SlideShare a Scribd company logo
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
What Can Economists Know?
Rethinking the Foundations of Macroeconomics and Finance
Roman Frydman
Department of Economics, New York University
OECD, June 5th, 2014
OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 1/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg (2007), Imperfect Knowledge
Economics: Exchange Rates and Risk, Princeton University Press.
———————(2011), Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings,
Risk, and the Role of the State, Princeton University Press.
———————(2013), “Opening Models of Asset Prices and Risk to
Non-Routine Change,” in Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps (eds.),
Rethinking Expectations: The Way Forward for Macroeconomics, Princeton
University Press.
———————(2014a), “The Contingent Expectations Hypothesis:
Conditional Rationality in Macroeconomics and Finance Theory,” April.
———————(2014b), “The Contingent Market Hypothesis:
Understanding Financial Markets’ Essential Role,” May.
———————and Nicolas Mangee (2104), "Is the Present Value Model
Really so Bad?, in preparation.
Roman Frydman and Edmund Phelps (2013), “Which Way Forward for
Macroeconomics and Policy Analysis?,”in Roman Frydman and Edmund S.
Phelps (eds.)
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 2/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
The global financial crisis has triggered an intense debate
about
• the relevance of contemporary macroeconomics and
finance models;
• how well (badly) financial markets help society allocate
its capital;
• whether and how the state should intervene into their
functioning.
Two views have dominated the debate
• conventional REH view
• the behavioral-finance view
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 3/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Conventional view:
• REH models, for example DSGE models, should be
retained as relevant for macroeconomic and policy
analysis,
• but they need to be improved by adding to them
• a link between the financial sector and the real economy;
or
• participants’ learning about the economy’s structure.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 4/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Behavioral-finance view:
• REH, with its emphasis on fundamental considerations,
does represent
• how rational individuals understand and forecast
outcomes.
• But, owing to participants’ deficient cognitive abilities
and psychological biases,
• REH fails to represent forecasting in real world markets.
• Participants’ forecasts and prices are driven by
psychological and other factors largely unrelated to
fundamentals.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 5/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
These views have extreme implications concerning the role of
financial markets and state’s intervention in them.
REH-based efficient market hypothesis:
• market prices reflect future prospects of alternative uses
of capital nearly perfectly;
Behavioral-finance:
• swings in asset prices are largely unrelated to their future
prospects
• the state should intervene to eliminate them as soon as
they arise.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 6/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Frydman and Goldberg:
Both REH and behavioral-finance models rest on the flawed
premise;
• unanticipated change in the economy’s structure is
unimportant for understanding outcomes.
Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) jettisons this premise.
Intermediate view:
• financial markets play an essential role in helping society
assess prospects of assets
• but they do so imperfectly, even in the course of their
normal functioning.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 7/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
IKE:
• reconciles the importance of both fundamental and
psychological considerations in driving outcomes,
• without presuming that market participants are
irrational.
• resolves many so-called puzzles
• posed by viewing empirical evidence through the lens of
models that
• ignore unanticipated change in the economy’s structure.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 8/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
The Exchange-Rate Disconnect “Puzzle”
One of the core puzzles that contributed to the emergence of
behavioral-finance.
International macroeconomists have estimated
exchange-rate relationships with time-invariant models:
• fixed coefficients that are attached to unchanging sets of
fundamentals:
• such as interest rates, national income, and trade
balances.
Messe and Rogoff (1983) estimated such time-invariant
models for the DM/$, BP/$, and the JY/$ exchange rates.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 9/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Main finding: even with ex post values of fundamental
variables,
• all of the major exchange-rate models produced
predictions inferior to those implied by flipping a fair
coin.
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) examine whether exclusion of
unanticipated structural change can explain the Meese and
Rogoff’s finding.
• We used statistical procedures that approximate when
the exchange-rate relationship may have changed
• without prespecifying the timing or nature of this change.
• Figure 1 plots the exchange rate and reports results of
change tests, where dotted vertical lines indicate break
points.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 10/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
  
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
Figure 1
Structural Change Results
Exchange Rate Relationship
1974:07
1978:08
1979:10
1984:08
1985:10
1987:09
DM/$
Source: Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 11/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Six structural breaks in the sample, which includes the 1970’s,
1980’s, and 1990’s.
• Some of the breaks are proximate to major shifts in
economic policy:
• October 1979; the US Federal Reserve de-emphasized the
federal funds rate in favor of monetary aggregates as its
primary operating target,
• October 1985; the month following the Plaza accord,
which aimed at lowering the dollar’s value.
• However, others are related to factors other than policy
changes.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 12/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Disconnect Puzzle as an Artifact of Determinate Models
Meese and Rogoff tested the predictive efficacy of models that
we call determinate:
• such models rule out unanticipated structural change.
• the time-invariant models tested by Meese and Rogoff are
a particularly restrictive subclass of determinate models.
Allowing for such change shows that
• in each regime, many of the fundamentals implied by
economists’ exchange-rate models matter in ways that
are consistent with these models’ qualitative predictions.
• Different fundamentals with different influences drive
the exchange rate across the two regimes.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 13/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
 
0
0,025
0,05
0,075
0,1
0,125
0,15
Figure 2
Pre- and Post-Break Performance of
Fundamental Model for DM/$ Exchange Rate
1978:09'
%
The graph shows the root-mean squared error from the model estimated up until the
structural break found in 1978:09. Model variables are in logs. Source: Frydman and
Goldberg (2007).
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 14/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
The disconnect puzzle stems from ruling out unanticipated
structural change.
• Messe and Rogoff average very different forecast errors
implied by the model prior to and after the break:
• the forecast error of the estimated model prior to the
break point deteriorates markedly once structural
change occurs.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 15/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Missing Fundamentals in Stock Prices
Ignoring unanticipated structural change has also led to a
widespread belief that
• equity prices are driven by psychological factors that are
largely unrelated to fundamental considerations.
Finance theorists often suppose that the equity price, Pt, is
determined by the following equilibrium relationship:
Pt =
Dt +F M
t (Pt+1|Zt)
1+r
(1)
• F M
t [Pt+1|Zt] represents an aggregate of market
participants’ (the market’s) forecast;
• Zt represents the union of information variables and
other factors that participants consider relevant.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 16/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Conditional Rationality
To turn this equilibrium condition into a theory of equity
prices,
• an economist must represent the market’s forecast.
Muth’s (1961) insight: the market’s forecast should be
consistent with that of an economist.
• Equilibrium condition in (1) formalizes an economist’s
and the market’s understanding of Pt.
Iterating this condition forward:
Pt =
∞
k=0
1
1+r
k+1
F M
t (Dt+k|Zt) (2)
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 17/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Equity Prices in REH Models
Rational expectations hypothesis (REH): “expectations are
essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant
economic theory” (Muth, 1961, p. 315).
Relevant economic theory: determinate models
• the process driving the prospects of companies never
changes in unanticipated ways:
Dt = Dt−1(1+g)+εt (3)
Pt =
∞
k=0
1
1+r
k+1
Et (Dt+k|Zt) =
Dt
r −g
for all t (4)
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 18/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Missing Financial Markets’ Essential Role
REH implies that there is only one right way to forecast
company prospects and market prices;
In his prescient critique of socialist planning, Friedrich Hayek
argued that
The economic problem of society is...a problem of the
utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone
in its totality. (Hayek, 1945, pp. 519-520)
By ruling out diversity, REH models miss markets’ raison d’être
• to help society take advantage of the diversity of
individuals’ knowledge and information
• in assessing the prospects of alternative uses of its
capital.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 19/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Efficient Market Hypothesis
Because it relies on REH, efficient market hypothesis portrays
markets as
• able to assess the actual (ex post) prospects of assets
nearly perfectly,
• setting prices nearly perfectly at ex post fundamental
value, except for a mean-zero error term, ηt:
P
f
t =
∞
k=0
1
1+r
k+1
Dt+k = Pt +ηt (5)
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 20/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Figure 3
Real S&P Stock Price Index (P) and
the ex post “Rational Price” (P*
), both detrended
Source: Shiller (1981).
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 21/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Interpreting the Failure of REH Models
Shiller’s findings have been confirmed by other studies:
• REH models fail to account for asset prices and risk.
Two interpretations of the failure of EMH:
1 Behavioral-finance:
• Determinate models are relevant for understanding
outcomes.
• on purely logical grounds, REH represents rational
forecasting.
• Failure of REH models points to market participants’
irrationality.
• their forecasts and outcomes are largely driven by
non-fundamental considerations.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 22/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
2 Our research:
• a very different interpretation of the failure of EMH;
• the process driving company prospects in real-world
markets is driven by fundamental considerations,
• but it undergoes structural change that cannot be fully
foreseen in advance in probabilistic terms.
• REH models do not represent conditionally rational
forecasting in real-world markets.
• REH models represent decision-making by irrational
participants, who forego profit opportunities.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 23/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE)
An approach to building models that are open to
unanticipated structural change. (Frydman and Goldberg,
2007).
• Jettisons determinate models;
• but it does presume that the process driving outcomes
exhibit qualitative and contingent regularities.
An IKE model is only partly open to unanticipated structural
change
• it hypothesizes that there are protracted intervals of time
during which
• such change can be characterized with qualitative
constraints.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 24/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Contingent Expectations Hypothesis
CEH models (Frydman and Goldberg, 2014a):
• like their REH counterparts
• impose internal coherence within an economist’s model.
• in sharp contrast to REH,
• represent conditionally rational forecasting on the basis
of (IKE) models that are partly open to unanticipated
structural change.
• characterize market participants’ understanding of
change with qualitative and contingent conditions.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 25/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Contingent Market Hypothesis
Like EMH,
• CMH represents an economist’s and the market’s
understanding of prospects of assets with the present
value model:
Pt =
∞
k=0
1
1+r
k+1
F M
t (Dt+k|Zt) for all t
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 26/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
In sharp contrast to EMH, CMH
• recognizes that no one can fully foresee when and how
the process underpinning company prospects might
change:
Dt+k = bt,kXt +εt+k for all t and k (6)
• leaves open the precise quantitative values that the bt,k
parameters might take.
• may restrict at time t = 0 the algebraic signs of some of
these parameters so that,
• for example, a rise in current earnings or national output
will lead to a subsequent rise in dividends.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 27/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Like EMH,
• CMH relies on internal coherence (CEH) to represent the
market’s forecast and equity prices at a point in time
F M
t (Dt+k|Zt) = βt,kZt for all t and k (7)
Pt =
∞
k=0
1
1+r
k+1
F M
t (Dt+k|Zt) = βtZt (8)
Zt, represents a broad set of factors that market participants
rely on to forecast companies’ profitability and prospects.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 28/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Opening the Present Value Model to
Unanticipated Structural Change
∆Pt+1 = βt∆Zt+1 +∆βt+1Zt+1 (9)
• structural change effects, ∆βt+1Zt+1 represent
• the impact on price movements of participants’ revisions
of their forecasting strategies
• direct informational effects, βt∆Zt+1 represent the
impact of new information.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 29/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Unless structural change effects are constrained ex ante, the
model has no implications.
• for the time-series regularities (co-movements) between
stock prices, ∆Pt+1, and informational variables,∆Zt+1.
To illustrate, suppose that βt is positive and represents the
direct impact, of say, company earnings.
Movements in earnings and prices (between adjacent
periods) may or may not be (associated with movements of
prices) in the same direction.
• depends on the structural change effects in ∆βt+1Zt+1.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 30/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Determinate versus Partly Open Models of Change
Determinate:
• structural change and informational effects fully
specified in advance in probabilistic terms
• predict quantitative regularities that are hypothesized to
last from t = 0 to infinity.
Partly open:
• constrain unanticipated structural change with
qualitative and contingent conditions.
• predict that qualitative regularities characterize
time-series movements during intervals
• that begin and end at times that cannot be fully known in
advance, even in probabilistic terms.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 31/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Example:
∆βt+1Zt+1 < βt∆Zt+1 (10)
Suppose that there is only one variable, say earnings, and that
βt > 0 in every period.
• Whether the model implies that equity prices co-move
positively with earnings depends on
• the structural change effects in ∆βt+1Zt+1.
• If structural change is moderate (condition (10) holds),
• prices and earnings co-move positively.
• if the condition does not hold,
• no prediction.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 32/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Swings and Fundamentals
Frydman and Goldberg (2013):
• If fundamental variables, such as earnings trend in one
direction
• and unanticipated change is moderate (condition (10)
holds),
• CEH model implies that
• equity prices tend to co-move with earnings.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 33/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Figure 4
S&P 500 Stock Price and Earnings
1992-2009
E
P
Source: Frydman and Goldberg (2011) with data from Robert Shiller’s website.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 34/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
CEH’s Interpretation of Shiller (1981)
Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2011, 2013):
• Although psychological considerations play a role,
• equity price movements are largely driven by
fundamentals.
• Because the process driving prices and fundamentals
changes in unanticipated ways,
• equity prices tend to depart for long stretches of time
from benchmark values.
Long swings of equity prices from ex post fundamental value,
such as those in Shiller (1981); figure 3,
• can be understood in terms of the movements of
fundaments, such as earnings.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 35/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Intermediate View of Markets
Essential:
• provide valuations of relative prospects of alternative
uses of capital
• that no single individual can arrive at on his own.
• enable society to take advantage of the diversity of
interpretations by and information of many individuals.
Figure 3, swings around ex post fundamental values
• suggesting that in terms of longer-term averages, market
prices reflect prospects fairly well.
• such averages cannot guide allocations ex ante; they can
only be assessed ex post;
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 36/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Inherently imperfect:
• Beyond short horizons, prospects can, at best, be dimly
understood,
• equity prices tend to be driven by short-term movements
in fundamentals. (figure 4)
• asset prices can sometimes become excessive.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 37/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
Markets’ Imperfection and the State’s Role
To mitigate the costs of excessive swings the state could
implement policies (Frydman and Goldberg, 2011)
• to dampen such swings
• to protect the banking system from their consequences.
CMH also provides a foundation for designing new
international exchange rate arrangements
• intermediate: between floating and fixed exchange-rate
regimes
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 38/39
T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S
In order to improve the market’s role in valuing alternative
uses of capital, the state should
• reform corporate governance rules with an aim
• to provide incentives for corporate managers to consider
longer-term consequences of uses of company’s retained
earnings and other financing.
• reform taxes (increase the wedge between longer and
shorter term capital gains)
• to shift investors’ focus toward evaluating companies
longer-term prospects,
• so the market prices better reflect such prospects.
R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 39/39

More Related Content

Similar to Slides roman frydman oecd june 5 2014

国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証
国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証
国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証
和希 山本
 
Chapter 9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptx
Chapter  9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptxChapter  9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptx
Chapter 9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptx
azizurbba
 
Economic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHAN
Economic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHANEconomic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHAN
Economic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHAN
Lawrencewills
 
BEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of Moneta
BEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of MonetaBEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of Moneta
BEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of Moneta
ChantellPantoja184
 
FYP
FYPFYP
Chinh sach tien te va gia chung khoan
Chinh sach tien te va gia chung khoanChinh sach tien te va gia chung khoan
Chinh sach tien te va gia chung khoan
Nghiên Cứu Định Lượng
 
C H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docx
C H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docxC H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docx
C H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docx
humphrieskalyn
 
WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx
 WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx
WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx
aryan532920
 
Chapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docx
Chapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docxChapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docx
Chapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docx
walterl4
 
Slippery Subjects: Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...
Slippery Subjects:  Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...Slippery Subjects:  Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...
Slippery Subjects: Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...
Cian O'Donovan
 
Chap01
Chap01Chap01
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docx
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docxInternational Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docx
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docx
mariuse18nolet
 
Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...
Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...
Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...
Giwrgos Loukopoulos
 
Forex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading Data
Forex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading DataForex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading Data
Forex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading Data
Qexpert.com Financial
 
The X Factor
The X FactorThe X Factor
The X Factor
yamanote
 
Company Market Economy
Company Market EconomyCompany Market Economy
Company Market Economy
Baker Khader Abdallah, PMP
 
Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...
Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...
Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...
Proactive Advisor Magazine
 
Foreign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docx
Foreign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docxForeign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docx
Foreign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docx
budbarber38650
 
81520131C O P Y R I G H T © 2 0 1 4 P E A R S O N.docx
81520131C O P Y R I G H T  ©  2 0 1 4  P E A R S O N.docx81520131C O P Y R I G H T  ©  2 0 1 4  P E A R S O N.docx
81520131C O P Y R I G H T © 2 0 1 4 P E A R S O N.docx
sleeperharwell
 
Sp workbook c_park_aug2018
Sp workbook c_park_aug2018Sp workbook c_park_aug2018
Sp workbook c_park_aug2018
cparksbi
 

Similar to Slides roman frydman oecd june 5 2014 (20)

国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証
国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証
国際金融 為替レートの実証的検証
 
Chapter 9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptx
Chapter  9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptxChapter  9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptx
Chapter 9:Forecasting Exchange Rates.pptx
 
Economic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHAN
Economic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHANEconomic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHAN
Economic analysis-projects-principles-concepts-UPLOAD BY SABIR KHAN
 
BEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of Moneta
BEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of MonetaBEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of Moneta
BEP342 CHAPTER 6 Critiques of Moneta
 
FYP
FYPFYP
FYP
 
Chinh sach tien te va gia chung khoan
Chinh sach tien te va gia chung khoanChinh sach tien te va gia chung khoan
Chinh sach tien te va gia chung khoan
 
C H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docx
C H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docxC H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docx
C H A P T E R S • T H E E X T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T 61.docx
 
WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx
 WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx
WALDEN UNIVERSIT.docx
 
Chapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docx
Chapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docxChapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docx
Chapter 2 Industry Analysis©2012 Robert M. Grant & J.docx
 
Slippery Subjects: Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...
Slippery Subjects:  Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...Slippery Subjects:  Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...
Slippery Subjects: Locating Processes: Catch up, roll out and transition in ...
 
Chap01
Chap01Chap01
Chap01
 
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docx
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docxInternational Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docx
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (2011) 485–49.docx
 
Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...
Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...
Purchasing power parity a unit root, cointegration and var analysis in emergi...
 
Forex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading Data
Forex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading DataForex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading Data
Forex Trading Statistics v1.0 -15 Forex Currencies and 15 years of Trading Data
 
The X Factor
The X FactorThe X Factor
The X Factor
 
Company Market Economy
Company Market EconomyCompany Market Economy
Company Market Economy
 
Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...
Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...
Brian Glaze & Larry Ware, CRPC, CLTC – Proactive Advisor Magazine – Volume 5 ...
 
Foreign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docx
Foreign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docxForeign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docx
Foreign ExchangeRate Deterrntnattonand ForecastlngThe .docx
 
81520131C O P Y R I G H T © 2 0 1 4 P E A R S O N.docx
81520131C O P Y R I G H T  ©  2 0 1 4  P E A R S O N.docx81520131C O P Y R I G H T  ©  2 0 1 4  P E A R S O N.docx
81520131C O P Y R I G H T © 2 0 1 4 P E A R S O N.docx
 
Sp workbook c_park_aug2018
Sp workbook c_park_aug2018Sp workbook c_park_aug2018
Sp workbook c_park_aug2018
 

More from OECD_NAEC

2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes
2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes
2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability
2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability
2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version
2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version
2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being
2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being
2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills
2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills
2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills
OECD_NAEC
 
Naec 29 9-2014 helm
Naec 29 9-2014 helmNaec 29 9-2014 helm
Naec 29 9-2014 helm
OECD_NAEC
 
Naec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilience
Naec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilienceNaec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilience
Naec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilience
OECD_NAEC
 
Naec 29 9-2014 jacobzone
Naec 29 9-2014 jacobzoneNaec 29 9-2014 jacobzone
Naec 29 9-2014 jacobzone
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis
2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis
2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis
OECD_NAEC
 
2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job
2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job
2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job
OECD_NAEC
 
2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann
2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann
2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann
OECD_NAEC
 

More from OECD_NAEC (20)

2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Stefano Scarpetta
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Lamia Kamal-Chaoui
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_DSG Tamaki
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Shardul agrawala
 
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall
2014.11.28 - NAEC Group Meeting_Adrian Blundell-Wignall
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 5_Paul Ormerod
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 6_Diana Mangalagiu
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 4_Wim Thomas
 
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow
2014.12.01 - NAEC-Strategic Foresight Workshop_Session 2_Esther Eidinow
 
2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes
2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes
2014.11.27 - NAEC Seminar_Currency-based measures codes
 
2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability
2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability
2014.11.20 - NAEC Seminar - Microstability
 
2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version
2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version
2014.11.Microstability naec20nov2014 print version
 
2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being
2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being
2014.10.21 - NAEC Seminar_Skills-Inequality-Well-being
 
2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills
2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills
2014.10.10 - NAEC Seminar_Identifying Social and Emotional Skills
 
Naec 29 9-2014 helm
Naec 29 9-2014 helmNaec 29 9-2014 helm
Naec 29 9-2014 helm
 
Naec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilience
Naec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilienceNaec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilience
Naec 29 9-2014 ilmola risk resilience
 
Naec 29 9-2014 jacobzone
Naec 29 9-2014 jacobzoneNaec 29 9-2014 jacobzone
Naec 29 9-2014 jacobzone
 
2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis
2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis
2014.09.22 - NAEC Seminar_Origins of the crisis
 
2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job
2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job
2014_09_19_NAEC Seminar_How good is your job
 
2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann
2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann
2014.09.11 - NAEC seminar_MaRs_Philipp Hartmann
 

Recently uploaded

Seven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdf
Seven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdfSeven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdf
Seven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdf
FinTech Belgium
 
PM pre reads for the product manager framework
PM pre reads for the product manager frameworkPM pre reads for the product manager framework
PM pre reads for the product manager framework
KishoreKatta6
 
13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx
13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx
13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx
ILC- UK
 
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio Problem
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio ProblemFabular Frames and the Four Ratio Problem
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio Problem
Majid Iqbal
 
Chapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and Nordhaus
Chapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and NordhausChapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and Nordhaus
Chapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and Nordhaus
iraangeles4
 
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive GuidanceDiscover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance
36 Crypto
 
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptx
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptxDiscovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptx
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptx
cosmo-soil
 
KYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory Frameworks
KYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory FrameworksKYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory Frameworks
KYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory Frameworks
Any kyc Account
 
Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...
Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...
Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...
Suomen Pankki
 
China's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SU
China's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SUChina's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SU
China's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SU
msthrill
 
Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...
Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...
Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...
nimaruinazawa258
 
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcript
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma TranscriptSouth Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcript
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcript
ynfqplhm
 
Exploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptx
Exploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptxExploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptx
Exploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptx
cosmo-soil
 
CONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDAD
CONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDADCONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDAD
CONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDAD
godiperoficial
 
Importance of community participation in development projects.pdf
Importance of community participation in development projects.pdfImportance of community participation in development projects.pdf
Importance of community participation in development projects.pdf
krisretro1
 
高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样
高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样
高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样
234knry
 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma Transcript
University of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma TranscriptUniversity of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma Transcript
University of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma Transcript
tscdzuip
 
The Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptx
The Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptxThe Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptx
The Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptx
Diana Rose
 
How to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete Guide
How to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete GuideHow to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete Guide
How to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete Guide
Daniel
 
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]
Commonwealth
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Seven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdf
Seven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdfSeven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdf
Seven Camp April 2024 Cohort Booklet.pdf
 
PM pre reads for the product manager framework
PM pre reads for the product manager frameworkPM pre reads for the product manager framework
PM pre reads for the product manager framework
 
13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx
13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx
13 Jun 24 ILC Retirement Income Summit - slides.pptx
 
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio Problem
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio ProblemFabular Frames and the Four Ratio Problem
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio Problem
 
Chapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and Nordhaus
Chapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and NordhausChapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and Nordhaus
Chapter 25: Economic Growth Summary from Samuelson and Nordhaus
 
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive GuidanceDiscover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance
 
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptx
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptxDiscovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptx
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptx
 
KYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory Frameworks
KYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory FrameworksKYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory Frameworks
KYC Compliance: A Cornerstone of Global Crypto Regulatory Frameworks
 
Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...
Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...
Governor Olli Rehn: Inflation down and recovery supported by interest rate cu...
 
China's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SU
China's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SUChina's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SU
China's Investment Leader - Dr. Alyce SU
 
Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...
Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...
Tdasx: Interpreting the 2024 Cryptocurrency Market Funding Trends and Technol...
 
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcript
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma TranscriptSouth Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcript
South Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcript
 
Exploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptx
Exploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptxExploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptx
Exploring-Madhya-Pradesh-Culture-Heritage-and-Land-Records.pptx
 
CONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDAD
CONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDADCONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDAD
CONTABILIDAD FINANCIERA / ENSAYO DE CONTABILIDAD
 
Importance of community participation in development projects.pdf
Importance of community participation in development projects.pdfImportance of community participation in development projects.pdf
Importance of community participation in development projects.pdf
 
高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样
高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样
高仿英国伦敦艺术大学毕业证(ual毕业证书)文凭证书原版一模一样
 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma Transcript
University of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma TranscriptUniversity of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma Transcript
University of North Carolina at Charlotte degree offer diploma Transcript
 
The Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptx
The Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptxThe Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptx
The Rise and Fall of Ponzi Schemes in America.pptx
 
How to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete Guide
How to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete GuideHow to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete Guide
How to Invest in Cryptocurrency for Beginners: A Complete Guide
 
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]
 

Slides roman frydman oecd june 5 2014

  • 1. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S What Can Economists Know? Rethinking the Foundations of Macroeconomics and Finance Roman Frydman Department of Economics, New York University OECD, June 5th, 2014 OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 1/39
  • 2. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg (2007), Imperfect Knowledge Economics: Exchange Rates and Risk, Princeton University Press. ———————(2011), Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State, Princeton University Press. ———————(2013), “Opening Models of Asset Prices and Risk to Non-Routine Change,” in Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps (eds.), Rethinking Expectations: The Way Forward for Macroeconomics, Princeton University Press. ———————(2014a), “The Contingent Expectations Hypothesis: Conditional Rationality in Macroeconomics and Finance Theory,” April. ———————(2014b), “The Contingent Market Hypothesis: Understanding Financial Markets’ Essential Role,” May. ———————and Nicolas Mangee (2104), "Is the Present Value Model Really so Bad?, in preparation. Roman Frydman and Edmund Phelps (2013), “Which Way Forward for Macroeconomics and Policy Analysis?,”in Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps (eds.) R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 2/39
  • 3. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S The global financial crisis has triggered an intense debate about • the relevance of contemporary macroeconomics and finance models; • how well (badly) financial markets help society allocate its capital; • whether and how the state should intervene into their functioning. Two views have dominated the debate • conventional REH view • the behavioral-finance view R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 3/39
  • 4. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Conventional view: • REH models, for example DSGE models, should be retained as relevant for macroeconomic and policy analysis, • but they need to be improved by adding to them • a link between the financial sector and the real economy; or • participants’ learning about the economy’s structure. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 4/39
  • 5. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Behavioral-finance view: • REH, with its emphasis on fundamental considerations, does represent • how rational individuals understand and forecast outcomes. • But, owing to participants’ deficient cognitive abilities and psychological biases, • REH fails to represent forecasting in real world markets. • Participants’ forecasts and prices are driven by psychological and other factors largely unrelated to fundamentals. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 5/39
  • 6. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S These views have extreme implications concerning the role of financial markets and state’s intervention in them. REH-based efficient market hypothesis: • market prices reflect future prospects of alternative uses of capital nearly perfectly; Behavioral-finance: • swings in asset prices are largely unrelated to their future prospects • the state should intervene to eliminate them as soon as they arise. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 6/39
  • 7. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Frydman and Goldberg: Both REH and behavioral-finance models rest on the flawed premise; • unanticipated change in the economy’s structure is unimportant for understanding outcomes. Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) jettisons this premise. Intermediate view: • financial markets play an essential role in helping society assess prospects of assets • but they do so imperfectly, even in the course of their normal functioning. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 7/39
  • 8. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S IKE: • reconciles the importance of both fundamental and psychological considerations in driving outcomes, • without presuming that market participants are irrational. • resolves many so-called puzzles • posed by viewing empirical evidence through the lens of models that • ignore unanticipated change in the economy’s structure. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 8/39
  • 9. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S The Exchange-Rate Disconnect “Puzzle” One of the core puzzles that contributed to the emergence of behavioral-finance. International macroeconomists have estimated exchange-rate relationships with time-invariant models: • fixed coefficients that are attached to unchanging sets of fundamentals: • such as interest rates, national income, and trade balances. Messe and Rogoff (1983) estimated such time-invariant models for the DM/$, BP/$, and the JY/$ exchange rates. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 9/39
  • 10. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Main finding: even with ex post values of fundamental variables, • all of the major exchange-rate models produced predictions inferior to those implied by flipping a fair coin. Frydman and Goldberg (2007) examine whether exclusion of unanticipated structural change can explain the Meese and Rogoff’s finding. • We used statistical procedures that approximate when the exchange-rate relationship may have changed • without prespecifying the timing or nature of this change. • Figure 1 plots the exchange rate and reports results of change tests, where dotted vertical lines indicate break points. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 10/39
  • 11. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S    1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 Figure 1 Structural Change Results Exchange Rate Relationship 1974:07 1978:08 1979:10 1984:08 1985:10 1987:09 DM/$ Source: Frydman and Goldberg (2007). R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 11/39
  • 12. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Six structural breaks in the sample, which includes the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s. • Some of the breaks are proximate to major shifts in economic policy: • October 1979; the US Federal Reserve de-emphasized the federal funds rate in favor of monetary aggregates as its primary operating target, • October 1985; the month following the Plaza accord, which aimed at lowering the dollar’s value. • However, others are related to factors other than policy changes. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 12/39
  • 13. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Disconnect Puzzle as an Artifact of Determinate Models Meese and Rogoff tested the predictive efficacy of models that we call determinate: • such models rule out unanticipated structural change. • the time-invariant models tested by Meese and Rogoff are a particularly restrictive subclass of determinate models. Allowing for such change shows that • in each regime, many of the fundamentals implied by economists’ exchange-rate models matter in ways that are consistent with these models’ qualitative predictions. • Different fundamentals with different influences drive the exchange rate across the two regimes. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 13/39
  • 14. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S   0 0,025 0,05 0,075 0,1 0,125 0,15 Figure 2 Pre- and Post-Break Performance of Fundamental Model for DM/$ Exchange Rate 1978:09' % The graph shows the root-mean squared error from the model estimated up until the structural break found in 1978:09. Model variables are in logs. Source: Frydman and Goldberg (2007). R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 14/39
  • 15. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S The disconnect puzzle stems from ruling out unanticipated structural change. • Messe and Rogoff average very different forecast errors implied by the model prior to and after the break: • the forecast error of the estimated model prior to the break point deteriorates markedly once structural change occurs. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 15/39
  • 16. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Missing Fundamentals in Stock Prices Ignoring unanticipated structural change has also led to a widespread belief that • equity prices are driven by psychological factors that are largely unrelated to fundamental considerations. Finance theorists often suppose that the equity price, Pt, is determined by the following equilibrium relationship: Pt = Dt +F M t (Pt+1|Zt) 1+r (1) • F M t [Pt+1|Zt] represents an aggregate of market participants’ (the market’s) forecast; • Zt represents the union of information variables and other factors that participants consider relevant. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 16/39
  • 17. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Conditional Rationality To turn this equilibrium condition into a theory of equity prices, • an economist must represent the market’s forecast. Muth’s (1961) insight: the market’s forecast should be consistent with that of an economist. • Equilibrium condition in (1) formalizes an economist’s and the market’s understanding of Pt. Iterating this condition forward: Pt = ∞ k=0 1 1+r k+1 F M t (Dt+k|Zt) (2) R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 17/39
  • 18. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Equity Prices in REH Models Rational expectations hypothesis (REH): “expectations are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory” (Muth, 1961, p. 315). Relevant economic theory: determinate models • the process driving the prospects of companies never changes in unanticipated ways: Dt = Dt−1(1+g)+εt (3) Pt = ∞ k=0 1 1+r k+1 Et (Dt+k|Zt) = Dt r −g for all t (4) R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 18/39
  • 19. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Missing Financial Markets’ Essential Role REH implies that there is only one right way to forecast company prospects and market prices; In his prescient critique of socialist planning, Friedrich Hayek argued that The economic problem of society is...a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek, 1945, pp. 519-520) By ruling out diversity, REH models miss markets’ raison d’être • to help society take advantage of the diversity of individuals’ knowledge and information • in assessing the prospects of alternative uses of its capital. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 19/39
  • 20. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Efficient Market Hypothesis Because it relies on REH, efficient market hypothesis portrays markets as • able to assess the actual (ex post) prospects of assets nearly perfectly, • setting prices nearly perfectly at ex post fundamental value, except for a mean-zero error term, ηt: P f t = ∞ k=0 1 1+r k+1 Dt+k = Pt +ηt (5) R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 20/39
  • 21. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Figure 3 Real S&P Stock Price Index (P) and the ex post “Rational Price” (P* ), both detrended Source: Shiller (1981). R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 21/39
  • 22. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Interpreting the Failure of REH Models Shiller’s findings have been confirmed by other studies: • REH models fail to account for asset prices and risk. Two interpretations of the failure of EMH: 1 Behavioral-finance: • Determinate models are relevant for understanding outcomes. • on purely logical grounds, REH represents rational forecasting. • Failure of REH models points to market participants’ irrationality. • their forecasts and outcomes are largely driven by non-fundamental considerations. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 22/39
  • 23. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S 2 Our research: • a very different interpretation of the failure of EMH; • the process driving company prospects in real-world markets is driven by fundamental considerations, • but it undergoes structural change that cannot be fully foreseen in advance in probabilistic terms. • REH models do not represent conditionally rational forecasting in real-world markets. • REH models represent decision-making by irrational participants, who forego profit opportunities. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 23/39
  • 24. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) An approach to building models that are open to unanticipated structural change. (Frydman and Goldberg, 2007). • Jettisons determinate models; • but it does presume that the process driving outcomes exhibit qualitative and contingent regularities. An IKE model is only partly open to unanticipated structural change • it hypothesizes that there are protracted intervals of time during which • such change can be characterized with qualitative constraints. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 24/39
  • 25. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Contingent Expectations Hypothesis CEH models (Frydman and Goldberg, 2014a): • like their REH counterparts • impose internal coherence within an economist’s model. • in sharp contrast to REH, • represent conditionally rational forecasting on the basis of (IKE) models that are partly open to unanticipated structural change. • characterize market participants’ understanding of change with qualitative and contingent conditions. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 25/39
  • 26. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Contingent Market Hypothesis Like EMH, • CMH represents an economist’s and the market’s understanding of prospects of assets with the present value model: Pt = ∞ k=0 1 1+r k+1 F M t (Dt+k|Zt) for all t R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 26/39
  • 27. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S In sharp contrast to EMH, CMH • recognizes that no one can fully foresee when and how the process underpinning company prospects might change: Dt+k = bt,kXt +εt+k for all t and k (6) • leaves open the precise quantitative values that the bt,k parameters might take. • may restrict at time t = 0 the algebraic signs of some of these parameters so that, • for example, a rise in current earnings or national output will lead to a subsequent rise in dividends. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 27/39
  • 28. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Like EMH, • CMH relies on internal coherence (CEH) to represent the market’s forecast and equity prices at a point in time F M t (Dt+k|Zt) = βt,kZt for all t and k (7) Pt = ∞ k=0 1 1+r k+1 F M t (Dt+k|Zt) = βtZt (8) Zt, represents a broad set of factors that market participants rely on to forecast companies’ profitability and prospects. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 28/39
  • 29. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Opening the Present Value Model to Unanticipated Structural Change ∆Pt+1 = βt∆Zt+1 +∆βt+1Zt+1 (9) • structural change effects, ∆βt+1Zt+1 represent • the impact on price movements of participants’ revisions of their forecasting strategies • direct informational effects, βt∆Zt+1 represent the impact of new information. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 29/39
  • 30. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Unless structural change effects are constrained ex ante, the model has no implications. • for the time-series regularities (co-movements) between stock prices, ∆Pt+1, and informational variables,∆Zt+1. To illustrate, suppose that βt is positive and represents the direct impact, of say, company earnings. Movements in earnings and prices (between adjacent periods) may or may not be (associated with movements of prices) in the same direction. • depends on the structural change effects in ∆βt+1Zt+1. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 30/39
  • 31. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Determinate versus Partly Open Models of Change Determinate: • structural change and informational effects fully specified in advance in probabilistic terms • predict quantitative regularities that are hypothesized to last from t = 0 to infinity. Partly open: • constrain unanticipated structural change with qualitative and contingent conditions. • predict that qualitative regularities characterize time-series movements during intervals • that begin and end at times that cannot be fully known in advance, even in probabilistic terms. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 31/39
  • 32. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Example: ∆βt+1Zt+1 < βt∆Zt+1 (10) Suppose that there is only one variable, say earnings, and that βt > 0 in every period. • Whether the model implies that equity prices co-move positively with earnings depends on • the structural change effects in ∆βt+1Zt+1. • If structural change is moderate (condition (10) holds), • prices and earnings co-move positively. • if the condition does not hold, • no prediction. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 32/39
  • 33. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Swings and Fundamentals Frydman and Goldberg (2013): • If fundamental variables, such as earnings trend in one direction • and unanticipated change is moderate (condition (10) holds), • CEH model implies that • equity prices tend to co-move with earnings. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 33/39
  • 34. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S   0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 Figure 4 S&P 500 Stock Price and Earnings 1992-2009 E P Source: Frydman and Goldberg (2011) with data from Robert Shiller’s website. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 34/39
  • 35. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S CEH’s Interpretation of Shiller (1981) Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2011, 2013): • Although psychological considerations play a role, • equity price movements are largely driven by fundamentals. • Because the process driving prices and fundamentals changes in unanticipated ways, • equity prices tend to depart for long stretches of time from benchmark values. Long swings of equity prices from ex post fundamental value, such as those in Shiller (1981); figure 3, • can be understood in terms of the movements of fundaments, such as earnings. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 35/39
  • 36. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Intermediate View of Markets Essential: • provide valuations of relative prospects of alternative uses of capital • that no single individual can arrive at on his own. • enable society to take advantage of the diversity of interpretations by and information of many individuals. Figure 3, swings around ex post fundamental values • suggesting that in terms of longer-term averages, market prices reflect prospects fairly well. • such averages cannot guide allocations ex ante; they can only be assessed ex post; R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 36/39
  • 37. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Inherently imperfect: • Beyond short horizons, prospects can, at best, be dimly understood, • equity prices tend to be driven by short-term movements in fundamentals. (figure 4) • asset prices can sometimes become excessive. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 37/39
  • 38. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S Markets’ Imperfection and the State’s Role To mitigate the costs of excessive swings the state could implement policies (Frydman and Goldberg, 2011) • to dampen such swings • to protect the banking system from their consequences. CMH also provides a foundation for designing new international exchange rate arrangements • intermediate: between floating and fixed exchange-rate regimes R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 38/39
  • 39. T H E I N E T P R O G R A M O N I M P E R F E C T K N O W L E D G E E C O N O M I C S In order to improve the market’s role in valuing alternative uses of capital, the state should • reform corporate governance rules with an aim • to provide incentives for corporate managers to consider longer-term consequences of uses of company’s retained earnings and other financing. • reform taxes (increase the wedge between longer and shorter term capital gains) • to shift investors’ focus toward evaluating companies longer-term prospects, • so the market prices better reflect such prospects. R. Frydman — What Can Economists Know? — OECD, June 5th, 2014 — Slide 39/39