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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Peter Lam
Next Wave of Security
Operationalization
STR-W04
A National Bank
Security Analyst
#RSAC
Disclaimer
2
 The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent of position of RSA or
the author’s employer
#RSAC
Speaker Bio
3
 Who am I?
 Peter Lam
 1st Time Presenter at RSA
 Information Security Staff in a national bank
 20+ Year of Professional IT Experience
 Experience in:
 System / Platform Engineering, Application Development, Security, Incident
Response
#RSAC
Purpose & Audience
#RSAC
Purpose & Audience
5
 Purpose
 Help Drive Better Adoption of Technologies (Vendor & Us)
 Demand Drives Supply
 Definitely NOT to Repeat Presentations around STIX/TAXII by MITRE
team
 Introduce A Proof-of-Concept Threat Operationalization Platform
 Explain Problems These Technologies Help Solve NOW
 Audience
 Everyone who Wants to Learn about STIX & TAXII but Want
Something that They Can Try Without Too Much Cost
#RSAC
What’s the problem?
#RSAC
Intelligence Sources
7
Paid Free
Control
System
Private
Vendor
Open
Source
Govern
ment
Private
Vendor
Proprietary /
System Specific
Portal / Secured
Email
CSV / CIF
/ RSS
PDF / RSS PDF
pricetypeformat
touch
needed
No Maybe Maybe Yes Yes
e.g.
Firewall
ISAC / Boutique
Security Firm OSINT CISCP
Any
(Teaser
News)
CIF – Collective Intelligence Framework
ISAC – Information Sharing and Analysis Center
OSINT – Open Source Intelligence
CISCP – Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program
#RSAC
Challenge One
8
 Ineffective and Labor Intensive, because
 Multiple delivery channels
 Mostly manual effort
 Missed email; Staff on vacation, etc.
 Format varies greatly among vendor
 Comma Separated Value (CSV), Extendible
Markup Language (XML), Unformatted text
 Needs multiple parsers for different sources
 Human error; copy & paste, field extraction
 Huge amount of Intelligence
#RSAC
Simplistic Control Network
9
Application
End-Point
Protection
Firewall Vendor
“Secret Sauce”
proxy
Desktop
Users
Laptop
Users
End-Point
Protection
Firewall
Web Application
Firewall
Web Application
Firewall Vendor
“Secret Sauce”
Proxy Vendor
“Secret Sauce”End-Point
Protection Vendor
“Secret Sauce”
#RSAC
Simplistic Control Network
10
End-Point
Protection
proxy
Desktop
Users
Laptop
Users
End-Point
Protection
Proxy Vendor
“Secret Sauce”
End-Point
Protection Vendor
“Secret Sauce”
End-Point
Protection
Laptop
Users (at home)
Evil
#RSAC
Challenge Two
11
 Vendors Most Likely Won’t
Share Their “Secret Sauce”, or
indicators
 Unless Part of the Sharing Ring
 Not Hard to Understand “Why”
 Same Indicator Not Replicated
Across Multiple Controls
 Multi-Layer Security Control
But Single-Layer Security
Intelligence?
#RSAC
What?
12
• Operationalization of Threat Intelligence Handling
around Indicators
• Automatically:
• Collect
• Receive Threat Intelligence
• Dissect
• Extract Crucial Indicators
• Detect
• Search for Realized Threat
• Distribute
• Intelligence across All Layers of Controls
• Prevent
• Deploy Prevention Control
#RSAC
Why?
13
• Bad Guys have Malware Supply Chain
• Commercialization of Crime Ware
• Operationalize of Malware Development
• Highly Time Sensitive Response Needed
• Exponentially Expensive to Recover
• Machines Should do the Heavy Lifting, NOT
HUMAN, ESPECIALLY NOT the ANALYSTS
#RSAC
How?
#RSAC
High Level Understanding of
the Enabling Technologies
#RSAC
Protocol Technologies
#RSAC
TAXII
17
 Stands for
 Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information
 Threat Intelligence Exchange Agreements
 How messages are expressed and transported
 Exchange Models
 Source-Subscriber / Hub & Spoke / Peer-to-Peer Models
 Role Models
 Data Producers / Consumers
 Service Models
#RSAC
Exchange Model
18
 Source-Subscriber Model
 Typical for Current Threat
Intelligence (TI) Vendor / Customer
Relationship Model
 Hub & Spoke Model
 Suitable for used in Large
Organizations
 Various Contract Owners with TI
vendors and become a Spoke
(Consumer & Producer)
 Play Attention to Sharing
Agreement
Source
Subscriber
Subscriber Subscriber
Subscriber
Hub
Spoke
(Consumer only)
Spoke
(Consumer &
Producer)
Spoke
(Producer
only)
Spoke
(Consumer
&
Producer)
#RSAC
Role & Service Models
19
 Role Models
 Producer Only
 Consumer Only
 Producer & Consumer
 Service Models
 Discovery Service
 Collection Management Service
 Inbox Service
 Poll Service
#RSAC
STIX
20
 Stands for
 Structured Threat Information eXpression
 Structured Way of Describing Cyber Threat
 Eight Main Constructs
#RSAC
STIX Eight Constructs
21
 Observable
 What activity was observed
 Indicator
 What should be looked for
 Incident
 Where was it seen
 Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
(TTP)
 What does it do
 ExploitTarget
 What weakness does it
exploit
 Campaign
 Why
 ThreatActor
 Who
 Course of Action
 Suggested Action
#RSAC
Profiles
22
 Contracts between Sharing Parties (Producers to Consumers)
 Define In-Scope / Out-of-Scope
 Which Constructs / Elements Required
 More on This
#RSAC
Related Standards
23
 STIX’s Observable Indicators leverage CybOX to precisely
describe the details
 CybOX
 Cyber Observable eXpression
 About 80 Objects
#RSAC
Which Fundamental Problems Were Solved
24
 TAXII
 Solves Transport / Channel Problem
 No more secured emails, RSS, portal access to obtain intelligence
 STIX / CyBox
 Solves Intelligence Format Problem
 No more free form text, or CSV
 No more copy and paste
 No more extracting searchable terms from emails, or portal
 Precisely Describe
 Allow Machine Extraction without Human Interaction
#RSAC
Now What?
25
 Read the XML encoded intelligence manually?
 Have a way to precisely describe and share intelligence between
parties
 Of course NOT
 At the minimum
 Search for indicators like IPs / URLs
 Add IPs / URLs to “Block” list
 Propagate intelligence across control layers
#RSAC
Platform Technologies
#RSAC
Feeds
27
 Compliant with Standards
 Confirm Which Constructs are
Supported with Vendors
 Standards Very Board By
Design
 Data Fields Mostly Not
Required
 At least, Observable /
Indicators
#RSAC
STIX Profile
28
 Without Profile
 Feed Still Compliant, but Not
As Rich
 Time Reference
 Confidence Level
#RSAC
POC Platform
29
Host
FireWallProxyFireWall
Control Defenses
Threat Intelligence Feeds (FS-ISAC / Hailataxii)
Security Information & Event Management
(Splunk)
Indicator
Extractor
(SPLICE)
Intel.
SIEM
Threat Gateway (Soltra Edge)
Threat Gateway
#RSAC
Platform
30
 Threat Intelligence Gateway
 Receive Threat Intelligence
 Talk TAXII
 Decompose STIX
 Indicator Extractor
 Extract Indicator of
Compromise from STIX
 Search for Realized Threat
against SIEM
 Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM)
 Initiate Incident Response
Upon Match
 Initiate First Response
 Block IP/URL at perimeter
 Scripts
 Add Indicators to “Block” list
#RSAC
POC Platform
31
Host
FireWallProxyFireWall
Control Defenses
Threat Intelligence Feeds
Security Information & Event Management
(Splunk)
Indicator
Extractor
(SPLICE)
Intel.
SIEM
Threat Gateway (Soltra Edge)
Threat Gateway
Feed 1 Feed 2 Feed X
Intelligence Pool
Atomic
Intelligence
Compound
Intelligence
#RSAC
Demo Screen
32
#RSAC
Apply
#RSAC
Summary
 Threat Intelligence Sharing Technologies are Maturing
 Feed Readily Available (Hailataxii & FS-ISAC if member)
 POC Platform can be Created with Minimum Cost
 Automatic
 Detect Indicator for Realized Threat
 Deploy Indicator to “Block” list
34
#RSAC
Apply
 Obtain Quality Vendor Feed
 Deploy POC Platform
 Create Automatic Mechanism
35
#RSAC
Reference & Tool
 Feed
 Hailataxii.com (Open Source)
 FS-ISAC
 Soltra EDGE (www.soltra.com)
 Splunk SA-Splice (splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2637)
 Script to Extract All Atomic Indicators
36

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str-w04_next-wave-of-security-operationalization

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Peter Lam Next Wave of Security Operationalization STR-W04 A National Bank Security Analyst
  • 2. #RSAC Disclaimer 2  The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent of position of RSA or the author’s employer
  • 3. #RSAC Speaker Bio 3  Who am I?  Peter Lam  1st Time Presenter at RSA  Information Security Staff in a national bank  20+ Year of Professional IT Experience  Experience in:  System / Platform Engineering, Application Development, Security, Incident Response
  • 5. #RSAC Purpose & Audience 5  Purpose  Help Drive Better Adoption of Technologies (Vendor & Us)  Demand Drives Supply  Definitely NOT to Repeat Presentations around STIX/TAXII by MITRE team  Introduce A Proof-of-Concept Threat Operationalization Platform  Explain Problems These Technologies Help Solve NOW  Audience  Everyone who Wants to Learn about STIX & TAXII but Want Something that They Can Try Without Too Much Cost
  • 7. #RSAC Intelligence Sources 7 Paid Free Control System Private Vendor Open Source Govern ment Private Vendor Proprietary / System Specific Portal / Secured Email CSV / CIF / RSS PDF / RSS PDF pricetypeformat touch needed No Maybe Maybe Yes Yes e.g. Firewall ISAC / Boutique Security Firm OSINT CISCP Any (Teaser News) CIF – Collective Intelligence Framework ISAC – Information Sharing and Analysis Center OSINT – Open Source Intelligence CISCP – Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program
  • 8. #RSAC Challenge One 8  Ineffective and Labor Intensive, because  Multiple delivery channels  Mostly manual effort  Missed email; Staff on vacation, etc.  Format varies greatly among vendor  Comma Separated Value (CSV), Extendible Markup Language (XML), Unformatted text  Needs multiple parsers for different sources  Human error; copy & paste, field extraction  Huge amount of Intelligence
  • 9. #RSAC Simplistic Control Network 9 Application End-Point Protection Firewall Vendor “Secret Sauce” proxy Desktop Users Laptop Users End-Point Protection Firewall Web Application Firewall Web Application Firewall Vendor “Secret Sauce” Proxy Vendor “Secret Sauce”End-Point Protection Vendor “Secret Sauce”
  • 10. #RSAC Simplistic Control Network 10 End-Point Protection proxy Desktop Users Laptop Users End-Point Protection Proxy Vendor “Secret Sauce” End-Point Protection Vendor “Secret Sauce” End-Point Protection Laptop Users (at home) Evil
  • 11. #RSAC Challenge Two 11  Vendors Most Likely Won’t Share Their “Secret Sauce”, or indicators  Unless Part of the Sharing Ring  Not Hard to Understand “Why”  Same Indicator Not Replicated Across Multiple Controls  Multi-Layer Security Control But Single-Layer Security Intelligence?
  • 12. #RSAC What? 12 • Operationalization of Threat Intelligence Handling around Indicators • Automatically: • Collect • Receive Threat Intelligence • Dissect • Extract Crucial Indicators • Detect • Search for Realized Threat • Distribute • Intelligence across All Layers of Controls • Prevent • Deploy Prevention Control
  • 13. #RSAC Why? 13 • Bad Guys have Malware Supply Chain • Commercialization of Crime Ware • Operationalize of Malware Development • Highly Time Sensitive Response Needed • Exponentially Expensive to Recover • Machines Should do the Heavy Lifting, NOT HUMAN, ESPECIALLY NOT the ANALYSTS
  • 15. #RSAC High Level Understanding of the Enabling Technologies
  • 17. #RSAC TAXII 17  Stands for  Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information  Threat Intelligence Exchange Agreements  How messages are expressed and transported  Exchange Models  Source-Subscriber / Hub & Spoke / Peer-to-Peer Models  Role Models  Data Producers / Consumers  Service Models
  • 18. #RSAC Exchange Model 18  Source-Subscriber Model  Typical for Current Threat Intelligence (TI) Vendor / Customer Relationship Model  Hub & Spoke Model  Suitable for used in Large Organizations  Various Contract Owners with TI vendors and become a Spoke (Consumer & Producer)  Play Attention to Sharing Agreement Source Subscriber Subscriber Subscriber Subscriber Hub Spoke (Consumer only) Spoke (Consumer & Producer) Spoke (Producer only) Spoke (Consumer & Producer)
  • 19. #RSAC Role & Service Models 19  Role Models  Producer Only  Consumer Only  Producer & Consumer  Service Models  Discovery Service  Collection Management Service  Inbox Service  Poll Service
  • 20. #RSAC STIX 20  Stands for  Structured Threat Information eXpression  Structured Way of Describing Cyber Threat  Eight Main Constructs
  • 21. #RSAC STIX Eight Constructs 21  Observable  What activity was observed  Indicator  What should be looked for  Incident  Where was it seen  Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTP)  What does it do  ExploitTarget  What weakness does it exploit  Campaign  Why  ThreatActor  Who  Course of Action  Suggested Action
  • 22. #RSAC Profiles 22  Contracts between Sharing Parties (Producers to Consumers)  Define In-Scope / Out-of-Scope  Which Constructs / Elements Required  More on This
  • 23. #RSAC Related Standards 23  STIX’s Observable Indicators leverage CybOX to precisely describe the details  CybOX  Cyber Observable eXpression  About 80 Objects
  • 24. #RSAC Which Fundamental Problems Were Solved 24  TAXII  Solves Transport / Channel Problem  No more secured emails, RSS, portal access to obtain intelligence  STIX / CyBox  Solves Intelligence Format Problem  No more free form text, or CSV  No more copy and paste  No more extracting searchable terms from emails, or portal  Precisely Describe  Allow Machine Extraction without Human Interaction
  • 25. #RSAC Now What? 25  Read the XML encoded intelligence manually?  Have a way to precisely describe and share intelligence between parties  Of course NOT  At the minimum  Search for indicators like IPs / URLs  Add IPs / URLs to “Block” list  Propagate intelligence across control layers
  • 27. #RSAC Feeds 27  Compliant with Standards  Confirm Which Constructs are Supported with Vendors  Standards Very Board By Design  Data Fields Mostly Not Required  At least, Observable / Indicators
  • 28. #RSAC STIX Profile 28  Without Profile  Feed Still Compliant, but Not As Rich  Time Reference  Confidence Level
  • 29. #RSAC POC Platform 29 Host FireWallProxyFireWall Control Defenses Threat Intelligence Feeds (FS-ISAC / Hailataxii) Security Information & Event Management (Splunk) Indicator Extractor (SPLICE) Intel. SIEM Threat Gateway (Soltra Edge) Threat Gateway
  • 30. #RSAC Platform 30  Threat Intelligence Gateway  Receive Threat Intelligence  Talk TAXII  Decompose STIX  Indicator Extractor  Extract Indicator of Compromise from STIX  Search for Realized Threat against SIEM  Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)  Initiate Incident Response Upon Match  Initiate First Response  Block IP/URL at perimeter  Scripts  Add Indicators to “Block” list
  • 31. #RSAC POC Platform 31 Host FireWallProxyFireWall Control Defenses Threat Intelligence Feeds Security Information & Event Management (Splunk) Indicator Extractor (SPLICE) Intel. SIEM Threat Gateway (Soltra Edge) Threat Gateway Feed 1 Feed 2 Feed X Intelligence Pool Atomic Intelligence Compound Intelligence
  • 34. #RSAC Summary  Threat Intelligence Sharing Technologies are Maturing  Feed Readily Available (Hailataxii & FS-ISAC if member)  POC Platform can be Created with Minimum Cost  Automatic  Detect Indicator for Realized Threat  Deploy Indicator to “Block” list 34
  • 35. #RSAC Apply  Obtain Quality Vendor Feed  Deploy POC Platform  Create Automatic Mechanism 35
  • 36. #RSAC Reference & Tool  Feed  Hailataxii.com (Open Source)  FS-ISAC  Soltra EDGE (www.soltra.com)  Splunk SA-Splice (splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2637)  Script to Extract All Atomic Indicators 36