The document analyzes risk allocation in oil and gas contracts through indemnity, exclusion, and limitation of liability clauses. It examines how these clauses can be negotiated, interpreted, and applied to effectively distribute contractual liability among parties, using examples from various contracts and case law in the industry. The discussion highlights challenges such as multiple parties involved and the complexities of enforcing indemnity in contracts.

1. 0
RISK ALLOCATION IN OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS BY WAY OF INDEMNITY,
EXCLUSION & LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Valentine Ataka*
*Valentine Ataka is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, a blogger on Energy Law and Policy issues and an LLM Oil
& Gas Law Candidate (RGU-2013)

2. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………………………….……………………………….2
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION ..……………………………………………………………….……………………....3
2.0 INDEMNITY…………………………………………………………………………..……………………….4
2.1 Definition of Indemnity ..…………………………………………….…………..….………..4
2.2 Examples …………………………………………………..………….……………..………….…...5
2.3 Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses ……………………………………….………………6
2.4 Scope of Indemnity ……………………………………………………………………………….. 6
3.0 EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY ……………………………………………………....….……...10
3.1 Definition of Exclusion …………………………………..…………..……………………..10
3.2 Examples & Scope of Exclusion ….……………………..….…………………..…….10
3.3 Interpretation of Exclusion Clause…………….....……..…………………………...13
4.0 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ……………………………………………………..……………. 14
4.1 Definition of Limitation ……………………………………………………………………….. 14
4.2 Examples and Forms of Limitation …………………………………………………….. 14
5.0 CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………….………..….15
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………..17

3. 2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIPN – Association of International Petroleum Negotiators
E&P – Exploration and Production
IMHH- Industry Mutual Hold Harmless Scheme
LOGIC - Leading Oil and Gas Industry Competitiveness
NOGEPA - Netherlands Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Association
O&G – Oil and Gas
ABSTRACT
This write-up presents an analysis of the various standard clauses used in Oil and
Gas Industry to apportion liability. The discussion focuses on standard provisions
for indemnity, exclusion and limitation of liability and relies on examples from
various model contracts, industry practice around the world as well as case law.
The approach taken in the brief is to discuss how such provisions can be negotiated,
drafted, interpreted and applied in order to effectively realize the intended object of
properly allocating contractual liability between and amongst parties in oil and gas
contracts.
This will be achieved by discussing various issues relating to the definitions,
interpretation, scope of and exceptions to liability apportioning by the three
approaches. Each issue will be discussed on the background of case law, other
authors’ opinions and examples from industry standards contracts.

4. 3
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Players in the oil and gas industry have to contend with a wide range of risks1
.
These include mechanical breakdowns, HSE accidents, unfavorable price changes
etc2
. Atoning for the financial consequences of such risks can be very costly3
and
may cause significant financial set-backs to the business.4
To minimize exposure,
industry players usually undertake various measures and practices to manage the
risks. In a wide context, risk management includes prevention and mitigation of
risks and remediation of loss in the event of occurrence5
.
One element of risk management is risk allocation between or among the parties
involved in an undertaking6
. This is particularly problematic in the O&G industry
which is characterized by multiplicity of parties in one project7
. Risk allocation in the
1
Greg Gordon, ‗Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts‘ in Greg Gordon et al (eds) Oil and
Gas law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends’ (2nd
Edn, Dundee University, 2011)
2
Tobby Hewitt, ‗Who is to Blame? Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts‘ Journal
of Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 26 No 2 2008
3
Piper Alpha is said to have occasioned a total insured loss of US$3.304 billion; See
Hewitt, ibid
4
According to the Guardian the Deepwater Horizon incident has let to the dip of BP profits
by 35% See The Guardian, ‘BP's Deepwater Horizon costs rise $847m‘ Tuesday 31 July
2012http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/31/bp-deepwater-horizon-costs
accessed 12th
April 2013
5
Aven T et al ‗A Decision Framework For Risk Management, With Application To The
Offshore Oil And Gas Industry‘ Reliability Engineering and System Safety 92 (2007) 433–
448
6
Adedeji Bodunde Badiru & Samuel Olusola Osisanya, Project Management for the Oil and
Gas Industry: A World System Approach (CRC Press, 2013) e-book
7
For instance according to the House of Lords in Caledonia Northsea vs British
Communication Plc & Others [2002] UKHL 4, the Piper Alpha project whose accident of 6th
July 1988 killed over 160 workers, there were over 24 Contractors involved

5. 4
industry may be achieved by setting out in the contracts clauses which declare
which party will be liable for (or exempted from) a given risk and to what extent.
There are three forms of risk allocation approaches common to contracts used in
the O&G industry8
. These are
(a) Indemnity
(b) Exemption and
(c) Limitation of liability
The approaches are discussed separately below.
2.0 INDEMNITY
2.1 Definition
Under an indemnity arrangement the indemnifying party agrees to make a
payment to the party having the benefit of the indemnity in the event that the
indemnified party suffers loss as a result of the occurrence of a specified event9
.
In a more simple approach a Canadian Court in Lafrentz v. M & L Leasing10
defined contractual indemnity as ‗an obligation to protect against or keep free
from loss, to repay for what has been lost or damaged, to compensate for a loss‘
To contradistinguish contractual ‗Indemnity‘ from ‗Exclusion‘ the Supreme Court
of England in Farstad Supply AS VS Enviroco11
has stated that a clause that
uses both phrases ‗indemnify‘ and ‗hold harmless‘ amounts to risk allocation by
indemnity and exclusion. The Court explained that the operation of the Clause
would in fact determine its true nature i.e. if it serves to create responsibility for
the exposure of ‗a third party‘ it would be an indemnity Clause; whereas if it
8
Greg Gordon, (above n1)
9
ibid
10
2000 ABQB 714 (CanLII)
11
[2010] UKSC 18

6. 5
operates only to create responsibility for the exposure of a party in the contract
then it would be ‗an exclusion‘ clause.
Indemnity may be further dichotomized as ‗unilateral‘ or ‗mutual‘ indemnity12
. The
former refers to a situation whereby only one party (A) takes up responsibility to
indemnify another (B) in the event that B suffers loss in the course of their
contractual relationship. Mutual indemnity however refers to a situation whereby
each party is simultaneously a potential indemnifier and beneficiary of possible
indemnity.
2.2 Examples
An example of an indemnity Clause is set out at Clause 19.1 LOGIC Standard
Offshore Service Contract13
reproduced in part below:
19.1 The CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for and shall save, indemnify, defend
and hold harmless the COMPANY GROUP from and against all claims, losses,
damages, costs (including legal costs) expenses and liabilities in respect of:
(a) loss of or damage to property …….
The addition of the term ‗defend‘ to the obligation of the indemnifier for example in
the LOGIC contract above implies that the obligation extends to conducting the
defence of any litigation that may arise against the benefiting party.14
12
Gordon (above n1)
13
LOGIC, ‗Standard Contracts for the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Service Onshore &
Offshore‘ http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/Services%20Onshore%20and%20Offshore%20Edition
%202.pdf accessed 3rd
March 2013
14
Gordon (above n1)

7. 6
2.3 Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses
2.3.1 Contextualism
Courts will construe an indemnity clause in the context of the entire contract. This
resonates with Lord Hoffman‘s restatement in Investors Compensation Scheme
Ltd vs West Bromwich Building Society15
. He acknowledged that while the old
rule of ‗objective bystander‘ still applied in interpretation of contracts, such a
bystander should be assumed to be informed of most of the background facts to the
disputing parties‘ contract.
2.4.2 Contra proferentem rule
Where there is ambiguity in the clause, the ambiguity will be construed to give an
outcome least favourable to the party likely to benefit from (in this context to be
indemnifying pursuant to) the clause.16
However according to Lord Glennie in
Slessor vs Vecto Gray17
where indemnity is mutual (for example in a knock for
knock clause) the rule ceases to apply since both parties stand to be beneficiaries.
2.4 Scope of indemnity
2.4.1 Scope where there are multiple parties
Multiplicity of parties as is common in O&G contracts may give rise to abstract
results in effecting an indemnity clause. In Slessor18
under Clause B13 of the
Agreement in question, the parties
mutually and irrevocably [undertook] to release, defend and indemnify each other
for damage to any property and/or injury to/or death of the personnel of the
others, arising out of or in connection with the Work, howsoever caused
[emphasis added].
15
[1998] 1WLR 896
16
Ibid
17
[2006] CSOH 104 paragraph 12
18
Ibid

8. 7
The Court interpreted ‘personnel of the others’ to mean that the three parties in the
contract (say A, B and C) had agreed that A would indemnify B&C for the injury of
B&C‘s personnel, B had agreed to indemnify A&C for the injury of A&C‘s personnel
and similarly C to indemnify A&B‘s for the injury of A&B‘s personnel. While
concerned that this interpretation ‗was not supported by any commercial or
business commonsense‘ Lord Glennie held that since it was the clear wording of the
Clause, it would be upheld.
2.4.2 Scope of indemnity where there is subrogation
Where the Indemnifier has taken out an insurance policy to cover the same risk
that is the subject of the contract, the obligation to indemnify may be extinguished
depending on whether or not there is an express obligation on the indemnifier to
take out the policy.
In BP Exploration Operating Co. Ltd. V. Kvaerner Oilfield Products Ltd19
Clause 10.5 of the Contract in question imposed an obligation on BP to take out an
insurance policy whose cover was found to extend to the contractor. The Court held
that in the circumstances, the Insurance Company had no right to subrogate and
the duty to indemnify was extinguished once the insurance company settled the
claim.
By contrast in Caledonia North Sea Limited (Respondents) v British
Telecommunications Plc (Appellants) (Scotland) and others20
the court
found that there was no obligation on the part of the operator to take out an
insurance policy. Still it did and the insurance company met the claims. The Court
therefore upheld the insurer‘s right to subrogate and be reimbursed in full as
secondary indemnifiers.
19
[2004] All ER (D) 87
20
[2002] UKHL 4

9. 8
2.4.3 Extension of scope to third Parties
Indemnity will ordinarily not extend to third parties if not contemplated by the
contract. In Westerngeco v ATP Oil & Gas,21
a contractor (Westerngeco) entered
into a contract for streaming of seismic cables from a vessel with ATP (company)
whereby
‗The parties agree[d] that the Contractor‘s Group‘s [the claimant‘s] liability under
this Contract shall not exceed the aggregate amount of payments received by the
Contractor for the work and Company [Clause 19.8]
In carrying out the work, Westerngeco damaged wellheads belonging to Total
who were not a party to the contract. The Court had to determine whether
pursuant to Clause 19.8 Westerngeco could claim indemnity to also cover losses
incurred by Total.
The Court found that the words ‘under this Contract’ in Clause 19.8 referred to the
defendant only hence held that a limitation of liability could only be effective to limit
liability to the other contracting party, not third parties.
2.4.4 Extending scope through Knock for Knock Indemnities
The UKCS industry offers a model approach to resolving the complexities of
indemnity in a multi-party industry. Under the auspices of LOGIC, industry players
have put together a Mutual Hold Harmless (IMMH) Scheme with a Draft Deed
(IMMH Deed22
). Contractors join the scheme by signing standard Deeds of
Adherence. Under Clause 2.1 of the deed, the signatories are obliged to
be solely responsible for and shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other
Signatories and the other members of their respective Groups against all Claims
arising from, out of, or relating to the Services in connection with:
(i) personal injury to or sickness……; and
(ii) loss of, recovery of, or damage to any Property ……; and
21
[2006] All ER (D) 254
22
LOGIC ‗Mutual Indemnity And Hold Harmless Deed‘(2012) http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/IMHH%202012%20Deed.pdf Accessed 12th
April 2013

10. 9
(iii) Consequential Loss ……...
The Deed extends the scope of indemnity to the signatories and their affiliates,
personnel and invitees23
. At Clause 5.1 it also resolves the subrogation problem by
enjoining signatories to procure waiver of subrogation rights from their respective
insurers.
The deed however serves only as a gap filler since it does not take precedence over
any existing indemnity agreements between parties.24
Further being a voluntary
Scheme, it has been shunned by some important players in the industry such as
several large drilling companies who are wary of the potential losses which they
may suffer since they have relatively larger numbers of personnel on the
platforms.25
A similar arrangement is adopted by the Industry in Netherlands through the
Mutual Indemnity Agreement in the E&P Industry administered by NOGEPA26
. The
Dutch scheme aims to provide clarity in allocation of liabilities and avoidance of
overlapping insurances covering identical risks. Unlike the IMHH model, it permits
the participation of Operators.
23
See definition of ‗Group‘ under Clause 1 in reference to the entitlement of ‗Groups‘ under
Clause 2
24
Clause 11 of the Deed
25
Gordon (above n1)
26
NOGEPA, ‗Mutual Indemnity Agreement‘
http://www.nogepa.nl/en/Home/MIAwederzijdsevrijwaring.aspx accessed 20th April 2013

11. 10
3.0 EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
3.1 Definition
The sum effect of an exclusion clause is to absolve a party from responsibility for
loss arising from an identified risk27
. The absolution may be in respect of a class of
risks or any risks whatsoever arising from the contract.
These provisions in a contract create a class of injury or loss whose occurrence are
expressed not to be qualified for remediation by the party with the obligation to
remedy the risk covered.
3.2 Examples & Scope of Exclusion Clauses
In O&G contracts parties usually agree to exclude liability for
(i) Consequential loss
(ii) Loss resulting from wilful conduct
(iii) Loss resulting from gross negligence
3.2.1 Consequential/indirect Loss
The common law basis for this kind of exclusion is inferable from the celebrated
case of Hadely vs Baxendale28
which established the two-limb rule that an injured
party can only claim
(i) damages that are fairly and reasonably considered to have arisen
naturally from the breach itself, or
(ii) such damages as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time the contract was made.
The English courts have held the view that Consequential loss for the purposes of
exclusion connotes matters falling under the second limb in Hadley vs. Baxendale
such as production costs and loss of profit by relating it to. For instance in
Croudace Construction v Cawoods Concrete Products29
the liability clause
provided that:
we are not under any circumstances to be liable for any consequential loss or
damage caused or arising by reason of late supply or any fault failure or defect in
27
Fastard Case [2010] UKSC 18
28
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
29
[1978] 2 Lloyds Rep 55 CA

12. 11
any material or goods supplied by us or by reason of the same not being of the
quality or specification ordered or by any other matter whatsoever.
The Court of Appeal in England held that the word consequential excluded any loss
which directly and naturally resulted in the ordinary course of events from late
delivery which included the indemnification of a claim made by sub-contractors
against the claimants. The claim was made in respect of a delay in the sub-
contractors‘ work which was said to have been caused by the absence of the
material which the defendants ought to have delivered.
However a Victorian (Australia) Court of Appeal in Environmental Systems Pty
Ltd v Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd30
has discredited the English approach and held
that
it was not correct to construe consequential loss as limited to the second limb
in Hadley v Baxendale in accordance with the English authorities. Instead,
consequential loss in the exclusion clause should have the meaning that
‗ordinary reasonable business persons would naturally conceive of‘. Namely,
as ―everything beyond the normal measure of damages, such as profits lost
or expenses incurred through breach‖
Under the Australian approach therefore, costs incurred in curing the breach would
be excluded as consequential loss.
3.2.2 Gross negligence
Contractual allocation of liability defies the common law rule that a party will not be
compensated for their own negligence31
. Liability clauses generally permit
compensation irrespective of the negligence of the beneficiary. However this is
usually qualified by exempting liability for losses arising out of the beneficiary‘s own
‗gross negligent‘ acts.
30
[2008] VSCA 26
31
Timur Makarov, ‗Indemnity in the International Oil and Gas contracts: Key Features,
Drafting and Interpretation‘(CEPMLP, June 2009)

13. 12
In the Red Sea Tankers Ltd v Papchristidis32
the Court described ‗gross
negligence‘ as embracing:
serious negligence amounting to reckless disregard without any necessary
implication of consciousness of the high degree of risk or the likely consequences
of the conduct on the part of the person acting or omitting to act;
3.2.3 Wilful misconduct
Wilful misconduct on the other hand was dealt with at length by Colman J in the
case of National Oilwell (UK) Ltd v Davy Offshore Ltd33
where the judge
adopted the definition coined by Johnson J in Graham v Belfast and Northern
Counties Ry Co34
where he says:
Wilful misconduct in such a special condition means misconduct to which the will
is party as contradistinguished from accident, and is far beyond any negligence,
even gross or culpable negligence, and involves that a person wilfully misconducts
himself who knows and appreciates that it is wrong conduct on his part in the
existing circumstances to do, or to fail or omit to do (as the case may be), a
particular thing, and yet intentionally does, or fails or omits to do it, or persists in
the act, failure, or omission regardless of consequences.
In a more recent case of De Beers UK Limited v Atos Origin IT Services35
, the
judge defined ‗wilful misconduct' as conduct by a person who knows that he
is committing, and intends to commit a breach of duty, or is reckless in the
sense of not caring whether or not he commits a breach of duty.
32
[1997] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 547
33
[1993] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 582
34
[1901] 2 IE 13
35
[2010] EWHC (TCC)

14. 13
The ingredients of wilful conduct as interpreted by the English Courts
therefore include knowledge, intention and recklessness.
3.3 Interpretation of Exclusion Clauses
3.3.1 Clause to be interpreted in the contractual and commercial context
The Supreme Court of Canada in Tercon Contractors Ltd v. British
Columbia36
has taken the view that an exclusion clause should not be interpreted in
isolation. The Court bears in mind the other provisions of the contract as well as the
commercial context of the contract and subject transaction.
3.3.2 Where ‗exclusion‘ in not express
The words used to exclude liability have a great influence on the likely
determination of what the parties intended to omit from the ambit of liability. In
many cases the Courts usually look to the express usage of the phrases such as
‗consequential‘, wilful conduct‘ to find the existence of an exclusion.
However, in Sonat Offshore SA v Amerada Hess Development Ltd37
the Court
noted that exclusion does not have to be express in the contract. The court stated
that
it does not follow that because there is no express reference to the exclusion or
limitation of liability the agreement cannot have the effect on its true construction
of clearly providing for the consequences of breach or other fault.
Saville in that case J followed the decision in The Evia38
, where it was held that a
provision requiring charterers to pay for extra insurance if the vessel was ordered
into a war zone should be construed as providing exclusively for the consequences
of the charterers‘ breach in ordering the vessel to such a zone, though the provision
did not expressly limit liability to the amount of the extra premiums.
36
[2010] SCC 4 (S.C.C.)
37
[1988] 1 Lloyd‘s Rep. 145 at 157
38
[1982] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 307

15. 14
4.0 LIMITATION OF LIBILITY
4.1 Definition
A liability clause may apportion the responsibility for remedying loss arising out of
an act of the benefiting party but at the same time put a cap on it39
. The cap may
be on the basis of a predetermined portion of the loss or a fixed sum40
.
While an Exclusion clause completely absolves liability, a limitation clause merely
curtails the scope of the liability of the duty bearer.
4.2 Examples and forms of Limitation
4.2.1 Fixed amount limitation
It may be the desire of parties to specifically provide for the maximum amount of
loss that either of them would be liable for in the event of risk occurrence. An
example is found at Clause 35 of LOGIC Standard Contract for Supply of Major
Items41
. It provides that
the CONTRACTOR‘s total cumulative liability to the COMPANY arising out of or
related to the performance of the CONTRACT shall be limited to the sum specified
in Appendix 1 to Section I – Form of Agreement, or in the absence of such sum
the CONTRACT PRICE
This type of limitation is used especially in O&G contracts where there is a prospect
of unlimited and potentially exorbitant liability if left unchecked42
. They may serve
39
Glenn D. Well et al, ‗Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability—Can Your
Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the ―Entire‖ Deal?‘(2007)
http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/563ccf98-648d-4e5b-b3e5-
129805230615/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fb77618a-f943-4797-98a1-
2a69d92a4522/Extra-Contractual%20Liability%20Article.pdf accessed 13th
April 2013
40
Gordon (above n1)
41
LOGIC, ‗General Conditions of CONTRACT for Supply of Major items of Plant and
Equipment‘ http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/Supply%20of%20Major%20Items%20of%20Plant%2
0and%20Equipment%20Edition%202.pdf Accessed 3rd
April 2013
42
Gordon (above) pg 497

16. 15
as a compromise where the parties cannot agree on a mutual hold harmless
indemnity or exclusion of consequential loss provision.
They are advisable in the Oil and Gas industry for two key reasons summed up by
Gordon as follows
(1) Some O&G projects are so valuable that even the potential losses which are
unequivocally direct may be more than a contactor can bear; (2) even if the losses
which the contractor fears should be shut out by the indemnity or exclusion clause
there is always a risk that those clauses might for some reason be susceptible to
challenge. A liability cap therefore performs the valuable function of providing a
second line of defence of indeterminate or disproportionate liability
4.2.2 Proportionate Limitation
Some contracts specifically limit the liability of parties involved to the proportion of
their participation in the undertaking. An example is the AIPN Model International
Operating Agreement43
provides as follows at Clause 4.6
(A) Except as set out in this Article 4.6, neither the party designated as operator nor
any other indemnitee (as defined below) shall bear (except as a party to the
extent of its participating interest share) any damage, loss, cost, expense or
liability resulting from performing (or failing to perform) the duties and functions
of the operator, and the indemnitees are hereby released from liability to non-
operators for any and all damages, losses, costs, expenses and liabilities arising
out of, incident to or resulting from such performance or failure to perform, even
though caused in whole or in part by a pre-existing defect, the negligence
(whether sole, joint or concurrent), gross negligence, strict liability or other legal
fault of operator (or any such indemnitee).
5.0 CONCLUSION
The use of indemnity, exemption and limitation in O&G contracting is generally
intended to manage risks in such a way that liability is borne by the person most
capable of meeting it. Besides, such clauses are a safety net in an industry that is
prone to occurrence of risks which albeit far apart may have devastating financial
ramifications. They are also a response to the dependence of the industry on
uninterrupted operations; driven by the desire to expeditiously dispense with any
disputes involving the occurrence of operation risks. The clauses further serve the
43
AIPN ‗Model International Operating Agreement‘ (1995)

17. 16
difficult purpose of balancing the interests of the often multiple parties in O&G
undertakings.
In order to meet these objectives, persons negotiating, drafting and/or relying on
the three forms of risk allocation clauses in the O&G contracts are invited to bear in
mind the following among other matters:-
In drafting the clauses there is need for clarity on the intention of the
parties since as a general rule courts will, look to the agreement and
provided it is clear and unequivocal apply the agreed provision.44
Each negotiating party must secure a scope that serves its interest since
the court may extend scope to liability not anticipated unless the parties
are unequivocal on the scope.45
In drafting and applying liability clauses parties need to be aware of stray
liability i.e. provisions within the contract which do not necessarily fall
under a Clause aptly titled ‗Liability‘ or ‗Indemnity‘46
Parties need to be aware of statutory provisions which have overriding
effect on industry practice and common law positions e.g. the Texas
Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, 197347
which generally proscribes contractual
indemnification for one‘s own negligence
Above all, interpretation of the clauses should be approached objectively taking into
account the discernible intention of the parties as well as the contractual and the
commercial context of the parties‘ engagement.
44
Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. v. The King (1952)
45
Campbell vs Conoco [2002] All ER (D) 4
46
Gordon
47
As endorsed by Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Personnel Inc 758 S.W.2d 843 (1988)

18. 17
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Statutes
Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, 1973 (Texas)
Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 (UK)
Books
Greg Gordon et al (eds) Oil and Gas law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends’ (2nd
Edn,
Dundee University, 2011)
Adedeji Bodunde Badiru & Samuel Olusola Osisanya, Project Management for the Oil and
Gas Industry: A World System Approach (CRC Press, 2013) e-book
Case law
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Personnel Inc 758 S.W.2d 843 (1988)
BP Exploration Operating Co. Ltd. V. Kvaerner Oilfield Products Ltd [2004] All ER (D) 87
Caledonia North Sea Limited (Respondents) v British Telecommunications Plc (Appellants)
(Scotland) and others [2002] UKHL 4
Campbell vs Conoco [2002] All ER (D) 4
Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. v. The King (1952)
Croudace Construction v Cawoods Concrete Products [1978] 2 Lloyds Rep 55 CA
De Beers UK Limited v Atos Origin IT Services [2010] EWHC (TCC)
Environmental Systems Pty Ltd v Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 26
Farstad Supply AS VS Enviroco [2010] UKSC 18
Graham v Belfast and Northern Counties Ry Co[1901] 2 IE 13
Hadely vs Baxendale 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd vs West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1WLR 896
Lafrentz v. M & L Leasing 2000 ABQB 714 (CanLII)
National Oilwell (UK) Ltd v Davy Offshore Ltd[1993] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 582
Northsea vs British Communication Plc & Others [2002] UKHL 4
Red Sea Tankers Ltd v Papchristidis [1997] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 547
Slessor vs Vecto Gray [2006] CSOH 104
Sonat Offshore SA v Amerada Hess Development Ltd [1988] 1 Lloyd‘s Rep. 145 at 157
Tercon Contractors Ltd v. British Columbia [2010] SCC 4 (S.C.C.)

19. 18
The Evia [1982] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 307
Westerngeco v ATP Oil & Gas [2006] All ER (D) 254
Articles
Aven T et al ‗A Decision Framework For Risk Management, With Application To The Offshore
Oil And Gas Industry‘ Reliability Engineering and System Safety 92 (2007) 433–448
Glenn D. Well et al, ‗Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability—Can Your Contractual
Deal Ever Really Be the ―Entire‖ Deal?‘(2007)
http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/563ccf98-648d-4e5b-b3e5-
129805230615/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fb77618a-f943-4797-98a1-
2a69d92a4522/Extra-Contractual%20Liability%20Article.pdf accessed 13th
April 2013
Greg Gordon, ‗Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts‘ in Greg Gordon et al (eds) Oil and
Gas law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends’ (2nd
Edn, Dundee University, 2011)
Timur Makarov, ‗Indemnity in the International Oil and Gas contracts: Key Features,
Drafting and Interpretation‘(CEPMLP, June 2009)
Tobby Hewitt, ‗Who is to Blame? Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts‘ Journal
of Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 26 No 2 2008
Others
AIPN ‗Model International Operating Agreement‘ (1995)
LOGIC - -‗Standard Contracts for the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Service
Onshore & Offshore‘ http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/Services%20Onshore%20and%20Offsh
ore%20Edition%202.pdf accessed 3rd
March 2013
- ‗Mutual Indemnity And Hold Harmless Deed‘(2012) http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/IMHH%202012%20Deed.pdf Accessed
12th
April 2013
- ‗General Conditions of CONTRACT for Supply of Major items of Plant and
Equipment‘ http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/Supply%20of%20Major%20Items%
20of%20Plant%20and%20Equipment%20Edition%202.pdf Accessed 3rd
April 2013
NOGEPA, ‗Mutual Indemnity Agreement‘
http://www.nogepa.nl/en/Home/MIAwederzijdsevrijwaring.aspx accessed 20th April 2013
The Guardian, ‘BP's Deepwater Horizon costs rise $847m‘ Tuesday 31 July
2012http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/31/bp-deepwater-horizon-costs
accessed 12th
April 2013