Special Anniversary SectionThe Social Psychology of Sex an.docx

Special Anniversary Section
The Social Psychology of Sex and
Gender: From Gender Differences
to Doing Gender
Stephanie A. Shields
1
and Elaine C. Dicicco
1
The social psychology of gender is a major, if qualified,
success story of contemporary feminist psychology. The
breadth and intellectual vigor of the field is reflected in the
following six commentaries in the broadly defined area of
the Social Psychology of Gender which were commissioned
for this third of four 35th anniversary sections to feature brief
retrospectives by authors of highly cited PWQ articles.
Our goal in this section’s introduction is to provide a brief
history of the development of this area, placing the articles
described in the commentaries into this historical context.

The six articles in this special section, individually and taken
together, identify significant turning points in the social psy-
chology of gender. We focus on how, within a few brief
years, the study of gender in psychology underwent massive
transformation.
1
The social psychology of gender has grown to become a
thriving, scientifically sound research theme that encom-
passes a wide variety of topics and questions. The story of
how this came to be has been told from a number of perspec-
tives (e.g., Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Deaux, 1999;
Rutherford, Vaughn-Blount, & Ball, 2010; Unger, 1998).
Here, we focus on how, from psychology of gender’s murky
beginnings in early 20th century Freudian personality theory
and even deeper roots in androcentric paternalism of 19th
century science (Shields, 1975, 1982; Shields & Bhatia,
2009), feminist psychologists have shaped how sex and gen-
der are scientifically defined, theorized, and studied. Over the
course of the second half of the 20th century, feminist psy-

chologists challenged psychology’s long-standing equation
of female with defect and the psychology of gender with cat-
aloging sex differences (Marecek, Kimmel, Crawford, &
Hare-Mustin, 2003; Rutherford & Granek, 2010).
We identify three intertwined streams of investigation
from which the contemporary psychology of gender grew:
(a) research focusing on gender identity as a feature of per-
sonality, (b) research on behavioral sex differences, and (c)
research on gender roles and the study of gender in social
context. We interweave into this story how each of the six
key articles highlighted in this special section illustrate turn-
ing points in that history. We then describe the critical
importance of networks and mentors toward making the
research reported in those articles possible. We conclude
with our thoughts on future directions in the social psychol-
ogy of gender.
Three Streams of Research
Personality and Gender Identity

Sigmund Freud’s visit to the United States in 1909 (at G.
Stanley Hall’s invitation) was a signal moment for both Freu-
dian and American psychology. Although many American
scientists were disdainful of Freud’s ideas, he found a culture
receptive to his ideas about unconscious motivation and the
structure of personality; in turn, U.S. popular culture found
a psychological theory that meshed with American sensibil-
ities (Fancher, 2000; Lepore, 2011). One by-product of this
love affair between Freud’s theory and U.S. popular and
intellectual culture is the instant map of gender difference
that came with it. The core idea was that male–female psy-
chological differences were natural, deep-seated, and of pro-
found personal and social consequence. This proposal easily
built upon the already-accepted Anglo-American belief in
‘‘natural’’ gender differences as differentiating ‘‘advanced’’
races from the more ‘‘primitive’’ (Shields & Bhatia, 2009).
Furthermore, biological sex, gender identity, adherence to
gender roles, and sexual orientation were considered mono-

lithic, that is, completely consistent with one another in
‘‘normal’’ individuals. For example, the healthy and normal
girl or woman identified herself as female, conformed to
cultural expectations for appropriate feminine personality
and demeanor, and was heterosexual. These ideas, of
course, built on already prevailing beliefs and had long-
term effects for how gender was studied by psychologists.
1
Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University,
University
Park, PA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Stephanie A. Shields, Department of Psychology, The
Pennsylvania State
University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
Email: [email protected]
Psychology of Women Quarterly
35(3) 491-499
ª The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0361684311414823
http://pwq.sagepub.com

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F03616843
11414823&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2011-08-31
The Freudian version of gender psychology held sway
until feminist psychologists began to challenge academic and
clinical formulations of female nature in the 1960s. (Earlier
challenges to a female-deficit model had come from within
the psychoanalytic community, most notably by Karen Hor-
ney and Clara Thompson, but their theories are beyond the
scope of this commentary.) Behaviorism, the dominant para-
digm in U.S. academic psychology through most of the first
half of the 20th century, was not concerned with individual
differences (such as gender differences) or personality,
which further pushed the psychology of women and gender
under the Freudian umbrella. By that time, alternative views
(e.g., Seward, 1946) and the work of feminist psychologists
from earlier in the century (e.g., Calkins, 1896; Hollingworth,
1914, 1916; Tanner, 1896; Thompson, 1903) had been written
out of histories of psychology.

The systematic search for stable, enduring traits that
unambiguously distinguish one sex psychologically from the
other was an enterprise begun in earnest in the 1930s. The
first masculinity/femininity (M/F) scale was developed by
Terman and Miles (1936), who were best known for research
with high-intelligence quotient (IQ) children. The test
comprised over 450 items related to gender-typed interests,
opinions, and emotional reactions and was normed with stu-
dents in elementary and junior high school. The M/F scale
proved impossible to validate against external criteria because
it had low reliability and was uncorrelated with behavioral mea-
sures predicted to be related to it. Nevertheless, the authors
argued the utility of the scale in revealing ‘‘existing differences
in mental masculinity and femininity however caused’’ (Ter-
man & Miles, 1936, p. 6). The impetus behind their research
was the desire to create an assessment tool that could reliably
detect a propensity for ‘‘sexual inversion’’ (in the language of
psychology at the time), that is, homosexuality. The gay male

was presumed to be psychologically feminine, and Terman
and Miles wished to demonstrate that boys of high IQ were
no more likely to be sexual inverts than other boys.
We describe Terman and Miles’ (1936) project in some
detail for two reasons. First, it inspired other attempts to mea-
sure M/F through participants’ endorsement of gender stereo-
types, assuming that psychological gender was a deep-seated
and enduring trait and was difficult to measure accurately
without disguising the purpose of the test (Lewin, 1984a,
1984b; Morawski, 1987). Second, it uncovers the assumption
that sexual orientation is revealed through endorsement of
gender stereotypes and culturally constructed gender roles.
For example, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
tory (MMPI) femininity scale was famously normed on a
group of 13 homosexual men (Lewin, 1984b)!
By the early 1970s, the assumption that M/F represented
opposite anchors on a unidimensional, bipolar continuum was
challenged by a new generation of feminist psychologists

(Bem, 1974; Constantinople, 1973). The notion of psycholo-
gical M/F as a unified trait-like feature of personality was
retained, but now its elements (femininity and masculinity)
were hypothesized to be orthogonal, each expressed on its
own low to high continuum. Thus, an individual could be
described as high or low F and high or low M. The original
aim of M/F tests—to identify sexual inverts—was eclipsed
by concerns with a new kind of psychological health—andro-
gyny, that is, rating oneself as high on both positive stereoty-
pical M and F attributes (e.g., Bem, 1981). Despite the
patently sex-stereotypical content of M/F inventories, many
embraced the view that the extent to which an individual is
willing to describe herself or himself in terms of stereotypes
is a legitimate indicator of healthy psychological gender (see
Morawski, 1987, for an insightful critique). Just as Terman
and Miles (1936) discovered 40 years earlier, these new
M/F scales did not serve as good predictors of either gen-
dered behavior or other dimensions of gender.

In the present anniversary section, Spence’s (2011) over-
view of the course of her research vividly documents the shift
from reliance on the personality approach (as reflected in the
use of M/F scales) to a more complex conceptualization of
gender. For example, early in her work on gender, Spence
and her colleagues found that M/F scores were uncorrelated,
independent constructs and were therefore inappropriately
represented as opposite ends of a single continuum (Spence,
Helmreich, & Stapp, 1975). Later, she showed that higher
masculinity scores were associated with higher self-esteem
in both men and women, countering the idea that one needed
to score highly on both the M and the F scales (considered to
be ‘‘androgynous’’) to be psychologically healthy (Spence
& Helmreich, 1980). This study, and others that followed,
revealed the multidimensionality of gender—that is, ‘‘gen-
der’’ encompasses distinct factors that cannot be used to pre-
dict or make generalizations about gender-related attitudes
or behaviors (Spence, 1993).

Before we move to the second stream of research that con-
tributed to present-day psychology of gender, we should
make two additional points. First, John Money’s (e.g., Money
& Erhardt, 1972) research on prenatal and postnatal gender
development also challenged a unified trait-like view of gen-
der and advanced the idea that sex should be differentiated
from gender (Muelenhard & Peterson, 2011). Money asserted
that prenatal and postnatal gender differentiation had multi-
ple influences; that sex of upbringing, not biology, dictated
core gender identity (which he defined as the sense of oneself
as female or male); and that sexual orientation and what he
termed sex-coded role (gender role) were independent fea-
tures of gender differentiation. Years later, Money was shown
to be tragically wrong regarding the exclusive influence of
nurture on core gender identity, having based his ‘‘evidence’’
on questionable ethical treatment of patients (Colapinto,
2006). That said, when initially published, his work appealed
to feminist psychologists who were questioning the prevail-

ing view of gender as the simple product of genes and hor-
mones and who were theorizing the power of socialization
in determining gendered beliefs, values, and behavior. (For
example, see the popular textbook by Tavris & Offir, 1977.)
492 Psychology of Women Quarterly 35(3)
Second, this history of conceptualizing ‘‘gender’’ as
exclusively or primarily an aspect of personality masked the
power of beliefs about gender in influencing people’s percep-
tion of, and expectations regarding, the behavior of themselves
and others. Over the past 40-plus years, an abundance of
research has demonstrated the structural complexity of gender
stereotypes and their power to influence others’ perceptions
(e.g., Eagly & Kite, 1987; Kite, Deaux, & Haines, 2008) and,
in some circumstances, even recall of one’s own behavior
(Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1998).
Kite and Deaux (1987), for example, found that stereo-
types of lesbians and gay men largely reflected the inversion

model—lesbians as masculine; gay men as feminine—that
had been the rationale for decades of M/F research (see Kite,
2011). Mary Kite and Kay Deaux also found that the stereo-
type of gay men is not simply equivalent to the stereotype of
heterosexual women, nor is the stereotype of lesbians identi-
cal to the stereotype of heterosexual men. Their work was
influential because it was an important early exploration of
how intersections of homosexual/heterosexual and woman/
man occupy distinctly different identity positions in people’s
conceptualization of stereotypes. To this day, their study
remains one of the few published that examines stereotype
content of both lesbians and gay men. (For a recent exception,
see Lehavot, King, & Simoni, 2011, in this issue.) In her com-
mentary, Kite (2011) also reminds us that intersections of
sexual orientation and racial ethnicity have yet to be system-
atically examined by psychologists.
Behavioral Sex Differences
Within psychodynamically tinted, gender-as-personality psy-

chological research in the United States, empirical investiga-
tion of gender almost exclusively focused on behavioral sex
differences. (There was also a thriving research stream
devoted to women’s psychological disorders, especially if
connected to the menstrual cycle or sexuality, such as ‘‘cli-
torid’’ versus ‘‘uterine’’ women [Meyers, 1966], but this tan-
gent is beyond the scope of the present article.)
Browsing the psychological research literature published
during the 1960s and onward reveals a growing number of
themes relevant to the social psychology of gender. One
theme is women and employment, ranging from women’s
comparative fitness for work to the effects of employed moth-
ers on their children (e.g., Nye & Hoffman, 1963). Most of
this research, however, was conducted from a deficit perspec-
tive which presumed that individual employed women were
responsible for figuring out how to balance the demands of
work and family responsibilities. Herman and Gyllstrom’s
(1977) article on interrole and intrarole conflict, reconsidered

by Brett (2011), was important in challenging the truism that
women could not be good workers because of competing car-
egiving and domestic roles. They showed that it was not gen-
der, but rather the number of roles between home and work
one had to juggle that determined perceived interrole
conflict—that is, women and men with children who worked
full time reported similar amounts of role conflict. Their orig-
inal question of the toll of work and family for women is one
that reverberates today. For instance, mothers still face more
challenges (Crosby, Williams, & Biernat, 2004) than fathers
in the workplace—mothers are hired less frequently, are
given lower salaries, and are less likely to be hired than
fathers because mothers are seen as less committed to their
job (Correll, Benard, & Paik, 2007)—and even young adult
women continue to expect to shoulder a disproportionate
amount of domestic labor and childcare, despite their endor-
sement of egalitarian relationships (Askari, Liss, Erchull,
Staebell, & Axelson, 2010).

In the 1970s, women were becoming a serious presence
in American psychology graduate programs because of
legal changes such as clarifications of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and Title IX (1972) that prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sex at any educational program receiving fed-
eral funds. Many of these women students identified as
feminists, and they pointed out (as had an earlier generation
of feminist psychologists) that socialization and societal
expectation, not simply biology, were important in under-
standing why and how gender differences are produced.
An excellent example of this theme is Eccles’ work
(1987, 1994), which exemplifies how theory is made stron-
ger when the question shifts from a gender-differences per-
spective to one that examines gender in a social context (a
perspective we discuss further in the following section).
Instead of asking why women do not make the same career
choices as men, Eccles (2011) asked, both then and now,
why men and women make the choices they do. Her

expectancy-value model (Eccles et al., 1983) complicated
the idea that the reasons for making achievement-related
decisions reside solely within the individual. She demon-
strated how the social environment affects individuals’
expectations of success, ideas about the importance of a
task, and the perception of available options. Her model has
significantly impacted the way social psychologists think
about gender differences in achievement.
The 1970s was also characterized by the struggle to better
define what the feminist study of gender encompasses and
how thinking about ‘‘gender’’ is different from amassing a
list of sex-related differences. Initially, feminists compiled
and cataloged conference articles and published research
as a way to make sense of the field characterized both by the
conventional gender-as-personality framework and also by a
newly emerging emphasis on studying gender as a function
of social context (e.g., Baer & Sherif, 1974; Sherman,
1971). Another move to define the field revolved around

language: how to define the boundaries of gender. By the
late 1970s, it was becoming common for feminist psychol-
ogists to differentiate between sex as categorization on the
basis of anatomy and physiology and gender as a culturally
defined set of meanings attached to sex and sex difference
(Unger, 1979).
Shields and Dicicco 493
A parallel interest in racial ethnic psychology (Leong,
2009; Pickren, 2004) rejected the Anglo-American framing
of ‘‘race psychology’’ (see Richards, 1997, for a history of
race psychology), but concern with other social identities,
such as social class (Lott & Bullock, 2007), came much later.
In any event, these identity-based areas of research devel-
oped essentially independently of one another. Specifically,
‘‘gender’’ was primarily the study of White women, and
‘‘race’’ was largely the study of African Americans with
no particular attention to gender. By the 1980s, there was

much discussion of intersections of gender with other
dimensions of social identity (e.g., Boston Lesbian Psychol-
ogies Collective, 1987; Fine & Asch, 1988), but intersec-
tionality, as a theoretical perspective reflected in research
practices has only come to the forefront in psychology in
recent years (e.g., Shields, 2008).
Debates about gender differences research continue to the
present (e.g., Kimball, 1995, 2001). At one level, the debate
revolves around whether difference or similarity should be
emphasized. For example, comparing women and men
glosses over within-group differences, accentuates the impor-
tance of difference between groups over similarities, and
reifies the categories of woman/man as having some explana-
tory standing on their own. Hyde (2005) has proposed an
alternative approach, namely that gender similarities, not dif-
ferences, are more scientifically appropriate to study. At
another level, arguing difference/similarity masks what many
believe, including ourselves, are the more pressing issues. In

a cogent critique of differences research, Fine and Gordon
(1989, p. 151) assert that ‘‘this almost exclusive construction
of gender-as-difference functions inside psychology as a
political and scientific diversion away from the questions of
power, social context, meaning, and braided subjectivities’’
(also see Lott, 1997). Indeed, gender-as-difference is the
principal way gender is discussed and explained in
popular-culture discourse which, in turn, is absorbed into
scientific discourse (Danziger, 1997; Richards, 2002;
Shields & Bhatia, 2009). The end result is that gender-as-
difference is transformed into an even less satisfactory
difference-as-explanation.
The alternative to gender-as-difference requires first the
recognition that gender beliefs and behaviors are ideologies
embedded in social-structural systems. It also requires acknowl-
edging what feminist psychologists have long asserted: There
is always a political dimension to the study of behavior, espe-
cially when that behavior is overtly connected to systems of

power and status.
From gender roles to gender in context. The first generation
of feminist psychologists had viewed social learning and
expectations as important to gender differences in behavior.
It is not surprising that, with the revival of feminist psychol-
ogy in the 1960s, the importance of social factors were
again highlighted. As for first-generation feminists in psy-
chology, gender learning was conceptualized as the
experience of having one’s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes
shaped in terms of culturally defined, gender-specific
roles—but with something of a different look. One new
development was describing gender roles as embedded in
larger, interlocking social-structural systems of power. Ear-
lier feminist psychologists had connected women’s roles
and socially sanctioned limits on women’s behavior to a
broader system of patriarchal domination, but they stopped
short of seeing gender oppression as inextricably linked to
other systems of oppression, such as class and race.
By the mid-1980s, we see the realization of the previous

decade’s efforts in a phenomenally creative and influential
set of publications that advanced gender theory, measure-
ment, and the critique of gender psychology’s business as
usual. The year 1987, for example, was something of a
watershed in the advancement of a feminist social psychol-
ogy of gender, with a number of classic books and articles
published (to cite but a few: Deaux & Major, 1987; Eagly,
1987; Eccles, 1987; West & Zimmerman, 1987). The range
and influence of work published during this period is even
more noteworthy because the late 1980s were also a period
of significant backlash against feminist progress toward
women’s opportunity and equality that had been made in the
1970s (Faludi, 1991). Indeed, backlash was evident as early
as 1979 when the Equal Rights Amendment stalled, three
states short of ratification.
The construct of self-silencing is a good example of a
social-role approach that situates role within systems of
oppression. Jack and Dill (1992) asserted the radical idea that

adherence to expectations for feminine behavior is a core
feature of clinical depression in women. Their approach
contrasts with the diathesis-stress models of depression
that focus on the individual as the problem and with the
psychoanalytic view of women’s self-silencing as ‘‘over
dependence on oral strivings’’ (Jack, 2011, p. 524). Instead,
they situate depression in women’s response to cultural
scripts of being a ‘‘good woman’’ and probe how adherence
to those scripts negatively affects women’s relational/self-
schemas, insights that remain relevant today (Jack, 2011;
Shouse & Nilsson, 2011).
Alternatives to the older gender-as-trait models stressed
the importance of considering gender-in-context. Gender-
in-context models (e.g., Deaux & Major, 1987) emphasized
that the individual’s gender repertoire was only one ingredi-
ent in any social situation. Other individuals with whom the
person was interacting had their own expectations about the
other person’s behavior and their own repertoire of gender-

related attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. The situation, too,
could be described as one that varied in how ‘‘gendered’’ it
was and in what ways it was gendered. For example, in both
a board meeting with only one token woman present and a
heterosexual date, gender is salient, but observers and targets
carry different gender-related expectations for each situation.
Thus, whether gender-typed behavior is observed depends on
the interaction among person, observer, and social context.
This approach has helped researchers sort out why gender of
participant seems to have a ‘‘now you see it, now you don’t’’
character (Deaux & Major, 1987). A relatively early example
of the gender-in-context approach is Berman’s (1980) review
of her own and others’ research on responsiveness to infants.
Women’s and men’s responses to infants varied greatly
depending on the physical and social qualities of the situa-
tion, the response required, and the research participant’s

experimental or prior role relationship with the young.
The move away from gender as simply a trait or a role sti-
mulated efforts to measure the parameters of beliefs about
gender, including investigation of gender stereotypes, their
persistence and effects on social interaction, and the sexist
beliefs that underlie and sustain reliance on stereotypes. Glick
and Fiske (1997) bring us squarely to the issue at the center of
the social psychology of gender: Its relation to social-
structural systems of patriarchy that maintain and promote
institutions and practices of inequity. Their article reports
the development and validation of the widely used Ambiva-
lent Sexism Inventory (ASI). They begin with the fact that
sexism is not like other types of out-group prejudice, yet,
it has similar consequences. Specifically, women and men
are interdependent and cannot avoid each other, as one can
do with other out-groups. This connectivity allows women to be
seen in an apparently positive way (Glick & Fiske, 2011). Like
Spence and Helmreich’s (1972) AWS and other specialized

instruments for measuring sexism (e.g., Swim & Cohen,
1997; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995), the ASI tunes into
what makes sexism ‘‘special’’—that is, what makes it possible
to endorse a patriarchal system that devalues women and, simul-
taneously, appears to be one that values women. It is the gender
version of the often heard adage: ‘‘I’m not prejudiced, but . . .
.’’
The social constructionist approach to gender similarly
presses the gender-in-context position further. The construc-
tionist perspective conceives of gender as a process—often
characterized as ‘‘doing gender’’—which simultaneously cre-
ates and reinforces cultural meanings of gender and the sys-
tems of power and oppression on which it rests (Bohan,
1993; Shields, 2002; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Gender
emerges through social interactions as a negotiated statement
of identity; that is, gender is not something that one achieves
over the course of development, but rather it is continually
practiced in social interactions large and small. Viewing gen-
der as a verb, a practice, helps us to understand why gender

systems are so difficult to root out or change. As sociologist
Dana Vannoy (2001, p. 511) points out: ‘‘Every moment
every day individuals have the opportunity to choose to
behave differently � to resist gender expectations associ-
ated with control and deference,’’ and yet we do not. In fact,
even those of us who strive not to subscribe to gendered
norms of inequality are caught up in the ordinariness of
doing gender, such that ‘‘the taken-for-granted acting out
of nearly invisible expectations usually re-creates gender
inequality between men and women even if gender is irrele-
vant to the situation’’.
Making Feminist Research Possible:
Networks and Mentors
We want to note one more common theme that struck us as
we each read through the commentaries and the papers on
which they are based. Across all six commentaries, we
noticed that the impetus for the work came from an ‘‘a-ha
moment’’ (or ‘‘click") in the author(s)’ own lived experience.
From our present-day vantage, it is easy to forget that just a

few years across our chronology made a huge difference in
how that realization could be acted on.
In the early 1960s, women were underrepresented in grad-
uate programs and were a rarity in research-oriented univer-
sities. Janet Spence was the lone female faculty member in
her psychology department in the mid-1960s. Women full-
professors (women of color and White women) are still
noticeably underrepresented at most research universities,
especially the most prestigious. But even underrepresented
is an improvement over only. By the late 1960s, gender ratios
were beginning to change, at least at the graduate level. This
change enabled many of us to have our first foray into femin-
ist psychology be through a collaborative venture with other
feminists, as Jacqueline Eccles collaborated with four other
feminist graduate students at UCLA. Eccles also points out
how her Expectancy-Value model came to an early and suc-
cessful fruition because of the fortuitous combination of an
NIE program officer who ‘‘got it,’’ involvement of engaged

students, and mentoring advice from Elizabeth Douvan.
(Douvan became the first president of the Society for the Psy-
chology of Women in 1973.) Jeanne Herman (Brett) and
Karen Kucynzki Gyllstrom undertook an innovative study
in the entirely new field of work-family because of their joint
interest in significant questions that other I/O psychologists
had overlooked. Moving forward a few more years, Mary
Kite and Dana Jack had successful feminist faculty mentors
(Kay Deaux and Carol Gilligan, respectively) to inspire them
and to work collaboratively with them. To move from a mar-
ginal position to the center also requires significant profes-
sional networks (e.g., Unger, Sheese, & Main, 2010), and
we see the importance of these networks, albeit gender
reversed, in the most recent case of Peter Glick who writes
of Susan Fiske’s openness to his sabbatical visit as the begin-
ning of their years’ long collaboration.
From Turning Points to Future Directions
Having looked at where the social psychology of gender

came from, we cannot resist ending this essay with some
thoughts about where the psychology of gender may be
headed. This charge is easier said than done. Each of us is
at a quite different point in our career: Elaine has just com-
pleted her first year in graduate school and is beginning to
pursue a dual degree in social psychology and women’s stud-
ies; Stephanie did her graduate work in the early 1970s and
has been deeply involved in feminist psychology throughout
her entire career. Despite these differences, we are both
motivated to be optimistic: Elaine is excited to become part
of the feminist psychology community and contribute to its
advancement; Stephanie, through thick and thin, has kept
faith in the potential of psychological science (broadly
defined) to be a vehicle for promoting positive social change.
With that caveat in mind, we see three important emerging
themes in the social psychology of gender.

Reliance on a Broader Palette of Research Methods
New methods and improved methods are coming on the
scene. We mention only two examples here, but our main
point is that we need to think more broadly about the range
of methods that lend themselves to feminist research on gen-
der. Whether the methods are easily compatible with feminist
research values or have less obvious potential, we have to
remain vigilantly feminist regarding the questions that we
ask, our partnerships with our participants, and our interpre-
tations of our findings.
First, a wide range of qualitative methods are at last mak-
ing inroads into the inner sanctum of conventional psycholo-
gical research methods. Qualitative work is often lauded as
an ideal feminist approach to research because it gives voice
to research participants and has the potential to level the
power relationship between researcher and participant. For
qualitative studies and mixed qualitative/quantitative meth-
ods to fulfill this promise, however, students need to be

exposed to the wide range of qualitative techniques avail-
able and receive adequate training in their use. Importantly,
too, exploration of qualitative and mixed methods helps
feminist researchers maintain a healthy skepticism regard-
ing ‘‘value-neutral’’ research and foster awareness of the
politics of the research process (e.g., Cosgrove & McHugh,
2010; Gergen, 2001)
Second, neuroscience techniques are here to stay. A fem-
inist research presence is important in neuroscience because,
if no one is there to point out boundary conditions or faulty
applications of the techniques, we risk witnessing a revival
of the 19
th
century psychology of gender that defined
women’s social-structural dilemmas as no more than an
expression of women’s (neuro)biology (Fine, 2008). But
beyond monitoring misapplication, brain imaging and other
behavioral biomarkers, such as salivary cortisol, should be

explored for what they might add to feminist research. For
example, they may contribute to building long-needed testa-
ble theories that address the complex interrelation of biologi-
cal, social, emotional, and cognitive events in constructing
and maintaining gendered behavior.
Intersectionality of Social Identities
For years, feminist psychologists have asserted that our
research must take into account the fact that social identities
do not function independently of one another. Recently we
see the beginnings of a move to take seriously the need to
modify old research practices or create new ones that enable
the study of intersectionality with some sophistication (e.g.,
Bowleg, 2008; Warner, 2008). Besides being a more accurate
representation of lived experience, an intersectionality per-
spective troubles the biological essentialism that flows from
unidimensional group comparisons. We noted earlier in our
paper some limitations associated with the gender differences
approach to research. It has also long been understood that

when two groups are compared, one inevitably serves as the
standard against which the other is measured. Such an andro-
centric comparison of women and men, for example, glosses
over within-group differences, accentuates the importance of
difference between groups, and reifies the categories of
woman/man as having some explanatory standing on their
own (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). When the groups are
construed as ‘‘natural’’ groups (women/men; Black/White;
even rich/poor), the explanatory path of least resistance is
an attribution to nature/biology/ancestral conditions.
Gender as Systems of Status and Power Relations
There is still a long way to go in sorting out how gender, sta-
tus, and power operate within specific social contexts. In
social psychological research, power is often conceptualized
as an attribute of individuals whose status grants them posi-
tion and resources to influence others. Most social psycho-
logical research concerned with power tends to focus on the
effects of power on the less powerful and the powerholders,

so the contexts studied are those in which status and power
go together. When we apply questions of power to gender,
however, it can be important to disaggregate the two con-
structs, particularly if we do so keeping intersectionality
in mind. Intersections create both oppression and opportu-
nity (Baca Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996), so both status and
whatever power is attached to a given intersectional posi-
tion are relative to who else is in the situation and to the
nature of the situation.
Deaux (2000) points out that if status and power are con-
flated, we risk essentializing the link between gender and
power. To take an example from our own collaborative
research in progress, it appears that participants rate angry
targets differently by gender/racial ethnicity and also by con-
text. Anger is an emotion which expresses a sense of violated
entitlement and its aim is to restore order (not necessarily
achieved). It may be that higher status individuals are
believed to have a greater sense of entitlement about more

things, meaning their angry responses are more likely to be
expected or tolerated. On the other hand, it may be that per-
ceived power to effect change is only loosely related to per-
ceived status, and anger takes a different meaning if
expressed under conditions in which there is little power to
change the situation compared to others in which there is
more power. So we need to understand whether perceived
anger for different groups is due to status implied by
intersectional position, beliefs about the group’s capacity to
experience violated entitlement in the situation, differences
in willingness to assert their entitlement, or beliefs about the
efficacy of asserting it.
A Concluding Thought
Our collaboration on this introduction to the special section
reminded both of us about why we are passionate about our
research and committed to studying the psychology of gender.

We came to this collaboration from two very different points
in our career. For Stephanie, reviewing this history was a
remin-
der of how far the field has moved forward from its complicated
mid-20
th
century beginnings as a female-pathologizing,
heterosexist province of psychodynamic personality theory.
For Elaine, it was a reminder of how much she has bene-
fitted from the feminist movement generally and within
psychology. The most exciting point for both of us comes
in looking forward to the opportunities that our collaboration
promises now and into the future.
Acknowledgment
We would like to thank Matthew Zawadzki, Jessica Cundiff, and
Jean Lamont for comments on a preliminary version of this
article.
Note
1. Although we are telling the story from a historical
perspective,

we rely primarily on the current convention of using gender to
refer broadly to psychological, social, and cultural
representation
of biological sex categories. Given space limitations, we are
able
to cite only a fraction of the many influential and representative
publications pertinent to our account. We also include reference
to some sociological work that has had a marked effect on the
development of feminist psychology.
References
Askari, S. F., Liss, M., Erchull, M. J., Staebell, S. E., &
Axelson, S.
J. (2010). Men want equality, but women’s don’t expect it:
Young adults’ expectations for participation in household and
child care chores. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 34, 243–
252.
Baca Zinn, M., & Thornton Dill, B. (1996). Theorizing
difference
from multiracial feminism. Feminist Studies, 22, 321–331.
A topical bibliography (selectively annotated) on the
psychology of

women. JSAS, 4, 42. (Order #614).
Bem, S. L. (1974). The measurement of psychological
androgyny.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42, 155–162.
Bem, S. L. (1981). Gender schema theory: A cognitive account
of
sex typing. Psychological Review, 88, 354–364.
Berman, P. W. (1980). Are women more responsive than men to
the
young? A review of developmental and situational variables.
Psychological Bulletin, 88, 668–695.
Bohan, J. S. (1993). Essentialism, constructionism, and feminist
psychology. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 17, 5–21.
Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective (Eds.). (1987). Lesbian
psychologies. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Bowleg, L. (2008). When Black þ Lesbian þ Woman Black Les-
bian Woman: The methodological challenges of qualitative and
quantitative intersectionality research. Sex Roles, 59, 312–325.
Brett, J. M. (2011). Thirty-five years of studying work and
family.
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 500–503.

Calkins, M. (1896). Community of ideas of men and women.
Psy-
chological Review, 2, 426–430.
Colapinto, J. (2006). As nature made him: The boy raised as a
girl
(2nd ed.). New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
Constantinople, A. (1973). Masculinity-femininity: An
exception to
a famous dictum? Psychological Bulletin, 80, 389–407.
Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job: Is
there a
motherhood penalty? American Journal of Sociology, 112,
1297–1338.
Cosgrove, L., & McHugh, M. (2010). A post-Newtonian, post-
modern approach to science. In S. Hesse-Biber & P. Leavy
(Eds.), Handbook of emergent methods (pp. 73–86). New York,
NY: Guilford.
Crawford, M., & Marecek, J. (1989). Psychology reconstructs
the
female, 1968-1988. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, 147–
166.

Crosby, F. J., Williams, J. C., & Biernat, M. (2004). The
maternal
wall. Journal of Social Issues, 60, 675–682.
Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the mind: How psychology found
its
language. London: Sage.
Deaux, K. (1999). An overview of research on gender: Four
themes
from 3 decades. In W. B. Swann Jr., J. H. Langlois & L.
A. Gilbert (Eds.), Sexism and stereotypes in modern society:
The
gender science of Janet Taylor Spence (pp. 11–34). Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
Deaux, K. (2000). Gender and emotion: Notes from a grateful
tour-
ist. In A. H. Fischer (Ed.), Gender and emotion: Social psycho-
logical perspectives (pp. 301–318). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Deaux, K., & Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into context: An
interactive model of gender-related behavior. Psychological

Review, 94, 369–389.
Eagly, A. H. (1987). Sex differences in social behavior: A
social-role interpretation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eagly, A. H., & Kite, M. (1987). Are stereotypes of nationality
applied to both men and women? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 53, 451–462.
Eccles, J. S. (1987). Gender roles and women’s achievement-
related
decisions. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 11, 135–172.
Eccles, J. S. (1994). Understanding women’s educational and
occupa-
tional choices. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 18, 585–609.
Eccles, J. S. (2011). Understanding women’s achievement
choices:
Looking back and looking forward. Psychology of Women
Quar-
terly, 35, 510–516.
Eccles, J. S., Adler, T. F., Futterman, R., Goff, S. B., Kaczala,
C. M.,
Meece, J. L., . . . Midgley, C. (1983). Expectancies, values, and
academic behaviors. In J. T. Spence (Ed.), Achievement and

achievement motivation (pp. 75–146). San Francisco, CA: W.
H. Freeman.
Faludi, S. (1991). Backlash: The undeclared war against
American
women. New York, NY: Doubleday.
Fancher, R. E. (2000). Snapshots of Freud in America: 1899-
1999.
American Psychologist, 55, 1025–1028.
Fine, C. (2008). Will working mothers’ brains explode? The
popular
new genre of sexism. Neuroethics, 1, 69–72.
Fine, M., & Asch, A. (Eds.). (1988). Women with disabilities:
Essays in psychology, culture, and politics. Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press.
Fine, M., & Gordon, S. M. (1989). Feminist transformations of/
despite psychology. In M. Crawford & M. Gentry (Eds.), Gen-
der and thought (pp. 146–174). New York, NY: Springer-

Verlag.
Gergen, M. (2001). Feminist reconstructions in psychology:
Narrative, gender, and performance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1997). Hostile and benevolent sexism:
Measuring ambivalent sexist attitudes toward women. Psychol-
ogy of Women Quarterly, 21, 119–135.
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2011). Ambivalent sexism revisited.
Psy-
chology of Women Quarterly, 35, 530–535.
Hare-Mustin, R. T., & Marecek, J. (1988). The meaning of
differ-
ence: Gender theory, postmodernism, and psychology. American
Psychologist, 43, 455–464.
Herman, J. B., & Gyllstrom, K. K. (1977). Working men and
women: Inter- and intra-role conflict. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 1, 319–333.
Hollingworth, L. S. (1914). Variability as related to sex
differences
in achievement. American Journal of Sociology, 19, 510–530.
Hollingworth, L. S. (1916). Social devices for impelling women

to
bear and rear children. American Journal of Sociology, 22, 19–
29.
Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis.
American
Psychologist, 60, 581–592.
Jack, D. C. (2011). Reflections on the Silencing the Self Scale
and
its origins. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 523–529.
Jack, D. C., & Dill, D. (1992). The Silencing the Self Scale:
Sche-
mas of intimacy associated with depression in women. Psychol-
ogy of Women Quarterly, 16, 97–106. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.
1992.tb00242.x.
Kimball, M. M. (1995). Feminist visions of gender similarities
and
differences. New York, NY: Haworth.
Kimball, M. M. (2001). Gender similarities and differences as
feminist contradictions. In R. K. Unger (Ed.), Handbook of the
psychology of women and gender (pp. 66–83). New York, NY:
Wiley.

Kite, M. E. (2011). (Some) things are different now: An
optimistic
look at sexual prejudice. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35,
517–522.
Kite, M. E., & Deaux, K. (1987). Gender belief systems:
Homosexu-
ality and the implicit inversion theory. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 11, 83–96. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-6402.1987.tb00776.x.
Kite, M. E., Deaux, K., & Haines, E. L. (2008). Gender
stereotypes.
In F. L. Denmark & M. A. Paludi (Eds.), Psychology of women:
A handbook of issues and theories (2nd ed., pp. 205–236).
West-
port, CT: Greenwood.
Lehavot, K., King, K. M., & Simoni, J. (2011). Development
and
validation of a gender expression measure among sexual minor-
ity women. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 381–400.
Leong, F. T. L. (Eds). (2009) History of racial and ethnic
minority
psychology [Special issue]. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic

Minority Psychology, 15(4).
Lepore, J. (2011, March 14). Twilight: Growing old and even
older.
The New Yorker, pp, 30–35.
Lewin, M. (1984a). ‘‘Rather worse than folly?’’ Psychology
mea-
sures femininity and masculinity. In M. Lewin (Ed.), In the
shadow of the past: Psychology portrays the sexes (Vol. 1,
p. 155). –178). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Lewin, M. (1984b). Psychology measures femininity and
masculi-
nity. In M. Lewin (Ed.), In the shadow of the past: Psychology
portrays the sexes (Vol. 2, pp. 179–204). New York, NY:
Colum-
bia University Press.
Lott, B. E. (1997). The personal and social correlates of a
gender dif-
ferences ideology. Journal of Social Issues, 53, 279–298.
Lott, B. E., & Bullock, M. E. (2007). Psychology and economic
injustice: Personal, professional, and political intersections.

Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Marecek, J., Kimmel, E. B., Crawford, M., & Hare-Mustin, R.
T. (2003).
Psychology of women and gender. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.),
Hand-
book of psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 249–268). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Meyers, T. J. (1966). The clitorid woman. The Psychiatric Quar-
terly, 40, 248–257.
Money, J., & Erhardt, A. A. (1972). Man and woman, boy and
girl.
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.
Morawski, J. G. (1987). The troubled quest for masculinity,
feminin-
ity, and androgyny. In P. Shaver & C. Hendrick (Eds.), Review
of
personality and social psychology (Vol. 7, pp. 44–69). Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.
Muelenhard, C. L., & Peterson, Z. D. (2011). Distinguishing
between sex and gender: History, current conceptualizations,
and
implications. Sex Roles, 62. doi: 10.1007/s11199-011-9932-5.

Nye, F. I., & Hoffman, L. W. (1963). The employed mother in
America. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
Pickren, W. E. (2004). Between the cup of principle and the lip
of
practice: Ethnic minorities and American psychology, 1966-
1980. History of Psychology, 7, 45–64.
Richards, G. (1997). ‘‘Race,’’ racism and psychology: Towards
a
reflexive history. London: Routledge.
Richards, G. (2002). The psychology of psychology: A
historically
grounded sketch. Theory & psychology, 12, 7–36.
Robinson, M. D., Johnson, J. T., & Shields, S. A. (1998). The
gender
heuristic and the data base: Factors affecting the perception of
gender-related differences in the experience and display of emo-
tions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 206–219.
Rutherford, A., & Granek, L. (2010). Emergence and
development of
the psychology of women. In J. Chrisler & D. McCreary (Eds.),
Handbook of gender research in psychology (pp. 19–41). New

York, NY: Springer.
Rutherford, A., Vaughn-Blount, K., & Ball, L. C. (2010).
Responsi-
ble opposition, disruptive voices: Science, social change, and
the
history of feminist psychology. Psychology of Women
Quarterly,
34, 460–473.
Seward, G. H. (1946). Sex and the social order. New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill.
Sherman, J. A. (1971). On the psychology of women: A survey
of
empirical studies. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
Shields, S. A. (1975). Functionalism, Darwinism, and the
psychol-
ogy of women: A study in social myth. American Psychologist,
30, 739–754.
Shields, S. A. (1982). The variability hypothesis: History of a
biolo-

gical model of sex differences in intelligence. Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society, 7, 769–797.
Shields, S. A. (2002). Speaking from the heart: Gender and the
social
meaning of emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shields, S. A. (Ed.). (2008). Intersectionality of social
identities:
A gender perspective [Special issue]. Sex Roles, 59. (5–6).
Shields, S. A., & Bhatia, S. (2009). Darwin and race, gender,
and
culture. American Psychologist, 64, 111–119.
Shouse, S. H., & Nilsson, J. (2011). Self-silencing, emotional
aware-
ness, and eating behaviors in college women. Psychology of
Women Quarterly, 35, 451–457.
Spence, J. T. (1993). Gender-related traits and gender ideology:
Evidence for a multifactorial theory. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 64, 624–635.
Spence, J. T. (2011). Off with the old, on with the new.
Psychology

of Women Quarterly, 35, 504–509.
Spence, J. T., & Helmreich, R. (1972). The Attitudes Toward
Women Scale: An objective instrument to measure attitudes
toward the rights and roles of women in contemporary society.
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 2, 66.
Spence, J. T., & Helmreich, R. L. (1980). Masculine
instrumentality
and feminine expressiveness: Their relationships with sex role
attitudes and behaviors. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 5,
147–163.
Spence, J. T., Helmreich, R. L., & Stapp, J. (1975). Ratings of
self
and peers on sex-role attributes and their relation to self-esteem
and conceptions of masculinity and femininity. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 32, 29–39.
Swim, J. K., & Cohen, L. L. (1997). Overt, covert, and subtle
sexism: A comparison between the Attitudes toward Women and
Modern Sexism Scales. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21,
103–118.

Tanner, A. (1896). The community of ideas of men and women.
Psychological Review, 3, 548–550.
Tavris, C., & Offir, C. (1977). The longest war: Sex differences
in
perspective. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Terman, L. M., & Miles, C. C. (1936). Sex and personality. New
York, NY: Russell & Russell.
Thompson, H. B. (1903). The mental traits of sex. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Tougas, F., Brown, R., Beaton, A. M., & Joly, S. (1995).
Neosexism:
Plus ça change, plus c’est pareil. Personality and Social
Psychol-
ogy Bulletin, 21, 842–849.
Unger, R. K. (1979). Toward a redefinition of sex and gender.
American Psychologist, 34, 1085–1094.
Unger, R. K. (1998). Resisting gender: Twenty-five years of
feminist
psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Unger, R. K., Sheese, K., & Main, A. S. (2010). Feminism

and women leaders in SPSSI: Social networks, ideology, and
generational change. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 34,
474–485.
Vannoy, D. (2001). Collapsing the walls of patriarchy and
masculine
hegemony. In D. Vannoy (Ed.), Gender mosaics (pp. 508–513).
Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury.
Warner, L. R. (2008). A best practices guide to intersectional
approaches in psychological research. Sex Roles, 59, 454–463.
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. Gender
and
Society, 1, 125–151.
<<
/ASCII85EncodePages false
/AllowTransparency false
/AutoPositionEPSFiles true
/AutoRotatePages /None
/Binding /Left
/CalGrayProfile (Gray Gamma 2.2)
/CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1)
/CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated 050SWOP051 v2)
/sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1)
/CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Warning
/CompatibilityLevel 1.3

/CompressObjects /Off
/CompressPages true
/ConvertImagesToIndexed true
/PassThroughJPEGImages false
/CreateJDFFile false
/CreateJobTicket false
/DefaultRenderingIntent /Default
/DetectBlends true
/DetectCurves 0.1000
/ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged
/DoThumbnails false
/EmbedAllFonts true
/EmbedOpenType false
/ParseICCProfilesInComments true
/EmbedJobOptions true
/DSCReportingLevel 0
/EmitDSCWarnings false
/EndPage -1
/ImageMemory 1048576
/LockDistillerParams true
/MaxSubsetPct 100
/Optimize true
/OPM 1
/ParseDSCComments true
/ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true
/PreserveCopyPage true
/PreserveDICMYKValues true
/PreserveEPSInfo true
/PreserveFlatness false
/PreserveHalftoneInfo false
/PreserveOPIComments false
/PreserveOverprintSettings true
/StartPage 1
/SubsetFonts true
/TransferFunctionInfo /Apply
/UCRandBGInfo /Remove

/UsePrologue false
/ColorSettingsFile ()
/AlwaysEmbed [ true
]
/NeverEmbed [ true
]
/AntiAliasColorImages false
/CropColorImages false
/ColorImageMinResolution 266
/ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleColorImages true
/ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic
/ColorImageResolution 200
/ColorImageDepth -1
/ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1
/ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000
/EncodeColorImages true
/ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode
/AutoFilterColorImages false
/ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG
/ColorACSImageDict <<
/QFactor 0.15
/HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1]
>>
/ColorImageDict <<
/QFactor 0.76
>>
/JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict <<
/TileWidth 256
/TileHeight 256
/Quality 30
>>
/JPEG2000ColorImageDict <<
/TileWidth 256
/TileHeight 256

/Quality 30
>>
/AntiAliasGrayImages false
/CropGrayImages false
/GrayImageMinResolution 266
/GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleGrayImages true
/GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic
/GrayImageResolution 200
/GrayImageDepth -1
/GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2
/GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000
/EncodeGrayImages true
/GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode
/AutoFilterGrayImages false
/GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG
/GrayACSImageDict <<
/QFactor 0.15
>>
/GrayImageDict <<
/QFactor 0.76
>>
/JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict <<
/TileWidth 256
/TileHeight 256
/Quality 30
>>
/JPEG2000GrayImageDict <<
/TileWidth 256
/TileHeight 256
/Quality 30
>>
/AntiAliasMonoImages false
/CropMonoImages false

/MonoImageMinResolution 900
/MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleMonoImages true
/MonoImageDownsampleType /Average
/MonoImageResolution 600
/MonoImageDepth -1
/MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000
/EncodeMonoImages true
/MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode
/MonoImageDict <<
/K -1
>>
/AllowPSXObjects false
/CheckCompliance [
/None
]
/PDFX1aCheck false
/PDFX3Check false
/PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false
/PDFXNoTrimBoxError true
/PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
]
/PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox false
/PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
]
/PDFXOutputIntentProfile (U.S. Web Coated 050SWOP051
v2)
/PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier (CGATS TR 001)

/PDFXOutputCondition ()
/PDFXRegistryName (http://www.color.org)
/PDFXTrapped /Unknown
/Description <<
/ENU
<FEFF00550073006500200074006800650073006500200053006
1006700650020007300740061006e006400610072006400200073
0065007400740069006e0067007300200066006f0072002000630
0720065006100740069006e006700200077006500620020005000
440046002000660069006c00650073002e0020005400680065007
30065002000730065007400740069006e0067007300200063006f
006e006600690067007500720065006400200066006f007200200
04100630072006f006200610074002000760037002e0030002e00
20004300720065006100740065006400200062007900200054007
2006f00790020004f007400730020006100740020005300610067
00650020005500530020006f006e002000310031002f003100300
02f0032003000300036002e000d000d0032003000300050005000
49002f003600300030005000500049002f004a005000450047002
0004d0065006400690075006d002f004300430049005400540020
00470072006f0075007000200034>
>>
/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(Common)
(1.0)
]
/OtherNamespaces [
<<
/AsReaderSpreads false
/CropImagesToFrames true
/ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue
/FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false
/IncludeGuidesGrids false
/IncludeNonPrinting false
/IncludeSlug false

/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(InDesign)
(4.0)
]
/OmitPlacedBitmaps false
/OmitPlacedEPS false
/OmitPlacedPDF false
/SimulateOverprint /Legacy
>>
<<
/AllowImageBreaks true
/AllowTableBreaks true
/ExpandPage false
/HonorBaseURL true
/HonorRolloverEffect false
/IgnoreHTMLPageBreaks false
/IncludeHeaderFooter false
/MarginOffset [
0
0
0
0
]
/MetadataAuthor ()
/MetadataKeywords ()
/MetadataSubject ()
/MetadataTitle ()
/MetricPageSize [
0
0
]
/MetricUnit /inch
/MobileCompatible 0
/Namespace [
(Adobe)

(GoLive)
(8.0)
]
/OpenZoomToHTMLFontSize false
/PageOrientation /Portrait
/RemoveBackground false
/ShrinkContent true
/TreatColorsAs /MainMonitorColors
/UseEmbeddedProfiles false
/UseHTMLTitleAsMetadata true
>>
<<
/AddBleedMarks false
/AddColorBars false
/AddCropMarks false
/AddPageInfo false
/AddRegMarks false
/BleedOffset [
9
9
9
9
]
/ConvertColors /ConvertToRGB
/DestinationProfileName (sRGB IEC61966-2.1)
/DestinationProfileSelector /UseName
/Downsample16BitImages true
/FlattenerPreset <<
/ClipComplexRegions true
/ConvertStrokesToOutlines false
/ConvertTextToOutlines false
/GradientResolution 300
/LineArtTextResolution 1200
/PresetName ([High Resolution])
/PresetSelector /HighResolution
/RasterVectorBalance 1

>>
/FormElements true
/GenerateStructure false
/IncludeBookmarks false
/IncludeHyperlinks false
/IncludeInteractive false
/IncludeLayers false
/IncludeProfiles true
/MarksOffset 9
/MarksWeight 0.125000
/MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings
/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(CreativeSuite)
(2.0)
]
/PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK
/PageMarksFile /RomanDefault
/PreserveEditing true
/UntaggedCMYKHandling /UseDocumentProfile
/UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile
/UseDocumentBleed false
>>
]
/SyntheticBoldness 1.000000
>> setdistillerparams
<<
/HWResolution [288 288]
/PageSize [612.000 792.000]
>> setpagedevice

Special Anniversary SectionThe Social Psychology of Sex an.docx

Special Anniversary SectionThe Social Psychology of Sex an.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Special Anniversary SectionThe Social Psychology of Sex an.docx

Similar to Special Anniversary SectionThe Social Psychology of Sex an.docx (20)

More from williame8

More from williame8 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Special Anniversary SectionThe Social Psychology of Sex an.docx