2. CONTENTS Page
Introduction 1
1. General Management Theory 1
1.1 Overview
1.2 Analysis
2. Leadership and Motivation 2
2.1 Overview
2.2 Analysis
3. Human Behaviour and Group Behaviour 3
3.1 Overview
3.2 Analysis
4. Conflict Resolution 5
4.1 Overview
4.2 Analysis
5. Communications 6
5.1 Overview
5.2 Analysis
6. Conclusion 7
7. Bibliography 8
8. Appendix 11
8.1 The Case 11
8.2 Additional Research 13
8.3 Executive summery- Mixed Nationality Crews:
The Filipino Seafarer’s Experience 17
Individual Booklet Attachments to the Appendix
8.4 Driving Safety Culture-Identification of Leadership Qualities for Effective Safety
Management
8.5 The MARCOM Project Final Report Vol. 1
8.6 Does Togetherness Make Friends: Stereotypes and Intergroup Contact on
Multiethnic-Crewed Ships
8.7 Human Errors and Non-Technical Skills
8.8 Getting The Best From Multicultural Manning
8.9 An Assessment of The Role of Human Factors in Oil Spills From Vessels
8.10 Similar Cases: Marine Accident Investigation Branch
8.10.1 Attilio Ievoli
8.10.2 The Grounding of The Attilio Ievoli-Analysis of Human Factor
8.10.3 CP Valour
8.10.4 Dole America
3. 8.10.5 Maersk Kendal
8.10.6 Ursine and Pride of Burges
8.11 Complacency as Element of Maritime Accidents
8.12 Sailors-Cosmopolitans or Locals: Occupational Identity of Sailors on Ships in
International Trade
8.13 A Mariner’s Guide on Human Element Issues
8.14 Human Error and Marine safety
8.15 The Human Element In Shipping
4. 1
Introduction
The importance of effective shipboard management cannot be overlooked. In order to
achieve organisational outcomes, both human and non human resources are needed; the
former represents people, their expertise and experience while the later involves finance,
facilities and materials. While the management of non human resources comes with its own
set of issues and complexities, the management of human resources is arguably the most
complicated element of management. Indeed, in a maritime environment where
approximately 75-96% of all accidents and incidents are attributed to human as opposed to
non human factors (Rothblum 2000:1) and 71% of human factor errors are caused my
management errors as opposed to operational errors (Bielić:7), the value of effective
leadership, a positive work environment, conflict resolution and communication should not
be underestimated. Furthermore, given that maritime incidents often involve a level of
environmental damage and cause unmeasurable damage to corporate reputations; it is also
timely and appropriate to address shipboard management. This paper will explore
management theory and its associated components through a case study of a container ship
which ran aground. Through an analysis of this case, it will be clear that technical
knowledge and expertise represent only a fraction of the skills required to be a successful
Master.
Section 1 – General Management Theory
1.1 Overview
Humans have engaged in, adhered to, and developed management practices over
thousands of years to build pyramids, fight wars, organise societies and construct water
supply systems. However, management theory has only emerged as a formal discipline of
study in the 18th century. The Industrial Revolution created new problems within the factor
system. In response, management pioneers including Charles Babbage proposed solutions
for industrial organisations. Babbage was an advocate of the division of labour whereby
tasks of each worker could be simplified and integrated with those of other workers
(Gallagher et al 1997:98). This idea was later developed by Fredrick Taylor into what he
called scientific management. Taylor’s management principles were based on the division
of planners and workers and the standardisation of tasks and conditions (Kondalkar
2007:20).
As values, work place environments, expectations and perceptions have changed over time,
so to have the management theories used to understand and influence the industrial
environment. This has seen the emergence of transitional, human relations movement,
behavioural science and the systems approach theories. Given the complexities and
diversity of the global economic and industrial landscape, contingency theory has emerged
as a dominant management theory. Contingency theory is based on the understanding that
5. 2
there is no ‘one size fits all’ model and promotes the use of a combination of techniques
according to the specific characteristics and needs of the environment (Chawla 200:15).
1.2 Analysis
In terms of the case study, the Master applied a scientific style of management based on
adherence to the ‘division of labour’ concept. Given that the second officer felt that he was
gaining insufficient experience to prepare him for a chief officers position, it would appear
reasonable to suggest that the second officer was restricted to duties at level as opposed to
the opportunity to undertake higher duties. While this has been the traditional approach
for shipboard management, it is no longer the most appropriate management style in light
of a range of technical changes (including real time communication) and social changes
(including access to education). These changes have enabled Masters to adopt more
flexible management styles including the contingency approach. In this case, the Master
and his crew may have experienced a higher sense of job satisfaction and lower stress levels
if there was greater mobility and opportunities on board to share tasks and learn new skills.1
Section 2 - Leadership and Motivation
2.1 Overview
As the leader of the ship, the Master is the “longa manus”(long arm) of the company
(Bielić:7) who plays a central role in creating the work environment. It has been found that
an effective leader will:
combine a number of sources of power;2
understand the needs and motivations of their subordinates;3
inspire subordinates to work with enthusiasm and commitment;4 and
1
Bielić describes this as ‘uncritical management style’ (4).
2
These power sources include legitimate power (based on the degree to which their power is accepted to their
subordinates), expert power (based on knowledge and technical expertise), reward power (based on the
capacity to reward and promote subordinates), coercive power (based on the ability to punish) and referent
power (this is the most effective source of power which is based on prestige and popularity) (Millet et al
2004:395; Flaherty et al 1999:303-4);
3
This is informed by the view that people will work towards the achievement of organisational goals if they are
motivated. As identified in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs motivating factors may include money, job
satisfaction, a sense of achievement and opportunities to participate in setting their own objectives (Kondalkar
2007:27).
4
This ingredient in based on the leaders’ ability to identify the skills and capabilities of their subordinates and
then drives them to perform beyond their expectations.
6. 3
act in a manner, most suitable to the workplace context, which will facilitate a
climate conducive to the achievement of organisational goals.5
leads by Example (for further leadership qualities see Little (2004:68) and Kuo
(2007:199)).
2.2 Analysis
In the case study, it is evident that the Master had failed to combine these ingredients of
leadership. Firstly, the Master may have had expert power based on his knowledge and
experience but he didn’t possess referent power; he lacked the admiration and respect from
those who followed him. Secondly, the Master didn’t understand the needs of his crew.
The crew were not just motivated by financial reward. They were also motivated by
professional career development, opportunities to gain experience beyond their job
description, further studies and social networking. The Master’s inability to identify and
understand these needs undermined the Captain’s referent power. Thirdly, the Master
failed to empower his crew by giving them opportunities to assume higher levels of
responsibility and authority. Given this lack of faith and trust in his crew it is unsurprising
that the second officer had requested a transfer to another ship. Finally, the Master was
unable to modify his approach and style to suit the needs of his crew. He seemed locked
into the seemingly outdated scientific style of management and failed to understand the
benefits of a participative style of management.6
Section 3 - Human behaviour and group behaviour
3.1 Overview
Understanding the dynamics of human and group behaviour provides an insight into
workplace patterns and outcomes. There are a range of factors that may affect the
behaviour of individuals including age, gender, religious background, race, sexuality and
marital status. Country of origin also has an impact on individual behaviour. For example,
in countries with a high power distance (including Malaysia and the Philippines), people will
be more likely to accept power relations that are autocratic. Conversely, in countries with a
low power distance7 (including the United States and the United Kingdom), people will
expect more democratic styles of power relations (George et al 2003:201). As a result,
researchers including Østreng have found that Filipino sailors are more likely to accept
5
In this sense, leaders must ensure their leadership style is flexible and adaptive to suit the needs and
aspirations of their subordinates.
6
Bielić describes this trait as ‘ leadership complacency’ (4).
7
Power Distance. George JM et al, states “power distance is the degree to which societies accept the idea that
inequalities in the power and well being of another citizens are due to differences in individuals’ physical and
intellectual capabilities and heritage”.
7. 4
commands and conditions that would be perceived as unacceptable for those from Western
countries (2001:12).8 In addition, human behaviour can be shaped and influenced by
management and leadership styles. Depending on the method used, certain types of
behaviours can be changed, discouraged, promoted or extinguished (Millett et al 2004:50).
Group dynamics also provide a useful framework for analysing workplace patterns. Groups
can form both formally or informally. Formal group membership is based on the required
skill, knowledge and experience to achieve the organisational outcome (Dzindolet et al
2001:319). Conversely, as explained by Newcomb’s ‘balance theory’, the membership of
informal groups may be based on common attitudes, value systems, religion and/or lifestyle
(Kondalkar 2007:149). The level of cohesiveness within groups has a direct impact on
productivity, participation, communication and job satisfaction. It has been found that a
group with a high level of cohesiveness leads to high performance and success (Squire: 2-3).
3.2 Analysis
At an individual level, the Master did not recognise the strengths of his crew. The second
and third officers both demonstrated an eagerness to develop their skills and acquire new
ones. As opposed to embracing these qualities, the Master perceived the junior officers as
unreliable and poorly trained. This led to the Master spending more time on the Bridge,
thereby creating more stress for himself and ultimately the officer of the watch.9
The Master also failed to acknowledge how his management style shaped the behaviour of
the second and third officer. While these officers were both from the Philippines, this
cultural factor was not the sole reason for the officers deciding not to question the Master
during times of uncertainty. In this case, the second and third officers did not challenge or
question the Master due to his pattern of using extinction methods. The Master gradually
extinguished the junior officers from questioning him by berating them.
At the group level, the Master also failed to see the value in informal groups. For example,
the Master instructed the chief officer to break up the ‘inappropriate’ group of junior
officers. Given that the crew was of mixed nationalities, this informal group had the
capacity to strengthen interpersonal relationships based on their mutual interest of sport. If
the Master did recognise the value of these informal groups, the dynamics on board would
8
This was also seen in the case of the grounding of Maersk Kendal (see appendix).
9
This is similar to the case of the grounding and consequent loss of CP Valour, whereby the Masters lack of
trust in his junior officers led the master to become overloaded and lose situational awareness during a critical
anchoring operation (see appendix).
8. 5
be far different; the crew would be able to communicate more freely and openly, tasks
could be achieved more efficiently.10
Section 4 - Conflict Resolution
4.1 Overview
Conflict has connotations with hostility, negative attitude and aggression. As a result,
conflict in the work environment has traditionally been viewed as a negative or destructive.
By the 1970’s, however, conflict became accepted as a driver for innovation, change,
increased competitiveness and cohesiveness (Kondalkar 2007:160). Given that there is a
fine line between functional and destructive conflict, the study of conflict resolution and
management has gained increased momentum and attention.
Conflict in the workplace can manifest in various ways. According to Kondalkar (2007:165-
166), conflict can be, but not limited to, vertical (between different levels of hierarchy),
horizontal (between individuals at the same level) and/or inter-organisational conflict
(between two dependent organisations such as a government agency and a union). In order
to address these different types of conflict, managers may employ one or more of the
following methods: competition; accommodation; avoidance; compromise; and/or
collaboration (Judge et al 2008:226-227; Kondalkar 2007:168).
4.2 Analysis
In terms of the case, there was high evidence of latent conflict. However, this conflict was
never expressed. This can be attributed to the Master’s management style which employed
avoidance and competition methods to handle potential conflict. For example, the third
officer said the Master had ignored his questions and berated him when questioning the
Master’s decisions. Furthermore, the chief officer’s proposal to include junior officers in the
dining saloon was immediately dismissed by the master and not letting the second officer to
explain his reason for being in the cargo room. This absence of conflict may have
contributed to the container ship running a ground. It could be argued that if the crew felt
comfortable discussing passage plans and course alterations without fear of being berated
then, the crew may have been able to discuss the Master’s premature decision to alter
course before wheel over position or if the Master had taken over the watch (IMO
2000:69). In this case, a healthy level of conflict may have promoted more open
communication and cooperation.
10
Indeed, as stated by Horck (2005:18) “people solve problems more in teams today and that is why it is
important to employ staff with a good social competence; perhaps it is more important than employing people
with high intelligence”.
9. 6
Section 5 - Communications
5.1 Overview
Early forms of management theory promoted communication as a tool for superiors to issue
orders to subordinates. Informed by this view, upward communication was discouraged
and blind obedience to orders was expected (Kondalkar 2007:199). Communication that
flows from the top-down to the bottom-up has now emerged as the most critical
component of any organisation (Kondalkar 2007:193; Millet et al 2004:308-312). Effective
communication integrates various groups both internally and externally, enhances the flow
of information on key issues including policies, problems and strategic plans and provides a
platform for strong relationships (Kondalkar 2007:194). Conversely, poor communication
can be a source of frustration and stress (Kondalkar 2007:194; Bielić: 4). For example, in a
study to identify problems encountered by Filipino seafarers, conducted by National
Maritime Polytechnic , out of all the respondents who claimed they had experienced
problem on board, 75% was communication and language related problems (see appendix).
Whether communication is transmitted through written, oral or non verbal means, there
are a range of barriers to effective communication. These barriers include: physical barriers
such as poor timing and inadequate information; and/or interpersonal barriers such as
perception, power positions and cultural barriers (Kondalkar 2007:201-202; Marcom Project
1998:57-60). To ensure that these potential barriers have not distorted the intended
message, it is important that the source of the message gains feedback from the receiver. If
the message has been misinterpreted or not fully understood, feedback allows the source
time to provide further information to ensure the message is acted upon correctly.11
Measures to overcome these barriers include: improved listening skills; improved written
skills; and unity of command principles whereby channels of command and control are
adhered to (Kondalkar 2007:204; Horck 2005:7-10).
5.2 Analysis
In terms of the case, it is apparent that the Master’s management style reflected earlier
understandings of communication whereby communication only existed as a tool to give
orders from the top-down. For example, the Master: ignored junior officers when they
spoke to him; instructed junior officers to do as they were told; only talked to the third
officer when issuing a direct order; was unwilling to discuss the second officers needs; and
dismissed a suggestion from the chief officer regarding seating in the dining saloon. These
11
The danger of not adhering to these practices are evident in the cases of Attilio Ievoli and Maersk Kendal
whereby improper communication due to cultural differences and inadequate feedback practice let to the
vessels running aground (see appendix).
10. 7
behaviours demonstrate that the Master had no regard for upward communication.
Furthermore, given that the Master did not inform the third officer of his decision to change
course, it would appear reasonable to suggest that the Master also dismissed the need for
top-down communication. Furthermore the master was reluctant to communicate even
during a formal inquiry.
Section 6 – Conclusion
The following issues have been identified which may have contributed to the ship running
aground:
1. The Master applied a scientific style of management which lead to poor job
satisfaction and increased stress.
2. The Master was a leader without followers; he lacked the respect and admiration of
his crew which undermined team work.
3. The Master did not have any faith in the abilities of the crew thereby contributing to
the Master’s stress levels.
4. The Master created an environment whereby the crew were reluctant to question
the Master.
5. The Master dismissed the need for, and value of, communication thereby leaving to
crew unaware of the Master’s actions and decisions.
This case highlights the dangers of poor shipboard management. While theory is often
dismissed as being impractical, it is essential that shipboard management theory is
translated into practice. The human, environmental and financial cost of overlooking this
reality is too great to ignore.
11. 8
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12. 9
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14. 11
Section 8 - Appendix
8.1 The Case
A 5000 teu container ship ran aground at 15 knots on the approaches to a major port, 5
miles from the pilot station. The master was on the bridge with the third officer at the time.
Although he had not informed the third officer of his intentions to do so, the master had
apparently taken the con because, shortly before the grounding, he had made a 15º
alteration of course to port using the autopilot. There was no helmsman in the wheelhouse
at the time. He had been sent below to prepare the pilot ladder.
What follows are summaries of interviews conducted at the enquiry following the
grounding.
The third officer (from the Philippines) stated that he assumed the master had taken the
con because that was often his practice when arriving at the bridge. On one occasion in
similar circumstances shortly after joining the ship the third officer had asked if the master
was taking the con, but the master had ignored his question. He no longer asked. He also
stated that the master rarely spoke to him, except to issue a direct order.
When asked whether he was monitoring the passage plan prior to this incident, the third
officer confirmed that he was, and that he believed the master had commenced the final
alteration of course in advance of the wheel-over point at the next waypoint. When asked
why he had not questioned the master’s decision he stated that on a previous occasion
when he had done so his reasons for doing so had proved incorrect, for which the master
had severely berated him and suggested that he should gain more experience before
questioning the master’s decisions. He therefore questioned his own interpretation of the
situation, rather than the master’s, and not wishing to incur further wrath had decided to
remain silent.
The chief officer (of Eastern European origin), when questioned about the master’s
relationship with the junior officers, stated that the master largely ignored them. When the
chief officer had suggested that seating in the dining saloon be rotated on a regular basis so
that junior officers were able to share the captain’s table on occasions, thus having the
opportunity to ask and learn, the master had said that he did not want them there to spoil
his meal. The chief officer had also been discouraged from ‘wasting’ his time assisting the
junior officers with their further studies. As a consequence the junior officers spent the
majority of their off-duty hours either alone or with a group comprising second and third
mate, third engineer and boatswain – with whom they shared sporting interests. The chief
officer stated that the master had instructed him to break up this ‘inappropriate’ group.
The second officer (also from the Philippines) confirmed that he had requested a transfer to
another ship. He was hoping for further advancement and felt that he was gaining
insufficient experience on this ship to prepare him for a chief officer’s position. When the
15. 12
master had encountered him in the cargo office discussing the operation with the chief
officer whilst cargo was being loaded, the master had stated that his duty was to oversee
the operation from the deck, and that was where he should be. When the second officer
had attempted to discuss the reasons for his actions the master had instructed him to do as
he was told.
Although he recognised the master’s right to be on the bridge whenever he saw fit, he felt
that the master’s practice of taking over during all the more demanding phases of the
passage meant that his own opportunity to gain experience was severely restricted. The
master had refused to discuss the second officer’s concerns.
The master (British) provided information only reluctantly to the enquiry. When asked why
he spent so much time on the bridge he stated that the junior officers were unreliable and
poorly trained. The only evidence he offered to support this claim was the single incident
identified by the third officer. The master admitted to being under severe stress.
16. 13
8.2 - Additional Research
Rothblum A., (2000:1) (see appendix) states about 75-96% of marine accidents are caused,
at least in part, by some form of human error. Studies have shown that human error
contributes to:
• 84-88% of tanker accidents
• 79% of towing vessel groundings
• 89-96% of collisions
• 75% of allision
• 75% of fires and explosions
In his book Shipboard Management-Human Element and Leadership, Stratton, D. (1995:9),
outlines the quality a group of Masters and Chief Engineers considered being most desirable
in their watch keeping officers. The following tasks were included in their findings which
needed to be improved at all levels:
Planning and Organising
Directing and Controlling
Communications
Rationality/Logic
Interpersonal Relationship/Teamwork
Technical Competence
Leadership and Motivation
Section 5.2 of the International Safety Management Code which requires the Master “to
motivate the crew in the observation of the safety policy”. Parker, Mr. C.J., (2000:177)
states, “whoever drafted this section really had the wrong idea as it implies that the
Master can control motivation like the handling of the ship. It does not work that way.
Motivation comes from within. Nearly everybody wants to do well and the trick is to
provide the conditions and the encouragement. A moment’s reflection from one’s own
experience reveals that being given responsibility with helpful support is much more
rewarding than being told what to do and being criticised if it goes wrong.
People need to achieve something worthwhile for their efforts to be motivated. They
need to know how their effort fits into the overall scheme and how successful they have
been. They need to feel a sense of responsibility for themselves and others, their work
and their area of influence. They need people to talk to, to encourage them and value
them”.
Chawla, Capt. P., (2000:16), states that the “autocratic ways of the past are no longer
acceptable in current shipping environment as work has been made easier by
technology. As a master, it will be necessary to learn as much as how modern day
17. 14
participative management can be carried out on board to meet what a ship owner
requires from a master”.
10 Leadership Qualities by Little A.D. (2004:68)
Ten key qualities were identified through literature review, comparison with other
industries, and through discussion with those interviewed for this study. Each of the
qualities is described below, with reference to supporting quotes from interviews where
appropriate (note that the list is in no particular order).
1. Instil respect and command
Gaining respect of the crew requires the leader to demonstrate that they are competent,
and act to the benefit of the ship, crew and company, not for self-interest. Good leaders
will utilise the collective intelligence and abilities of their crew and assistance from
shore management in analysing problems and in generating solutions, but must have the
confidence to make and implement the decision themselves, acting according to their
authority. At times, this may mean having to choose a more difficult and less popular
decision.
2. Lead the Team by example
The leaders should be seen to be pulling their weight as part of a team, and should be
seen to be practicing what they preach. This is crucial in developing a sense of shared
commitment and values which are vital for effective leadership.
3. Draw on knowledge and experience
The leader should know the ship and crew well, and be able to draw on their own
experience to make sound decisions and act appropriately during both normal running
and in the event of an emergency. This is perhaps particularly important in the context
of the ship environment, which is isolated from others whose experience could
otherwise be drawn upon.
4. Remain calm in a crisis
The ability to remain professional, calm and in control in the event of an emergency is
critically important. As a situation moves from normal to an emergency, the leader
needs to be able to take more of a dictatorial role.
5. Practice ‘Tough empathy’
‘Tough empathy’; is best described as the ability to give people what they need, not
what they want. Empathy is the capacity to put yourself in another’s place; it requires
the cultivation and use of listening skills. ‘Tough’ empathy balances respect for the
individual with the task at hand and real life constraints. One way of describing it is
‘caring with detachment’. Those who demonstrate tough empathy are showing that they
genuinely care about other’s needs.
6. Be sensitive to different cultures
Good leaders should regard all members of the crew as equal. Effective leadership will
successfully gain the most value from each member of crew and nurture a positive team
dynamic that spans any cultural differences.
18. 15
7. Recognise the crew’s limitations
The leaders should understand how operational and other demands can be realistically
delivered according to the capabilities of their crew. This includes understanding the
experience of the crew, the need for rest periods, and ensuring that the crew is asked to
perform according to its responsibilities.
8. Motivate and create a sense of community
Motivation comes from receiving a return from effort made, for example, in the form of
job satisfaction. For example, a leader can motivate crew through involving them in all
aspects of management, feedback and appreciation of their effort.
Sharing the work, being visible, showing concern for the crew’s anxieties and caring for
those who have problems, will all help build a sense of community and create trust in
the leader.
9. Place the safety of passengers and crew above everything
The leader needs to be constantly balancing the relative priorities associated with the
normal running of the ship, but should always consider the safety of those on board the
highest priority.
10. Communicate and listen clearly
The ability to effectively communicate at all levels is vitally important in providing
effective leadership to the crew. Two-way communication, being approachable and
having an “open door” policy makes for good crew relations and helps to instil respect,
balancing authority with approachability (see above).
Cross-cultural interaction will retain its potential for conflict only as long as cultural and
linguistic differences are treated as grounds for anger and resistance, negative stereotyping,
and educational and workplace underachievement.
Communication
Over the past 25 years or so approximately 80% of the world’s merchant ships have become
multilingual and multi ethnic in crew composition. (MARCOM Project 1998). As well as
having more diversity of crew there are now fewer numbers in the crew of a merchant ship.
This in itself can lead to loneliness stress and fatigue. If there are also problems of
communication contributing to a lack of mutual confidences, suspicions and
misunderstandings, then the opportunities for human errors leading to dangers to the ship,
the people on board and the environment, are greatly increased.
Marcom Project (1998:57) reveals that 96% of maritime accidents described were caused by
human factor and 40% of this factor was communicatively relevant factors. Of the
communication related factors, 12% was attributed to on-board communication and 88% to
external communication.
The primary methods used to communicate include written, oral and non-verbal, all of
which have both advantages. For example: written communication is a valuable method in
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terms of its ability to be saved, stored and retrieved for future reference; oral
communication is a powerful tool to influence receivers through the use to tone, pitch,
speed and volume; and non verbal communication can be transmitted through body
language to express emotions such as joy, anger, stress or fear more effectively than other
forms of communication (Kondalkar 2007:196-197; George, J.M., 2003:513-521).
Human Behaviour and Group Behaviour
The Master’s motivation for this instruction to break up the group may be based on his
autocratic style of leadership. This is supported by studies which have found that autocratic
leaders perceive informal group as a potential threat to their authority (Bielić: 7).
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8.3 - Executive Summary
MIXED NATIONALITY CREWS:
THE FILIPINO SEAFARERS’ EXPERIENCE
National Maritime Polytechnic
___________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
Approximately 80 percent of the world’s merchant fleets are manned
by mixed nationality crews (Marcom Project, 1998). This means that a ship’s
crew composition is made up of seafarers with different nationalities having
a diversity of culture. There are many different crew compositions that a
merchant marine fleet may adopt. It could be a single nationality crew drawn
from the ship-owner’s country, or a single nationality drawn from a country
other than the ship-owner’s.
The crew could also be composed of officers from the ship-owner’s
country and ratings from a third world country; or senior officers from the
ship-owner’s country, junior officers from a third world country, and all the
ratings from still another third world country; or the master could come from
the owner’s country and all the rest of the officers and ratings from a wide
range of countries (Moreby, p.115).
The different cultural backgrounds of the crew manning the ship may
present a problem in the safe and efficient operation of a ship. Reports have
shown that casualties have occurred more often on ships with mixed crews
than on ships operated by a single nationality (IMO News, No. 3: 1994).
It is in this context that National Maritime Polytechnic (NMP)
conducted this study to identify the different problems encountered by
Filipino seafarers in their relationship with the rest of the crew who are of
other nationalities. The study’s findings will serve as very useful basis or
input in the formulation of training programs or any other industry-related
activity particularly on cultural awareness that would help solve or minimize
the occurrence of such problems, hence, the safe and efficient operation of
ships.
Specifically, the objectives of the study are:
1. To find out which nationalities are frequent companions of Filipino
crew on board oceangoing vessels.
2. To determine which nationality is frequently dominant on board
oceangoing vessels.
3. To identify the different problems encountered by Filipino seafarers in
working with seafarers of other nationalities.
4. To identify the causes of these problems.
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5. To determine or identify potential solutions to these problems.
6. To recommend training programs or other related activities aimed at
providing Filipino seafarers the needed knowledge, skills and
attitudes to be able to cope or deal with culturally oriented problems
related to multinational crewing of vessels.
Methodology
A pre-survey was conducted to all shipping and manning agencies
with vessels plying in the international route to determine which of these
companies have vessels manned by mixed crew. Based on the results of the
pre-survey, companies with mixed crewing vessels were then identified.
Coordination with these companies was made for the conduct of the actual
data gathering.
A total of 1140 questionnaires from seafarer-respondents representing
160 shipping companies, were gathered. Seafarers awaiting the processing of
their documents at the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) were administered
survey questionnaires. Seafarer-Trainees enrolled at NMP were also asked to
participate in the study.
Respondents of the Study
Respondents are seafarers with work experience on board vessels
manned by mixed crew. Of the 1140 respondents, 40% have boarded more
than six vessels with mixed nationality crews such as in Bulk Carrier (29%),
Tanker and General Cargo (28%), and Container (13%). Majority (62%) have
been at sea for one to ten years. A few (8%) are on their first employment or
have just finished their first contract on board; 3 percent have more than 20
years sea experience.
In terms of position, 67 percent are holding ratings’ positions; only 33
percent are in the officers’ positions (9% are management level officers and
24% are operational level officers).
The frequent companions of Filipinos on board ships are Europeans
(58%), specifically, Greeks and Germans. Asians (38%) are represented by
the Japanese, Koreans and Indians. Seafarers from America, Africa and
Oceania account for only 4%. These nationalities are holding officers’
positions (84%) and they are the superiors of Filipino crew.
The dominance of Filipinos in the international shipping market was
again validated in the study when 94% of the respondents reported that they
are the dominant nationality in the vessel they boarded. Dominant
nationality refers to the nationality that has the most number of crew on
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board a vessel.
Problems Encountered: Causes, Effects and Measures Taken
About two-thirds (66%) of the respondents claim that they have not
encountered any serious problems with crews of different nationalities while
31% said that they have experienced some problems with them.
Most of the respondents who indicated having no problem with mixed
nationality crews, attribute this to the following reasons: 1) they have
established smooth interpersonal relationship (33%); 2) they focus on their
work; (12%); 3) respect (9%); 4) obedience to orders and commands in the line
of duty (7%); 5) patience (7%) and 6) understanding (7%).
On the other hand, the 31 percent respondents who have experienced
problems on board ships manned by mixed crew, identified communication
and language (75%) and attitude-related (67%) as their main problems. Other
problems include those related to work habits and practices, job
performance, food-related, personal hygiene and corruption.
The most common form of communication and language problems are
language barrier and raising of voice when giving orders experienced by
both officer- and rating-respondents with their Japanese, Korean and Greek
superiors. Their difficulty li es in their inability to understand the English
language as these nationals speak it. The Japanese and Korean language
belongs to the same Altaic group, which has its own characteristics, thus,
requiring longer time to decipher the meaning of the word. Hence, it takes
them longer time to accomplish the job thereby making it stressful and tiring.
Raising of voice when giving orders is perceived by the respondents
to be caused by superiority complex. Respondents believe that these
nationals shout thinking that they know more about the job than their
counterpart Filipino crew. The Filipino crew being shouted at suffer a loss of
face or hiya especially when it is done in the presence of other people. This
leads to the disturbance of the interpersonal relationship. To cope with such
kind of problem on board, respondents say they simply have to try to
understand what the other national is saying. Others stress the importance of
being more patient and striving to do their job as best as they can.
Another common problem on board is attitude-related (67%), such as
arrogance and lack of trust (54%), superiority complex (39%), and prejudice
(1%). These were cited by both officer- and rating-respondents with their
Japanese and German superiors. These are ethnocentric attitudes which
respondents believe to be attributed to superiority complex (37%) which
stems from the following: 1) they think that they know more about the job
than their counterpart Filipino crew (55%); 2) the owner or principal of the
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vessel is from their own country (30%); and 3) they are better off
economically (13%).
Respondents perceive such attitude-related problems as caused also
by racial prejudice (24%) due to creed, color or race. As a consequence, the
interpersonal relationship of the crew as well as the efficiency in
accomplishing the work is affected. Being more patient, proving to others
that they can do more, and doing the job as best as they can are the coping
mechanisms employed by respondents to this group of problem.
Potential Solutions
When asked to give suggestions or solutions to cope or minimize
problems in mixed nationality crew, the following came out: 1) develop the
ability to deal with others; 2) value your work; 3) have respect for one
another; 4) have more patience; and 5) strive for better understanding of other
people’s way of life. These are culturally-based values of Filipino values
which should further be enhanced or strengthened.
Recommendations
Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are
proposed. These were grouped into sectors of the maritime industry, which
should address these recommendations.
For Training Institutions
Development of a cultural awareness training program to cope with
problems on board.
This training would develop and enhance Filipino appreciation of
their own culture thereby strengthening or enhancing their own personal
values, which are useful mechanisms in dealing with mixed-cultural
problems. It would also help develop confidence in themselves so they
would not feel inferior and be able to face other nationalities on an equal
basis on equal footing.
Attitudes, like cultural relativity, and core values, such as freedom,
quality, opportunity, respect, and impartial justice, should be developed and
inculcated in the seafarers. These attitudes and values should be integrated
in the training program.
Government Agencies
Government agencies, such as the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), should review and enhance their orientation policies
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in the deployment of seafarers giving more emphasis on the cultural
background of seafarers of other nationalities whom Filipinos will
encounter on board.
Formulation of a Code of Conduct for mixed nationality crews so that
seafarers will be guided on the proper decorum on board ship.
For Shipping and Manning Agencies
Employers of seafarers should enhance the pre-departure orientation
seminar (PDOS), taking into consideration the cultural diversity of the crew
particularly the seafarers of other nationalities whom Filipinos will work
with on board.
Review and revision of recruitment and selection policies taking into
consideration the nationalities that can effectively work on board vessels.
Induction and orientation policies for the deployment of seafarers should
also be reviewed. We find this necessary because in the PDOS little attention
is given on the cultural background of the different nationalities that
compose the vessel’s complement.
Racial discrimination was identified to be one of the causes of the
problems identified in the study. To minimize this problem, representations
should be made with ship-owners regarding recruitment policies that would
address discrimination.
Ship Owners/Managers
One of the main problems cited by the respondents is on
communication and language. To address this issue, ship owners/managers
should improve the linguistic capabilities of their seafarers in English and
familiarize their seafarers with other languages commonly encountered on
board.
All Concerned
Study common causes of discord for Filipinos on board ships with
mixed nationalities so that appropriate measures or specific interventions
may be given or formulated to minimize conflicts aboard ship.
