Experts of the Ukrainian Institute of Politics, together with partners, prepared an analytical study "SEVEN SCENARIOS FOR UKRAINE: from triumph to decline." The study, which was conducted for more than 6 months, examines 7 key scenarios for Ukraine, their markers, implementation conditions and consequences.
This document summarizes the political and military situation in Ukraine. It describes how Russia's 2014 military intervention in Ukraine continues to define Ukrainian politics, with a stalemated conflict and peace process. The document discusses Russia's strategy of destabilizing Ukraine and influencing its policies through the conflict. It also notes growing political disillusionment in Ukraine due to corruption and lack of reforms, which could benefit Russian-backed political forces. The document analyzes the Minsk peace agreements and how Russia uses this process to maintain influence in eastern Ukraine.
Not so quiet on the eastern front: audit of the Minsk agreements and Ukraine`...DonbassFullAccess
This document provides a summary of a report that analyzes the Minsk agreements aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Ukraine's options for reintegrating the occupied territories. The summary discusses key findings:
1) The Minsk agreements have failed to achieve a durable ceasefire or fully implement security measures due to ambiguous language and lack of sequencing of steps.
2) Implementation has stalled with ongoing fighting, restricted OSCE monitoring access, and prisoners still detained on both sides.
3) The Normandy format negotiations have political benefits for Ukraine by involving European partners who confirm Russia's responsibility, and linking sanctions relief to Minsk implementation.
The document provides a summary of the strategic communication, military, cyber, and economic aspects of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. It notes that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in strategic communication by portraying Zelensky as a heroic leader defending against Russian aggression. Militarily, Russian forces have encircled some Ukrainian cities but are facing stronger-than-expected resistance in urban areas. There has been a global uprising of cyber partisans attacking Russian targets, while Russian cyber operations have targeted Ukrainian infrastructure. Western sanctions are severely impacting the Russian economy. The outlook is that Russia will escalate violence in Ukrainian cities as its economy begins to collapse under sanctions.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
This document discusses Russia's policy toward the separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. It argues that despite supporting the Minsk peace process publicly, Moscow's actions are strengthening the separatist entities and aiming to keep Ukraine unstable. Moscow has begun directly funding pensions and salaries in the separatist regions, signaling an intention to transform the conflict into a frozen conflict. However, observers note Russia may be considering various options and waiting to see how other international issues develop before determining its long-term strategy in eastern Ukraine. Full implementation of the Minsk agreements remains elusive.
This document summarizes Ukraine's ongoing struggles with reforms, security challenges, and anti-corruption efforts since the 2014 Euromaidan revolution. Key points include:
1) Ukraine faces ongoing security threats from Russian aggression and interference while also struggling with reforms in governance, economic policy, and anti-corruption efforts due to resistance from entrenched political and business interests.
2) Significant reforms have been undertaken in some areas like macroeconomic policy, energy sector, and banking, but resistance remains for deeper reforms in governance, rule of law, and reducing the influence of oligarchs.
3) Civil society has played an important role in supporting reforms but faces challenges in connecting with citizens and maintaining reform momentum against powerful
This document summarizes the political and military situation in Ukraine. It describes how Russia's 2014 military intervention in Ukraine continues to define Ukrainian politics, with a stalemated conflict and peace process. The document discusses Russia's strategy of destabilizing Ukraine and influencing its policies through the conflict. It also notes growing political disillusionment in Ukraine due to corruption and lack of reforms, which could benefit Russian-backed political forces. The document analyzes the Minsk peace agreements and how Russia uses this process to maintain influence in eastern Ukraine.
Not so quiet on the eastern front: audit of the Minsk agreements and Ukraine`...DonbassFullAccess
This document provides a summary of a report that analyzes the Minsk agreements aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Ukraine's options for reintegrating the occupied territories. The summary discusses key findings:
1) The Minsk agreements have failed to achieve a durable ceasefire or fully implement security measures due to ambiguous language and lack of sequencing of steps.
2) Implementation has stalled with ongoing fighting, restricted OSCE monitoring access, and prisoners still detained on both sides.
3) The Normandy format negotiations have political benefits for Ukraine by involving European partners who confirm Russia's responsibility, and linking sanctions relief to Minsk implementation.
The document provides a summary of the strategic communication, military, cyber, and economic aspects of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. It notes that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in strategic communication by portraying Zelensky as a heroic leader defending against Russian aggression. Militarily, Russian forces have encircled some Ukrainian cities but are facing stronger-than-expected resistance in urban areas. There has been a global uprising of cyber partisans attacking Russian targets, while Russian cyber operations have targeted Ukrainian infrastructure. Western sanctions are severely impacting the Russian economy. The outlook is that Russia will escalate violence in Ukrainian cities as its economy begins to collapse under sanctions.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
This document discusses Russia's policy toward the separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. It argues that despite supporting the Minsk peace process publicly, Moscow's actions are strengthening the separatist entities and aiming to keep Ukraine unstable. Moscow has begun directly funding pensions and salaries in the separatist regions, signaling an intention to transform the conflict into a frozen conflict. However, observers note Russia may be considering various options and waiting to see how other international issues develop before determining its long-term strategy in eastern Ukraine. Full implementation of the Minsk agreements remains elusive.
This document summarizes Ukraine's ongoing struggles with reforms, security challenges, and anti-corruption efforts since the 2014 Euromaidan revolution. Key points include:
1) Ukraine faces ongoing security threats from Russian aggression and interference while also struggling with reforms in governance, economic policy, and anti-corruption efforts due to resistance from entrenched political and business interests.
2) Significant reforms have been undertaken in some areas like macroeconomic policy, energy sector, and banking, but resistance remains for deeper reforms in governance, rule of law, and reducing the influence of oligarchs.
3) Civil society has played an important role in supporting reforms but faces challenges in connecting with citizens and maintaining reform momentum against powerful
- When will Russia run out of money for the war in Ukraine and Europe?
- Is the world doing enough to help Ukraine?
- What is needed from the world NOW?
«Nobody Wants Us»: The Alienated Civilians of Eastern UkraineDonbassFullAccess
This document summarizes a report by the International Crisis Group on the situation facing civilians in eastern Ukraine. It finds that after four years of conflict, civilians on both sides of the front lines face deteriorating living conditions and a growing sense of abandonment by both Kyiv and Moscow. While a political settlement is needed, the parties have made little progress. In the meantime, Kyiv should improve its policies toward conflict-affected civilians to distinguish them from rebel leaders and lay the groundwork for peace. This includes honoring pension obligations, protecting civilians, acknowledging grievances, and restoring freedom of movement and access to services. International partners should encourage more inclusive policies to support implementation of the Minsk agreements.
Lecture 3 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power CompetitionStanford University
Mike McFaul, Russia, Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, hacking for defense, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank,
Can the United Nations unite Ukraine. Hudson Institute. February 2018DonbassFullAccess
Research paper by Hudson Institute on the possible outcomes of the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. Edited by Richard Gowan.
The chances of a peacekeeping force successfully deploying to eastern Ukraine are currently low. But if broader political circumstances created an opening with Moscow for this option, there is sufficient evidence to suggest an international force could manage the basic security, policing and political dimensions of reintegrating the Donbas under Kyiv’s control. It would be a risky and stop-start process, but it may be the best way to end what
is Europe’s deadliest ongoing conflict, and remove one of the main obstacles to normal relations between the West and Moscow.
Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future.
Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law.
The Russia-Ukraine war has been a longstanding and complex issue, rooted in historical tensions and geopolitical power struggles. The entire world was shocked on 24 Feb, 2022. I remember, it was Tuesday when news said Vladimir Putin claimed to commence a “special military operation”, thereby beginning a never-ending power clash or, in simpler terms, Russia Ukraine war. Want to know the backstory of what led to this war in Ukraine? Have a look at its in-depth analysis.
This document provides an overview of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine and the West. Some key points:
- Russia sees Ukraine's experience with hybrid warfare as a lesson for other countries to learn from, as Russia aims to weaken states from within before military aggression.
- Russian political experts and officials see this as a time of opportunity, as they view the West as weak under Obama/Trump and burdened by other conflicts. Russia aims to reassert itself as a great power over a Eurasian sphere of influence.
- Ukraine has faced aggression, occupation, cyberattacks, and political/economic pressure from Russia. Other tactics include fueling internal/external conflicts, supporting radical groups, and controlling the narrative through
The Russia-Ukraine war has been a longstanding and complex issue, rooted in historical tensions and geopolitical power struggles. The entire world was shocked on 24 Feb, 2022. I remember, it was Tuesday when news said Vladimir Putin claimed to commence a “special military operation”, thereby beginning a never-ending power clash or, in simpler terms, Russia Ukraine war. Want to know the backstory of what led to this war in Ukraine? Have a look at its in-depth analysis.
The document discusses Russia's invasion of Ukraine and actions needed to stop Russian aggression. It provides historical context on Ukraine-Russia relations and analyzes Russia's capacity to continue financing the war. While Russia still has reserves of $150-200 billion, imposing an oil/gas embargo could deplete resources more quickly by worsening Russia's fiscal deficit and balance of payments. The document also evaluates risks of the war, with a military victory for Ukraine or lack of resources to continue the war having high impact and probability. Additional actions are needed from the global community to support Ukraine militarily, cut off Russian resources, and increase internal tensions in Russia to end the war.
The causes of the crisis in Ukraine are mainly geopolitical and strategic. What is at stake is not, in fact, Ukraine's accession to the European Union because this has very little to offer in promoting the country's development. Ukraine only has to lose. Many industries will no longer operate or will be dominated by European multinationals and small farmers will be ruined. But what the United States intends through the incorporation of Ukraine to the European Union is, above all, allow NATO forces are stationed on the border of Russia. The most likely future scenario for the outcome of the political crisis in Ukraine is the division of the country, with the Crimea already incorporated into Russia and the transformation of eastern, central-eastern and southern Ukraine in an autonomous region of Kiev government if it is held the agreement of the European Union and Ukraine or occur its annexation to Russia if NATO forces are stationed in Ukraine. The civil war that has started in Ukraine can turn into a military conflict involving NATO forces and Russia to unpredictable consequences.
Ukraine must take swift and decisive action to defeat the rebels. Diplomatic alternatives offer no further hope. Unless Kiev acts soon the Ukrainian state as we know it will cease to exist. Decisive action by the Ukrainian military will enable Vladimir Putin to distance himself from the rebels re-vitalise political and economic ties to Kiev.
The document provides an overview of the humanitarian situation and needs in Ukraine as of December 2014. It notes that over 1 million people have been displaced from eastern Ukraine and Crimea due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in the Donbas region. Around 1.4 million of the estimated 5.2 million people living in conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine are considered highly vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance. Key needs identified include emergency shelter, winterization assistance, and protection for internally displaced persons, host communities, and other vulnerable groups affected by the crisis.
The document provides an overview of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine as of December 2014. It notes that over 1 million people have been displaced from eastern Ukraine and Crimea due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in the Donbas region. Around 508,000 people are internally displaced within Ukraine, while over 545,000 have fled abroad. The civilian population faces risks from the violence, with protection concerns rising as civilian casualties increase. Displaced families require emergency shelter and warm clothes/supplies to survive the winter. Humanitarian access to deliver assistance remains limited in some active conflict zones.
This document summarizes the humanitarian crisis occurring along the 500km separation line between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine. It estimates that around 100,000 civilians still live in frontline areas that see daily fighting, with troops and military equipment mixed in with civilian areas and homes. Both sides are said to violate a ceasefire agreement and use heavy weapons near civilian populations. The document calls on all sides to better separate troops from civilians and withdraw heavy weapons to reduce risks to civilians from the ongoing conflict.
The document summarizes the root causes, key events, and international response to the ongoing Ukraine crisis. It discusses how Russian opposition to Ukraine strengthening ties with the EU led to protests in Ukraine and the ousting of the Ukrainian president in 2014. This prompted Russia to invade and annex Crimea on the basis of protecting Russian citizens. The document outlines international sanctions imposed on Russia and their economic impacts. It also summarizes peace talks in Minsk and the agreements reached to establish ceasefires and decentralize power in eastern Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, Russia began an invasion of Ukraine, in a major escalation of the Russo Ukrainian War that began in 2014. It is the largest military attack in Europe since World War II.Following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in February 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and Russian backed separatists seized part of south east Ukraine, starting the war in Donbas. In 2021, Russia began a large military build up along its border with Ukraine, leading to an international crisis. During this period, the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, espoused Russian irredentist views, questioned Ukraines right to statehood, and accused NATO of threatening Russias security, demanding that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the alliance. Putin also baselessly accused Ukraine of committing genocide against its Russian speakers. The United States and others accused Russia of planning to attack or invade Ukraine, which Russian officials repeatedly denied as late as 23 February 2022. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Chouhan "Russia Ukraine War-2022" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-6 | Issue-3 , April 2022, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd49572.pdf Paper URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/political-science/49572/russia-ukraine-war2022/dr-rajesh-kumar-chouhan
Final Analysis of Competing Hypotheses_gradedEric Tallant
Russia's goals in Eastern Ukraine are to limit Western influence near its borders and project strength. By annexing Crimea and fueling conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has created a buffer zone between itself and expanding NATO. This prevents NATO from advancing further into Ukraine and deters it from directly intervening in the conflict for fear of provoking Russia. Maintaining instability in Eastern Ukraine also allows Russia to control the strategic Crimean region and its ports on the Black Sea.
FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT: Russian Aggression, International Support and Action ...Mmedeiros_1986
1. The document summarizes the Russian aggression in Crimea and the international response. It discusses the positions of major global players, Russia's geopolitical and economic interests in Crimea, and various conspiracy theories about Russia's motivations. It also outlines restraints on Russia's actions and the information war between Russia and Maidan.
2. The document analyzes Russia's violations of international treaties and its goal of attaching Crimea to a "small security belt" of regions under its control. It explores theories that Russia aims to raise stakes in negotiations, counter US influence in Ukraine, or distract from its own economic problems.
3. The international response and NATO military superiority in the Black Sea have restrained further
The article analyzes the structure, content, properties and effects of the
Russian-Ukrainian ‘hybrid war’ in its non-military dimension. Particular emphasis is
placed on the aspect of the information and propaganda war, as well as activities in
cyberspace. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is described in the context of the new war
strategy of General Valery Gerasimov. Contemporary practice of hybrid actions in the
conflict in Ukraine has revealed that, for the first time, a stronger opponent, Russia,
uses the full spectrum of hybrid interaction on an opponent who is weak and unable
to defend the integrity of its territory. The military conflict of 2014 showed not only
the weakness of the Ukrainian state, but also, more importantly, the inefficiency of the
organizations responsible for ensuring international security: NATO, OSCE and the
UN. In the longer term, it should be noted that the escalation of hybrid activities in
Ukraine clearly threatens the states on the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The analysis conducted refers to the problem defined in the form of questions: what
is the essence of hybrid operations? What is the nature of non-military hybrid operations? What was the course of these activities in Ukraine? How was international law
interpreted in relation to this conflict?
Об Украинском Институте Политики - частном аналитическом центре, созданном в г. Киеве (Украина) в 2012-м году. Экспертами УИП, состоянием на октябрь 2023 года, являются 24 специалиста. Возглавляет аналитический центр Руслан Бортник
"СІМ СЦЕНАРІЇВ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНИ: від тріумфу до занепаду"Ruslan Bortnik
Експерти Українського Інституту політики разом з партнерами підготували аналітичне дослідження "СІМ СЦЕНАРІЇВ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНИ: від тріумфу до занепаду". В дослідженні, яке велося понад 6 місяців, розглядаються 7 ключових сценаріїв для України, їх маркери, умови реалізації та наслідки.
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- When will Russia run out of money for the war in Ukraine and Europe?
- Is the world doing enough to help Ukraine?
- What is needed from the world NOW?
«Nobody Wants Us»: The Alienated Civilians of Eastern UkraineDonbassFullAccess
This document summarizes a report by the International Crisis Group on the situation facing civilians in eastern Ukraine. It finds that after four years of conflict, civilians on both sides of the front lines face deteriorating living conditions and a growing sense of abandonment by both Kyiv and Moscow. While a political settlement is needed, the parties have made little progress. In the meantime, Kyiv should improve its policies toward conflict-affected civilians to distinguish them from rebel leaders and lay the groundwork for peace. This includes honoring pension obligations, protecting civilians, acknowledging grievances, and restoring freedom of movement and access to services. International partners should encourage more inclusive policies to support implementation of the Minsk agreements.
Lecture 3 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power CompetitionStanford University
Mike McFaul, Russia, Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, hacking for defense, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank,
Can the United Nations unite Ukraine. Hudson Institute. February 2018DonbassFullAccess
Research paper by Hudson Institute on the possible outcomes of the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. Edited by Richard Gowan.
The chances of a peacekeeping force successfully deploying to eastern Ukraine are currently low. But if broader political circumstances created an opening with Moscow for this option, there is sufficient evidence to suggest an international force could manage the basic security, policing and political dimensions of reintegrating the Donbas under Kyiv’s control. It would be a risky and stop-start process, but it may be the best way to end what
is Europe’s deadliest ongoing conflict, and remove one of the main obstacles to normal relations between the West and Moscow.
Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future.
Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law.
The Russia-Ukraine war has been a longstanding and complex issue, rooted in historical tensions and geopolitical power struggles. The entire world was shocked on 24 Feb, 2022. I remember, it was Tuesday when news said Vladimir Putin claimed to commence a “special military operation”, thereby beginning a never-ending power clash or, in simpler terms, Russia Ukraine war. Want to know the backstory of what led to this war in Ukraine? Have a look at its in-depth analysis.
This document provides an overview of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine and the West. Some key points:
- Russia sees Ukraine's experience with hybrid warfare as a lesson for other countries to learn from, as Russia aims to weaken states from within before military aggression.
- Russian political experts and officials see this as a time of opportunity, as they view the West as weak under Obama/Trump and burdened by other conflicts. Russia aims to reassert itself as a great power over a Eurasian sphere of influence.
- Ukraine has faced aggression, occupation, cyberattacks, and political/economic pressure from Russia. Other tactics include fueling internal/external conflicts, supporting radical groups, and controlling the narrative through
The Russia-Ukraine war has been a longstanding and complex issue, rooted in historical tensions and geopolitical power struggles. The entire world was shocked on 24 Feb, 2022. I remember, it was Tuesday when news said Vladimir Putin claimed to commence a “special military operation”, thereby beginning a never-ending power clash or, in simpler terms, Russia Ukraine war. Want to know the backstory of what led to this war in Ukraine? Have a look at its in-depth analysis.
The document discusses Russia's invasion of Ukraine and actions needed to stop Russian aggression. It provides historical context on Ukraine-Russia relations and analyzes Russia's capacity to continue financing the war. While Russia still has reserves of $150-200 billion, imposing an oil/gas embargo could deplete resources more quickly by worsening Russia's fiscal deficit and balance of payments. The document also evaluates risks of the war, with a military victory for Ukraine or lack of resources to continue the war having high impact and probability. Additional actions are needed from the global community to support Ukraine militarily, cut off Russian resources, and increase internal tensions in Russia to end the war.
The causes of the crisis in Ukraine are mainly geopolitical and strategic. What is at stake is not, in fact, Ukraine's accession to the European Union because this has very little to offer in promoting the country's development. Ukraine only has to lose. Many industries will no longer operate or will be dominated by European multinationals and small farmers will be ruined. But what the United States intends through the incorporation of Ukraine to the European Union is, above all, allow NATO forces are stationed on the border of Russia. The most likely future scenario for the outcome of the political crisis in Ukraine is the division of the country, with the Crimea already incorporated into Russia and the transformation of eastern, central-eastern and southern Ukraine in an autonomous region of Kiev government if it is held the agreement of the European Union and Ukraine or occur its annexation to Russia if NATO forces are stationed in Ukraine. The civil war that has started in Ukraine can turn into a military conflict involving NATO forces and Russia to unpredictable consequences.
Ukraine must take swift and decisive action to defeat the rebels. Diplomatic alternatives offer no further hope. Unless Kiev acts soon the Ukrainian state as we know it will cease to exist. Decisive action by the Ukrainian military will enable Vladimir Putin to distance himself from the rebels re-vitalise political and economic ties to Kiev.
The document provides an overview of the humanitarian situation and needs in Ukraine as of December 2014. It notes that over 1 million people have been displaced from eastern Ukraine and Crimea due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in the Donbas region. Around 1.4 million of the estimated 5.2 million people living in conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine are considered highly vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance. Key needs identified include emergency shelter, winterization assistance, and protection for internally displaced persons, host communities, and other vulnerable groups affected by the crisis.
The document provides an overview of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine as of December 2014. It notes that over 1 million people have been displaced from eastern Ukraine and Crimea due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in the Donbas region. Around 508,000 people are internally displaced within Ukraine, while over 545,000 have fled abroad. The civilian population faces risks from the violence, with protection concerns rising as civilian casualties increase. Displaced families require emergency shelter and warm clothes/supplies to survive the winter. Humanitarian access to deliver assistance remains limited in some active conflict zones.
This document summarizes the humanitarian crisis occurring along the 500km separation line between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine. It estimates that around 100,000 civilians still live in frontline areas that see daily fighting, with troops and military equipment mixed in with civilian areas and homes. Both sides are said to violate a ceasefire agreement and use heavy weapons near civilian populations. The document calls on all sides to better separate troops from civilians and withdraw heavy weapons to reduce risks to civilians from the ongoing conflict.
The document summarizes the root causes, key events, and international response to the ongoing Ukraine crisis. It discusses how Russian opposition to Ukraine strengthening ties with the EU led to protests in Ukraine and the ousting of the Ukrainian president in 2014. This prompted Russia to invade and annex Crimea on the basis of protecting Russian citizens. The document outlines international sanctions imposed on Russia and their economic impacts. It also summarizes peace talks in Minsk and the agreements reached to establish ceasefires and decentralize power in eastern Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, Russia began an invasion of Ukraine, in a major escalation of the Russo Ukrainian War that began in 2014. It is the largest military attack in Europe since World War II.Following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in February 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and Russian backed separatists seized part of south east Ukraine, starting the war in Donbas. In 2021, Russia began a large military build up along its border with Ukraine, leading to an international crisis. During this period, the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, espoused Russian irredentist views, questioned Ukraines right to statehood, and accused NATO of threatening Russias security, demanding that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the alliance. Putin also baselessly accused Ukraine of committing genocide against its Russian speakers. The United States and others accused Russia of planning to attack or invade Ukraine, which Russian officials repeatedly denied as late as 23 February 2022. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Chouhan "Russia Ukraine War-2022" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-6 | Issue-3 , April 2022, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd49572.pdf Paper URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/political-science/49572/russia-ukraine-war2022/dr-rajesh-kumar-chouhan
Final Analysis of Competing Hypotheses_gradedEric Tallant
Russia's goals in Eastern Ukraine are to limit Western influence near its borders and project strength. By annexing Crimea and fueling conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has created a buffer zone between itself and expanding NATO. This prevents NATO from advancing further into Ukraine and deters it from directly intervening in the conflict for fear of provoking Russia. Maintaining instability in Eastern Ukraine also allows Russia to control the strategic Crimean region and its ports on the Black Sea.
FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT: Russian Aggression, International Support and Action ...Mmedeiros_1986
1. The document summarizes the Russian aggression in Crimea and the international response. It discusses the positions of major global players, Russia's geopolitical and economic interests in Crimea, and various conspiracy theories about Russia's motivations. It also outlines restraints on Russia's actions and the information war between Russia and Maidan.
2. The document analyzes Russia's violations of international treaties and its goal of attaching Crimea to a "small security belt" of regions under its control. It explores theories that Russia aims to raise stakes in negotiations, counter US influence in Ukraine, or distract from its own economic problems.
3. The international response and NATO military superiority in the Black Sea have restrained further
The article analyzes the structure, content, properties and effects of the
Russian-Ukrainian ‘hybrid war’ in its non-military dimension. Particular emphasis is
placed on the aspect of the information and propaganda war, as well as activities in
cyberspace. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is described in the context of the new war
strategy of General Valery Gerasimov. Contemporary practice of hybrid actions in the
conflict in Ukraine has revealed that, for the first time, a stronger opponent, Russia,
uses the full spectrum of hybrid interaction on an opponent who is weak and unable
to defend the integrity of its territory. The military conflict of 2014 showed not only
the weakness of the Ukrainian state, but also, more importantly, the inefficiency of the
organizations responsible for ensuring international security: NATO, OSCE and the
UN. In the longer term, it should be noted that the escalation of hybrid activities in
Ukraine clearly threatens the states on the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The analysis conducted refers to the problem defined in the form of questions: what
is the essence of hybrid operations? What is the nature of non-military hybrid operations? What was the course of these activities in Ukraine? How was international law
interpreted in relation to this conflict?
Similar to "SEVEN SCENARIOS FOR UKRAINE: from Triumph to Decline" (20)
Об Украинском Институте Политики - частном аналитическом центре, созданном в г. Киеве (Украина) в 2012-м году. Экспертами УИП, состоянием на октябрь 2023 года, являются 24 специалиста. Возглавляет аналитический центр Руслан Бортник
"СІМ СЦЕНАРІЇВ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНИ: від тріумфу до занепаду"Ruslan Bortnik
Експерти Українського Інституту політики разом з партнерами підготували аналітичне дослідження "СІМ СЦЕНАРІЇВ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНИ: від тріумфу до занепаду". В дослідженні, яке велося понад 6 місяців, розглядаються 7 ключових сценаріїв для України, їх маркери, умови реалізації та наслідки.
Реформа децентрализации в Украине: причины, ход, последствия.Ruslan Bortnik
Украинский Институт анализа и менеджмента политики подготовил исследование №6 из цикла «Цена Реформ» - "Реформа децентрализации в Украине: причины, ход, последствия.". Проанализированы цели, ход и последствия бюджетной децентрализации и административно-территориальной реформы, высказаны предложения по усовершенствованию реформы.
Реформа дерегуляции в Украине: причины, ход, последствия.Ruslan Bortnik
Исследование №5 Украинского Института анализа и менеджмента политики на тему "Реформа дерегуляции в Украине: причины, ход, последствия" из цикла "Цена реформ". Проанализированы последствия дерегуляции для рынков потребительских товаров, права собственности, техногенной безопасности и защиты национальных интересов.
Исследование Украинского Института анализа и менеджмента политики на тему: "Реформа полиции в Украине: причины, ход, последствия" (цикл "Цена Реформ"). Полная статистика преступлений за период исследования, изучение процессов.
Дослідження №3 Українського Інституту аналізу та менеджменту політики на тему «Реформа антикорупційної політики: вартість, інститути, результати» з циклу "Ціна реформ".
Розглянуті результати масштабних антикорупційних реформ проведених в Україні, створення та обсяги фінансування антикорупційних структур, а також – підсумки їх діяльності у період з 2015 по 2017 роки та оцінка реформи міжнародним співтовариством.
За період з 2015 по 2019 рік на діяльність Національного антикорупційного бюро, Спеціальної антикорупційної прокуратури, та Національного агентства з питань запобігання корупції буде витрачено 5,1 млрд. гривень. 2,2 млрд. з них – витрати, закладені у бюджеті на поточний рік. При цьому, за період з 2015 по 2017 роки, сума збитків, компенсованих державі НАБУ та САП склала 250 млн. гривень. Окрім цього, за словами керівників відомств, було попереджене розкрадання ще майже 2 млрд. грн. Проте, навіть з урахуванням коштів, збережених від розкрадання, результат діяльності антикорупційних структур не покриває 2,9 млрд грн., витрачених на неї з 2015 по 2017 роки включно.
Станом на вересень 2017 року НАБУ та САП передали до суду 86 справ. З них рішення були винесені лише у 23 випадках, а законної сили набули всього 17 обвинувальних вироків. Експерт зазначив, що претензії щодо неефективної роботи стосуються і НАПК, яке, за весь період свого існування перевірило лише 11 декларацій народних депутатів за 2015 та 2016 роки (з 846 декларацій)
Повністю дослідження - https://uiamp.org.ua/uk/cref/vypusk-no3-z-cyklu-cina-reform-antykorupciyna-reforma
Презентация исследования Украинского института анализа и менеджмента политики №3 «Реформа антикоррупционной политики: стоимость, институты, результаты».
Антикоррупционная реформа на сегодняшний день не достигла своих целей. Это связано с такими факторами, как низкая квалификация сотрудников антикоррупционных органов, несовершенство законодательной базы, зависимость антикоррупционных структур от высших эшелонов власти и многие другие.
Результаты работы антикоррупционных органов явно не соответствуют затраченным на их деятельность средствам. Так, суммарные затраты на НАБУ, САП, и НАПК в период с 2015 по 2019 гг. (включая 2,2 млрд. гривен, заложенные на текущий год) составят 5,1 млрд. грн. На отчётном брифинге в начале 2018 г. руководители НАБУ и САП заявили, что с момента начала расследований, сумма компенсированного ущерба составила около 250 млн. грн. Кроме того, по их словам, «удалось предотвратить разворовывание ещё почти 2 млрд. грн., 1,5 из них – в сфере энергетики». Даже с учётом этого «предотвращения», эффект от деятельности НАБУ и САП не покрывает потраченных на неё в период с 2015 по 2017 гг. 2,9 млрд. гривен.
Количество раскрытых дел и «посадок» коррупционеров также не впечатляет. На начало 2018 г. из 300 лиц, заподозренных в коррупции за весь период деятельности НАБУ и САП, только относительно 165 граждан дела были переданы в суд. Из 86 уголовных производств, направленных в суд, решения были вынесены в 23 случаях, а в законную силу вступили лишь 17 обвинительных приговоров (данные на сентябрь 2017 г.).
Затягивание процесса создания антикоррупционного суда, провал реформы электронного декларирования, противостояние между различными элементами антикоррупционной системы (НАБУ против ГПУ и т.п.), а также – попытки властей направить процесс создания новых профильных структур в выгодное им русло – яркие свидетельства того, что в Украине сформировалось коррупционное «глубинное государство», в недрах которого принимаются основные решения политического и экономического характера и для которого внешние формы вроде правящей коалиции, президентских полномочий, и судебной системы, служат лишь ширмой.
Весь текст исследования - https://uiamp.org.ua/cenareform
Price of reforms. Anticorruption reform: cost and results Ruslan Bortnik
An anti-corruption court has not yet been established and is unlikely to work until 2020 (according to the presidential bill, 1 year is envisaged for its formation).
The amounts of funds returned to the NABU and SAP in the treasury do not cover the costs of their maintenance.
The percentage of convictions that came into force is 19.7% of the number of cases transferred to the NABU in court.
Out of 423 people's deputies, in just two years, 11 electronic declarations were submitted to NAPC.
Places in international anti-corruption ratings remain steadily low, and Western partners are unhappy with the progress of fighting corruption and attacks on anti-corruption activists.
Education reform in Ukraine: languages and minoritiesRuslan Bortnik
In September of 2017 in Ukraine a new law on education was adopted, according to which from 2018 only in the junior school will be able classes with the teaching of subjects by the languages of national minorities. Since the 5th year of study, the teaching of subjects in the languages of national minorities has been almost completely eliminated. Since 2020, education in Ukraine will become fully Ukrainian-studying. In the language of national minorities will be possible only individual subjects. 400 thousand pupils will no longer be able to study on their native languages
Ефективність роботи нового уряду та коаліціїRuslan Bortnik
Основні результати дослідження:
Більша частина експертів (52,4%) вважає, що Коаліції у Верховні Раді наразі не існує, лише третина вважає що вона є.
Експертне середовище констатує досить хитке становище нинішньої формальної Коаліції (БПП+НФ), котра зможе існувати лише в разі підтримки її діяльності позафракційними групами інтересів. Експерти зазначають, що до реальної (а не формальної) Коаліції в парламенті входитьБлок Петра Порошенка та Народний Фронт (85,7%), а також - депутатські групи Відродження та Воля народу з результатами 71,4% та 66,7% відповідно.
Більшість експертів вважає, що основними суб’єктами впливу на роботу Коаліції та діяльності Уряду будуть Президент (76,2% та 81% відповідно) іфінансово-промислові групи(71,4% та 66,7% відповідно). Також експерти констатують надзвичайно низький рівень впливу громадянського суспільства на політикум та високий рівень політичної безвідповідальності перед виборцями. Виходячи з результатів дослідження, слід зазначити, що Президент, на думку експертів, зосередив у своїх руках усю повноту як законодавчої, так і виконавчої влади, що може призвести до негативних наслідків для України.
Прогнозований рівень ефективності роботи нового складу Коаліції експерти оцінили посередньо, оцінку 3 (за 5 бальною шкалою)поставили 47,6% респондентів. Жоден з експертів не дав позитивної оцінки 4 або 5 з приводу своїх очікувань.
Оцінюючи рівень ефективності роботи нового Кабінету Міністрів України, експерти не плекають особливих надій, такдомінує оцінка 3 (задовільно) - 38,1%, але в цілому сукупність негативних оцінок значно більша половини з опитаних – 52,4%. Дані результати демонструють відсутність позитивних прогнозів з приводу змін у роботі Уряду.
Майбутню роботу Гройсмана на посту Прем’єра експерти оцінюють досить негативно. По 5-бальній шкалі негативні оцінки 1 та 2 в сумі складають більшість – 52,4%.Найвищу оцінку не поставив жоден з експертів. Такий результат ілюструє негативні очікування експертів з приводу реалізації програм, котрі були задекларовані новим головою уряду.
Також експерти спрогнозували дату можливих перевиборів. 57,1% вважає, що це відбудеться навесні 2017 року. Жоден з експертів не вірить, що Верховна Рада пропрацює повну каденцію. Більшість експертів (64,7%) вважають, що розпад коаліції ініціює дострокові вибори до парламенту.
Експертне середовище,по мірі прояву електоральних симпатій, які існують зараз в суспільстві,ранжувалосписок політичних партій наступним чином (від першого до останнього місця): 1.Батьківщина, 2. Опозиційний блок, 3. БПП, 4. Самопоміч, 5. Блок Саакашвілі (у разі створення та висування), 6. Радикальна партія, 7. Свобода, 8. УКРОП, 9. Відродження, 10. Наш край, 11 НФ, 12. Правий сектор, 13 .Заступ.
Results of work of the government of A. YatsenyukRuslan Bortnik
The results of expert research on a subject: "Results of work of the government of A. Yatsenyuk following the results of implementation of the program of activity of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine"
Cколько стоили выборы в Киеве и Киевской областиRuslan Bortnik
УИАМП и партнеры подсчитали финансовые затраты участников местных выборов в Киеве и области. Согласно отчетам, для некоторых кандидатов стоимость одного голоса достигала 900 долларов США, что почти равносильно выборам мэра Нью-Йорка
Your Go-To Press Release Newswire for Maximum Visibility and Impact.pdfPressReleasePower4
This downloadable guide explains why press releases are still important for businesses today and the challenges you might face with traditional distribution methods. Learn how [Your Website Name] offers a comprehensive solution for crafting compelling press releases, targeting the right media outlets, and maximizing visibility.
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
Here is Gabe Whitley's response to my defamation lawsuit for him calling me a rapist and perjurer in court documents.
You have to read it to believe it, but after you read it, you won't believe it. And I included eight examples of defamatory statements/
Youngest c m in India- Pema Khandu BiographyVoterMood
Pema Khandu, born on August 21, 1979, is an Indian politician and the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh. He is the son of former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Dorjee Khandu. Pema Khandu assumed office as the Chief Minister in July 2016, making him one of the youngest Chief Ministers in India at that time.
The Biggest Threat to Western Civilization _ Andy Blumenthal _ The Blogs.pdfAndy (Avraham) Blumenthal
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Essential Tools for Modern PR Business .pptxPragencyuk
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Acolyte Episodes review (TV series) The Acolyte. Learn about the influence of the program on the Star Wars world, as well as new characters and story twists.
2. 2
NGO «Ukrainian Institute of Politics»
Address for letters:
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Phone: +380637893257
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Scenario Development Team for Ukraine:
«Seven scenarios for Ukraine: from triumph to decline»
Kyiv | UIP | 2022
Authors:
Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Kirill Molchanov, Denis Gaevsky,
Vladislav Dzividzinsky , Andrey Timchenko, Hanna Dianova Chirakh
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Ukrainian Policy Institute or all of its experts.
Any reprint, publication, or reference to the study is possible only in
agreement with the team of authors..
4. 4
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of development scenarios is one of the critical
methods that help us “dispel the darkness” of the future,
make the unknown (and, accordingly, frightening) predictable
and operable, and prepare states, societies, economies, and
ordinary people for it. Also, “scripting” impels essential policy
changes that help bring closer a “good” future and avoid
adverse developments, especially in a situation where the
scientific world and the political environment still disagree
about the origins of the crisis and its current stage of
development.
The study’s authors proceed from the inviolability of
the principles of the territorial integrity of internationally
recognized borders and the rule of law of Ukraine. However,
among other things, they are forced to analyze scenarios for
their illegal violation. We also tried to expand the forecasting
horizon.
The primary scientific method of research was the
method of structural analysis and modeling, within which 22
internal and external factors were studied. The following
were identified as critical factors: the course of hostilities in
the Russian-Ukrainian war, the international situation, and
social sentiments. Structural modeling was carried out for
each of the scenarios.
During the work on the study, the team of authors
agreed on the inexpediency and impossibility of scientifically
based gradation of the likelihood of scenarios (due to the
significant amount of unknown variables).
We insist that the scenarios are not an attempt to
predict the future but to systematically analyze the
interactions of a set of factors that affect the development of
the state and society.
The UIP supports all efforts aimed at ending the war
and preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Ukraine.
5. 5
Scenario #1 - "Triumph"
Markers:
• complete military victory for Ukraine;
• the defeat of the Russian troops, their withdrawal
from the entire territory of Ukraine (including the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and ORDLO);
• internal political crisis in the Russian Federation;
• the possible collapse of the Russian Federation and
the transfer of power to the regional elites;
• Ukraine's claims to part of the territories of the
Russian Federation and leadership in the post-Soviet
space;
• strengthening the global dominance of the United
States and allies.
6. 6
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political - complete restoration of territorial
integrity and the possible accession of the Kuban and
the Belgorod region to Ukraine; formation of a new
national identity in Ukraine; membership in the EU
and NATO; one of the critical political roles in Eastern
Europe - similar to France or Germany; strengthening
the role of the military with the gradual restoration of
democratic governance and competitive elections;
• economic – inflow of reparations and investments
into the Ukrainian economy; industrial recovery and
new industrialization; the role of one of the critical
hubs of world trade; the rapid growth of the military-
industrial complex and the export of military services;
strengthening the position of a crucial agricultural
exporter in the world;
• social – new civic solidarity, high standard of living,
migration to Ukraine from Russia and all over the
post-Soviet space.
Implementation conditions:
The scenario is possible with the active assistance of
the United States, NATO, and the EU, providing
Ukraine with weapons and financial aid in the
required quantity to resume an active
counteroffensive in several directions at once
(Kherson, Donetsk, Kharkiv, etc.); achieving more
profound isolation of the Russian Federation,
including the deprivation of partnership with other
countries - China, Turkey, India, and so on.
Under the pressure of Western sanctions, an
economic recession inside Russia could occur, leading
to a faster depletion of military resources and
hastening its defeat. A "palace" change of power can
occur with the assistance of a part of the Russian
elites. The scenario with the internal resistance of the
Russians themselves to get rid of the Putin regime
looks less realistic at this stage.
7. 7
Scenario #2 - "Success"
Markers:
• the exhaustion of the Russian Federation in the war
with Ukraine;
• a string of tactical military defeats; withdrawal of
Russian troops from all territory of Ukraine;
• diplomatic definition of the future of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine;
• peace agreements between Ukraine and the new
government of the Russian Federation;
• preservation of the Russian Federation as a single
state during the change of power and the
liberalization of the political regime;
• the refusal of the Russian Federation from global
ambitions.
8. 8
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political – the restoration of the territorial
integrity of Ukraine; the high role of the military in the
political dominance of the presidential vertical and
the presidential party; new civic solidarity;
parliamentary and presidential elections; a gradual
increase in the role of Ukraine in Europe; EU
membership; probable NATO membership;
• economic – rapid economic recovery to pre-war
levels thanks to external support and investment. The
dominant industries are agriculture, metallurgy,
export of raw materials, trade, logistics, military
services, digitalization;
• social – a rapidly growing standard of living, the
return of refugees to Ukraine.
Conditions for implementation:
The scenario is possible while maintaining the unity of
the political elites and the successful counter-
offensive of Ukraine, as well as the depletion of the
military resources of the Russian Federation. The
complete liberation of the Kherson, Kharkiv,
Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions should
take place, after which hostilities will be suspended.
At the same time, Western partners should
strengthen the sanctions policy against the Russian
Federation and provide arms supplies and financial
assistance to Ukraine in the required amount.
9. 9
Scenario #3 - "Overweight"
Markers:
• repelling the Russian attack on Ukraine and
restoring the pre-war status quo;
• return to the borders until February 24, 2022;
• the permanent or temporary refusal of the Russian
Federation to continue the war against Ukraine;
• resumption of negotiations on the status of ORDLO;
• freezing the issue of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea; mitigation of global confrontation.
10. 10
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political – the risks of a new war and aggression
on the part of the Russian Federation; the actual
military neutrality of Ukraine upon accession to the
EU; the dominant presidential vertical in domestic
politics; limitedly competitive elections; high
popularity of the military;
• economic – partially recovering the economy at a
slow pace due to significant human, infrastructural
and financial losses. The dominant industries are
military services, agriculture, and the exploitation of
natural resources;
• social – the standard of living of citizens remains at
the level reached at the time of the end of the
war/suspension of hostilities by the Russian
Federation with the prospect of gradual growth in the
future, as well as the partial return of refugees to
Ukraine.
Implementation conditions:
The scenario is possible with an active counter-
offensive of Ukraine and a significant depletion of the
Russian army. There must be a complete liberation of
the Kherson region and parts of the Zaporizhzhia and
Kharkiv regions, after which there will be a suspension
of hostilities without any agreement or a deal with a
weak status leaving the parties in limbo. Agreements
between the US/NATO and the Russian Federation
and international mediators can play a decisive role.
11. 11
Scenario #4 – "Dead End"
Markers:
• prolonged low-level war and temporary freezing of
the conflict without political agreements;
• new agreements of the type "Minsk";
• both sides declare their "strategic victory";
• the front line/demarcation line acts as a conditional
border;
• continuation of the confrontation between the
Russian Federation and the United States with
partners.
12. 12
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political – the risks of a new war and aggression
from the Russian Federation remain; conditional
borders run along the front line; rigid presidential
vertical in Ukraine and lack of political competition;
formal elections; strong external influence on
Ukraine;
• economic – "subsidized" nature of the economy,
dependence on external financial support. The
economic situation in the country remains difficult: a
partial recovery is underway, but due to the lack of
stability and significant risks of defrosting the conflict,
it is impossible to restore the economy to the pre-war
level fully. In a more favorable situation are the
regions that do not border on the front line, where
the business remaining in Ukraine will mainly “flow.”
The dominant sectors of the economy are agriculture
and the military industry;
• social – the standard of living of citizens is slowly
recovering, and there is a partial return of refugees to
Ukraine. Still, the emigration of the most prosperous
and educated citizens continues.
Implementation conditions:
The scenario is possible if financial and military
assistance to Ukraine is sufficient to contain the
advance of the Russian army but not enough to
launch an active counteroffensive and liberate the
occupied territories. Ukraine and the Russian
Federation - will be primarily exhausted to continue
the "hot" phase of the war but are not ready to
negotiate effective peace agreements. It is also
possible that the world elites will reach a consensus
regarding freezing the military conflict in Ukraine.
13. 13
Scenario #5 - "Imbalance"
Markers:
• a problematic compromise on the "Istanbul option"
- Ukraine and the Russian Federation sign a peace
agreement or other agreements on the cessation of
hostilities without a complete defeat/victory of one of
the parties;
• military democracy, the possibility of a new war;
• returning to the borders before February 24 and
accepting part of the Russian demands for a non-bloc
status;
• freezing "territorial" issues; local compromise
between the Russian Federation and the United States
with partners.
14. 14
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political – the Russian army returns to the
borders on February 23, 2022; several states of the
world provide security guarantees to Ukraine (they
may include the United States, Great Britain, France,
Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, Israel) that
do not apply to Crimea and ORDLO; Ukraine limits its
sovereignty in the matter of international
cooperation in the field of security and guarantees it
is not joining NATO or other military alliances; the
prospects of joining the EU remain; internal political
competition is gradually being restored, and
competitive presidential and parliamentary elections
are being held; political disunity ;
• economic – there is a gradual economic recovery
thanks to external support. Agriculture, the
exploitation of natural resources, the service sector,
the military sector, and trade remain the dominant
sectors of the economy;
• social – citizens' living standard is gradually
improving, and most refugees return to Ukraine.
Implementation Conditions:
A deadlock on the fronts (optional) could lead to
such a scenario, which could create conditions for
the resumption of the peace negotiation and
settlement. At the same time, tacit agreements
between the US and EU elites between themselves
and the Russian Federation are possible that the war
in Ukraine must be stopped since the global security
crisis is acute, and the world economy is suffering
significant losses. International mediators - China,
Turkey, and other countries- can play an important
role.
15. 15
Scenario #6 - "Failure"
Markers:
• the capture of the Russian Federation of the eastern
and southern regions of Ukraine while maintaining
Ukrainian statehood in the rest of the territory;
• forced asymmetrical concessions by Ukraine with or
without signing a peace agreement;
• the likelihood of a new war;
• continuation of the confrontation between the
Russian Federation and the United States with
partners.
16. 16
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political – the Russian Federation reserves all
the occupied territories; high level of external
control; restrictions on the sovereignty of Ukraine in
the issue of international cooperation in the field of
security; domestic power in the hands of the military
and militarized elites; political instability; elections
are nominal;
• economic – Ukraine falls into political and
economic dependence on the Russian Federation
and the West; the exclusively raw-material type of
economy remains;
• social – continued decline in citizens’ standard of
living; the mass exodus of people abroad.
Implementation conditions:
The scenario is possible in case of a significant
reduction or complete cessation of military and
financial assistance by Western partners, which can
lead to depletion of resources and weakening of
Ukraine. Under such conditions, the troops of the
Russian Federation will retain the possibility of
moving deep into the territory of Ukraine, which will
lead to its gradual capture.
17. 17
Scenario #7 - "Decline"
Markers:
• achievement of the Russian Federation of its goals
by military means;
• occupation of all or most of the territory of Ukraine;
continuation of local hostilities;
• chaos and anarchization of management processes;
• severe humanitarian crisis;
• the ongoing global conflict between the Russian
Federation and the United States with partners;
• yusecurity crisis for the EU.
18. 18
Possible consequences for Ukraine:
• the political – the formation of quasi-state
formations on the territory of Ukraine by the forces of
the Russian Federation; maintaining control of the
legitimate government of Ukraine only over part of
the territory; the dominant external dependence of
the legitimate government; democratic elections are
not held (although formal plebiscites are not ruled
out); absolute power is in the hands of military
commanders; authoritarian and totalitarian regimes;
political fragmentation ;
• economic – the destruction of a complex economy;
enhanced exploitation of raw materials and resource
base; natural type of management; dependence on
imports of critical goods;
• social – citizens' standard of living is critically
reduced; a sharp increase in mortality, morbidity, and
crime rates; the most productive (educated and
wealthy) of the citizens emigrate.
Implementation conditions:
The scenario is possible in the event of the significant
military success of the Russian Federation (with the
involvement of allies), including the use of nuclear or
other non-conventional weapons, as well as due to a
significant reduction or complete cessation of military
and financial assistance from Western partners. At
the same time, the Russian Federation remains under
sanctions, as a result of which the standard of living in
the occupied territories will also be deficient.
19. 19
AFTERWORD
The Ukrainian Institute of Politics sincerely thanks all the
participants of the study, the team of authors, the editorial
and design team, as well as those who made the publication
of this research material possible.
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