The document discusses the current state of security research, emphasizing challenges faced by exploit writers and the complexities of vulnerability coordination in the industry. It highlights myths about security, the growing market for vulnerabilities, and the necessity of building effective research teams within companies. Additionally, it calls for better understanding and resource allocation to enhance security practices in a rapidly evolving threat landscape.

1. Behind The Scenes
Security Research
Rodrigo Rubira Branco (BSDaemon)
Director, Vulnerability & Malware Research Labs
rbranco *noSPAM* qualys.com
http://twitter.com/bsdaemon

2. Agenda
Objectives
Introduction
Security research as a worldwide wype
– Where are the real hackers?
– What is the difference between the public exploits and the private ones?
Security conferences around the globe
The problems in the security industry
Future
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 2

3. Objectives
Discuss about security problems and security industry
problems
Demonstrate how vulnerability finding works (or is
supposed to work) – focusing on building the team
Explain the challenges the exploit writer faces nowadays
Be fun?
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 3

4. Security nowadays
Buggy programs deployed on critical servers
Rapidly-evolving threats, attackers and tools
(exploitation frameworks)
Lack of developers training, resources and people to fix
problems and create safe code
That’s why we are here today, right?
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 4

5. Security nowadays – 0day challenge
First host All vulnerable hosts
attacked attacked
Reaction time
Slammer: 10 mins
Future worms: < 1 minute [Staniford et. al. 2002]
“0day Statistics
Average 0day lifetime:
348 days
Shortest life:
99 days
Longest life:
1080 (3 years)"
- Justine Aitel
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 5

6. !exploitable
_declspec(naked) int main() {
_asm {
mov eax, 0x41414141
call eax
}
}
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 6

7. !exploitable
This is incorrectly classified as EXPLOITABLE because
the tool always assume that the attacker has control over
all the input operands
So, what is the point? The point is that security research
is a long-way run, shortcuts will only give you tainted
information (hidden joke)
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 7

8. State Transition for Memory Corruption
Case 1
(green):
Format String
Case 2 and 3
(red and
blue): buffer
overflow
Case 4
(purple):
unpredictable
Source:
Automatic Diagnosis and c: corrupting instruction
Response to Memory t: takeover instruction
Corruption Vulnerabilities f: faulting instruction
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 8

9. Source:
http://www.h2hc.com.br/repositorio/2008/Nico.pdf
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 9

10. The Extinction of Hackers - FX
FX wrote the article long ago (well, I only have a copy of
the file so didn’t manage to get the right timing and just
forgot to ask him before coming)
He seems to be actually right:
– Kids use the computers for games
– Things are a lot easier to do nowadays (in means that you don’t
really need to know how to use the computer to actually do
something useful with it)
– Things are a lot more complex nowadays (yeah, in the opposite
direction of the other statement) -> Exploiting software is
becoming a complex task (no easy 0x41414141 anymore)
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 10

11. Vulnerability Coordination?
Basically is a mess (but it is getting better)
Lots of conflicts (and lots of conflicts of interest)
Difficult to really scientificaly measure the impacts of any
decision:
– Full disclosure (everybody is aware, instead of only the person
who is already exploiting it)
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 11

12. Vulnerability Coordination
Case 1: Security issue affecting 3 vendors. What one of
them replies?
– “We don’t know how to fix the code, do you mind in ask to the
other vendor to SHARE the patch?”
Case 2: Security issue in an ‘encryption’ mechanism of
a security software. What the vendor replies?
– “Ok, we going to change the documentation to say it is not
encryption”
Case 3: Security issue in a web software. What the
vendor says about it?
– “There is no security issue. Millions of people use the software
and none reported the problem before”
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 12

13. Who buys?
Because everybody is buying vulnerabilities, it is
becoming difficult to see vulnerability discussions on
public
Reliable/good exploits are not available for free anymore
(at large)
Governments, private sector, brokers, criminals
– They all want our 0days
– Legislation helps some countries
– This is destroying the new generations
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 13

14. Security Myth #1: The ‘EXPERT’
The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism – George Akerlof
Asymetric knowledge
– Complex subject
– Industry defines its own standards
– Politics defines ‘auditing’ (SOX)
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 14

15. Security Myth #2: There is no 0day risk
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach -
Gary S. Becker
There is no 100% security
– Since there is no guarantees, why should vendor cares?
– Security highly makes use of the ‘ass factor’:
» “Why should I buy from vendor X?”
» “Because everybody is doing so”
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 15

16. Security Myth #3: Computer power is growing
Moore’s law does not help the security industry
Forcing the perimeter to inspect everything expecting to
benefit from the growing capabilities of hardware seems
to be non-sense
Simple like that: As the computers have more power,
engineers start to use it, to save bandwitdth and provide
security:
– Compression
– Encryption
In the end, the gateway has more work to do
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 16

17. Security Myth #4: IPS
Many people seems to highly believe the IPS is a bunch of parsers
running in a central location:
– Most likely it will be more pattern-match-like based technology
– This is true for security filters as well (such as the XSS protections in
IE)
– Really parsing the complex file formats on gateways is infeasible,
parcial parsing is used
Everybody believes IPS is a bridge
– It does interact with packets (for inspection)
– It can be exploited as any other piece of software (not common)
Virtual Patching
– Trust in it only when a vulnerability is public, but there is no patch (in
this case, you have no options)
– False positives ARE very important: Check them before buying
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 17

18. Security Myth #5: Rogue <you name it>
Amazing question by Michael Golub: “What are the
features an AV has, that a Rogue AV doesn’t?”
– Both does not guarantee anything
– Both have ‘upgrade to premium’ options
– Both will have a nice GUI (rogue AV usually is nicer)
– Both will affect the performance of your computer (rogue AV
usually is faster)
– Both will have false alarms (false positives) -> Well, I never
heard that millions of users were affected by the rogue AV
quarantining a fundamental dll of Windows and thus letting the
computer unusable
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 18

19. So, why build a research team?
Companies highly benefit from security research:
– Better understanding
– Real-life awareness
– Solving complex problems with lower budgets
Having security researchers are not only for security
vendors:
– As presented in Hackito: A researcher is capable of solving
complex tasks, such as analyzing huge amounts of logs
– A researcher can provide real understanding of the threats in an
organization, ‘translate’ the marketing materials (bullshit) to the
real-world benefit it will provide
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 19

20. The experts
When choosing a researcher, careful to select him
– Remember the ‘Market for Lemons’ lessons
– Lots of conferences around the world: Be a speaker in many of
them means nothing
– Lots of security issues been released: Be one of the guys who
found them means nothing
» Many crappy security issues been released (it is part of the priorities
list of vendors to have as much as possible released issues)
– Ask around, go to the conferences and see it yourself, be
involved if you care
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 20

21. What to expect
It is important to define targets
– If you don’t know what you want, don’t expect much:
Researchers are lazy creatures (yeah, we are!)
Don’t define how do you want, only your expectations
– If you really knew what you want, you’ve hired developers, not
researchers
– I always like to tell people: “Ok, now you are giving me the
solution. I better know the problem first”
Security research is not only exploitation
– Defensive capabilities
– Complex problems
– Malware Analysis
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 21

22. Targets/Deliverables
Some companies count exploits/person/year
– Highly complex way to track work
– Will work if you have very capable manager (able to differentiate
complex from simple exploits)
– Usually done when the company is a research company or
somehow has exploit writers and security researchers in different
teams
Small groups together
– Very effective way to work and keep track of work
– Changing the groups and see the results – Easy to spot laziness
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 22

23. Research capabilities
Very often, even companies that does not have research
area have research capabilities
– They are hidden inside development teams
– Usually embedded in the job description of senior workers in
such teams
Create a communication link
– Since the research is hidden inside teams, sometimes it does
not achieve its maximal capability
– Gathering information inside the company will reveal much more
knowledge then initially expected
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 23

24. Management
Many processes or No processes
– Somehow in the between
– Important to define areas where the research has freedom to act
» For example, to speed up the communication process with vendors
– No paperwork means higher productivity and less boredom
» Still, some way to track work will be required by the company
Your team gotta travel
– Yes, they will want to go to H2HC in Brazil
– They will love to spend the weekend with friends in Sao Jose
dos Campos for Vale Security Conf (at least I do ☺ )
– They will be at Hackito in Paris as well
– And there is NOTHING you can do about that
» Better define good-to-go conferences in advance
» Give real time for real research (yeah, REAL)
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 24

25. Fuzzing, tools and others
If your research team is going to find vulnerabilities you:
– Want them to have real hardware resources (fuzzers are heavy
animals)
– Want them to have real understanding of what they are testing
(and this is VERY time consuming)
– Want them to have good tools for the process (expect to buy
tools such as IDA, Zynamics Binavi, Canvas)
Please, please, please:
– No dumb fuzzing anymore (I’m tired of crashes)
– Add analysis capabilities to the game
– Let them expend time writing tools
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 25

26. Future
I can’t foresee the future!
Hope more researchers will start to complain about the industry
Strongly believe the real experts at some point will receive the
real attention, since the problem is constanly growing and not
been fixed: Something wrong is going on...
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 26

27. Special Thanks
Michael Golub
– A good friend
– The main point of reference/discussions for many/most of the
presented ideas
Vale Security Conference Staff
– Great initiative, congrats and tks!
– For trusting me for discuss this subject here
Kernel Hacking: If you really know, you can hack! – http://www.kernelhacking.com/rodrigo 27

28. End! Really !?
Rodrigo Rubira Branco (BSDaemon)
Director, Vulnerability & Malware Research Labs
rbranco *noSPAM* qualys.com
http://twitter.com/bsdaemon