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法規名稱:公開發行公司建立內部控制制度處理準則
法規名稱:

•二、參考「金融控股公司內部控制及稽核制度實施辦法」
 、「銀行內部控制及稽核制 度實施辦法」、「票券商內
 部控制及稽核制度實施辦法」及「保險業內部控制及 稽
 核制度實施辦法」規定,公開發行公司內部稽核及自行檢
 查報告、工作底稿及相關資料保存年限統一為至少保存五
          相關資料保存年限統一為至少保存五
 年。(修正條文第十三條及第二十二條)
•十、為落實公開發行公司內部稽核單位執行年度稽核計畫
 之機制,明定公司應依風險評估結果
         應依風險評估結果擬訂其年度稽核計畫
         應依風險評估結果
 ,並確實執行,且其年度稽核計畫之稽核項目範圍應涵蓋
 公司於內部控制制度訂定之重要控制作業。 (修正條文第
 十三條)
Qualitative Risk Analysis Example




教育部 TANet 網路中心導入資訊安全管理制度計畫教育訓練教材
http://cissnet.edu.tw/download_tanet.aspx
FMEA Output

           RPN=SEV x PF x DET
           PRN: Risk Priority Number
           SEV:Severity
           PF:Probability Factor
           DET:Detection Effectiveness




Rers: http://www.siliconfareast.com/fmea_quickref.htm#table
Fault Tree Analysis
I. Risk Assessment in NIST SP-800 30




   source: NIST Sp800-30
I. Risk Assessment in NIST SP-800 30
                                   (cont.)




   source: NIST Sp800-30
Risk Management
                                                      Threats
                                      Risk
                                  Identification
                                                   Vulnerabilities


                                                   Quantitative
                                                    Analysis

                                                    Qualitative
                                                     Analysis

                        Risk
                                  Risk Analysis        FMEA
                     Assessment


                                                        FTA


                                                     OCTAVE


           Risk
                                                    Likelihood
        Management
                                      Risk
                                   Evaluation
                                                      Impact
                                  Acceptance


                                   Reduction
                        Risk
                     Mitigation
                                  Transference


                                   Avoidance
Access Control
Access Control Conceptual Diagram

                            Access Control
                                          2007/6/8




   Anything
   You Do                            Identify
                  Identification
   Will Be                           Youself
   Logged


                                     Prove It
 Accountability   Authentication    (I need to
                                   Verify you)



                                   Do What I
                  Authorization    Tell You to
                                       Do
TACACS+ and RADIUS Comparison

     Criterion                       TACACS+                                                          RADIUS
     Transport                       TCP (reliable; more overhead)                                    UDP (unreliable;
                                                                                                      higher
                                                                                                      performance)
     Authentication Can be separated (more flexible)                                                  Combined
     and
     Authorization
     Multiprotocol                   Supported (IP, Apple, NetBIOS,                                   IP only
     Support                         Novell, X.25)
     Access to                       Supports two methods to control                                  Not supported
     Router CLI                      the authorization of router
     Commands                        commands on a per-user or per-
                                     group basis
     Encryption                      Packet payload                                                   Passwords only


http://etutorials.org/Networking/network+management/Part+II+Implementations+on+the+Cisco+Devices/Chapter+9.+AAA+Accounting/Diameter+Det
ails/
RADIUS and Diameter Comparison
Characteristic       RADIUS                            Diameter
Transport protocol   Connectionless (UDP 1812).        Connection-oriented (TCP, SCTP,
                                                       3868).
Transport security   Optional IPsec.                   IPsec or Transport Layer Security
                                                       (TLS) is required.
Architecture         Client-Server model               Peer-to-peer model
State                Stateless                         Stateful(Session ID, transaction
                                                       status)
Authentication       Pre-shared key                    Pre-Shared key, digital certificate
                     PAP, CHAP, EAP                    PAP, CHAP, EAP
                     Only client to server re-         Mutual re-authentication
                     authentication
Authorization        Bind with re-authentication       Re-authorization any time
Accounting           Real-time accounting              Real-time accounting
Confidentiality      Only encrypt password             Encrypt all data, or IP header(IPSec)
Integrity            Poor                              Good
Scalability          Poor                              Good
Extensibility        Vendor-specific                   Public use
Security model       Supports only hop-by-hop security. Supports end-to-end and hop-to-
                     Every hop can modify information hop security. End-to-end guarantees
                     that cannot be traced to its origin. that information cannot be
                                                          modified without notice.
XACML Policy Sample
<Policy PolicyId="SamplePolicy"
      RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:permit-
   overrides“>
  <!-- This Policy only applies to requests on the SampleServer -->
  <Target>
   <Subjects>
    <AnySubject/>
   </Subjects>
   <Resources>
    <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
      <AttributeValue
   DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">SampleServer</AttributeValue>
      <ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
                       AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"/>
    </ResourceMatch>
   </Resources>
   <Actions>
    <AnyAction/>
   </Actions>
  </Target>

<!-- A final, "fall-through" Rule that always Denies --> <Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/>
   </Policy>
SPML Scenario




http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/86225/SPML
Cryptography
2DES Meet-in-the-Middle Attack

If DES1 encrypted output equals DES2 decrypted output, then key1 and key2 cracked



          known                                               known




           Source: www.giac.org/
Keyed Hash HMAC




  Source: http://www.unixwiz.net/
Algebraic Cryptanalysis




                  E            E


Message



                   E
Null Cipher
    “A re you deaf, Father W illiam !” the young m an said,
     “D id you hear w hat I told you just now ?
      “E xcuse m e for shouting! D on’t w aggle your head
       “Like a blundering, sleepy old cow !
         “A little m aid dw elling in W allington Tow n,
          “Is m y friend, so I beg to rem ark:
           “D o you think she’d be pleased if a book w ere sent dow n
            “E ntitled ‘The H unt of the Snark?’” -
              “Pack it up in brow n paper!” the old m an cried,
               “A nd seal it w ith olive-and-dove.
                “I com m and you to do it!” he added w ith pride,
                  “N or forget, m y good fellow , to send her beside
                   “E aster G reetings, and give her m y love.”
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Operation
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Operation
Security Architecture and Design
Zachman Framework




An Overview of Enterprise Architecture Framework Deliverables by Frank Goethals
DoDAF Framework




Enterprise Architecture A-to-Z
EAL Stats




www.commoncriteriaportal.org
Common Criteria Flow

an implementation-
independent               Protection           Category of Product
statement of security       Profile              (i.e., “firewalls”)
needs for a TOE type.

a set of software,
firmware and/or           Target of           Specific Product (i.e.,
hardware possibly         Evaluation            Cisco PIX 5xx)
accompanied by
guidance.

                           Security             Vendor claims:
an implementation-                             Specifications and
dependent statement         Target                 features
of security needs for a
specific identified TOE


             Functional                 Assurance
            Requirements               Requirements
Implementation of Evaluated Products
                                               TEST plan based on
                       Evaluation
                                               stated requirements


                        EAL Levels

      1   Functionally Tested
      2   Structurally Tested
      3   Methodically Tested
      4   Methodically Designed, Tested, Reviewed
      5   Semiformal testing
      6   Semiformal verification
      7   Formal verification and testing


                                                Based on production
                      Certification                environment



                     Accreditation
Storage Systems




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storage_area_network
Application Security
KDD Process
Neural Network
Expert System




     Source:idrinfo.idrc.ca
Waterfall Method




        http://www.softwebsolutions.com/our_process.html
Spiral Method




      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiral_model
Iterative Method




        Wikipedia
Inheritance

                   Parent Class
                      Animal
              Virtual Function Talk()




    Child Class                 Child Class
        Cat                         Dog
  Function Talk("")           Function Talk("")
Polymorphism
1. class Animal {
2. virtual public Talk(){ }
3. }
4. class Dog extends Animal {
5. public Talk() { speak "汪" }
6. }
7. class Cat extends Animal {
8. public Talk() { speak "喵" }
9. }
10.Function AnimalTalk( Animal objSomeAnimal)
11.{
12. objSomeAnimal.Talk; //polymophism; late binding
13.}
14.Animal objCat = new Cat;
15.Animal objDog = new Dog;
16.//Without polymorphism
17.objCat .Talk;      //"喵"
18.objDog .Talk;      //"汪"
19.//With polymorphism
20.AnimalTalk(objCat); //"喵"
21.AnimalTalk(objDog); //"汪"

• 在本範例中,AnimalTalk程序接受 (Accept) 屬於 Animal 型別而名為 objSomeAnimal 的參數,所以我
  們可以在 run-time傳送如 Cat或Dog衍生自 Animal 類別的類別。此項設計的優點在於,您可加入衍生      可加入衍生
           類別的新類別,                    程序中的用戶端程式碼。
  自 Animal 類別的新類別,而不需要變更 AnimalTalk程序中的用戶端程式碼
                                      程序中的用戶端程式碼
2-phase commit
LRCI
EnCase – File System
EnCase Timeline
稽核自動化平台
Telecommunication and Network Security
Attack Tree




http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Attack_tree_virus.png
Honeynet




http://www.iu.hio.no/
Partial Mesh as HA
Link Layer Encryption vs. End-to-end Encryption
ISDN Application
MPLS




       http://www.isoc.org/
IPSec Mode - Concise




http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc759130(WS.10).aspx#w2k3tr_ipsec_how_vvlc
PPTP and L2TP Data Format
Smurf




        http://www.techexams.net
FDDI Dual Counter-Rotating Ring
Routing Protocols
                         Open Hop                Class Authentica Category           Network
                                                 less  tion
         RIPv1           RFC        15           No     None       Interior          Small
                         1058                                      Distance vector
         RIPv2           RFC        15           Yes    Password   Interior          Small
                         2453                           MD5        Distance vector   Medium
         IGRP            Cisco      255          No     None       Interior          Small
                                                                   Distance vector
         EIGRP           Cisco      255          Yes    Password   Interior          Large
                                                        MD5        Hybrid
         OSPF            RFC        none         Yes    Password   Interior          Large
                         2328                           MD5        Link-state        Hetero
         ISIS            ISO                     Yes    Password   Interior          Large
                         10589                                     Link-state
         EGP                                                       Exterior          AS-AS
                                                                   Distance vector
         BGP             RFC                     CIDR   MD5        Exterior          AS-AS
                         1771                                      Distance vector
Cisco® Certified Network Associate Study Guide
Subnetting vs. supernetting




                  One Class C




  8 contiguous Class C




http://medusa.sdsu.edu/network/CS576/Lectures/ch05_Subnetting.pdf
VPN – Site to Site
NetBios
War Dialer - PhoneSweep
Finger
IPP in IIS




http://secunia.com/advisories/32248/
LPR in XP




https://www.cs.uwaterloo.ca/twiki/view/CF/LprPrintingForWindows
Tapping Fiber Optics




http://i.techrepublic.com.com/blogs/Figure%20A.jpg
SAN




http://www.allsan.com/sanoverview.php3
Transmission Technology




http://www.privateline.com/PCS/Multiplexing.htm
BCP
BIA Process


        Owner                            Impact




                   Business Activity



                                       Geographic
       Timescale
                                         Extent



                       MTPD

                        RPO
4.1 INCIDENT RESPONSE STRUCTURE
RTO < MTPD(MTD)
Trailer
Scope
BCM is a Balancing Act(cont.)

             High Cost                      High Loss


               recovery
               strategy        disruption
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost/Loss
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost




                          Optimal             Lose Business
                          Point


                            Time               73
Physical Security
OS
Heat and cool air




http://www.adc.com/us/en/Library/Literature/102264AE.pdf
Data loss on transportation
從漏洞到攻擊時距縮短→大幅提高攻擊成功率




source:IBM xforce report 2008

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Supplement V1.2

  • 1. • 本投影片僅供教育訓練用,如有侵權,請留言通 知,將立即刪除,謝謝。 • The slide is for education purpose only. Please leave your comment if there is any copyright infringement. I will delete it immediately. Thank you.
  • 2.
  • 3. 法規名稱:公開發行公司建立內部控制制度處理準則 法規名稱: •二、參考「金融控股公司內部控制及稽核制度實施辦法」 、「銀行內部控制及稽核制 度實施辦法」、「票券商內 部控制及稽核制度實施辦法」及「保險業內部控制及 稽 核制度實施辦法」規定,公開發行公司內部稽核及自行檢 查報告、工作底稿及相關資料保存年限統一為至少保存五 相關資料保存年限統一為至少保存五 年。(修正條文第十三條及第二十二條) •十、為落實公開發行公司內部稽核單位執行年度稽核計畫 之機制,明定公司應依風險評估結果 應依風險評估結果擬訂其年度稽核計畫 應依風險評估結果 ,並確實執行,且其年度稽核計畫之稽核項目範圍應涵蓋 公司於內部控制制度訂定之重要控制作業。 (修正條文第 十三條)
  • 4. Qualitative Risk Analysis Example 教育部 TANet 網路中心導入資訊安全管理制度計畫教育訓練教材 http://cissnet.edu.tw/download_tanet.aspx
  • 5. FMEA Output RPN=SEV x PF x DET PRN: Risk Priority Number SEV:Severity PF:Probability Factor DET:Detection Effectiveness Rers: http://www.siliconfareast.com/fmea_quickref.htm#table
  • 7. I. Risk Assessment in NIST SP-800 30 source: NIST Sp800-30
  • 8. I. Risk Assessment in NIST SP-800 30 (cont.) source: NIST Sp800-30
  • 9. Risk Management Threats Risk Identification Vulnerabilities Quantitative Analysis Qualitative Analysis Risk Risk Analysis FMEA Assessment FTA OCTAVE Risk Likelihood Management Risk Evaluation Impact Acceptance Reduction Risk Mitigation Transference Avoidance
  • 11. Access Control Conceptual Diagram Access Control 2007/6/8 Anything You Do Identify Identification Will Be Youself Logged Prove It Accountability Authentication (I need to Verify you) Do What I Authorization Tell You to Do
  • 12. TACACS+ and RADIUS Comparison Criterion TACACS+ RADIUS Transport TCP (reliable; more overhead) UDP (unreliable; higher performance) Authentication Can be separated (more flexible) Combined and Authorization Multiprotocol Supported (IP, Apple, NetBIOS, IP only Support Novell, X.25) Access to Supports two methods to control Not supported Router CLI the authorization of router Commands commands on a per-user or per- group basis Encryption Packet payload Passwords only http://etutorials.org/Networking/network+management/Part+II+Implementations+on+the+Cisco+Devices/Chapter+9.+AAA+Accounting/Diameter+Det ails/
  • 13. RADIUS and Diameter Comparison Characteristic RADIUS Diameter Transport protocol Connectionless (UDP 1812). Connection-oriented (TCP, SCTP, 3868). Transport security Optional IPsec. IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS) is required. Architecture Client-Server model Peer-to-peer model State Stateless Stateful(Session ID, transaction status) Authentication Pre-shared key Pre-Shared key, digital certificate PAP, CHAP, EAP PAP, CHAP, EAP Only client to server re- Mutual re-authentication authentication Authorization Bind with re-authentication Re-authorization any time Accounting Real-time accounting Real-time accounting Confidentiality Only encrypt password Encrypt all data, or IP header(IPSec) Integrity Poor Good Scalability Poor Good Extensibility Vendor-specific Public use Security model Supports only hop-by-hop security. Supports end-to-end and hop-to- Every hop can modify information hop security. End-to-end guarantees that cannot be traced to its origin. that information cannot be modified without notice.
  • 14. XACML Policy Sample <Policy PolicyId="SamplePolicy" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:permit- overrides“> <!-- This Policy only applies to requests on the SampleServer --> <Target> <Subjects> <AnySubject/> </Subjects> <Resources> <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">SampleServer</AttributeValue> <ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"/> </ResourceMatch> </Resources> <Actions> <AnyAction/> </Actions> </Target> <!-- A final, "fall-through" Rule that always Denies --> <Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/> </Policy>
  • 17. 2DES Meet-in-the-Middle Attack If DES1 encrypted output equals DES2 decrypted output, then key1 and key2 cracked known known Source: www.giac.org/
  • 18. Keyed Hash HMAC Source: http://www.unixwiz.net/
  • 19. Algebraic Cryptanalysis E E Message E
  • 20. Null Cipher “A re you deaf, Father W illiam !” the young m an said, “D id you hear w hat I told you just now ? “E xcuse m e for shouting! D on’t w aggle your head “Like a blundering, sleepy old cow ! “A little m aid dw elling in W allington Tow n, “Is m y friend, so I beg to rem ark: “D o you think she’d be pleased if a book w ere sent dow n “E ntitled ‘The H unt of the Snark?’” - “Pack it up in brow n paper!” the old m an cried, “A nd seal it w ith olive-and-dove. “I com m and you to do it!” he added w ith pride, “N or forget, m y good fellow , to send her beside “E aster G reetings, and give her m y love.”
  • 24. Zachman Framework An Overview of Enterprise Architecture Framework Deliverables by Frank Goethals
  • 27. Common Criteria Flow an implementation- independent Protection Category of Product statement of security Profile (i.e., “firewalls”) needs for a TOE type. a set of software, firmware and/or Target of Specific Product (i.e., hardware possibly Evaluation Cisco PIX 5xx) accompanied by guidance. Security Vendor claims: an implementation- Specifications and dependent statement Target features of security needs for a specific identified TOE Functional Assurance Requirements Requirements
  • 28. Implementation of Evaluated Products TEST plan based on Evaluation stated requirements EAL Levels 1 Functionally Tested 2 Structurally Tested 3 Methodically Tested 4 Methodically Designed, Tested, Reviewed 5 Semiformal testing 6 Semiformal verification 7 Formal verification and testing Based on production Certification environment Accreditation
  • 33. Expert System Source:idrinfo.idrc.ca
  • 34. Waterfall Method http://www.softwebsolutions.com/our_process.html
  • 35. Spiral Method http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiral_model
  • 36. Iterative Method Wikipedia
  • 37. Inheritance Parent Class Animal Virtual Function Talk() Child Class Child Class Cat Dog Function Talk("") Function Talk("")
  • 38. Polymorphism 1. class Animal { 2. virtual public Talk(){ } 3. } 4. class Dog extends Animal { 5. public Talk() { speak "汪" } 6. } 7. class Cat extends Animal { 8. public Talk() { speak "喵" } 9. } 10.Function AnimalTalk( Animal objSomeAnimal) 11.{ 12. objSomeAnimal.Talk; //polymophism; late binding 13.} 14.Animal objCat = new Cat; 15.Animal objDog = new Dog; 16.//Without polymorphism 17.objCat .Talk; //"喵" 18.objDog .Talk; //"汪" 19.//With polymorphism 20.AnimalTalk(objCat); //"喵" 21.AnimalTalk(objDog); //"汪" • 在本範例中,AnimalTalk程序接受 (Accept) 屬於 Animal 型別而名為 objSomeAnimal 的參數,所以我 們可以在 run-time傳送如 Cat或Dog衍生自 Animal 類別的類別。此項設計的優點在於,您可加入衍生 可加入衍生 類別的新類別, 程序中的用戶端程式碼。 自 Animal 類別的新類別,而不需要變更 AnimalTalk程序中的用戶端程式碼 程序中的用戶端程式碼
  • 40. LRCI
  • 41. EnCase – File System
  • 48. Link Layer Encryption vs. End-to-end Encryption
  • 50. MPLS http://www.isoc.org/
  • 51. IPSec Mode - Concise http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc759130(WS.10).aspx#w2k3tr_ipsec_how_vvlc
  • 52. PPTP and L2TP Data Format
  • 53. Smurf http://www.techexams.net
  • 55. Routing Protocols Open Hop Class Authentica Category Network less tion RIPv1 RFC 15 No None Interior Small 1058 Distance vector RIPv2 RFC 15 Yes Password Interior Small 2453 MD5 Distance vector Medium IGRP Cisco 255 No None Interior Small Distance vector EIGRP Cisco 255 Yes Password Interior Large MD5 Hybrid OSPF RFC none Yes Password Interior Large 2328 MD5 Link-state Hetero ISIS ISO Yes Password Interior Large 10589 Link-state EGP Exterior AS-AS Distance vector BGP RFC CIDR MD5 Exterior AS-AS 1771 Distance vector Cisco® Certified Network Associate Study Guide
  • 56. Subnetting vs. supernetting One Class C 8 contiguous Class C http://medusa.sdsu.edu/network/CS576/Lectures/ch05_Subnetting.pdf
  • 57. VPN – Site to Site
  • 59. War Dialer - PhoneSweep
  • 66. BCP
  • 67. BIA Process Owner Impact Business Activity Geographic Timescale Extent MTPD RPO
  • 69.
  • 72. Scope
  • 73. BCM is a Balancing Act(cont.) High Cost High Loss recovery strategy disruption Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost/Loss Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Optimal Lose Business Point Time 73
  • 75. OS
  • 76. Heat and cool air http://www.adc.com/us/en/Library/Literature/102264AE.pdf
  • 77. Data loss on transportation