Sources and Tips for Assignment 3 (History 105; Prof. Stansbury)—.docx

Sources and Tips for Assignment 3 (History 105; Prof.
Stansbury)—5 pages here
LENGTH AND DEVELOPMENT: Each paper in our class is a
5-paragraph essay, plus there is a title page (=cover page) at the
start and a Sources list at the end. The body of the paper is to
be double-spaced. The body of the paper should be five
paragraphs and a total of 500-to-800 words in length. The 500
minimum is firm; you really have not adequately developed the
paper if less than that. The 800-word upper limit is really a
guideline—ok to go over. Just don’t ramble. To determine
length, I look at the BODY of the paper only (not title page or
sources list) and consider primarily the word count. (Microsoft
Word makes this easy. Just select from the first line of your
first paragraph to the last line of your last paragraph. The
word-count is provided on the lower left by MS-Word.). [I do
not go by number of pages because there are too many ways that
gets fudged by margins, font size, line spacing, etc. However,
fyi---Typically, if you follow these instructions, the body of
your paper will be 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 pages in length—add a page
for your title page and another for your sources list and that
then gets to 4-1/2-to 5/1/2.]
Your paper must have a numbered list of sources at the end
combined with short in-text citations to those sources in the
body of the paper. Any direct quote needs both quote marks
and an in-text citation to the source. Any paraphrase or
summary of information from a source requires an in-text
citation to that source.
Use ONLY the sources designated and listed for this
assignment. If for some reason you must use additional
sources, do NOT google for them—use the university’s online
library.
In this assignment, do NOT include long quotes of 4 lines or
more. The paper is too short for that. Keep any quotes short
and clearly marked with quote marks and a citation. Most of

the paper should be you using mostly your words while using
and summarizing information from your sources, as well as
commenting and developing the paper according to the
instructions. TIP: Before writing your paper, brainstorm first
and make a general list or outline of each paragraph and what it
will include. Use the class text for examples or specific
information, and jot down the page numbers where you found
that information. Do the same with other sources used. This
will make your writing of the paper much easier. Then, start
typing a rough draft. Plan to revise and edit yourself; allot time
to polish the paper before you finally submit. Procrastination is
the enemy of quality.
--------------------
ON THE NEXT PAGE—How to list and how to cite the sources
in your paper. The instruction sheet for Assignment 3 shows
the Schultz class text (required for this) followed by a long list
from which you may choose for your other sources. On the next
three pages below, you will see a sample sources list for this
assignment, just illustrating what that might look like for you.
You will also see a sample of those sources as short in-text
citations in the body of your paper. By now, you should have
an idea of what those look like—and you must know you need
them. Then, on pages 3-through-5 below, you will see a listing
of the sources that helps you identify what subject each source
will work well with. Obviously, focus on sources that relate
well to the examples you chose. Chapters 24-through-29 of the
class text have relevant info for Assignment 3, but focus on the
pages listed for this topic (near top of next page). When citing
the class text (or any book), the in-text citation should include
specific page numbers where the information was found. With
an eBook, normally you can click on the screen and the page
number will appear on the lower left of the screen. [continued
on next page]
p. 2
TOPIC FOR ASSIGNMENT 3: America as Superpower—

Confrontation in a Nuclear Age (1947-Present)
In this assignment, instead of choosing from different topics,
you choose how to narrow down a larger topic by focusing on
some specific issues and specific examples. Using the listed
subjects provided, you get to choose how you do that. Sources:
These pages in the textbook will be especially relevant for you
to consult on the subjects listed. Schultz, p. 462–7, 485–8,
499–506, 535–540, 560–7. And—on the following pages you
will see a long list of sources to choose from—and the list
identifies what subjects they go well with.
---------------------------------------------------
On the rest of this page you see samples of SWS form for in-
text citations (in the body of your paper) and for listing your
sources at the end of your paper. THEN BELOW—ON PAGES
3-THRU-5 OF THIS DOCUMENT, you will see a long chart
where the entire list of sources you might select from is
categorized by subject. This can really help you as you narrow
the focus of your paper and select the sources you actually use.
--------------
For citing a source in the body of the paper, the SWS formula is
generally (last name, number from your list at end). If the
source is a book like the Schultz book, you should add the
specific page number. All the other sources listed here are
articles where the page number is seldom necessary. Here are
examples--the SWS style in-text citations in the body of your
paper would look something like these:
(Schultz, 1, p. #). (Wilde, 2). (Robins-Early, 3). (G.
H. W. Bush, 4). (Chace, 5).
The SWS style list of sources at the end of your paper would
look something like this, though the order may vary. Also, you
might choose other sources from the list on the instruction
sheet:

Sources
1. Kevin M. Schultz. 2018. HIST: Volume 2: U.S. History since
1865. 5th ed.
2. R. Wilde. June 20, 2019. What is Mutually Assured
Destruction? Thoughtco.
https://www.thoughtco.com/mutually-assured-destruction-
1221190
3. N. Robins-Early. March 7, 2015. Was the 2011 Libya
Intervention a Mistake? Huffington Post.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-intervention-
daalder_n_6809756
4. George H. W. Bush. March 6, 1991. Address before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf
Conflict. http://college.cengage.com/history/wadsworth_978113
3309888/unprotected/ps/bushnwo.html
5. S. Chace. Summer, 2015. The Cuban Missile Crisis:
Leadership as Disturbance, Informed by
History. http://libdatab.strayer.edu/login?url=https://search.ebsc
ohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=110092272&sit
e=eds-live&scope=site
---------------------- [see chart of sources on next
three pages]
p. 3
The idea is for you to combine items that connect well together:
COLD WAR---As a combination for your example: Your Cold
War period example could be Containment policy and the
Korean War (1050-1953). How you combine things will take a
little thought and reading. Containment policy goes well with
Berlin airlift, Korean War—perhaps even Vietnam and the
Cuban Crisis. Domino theory goes well with Vietnam—but
also could go with Korea. MAD doctrine goes well with Cuban
Missile Crisis. Other combinations are possible.
POST-COLD WAR---As a combination for your example:
Your Post-Cold War period example could be terrorism and the

invasion of Afghanistan in the early 2001). Terrorism goes well
with the invasion of Afghanistan; Rogue States goes well with
the First Persian Gulf War (1991); and Rogue States also
perhaps goes with the invasion of Iraq (2003) and the 2011
bombing of Libya. WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) goes
well with the invasion of Iraq.
subject
Possible sources (in addition to Schultz textbook)-----------------
-------------
Containment
Use Schultz textbook (p. 462-3, 537); perhaps also--
K. Hickman. Aug. 9, 2019. History of Containment Policy.
https://www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-containment-2361022
Perhaps also--
Winston Churchill. March, 1946. Iron Curtain Speech, Fulton
College,
Missouri. https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-
1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/
Domino Theory
Use Schultz textbook (p. 463); perhaps also—
R. McNamara. July 3, 2019. Why Did the US Enter the
Vietnam War? https://www.thoughtco.com/why-did-us-enter-
vietnam-war-195158
perhaps also—
B. Caplan. Sept. 9, 2019. The Domino Theory Reconsidered.
https://www.econlib.org/the-domino-theory-reconsidered/
“MAD Doctrine”
Use Schultz textbook (p. 467-9); perhaps also –
R. Wilde. June 20, 2019. What is Mutually Assured

Destruction? Thoughtco.
https://www.thoughtco.com/mutually-assured-destruction-
1221190
perhaps also—
John F. Dulles. January 2, 1954. Secretary Dulles’ Strategy of
Massive
Retaliation. http://college.cengage.com/history/wadsworth_9781
133309888/unprotected/ps/dulles.html
Berlin Airlift
Use Schultz textbook (p. 463-5)
Korean War
Use Schultz textbook (p. 466-7)
Vietnam War
Use Schultz textbook (p. 488-9, 496-9, 506)
Cuban Missile Crisis
Use Schultz textbook (p. 487-488); perhaps also
S. Chace. Summer, 2015. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Leadership
as Disturbance, Informed by History.
http://libdatab.strayer.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.co
m/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=110092272&site=eds-
live&scope=site
[continues next page]
-----
-----------------------------------
Terrorism
Use Schultz textbook (especially p. 559-567)

Rogue States
B. K. Musili. August 1, 2017. What is a Rogue State?
WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-a-
rogue-state.html
Note “villain” and similar descriptions of Saddam Hussein in
1991—comments on first Persian Gulf War-----
George H. W. Bush. March 6, 1991. Address before a Joint
WMD
(Weapons of Mass Destruction)
Use Schultz textbook (p. 562); perhaps also --
Colin Powell. February 6, 2003. Transcript of Powell’s UN
Presentation. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powel
l.transcript/
First Persian Gulf War (1991)
Use Schultz textbook (p. 538-540); perhaps also—
George H. W. Bush. March 6, 1991. Address before a Joint
Invasion of Afghanistan (2001)
Use Schultz textbook (p. 559-561 and following); perhaps also
D. Victor. Dec. 21, 2018. Need a Refresher on the War in

Afghanistan? Here are the Basics. New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/world/asia/afghanistan-
war-explainer.html
Invasion of Iraq (2003)
Use Schultz textbook (p. 562 and following); perhaps also—
Colin Powell. February 6, 2003. Transcript of Powell’s UN
Presentation. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powel
l.transcript/
Bombing of Libya (2011)
N. Robins-Early. March 7, 2015. Was the 2011 Libya
Intervention a Mistake? Huffington Post.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-intervention-
daalder_n_6809756
End of chart and document
-------------------------------------------
http://www.cambridge.org/9780521831314
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Fascists
Fascists presents a new theory of fascism based on intensive
analysis of the men and
women who became fascists. It covers the six European

countries in which fascism
became most dominant: Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary,
Romania, and Spain. It
is the most comprehensive analysis of who fascists actually
were, what beliefs they
held, and what actions they committed. Through this evidence
we see that fascism
is merely the most extreme form of “nation-statism,” which was
the dominant
political ideology of the twentieth century. Fascists argued that
an “organic nation”
and a strong state that was prepared to use violence to “knock
heads together” could
transcend the conflicts, especially the class conflicts, rending
modern society. We also
see the fascist core constituencies: social locations that were at
the heart of the nation
or closely connected to the state, and people who were
accustomed to use violence
as a means of solving social conflicts and who came from those
sections of all social
classes that were working outside the front lines of class
conflict. The book suggests
that fascism was essentially a product of post–World War I
conditions in Europe and
is unlikely to reappear in its classic garb in the future.
Nonetheless, elements of its
ideology remain relevant to modern conditions and are now
reappearing, though
mainly in different parts of the world.
Michael Mann is Professor of Sociology at the University of
California, Los Angeles,
and Visiting Research Professor at Queens University, Belfast.
i

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Fascists
MICHAEL MANN
University of California, Los Angeles
iii
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK
First published in print format
isbn-13 978-0-521-83131-4
isbn-13 978-0-521-53855-8
isbn-13 978-0-511-21651-0
© Cambridge University Press 2004
2004

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521831314
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any
part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
isbn-10 0-511-21651-3
isbn-10 0-521-83131-8
isbn-10 0-521-53855-6
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the
persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this
publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge
University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
hardback
paperback
paperback
eBook (NetLibrary)
eBook (NetLibrary)

hardback
http://www.cambridge.org
http://www.cambridge.org/9780521831314
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11:19
Contents
Preface page vii
1 A Sociology of Fascist Movements 1
2 Explaining the Rise of Interwar Authoritarianism and Fascism
31
3 Italy: Pristine Fascists 93
4 Nazis 139
5 German Sympathizers 177
6 Austro-Fascists, Austrian Nazis 207
7 The Hungarian Family of Authoritarians 237
8 The Romanian Family of Authoritarians 261
9 The Spanish Family of Authoritarians 297
10 Conclusion: Fascists, Dead and Alive 353
Appendix 377

Notes 389
Bibliography 395
Index 417
v
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Preface
I originally designed this study of fascism as a single chapter in
a general
book about the twentieth century, the third volume of my The
Sources of
Social Power. But my third volume still remains to be written,
since fascism
grew and grew to absorb my entire attention span over seven
years. My
“fascist chapter” was to be written first, since I was at that time
spending
a year in a Madrid institute with a fine library collection on the
interwar
struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. But then my
research
on fascism grew to the size of a whole book. I realized with a
sinking
heart (since this is not a pleasant subject on which to work for
years) that
it had to grow yet further. Since the deeds of fascists and their

fellow-
travelers culminated in mass murder, I had to engage with a
second large
body of literature, on the events centering on “The Final
Solution
” or
“Holocaust.” I soon realized that these two bodies of literature –
on fascists
and their genocides – had little in common. Fascism and the
mass murders
committed during World War II have been mostly kept in
separate scholarly
and popular compartments inhabited by different theories,
different data,
different methods. These compartments have mostly kept them
segregated
from other rather similar phenomena of murderous cleansing
that have been
regularly recurring across the modern period – from
seventeenth-century
America to the mid-twentieth-century Soviet Union, to Rwanda-
Burundi
and Yugoslavia at the very end of the twentieth century.

All these three main forms of deeply depressing human behavior
– fascism,
“the Holocaust,” and ethnic and political cleansing more
generally – share
a family resemblance. This resemblance has been given by three
main in-
gredients most openly revealed in fascism: organic nationalism,
radical statism,
and paramilitarism. Ideally, the entire family should be
discussed together.
But being of an empiricist bent, I felt I had to discuss them in
some detail.
vii
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viii Preface
This would have generated a book of near 1,000 pages, which
perhaps few

would read – and which no publisher would publish.
So I have broken my overall study into two. This volume
concerns fascists,
centering on their rise to power in interwar Europe. My
forthcoming vol-
ume, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic
Cleansing, concerns the
whole swath of modern ethnic and political cleansing, from
colonial times
through Armenia and Nazi genocides to the present day. The
weakness of
this particular division between the two volumes is that the
“careers” of
the worst types of fascists, especially Nazis, but also their
collaborators, are
broken up between two volumes. Their rise is traced in this
volume, their
final deeds in my other volume. The advantage of this division
is that the
final deeds of these fascists appear alongside others with whom
they share a
genuine family resemblance – colonial militias, the Turkish
Special Forces of
1915, the Cambodian Angka, the Red Guards, Hutu

Interahamwe, Arkan’s
Tigers, and so on. Indeed, popular speech, especially among
their enemies
and victims, recognizes this kinship by denouncing them all as
“Fascists!” –
a rather imprecise but nonetheless justifiable term of abuse. For
these are
brutal men and women using murderous paramilitary means to
attain, albeit
rather crudely voiced, goals of organic nationalism and/or
radical statism
(all qualities of fascism proper). Scholars tend to reject this
broad label of
“Fascist!” – preferring to reserve the term (without exclamation
mark) for
those adhering to a rather more tightly structured doctrine.
Since I also
have pretensions to scholarship, I suppose I must ultimately
share this pref-
erence for conceptual precision. But deeds can share
commonality as well
as doctrine. This volume concerns fascists as scholars
understand the term;
my other volume concerns perpetrators and “Fascists!” in the
more popular,

looser sense of the word.
I have greatly benefited from the advice and criticism of
colleagues in
writing this book. I wish to especially thank Ivan Berend,
Ronald Fraser,
Bernt Hagtvet, John Hall, Ian Kershaw, Stanley Payne, and
Dylan Riley.
I thank the Instituto Juan March in Madrid for its hospitality
during the
first year of research for this book, and the Sociology
Department of the
University of California at Los Angeles for providing a very
congenial home
throughout.
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1
A Sociology of Fascist Movements

taking fascists seriously
This book seeks to explain fascism by understanding fascists –
who they
were, where they came from, what their motivations were, how
they rose
to power. I focus here on the rise of fascist movements rather
than on es-
tablished fascist regimes. I investigate fascists at their flood
tide, in their
major redoubts in interwar Europe, that is, in Austria, Germany,
Hungary,
Italy, Romania, and Spain. To understand fascists will require
understanding
fascist movements. We can understand little of individual
fascists and their
deeds unless we appreciate that they were joined together into
distinctive
power organizations. We must also understand them amid their
broader
twentieth-century context, in relation to general aspirations for
more effec-
tive states and greater national solidarity. For fascism is neither
an oddity nor

merely of historical interest. Fascism has been an essential if
predominantly
undesirable part of modernity. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century
there are seven reasons still to take fascists very seriously.
(1) Fascism was not a mere sideshow in the development of
modern
society. Fascism spread through much of the European heartland
of moder-
nity. Alongside environmentalism, it was the major political
doctrine of
world-historical significance created during the twentieth
century. There is
a chance that something quite like it, though almost certainly
under another
name, will play an important role in the twenty-first century.
Fascists have
been at the heart of modernity.
(2) Fascism was not a movement set quite apart from other
modern move-
ments. Fascists only embraced more fervently than anyone else
the central
political icon of our time, the nation-state, together with its

ideologies
and pathologies. We are thankful that today much of the world
lives un-
der rather mild nation-states, with modest, useful powers,
embodying only
1
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2 Fascists
a fairly harmless nationalism. National government
bureaucracies annoy us
but they do not terrorize us – indeed, they predominantly serve
our needs.
Nationalism usually also appears in comforting domesticated
forms. Though
French people often proclaim themselves as culturally superior,
Americans
assert they are the freest people on Earth, and the Japanese

claim a unique
racial homogeneity, these highly suspect beliefs comfort
themselves, amuse
foreigners, and rarely harm anyone else.
Fascism represents a kind of second-level escalation beyond
such “mild
nation-statism.” The first escalation came in two parallel forms,
one con-
cerning the nation, the other the state. Regarding the nation,
aspirations for
democracy became entwined with the notion of the “integral” or
“organic”
nation. “The people” must rule, but this people was considered
as one and
indivisible and so might violently exclude from itself minority
ethnic
groups and political “enemies” (see my forthcoming volume,
The Dark-
side of Democracy, chap. 1, for more analysis of this).
Regarding the state, the
early twentieth century saw the rise of a more powerful state,
seen as “the
bearer of a moral project,” capable of achieving economic,
social, and moral

development.1 In certain contexts this involved the rise of more
authori-
tarian states. The combination of modern nationalism and
statism was to
turn democratic aspirations on their head, into authoritarian
regimes seek-
ing to “cleanse” minorities and opponents from the nation.
Fascism, the
second-level escalation, added to this combination mainly a
distinctively
“bottom-up” and “radical” paramilitary movement. This would
overcome
all opposition to the organic nation-state with violence from
below, at what-
ever the cost. Such glorification of actual violence had emerged
as a conse-
quence of the modern “democratization” of war into one
between “citizen
armies.” Fascism thus presented a distinctively paramilitary
extreme ver-
sion of nation-statism (my actual definition of fascism is given
below in this
chapter). It was only the most extreme version of the dominant
political
ideology of our era.

(3) Fascist ideology must be taken seriously, in its own terms. It
must
not be dismissed as crazy, contradictory, or vague. Nowadays,
this is quite
widely accepted. Zeev Sternhell (1986: x) has remarked that
fascism had
“a body of doctrine no less solid or logically indefensible than
that of any
other political movement.” Consequently, said George Mosse
(1999: x),
“only . . . when we have grasped fascism from the inside out,
can we truly
judge its appeal and its power.” Since fascists did offer
plausible solutions to
modern social problems, they got mass electoral support and
intense emo-
tional commitment from militants. Of course, like most political
activists,
fascists were diverse and opportunistic. The importance of
leadership and
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A Sociology of Fascist Movements 3
power in fascism enhanced opportunism. Fascist leaders were
empowered
to do almost anything to seize power, and this could subvert
other fascist
values. Yet most fascists, leaders or led, believed in certain
things. They
were not people of peculiar character, sadists or psychopaths, or
people
with a “rag-bag” of half-understood dogmas and slogans flitting
through
their heads (or no more so than the rest of us). Fascism was a
movement of
high ideals, able to persuade a substantial part of two
generations of young
people (especially the highly educated) that it could bring about
a more
harmonious social order. To understand fascism, I adopt a
methodology of
taking fascists’ values seriously. Thus each of my case-study
chapters begins

by explaining local fascist doctrine, followed, if possible, by an
account of
what ordinary fascists seem to have believed.
(4) We must take seriously the social constituency of fascist
movements
and ask what sorts of people were drawn to them. Few fascists
were marginals
or misfits. Nor were they confined to classes or other interest
groups who
found in fascism a “cover” for their narrow material interests.
Yet there were
“core fascist constituencies” among which fascist values most
resonated. This
is perhaps the most original part of this book, yielding a new
view of fascism,
and it derives from a methodology of taking fascist values
seriously. For the
core fascist constituency enjoyed particularly close relations to
the sacred
icon of fascism, the nation-state. We must reconstruct that
nation-state–
loving constituency in order to see what kinds of people might
be tempted
toward fascism.

(5) We must also take seriously fascist movements. They were
hierarchical
yet comradely, embodying both the leadership principle and a
constraining
“social cage,” both of which heightened commitment, especially
by single
young men for whom the movement was almost a “total
institution.” We
must also appreciate its paramilitarism, since “popular
violence” was crucial
to its success. Fascist movements also changed as they were
tempted by two
different prospects. One was to use power in more and more
radical and
violent ways. The other was to enjoy the fruits of power by
compromising
under the table with powerful traditional elites. These led
toward either
a hardening of fascism (as in Germany) or a softening (as in
Italy, at least
until the late 1930s). Fascists also experienced “careers” in the
movement,
which might lead them down either path. We must observe
fascists in action:

committing violence, trimming, pursuing careers.
(6) We must take “hardened” fascists seriously in a far more
sinister sense,
as the eventual perpetrators of great evil. We must not excuse or
relativize
this but seek to understand it. The capacity for evil is an
essential human
attribute, and so is our capacity to commit evil for what we
believe to be
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4 Fascists
moral purposes. Fascists were especially self-deluded. We need
to know
more of the circumstances in which we humans do this. Though
we pre-
fer to write history and sociology as a happy, progressive, moral
tale, this

grotesquely distorts the reality of human experience. The
twentieth century
saw massive evil, not as an accident or as the resurgence of the
primitive
in us, but as willed, purposive, and essentially “modern”
behavior. To un-
derstand fascism is to understand how people of apparently high
modern-
izing ideals could then act to produce evil that was eventually
unmitigated.
However, I leave the very worst for my forthcoming book, The
Dark Side of
Democracy.
(7) We must take seriously the chance that fascists might return.
If we
understand the conditions that generated fascists, we can better
understand
whether they might return and how we might avoid this. Some
of the con-
ditions that generated fascism are still present. Organic
nationalism and the
adoption of paramilitary forms, committed to ethnic and
political cleans-
ing, at present moves many thousands of people across the

world to commit
supposedly “idealistic” yet in reality murderous acts against
neighbours and
political opponents whom they call “enemies.” This may horrify
us, but
it is not dismissible as a return to the “primitive” in us. Ethnic
and politi-
cal cleansing has been one of European civilization’s main
contributions to
modernity; while violent paramilitarism has been distinctively
twentieth-
century. We must comprehend these aspects of modernity. It is
rather for-
tunate nowadays that “statism” (the third main component of
fascism after
organic nationalism and paramilitarism) is greatly out of
fashion, since both
its historic carriers, fascism and communism, collapsed
disastrously. Current
cleansing regimes tend to be paramilitary and authoritarian, but
pretend they
are democratic; the words “fascist” and “communist” have
largely become
terms of imprecise abuse. Given time for a supposedly stateless
neoliberalism

to do similar damage to parts of the world, this rejection of the
powerful state
will probably fade. Then extreme statist values might be
harnessed again to
extreme paramilitary nationalism in movements resembling
fascism – unless
we can learn from the history I record here. I doubt new
movements will
call themselves fascist, since the word is now so abhorred. Yet
some of the
substance of fascism lives on.
There are two main schools of thought on fascism. A more
idealist “na-
tionalist school,” which I discuss first, has focused on fascists’
beliefs and
doctrines, while a more materialist “class school,” discussed
second, has fo-
cused on its class basis and its relationship to capitalism. The
debates between
them constitute yet another replay of the traditional polemic
between ide-
alism and materialism in the social sciences. But since the two
approaches

P1: IWV/KAF
11:20
often appear to be discussing different levels of phenomena –
beliefs versus
social base/functions – they frequently talk past each other.
Thus we lack
an acceptable general theory of fascism. Such a theory would
have to build
on top of both approaches, taking from each what is useful and
adding what
both neglect.
I have chosen not to here give the reader a heavy dose of
sociological
theory. But my own approach to fascism derives from a more
general model
of human societies that rejects the idealism-versus-materialism
dualism. My
earlier work identified four primary “sources of social power”

in human
societies: ideological, economic, military, and political.2 Class
theorists of
fascism have tended to elevate economic power relations in
their expla-
nations, while nationalist theorists have emphasized ideology.
Yet all four
sources of social power are needed to explain most important
social and
historical outcomes. To attain their goals, social movements
wield com-
binations of control over ultimate meaning systems
(ideological), control
over means of production and exchange (economic), control
over orga-
nized physical violence (military), and control over centralized
and terri-
torial institutions of regulation (political). All four are
necessary to explain
fascism. Mass fascism was a response to the post–World War I
ideological,
economic, military, and political crises. Fascists proposed
solutions to all
four. Fascist organization also combined substantial ideological
innovations

(generally called “propaganda”), mass political electoralism,
and paramilitary
violence. All became highly ritualized so as to intensify
emotional commit-
ment. In attempting to seize power, fascist leaders also sought
to neutralize
economic, military, political, and ideological (especially
church) elites. Thus
any explanation of fascism must rest on the entwining of all
four sources
of social power, as my empirical case-study chapters
demonstrate. My fi-
nal chapter presents the pay-off from this model: a general
explanation of
fascism.
toward a definition of fascism
Obviously, we must define our terms, though this is no easy
matter. Some
scholars have refused to define fascism at all in any “generic”
sense, believing
that “true” fascism was found only in Italy, its original home.
Along with
many others, I disagree. However, I do not initially seek a

generic definition
that might apply across many times and places. I merely seek
one offering
heuristic utility across the interwar period in Europe – until my
last chapter,
when I raise the issue of whether fascist movements have
existed in more
recent times and in other places.
P1: IWV/KAF
11:20
6 Fascists
Let us first get a general sense of fascism through the views of
its promi-
nent intellectuals, with the commentaries of Sternhell (1976,
1986, 1994)
and Mosse (1999), plus Griffin’s compilation of fascist texts
(1995), as my
main guides. Most of them were initially nonmaterialist leftists
who then

embraced organic nationalism. In 1898 the Frenchman Barrès
called his fu-
sion “Socialist Nationalism,” though it was the Italian
Corradini’s inversion
of these words, as “National Socialism,” which caught on,
though by so-
cialism he really meant syndicalism: “Syndicalism and
nationalism together,
these are the doctrines that represent solidarity,” he
emphasized. Class and
sectoral conflict could be harmonized with the help of
syndicalist (labor
union) organizations coordinated by a “corporate state.” So
national so-
cialism would be confined within national boundaries, with
class struggle
transformed into struggle between nations. “Bourgeois nations”
(such as
Britain and France) exploited “proletarian nations” (such as
Italy). To resist,
the proletarian nation must fight, with economic weapons and
through “the
sacred mission of imperialism.” Except for the last phrase, this
resembles the
“third world socialism” of recent years. These were not

uncommon ideas
in the twentieth century.
As leftists but not materialists, these men also lauded
“resistance,”
“will,” “movement,” “collective action,” “the masses,” and the
dialectic of
“progress” through “struggle,” “force,” and “violence.” These
Nietzschean
values made fascism “radical.” Fascists were determined to
overcome all
opposition ruthlessly, by will, force, whatever was necessary,
without com-
promise or scruples. This meant in practice forming
paramilitaries as well
as parties. As collectivists they despised the “amoral
individualism” of free
market liberalism and “bourgeois democracy,” which neglected
the inter-
ests of “living communities” and of “the nation as an organic
whole.” The
nation was essentially one and indivisible, a living and
breathing entity, de-
fined as either “integral” or “organic.” To be German, Italian,
or French,

fascists asserted, meant much more than just living in a
geographical space; it
meant something outsiders could not experience, involving a
basic identity
and emotion, beyond reason. As Mosse emphasizes, the
Germanic version
of the nation differed from the Southern European, being racial
as well
as cultural. It drew more on social Darwinism, anti-Semitism,
and other
nineteenth-century racialist strands of theory to generate a
Volk, a singu-
lar ethnic-cultural unity transcending all possible conflicts
within it, but
erecting higher boundaries against other peoples.
Nonetheless, the nation had both a moral and a rational
structure. Build-
ing on Rousseau and Durkheim, the theorists said that
competitive in-
stitutions such as markets, parties, elections, or classes could
not generate

P1: IWV/KAF
11:20
morality. This must come from the community, the nation. The
Frenchman
Berth railed against liberalism: “Society is brought to the point
where it is
only a market made up of free-trading atoms, in contact with
which every-
thing dissolves. . . . dustlike particles of individuals, shut up
within the nar-
row confines of their consciousness and their money boxes.”
Panunzio and
Bottai followed Durkheim in praising the virtues of “civil
society,” believing
that voluntary communal associations were the foundations of
liberty. Yet
they must be integrated into an overall corporate state that
would then rep-
resent the interests of the nation as a whole. Without this
linkage between
state and communal associations, they said, the state would be

“empty,”
with “a deficiency of sociological content,” as was the case in
the liberal
state (Riley 2002: chap. 1). In contrast, the fascist state would
be “corpo-
rate” and “sociological,” based on strong bonds of association.
Again, this
sounds quite modern. Berth and Panunzio might have been
targeting the
neo-liberalism dominant a hundred years later.
Fascist intellectuals also attacked a left trapped within passive
“bourgeois
materialism.” Its revolutionary pretensions had been exposed,
they argued,
by the superior mobilizing power of modern warfare between
entire na-
tions. Nations, not classes, were the true masses of modernity.
Class conflict
between capitalists and workers was not the core of the
problem, they in-
sisted. Instead, the real struggle was between “workers of all
classes,” “the
productive classes,” ranged against “unproductive” enemies,
usually iden-

tified as finance or foreign or Jewish capitalists. They would
defend the
productive workers of all classes. The Frenchman Valois wrote
that “na-
tionalism + socialism = fascism,” and the Englishman Oswald
Mosley said,
“If you love our country, you are national, and if you love our
people you
are socialist.” These were attractive ideas in the early twentieth
century, the
“age of the masses,” since fascists promised to “transcend” a
class struggle
then seemingly tearing apart the social fabric. Indeed, milder
versions of
such claims to transcendence have been adopted by most of the
successful
political movements of the twentieth century.
The nation should be represented through a corporatist,
syndicalist state.
It could “transcend” the moral decay and class conflict of
bourgeois so-
ciety with a “total plan” offering a statist “third way” between
capitalism
and socialism. The Italian Gentile (a late convert to fascism)

claimed that
fascism resolved the “paradox of liberty and authority. The
authority of
the state is absolute.” Mussolini agreed: “[E]verything in the
State, nothing
against the State, nothing outside the State.” “Ours will be a
totalitarian
state in the service of the fatherland’s integrity,” proclaimed the
Spaniard
José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The Belgian Henri de Man
applauded
P1: IWV/KAF
11:20
8 Fascists
“authoritarian democracy.” The “fascist revolution” would
produce “the
total man in the total society, with no clashes, no prostration, no
anarchy.”
said the Frenchman Déat.

But this was the future. Right now, the nation must struggle
against its
enemies for self-realization. It would be led by a paramilitary
elite. The more
radical fascists …
Yale University Press
Chapter Title: Democracy Goes into Reverse
Book Title: Democracy in Retreat
Book Subtitle: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the
Worldwide Decline of Representative
Government
Book Author(s): Joshua Kurlantzick
Published by: Yale University Press. (2013)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bh31.4

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D

uring april, the hottest month of the year in Thailand, all
activity
in Bangkok slows to a molasses pace. With temperatures rising
to
well over 100 degrees Fahrenheit, many residents leave town,
head-
ing north or to the islands east and south of the city, and the
slow- moving
fl ow of traffi c releases a cloud of smog into the steaming air.
In mid- April,
the entire country shuts down for a week for the Thai New Year,
leaving the
few people still in the capital marveling at their sudden ability
to drive across
the city in minutes rather than hours.
But in the spring of 2010, Bangkok was anything but quiet.
Tens of thou-

sands of red shirted protesters descended upon the city to
protest against the
government, which they viewed as illegitimate and
unsympathetic to the
working class, and to call for a new election. They mostly
hailed from poorer
villages in the rural northeast, or from working class suburbs of
Bangkok.
At fi rst, the protests seemed like a village street party.
Demonstrators snacked
on sticky rice and grilled chicken, and danced in circles to
bands playing
mor lam, a northeastern Thai music that, with its wailing guitars
and plain-
tive, yodeling vocals, resembles an Asian version of Hank
Williams. Amid a

rollicking, almost joyous atmosphere, over 100,000 red shirts
soon gathered
around a makeshift stage in central Bangkok to demand the
resignation of
the government.
Within weeks, however, the demonstrations turned violent,
leading to
the worst bloodshed in Bangkok in two de cades. On April 10,
some dem-
onstrators fi red on police and launched grenades at the security
forces. The
troops cracked down hard, sometimes shooting randomly into
the crowds.1
By the end of the day, twenty- four people had been killed.
Democracy Goes into Reverse
1

2020 19:45:08 UTC
2 Democracy Goes into Reverse
That was just a warm- up for late May. By that time, the red
shirts had
been camped out for weeks in the central business district,
shutting down
commerce and paralyzing traffi c. The government and the
armed forces,
which had rejected the protesters’ demands for an immediate
election, de-
cided to take a tougher line. Advancing into the red shirts’
encampment,
heavily armed soldiers created virtual free- fi re zones, shooting

at anyone
who moved and reportedly posting snipers in buildings above
the streets to
take out red shirts. A prominent general who had joined the red
movement
was killed by a bullet to the forehead as he stood talking with a
reporter
from the New York Times.2 The red shirts battled back, setting
fi re to the
stock exchange, the largest mall in the city, and other symbols
of elite privi-
lege. On the eve ning of May 19, fl ames engulfed the Bangkok
skyline, dwarf-
ing the temples of the old city and the glass- and- steel high
rises of the
fi nancial district.3 By the end of May, most of the red shirts
had gone home,

but the battle had ended at a terrible cost. The clashes had
resulted in the
killing of over one hundred people, most of them civilians, and
the govern-
ment had declared a state of emergency in most provinces,
giving it the
equivalent of martial law powers to detain people without
having to charge
them with committing a crime.
Such violence has become increasingly common in a country
that was
once among the most stable in Southeast Asia and an example to
other
developing nations of demo cratic consolidation. Four years
before the red
shirt protests, a different group of protesters had launched

Thailand into
turmoil, gathering on the main green in the old city of Bangkok,
near the
Grand Palace, with its glittering spires inlaid with tiny gems.
Then it was
thousands of middle- class urbanites from Bangkok— lawyers,
doctors, shop-
keep ers, and others— demanding the removal of Prime Minister
Thaksin
Shinawatra, a charismatic populist, mostly backed by the rural
poor, who
had been elected by large majorities but was clearly disdainful
of demo cratic
institutions.
Dressed in the yellow of Thailand’s revered monarch, King
Bhumibol

Adulyadej, the middle- class protesters were led by a group
with the Or-
wellian name People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Like the
Demo cratic
2020 19:45:08 UTC
Democracy Goes into Reverse 3
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) or the old German
Demo cratic
Republic, the PAD was neither demo cratic nor representative of
many people.
Its platform for change called for reducing the number of
elected seats in
Parliament, essentially to slash the power of the rural poor, who
constitute

the majority of Thais.4 “The middle class— they disdain the
rural masses and
see them as willing pawns to the corrupt vote buyers,” said one
former U.S.
ambassador to Thailand.5
Thaksin had used his power to eviscerate the civil ser vice,
silence the
media, and allegedly disappear po liti cal opponents. He
declared a “war on
drugs” in which more than two thousand people were killed by
the security
forces, frequently with gunshots to the back of the head, and
often despite
the fact that they had no links to narcotics.6 He also cracked
down on dissent.
In one horrifi c incident in October 2004, Thai security forces

rounded up
hundreds of young men in southern Thailand after
demonstrations against
the government at a local mosque. The security forces stacked
them inside
stifl ing, insuffi ciently ventilated trucks; eighty- fi ve people
died of suffoca-
tion.7 On a daily basis Thaksin spread fear among potential
critics. At the
offi ces of the Bangkok Post its tough investigative reporters,
who had sur-
vived on cheap whiskey and cigarettes through coups, street
protests, and
wars, were completely dispirited. One editor said they were
scared even to
touch stories related to Thaksin, for fear the prime minister’s
cronies would

buy the paper and fi re them.8
Still, Thaksin had been elected twice, and he dominated Thai
politics
largely because he was the most compelling, or ga nized, and
dynamic poli-
tician in the country. In a lengthy cable analyzing Thaksin’s
appeal— and
released to the public by Wikileaks— Ralph Boyce, a former
U.S. ambassa-
dor to Thailand who was no fan of Thaksin’s repressive
policies, admitted:
“Thaksin’s personality, sophisticated media pre sen ta tion,
focused populist
message, and traditional get- out- the- vote or ga niz ing,
combined to allow
[Thaksin’s party] to leave . . . its closest rival in the po liti cal

dust . . .
Thaksin . . . has no equal in Thailand on how to attract po liti
cal attention.”
In 2005 Thaksin trounced the Demo crat Party, which was
favored by
most yellow shirts, and in 2006, when he called a new election,
the Demo crats
2020 19:45:08 UTC
simply refused to participate. By that time the Demo crats, once
the most
powerful party in Thailand, had been reduced to a small rump in
Parlia-

ment, holding less than one hundred out of the fi ve hundred
seats in total.
Instead of contesting the 2006 election, then, the yellow shirts,
who shared
po liti cal leanings with the Demo crat Party, tried to paralyze
the country.
They stormed Parliament and shut it down, trapping lawmakers
and forc-
ing some se nior ministers to fl ee, James Bond– style, over a
fence and into
a nearby building. Later, they laid siege to the main
international airport,
throwing commerce into turmoil and severely damaging
tourism, one of
the country’s main sources of foreign exchange.
After months of rallies, Thaksin’s government was fi nally
ousted in a

coup in 2006, but this only led to more chaos. For nearly a de
cade now, Thai-
land has weathered one street protest after another, with both
sides disdain-
ing demo cratic institutions and refusing to resolve their
differences at the
ballot box instead of in the streets, often with bloody results.
After Thaksin
and, later, other pro- Thaksin parties were prevented from
assuming power
despite their electoral mandates, Thailand’s working classes
formed their
own movement. They donned red clothing— Thaksin’s color—
in response
to the yellow shirts. (The red shirts’ offi cial name was the
United Front for

Democracy Against Dictatorship.) Just as the yellow shirts had
tried to cre-
ate havoc and paralyze the economy, so too the red shirts
attempted to
destroy what was left of demo cratic culture and order. They
laid siege to
Parliament, forcing lawmakers loyal to the yellow shirts to fl
ee. In April
2009, they stormed a meeting of Southeast Asian nations in the
resort town
of Pattaya, forcing many visiting Asian leaders to hide inside
their hotel,
and ultimately causing the meeting to be canceled, to the great
embarrass-
ment of the Thai government.9 Finally, in the spring of 2010,
the red shirts
converged on Bangkok.

In July 2011, despite efforts by Thailand’s middle classes and
its mili-
tary to prevent the red shirts from taking power, the red shirts’
favored
party, called Puea Thai, won national elections again, forming a
majority in
parliament. The electoral victory handed the prime ministership
to Yingluck
Shinawatra, the party’s leader— and the youn gest sister of
former prime
2020 19:45:08 UTC
minister Thaksin. Soon, Thailand was boiling again, as

Thaksin’s oppo-
nents revolted against his sister’s government, warning that if
Thaksin re-
turned to Bangkok— and to power— they might well riot in the
streets
again, shutting down the city once more.
In the late 1990s, the possibility of such a breakdown of
democracy in Thai-
land seemed remote. After a massive pop u lar demonstration of
hundreds
of thousands in Bangkok ousted a military regime in 1992,
Thais believed
they had fi nally created a stable democracy. At the Bangkok
Post, young re-
porters often seemed downright jubilant. During the day, they
crawled

through traffi c in their cars to research investigative pieces
unthinkable
under past dictatorships; at night, they often attended informal
strategy ses-
sions about how to make good on the promises written into the
new, pro-
gressive constitution passed in 1997. That groundbreaking
constitution
guaranteed many new rights and freedoms, created new national
institutions
to monitor graft, and strengthened po liti cal parties at the
expense of un-
elected centers of power— the palace, the military, big
business, and the elite
civil service— that together had run Thailand since the end of
the absolute
monarchy in the 1930s. It also set the stage for elections in

2001 that were
probably the freest in Thailand’s history. Meanwhile, the media
utilized its
new freedoms, along with new technologies like the Internet and
satellite
tele vi sion, to explore formerly taboo topics like po liti cal
corruption and
labor rights.
By the early 2000s, many Thais felt great pride in their nation’s
demo-
cratic development. Outsiders noticed, too. “Thailand’s
freedom, openness,
strength, and relative prosperity make it a role model in the
region for what
people can achieve when they are allowed to,” U.S. Assistant
Secretary of

State James Kelly declared in 2002.10 Besides Kelly, former
Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright and then Secretary of State Colin
Powell, among
others, heaped praise on Bangkok. Powell declared in 2002,
“Thailand has
lived up to our expectations in so many ways.”11 In its 1999
report, the inter-
national monitoring or ga ni za tion Freedom House ranked
Thailand a “free”
nation.12
2020 19:45:08 UTC

Today, Thailand looks almost nothing like a model emerging
democ-
racy. The never- ending cycle of street protest, by both the
middle class and
the poor, paralyzes policy making, hinders economic growth,
and deters
investment at a time when authoritarian competitors like China
and Viet-
nam are vacuuming up foreign capital. Few Thais now trust the
integrity
of the judiciary, the civil ser vice, or other national institutions.
Even the
king, once so revered that Thais worshipped him like a god, has
seen his
impartiality questioned.13 The Thai military now wields
enormous infl u-
ence behind the scenes, a dramatic reversal from the 1990s,

when most
Thais believed the military had returned to the barracks for
good.14 A once
freewheeling media has become increasingly shuttered and
servile. The
government now blocks over one hundred thousand websites,
more than in
neighboring Vietnam.15 Once- groundbreaking Bangkok
newspapers now
read like Asian versions of the old Pravda, lavishing praise on
the red shirts
or the yellow shirts depending on the paper’s point of view.16
The Thai
government even began locking up Americans visiting the
country who’d
written blog posts about the Thai monarchy years earlier. Even
after Thak-

sin’s sister took the reins of power, little changed, with arrests
and Web
blocking continuing as before.
Many middle- class Thais, faced with the breakdown of their
once-
vibrant democracy, seem to believe their country is somehow
singular— that
its collapse is due to a coincidence of factors that are unique to
the country
and hard for a foreigner to understand: the end of the reign of
Bhumibol,
who’d long played a stabilizing role; the Asian fi nancial crisis,
which pushed
the country toward pop u lism; and the unfortunate rise of
Thaksin, a man
with little commitment to the rule of law. “We were just

unlucky,” a se nior
Thai government offi cial said. “If we’d not had Thaksin, if His
Majesty
could have been more involved, like in 1992, things would have
been much
different. . . . It’s a Thai situation.” 17
But demo cratic meltdowns like Thailand’s have become
depressingly com-
mon. In its annual international survey, the most comprehensive
analysis of
freedom around the globe, Freedom House, which uses a range
of data to
assess social, po liti cal, and economic freedoms in each nation,
found that
2020 19:45:08 UTC

global freedom plummeted in 2010 for the fi fth year in a row,
the longest
continuous decline in nearly forty years. At the same time, most
authoritar-
ian nations had become more repressive, stepping up their
oppressive mea-
sures with little re sis tance from the demo cratic world.
Overall, Freedom
House reported, twenty- fi ve nations went backward, in terms
of freedom,
in 2010 alone, while only eleven made any gains; among the
decliners were
critical regional powers like Mexico and Ukraine. This despite
the fact that

in 2011 one of the most historically authoritarian parts of the
world, the
Middle East, seemed to begin to change. The decline, Freedom
House noted,
was most pronounced among what it called the “middle ground”
of nations,
primarily in the developing world— nations that have begun
demo cratizing
but are not solid and stable democracies.18 Indeed, the number
of electoral
democracies fell in 2010 to its lowest number since 1995.19 “A
‘freedom
recession’ and an authoritarian resurgence have clearly emerged
as global
trends,” writes Freedom House’s director of research, Arch
Puddington.

“Over the last four years, the dominant pattern has been one of
growing
restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of expression and
association in
authoritarian settings, and a failure to continue demo cratic
progress in pre-
viously improving countries.”20 Freedom House also found an
increasing
“truculence” among authoritarian regimes. This truculence
actually was
only made stronger by the Arab Spring, which led autocratic
regimes like
China and Uzbekistan to crack down harder on their own
populations. The
International Federation for Human Rights, an or ga ni za tion
that monitors
abuses around the world, found in its late- 2011 annual report

that the Arab
uprisings had little impact on a dire, deteriorating climate for
human rights
defenders worldwide.21
Indeed, in the fall of 2011 Rus sia, which along with China is
one of the
most powerful authoritarian nations, made clear that any hopes
of change
were just a mirage, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who has
dominated
Rus sia for more than a de cade, announced that, in a secret deal
with Presi-
dent Dmitry Medvedev, Putin would once again assume the
presidency in
2012 and potentially serve two more terms, which would keep
him in con-

trol of the Kremlin until 2024, longer than some Soviet leaders
had lasted.
Putin had been constitutionally barred from serving another
presidential
2020 19:45:08 UTC
term after his fi rst two terms ended in 2008, and once
Medvedev assumed
the presidency some Rus sian liberals had hoped that he would
introduce
reforms, despite his history as a close confi dante of Putin’s.
Indeed, in offi ce
Medvedev declared that Rus sia’s criminal justice system
needed to be over-

hauled, and that the country should open up its po liti cal
system, but his
announcement that he had secretly agreed with Putin to
manipulate the
presidency and prime ministership to put Putin back in power
showed that
he, too, was at heart hardly a demo crat. When Rus sia’s fi
nance minister ques-
tioned the handoff of power from Medvedev back to Putin, he
was sum-
marily fi red, in a clear message.
The stagnation of democracy predates this fi ve- year period,
Freedom
House noted; since 2000 democracy gained little ground around
the world,
before sliding backward beginning in the mid- 2000s. “Since

they were fi rst
issued in 1972, the fi ndings in Freedom in the World have
conveyed a story of
broad advances,” Freedom House reported. “But freedom’s
forward march
peaked around the beginning of the [2000s].”
Even as some demo crats were celebrating the Arab Spring and
hoping
that, as in 1989, its revolutions might spread to other parts of
the world, a
mountain of other evidence supported Freedom House’s gloomy
conclu-
sions. Another of the most comprehensive studies of global
democracy,
compiled by Germany’s Bertelsmann Foundation, uses data
examining de-

mocracies’ ability to function, manage government, and uphold
freedoms
to produce what it calls the “transformation index.” The overall
goal of the
index is to analyze the state and quality of democracy in every
developing
nation that has achieved some degree of freedom. To do so,
Bertelsmann
looks at a range of characteristics including the stability of
demo cratic insti-
tutions, po liti cal participation, the rule of law, and the
strength of the state,
among other areas. And the most recent index found “the
overall quality
of democracy has eroded [throughout the developing world]. . .
. The key
components of a functioning democracy, such as po liti cal

participation and
civil liberties, have suffered qualitative erosion. . . . These
developments
threaten to hollow out the quality and substance of governance.”
The index
concluded that the number of “highly defective democracies”—
democracies
2020 19:45:08 UTC
with institutions, elections, and po liti cal culture so fl awed
that they no lon-
ger qualifi ed as real democracies— had roughly doubled
between 2006 and

2010. By 2010, in fact, nearly 53 of the 128 countries assessed
by the index
were categorized as “defective democracies.”
Sixteen of these fi fty- three, including regionally and globally
powerful
states like Rus sia and Kenya, qualifi ed as “highly defi cient
democracies,”
countries that had such a lack of opportunity for opposition
voices, prob-
lems with the rule of law, and unrepresentative po liti cal
structures that they
were now little better than autocracies. The percentage of
“highly defi cient
democracies” in the index has roughly doubled in just four
years. And in
Africa, which had been at the center of the global wave of demo
cratization

in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the deterioration was most
pronounced.
Between 2008 and 2010, Bertelsmann found, sub- Saharan
Africa was
home to nine of the thirteen nations in the developing world that
suffered
the greatest deterioration in the quality of their po liti cal
systems. Among
these backsliders were Senegal, Tanzania, and Madagascar,
which once were
among the greatest hopes for democracy on the continent.
Even nations that have been held up as demo cratic models have
re-
gressed over the past fi ve to ten years, according to both the
Freedom House
and the Bertelsmann studies. When they entered the Eu ro pe an

Union in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic, and
Slovakia were considered success stories and would join the
older democ-
racies of Western Eu rope as solid, consolidated demo cratic
systems. But in
their de cade inside the EU, all of these new entrants actually
have been
downgraded repeatedly by Freedom House, showing that their
demo cratic
systems, election pro cesses, and commitments to civil liberties
have deterio-
rated.22 Populist and far- right parties with little commitment to
demo cratic
norms gained steadily in popularity; public distaste for
democracy in these

supposed success stories skyrocketed, so much so that in one
2006 survey
publics in Central Eu rope showed the most skepticism about
the merits of
democracy of any region of the world.23 Hungary deteriorated
so badly that
its press freedoms reverted to almost Soviet- type suppression,
with its gov-
ernment using harsh new laws and other attacks to silence the
media.24
2020 19:45:08 UTC
The third major international study of democracy, the

Economist
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) “index of democracy,” only further
confi rmed the
decline. The EIU’s annual survey of the entire world analyzes
democracy
using categories for electoral pro cess, pluralism, po liti cal
participation, po-
liti cal culture, functioning of government, and civil liberties
including press
freedom and freedom of association. In its most recent study, it
found that
democracy was in retreat across nearly the entire globe. “In all
regions, the
average democracy score for 2010 is lower than in 2008,” noted
the report.
In ninety- one of one hundred sixty- seven countries it studied,
the democ-

racy score had deteriorated in that time period, and in many
others it had
only remained stagnant. Of the seventy- nine nations that it
assessed as hav-
ing some signifi cant demo cratic qualities, only twenty- six
made the grade as
“full democracies,” while the other fi fty- three were ranked
only as “fl awed
democracies” because of serious defi ciencies in many of the
areas it assessed.
“Democracy is in retreat. The dominant pattern in all regions . .
. has been
backsliding on previously attained progress,” the survey
concluded.
In some of the specifi c categories that it examined to assess
democracy,

such as media freedom, the EIU found that backsliding was
even more severe
than the broader decline in the democracy index. More than
thirty nations,
including regional powers— and onetime examples of
democratization—
like Rus sia, Hungary, Mexico, and Turkey, witnessed sharp
increases in
media and online repression between 2008 and 2010. The
Economist Intel-
ligence Unit’s 2011 Democracy Survey, released roughly a year
after the
Arab uprisings began, had just as much gloom. As in 2010, it
similarly found
that “democracy has been under intense pressure in many parts
of the
world,” and that the quality of democracy had regressed on

nearly every
continent in 2011.
Like Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Foundation, the EIU
found
that, with only a few exceptions, backsliding was occurring in
nearly every
developing region of the world. It found that authoritarianism
was becom-
ing more entrenched in Central Asia, demo cratization was
being reversed
in Africa, authoritarian populists were emerging in Latin
America, and
po liti cal participation was plummeting in the former Soviet
states of East-
ern and Central Eu rope, undermining the region’s demo cratic
transitions.

2020 19:45:08 UTC
Assessing the data, and the severe reversals, the EIU was glum
about the
future, though it recognized that the Middle East had nowhere
to go but
up, given its long- entrenched authoritarianism. “The threat of
backsliding
now greatly outweighs the possibility of future gains [in demo
cratization
worldwide],” the survey concluded.
Old- fashioned coups also have returned. In Latin America,
Asia, and

even most of Africa, coups, which had been a frequent means of
changing
governments during the Cold War, had become nearly extinct by
the early
2000s. But between 2006 and 2010 the military grabbed power
in Guinea,
Honduras, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea- Bissau, Bangladesh,
Thailand, Fiji,
and Madagascar, among other states.
In many other developing nations, such as Mexico, Pakistan,
and the
Philippines, the military did not launch an outright coup but
managed to
restore its power as the central actor in po liti cal life,
dominating the civilian
governments that clung to power only through the support of the
armed

forces. Freedom House, in fact, notes that the global decline in
democracy
in the past fi ve years has been the result, in part, of weakening
civilian
control of militaries across the developing world. The civilian
Thai prime
minister in the late 2000s, Abhisit Vejjajiva, who took power in
2008, owed
his survival in offi ce to the military’s backing, and se nior
army offi cers made
clear to him, in private, that if they withdrew their support, his
government
could easily collapse. Unsurprisingly, the Thai military’s bud
get more than
doubled between 2006 and 2011, with much of the expenditures
going to-

ward tools to control Thailand’s own population, rather than
toward fi ght-
ing potential foreign enemies. After Thaksin’s sister became
prime minister,
the armed forces negotiated a deal with her that gave the
military total
control over its own bud get, with little civilian authority— and
which es-
sentially preserved its ability to interfere in politics indefi
nitely. Philippine
president Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo relied upon the armed
forces to enforce
a crackdown against opponents. According to several local
human rights
groups, more than a thousand left- leaning activists, opposition
politicians,
and other government opponents were killed between 2001 and

2010, and
one comprehensive study found that “the [Philippine] military
[is] an im-
portant veto actor in the competition among the country’s po liti
cal elites.”25
This content …
1
Introduction
In late-century Africa, things fell apart. By way of illustra-tion,
consider Figure 1.1, which lists civil wars in African
countries from 1970 to 1995, as judged by the World Bank.
As time passes, the list grows. Angola, Chad, Namibia,
Nigeria, and Sudan enter the 1970s war-torn; in the mid-1970s,
Sudan exits the list, but Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe join

it; by 1980, Zimbabwe departs from the ranks of the war-torn,
but is replaced by Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda. The
pattern – a few dropping off, a larger number entering in –
continues into the early 1990s. Only one country that was con-
flict ridden in 1990 becomes peaceful by 1992, while eleven
others crowd into the ranks of Africa’s failed states.
Humanitarians, policymakers, and scholars: Each de-
mands to know why political order gave way to political con-
flict in late-century Africa. Stunned by the images and realities
of political disorder, I join them in search of answers. In so
doing, I – a political scientist – turn to theories of the state and
3

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year 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
89 90 91 92 93 94 95
Burundi
Chad
Congo
Djibouti
Ethiopia

Kenya
Liberia
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda
Congo
Zimbabwe
Figure 1.1. Civil wars, Africa 1970–1995. Source: World Bank
(Sambanis 2002).

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Introduction
locate the sources of political disorder midst the factors that

lead states to break down.
I anchor this book in the work of Weber (1958) and view
coercion as the distinctive property of politics. As will become
clear in the next chapter, I depart from Weber – and his “struc-
turalist” descendants1 – by turning to the theory of games.
Driven by the realities of Africa, I view political order as
problematic: In light of the evidence Africa offers, political
order cannot be treated as a given. Rather, I argue, it results
when rulers – whom I characterize as “specialists in violence” –
choose to employ the means of coercion to protect the creation
of wealth rather than to prey upon it and when private citizens
choose to set weapons aside and to devote their time instead

to the production of wealth and to the enjoyment of leisure.2
When these choices constitute an equilibrium, then, I say,
political order forms a state.3
To address the collapse of political order in late-century
Africa, I therefore return to theory – the theory of the state –
and
to theorizing – the theory of games. I do so because proceeding
in this fashion points out the conditions under which political
order can persist – or fail. I devote Chapter 2 to an informal
1 Evans, P., T. Skocpol, and D. Rueschmeyer (1985), Bringing
the State Back
In, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press provides
perhaps the
best-known example.
2 I am drawing on Bates, R. H., A. Greif, et al. (2002),
“Organizing Violence,”

Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(5): 599–628.
3 The ambiguous phrasing is intended.
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Introduction
derivation of those conditions. In the remaining chapters, I
turn from deduction to empirics and explore the extent to
which these conditions were to be found, or were absent, in

late-century Africa. The evidence leads me to conclude that
in the 1980s and 1990s, each of three key variables departed
from the levels necessary to induce governments and citizens
to choose in ways that would yield political order.
The Literature
Following the outbreak of conflict in Serbia, Somalia, Rwanda,
and elsewhere, the study of political violence has once again
become central to the study of politics. Familiar to many, for
example, would be the attempts by Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
and Fearon and Laitin (2003) to comprehend the origins of civil
wars. Also familiar would be studies of the impact of ethnic-
ity (Fearon and Laitin 2003), democracy (Hegre, Gates et al.

2001; Hegre 2003), and natural-resource endowments (e.g.,
Ross 2004). In my attempts to comprehend why things fell
apart in late-century Africa, I draw upon these writings. But I
also take issue with them, for virtually all share common prop-
erties from which I seek to depart.
Consider, for example, the assumption that civil war can be
best treated as the outcome of an insurgency. When thinking
about the origins of political disorder in Africa, I can find no
way of analyzing the origins of insurrection without starting
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Introduction
with the behavior of governments. The conditions that led
to the breakdown of order in Africa include the authoritarian
nature of its states and their rulers’ penchant for predation. By
rendering their people insecure, they provoked insurgencies.
While both insurrectionaries and incumbents must necessar-
ily feature in the analysis of political disorder, in this instance
it
makes sense not to focus exclusively on the rebels but to stress
as well the behavior of those whom they seek to drive from

power.
Recent contributions exhibit a second common feature:
the methods that they employ. Utilizing cross-national data,
they apply statistical procedures to isolate and measure the
relationship of particular variables with the onset and duration
of civil wars. I, too, make use of cross-national data; but rather
than collecting data for all countries in the globe, I restrict my
efforts to Africa. I do so in part because Africa provides an
unsettling range of opportunities to explore state failure and
because political disorder is so important a determinant of the
welfare of the continent. I also do so because I find it necessary
to draw upon my intuition. To employ that intuition, I need

first to inform it, be it by immersing myself in the field or in
qualitative accounts set down by observers. I have therefore
made use of a selected set of cases – those from the continent
of Africa – and my knowledge of their politics.4
4 The use of a subset of countries also eases the search for
exogenous vari-
ables, and thus causal analysis. For example, given the small
size of Africa’s
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Introduction
Lastly, if only because they are based on the analysis of
cross-national data, contemporary studies exhibit a third
property: Their conclusions take the form of “findings.” These
findings are based upon relationships between a selection of
key variables and the outbreak or duration of civil wars. Collier
and Hoeffler (2004), for example, stress the importance of
“opportunities,” that is, chances to secure economic rewards
and to finance political organizations. Noting that the magni-
tude of primary product exports, the costs of recruiting, and
access to funding from diasporas relate to the likelihood of
civil war, they conclude that “economic viability appears to be

the predominant systematic explanation of rebellion” (p. 563).
Fearon and Laitin (2003), by contrast, conclude that “capa-
bilities” play the major role: “We agree that financing is one
determinant of the viability of insurgency,” they write (p. 76).
But they place major emphasis on “state administrative, mil-
itary, and police capabilities” (p. 76), measures of which bear
significant relationships to the outbreak of civil wars in their
global set of data.
In this work, I proceed in a different fashion. I start by
first capturing the logic that gives rise to political order. While
I, too, test hypotheses about the origins of disorder, I derive
economies, I can treat global economic shocks as exogenous –
something

that yields inferential leverage when seeking to measure the
impact of
economic forces on state failure.
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Introduction
these hypotheses from a theory. By adopting a more deductive
approach, I depart from the work of my predecessors.
Key Topics

Energized by such works as Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy”
(1994), students of Africa have focused on the relationship
between ethnic diversity and political conflict. At least since
the time that William Easterly and Ross Levine penned
“Africa’s
Growth Tragedy” (1997), empirically minded social scientists
have sought to capture the impact of ethnicity on the eco-
nomic performance of Africa’s states. Interestingly, however,
they have found it difficult to uncover systematic evidence of
the relationship between measures of ethnicity and the likeli-
hood of political disorder.5
In this study I, too, find little evidence of a systematic rela-
tionship. And yet, the qualitative accounts – be they of the

killing fields of Darfur or of the tenuous peace in Nigeria – con-
tinue to stress the central importance of ethnicity to political
life in Africa. In response, I argue that ethnic diversity does
not cause violence; rather, ethnicity and violence are joint
5 For a discussion, see Bates, R. H., and I. Yackolev (2002),
Ethnicity in Africa,
in The Role of Social Capital In Development, edited by C.
Grootaert and T.
van Bastelaer, New York: Cambridge University Press; and
Fearon, J., and
D. Laitin (2003), “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,”
American Political
Science Review 97(1): 75–90.
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products of state failure. Their relationship is contingent: It
occurs when political order erodes and politicians forge polit-
ical organizations in the midst of political conflict.
The political significance of resource wealth has also
attracted much attention. Analyzing their data on civil wars,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) report that “dependence upon pri-
mary commodity exports” constituted “a particularly power-
ful risk factor” for the outbreak of civil war (p. 593). Africa

is, of course, noted for its bounteous natural endowments of
petroleum, timber, metals, and gemstones. And scholars and
policymakers have documented the close ties between the dia-
mond industry and UNITA (National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola) in Angola (Fowler 2000), the smuggling
of gemstones and the financing of rebels in Sierra Leone (Reno
2000), and the mining of coltan and the sites of rebellion in
eastern Zaire (present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo)
(Kakwenzire and Kamukama 2000).
And yet, using Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) own data,
Fearon (2005) has demonstrated that their findings are frag-
ile, depending in part on decisions about how to measure

and classify cases. In this study, too, I fail to find a signifi-
cant relationship between the value of natural resources and
the likelihood of state failure.6 Once again, then, there arises
6 For both Fearon (2005) and myself (this work), only the value
of petroleum
deposts is related to political disorder. Even here the
relationship is fragile,
however.
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Introduction
a disparity between the evidence from cross-national regres-
sions and that from qualitative accounts. I shall argue that the
disparity suggests that the exploitation of natural resources
for war finance is a correlate rather than a cause of political
disorder.
A third factor plays a major role in the literature: democ-
ratization. Qualitative accounts, such as those of Mansfield
and Snyder (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000) sug-
gest that democratization produces political instability and
leads to the mobilization of what Zakaria (1997) calls “illib-
eral” political forces. Careful empirical researchers, such as

Hegre (Hegre, Gates et al. 2001; Hegre 2004), confirm that new
democracies and intermediate regimes – those lying some-
where between stable authoritarian and consolidated demo-
cratic governments7 – exhibit significantly higher rates of civil
war. As demonstrated by Geddes (2003), many of these inter-
mediate regimes are the product of the “third wave” of democ-
ratization (Huntington 1991) and the collapse of communist
regimes and are therefore themselves new and vulnerable to
disorder.
In the 1980s and 1990s, many of Africa’s governments
reformed. Regimes that once had banned the formation
of political parties now faced challenges at the polls from
7 Using Polity coding. Available online at:

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/
polity/.
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candidates backed by an organized political opposition. And
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, militias assembled, states
failed, and Africa faced rising levels of political disorder. The

experience of Africa thus appears to conform to what the liter-
ature has recorded: Electoral competition and state failure go
together.
In analyzing the impact of political reform, I employ two
measures: the movement from military to civilian rule and the
shift from no- or one- to multiparty systems. In discussions of
democracy, the followers of Schumpeter (1950) argue for the
sufficiency of party competition; those of Dahl (1971) contend
that party competition is necessary but not sufficient. Without
an accompanying bundle of political and civil rights, the latter
argue, contested elections are not of themselves evidence of
democratic politics. In debates over the relationship between
party systems and democracy, I concur with the followers of

Dahl. When addressing political reform, I pay no attention to
the number of political parties, their relative vote shares, or
the conditions under which the opposition is allowed to cam-
paign. I therefore address not the relationship between democ-
racy and political conflict but rather the relationship between
political reform and political disorder.
Lastly, there are those who emphasize the impact of pov-
erty. That poverty and conflict should go together is treated
as noncontroversial, as if disorder were simply an expected
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corollary of the lack of economic development.8 But consider:
If, as many argue, lower per capita incomes imply lower wages
and therefore lower costs of rebellion, so too do they imply
fewer gains from predation; income thus cancels out the ratio
between the costs and benefits. From the theoretical point of
view, moreover, there is simply little that can be said about the
relationship between the average level of income – or, for that
matter, poverty – and incentives for violence. As I will argue

in Chapter 2, for our purposes, discussions of private income
can be set aside; for the logic of political order suggests that
the focus be placed not on private income but rather on public
revenues. Economic shocks will indeed play a major role in this
analysis, but the focus will be on their impact on the revenues
of states, not on the incomes of individuals.9 In this work, when
I measure the impact of income per capita, I treat it as a control
variable, rather than as a variable of theoretical interest.
In Chapter 2, I parse the logic of political order. I recount the
theory informally, portraying the interaction between govern-
ments and citizens and among citizens as well. Presented as a
8 Indeed, see Sambanis, N., and H. Hegre (2006), “Sensitivity
Analysis of

Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution
50(4): 508–35. The authors point to per capita income as one of
the very
few variables that bears a robust relationship with civic
violence.
9 See the arguments in Hirshleifer, J. (1995), Theorizing About
Conflict, in
Handbook of Defense Economics, edited by K. Hartley and T.
Sandler, New
York: Elsevier.
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Introduction
fable, the argument is based upon rigorous foundations and
points to the conditions under which governments choose to
engage in predation and citizens choose to take up arms.10
Chapters 3 through 5 set out the conditions that prevailed
prior to the collapse of political order. They document the
social and political configurations that were in place at the
time of the impact of the economic and political shocks that
dismantled the state in Africa. In Chapter 6, states fracture
and political disorder engulfs nations in Africa. Chapter 7
concludes.
10 The informed reader will note the parallels between my

analysis and that
of Azam, J.-P., and A. Mesnard (2003), “Civil War and the
Social Contract,”
Public Choice 115(3–4): 455–75; Snyder, R., and R. Bhavani
(2005),
“Diamonds, Blood and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework
for Ex-
plaining Political Order,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution
49(4): 563–
97; and Magaloni, B. (2006), Voting for Autocracy, New York:
Cambridge
University Press.
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2
From Fable to Fact
I devote this chapter to the exposition of a fable.1
Whilediminutive, it is incisive: It captures the incentives that
drive the choices that lead to the failure of states. It is also
suggestive, for it points to the conditions under which polit-
ical order should, or should not, prevail. After expositing this
fable, I determine whether it is also informative. It can be
so only insofar as the forces that animate its central char-
acters find their parallel in late-century Africa. I devote the
last portions of the chapter to arguing that they do and that
the story communicated by the fable can therefore bear the
weight of the tragedy that befell the continent. The fable can

be used – with help – to explore the foundations of political
disorder.
1 A rigorous presentation appeared as Bates, R. H., A. Greif, et
al. (2002),
“Organizing Violence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution
46(5): 599–
628.
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Introduction
A Fable
Consider the following scenario: A community is peopled by a
“specialist in violence” and two groups of citizens. Headed by
powerful patrons, the groups can act in a unified manner.2 The
specialist in violence earns his living from the use of force; he
either seizes the wealth of others or pockets funds they pay for
their protection. Sheltered behind their patrons, the citizens
generate incomes by engaging in productive labor; but they
too can be mobilized either to seize the income of others – or
to defend their incomes from seizure. The three personages in
this drama repeatedly interact over time. The question is: Can
political order prevail in such a setting?

The answer is: Yes. Under certain circumstances, the spe-
cialist will chose to use his control of the means of violence to
protect rather than to despoil private property. And the groups
of citizens will chose to devote their time and energies to labor
and leisure and forswear the use of arms, while rewarding the
specialist in violence for protecting them against raids by oth-
ers. In addition, under certain well-specified conditions, these
choices will persist in equilibrium, rendering political order a
state.
The primary reason for this outcome is that the players
interact over time. The specialist in violence and political
2 That is, they have solved the collective action problem.

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From Fable to Fact
organizations can therefore condition their future choices on
present behavior; that is, they can make threats and inflict pun-
ishments and thus shape the behavior of others. Should one
group raid or withhold tax payments, the specialist can retal-
iate by changing from guardian to predator. And should the

specialist opportunistically seize the wealth of the member of a
group, his defection would trigger punishment by that citizen’s
confederates: They can withhold tax payments or mobilize for
fighting. If not sufficiently paid for the provision of security,
the specialist in violence can pay himself: he can turn from
guardian to warlord. And if preyed upon or left undefended,
then the citizens can furnish their own protection; they can
take up arms.
When both the specialist and the citizens turn to pun-
ishment, political order breaks down. People become inse-
cure. They also become poor; having to reallocate resources
to defense, they have fewer resources to devote to produc-

tive activity. The resultant loss of security and prosperity stays
the hand of a specialist in violence who might be tempted to
engage in predation or of a group that might be tempted to
forcefully seize the goods of another or withhold tax payments,
thus triggering political disorder.
To better grasp the incentives that animate this story, focus
on the choices open to the specialist in violence, as commu-
nicated in Figure 2.1. In this figure, the vertical axis repre-
sents monetary gains or losses. The further above zero, the
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subject
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316423974.002
Introduction
Payoffs
+
0
-
Time
Payoffs on the equilibrium path
Payoffs from defection and subsequent punishment
Figure 2.1. Payoffs from strategy choices.

greater the payoffs; the further below, the greater the losses.
The horizontal axis designates time, with the more immediate
payoffs occurring near the origin and the more distant ones
further to the right. The dotted line represents the flow of pay-
offs that result from tax payments; the flow is steady, mod-
erate, and positive in value. The dashed line represents the
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subject
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316423974.002

From Fable to Fact
flow of payoffs that result from predation. Predation yields an
immediate benefit: The dashed line leaps above the dotted
line, indicating that the income from predation significantly
exceeds that from tax payments. But that one period spike
then gives way to a stream of losses, as illustrated by the plunge
below the zero point that separates gains from losses. Insofar
as a decision maker is forward looking, the losses that accrue
in the punishment phase caste a shadow over the returns from
defection and so temper any wish to engage in predation.
If summed over time, each line – that representing the
returns to taxation and that the returns to predation – yields an

expected payoff. What would determine their magnitudes? In
particular, what would determine whether the value of the vari-
able path, generated by predation, will be more or less attrac-
tive than that of the steady path, generated from tax payments?
The factors that determine the relative magnitude of these pay-
offs determine whether the specialist in violence will adhere
to the path of play and continue to behave as guardian or veer
from that path, engage in predation, and trigger the re-arming
of the citizenry and subsequent disorder.
The Conditions of Political Order
One factor is the level of tax revenue. If too low, the benefits of
predation may be tempting despite the subsequent costs.3 A

3 But they may also be if too high. See the discussion in Bates,
R. H., A. Greif,
et al. (2002), “Organizing Violence.”
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Introduction
second is the magnitudes of the rewards that predation might
yield. If sufficiently bounteous, the specialist in violence might
choose to deviate despite the losses. A third is the special-

Sources and Tips for Assignment 3 (History 105; Prof. Stansbury)—.docx

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