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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
MODERATOR: PANELISTS:
Bitcoin's Future Threats: Expert's
Roundtable based on 150 Case
Studies
HTA-F03
Wayne Huang Charlie Lee
Danny Yang
Fyodor Yarochkin
Kristov Atlas
VP Engineering
Proofpoint, Inc.
@waynehuang
whuang@proofpoint.com
wayne.armorize@gmail.com
Creator, Litecoin
Engineering Director, Coinbase
@SatoshiLite
Founder & CTO, MaiCoin, Inc.
@huuep
Senior Threat Researcher, VArmour, Inc.
@fygrave
Bitcoin Security Researcher
Independent Security Researcher
@kristovatlas
#RSAC
The BIG question…
Why are Bitcoin
targets so attractive?
3
Just before or in parallel:
Insider threat,
Fraud & scams,
Wallet theft,
Crime
Right after:
Remote exploitation,
DDos
#RSAC
The BIG question…
Why are Bitcoin
targets so attractive?
#RSAC
Questions
 Which threat vector will impact Bitcoin’s future most?
 How anonymous is Bitcoin?
 Will we see more of CryptoLocker clones in the future demanding
Bitcoin for encrypted file ransom?
 Which threat vector is likely under-rated?
 What opportunities and impact will Bitcoin bring to the security
industry?
 How to boost Bitcoin’s wide adoption?
HACKED
#RSAC
Remote exploitation of server-side
vulnerabilities
 Vulns in open source Bitcoin projects
 3rd party vulns
 Application vulns (OWASP)
#RSAC
Mining resources theft
 Seizing pro miners, Dell: stealing $9,000 a day
 German police: botnet mined €700,000 bitcoins
 Miner botnets (ex: DVRs, cams, NAS…)
 University servers
 Hidden miners (ex: games)
 Android app miners
(ex: wallpapers apps)
#RSAC
Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
 Compromises: embedded ARM, PPC, MIPS or X86 machines
 Attack vector: default passwords, a vuln in /cgi-bin/php
 Primary targets: cheap Linux-based embedded devices, ex:
 Dahua camera - arm
 AFoundry switch - mips
 Tera EP Wifi Broadband Switch - mips
 Mines MNC coin via p2pool.org
#RSAC
Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
#RSAC
Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
#RSAC
Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
#RSAC
Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
#RSAC
Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
#RSAC
Bitcoin mining botnet: sale
#RSAC
Source:
http://habrahabr.ru/post/147635/
#RSAC
Mining resources theft
 Botnets - Some also have injects for bitcoin theft, i.e this Zeus modification:
https://bigrc.biz/threads/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BC-botnet-evolution-
%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%82.9505/
#RSAC
Fraudulent vendors and scams
 Bitcoin startup scams (taking investor money)
 Miner scams (no shipment)
 Bitcoin-denominated ponzi scheme
 Exchange scams
 Bitcoin asset scams
#RSAC
Wallet theft
 Endpoint wallet stealers
 Dell: Nearly 150 Strains of Malware Are After Your Bitcoins
 Bitcoin-featured banking malware
 Trojaned browser plugins
#RSAC
Bitcoin malware trends
 Malware is and will be an important tool for coin thieves against
end users
 Attack wallet files or website logins
 Desktop and mobile
 Interest from malware authors is proportional to the Bitcoin price
and adoption in their target demographic
 Dropped in 2014 along with price [Symantec]
 As adoption grows, average technical savvy of user will drop
#RSAC
Win32/Spy.Hesperbot
27
#RSAC
Trojan.Dyre/Dyreza
28
#RSAC
Malware Kits
29
#RSAC
Defending Against Bitcoin Malware
 For now, most Bitcoin malware will simply be standard financial
trojans. Use traditional methods of detection
 Behavioral analysis: processes scanning for ‘wallet.dat’,
‘wallet.aes.json’ or Base58Check strings all potentially suspicious
 Put private keys offline and into cold storage; use offline signing
 Security proportional to amount of funds stored, even during
upward price swings
 Multi-stage signing protocols such as P2SH multisig, Shamir’s
Secret Sharing, or threshold sigs distribute risk
#RSAC
Crime and terrorism
 Bitcoin as gaming credits (ex: gambling)
 Bitcoin as payment protocol for criminal trade
 Bitcoin used to fund or to donate to terrorists
 Bitcoin as means to launder money
#RSAC
Insider threat
 Current operators or employees
 Ex-employees
 Fake “compromises”
 US Department of Justice: US Secret
Service agent "diverted" more
than $800,000 in Bitcoins to
his personal accounts
#RSAC
Insider Threat: Sh33p Marketplace
33
#RSAC
Federal Agents Accused of Stealing SR Funds
34
#RSAC
DDoS
 Targeted DDoS against exchanges
 Cross-exchange DDoS
 DDoS against Bitcoin core reference
design
 DDoS mining pools for ransom
#RSAC
Phishing
 Phishing emails seemingly from blockchain wallet
 High click rate
 Spear-phising Silk Road auction enquirers
 Phishing Bitcoin exchange users
37
#RSAC
Questions
 Which threat vector will impact Bitcoin’s future most?
 How anonymous is Bitcoin?
 Will we see more of CryptoLocker clones in the future demanding Bitcoin
for encrypted file ransom?
 Does cryptocurrency promote ransomware
 Which threat vector is likely under-rated?
 What opportunities does Bitcoin bring to the security industry?
 How will Bitcoin impact the security industry?
 How to boost Bitcoin’s wide adoption?
#RSAC
http://bit.ly/rsabit
coinpanel
#RSAC
Questions:
Please Ask!

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RSA 2015 Bitcoin's Future Threats: Expert's Roundtable based on 150 Case Studies

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC MODERATOR: PANELISTS: Bitcoin's Future Threats: Expert's Roundtable based on 150 Case Studies HTA-F03 Wayne Huang Charlie Lee Danny Yang Fyodor Yarochkin Kristov Atlas VP Engineering Proofpoint, Inc. @waynehuang whuang@proofpoint.com wayne.armorize@gmail.com Creator, Litecoin Engineering Director, Coinbase @SatoshiLite Founder & CTO, MaiCoin, Inc. @huuep Senior Threat Researcher, VArmour, Inc. @fygrave Bitcoin Security Researcher Independent Security Researcher @kristovatlas
  • 2. #RSAC The BIG question… Why are Bitcoin targets so attractive?
  • 3. 3
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8. Just before or in parallel: Insider threat, Fraud & scams, Wallet theft, Crime
  • 10. #RSAC The BIG question… Why are Bitcoin targets so attractive?
  • 11. #RSAC Questions  Which threat vector will impact Bitcoin’s future most?  How anonymous is Bitcoin?  Will we see more of CryptoLocker clones in the future demanding Bitcoin for encrypted file ransom?  Which threat vector is likely under-rated?  What opportunities and impact will Bitcoin bring to the security industry?  How to boost Bitcoin’s wide adoption?
  • 13. #RSAC Remote exploitation of server-side vulnerabilities  Vulns in open source Bitcoin projects  3rd party vulns  Application vulns (OWASP)
  • 14. #RSAC Mining resources theft  Seizing pro miners, Dell: stealing $9,000 a day  German police: botnet mined €700,000 bitcoins  Miner botnets (ex: DVRs, cams, NAS…)  University servers  Hidden miners (ex: games)  Android app miners (ex: wallpapers apps)
  • 15. #RSAC Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices  Compromises: embedded ARM, PPC, MIPS or X86 machines  Attack vector: default passwords, a vuln in /cgi-bin/php  Primary targets: cheap Linux-based embedded devices, ex:  Dahua camera - arm  AFoundry switch - mips  Tera EP Wifi Broadband Switch - mips  Mines MNC coin via p2pool.org
  • 16. #RSAC Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
  • 17. #RSAC Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
  • 18. #RSAC Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
  • 19. #RSAC Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
  • 20. #RSAC Mining resources theft: Embedded Devices
  • 23. #RSAC Mining resources theft  Botnets - Some also have injects for bitcoin theft, i.e this Zeus modification: https://bigrc.biz/threads/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BC-botnet-evolution- %D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%82.9505/
  • 24. #RSAC Fraudulent vendors and scams  Bitcoin startup scams (taking investor money)  Miner scams (no shipment)  Bitcoin-denominated ponzi scheme  Exchange scams  Bitcoin asset scams
  • 25. #RSAC Wallet theft  Endpoint wallet stealers  Dell: Nearly 150 Strains of Malware Are After Your Bitcoins  Bitcoin-featured banking malware  Trojaned browser plugins
  • 26. #RSAC Bitcoin malware trends  Malware is and will be an important tool for coin thieves against end users  Attack wallet files or website logins  Desktop and mobile  Interest from malware authors is proportional to the Bitcoin price and adoption in their target demographic  Dropped in 2014 along with price [Symantec]  As adoption grows, average technical savvy of user will drop
  • 30. #RSAC Defending Against Bitcoin Malware  For now, most Bitcoin malware will simply be standard financial trojans. Use traditional methods of detection  Behavioral analysis: processes scanning for ‘wallet.dat’, ‘wallet.aes.json’ or Base58Check strings all potentially suspicious  Put private keys offline and into cold storage; use offline signing  Security proportional to amount of funds stored, even during upward price swings  Multi-stage signing protocols such as P2SH multisig, Shamir’s Secret Sharing, or threshold sigs distribute risk
  • 31. #RSAC Crime and terrorism  Bitcoin as gaming credits (ex: gambling)  Bitcoin as payment protocol for criminal trade  Bitcoin used to fund or to donate to terrorists  Bitcoin as means to launder money
  • 32. #RSAC Insider threat  Current operators or employees  Ex-employees  Fake “compromises”  US Department of Justice: US Secret Service agent "diverted" more than $800,000 in Bitcoins to his personal accounts
  • 33. #RSAC Insider Threat: Sh33p Marketplace 33
  • 34. #RSAC Federal Agents Accused of Stealing SR Funds 34
  • 35. #RSAC DDoS  Targeted DDoS against exchanges  Cross-exchange DDoS  DDoS against Bitcoin core reference design  DDoS mining pools for ransom
  • 36. #RSAC Phishing  Phishing emails seemingly from blockchain wallet  High click rate  Spear-phising Silk Road auction enquirers  Phishing Bitcoin exchange users
  • 37. 37
  • 38. #RSAC Questions  Which threat vector will impact Bitcoin’s future most?  How anonymous is Bitcoin?  Will we see more of CryptoLocker clones in the future demanding Bitcoin for encrypted file ransom?  Does cryptocurrency promote ransomware  Which threat vector is likely under-rated?  What opportunities does Bitcoin bring to the security industry?  How will Bitcoin impact the security industry?  How to boost Bitcoin’s wide adoption?

Editor's Notes

  1. This question pertains to custodial services. One of the benefits of Bitcoin is that it eliminates intermediaries and counter-party risk. However, many users appreciate the convenience and potential security of custodial companies, which re-introduce some of those negative elements that Bitcoin seeks to eliminate. In some cases, this has resulted in lost coins due to mismanagement, insider threats, or fraud. Is custodial Bitcoin a good or bad thing? Will we see more or less of it in the future? How can custodial companies prove that to users that they are liquid (e.g proof of reserves)?
  2. Keylogging, screenshot and video capture. Focused on obtaining login credentials
  3. Usually escrow funds are in danger with these marketplaces. Other exchanges have adopted 2 of 3 multisig escrow to prevent theft of escrow funds.
  4. Force had abused his positions as a DEA agent and compliance officer at digital currency exchange CoinMKT to freeze a customer’s account and transfer $297,000 worth of cryptocoins to his personal account Both Force and Bridges had set up front companies and associated bank accounts where illegally-acquired $820k were deposited
  5. This question pertains to custodial services. One of the benefits of Bitcoin is that it eliminates intermediaries and counter-party risk. However, many users appreciate the convenience and potential security of custodial companies, which re-introduce some of those negative elements that Bitcoin seeks to eliminate. In some cases, this has resulted in lost coins due to mismanagement, insider threats, or fraud. Is custodial Bitcoin a good or bad thing? Will we see more or less of it in the future? How can custodial companies prove that to users that they are liquid (e.g proof of reserves)?