SUMMARY A tillerman proceeded to the roof to investigate a fire reported out. He began to experience chest pains, which he initially trivialized. Fortunately, his crew insisted that he be checked out, and he later discovered an MI had been occurring. EVENT DESCRIPTION A truck company went to the roof to investigate a fire that was already out on arrival. The tillerman proceeded up the aerial with his SCBA and tools. At the tip of the aerial, he started to experience mild chest pains, nausea and shortness of breath. He attributed it to a cold he had been fighting over the previous weeks and the dinner they’d just eaten. When he returned to the turntable, he found the shortness of breath was more noticeable. Again he just he attributed it to being out of shape, his cold and the cold temperature outside, the new guys cooking and anything else that may put his mind at ease. Back on the ground, he took off some gear and the driver asked if he was OK. He was sweating heavily for the little amount of work and the nausea was getting worse. By now, other firefighters were checking on him and made sit down. A request for an ambulance was made and command was informed of what was going on, while others started to treat his symptoms. He was transported to the local ER where he was kept overnight for observation. He never felt sharp pains he would associate with a heart attack, but he knew things weren’t right when a few of the brothers with him at the ER kept watching the monitor. The next morning, he was sent to another hospital for a catheterization. They thought it was a blockage and that he would be out of the hospital the next morning. After he arrived at that hospital, he was in the Cath lab within the hour. When he was finally taken to his room, the doctor was talking with his wife, who was crying. That’s when the doctor told him there were no blockages; his heart had weakened to about 20% capacity. He started talking about pacemakers, defibrillators and everything else. The one thing that stood out was when the doctor told him, “Had you not had this checked when you did, it would have killed you!” View the report: Heart Condition Discovered at Fire Alarm TAKE AWAYS The reporter included some excellent lessons to be learned from this event. Listen to what your body is telling you. Personal factors may discourage firefighters from having regular physicals and participating in fitness evaluations. Despite experiencing similar symptoms or performing certain day-to-day activities with difficulty, they hesitate to seek the help they need. No one wants to hear that something’s wrong, but pretending nothing is happening doesn’t mitigate the situation and can potentially make things much worse. The reporter in this case admits that a normal stress test wouldn’t have found his condition, but it could have helped if done on a regular basis. Annual fitness and health evaluations are part of ensuring your safety and health, so look at it as a benefit that ...

1. SUMMARY
A tillerman proceeded to the roof to investigate a fire reported
out. He began to experience chest pains, which he initially
trivialized. Fortunately, his crew insisted that he be checked
out, and he later discovered an MI had been occurring.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
A truck company went to the roof to investigate a fire that was
already out on arrival. The tillerman proceeded up the aerial
with his SCBA and tools. At the tip of the aerial, he started to
experience mild chest pains, nausea and shortness of breath. He
attributed it to a cold he had been fighting over the previous
weeks and the dinner they’d just eaten.
When he returned to the turntable, he found the shortness of
breath was more noticeable. Again he just he attributed it to
being out of shape, his cold and the cold temperature outside,
the new guys cooking and anything else that may put his mind
at ease.
Back on the ground, he took off some gear and the driver asked
if he was OK. He was sweating heavily for the little amount of
work and the nausea was getting worse. By now, other
firefighters were checking on him and made sit down. A request
for an ambulance was made and command was informed of what
was going on, while others started to treat his symptoms. He
was transported to the local ER where he was kept overnight for
observation.
He never felt sharp pains he would associate with a heart attack,
but he knew things weren’t right when a few of the brothers
with him at the ER kept watching the monitor. The next
morning, he was sent to another hospital for a catheterization.
They thought it was a blockage and that he would be out of the
hospital the next morning. After he arrived at that hospital, he
was in the Cath lab within the hour.
When he was finally taken to his room, the doctor was talking

2. with his wife, who was crying. That’s when the doctor told him
there were no blockages; his heart had weakened to about 20%
capacity. He started talking about pacemakers, defibrillators and
everything else. The one thing that stood out was when the
doctor told him, “Had you not had this checked when you did, it
would have killed you!”
View the report: Heart Condition Discovered at Fire Alarm
TAKE AWAYS
The reporter included some excellent lessons to be learned from
this event.
Listen to what your body is telling you. Personal factors may
discourage firefighters from having regular physicals and
participating in fitness evaluations. Despite experiencing
similar symptoms or performing certain day-to-day activities
with difficulty, they hesitate to seek the help they need. No one
wants to hear that something’s wrong, but pretending nothing is
happening doesn’t mitigate the situation and can potentially
make things much worse.
The reporter in this case admits that a normal stress test
wouldn’t have found his condition, but it could have helped if
done on a regular basis. Annual fitness and health evaluations
are part of ensuring your safety and health, so look at it as a
benefit that will give you a long, happy and healthy retirement
after the fire service.
Most outcomes from establishing these types of regular exams
have only been positive for the fire department and, more
importantly, the firefighters themselves.
DISCUSSION TOPICS
1. Does your department provide annual physicals that follow
NFPA 1582 standards?
2. What are the signs and symptoms of a MI? Would you know
them if you felt them?
3. How can you tell the difference between a normal
physiological-exertion response and a cardiovascular event?

3. 4. Are health and wellness priorities in your organization? How
can it be improved?
5. Does your department allow time to work out while on duty?
Are workouts mandatory?
6. Does the senior leadership in your organization lead by
example?
LEADING PRACTICES
It’s important to do what we can to maintain optimal health.
Ensuring we’re physically fit and eating a healthy diet is an
important start everyone can take. Annual physicals can identify
potential risks before they become serious threats.
Fire department members should consult NFPA 1582: Standard
on Comprehensive Medical Programs for Fire Department and
NFPA 1583: Standard on Health-Related Fitness Programs for
Fire Fighters for additional guidance on establishing a
comprehensive fitness-wellness program.
Resources are also available through The Fire Service Joint
Labor Management Wellness/Fitness Initiative, sponsored by
the IAFF and the IAFC.
Emergency-scene rehab is another critical step to keep our
people safe and allow for a rest-and-recovery period. Many
consider routine EKG monitoring of firefighters in rehab as a
precaution. Complacency in these areas can create needless
risks to ourselves, our crews and the citizens we’re sworn to
protect
Units responded for a report of a structure fire; fire reported in
an attached garage under renovation. Upon arrival of the first
unit, there was heavy fire in the garage, with extension to the
house. The first arriving unit reported propane tanks involved
and on fire. Within the first 5 minutes of units arriving and
operating on the scene, there were 3 large explosions, each
involving a 100 lb. Propane cylinder.

4. Units arrived out of their assigned running order, and jumped
positions from the SOPs. This included the fourth due engine
arriving and taking the second due engine"s water supply
responsibilities, and both trucks arriving late due to getting lost.
In addition, there was a face-to-face miscommunication between
the driver of the fourth due engine and the officer, who was
detailed in from another station. This resulted in a several
minute delay in the establishment of a sustained water supply
for the first due engine.
Initial actions were focused on ensuring evacuation of the
houses on exposures B and D, and then defensive operations.
The three explosions occurred while personnel were engaged in
these activities. The explosions were powerful enough to knock
several firefighters down, but due to their wearing PPE and not
being in immediate proximity, there were no injuries.
Lessons Learned
Situational Awareness: The calling party reported to the 911
operator that there were propane tanks involved in the area of
the fire. This information was never relayed to responding units.
Teamwork: The driver and officer on the 4th due engine did not
communicate effectively. According to our SOPs, the first
responsibility of the second and fourth due engines is to
"Ensure and expand upon the water supply as necessary for the
first (or third) due engine. In this case, the officer gave
instructions which were either not heard correctly or were
misinterpreted by the driver/operator, the officer and the
firefighter abandoned the apparatus driver/operator and went up
to the fire, leaving the driver/operator to complete a labor-
intensive water supply operation by himself. Especially when
pairing personnel who are not used to working with each other
(the officer was detailed in on overtime) it is imperative that
two-way communications techniques be used to ensure that
messages are understood and followed correctly.

5. Area Knowledge: Unit officers and apparatus drivers must have
greater familiarization with their response areas, not limited to
just their "first due" area. They must also be able to get to any
location from different directions of travel. Enhanced GPS
mapping capabilities would be a welcomed addition to all
responding apparatus.
Standard Operating Procedures: Units must know and follow
their SOPs. It is extremely difficult for units and personnel to
readjust to last-second changes in assignments.
Communications: When units will be delayed, they must notify
the Incident Commander, so that consideration of the delays can
be made, and adjustments made as necessary.
Protective Clothing: Again, the importance of properly wearing
all appropriate PPE is a lesson learned. The force of the
explosions might well have caused serious injuries had
personnel not been properly protected.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly paid
· Job or Rank: Battalion Chief / District Chief
· Department Shift: 24 hours on - 48 hours off
· Age: 43 - 51
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 27 - 30
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Dec 29 2006 5:00PM
· Hours Into the Shift: 9 - 12
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again? Yes
· Contributing Factors? Decision Making, Teamwork, SOP /

6. SOG, Situational Awareness
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Property damage,
Life threatening injury
1- Dispatched to assist neighboring department on a 3 story
garden style apartment building with fire reported on the third
floor. Upon arrival of the first units there was a heavy fire load
evident on the third floor of the structure. Crew advanced two
1" 3/4 handlines into the structure. The first crew went to the
fire origin and the second crew starting cutting the fire off in
the hallway, so not to spread to neighboring areas. The crew
from the rescue entered the structure and reached the third floor
when the ceiling came down. This caused evasive movements
causing a firefighter to twist his ankle. The firefighter was
taken to the hospital for further evaluation.
Lessons Learned
Although the IC did a terrific job at running this scene,
communications within the structure were lacking. Having
interdepartment training could have prevented this incident
from occurring.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Fire Fighter
· Department Shift: 12 hour days, 12 hour nights
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 14 - 16
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.

7. · Date and Time: Feb 17 2006 11:00AM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event: Clear and Dry
· Do you think this will happen again? Uncertain
· Contributing Factors? Communication
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury
Our department responded to a residential structure fire
reported from a neighborhood near our headquarters station.
Upon arrival we were faced with a heavily involved garage fire
that was spreading into the attic of the house. We started a fire
attack on the burning garage from the exterior with a 2.5” hose
and a team consisting of two firefighters and myself. During the
attack, our team positioned themselves on the empty driveway
and had moved to within several feet of the burning garage. Our
assistant fire chief was functioning as an operations manager
from the front yard, giving direction to crew members entering
the front door. As he was doing this, he noticed from the side of
the garage the brick veneer wall above the garage door had
begun to bow out and was leaning towards our location in the
driveway. From our vantage point we could not see that the
structure supporting brick veneer had burnt away. During our
initial attack the extent of damage to the structure was
somewhat hidden by the flames and smoke. As we began to
knock the fire down, the assistant fire chief recognized the signs
of an unsupported brick veneer wall that was in imminent
danger of collapse. He immediately came over and moved our
attack team back roughly 15 feet away from the garage. Not
more than 30 seconds after we repositioned, the entire brick
veneer wall pulled away from the destroyed framework and
collapsed onto the driveway with debris tumbling right up to the
feet of the hose team. Both the chief and I ran up to the
firefighters checking for injuries and found them to be ok. From

8. our vantage point in the driveway the wall appeared flat and
gave no signs of potential collapse.
Lessons Learned
The importance of recognizing the potential for structural
collapse during a fire cannot be overstated. Adhering to the
principle of knowing the collapse zone and staying clear
becomes critical. Residential structures built using brick veneer
should always be suspect to failure when a heavy fire condition
exists in the area of the wood framing adjacent to the wall.
Always play it safe and keep personnel away from these such
veneer walls should you discover those significant conditions
and consider the time the fire has acted upon them. Acting
immediately and not waiting to see what happens is the final
step. Step in, use a "lean forward" attitude and correct the
situation before something goes wrong.
Demographics
· Department Type: Paid Municipal
· Job or Rank: Captain
· Department Shift: 24 hours on - 48 hours off
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 11 - 13
· Region: FEMA Region IV
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Dec 14 2011 1:02PM
· Hours Into the Shift:
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again?
· Contributing Factors? Command, Communication, Individual
Action, Situational Awareness
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Life threatening
injury, Lost time injury

9. Our engine was dispatched to a structure fire reported to be
from a malfunctioning electrical meter on the exterior of a
townhouse. Our staffing that day was 4 personnel and we
arrived as the fourth engine out of five. We reported to the
command post and were directed to pull a secondary line to the
rear of the building where the electric meter was located. The
townhouse was a second from the end unit with a Bravo
Exposure and three Delta Exposures. The electrical meter was
on the exterior of a storage shed and the shed was attached to
the rear of the townhouse. The only way to enter the storage
shed to gain access was to exit the townhouse and enter the
storage shed from outside. There was no direct way into the
shed from the townhouse. The occupant had already exited the
structure on his own accord and was being evaluated by the
medic unit due to an electrocution. The first arriving engine had
contained the fire with dry chemical fire extinguishers and CO2
extinguishers. The rescue and truck were ventilating the
structure because some smoke had entered the structure, but no
fire had extended into the structure. Once we had our second
line in place, I looked up and noticed that the first arriving
engine was starting to do salvage and overhaul on the shed and
had started to use a 1 ¾ attack line to extinguish hot spots. I
asked the rescue squad officer to find out if the power was still
on to the meter by checking to see if the measuring wheel inside
was still spinning. He came back to me and stated that it was
still spinning and that it appeared to still have power. As I was
getting ready to radio command, I saw a blue arc of electricity
above the crew with the attack line. I did a face to face with
command and told them that we should immediately stop using
water until the power company could secure the power to the
house. The battalion chief stated to me that he agreed, but if the
fire in the house started to flare back up, he wanted us to try
and hold the fire in check with a minimal amount of water. I
explained to him that I did not agree with this, and he stated
that he still wanted us to keep the fire in check if it flared back

10. up. At this point I did not want to argue with him in front of
everybody because the fire did appear to be completely out and
there did not appear to be a chance of rekindle. Had it flared
back up, I would have ordered crews not to put it out and
argued my point with the battalion chief regardless of his
wishes. I went and spoke with the captain in charge of the first
arriving company about what had happened and asked them if
they saw the blue arc of electricity above their head. They
stated that they did not see it, but if their crew had not put so
much water on it, they felt this would not have happened. I
informed him I did not think their tactic was a good idea no
matter how much water was put on it because the power was
still active to the structure.
Lessons Learned
When the source of the fire is electrical in nature, only
extinguishing agents that do not conduct electricity should be
used for extinguishing fires, big or small. Departments should
practice "risk a lot to save a lot and risk little to save little."
The battalion chief in charge should not have instructed his
crews to keep the fire in check with water with no life safety
issues in the structure or the adjacent exposures. Command
officers have to trust their line officers when they inform them
that tactics are unsafe. When officers are told of their mistakes,
they should accept the criticism and not make excuses from
deviating from sound judgment. Individuals, like me, should
voice their safety concerns as soon as they see them happen. If I
had told the crew flowing water to stop immediately when I
questioned whether or not the power was secured, the water
would have never come in contact with the power causing the
blue arc of electricity. When I saw the salvage and overhaul
taking place, I knew that there wasn’t any extension into the
structure and that there were no life safety issues in the
structure or exposures.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Captain

11. · Department Shift: Straight days (12 hour)
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 14 - 16
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Apr 25 2011 3:30PM
· Hours Into the Shift:
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again?
· Contributing Factors? Command, Decision Making, Human
Error, Individual Action, Other
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Life threatening
injury
Units were dispatched to an apartment fire reported "in the area
of” with no address. The Battalion Chief arrived on scene and
communicated a working fire. I was the officer on the first
arriving engine. We found 4 apartments with heavy fire
involvement and command advised us to hit it from the other
side. Not knowing where the other side was, we changed from
pulling a 3" attack line to establishing a hose lay attacking the
fire with a 1 ¾” line. Command advised we had a second crew
coming in behind us. We attacked fire on the 1st floor, knocking
major portions of fire in the first two units. My crew advanced
the line to the second floor for fire attack. During this time the
fire began to intensify. The second crew was delayed in
advancing the second line to the first floor units.
While completing attack on the second floor, the floor collapsed
causing me to fall into the first floor. My two firefighters, who
were exiting the building, advised command of the incident.

12. Command continued communicating over the radio. I was
unable to call a MAYDAY because of the radio traffic. I
rescued myself out of the first floor and attempted to locate my
crew. Command had advised them to go get me. One went inside
and one went around the back. After not finding my crew, I
found command and advised him I was out and trying to locate
my crew. We exchanged words and I called a mayday declaring
a lost crew. There were no RIT or back-up crews. I also advised
command to go "defensive mode” and call for a PAR report.
After several tense moments, my crew was located. There was a
failure of an on-scene report advising crews of location and
conditions. Failure to identify, properly state task assignments,
and a failure on my part to question command on my assignment
to "attack from the other side."
The first crew was aggressive making it to the second floor; I
did not check to insure fire was in control prior to advancing
above.
Lessons Learned
There was a failure to have a RIT or backup units in place to
assist. A good command system should have been established
from the beginning. Staging should have been established with
the amount of fire we had and the building construction. There
was no department review or critique of the incident. Command
believed it was a lack of proper actions by the first officer. I
accept my mistake and have taken action to improve my
abilities. The department should have conducted an
investigation and a post incident analysis so everyone could
learn from the incident.
Demographics
· Department Type: Paid Municipal
· Job or Rank: Battalion Chief / District Chief
· Department Shift: 24 hours on - 48 hours off
· Age: 34 - 42

13. · Years of Fire Service Experience: 17 - 20
· Region: FEMA Region V
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Feb 13 2000 10:00AM
· Hours Into the Shift:
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again?
· Contributing Factors? Command, Communication, Individual
Action, Situational Awareness
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Life threatening
injury
Our department received a call for a residential structure fire,
fire reported in the basement. While enroute, the responding
units received information from dispatch indicating the resident
was attempting to extinguish the fire and refused to leave the
structure. Upon arrival, the chief of the department assumed
command on Side A. He gave an initial report of a 2-story
residential structure with smoke showing from Side C. A 360 of
the structure revealed the resident outside on Side C and a
moderate amount of black smoke coming from a basement
doorway near the B-C corner. Fire was observed inside the
doorway and to the right. Call was then upgraded to a second
alarm.A 200’ 1.75” pre-connected attack line was deployed by a
three-member team from the initial attack engine and stretched
to Side C. The crew proceeded inside and knocked the fire
down, which was located inside a storage room. The area was
overhauled and no extension was found. When the initial attack
crew exited the structure and prepared to head off to the rehab
area, I noticed one of the members’ protective hood was pulled
up, exposing an area, approximately the size of a tennis ball, on

14. the rear of his neck. The portion of the hood that had pulled up
appeared to have been caught in the liner of the member’s
helmet. It became dislodged when he pulled the hood over his
head after donning his face piece or after adjusting his helmet
just prior to entry.
Lessons Learned
Needless to say, this member was very fortunate that the fire,
which turned out to be rather small, had not built up to the point
of causing a severe burn to his neck during fire suppression
operations. Although this was one individual that would have
been directly impacted by a burn, all members of a suppression
crew must look out for each other by making sure everyone is
buttoned up in the hard-to-see areas prior to entry.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Deputy Chief
· Department Shift: 10 hour days, 14 hour nights (2-2-4)
· Age:
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 24 - 26
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Mar 5 2009 3:08PM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again? Yes
· Contributing Factors? Human Error, Individual Action,
Teamwork
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury
As a rescue company, we responded to a structure fire reported

15. to be a working fire. Our departmental policy dictates that a
crew of four will divide into two teams. I was the B- Team
supervisor and had the responsibility of covering the floor
above the fire for search/rescue, ventilation, and fire extension.
Upon our arrival we found a 1 ½ story split level detached home
with about 40% involvement that included quadrant A of the
upper level and quadrants A and B of the lower level. We were
the third piece to arrive on the scene after a ladder and engine.
As we approached the Alpha side of the building I noticed a
hose line going into the lower level that was charged. There was
evidence (visible steam) from the outside that water was in fact
being applied to the fire on the lower level. I saw members from
the ladder company at the bottom of the stairs, thus steering my
decision to go up.
My team member and I entered the building and proceeded to
the upper floor in the area of the origin of the fire and began
our search. We went straight at the top of the stairs through a
kitchen and then left into the dining room. My team member and
I had good face to face communication while proceeding
through these areas.
Once I made it to the outside wall (B side) of the dining area I
could hear the fire towards the front of the house. My partner
and I began to turn around in an effort to move back through the
path we came to search the Charlie and Delta quadrants, when a
loud rumble occurred and I was dropped to the floor. The
ceiling had collapsed due to heavy fire in the cockloft area that
we were unaware of. The collapse brought a heavy fire load
down when it occurred and there was fire all around. I yelled
for my partner and he responded. The collapse had actually
separated us, knocking him into a clear area. He was ok,
advising he could make it out via the interior stairs. Once I got
my bearing, I noticed a window and began to move the debris

16. quickly as to make a rapid egress because the flames were
intensifying.
As I began to make an unassisted egress from the upper floor
window, the ladder truck driver ran up to the window with a
ladder and placed just below the sill of the window. This ladder
placement was a mere coincidence for I had not transmitted any
information related to the collapse via the radio at this point. I
made my way down the provided ladder notified the IC of the
occurrence and recommended the evacuation of the building.
Lessons Learned
I now realize the importance of not operating alone. The
comfort of hearing my team member when I called is
unexplainable. Additionally, there seems to always be a huge
emphasis placed on interior firefighting crews to paint a picture
from the interior for the Incident Commander. Though I agree, I
believe it is equally as important for the Incident Commander to
keep interior crews abreast of the picture he/she sees from the
exterior.
Our response time from the actual 911 call was about 13
minutes. This was a lightweight construction home with heavy
fire involvement. It more than reinforces the timelines we have
all been taught in the past, 6-10 minutes and the structure is not
sound. This is probably the most valuable lesson of all.
Demographics
· Department Type: Volunteer
· Job or Rank: Lieutenant
· Department Shift: Stand-by (in-station)
· Age: 16 - 24
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 7 - 10
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Urban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.

17. · Date and Time: Mar 18 2008 1:00PM
· Hours Into the Shift:
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again?
· Contributing Factors? Command, Procedure, Other
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Life threatening
injury
Units responded for a report of a structure fire; fire reported in
an attached garage under renovation. Upon arrival of the first
unit, there was heavy fire in the garage, with extension to the
house. The first arriving unit reported propane tanks involved
and on fire. Within the first 5 minutes of units arriving and
operating on the scene, there were 3 large explosions, each
involving a 100 lb. Propane cylinder.
Units arrived out of their assigned running order, and jumped
positions from the SOPs. This included the fourth due engine
arriving and taking the second due engine"s water supply
responsibilities, and both trucks arriving late due to getting lost.
In addition, there was a face-to-face miscommunication between
the driver of the fourth due engine and the officer, who was
detailed in from another station. This resulted in a several
minute delay in the establishment of a sustained water supply
for the first due engine.
Initial actions were focused on ensuring evacuation of the
houses on exposures B and D, and then defensive operations.
The three explosions occurred while personnel were engaged in
these activities. The explosions were powerful enough to knock
several firefighters down, but due to their wearing PPE and not
being in immediate proximity, there were no injuries.
Lessons Learned
Situational Awareness: The calling party reported to the 911

18. operator that there were propane tanks involved in the area of
the fire. This information was never relayed to responding units.
Teamwork: The driver and officer on the 4th due engine did not
communicate effectively. According to our SOPs, the first
responsibility of the second and fourth due engines is to
"Ensure and expand upon the water supply as necessary for the
first (or third) due engine. In this case, the officer gave
instructions which were either not heard correctly or were
misinterpreted by the driver/operator, the officer and the
firefighter abandoned the apparatus driver/operator and went up
to the fire, leaving the driver/operator to complete a labor-
intensive water supply operation by himself. Especially when
pairing personnel who are not used to working with each other
(the officer was detailed in on overtime) it is imperative that
two-way communications techniques be used to ensure that
messages are understood and followed correctly.
Area Knowledge: Unit officers and apparatus drivers must have
greater familiarization with their response areas, not limited to
just their "first due" area. They must also be able to get to any
location from different directions of travel. Enhanced GPS
mapping capabilities would be a welcomed addition to all
responding apparatus.
Standard Operating Procedures: Units must know and follow
their SOPs. It is extremely difficult for units and personnel to
readjust to last-second changes in assignments.
Communications: When units will be delayed, they must notify
the Incident Commander, so that consideration of the delays can
be made, and adjustments made as necessary.
Protective Clothing: Again, the importance of properly wearing
all appropriate PPE is a lesson learned. The force of the
explosions might well have caused serious injuries had

19. personnel not been properly protected.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly paid
· Job or Rank: Battalion Chief / District Chief
· Department Shift: 24 hours on - 48 hours off
· Age: 43 - 51
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 27 - 30
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Dec 29 2006 5:00PM
· Hours Into the Shift: 9 - 12
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again? Yes
· Contributing Factors? Decision Making, Teamwork, SOP /
SOG, Situational Awareness
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Property damage,
Life threatening injury
Dispatched to assist neighboring department on a 3 story garden
style apartment building with fire reported on the third floor.
Upon arrival of the first units there was a heavy fire load
evident on the third floor of the structure. Crew advanced two
1" 3/4 handlines into the structure. The first crew went to the
fire origin and the second crew starting cutting the fire off in
the hallway, so not to spread to neighboring areas. The crew
from the rescue entered the structure and reached the third floor
when the ceiling came down. This caused evasive movements
causing a firefighter to twist his ankle. The firefighter was
taken to the hospital for further evaluation.

20. Lessons Learned
Although the IC did a terrific job at running this scene,
communications within the structure were lacking. Having
interdepartment training could have prevented this incident
from occurring.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Fire Fighter
· Department Shift: 12 hour days, 12 hour nights
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 14 - 16
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Feb 17 2006 11:00AM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event: Clear and Dry
· Do you think this will happen again? Uncertain
· Contributing Factors? Communication
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury
Dispatched to assist neighboring department on a 3 story garden
style apartment building with fire reported on the third floor.
Upon arrival of the first units there was a heavy fire load
evident on the third floor of the structure. Crew advanced two
1" 3/4 handlines into the structure. The first crew went to the
fire origin and the second crew starting cutting the fire off in
the hallway, so not to spread to neighboring areas. The crew
from the rescue entered the structure and reached the third floor

21. when the ceiling came down. This caused evasive movements
causing a firefighter to twist his ankle. The firefighter was
taken to the hospital for further evaluation.
Lessons Learned
Although the IC did a terrific job at running this scene,
communications within the structure were lacking. Having
interdepartment training could have prevented this incident
from occurring.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Fire Fighter
· Department Shift: 12 hour days, 12 hour nights
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 14 - 16
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Feb 17 2006 11:00AM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event: Clear and Dry
· Do you think this will happen again? Uncertain
· Contributing Factors? Communication
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury
Units responded for a report of a structure fire; fire reported in
an attached garage under renovation. Upon arrival of the first
unit, there was heavy fire in the garage, with extension to the

22. house. The first arriving unit reported propane tanks involved
and on fire. Within the first 5 minutes of units arriving and
operating on the scene, there were 3 large explosions, each
involving a 100 lb. Propane cylinder.
Units arrived out of their assigned running order, and jumped
positions from the SOPs. This included the fourth due engine
arriving and taking the second due engine"s water supply
responsibilities, and both trucks arriving late due to getting lost.
In addition, there was a face-to-face miscommunication between
the driver of the fourth due engine and the officer, who was
detailed in from another station. This resulted in a several
minute delay in the establishment of a sustained water supply
for the first due engine.
Initial actions were focused on ensuring evacuation of the
houses on exposures B and D, and then defensive operations.
The three explosions occurred while personnel were engaged in
these activities. The explosions were powerful enough to knock
several firefighters down, but due to their wearing PPE and not
being in immediate proximity, there were no injuries.
Lessons Learned
Situational Awareness: The calling party reported to the 911
operator that there were propane tanks involved in the area of
the fire. This information was never relayed to responding units.
Teamwork: The driver and officer on the 4th due engine did not
communicate effectively. According to our SOPs, the first
responsibility of the second and fourth due engines is to
"Ensure and expand upon the water supply as necessary for the
first (or third) due engine. In this case, the officer gave
instructions which were either not heard correctly or were
misinterpreted by the driver/operator, the officer and the
firefighter abandoned the apparatus driver/operator and went up
to the fire, leaving the driver/operator to complete a labor-
intensive water supply operation by himself. Especially when

23. pairing personnel who are not used to working with each other
(the officer was detailed in on overtime) it is imperative that
two-way communications techniques be used to ensure that
messages are understood and followed correctly.
Area Knowledge: Unit officers and apparatus drivers must have
greater familiarization with their response areas, not limited to
just their "first due" area. They must also be able to get to any
location from different directions of travel. Enhanced GPS
mapping capabilities would be a welcomed addition to all
responding apparatus.
Standard Operating Procedures: Units must know and follow
their SOPs. It is extremely difficult for units and personnel to
readjust to last-second changes in assignments.
Communications: When units will be delayed, they must notify
the Incident Commander, so that consideration of the delays can
be made, and adjustments made as necessary.
Protective Clothing: Again, the importance of properly wearing
all appropriate PPE is a lesson learned. The force of the
explosions might well have caused serious injuries had
personnel not been properly protected.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly paid
· Job or Rank: Battalion Chief / District Chief
· Department Shift: 24 hours on - 48 hours off
· Age: 43 - 51
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 27 - 30
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Dec 29 2006 5:00PM

24. · Hours Into the Shift: 9 - 12
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again? Yes
· Contributing Factors? Decision Making, Teamwork, SOP /
SOG, Situational Awareness
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Property damage,
Life threatening injury
Our department received a call for a residential structure fire,
fire reported in the basement. While enroute, the responding
units received information from dispatch indicating the resident
was attempting to extinguish the fire and refused to leave the
structure. Upon arrival, the chief of the department assumed
command on Side A. He gave an initial report of a 2-story
residential structure with smoke showing from Side C. A 360 of
the structure revealed the resident outside on Side C and a
moderate amount of black smoke coming from a basement
doorway near the B-C corner. Fire was observed inside the
doorway and to the right. Call was then upgraded to a second
alarm.A 200’ 1.75” pre-connected attack line was deployed by a
three-member team from the initial attack engine and stretched
to Side C. The crew proceeded inside and knocked the fire
down, which was located inside a storage room. The area was
overhauled and no extension was found. When the initial attack
crew exited the structure and prepared to head off to the rehab
area, I noticed one of the members’ protective hood was pulled
up, exposing an area, approximately the size of a tennis ball, on
the rear of his neck. The portion of the hood that had pulled up
appeared to have been caught in the liner of the member’s
helmet. It became dislodged when he pulled the hood over his
head after donning his face piece or after adjusting his helmet
just prior to entry.
Lessons Learned
Needless to say, this member was very fortunate that the fire,

25. which turned out to be rather small, had not built up to the point
of causing a severe burn to his neck during fire suppression
operations. Although this was one individual that would have
been directly impacted by a burn, all members of a suppression
crew must look out for each other by making sure everyone is
buttoned up in the hard-to-see areas prior to entry.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Deputy Chief
· Department Shift: 10 hour days, 14 hour nights (2-2-4)
· Age:
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 24 - 26
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Mar 5 2009 3:08PM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again? Yes
· Contributing Factors? Human Error, Individual Action,
Teamwork
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury
Dispatched to assist neighboring department on a 3 story garden
style apartment building with fire reported on the third floor.
Upon arrival of the first units there was a heavy fire load
evident on the third floor of the structure. Crew advanced two
1" 3/4 handlines into the structure. The first crew went to the
fire origin and the second crew starting cutting the fire off in
the hallway, so not to spread to neighboring areas. The crew
from the rescue entered the structure and reached the third floor

26. when the ceiling came down. This caused evasive movements
causing a firefighter to twist his ankle. The firefighter was
taken to the hospital for further evaluation.
Lessons Learned
Although the IC did a terrific job at running this scene,
communications within the structure were lacking. Having
interdepartment training could have prevented this incident
from occurring.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Fire Fighter
· Department Shift: 12 hour days, 12 hour nights
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 14 - 16
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Feb 17 2006 11:00AM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event: Clear and Dry
· Do you think this will happen again? Uncertain
· Contributing Factors? Communication
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury
Dispatched to assist neighboring department on a 3 story garden
style apartment building with fire reported on the third floor.
Upon arrival of the first units there was a heavy fire load

27. evident on the third floor of the structure. Crew advanced two
1" 3/4 handlines into the structure. The first crew went to the
fire origin and the second crew starting cutting the fire off in
the hallway, so not to spread to neighboring areas. The crew
from the rescue entered the structure and reached the third floor
when the ceiling came down. This caused evasive movements
causing a firefighter to twist his ankle. The firefighter was
taken to the hospital for further evaluation.
Lessons Learned
Although the IC did a terrific job at running this scene,
communications within the structure were lacking. Having
interdepartment training could have prevented this incident
from occurring.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Fire Fighter
· Department Shift: 12 hour days, 12 hour nights
· Age: 34 - 42
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 14 - 16
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Feb 17 2006 11:00AM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event: Clear and Dry
· Do you think this will happen again? Uncertain
· Contributing Factors? Communication
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury

28. As a rescue company, we responded to a structure fire reported
to be a working fire. Our departmental policy dictates that a
crew of four will divide into two teams. I was the B- Team
supervisor and had the responsibility of covering the floor
above the fire for search/rescue, ventilation, and fire extension.
Upon our arrival we found a 1 ½ story split level detached home
with about 40% involvement that included quadrant A of the
upper level and quadrants A and B of the lower level. We were
the third piece to arrive on the scene after a ladder and engine.
As we approached the Alpha side of the building I noticed a
hose line going into the lower level that was charged. There was
evidence (visible steam) from the outside that water was in fact
being applied to the fire on the lower level. I saw members from
the ladder company at the bottom of the stairs, thus steering my
decision to go up.
My team member and I entered the building and proceeded to
the upper floor in the area of the origin of the fire and began
our search. We went straight at the top of the stairs through a
kitchen and then left into the dining room. My team member and
I had good face to face communication while proceeding
through these areas.
Once I made it to the outside wall (B side) of the dining area I
could hear the fire towards the front of the house. My partner
and I began to turn around in an effort to move back through the
path we came to search the Charlie and Delta quadrants, when a
loud rumble occurred and I was dropped to the floor. The
ceiling had collapsed due to heavy fire in the cockloft area that
we were unaware of. The collapse brought a heavy fire load
down when it occurred and there was fire all around. I yelled
for my partner and he responded. The collapse had actually

29. separated us, knocking him into a clear area. He was ok,
advising he could make it out via the interior stairs. Once I got
my bearing, I noticed a window and began to move the debris
quickly as to make a rapid egress because the flames were
intensifying.
As I began to make an unassisted egress from the upper floor
window, the ladder truck driver ran up to the window with a
ladder and placed just below the sill of the window. This ladder
placement was a mere coincidence for I had not transmitted any
information related to the collapse via the radio at this point. I
made my way down the provided ladder notified the IC of the
occurrence and recommended the evacuation of the building.
Lessons Learned
I now realize the importance of not operating alone. The
comfort of hearing my team member when I called is
unexplainable. Additionally, there seems to always be a huge
emphasis placed on interior firefighting crews to paint a picture
from the interior for the Incident Commander. Though I agree, I
believe it is equally as important for the Incident Commander to
keep interior crews abreast of the picture he/she sees from the
exterior.
Our response time from the actual 911 call was about 13
minutes. This was a lightweight construction home with heavy
fire involvement. It more than reinforces the timelines we have
all been taught in the past, 6-10 minutes and the structure is not
sound. This is probably the most valuable lesson of all.
Demographics
· Department Type: Volunteer
· Job or Rank: Lieutenant
· Department Shift: Stand-by (in-station)
· Age: 16 - 24
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 7 - 10
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Urban

30. Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Mar 18 2008 1:00PM
· Hours Into the Shift:
· Event Participation: Involved in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again?
· Contributing Factors? Command, Procedure, Other
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Life threatening
injury
Our department received a call for a residential structure fire,
fire reported in the basement. While enroute, the responding
units received information from dispatch indicating the resident
was attempting to extinguish the fire and refused to leave the
structure. Upon arrival, the chief of the department assumed
command on Side A. He gave an initial report of a 2-story
residential structure with smoke showing from Side C. A 360 of
the structure revealed the resident outside on Side C and a
moderate amount of black smoke coming from a basement
doorway near the B-C corner. Fire was observed inside the
doorway and to the right. Call was then upgraded to a second
alarm.A 200’ 1.75” pre-connected attack line was deployed by a
three-member team from the initial attack engine and stretched
to Side C. The crew proceeded inside and knocked the fire
down, which was located inside a storage room. The area was
overhauled and no extension was found. When the initial attack
crew exited the structure and prepared to head off to the rehab
area, I noticed one of the members’ protective hood was pulled
up, exposing an area, approximately the size of a tennis ball, on
the rear of his neck. The portion of the hood that had pulled up
appeared to have been caught in the liner of the member’s
helmet. It became dislodged when he pulled the hood over his
head after donning his face piece or after adjusting his helmet

31. just prior to entry.
Lessons Learned
Needless to say, this member was very fortunate that the fire,
which turned out to be rather small, had not built up to the point
of causing a severe burn to his neck during fire suppression
operations. Although this was one individual that would have
been directly impacted by a burn, all members of a suppression
crew must look out for each other by making sure everyone is
buttoned up in the hard-to-see areas prior to entry.
Demographics
· Department Type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
· Job or Rank: Deputy Chief
· Department Shift: 10 hour days, 14 hour nights (2-2-4)
· Age:
· Years of Fire Service Experience: 24 - 26
· Region: FEMA Region III
· Service Area: Suburban
Event Information
· Event Type: Fire emergency event: structure fire, vehicle fire,
wildland fire, etc.
· Date and Time: Mar 5 2009 3:08PM
· Hours Into the Shift: 5 - 8
· Event Participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved
in the event
· Weather at Time of Event:
· Do you think this will happen again? Yes
· Contributing Factors? Human Error, Individual Action,
Teamwork
· What do you believe is the loss potential?: Lost time injury