RyanPolitics&Policy

White Gold and Troubled Waters in Southern
Africa: Hydropolitical Policys Effect on Peace
in Lesotho and South Africa
SUSANNAH RYAN
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Over recent decades, scholars have debated the connection between
resource scarcity and conflict. Does resource scarcity produce con-
flict, or does scarcity demand development and international coop-
eration? Can environmental stress be an occasion for peace, or does
international cooperation during an environmental crisis indicate
local or intrastate conflicts? Toward responding to these questions,
this analysis examines the effects the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project (LHWP) and shows that while the LHWP helped to put a
stop to international conflicts between Lesotho and South Africa,
the Projects consequences (ecocide, displacement, and unequal dis-
tribution of basic resources) have intensified tensions within these
states.
Keywords: Natural Resource Management, Peace, Violence, Conflict,
Resource Wars, Water Policy, Security Policy, Water Conservation, Leso-
tho, South Africa, Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Resource Scarcity,
Development, International Cooperation, Environmental Crisis.
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Moreno-Jaimes, Carlos. 2011. “Is Local Spending Responsive to the
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Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank her anonymous reviewers and Editor,
Emma Norman, for their feedback and guidance. She would also like to thank Eric King
Watts, Anne-Maria Makhulu, and Erik Doxtader for their direction during this projects con-
ception, and Calum Matheson for his ongoing engagement with the subject.
Politics Policy, Volume 43, No. 2 (2015): 239-255. 10.1111/polp.12114
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
VC 2015 Policy Studies Organization

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00318.x/
abstract
Related Media:
AfricaGlobalisation. 2013. “White Gold.” YouTube Video, May 27.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKj7G5QR0To
Greyl, Lucie. 2015. “Lesotho Highlands Water Project Lesotho.” Ejolt/
Environmental Justice Atlas. http://ejatlas.org/conflict/lesotho-highlands-
water-project-lesotho
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. 2015. “Lesotho Highlands
Water Project.” http://www.lhda.org
The World Bank. 2011. “Abundant Waters: Harnessing Water for
Lesothos Future.” http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2011/03/15/
Abundant-Waters-Harnessing-Water-Lesotho-Future
Durante las ultimas decadas academicos han debatido la conexion
entre la escasez de recursos y el conflict. Puede la escasez de recur-
sos producir conflicto, o acaso la escasez requiere del desarrollo y la
cooperacion internacional? Puede la presion al medio ambiente for-
mularse como una oportunidad para establecer la paz, o de lo contra-
rio, puede la cooperacion internacional indicar conflictos dentro y
entre naciones durante tiempos de crisis medioambientales? Para
responder estas preguntas se analizan los efectos del proyecto Leso-
tho Highlands Water Project, LHWP por sus siglas en ingles, y se
muestra que si bien el proyecto LHWP ayudo a finalizar los conflic-
tos entre Lesoto y Sudafrica, las consecuencias del proyecto (ecoci-
dio, desplazamientos y distribucion desigual de recursos basicos) han
intensificado la tension dentro de estos paıses.
The relationship between dwindling natural resources and civic violence in
developing countries has been a matter of vibrant debate among political scien-
tists, geologists, economists, and sociologists for decades. While scholars across
disciplines maintain that there are powerful links between environmental stress
and conflict, others argue that the connection is overemphasized, and that
there are a number of unexplored outcomes of resource scarcity, including
international cooperation. One strand of these debates addresses the ways in
which environmental change has been woven into political discourse as a mat-
ter of national security. Several scholars argue that environmental problems
contribute to state failure and international violence. Gleick (1993) asserts that
water scarcity has led to conflicts among nations and will continue to do so as
human needs for water grow. Myers (1993) proposes that deterioration of the
environment leads to global conflict and political instability. Homer-Dixon
(1999) uses several case studies to predict ethnic clashes and civil unrest as the
result of renewable resource scarcity. And Kahl (2006) contends that environ-
mental stress renders societies and governments in poor countries vulnerable to
armed conflict.
240 | POLITICS POLICY / April 2015

The implications of scarcity of such a basic, vital resource like water (as
well as high-value resources like oil) include corrupt governance, poor develop-
ment, displacement, and conflict (Collier 2007). However, political scientist
Deudney (1999) is critical of these conclusions for being too singularly focused
on the costs of scarcity. He argues that, contrary to what most of the literature
on “resource wars” suggests, the urgent need for a natural resource—especially
water—discourages conflict and stimulates international cooperation.
Previous case studies have concluded that resource scarcity may not lead to
violence, and that it certainly does not preclude peace.1
For example, an exami-
nation of the political context surrounding the Lesotho Highlands Water Pro-
ject (LHWP) reveals that during times of resource scarcity, a trade agreement
or development policy can function as an international peace treaty. The part-
nership formed between Lesotho and South Africa through the LHWP could
therefore be judged in Deudneys (1990, 1999) terms as cooperative. That said,
while the LHWP may be lauded for its peace-making possibilities and for
bringing out mutual economic growth for both countries, I argue that it does
not simply serve as a model for Deudneys critique. Although the LHWP made
international peace between Lesotho and South Africa possible, it, too, has
promoted latent conflict within the states, or nonviolent conflict that has a
great potential to become violent. In sum, the international cooperation incited
by resource scarcity does not altogether remove the possibility of conflict. The
presence of international cooperation at times of scarcity may merely indicate
that conflicts over resources have manifested on a different scale.
In this article, I focus on developing two arguments: (1) as Deudneys
scholarship proposes, resource scarcity can work as a facilitator for interna-
tional peace; and (2) when stress caused by resource scarcity does not result in
international conflict, that stress may materialize in more local political ten-
sions. Toward establishing these claims, I provide a study of the LHWP, the
hydropolitical conditions surrounding its formation, and the latent conflicts
that have emerged since the project began construction. Scholarly work related
to the LHWP has decreased significantly in the past decade; very little up-to-
date material is available. A critical examination of the Lesotho Highlands
Water Treaty and outcomes of Phase I of the LHWP is nevertheless important
and timely given its recent commencement at Maseru, on March 27, 2014. This
article begins with an analysis regarding how interstate conflict over water was
avoided by Lesotho and South Africa through both countries governments
enlisting in a mutually advantageous development project. Following this, I
provide an overview of the projects policies and the implementation of Phase I
(1990-2004). I conclude with a review of the effects the LHWP has had on com-
munities in terms of civic relations, and propose how, during the construction
1
Environmental cooperation has historically led to a reduction in political tensions and ultimately,
brings out peace between nations (see Dinar 2011, 9).
Ryan / HYDROPOLITICAL POLICY AND PEACE | 241

of Phase II (which began in March 2014), consequences like latent conflict can
be avoided with more governmental accountability toward the Lesotho High-
lands Water Treaty.
The purpose of this study is to both affirm and problematize Deudneys
(1990, 1999) conclusions related to resource scarcity and conflict. It is impor-
tant, as Deudney encourages, to see environmental crises as an opportunity for
international cooperation. However, it is equally important to acknowledge
that resource scarcity negatively affects civilians even when there is interstate
collaboration. While development projects such as the LHWP address scarcity
at an international level, the impact of the project on the environment and
communities points to the pervasive risk of violence at an intrastate level. As I
elaborate in the concluding remarks of this article, if governments seek to turn
an environmental crisis into an occasion for peace, there should be a careful
consideration of how development affects peoples; also, in times of develop-
ment, there should be assertive compensation and reparation efforts that pre-
vent resource scarcity from becoming a source of local tensions.
White Gold and Hydropolitics: Lesotho and South Africa (1955-98)
Resource scarcity has long been credited with generating conflict. States
with diminished supply of water are considered especially vulnerable to “water
wars” because water is essential to existence (Turton 2002). Consequently, for
states facing water scarcity, accessing and circulating water becomes a highly
politicized issue. Water is not treated as a resource with which all peoples and
populations have a natural right to access; it is contested terrain as civilizations
compete for supply. The set of disputes and negotiations related to the control
of water is referred to as hydropolitics (Turton 2002, 14).
Scholars hold differing opinions over whether hydropolitics actually lead
to violent conflict. As Deudney (1990) points out, other factors such as a weak
state and crime may be the proximate cause of conflict whereas scarcity often
increases cooperation between countries, particularly in cases of water shortage
(see also Sullivan 2010, 120-1). Environmental pressures like water scarcity typ-
ically produce a weighty demand for development projects such as the LHWP
(Kahl 2006, 10); by extension, they produce a demand for interstate coopera-
tion. In this section, I explain how the political climate in Southern Africa was
changed by South Africas water shortage in the mid-twentieth century and
how, much in line with Deudneys claims, the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty
alleviated the looming threat of violence on the border of Lesotho and South
Africa.
As will be made clear in the following historical overview, the LHWP func-
tions as an alternative to military aggression, signifying the cooperation that
comes on in light of resource scarcity as Deudney argues. A “water war” was
unlikely. Lesotho lacked the “industrial products and surplus wealth” to wage
war against a potential aggressor who intends to tap into their water supply

(Deudney 1990, 462). Additionally, South Africa—still under apartheid rule
and facing both intrastate and interstate pressure to deracialize their gover-
nance—did not have the political prowess or stable footing to pour their mate-
rial and institutional resources into a military conflict. Ultimately, Lesotho and
South Africa opted for mobilizing a water trade agreement to address scarcity,
which produced far less social and political disruption and was more cost-
efficient than military aggression (Deudney 1999, 207-8).
The LHWP was originally proposed by the British High Commissioner of
Lesotho in the 1950s while the country was still under British rule. Economists
at this time perceived the heavy rainfall in Basotholand as an opportunity to
harness water as a natural resource that can be exchanged for currency. In
1966, a newly independent Lesotho entered into negotiations over a project
called “Oxbow-Malibamatso,” which would transfer water to industrialized
regions in South Africa. Negotiations at this time never settled into agreement
due to disputes over Lesothos purchase price of water (Mwangi 2007, 7).
After the countrys first attempts to bargain with Lesotho, South Africa
explored the cheaper Tugela Transfer to improve water supply; but by the late
1970s, an acute need for water in the Vaal river basin put a development project
with Lesotho back into play (Thabane 2000, 633). At the time, the political
relationship between the two nations was disagreeable; the legitimacy of the
South African apartheid state was under international scrutiny and Chief Lea-
bua Jonathan, then-leader of the Lesotho government, participated in censur-
ing White South African rule. Along with political instability, South Africa was
at this time also suffering a severe drought that posed a threat to the regions
economy, particularly with regard to mining in the countrys urban center,
Johannesburg. The LHWP was the only viable solution to South Africas water
crisis. Therefore, although the LHWP was originally part of the agenda of an
Apartheid State, the water crisis necessitated incorporation into the countrys
postapartheid policies.
In 1994, both countries formally acknowledged that the economic well-
being of the region is interdependent (Laurence 1987, 61-3). In 1998, His Maj-
esty King Letsie III of Lesotho, President Nelson Mandela, and Sir Ketumile
Masire of Botswana officiated the inauguration of Phase I of the LHWP. Since
the project was rooted in South Africas apartheid government, Mandelas
(1998) championing of the cooperation embodied in the Lesotho Highlands
Water Treaty was important for rewriting the dam development project as a
democratic South African undertaking:
The resounding success of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project testifies
to the powerful split of co-operation that is growing as Africa lifts itself
through its own efforts, with the strong support of an international
community. The flow of fresh water is the concrete result of the welding
together of our efforts and nation building and regional develop-
ment. . .Here in Southern Africa we have worked for our mutual benefit.

Although framed as a positive political and economic development, the
LHWP was not commenced without some duress. Soon after Mandelas state-
ment, a political crisis in Lesotho required Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili
to appeal to the South African Development Community (SADC) for assis-
tance. The SADC subsequently organized a military intervention in Lesotho
along with the Botswana Defense Force; Mandela authorized 700 South
African troops to partake in the mission (Mwangi 2007, 10). As Mangosuthu
Buthelezi, who acted as president of South Africa numerous times, explained,
the primary purpose of the intervention in Lesotho was to safeguard the
LHWP (Likoti 2007, 257).
Years following South Africas intervention, support for the project has
remained adamant. In 2004, Thabo Mbeki described the LHWP as a demon-
stration of collaboration over harsh competition and King Letsie III of Leso-
tho said, “we often hear predictions that water will be a source of international
conflict. We certainly do not wish to see the LHWP being a source of such con-
flicts with our neighbors” (Letsie 2004). Most recently, in his State of the
Nation Address delivered in the winter of 2014, President Jacob Zuma praised
the collaborative success of Phase I. Because LHWP is upheld as a legitimate
and mutually beneficial development project for both states, it is fair to argue
that the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty functioned as a peace treaty. Rather
than the countries waging war over water, political leaders have consistently
supported the project as a diplomatic alternative to conflict. To this extent, the
LHWP corroborates with Deudneys claims: in instances of resource scarcity,
nations will elect to engage in peaceful development and trade instead of
combat.
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project
The LHWP is Africas largest design for transferring water. It is comprised
of several large dams and tunnels that move from the water-wealthy mountains
in Lesotho to the dry terrains in South Africa. In this section, I outline the
objectives of the LHWP and its policies, which were shaped by the terms of the
Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty. Reviewing of the project and its policies is
crucial to verifying that the environmental and civic consequences of the
LHWP are violations of the Treaty, and thus, not the result of scarcity itself,
but the parties failure to fulfill the compensations and reparations promised to
civilians.
Ranked as one of the driest countries with annual rainfall at about half of
the world average, water availability is a severe constraint on development in
South Africa (South Africa Department of Energy 2010, 60-1). Even if a
nation were sufficient in other natural resources, the scarcity of water for low-
and middle-income countries is damaging to their economy; in South Africas
case, water transfer is needed for sustaining operations in the nations indus-
trial heartland, the Gauteng Province (Barbier 2005, 242). While the LHWP is

essential to South Africas environmental and economic stability, it is also a
staple for Lesothos development, with water being the countrys most lucra-
tive natural resource. Lesothos economy is mostly based on livestock and agri-
culture, but only one-eighth of the land is arable (a product of erosion,
overgrazing, and overcropping). Whatever Lesotho lacks in fertile soil and
modern industrialization, it makes up with an abundance of glittering water-
falls and a store of rivers that give the country a unique advantage in an arid
region. The water harvested for export is so referred to by Lesothians as “white
gold” (Maro 2011, 35-6).
In view of both Lesotho and South Africas needs regarding development,
the LHWP is designed to transfer water to the Gauteng region in South Africa
and provide Lesotho with statewide hydroelectric power by improving infra-
structure (e.g., dams, weirs, and delivery tunnels). Additionally, the LHWP is
set to alleviate poverty in Lesotho and stabilize the nations economy by utiliz-
ing its most copious natural resource (Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations 1986, Article 4). Toward accomplishing these ends, the pro-
ject is separated into two phases: “Phase I,” which was altogether completed in
2004, and “Phase II.” Phase I was divided into two subphases: Phase IA (com-
pleted in 1998) and Phase IB (completed in 2004). Phase IA included: (1) the
construction of the 185 meter-high Katse Dam on the Malibamatso River; (2)
82 kilometers of delivery tunnels to South Africas Gauteng Province; (3) con-
struction of the Muela Dam on the Liqoe River; and (4) development of the
Muela Hydropower Station. Phase IB included the construction of the Mohale
Dam on the Senqunyane River and several delivery tunnels to Katse (see Haas,
Mazzei, and OLeary 2010, ix).
Along with detailing the material aspects of the LHWP, The Lesotho High-
lands Water Treaty delegates responsibilities regarding the projects execution.
The treaty establishes that Lesotho is responsible for consistently transferring
clean, usable water to South Africa and providing security for all infrastructure
related to the project that is situated within its borders (Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations 1986, Article 6). Meanwhile, the treaty
establishes that South Africa is responsible for purchasing the water transferred
from Lesotho, underwriting much of the construction of Phase I and Phase II,
and providing security for all infrastructure related to the project that is situated
within its borders (Article 7). The treaty also outlines specific means to preserve
the quality of life of those impacted by the project: The Lesotho Highlands
Development Authority (LHDA) is responsible for ensuring that the citizens of
the Kingdom of Lesotho affected by the project are able to “maintain a standard
of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of first disturbance” (Article
15). Both Lesotho and South Africa are cited in the treaty as responsible for pre-
serving the quality of the environment and protecting the “welfare of persons
and communities affected by the Project” (Article 15).
These last provisions listed in Articles 7 and 15 of the Lesotho Highlands
Water Treaty are of particular importance with regard to the consequences of

the project and the conflict that followed construction of Phase IA and Phase
IB. Lesothians suffered from ecocide and displacement, which compromised
their quality of life and created tensions between communities that often
resulted in bloodshed (see Bildhaeuser 2010, 52; Sibanda 2003, 34-5). Concur-
rently, many South Africans living in rural, impoverished regions impacted the
most by water scarcity were met with discrepancies regarding water distribu-
tion that are analogous to apartheid politics.
After the formation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty and comple-
tion of Phase I, the LHWP was credited with “demonstrating the benefits of
bilateral government cooperation” (Haas, Mazzei, and OLeary 2010, 26).
Yet although the LHWP is a development project that promoted peace over
international conflict, the consequences of Phase I (mentioned earlier and
detailed shortly) demonstrate that Deudneys (1990, 1999) conclusions related
to water scarcity and cooperation are complicated by the presence of intrastate
conflict, which can compromise the success of the project and completion of
Phase II.
Consequences of Phase I: Lesotho
Throughout the implementation of the LHWP, alleviation of poverty and
economic stability has been of primary importance to Lesotho. Revenues from
Phase IA of the project-supported infrastructure projects—roads, dams,
bridges, and forestry and soil conservation—all of which were delegated to
local labor markets. Once construction of Phase IB began, however, the
LHWPs virtuous results were compromised due to a lack of transparency,
weak technical designs, and poor (even criminal) management.2
More specifi-
cally, at the end of Phase I, the LHWPs destruction of the environment and
the LHDAs flippant regard for displaced communities ultimately created
strained relations between Lesothians that reportedly resulted in violence. In
this section, I discuss how the LHWP impacted the environment and how those
effects ultimately agitated conflicts between peoples.
The World Bank is correct to acknowledge a great deal of economic growth
in Lesotho since the completion of Phase I, as demonstrated by the countrys
gross domestic product (GDP), increase in jobs, and development of infra-
structure. However, the construction of the LHWPs dams has taken a toll on
Lesothos environment. Even though the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty
declares dedication to ensuring social and environmental stability, the project
construction continues to cause “unwarranted environmental destruction” in
Lesotho, which led to the loss of arable land and soil erosion; this “ecocide”
that has had a profound effect on agriculture in Lesotho has threatened human
security in the country (Mwangi 2007, 12). With these environmental costs, the
2
This “poor (even criminal) management” refers to cases of project level fraud and “the lack of
guidelines in assessing funds.” See Haas, Mazzei, and OLeary (2010, 13-14).

displaced Lesotho communities also received little to none of the compensation
they were promised in exchange for evacuating their land so that the projects
construction could take place (Thamae 2006, 9). As a result of competition for
diminishing resources like animal stock and crops, and in response to the real
danger of starvation among affected families, there have been eruptions of vio-
lence between communities struggling to survive (Mwangi 2007, 15).
The environmental destruction caused by the construction of the LHWP
dams was devastating for Lesotho, a landlocked country with only a small por-
tion of its soil being suitable for farming. Phase I ravaged approximately 3,700
acres of cropland and over 12,000 acres of grazing land. The Mohale Valley,
which was overtaken by the Mohale Dam, was the region in the country with
the most fertile land and the only region that produced agricultural surpluses.
With two-thirds of the population living in the areas affected by the dam con-
struction depending on local produce, the loss of farmland has diminished
food security (Hoover 2001, 7).
The extreme effect the project has had on Lesothos environment has
affected peoples lives in other ways as well. For example, fuel sources (trees
and woody shrubs) were lost to inundation, which posed a problem for many
households that sold firewood as part of their family income. Prior to the
implementation of Phase I, over half of all households would gather under-
growth from the riparian areas; since those areas are now submerged, about
half of the population are forced to find $200 worth of brushwood elsewhere
and many cannot afford the expense (Boehm and Hall 1999, ii). Other resour-
ces swallowed by the dam construction include: over 175 species of medicinal
plants that grew in flooded areas; leloi grass, which was used for traditional
crafts; and river sand, used for making bricks (Hoover 2001, 8-9).
With the exception of water, there has been a sharp decline in access to
resources for communities affected by the construction of the Mohale Dam;
communities have lost access to wild vegetables, medicinal grounds, and wood-
lands that previously sustained their quality of life. With respect to water
access, since resettlement, there has been a shift from using natural water
sources to using piped water services; this could almost be considered an
achievement by the LHWP, were it not for the fact that the water sources pro-
vided by the state often do not function properly, leaving displaced com-
munities to resort to communal water resources (Setsabi and Mashinini 2006,
135-6).
Because resettlement leads to an increased demand on utilities and commu-
nal resources, the projects relocation of peoples has led to conflicts between
host communities and resettlers. One-quarter of the households displaced at
the time of dam construction report not feeling accepted by their host com-
munities (see Setsabi and Mashinini 2006, 132). One relocatee in Ha Tsiu cited
conflict within the community as a major challenge faced after the LHWP dis-
placed villages: “they insult each other and this is the challenge. I had to go
between and to settle peace . . . I dont know why people fight” (quoted in

Bildhaeuser 2010, 52). He adds that bloodshed often results from insults (52).
Violent conflict is common when large populations are shuffled across territo-
ries and, because Lesothoians are cagey on local disputes, it is hard to gauge
exactly how prevalent violent conflicts are among displaced communities
(Mwangi 2007, 4). Even if violence were not a particularly distinguishing factor
for displaced peoples, there is no doubt that their displacement has spurred
hostilities that have brought the country into latent conflict. Put differently,
through a combination of ecocide and deficient or missing reparations, the
LHWP created an atmosphere in which violent conflict between communities
could feasibly occur within the state. Because newly integrated villages should
compete for grazing land and other natural resources, with starvation at stake,
tensions between families and villages are high. It was not uncommon for the
LHDA to fail to inform a host village of the arrival of displaced people until
after contractors began preparing the resettlement site. Such a disregard for
the people in the area led to severe hostility toward those resettling. For
instance, an older person from the displaced village, Molikaliko, passed away
shortly after arriving at Makhoakhoeng, but when friends and family gathered
for a funeral, armed members of the host society guarded the local graveyard
and threatened aggression if they attempted to bury their loved one there
(Transformation Resource Center 1999, 8). These testimonies by those affected
by the dam construction reveal that resettlements and relocations have culti-
vated an environment vulnerable to civic violence.
If there happened to be some monetary compensation delivered to dis-
placed peoples, which was an infrequent occurrence, there would be internal
conflicts over access to that money and its distribution. In Hai Tsui, three
members of the Compensation Committee embezzled payments and, as a
result, LHDA stopped issuing compensation. Makoali Mokhachane, another
member of this committee, explains, “those people that took the money are still
here but the moment that the auditor comes back to us, it should reveal mis-
management. This is when we can take the people to the court . . . We do not
look at them well. We kind of despise them” (quoted in Bildhaeuser 2010, 52).
As reported by Nkopane Khama, Ramotse (leader appointed by the village
chief) in Hai Tsu, theft by members of the Compensation Committee have led
those who have been relocated to feel underrepresented and not well-integrated
into processes affecting them: “The arrangement that the communal compen-
sation is shared with them is no problem,” Khama clarifies, “[i]n principle, we
agree that we are one people. But the modalities how that money is now
decided on is an issue. So it looks like we do not have any power, we are just
following the host community” (quoted in Bildhaeuser 2010, 57).
The manner in which the LHWP was executed has left Lesothoians in a far
more precarious situation than before the project, despite their countrys eco-
nomic growth. In sum, the states failure to meet the terms outlined in the
Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty has led to further environmental stress, while
displaced communities compete with host communities for natural resources.

While major donors of the project such as the World Bank have produced
guidelines on restoration for affected populations, compensation is inadequate
(Bildhaeuser 2010, 15). Consequentially, villages are in a state of latent conflict
or unstable peace that can—and often does—result in atrocity. It is important
to note that the civic conflicts that circulate throughout a recently noted peace-
ful democracy (Jordan 2012) did not result from some natural phenomenon,
but in the aftermath of a Treaty that would seemingly ensure peace in the face
of resource scarcity.
Consequences of Phase I: South Africa
Since the construction of Phase I, the LHWP has supplied South Africa
with approximately 780 million cubic meters of water per year. Phase II, which
was inaugurated during March 2014, would further increase South Africas
water supply by 50 percent (South African Government Press Release 2014).
As touched on earlier, the LHWP was—and remains—necessary for South
African industry and, with 84 percent of Lesothos external trade in South
Africa, the project is highly important for economic development in Southern
Africa (South African Government Press Release 2014). But, similar to the
effects of the LHWP in Lesotho, the execution of the project has produced
unintended consequences. In this section, I review how the water transferred
from Lesotho to South Africa was distributed, and how that distribution is
demonstrably reminiscent of apartheid politics. The LHWP has exacerbated
socioeconomic gaps between race groups; many South Africans have, thus,
detached the LHWP from Mandelas vision and consider it, instead, a policy
that fits an apartheid rather than a postapartheid era.
The average real GDP growth rate from the beginning of Phase I through
two years after its completion in 2004 was approximately 2.4 percent, and in per
capita terms, approximately 0.4 percent. This is an improvement from the last
decade of apartheid rule (i.e., 1985-94), and such improvement is in part indebted
to the LHWP, which sustained business operations in the mining industry (IMF
Country Report 2004, 4). However, these improvements have not materialized for
residents living in provinces surrounding Lesotho and the water sources that fuel
the states economic growth. South Africans residing in places like the KwaZulu-
Natal Province and the Eastern Cape have objected to the work of the LHDA
due to the harrowing conditions it imposes on poor Black African communities
(AfricaGlobalisation 2013). Jonny Mpho, an activist stationed in Alexandria, reit-
erates sentiments of Black African civilians living in rural areas of the country.
“How can a big project like this happen in Lesotho whereas people around this
Project, they dont have access to water?” (AfricaGlobalisation 2013).
Water supply and sanitation has been a central cause for postapartheid. In
1994, 15 million people did not have access to a safe water supply, but by 2010
the government provided widespread improvements in water sources in urban
areas of the country (WHO/UNICEF n.d.). However, water access and

sanitation improvements in rural areas in the KwaZulu-Natal Province and
Eastern Cape have been emerging at a much slower pace. According to a 2012
governmental census, approximately 39 percent of the households in the
KwaZulu-Natal Province and 30 percent in the Eastern Cape reported that
their main source of water was from a tap in their dwelling; for families residing
in Limpopo, only 15 percent use water from their taps. These numbers stand in
stark contrast to over 60 percent of the households surveyed in the Gauteng
Province relying on piped water in their dwelling (Statistics South Africa 2013,
116). Such disparities are specific not only to provinces, but to racial groups as
well. Ninety-seven percent of White and Indian/Asian households are able to
use tap water from their homes; 82 percent of Coloured households do the
same. By comparison, a mere 32 percent of Black African households are able
to rely on tap water in their homes (Statistics South Africa 2013, 117).
These two sets of statistics correlate in significant ways. Because there are
more Black Africans in South Africa than any other racial group, there does
not seem to be a distinguishing difference in the proportion of Black Africans
living in any Province: approximately 88 percent of the total population in
Eastern Cape; 86 percent in the KwaZulu-Natal Province; 97 percent in Lim-
popo; and 77 percent in the Gauteng Province. But the differences between
provinces regarding how White populations are dispersed are far more dra-
matic: approximately 4 percent of the total population in Eastern Cape is
White; 3 percent in the KwaZulu-Natal Province; 2 percent in Limpopo; but,
Whites make up over 17 percent of the total population in the Gauteng Prov-
ince. Furthermore, almost half of all of South Africas White population
resides in the Pretoria area, where most of the water is transferred (Statistics
South Africa 2013, 54). It is hardly happenstance that the Eastern Cape, the
KwaZulu-Natal Province, and Limpopo were formerly regions occupied by
Black Africans during the apartheid regime. Additionally, these regions were
previously segregated for Bantustans, or territories where the apartheid govern-
ment proposed to relocate Black South Africans. The Gauteng Province, how-
ever, was a region marked for White residents even during the apartheid era.
With this taken into account, it is fair to say that President Mandela was
far too optimistic about the LHWP. It began as an apartheid project and has
imposed apartheid-era infrastructure on Black populations who do not reap
the benefits of the trade agreement. In turn, the project has succeeded in
improving water scarcity in a specific region, one that decades ago was inhab-
ited only by White South Africans and one in which, today, over half of the
White South African population resides.
Conclusions and Implications:
Lessons Learned and to be Applied for Phase II
This article began by rearticulating questions on the connection between
resource scarcity and conflict. Although there is a tendency to associate

environmental crises such as water scarcity with interstate violence, scarcity
does not only produce conflict. Daniel Deudneys (1990, 1999) important cri-
tique of “water wars” provides an alternative way of viewing scarcity: environ-
mental stress will likely provoke countries to cooperate toward a solution since
military aggression is more costly socially and economically. An overview of
the LHWP and the political climate surrounding its initiation substantiates
Deudneys claims. Lesotho and South Africa chose to engage in a collabora-
tive, mutually beneficial development project in response to severe water short-
age. While this article expresses some ambivalence toward the projects
successes and failures, it is fair to acknowledge that the LHWP created peace-
ful relations between Lesotho and Sound Africa under conditions presumed to
produce interstate conflict.
However, this case study also problematizes Deudneys critiques of scarcitys
relationship to violence. Although water shortage produced international coop-
eration, the LHWPs detrimental affects of the environment and communities in
Lesotho and South Africa have contributed to latent conflict on a local scale,
some of which has already resulted in violence. Therefore, large civil engineering
projects like the LHWP do indicate that international cooperation is preferable
to military violence; however, because such development projects inevitably
transform and often compromise the living conditions of peoples, peace at an
international level does not necessarily mean that peace is being experienced at a
microlevel. Although Lesothian and South African officials praise the LHWPs
outcomes, civilians from both countries express discontent with the projects
implementation. In Lesotho, displaced families lost valuable fertile land, medici-
nal plants, precious burial grounds, and ultimately, their independence. Passed
on to another community, most often without compensation or the vocational
training promised in the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty, the members of dis-
placed villages found themselves at the mercy of a host village. Because peace is
highly lauded for religious and cultural reasons, some of the integrated commun-
ities share hospitable relations, but often the new arrivals initiated competition
over resources and farmland that, since the dam construction of Phase I, had
become even more rare. This has resulted in local conflict and violence across
the state. Along those same lines, the project intensified economic and racial dif-
ference in South Africa; it has succeeded in providing water resources to the
nations mining industry, but the consumers who have benefited from the
improvement in water supplies have been non-Black African populations. Black
South Africans who reside in rural areas rely on using public taps, gathering
water remnants dripping to the ground from leaky pipes, or scooping river water
into a pail as their primary water source. The disparity of water supply between
impoverished Black South Africans and largely White populations living north
of Lesotho is reminiscent of apartheid South Africas segregationist policies.
Altogether, this case study demonstrates that even though resource scarcity
brings out international cooperation, this macrolevel peace does not ensure
peace between communities who experience environmental and economical

stress on a daily basis. However, as this article points out, the Lesotho High-
lands Treaty was conscious of this fact and required Lesothian and South Afri-
can governmental organizations to preserve the quality of life of peoples
affected by the LHWP. It has been a failure of compensation and reparation
initiatives that ultimately compromised intrastate peace. For this reason, the
Phase II feasibility study states that improved communication with impacted
communities and more suitable programs for distributing compensation to
affected civilians is required for securing public support for the Project and
ultimately, essential to the Projects overall success.3
Collectively, the LHWP demonstrates that international peace in the face
of resource scarcity is possible on both macrolevels and microlevels. Interstate
peace can be ensured so long as development is mutually beneficial and effec-
tively resolves issues of scarcity; intrastate peace is possible if those collabora-
tive development plans contain assertive and adequate plans for
communication with affected communities, and compensation for those mate-
rially affected by development. The violence associated with resource scarcity
is neither inevitable nor impossible; conflict stemming from environmental
stress is contingent on development policies, those policies attention to inter-
state and intrastate outcomes, and their thorough and thoughtful execution.
About the Author
Susannah Ryan is a doctoral student at the Department of Communica-
tion at UNC-Chapel Hill and the Graduate Program in African and African-
American Studies at Duke University. With particular interest in Central and
Southern African politics, her research revolves around human rights, transi-
tional justice, and theories of reconciliation. Her further work on these topics
is forthcoming in JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics.
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