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Classification of

Quantum Repeater Attacks
Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter
at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Presentation Outline
• Quantum Repeater and its elements
• Model of Quantum Repeater
• Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks
2
Quantum Repeater and

its elements
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Quantum Application and Repeater
• A quantum application, or its server will use quantum state
teleported from client to do something interesting
• To create Quantum Internet, we need to have a way to
application client to send a quantum state to a quantum
application server
• Quantum repeater, which take the roles of a router in
classical internet, is a key to create Quantum Internet
4
© Shigeya Suzuki / Keio University. All Rights Reserved
Example
5
QNIC
QKD Device
QNIC QNIC
Repeater
QNIC
QKD Device
Firbre/Freespace
Classical
IKE
daemon
QKD
plugin
IKE
daemon
QKD
pluginQKD level exchange
Classical(IP)
IKE level exchange
API call/RPC
Device
API
Device
API
Host
(on startup init)
Host
(on startup init)
IKE
API
IKE
API
API or
Interface
QNIC QNIC
Repeater
Quantum
Socket
I/F
Quantum
Socket
I/F
Inter-Repeater
Entanglement/Purification
Protocols
IPsec Connection (encrypted, secured)
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Quantum Repeater Elements
• Qubits
• Fidelity of a Qubit
• Entanglement
• Bell Pair and Teleportation
• Fidelity and Purification
• Entanglement Swapping
• Multi-hop entanglement by Purification and Entanglement
swap
• Quantum Repeater
6
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Qubits
• Each qubits represents single quantum state
• May hold either simple state or complex states like
superposition
• Measuring the state of a qubit cause state collapse
7
x
y
z
1
0
By Glosser.ca, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
Bloch Sphere
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Fidelity of a Qubit
• How well the qubit hardware correctly represents the state we
want to set is important
• Described by the fidelity of the qubit
– e.g., you want set direction of the spin of an electron, and how close
the spin actually points to your desired direction is the fidelity
• Essentially, it’s the probability that the state does what you
want when you use/measure it
8
x
y
z
1
0
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Entanglement
• By using some known procedure, it is possible to create
entangled pairs of qubits
• Some operations on one entangled qubit affects the other
➡ does not mean we can remotely flip a qubit!
• Happens over any distance
➡ cannot be used to send data faster than light
9
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Bell Pair and Teleportation
• Bell Pair, which is a kind of entanglement state, can be used
to teleport one quantum state from one side of the
entanglement to the other side
• Current known scheme allow to create Bell Pair among two
distant qubits connected via a fiber
• Requires supporting

classical communication
• Destroys entanglement
➡ so making more

entanglement is the work

of the network!
10
(1) A coupled with B, then
both A and B measured
(2) Apply operation by the measurement
result transforms C to state of A
A
B
C
Cnew
1
2
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Fidelity and Purification
• Just created entanglement between two nodes may not have
desired fidelity
• Various qubit operations may diminish fidelity, too
• To use for communication, either improve fidelity of the qubit
or apply error correction scheme using multiple qubits
• Purification protocol creates single better fidelity entangled
pair from two entangled pairs
11
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Entanglement Swapping
• Entanglement swapping operation extends distance of
entangled qubits by splicing two pairs of entanglements into
one
• After entanglement swapping, qubits in the middle node does
not provide any role, can be reused
12
Node A Node B Node C
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Multi-hop entanglement

by Purification and Entanglement swap
• By using purification and entanglement swap repeatedly in
coordinated manner among nodes, we can create entangled
qubits between any two user specified nodes
13
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Qubits - security point of view
• When Alice and Bob want to communicate, we want
– Detect existence of any eavesdropper
– To be sure Alice and Bob are actually communicating
14
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Detection of eavesdroppers
• By applying quantum tomography on randomly select
entangled qubits to detect eavesdropper
• But If an eavesdropper can predict the selection of qubits for
quantum tomography, he/she can remain undetectable by not
touching the selected qubit
15
Model of Quantum Repeater System
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Quantum Repeater Node
17
QNIC
QNIC qubitsRealtime Controller
QNIC
QNIC qubitsRealtime Controller
Quantum LinksQuantum Repeater Node
Classical Links
To
Other
QNodes
To
Classical
Network
Buffer qubits
QBuffer
Realtime Controller
CNIC
Node Controller
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Quantum Application Node
18
QNIC
QNIC qubitsRealtime Controller
Quantum LinksQuantum Application Node
Classical Links
To
Other
QNodes
To
Classical
Network
Term. qubits
QApplication
Realtime Controller
CNIC
Node Controller
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Peculiarities of Quantum Repeaters
• Quantum operation require classical communications
• Requires realtime operation
• Hop by hop decision on each router is not feasible
19
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Quantum operation require
classical communications
• Many of the operation on entangled pair, or teleportation
require communication using classical information system
20
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Requires Realtime operation
• Operation should be done in realtime, synchronized manner
– All of the operation onto qubits must be controlled by realtime
manner
– Some of the operation among nodes should be done in accurately
synchronized clocks
21
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Hop by hop decision is not feasible
• (Extending entanglement one hop at a time is not feasible)
• Creation of end-to-end entanglement require repeated and
coordinated creation of entanglements among participating
nodes in between two end nodes
– Creation of an entangled pair require physical connection
– Qubit’s fidelity decays as time passes
• Purification require two entangled pairs on same nodes
22
Classification of Attacks
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Elements Grouping
wrt attack vector characteristics
• Qubits
– Terminal qubits
– Interface qubits
– Buffer qubits
• Channels
– In-node quantum channels
– Inter-node quantum channels
– Inter-node classical channels
• Classical node resources
24
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Qubits
• Terminal qubits
– Qubits used as interface to application. Has direct interface to
application, but no direct interface to outside of the node
• Interface qubits
– Qubits which has direct interface to outside of the node
• Buffer qubits
– Qubits which works in between terminal qubits and interface qubits
to work as buffers. No direct interface to application or outside of
the node
25
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Channels
• In-node quantum channels
• Inter-node quantum channels
• Inter-node classical channels
26
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Classical node resources
• Node has usual classical components such as:
– Power supply and external power
– Clocks
– Buses
– etc, etc…
27
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Relationship with RFID system
• Quantum repeater systems and RFID systems has similar
properties
• Both systems are tightly coupled hybrid systems of sensing
and software elements, and also expect to make use of the
effects of interaction with the outside world
• Due to this, We have referenced some of discussion on
attack to RFID systems
28
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Attack to Qubits
29
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Terminal qubits Eavesdropper
detectable
Possibility of out-of-
system attacks
Vulnerable to direct
attacks and its
variants, like
classical system
Interface qubits Eavesdropper
detectable but direct
attack to Quantum
interface
demonstrated
(same as above) (same as above)
Buffer qubits Eavesdropper
detectable
(same as above) (same as above)
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Attack to Quantum Channels
30
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
In-node quantum
channels
Safe N/A Vulnerable to direct
attacks and its
variants,
like classical system
Inter-node quantum
channels
Eavesdropper
detectable but direct
attack to Quantum
interface
demonstrated
N/A Vulnerable to direct
attacks and its
variants,
like classical system
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Attack to Classical Channels and
Classical node resources
31
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Inter-node classical
channels
Vulnerable to
Classical
Confidentiality attack
possible
N/A Vulnerable to
Classical Availability
attack possible
Classical node
resources
Vulnerable to
Classical
Confidentiality attack
possible
Vulnerable to
Classical Integrity
attack possible
Vulnerable to
Classical Availability
attack possible
© Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved
Summary
• In this paper, we provided an model of a quantum repeater network and
grouped elements of them, then, provided an analysis on a quantum
repeater architecture based on our current knowledge
– On confidentiality, quantum repeater systems have great advantage
by applying quantum tomography to detect third party eavesdropper
– On integrity and availability, a quantum repeater system seems to be
not so different from a classical network system
• Since quantum repeater system heavily depends on classical
information system, classical part is a key to make quantum repeater
system secure
32
This research has been supported by

Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development,

Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant 144051
Acknowledgements

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Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks

  • 1. Classification of
 Quantum Repeater Attacks Shigeya Suzuki, Rodney Van Meter at SENT ’15, 8th February 2015, San Diego CA, USA
  • 2. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Presentation Outline • Quantum Repeater and its elements • Model of Quantum Repeater • Classification of Quantum Repeater Attacks 2
  • 4. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Quantum Application and Repeater • A quantum application, or its server will use quantum state teleported from client to do something interesting • To create Quantum Internet, we need to have a way to application client to send a quantum state to a quantum application server • Quantum repeater, which take the roles of a router in classical internet, is a key to create Quantum Internet 4
  • 5. © Shigeya Suzuki / Keio University. All Rights Reserved Example 5 QNIC QKD Device QNIC QNIC Repeater QNIC QKD Device Firbre/Freespace Classical IKE daemon QKD plugin IKE daemon QKD pluginQKD level exchange Classical(IP) IKE level exchange API call/RPC Device API Device API Host (on startup init) Host (on startup init) IKE API IKE API API or Interface QNIC QNIC Repeater Quantum Socket I/F Quantum Socket I/F Inter-Repeater Entanglement/Purification Protocols IPsec Connection (encrypted, secured)
  • 6. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Quantum Repeater Elements • Qubits • Fidelity of a Qubit • Entanglement • Bell Pair and Teleportation • Fidelity and Purification • Entanglement Swapping • Multi-hop entanglement by Purification and Entanglement swap • Quantum Repeater 6
  • 7. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Qubits • Each qubits represents single quantum state • May hold either simple state or complex states like superposition • Measuring the state of a qubit cause state collapse 7 x y z 1 0 By Glosser.ca, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons Bloch Sphere
  • 8. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Fidelity of a Qubit • How well the qubit hardware correctly represents the state we want to set is important • Described by the fidelity of the qubit – e.g., you want set direction of the spin of an electron, and how close the spin actually points to your desired direction is the fidelity • Essentially, it’s the probability that the state does what you want when you use/measure it 8 x y z 1 0
  • 9. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Entanglement • By using some known procedure, it is possible to create entangled pairs of qubits • Some operations on one entangled qubit affects the other ➡ does not mean we can remotely flip a qubit! • Happens over any distance ➡ cannot be used to send data faster than light 9
  • 10. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Bell Pair and Teleportation • Bell Pair, which is a kind of entanglement state, can be used to teleport one quantum state from one side of the entanglement to the other side • Current known scheme allow to create Bell Pair among two distant qubits connected via a fiber • Requires supporting
 classical communication • Destroys entanglement ➡ so making more
 entanglement is the work
 of the network! 10 (1) A coupled with B, then both A and B measured (2) Apply operation by the measurement result transforms C to state of A A B C Cnew 1 2
  • 11. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Fidelity and Purification • Just created entanglement between two nodes may not have desired fidelity • Various qubit operations may diminish fidelity, too • To use for communication, either improve fidelity of the qubit or apply error correction scheme using multiple qubits • Purification protocol creates single better fidelity entangled pair from two entangled pairs 11
  • 12. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Entanglement Swapping • Entanglement swapping operation extends distance of entangled qubits by splicing two pairs of entanglements into one • After entanglement swapping, qubits in the middle node does not provide any role, can be reused 12 Node A Node B Node C
  • 13. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Multi-hop entanglement
 by Purification and Entanglement swap • By using purification and entanglement swap repeatedly in coordinated manner among nodes, we can create entangled qubits between any two user specified nodes 13
  • 14. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Qubits - security point of view • When Alice and Bob want to communicate, we want – Detect existence of any eavesdropper – To be sure Alice and Bob are actually communicating 14
  • 15. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Detection of eavesdroppers • By applying quantum tomography on randomly select entangled qubits to detect eavesdropper • But If an eavesdropper can predict the selection of qubits for quantum tomography, he/she can remain undetectable by not touching the selected qubit 15
  • 16. Model of Quantum Repeater System
  • 17. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Quantum Repeater Node 17 QNIC QNIC qubitsRealtime Controller QNIC QNIC qubitsRealtime Controller Quantum LinksQuantum Repeater Node Classical Links To Other QNodes To Classical Network Buffer qubits QBuffer Realtime Controller CNIC Node Controller
  • 18. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Quantum Application Node 18 QNIC QNIC qubitsRealtime Controller Quantum LinksQuantum Application Node Classical Links To Other QNodes To Classical Network Term. qubits QApplication Realtime Controller CNIC Node Controller
  • 19. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Peculiarities of Quantum Repeaters • Quantum operation require classical communications • Requires realtime operation • Hop by hop decision on each router is not feasible 19
  • 20. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Quantum operation require classical communications • Many of the operation on entangled pair, or teleportation require communication using classical information system 20
  • 21. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Requires Realtime operation • Operation should be done in realtime, synchronized manner – All of the operation onto qubits must be controlled by realtime manner – Some of the operation among nodes should be done in accurately synchronized clocks 21
  • 22. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Hop by hop decision is not feasible • (Extending entanglement one hop at a time is not feasible) • Creation of end-to-end entanglement require repeated and coordinated creation of entanglements among participating nodes in between two end nodes – Creation of an entangled pair require physical connection – Qubit’s fidelity decays as time passes • Purification require two entangled pairs on same nodes 22
  • 24. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Elements Grouping wrt attack vector characteristics • Qubits – Terminal qubits – Interface qubits – Buffer qubits • Channels – In-node quantum channels – Inter-node quantum channels – Inter-node classical channels • Classical node resources 24
  • 25. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Qubits • Terminal qubits – Qubits used as interface to application. Has direct interface to application, but no direct interface to outside of the node • Interface qubits – Qubits which has direct interface to outside of the node • Buffer qubits – Qubits which works in between terminal qubits and interface qubits to work as buffers. No direct interface to application or outside of the node 25
  • 26. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Channels • In-node quantum channels • Inter-node quantum channels • Inter-node classical channels 26
  • 27. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Classical node resources • Node has usual classical components such as: – Power supply and external power – Clocks – Buses – etc, etc… 27
  • 28. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Relationship with RFID system • Quantum repeater systems and RFID systems has similar properties • Both systems are tightly coupled hybrid systems of sensing and software elements, and also expect to make use of the effects of interaction with the outside world • Due to this, We have referenced some of discussion on attack to RFID systems 28
  • 29. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Attack to Qubits 29 Confidentiality Integrity Availability Terminal qubits Eavesdropper detectable Possibility of out-of- system attacks Vulnerable to direct attacks and its variants, like classical system Interface qubits Eavesdropper detectable but direct attack to Quantum interface demonstrated (same as above) (same as above) Buffer qubits Eavesdropper detectable (same as above) (same as above)
  • 30. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Attack to Quantum Channels 30 Confidentiality Integrity Availability In-node quantum channels Safe N/A Vulnerable to direct attacks and its variants, like classical system Inter-node quantum channels Eavesdropper detectable but direct attack to Quantum interface demonstrated N/A Vulnerable to direct attacks and its variants, like classical system
  • 31. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Attack to Classical Channels and Classical node resources 31 Confidentiality Integrity Availability Inter-node classical channels Vulnerable to Classical Confidentiality attack possible N/A Vulnerable to Classical Availability attack possible Classical node resources Vulnerable to Classical Confidentiality attack possible Vulnerable to Classical Integrity attack possible Vulnerable to Classical Availability attack possible
  • 32. © Shigeya Suzuki, All Rights Reserved Summary • In this paper, we provided an model of a quantum repeater network and grouped elements of them, then, provided an analysis on a quantum repeater architecture based on our current knowledge – On confidentiality, quantum repeater systems have great advantage by applying quantum tomography to detect third party eavesdropper – On integrity and availability, a quantum repeater system seems to be not so different from a classical network system • Since quantum repeater system heavily depends on classical information system, classical part is a key to make quantum repeater system secure 32 This research has been supported by
 Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development,
 Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant 144051 Acknowledgements