Ship operations can impact navigational safety due to factors like fatigue, stress, commercial pressures, and reduced watch levels. Root causes of many accidents are found to be operational exigencies that pressure masters to take shortcuts or unsafe actions to maintain schedules. Case studies of accidents like collisions of Baltic Ace and Corvus J, and MSC Chitra and Khalijia 3 illustrate how stresses of ship operations and commercial pressures can contribute to human errors.

1. Impact of Ship OperationsImpact of Ship Operations
on Navigational Safetyon Navigational Safety
AOMM Seminar on “Role ofAOMM Seminar on “Role of
Ship operations in Safety”Ship operations in Safety”
99thth
December 2012December 2012
Capt Ashok MenonCapt Ashok Menon

2. Safe NavigationSafe Navigation
► Safer ShipsSafer Ships
- safety of the ship and lives- safety of the ship and lives
►Protection of environmentProtection of environment
► Protection of PropertyProtection of Property
►CommercialCommercial
- Financial Loss- Financial Loss
- Loss of Time- Loss of Time

5. ► Human error often touted as theHuman error often touted as the
culprit for 75% of navigationalculprit for 75% of navigational
errors.errors.
► Reasons are many:Reasons are many:
- Negligence / Ignorance- Negligence / Ignorance
- Misinterpretation of ROR- Misinterpretation of ROR
- Wrong judgement- Wrong judgement
- Personal factors- Personal factors

6. ► Root Cause analysisRoot Cause analysis
Most important of these rootMost important of these root
causes – Operational exigenciescauses – Operational exigencies
such as:such as:
- Fatigue and stress- Fatigue and stress
- Commercial pressures- Commercial pressures
- Fear of missing ETA, Tide, Pilots,- Fear of missing ETA, Tide, Pilots,
etc.etc.
- VTMS errors- VTMS errors

7. Fatigue and StressFatigue and Stress
► STCW requires rest hours of atSTCW requires rest hours of at
least 77 hours per week and 10 hrsleast 77 hours per week and 10 hrs
per day, of which 6 hrs must beper day, of which 6 hrs must be
continuous.continuous.
►This is a difficult task with theThis is a difficult task with the
existing manning level, especiallyexisting manning level, especially
in ports. Forces ships personnel toin ports. Forces ships personnel to
work in excess of the rest hourswork in excess of the rest hours
requirement.requirement.

8. ►THE EFFECT OF STRESS!!!THE EFFECT OF STRESS!!!

9. ► EFFECT OF SHIP OPERATIONSEFFECT OF SHIP OPERATIONS
►We often neglect the effect thatWe often neglect the effect that
continuous ship operations have oncontinuous ship operations have on
the decision making andthe decision making and
judgmental capabilities of thejudgmental capabilities of the
watchkeeping Officer and Master.watchkeeping Officer and Master.
►The pressures of day-to-dayThe pressures of day-to-day
operations has been found to beoperations has been found to be
the root cause behind manythe root cause behind many
navigational accidents.navigational accidents.

10. ► Commercial PressuresCommercial Pressures
-- Various types of pressures are-- Various types of pressures are
exerted on the Master, forcing himexerted on the Master, forcing him
to take short cuts, unsafe actionsto take short cuts, unsafe actions
and wrong decisionsand wrong decisions
- Such pressures include loading to a- Such pressures include loading to a
draft deemed unsafe for thedraft deemed unsafe for the
destination port, trying to take shortdestination port, trying to take short
cuts in order to save fuel etc.cuts in order to save fuel etc.

11. ► Over-speeding to maintain time.Over-speeding to maintain time.
- Ships need to maintain ETAs, due- Ships need to maintain ETAs, due
to pilot timings, tidal restrictions,to pilot timings, tidal restrictions,
maintaining vessel schedules, etc.maintaining vessel schedules, etc.
- Thus Masters are tempted not to- Thus Masters are tempted not to
reduce the ships speed even inreduce the ships speed even in
situations where such reduction issituations where such reduction is
required for navigational safety.required for navigational safety.
►Leads to collisions, close quarterLeads to collisions, close quarter
situations groundings due to squatsituations groundings due to squat

12. ► Distractions on the bridgeDistractions on the bridge
- PaperworkPaperwork
- Idle GossipIdle Gossip
- VHF Communication / Satellite CallsVHF Communication / Satellite Calls
- Chart correctionsChart corrections

13. ► Reduction of watch levelsReduction of watch levels
- Adequate watch levels not maintd- Adequate watch levels not maintd
due to crew on other jobsdue to crew on other jobs
- Chief Officer busy with hold- Chief Officer busy with hold
cleaning etc, watchkeeperscleaning etc, watchkeepers
keeping six-on and six off watchkeeping six-on and six off watch
causing fatiguecausing fatigue
- Only Watchkeeping Officer on- Only Watchkeeping Officer on
bridge in daytime (allowed underbridge in daytime (allowed under
SOLAS) not for all situations.SOLAS) not for all situations.

14.  CASE STUDIESCASE STUDIES

15.  Collision Between the CarCollision Between the Car
Carrier Baltic Ace and theCarrier Baltic Ace and the
Container shipContainer ship
Corvus J off Netherlands coast inCorvus J off Netherlands coast in
the freezing waters of the Norththe freezing waters of the North
Sea on 6Sea on 6thth
Dec 2012Dec 2012

16.  The bahamian-flagged Baltic AceThe bahamian-flagged Baltic Ace
was headed to Finland, fromwas headed to Finland, from
Zeebrugge, when it collided about 40Zeebrugge, when it collided about 40
miles off the coast of the netherlandsmiles off the coast of the netherlands
with Cyprus-flagged Corvus j, whichwith Cyprus-flagged Corvus j, which
was on its way to Antwerpwas on its way to Antwerp

17.  CASE STUDIESCASE STUDIES

19. The Baltic ace which was hit on herThe Baltic ace which was hit on her
port side was split open.port side was split open.
She started to take in water and soonShe started to take in water and soon
capsized.capsized.
Six of her crew died and a furtherSix of her crew died and a further
seven are missing, presumably deaseven are missing, presumably dea
in the icy waters.in the icy waters.

21. ►The Baltic Ace had the Corvus J on herThe Baltic Ace had the Corvus J on her
own port side, while the Corvus J hadown port side, while the Corvus J had
the Baltic Ace fine on her starboardthe Baltic Ace fine on her starboard
bow.bow.
►Thus it appears that the Corvus J wasThus it appears that the Corvus J was
the give way vessel while the Balticthe give way vessel while the Baltic
Ace was the stand on vessel.Ace was the stand on vessel.

23. ►MSC Chitra – Khalijia 3MSC Chitra – Khalijia 3
7th August, 20107th August, 2010 -- off Mumbai portoff Mumbai port
- MSC Chitra collided with Khalijia 3.MSC Chitra collided with Khalijia 3.
- MSC Chitra subsequentlyMSC Chitra subsequently
capsized, causing hugecapsized, causing huge
environmental pollutionenvironmental pollution
- Many containers had IMDG cargoMany containers had IMDG cargo
which caused unknown damage towhich caused unknown damage to
the ecology of the Indian coastline.the ecology of the Indian coastline.

24. ►The investigation launched by DG:The investigation launched by DG:
► Master of Khalijia 3Master of Khalijia 3 was under awas under a
long term fatiguelong term fatigue and was stressedand was stressed
due todue to the vessel having beenthe vessel having been
grounded for several days prior togrounded for several days prior to
entering Mumbai portentering Mumbai port - decision- decision
makingmaking
- Master did not reduce speed inMaster did not reduce speed in
order to pick up the pilot as well asorder to pick up the pilot as well as
not to miss the tide.not to miss the tide.

25. ► Master of MSC Chitra guilty ofMaster of MSC Chitra guilty of
human error in not following ROR.human error in not following ROR.
►Although he was the stand-onAlthough he was the stand-on
vessel, he was not relieved of hisvessel, he was not relieved of his
obligation to keep clear.obligation to keep clear.
►Was traveling at full speed.Was traveling at full speed.
►Did not take cognizance of erraticDid not take cognizance of erratic
manoeuvre by Khalijis 3manoeuvre by Khalijis 3
►Both Masters certificatesBoth Masters certificates
suspended.suspended.

27. MV RENA GROUNDINGMV RENA GROUNDING
►236-metre (774 ft) 236-metre (774 ft) PanamaxPanamax
container ship container ship
►Grounded on Astrolabe Reef, offGrounded on Astrolabe Reef, off
New Zealand, a charted andNew Zealand, a charted and
prominent reef at 2.20am on Mayprominent reef at 2.20am on May
5, 2011 whilst doing over 17 knots.5, 2011 whilst doing over 17 knots.
►Ship broke into two causing muchShip broke into two causing much
pollution.pollution.

28. ► The investigation it was revealedThe investigation it was revealed
that the root cause of this disasterthat the root cause of this disaster
was the Master’s decision to take awas the Master’s decision to take a
short cut in order to arrive in timeshort cut in order to arrive in time
and maintain his ETA.and maintain his ETA.
►Charged with negligence andCharged with negligence and
found guilty.found guilty.
►Probably commercial pressuresProbably commercial pressures
forced him to take the shortcut.forced him to take the shortcut.

31. M.V. PRATIBHA CAUVERYM.V. PRATIBHA CAUVERY
►On October 31st, 2012, the tankerOn October 31st, 2012, the tanker
Pratibha Cauvery drifted from herPratibha Cauvery drifted from her
anchorage under the influence ofanchorage under the influence of
the cyclone Neelam and groundedthe cyclone Neelam and grounded
off Elliot’s Beach in Chennai.off Elliot’s Beach in Chennai.
► Vessel had very less fuel,Vessel had very less fuel,
practically in un-pumpable range,practically in un-pumpable range,
hence could not manoeuvre.hence could not manoeuvre.

32.  MT Pratibha Cauvery was not sea-MT Pratibha Cauvery was not sea-
worthy since October 2 and hadworthy since October 2 and had
been berthed at the Chennai Portbeen berthed at the Chennai Port
since a month.since a month.
 There was no supply of fuel andThere was no supply of fuel and
provisions to the ship since then.provisions to the ship since then.
 The Port asked the ship to vacateThe Port asked the ship to vacate
the anchorage before the onset ofthe anchorage before the onset of
the storm but she could not do so.the storm but she could not do so.

33. Thus Master was blamed for notThus Master was blamed for not
leaving the port as required andleaving the port as required and
hence causing the ship to drift andhence causing the ship to drift and
ground.ground.

36. Majestic Bulker COLLISIONMajestic Bulker COLLISION
►The Majestic Bulker, a PanamaxThe Majestic Bulker, a Panamax
Bulk Carrier collided with anotherBulk Carrier collided with another
bulk carrier in good visibility andbulk carrier in good visibility and
open waters, at full speed.open waters, at full speed.
► Both ships were declared totalBoth ships were declared total
constructive loss and both Mastersconstructive loss and both Masters
charged with negligence.charged with negligence.
►There was no loss of life, butThere was no loss of life, but
pollution occurred.pollution occurred.

38. ►The vessel which was supposed toThe vessel which was supposed to
give way was cleaning her cargogive way was cleaning her cargo
holds prior to loading grain at a U.holds prior to loading grain at a U.
S port. Thus the two young officersS port. Thus the two young officers
were alternating watches.were alternating watches.
►Keeping six hours continuousKeeping six hours continuous
watch can be very difficult and thewatch can be very difficult and the
second officer sat on the pilot chairsecond officer sat on the pilot chair
and promptly went to sleep at fiveand promptly went to sleep at five
in the morning till the collision.in the morning till the collision.

39. ►Thus we see that there are many otherThus we see that there are many other
operational reasons for navigationaloperational reasons for navigational
incidents which need to be looked intoincidents which need to be looked into
and preventive actions taken to have aand preventive actions taken to have a
repetition of these.repetition of these.

40. ►THANK YOUTHANK YOU