that there is no such thing as an item of plant - at least in an industrial context - that is ‘non-
critical' or ‘non-significant' to the extent that it does not justify analysis using RCM. Two of the
main reasons for believing that systems or items of plant should not be dismissed as ‘non-
critical' prior to rigorous analysis are exactly the same as the reasons given in section 4.5
above for not dismissing functions and failure modes in the same way. (In fact, many
organisations that choose to start with a formal, across-the-board equipment criticality
assessment seem to spend as much time deciding what assessment methodology they will
use and then applying it as they would have spent using true RCM to analyse all the
equipment in their facility.)
Much more could be said both in favour of and against the idea of using equipment criticality
assessments as a means of deciding whether to perform rigorous analyses using techniques
such as RCM. However, since criticality assessment techniques are not an integral part of the
RCM process, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that it is
incorrect to present such techniques as streamlined forms of RCM because they do not form
part of the RCM process as defined by the SAE Standard.
5 Conclusion
In nearly all cases, the proponents of the streamlined approaches to RCM outlined in Section 4
claim that these approaches can produce much the same results as true RCM in about a half
to a third of the time. However, the above discussion indicates that not only do they not
produce the same results as true RCM, but that they contain logical or procedural flaws which
increase risk to an extent that overwhelms any small advantage they might offer in reduced
application costs. It also transpires that many of these ‘streamlined' techniques actually take
longer and cost more to apply than true RCM, so even this small advantage is lost. As a result,
13. the business case for applying streamlined RCM is suspect at best.
However, a rather more serious point needs to be borne in mind when considering these
techniques. The very word ‘streamline' suggests that something is being omitted, and Section
4 of this paper indicates that this is indeed so for the streamlined techniques described. In
other words, there is to a greater or lesser extent a degree of sub-optimisation embodied in all
of these techniques.
Leaving things out inevitably increases risk. More specifically, it increases the probability that
an unanti-cipated failure, possibly one with very serious consequences, could occur. If this
does happen, as suggested in Section 3, managers of the organisation involved are
increasingly likely to find themselves called person-ally to account. If the worst comes to the
worst, they will not only have to explain, often in an emotionally-charged courtroom confronted
by bitterly hostile legal Rottweilers, what went wrong and why. They will also have to explain
why they deliberately chose a sub-optimal decision-making process to establish their asset
management strategies in the first place, rather than using one which complies fully with a
Standard set by an internationally-recognised standards-setting organisation. It would not be
me that they would have to convince, not their peers and not their managers, but a judge and
jury.
One rationale often advanced for using the streamlined methods is that it is better to do
something than to do nothing. However, this rationale misses the point that all the analytical
processes described above, streamlined or otherwise, require their users to document the
analyses. This means that a clear audit trail exists showing all the key information and
decisions underlying the asset management strategy, in most cases where none has existed
before. If a sub-optimal approach is used to formulate these strategies, the existence of written
records makes every shortcut much clearer to any investigators than they would otherwise
have been. (This in turn may suggest that perhaps we should simply forget about all of these
formal analytical processes. Unfortunately, the demand for documented analyses embodied in
the second wave of safety legislation described in Section 3 of this paper does not allow us
this option.)
A further rationale for streamlining says something like "we have been using this approach for
a few years now and we haven't had any accidents, so it must be all right." This rationale
betrays a complete misunderstanding of the basic principles of risk. Specifically, no analytical
methodology can completely eliminate risk. However, the difference between using a more
rigorous methodology and a less rigorous methodology may be the difference between a
probability of a catastrophic event of one in a million versus one in ten thousand. In both
cases, the event may happen next year or it may not happen for thousands of years, but in the
second case, it is a hundred times more likely. If such an event were to happen, the user of
true RCM would be able to claim that he or she exercised prudent, responsible custodianship
by applying a rigorous process that complies with an internationally recognised standard, and
as such would be in a highly defensible position. Under the same circumstances, the user of
streamlined RCM is on much, much shakier ground.
6 Footnote
14. An interesting footnote to the whole debate about streamlined RCM concerns what exactly it is
that is ostensibly being streamlined. Nearly all the advocates of streamlined processes
compare their offerings to something they call ‘classical' RCM. However, closer study of what
they mean by ‘classical' RCM reveals that it is often a monstrously complicated process or
collection of processes that bears little or no resemblance to RCM as defined in the SAE
standard. In these cases, it is hardly surprising that streamlined RCM is cheaper and quicker
than these so-called ‘classical' fantasies. In reality, if true RCM is applied as explained in the
first paragraph of section 4 of this paper, it is nearly always quicker and cheaper than the
streamlined versions, in addition to being far more defensible and producing far greater
returns.
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