This document discusses regulatory focus theory and how it relates to different cognitive systems. It proposes that promotion-focused individuals who pursue ideals rely more on cognitive System 1, which is fast, automatic, and emotionally charged. Prevention-focused individuals who pursue oughts rely more on cognitive System 2, which is slower, deliberate, and controlled. Attribute framing, such as positive or negative information, can also influence regulatory focus and reliance on different cognitive systems. Three studies in the document provide evidence that promotion-focused consumers rely more on System 1, while prevention-focused consumers rely more on System 2.

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Regulatory Focus and Its Underlying Cognitive Systems
By Ko, Eun Hee
INTRODUCTION
Adalia is currently planning her summer vacation this year. She is a single, living alone,
and works for Mckinsey consulting firm as a lawyer in New York City. She is considering
three places for her vacation, which are Sorrento in Italy, Chantilly in France, and Bali in
Indonesia. She thinks that there is nothing important than her rest in her vacation because she
has been tired enough due to heavy work. Emily is also making her summer vacation plan but
she should consider much more things than Adalia in selecting a vacation place since she is
married, and have two kids and a husband; therefore she needs to be much more careful than
Emily in deciding vacation places, considering her children’s safety and comfort or her
husband’s taste. After contemplating for a wile, she finally decides to go to a resort in Florida,
which is relatively near her home and safe compared to other dreaming vacation places. Even
though she is a dentist in New York City and has been tired enough by her hard work so that
she is aspiring to go to a dreaming vacation as well as Adalia, she needs to consider much
more things than Adalia because of her situation.
Although the two women are in the same decision making situation and have similar
aspirations toward vacation, their final decisions are different; in case of Adalia, her own
preference or aspiration toward her vacation works as the most decisive factor in her decision
making process, whereas Emily should control her own aspiration in this selection because
her family’s safety or comfort is more important consideration rather than her own aspiration
or hope.

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The two examples above showed how different persons in different situations make their
decisions with distinct goals highlighted in a regulatory focus theory, in which individuals can
be classified into two categories in terms of their motivations; ideals and oughts (Higgins
1997). Specifically, the scenarios above show that promotion-focused individuals who have
the goal of ideals motivated by their aspirations or hopes and prevention-focused individuals
who have the goal of oughts by their obligations or responsibilities behave differently in
selecting their vacation places.
The principles of self-regulatory focus are important to consider in the context of
consumer behavior because these higher order goals of approach and avoidance provide
insight into how certain lower order consumption goals are made as fulfilled (Aaker and Lee,
2001). Although Adalia and Emily have the same functional goal of selecting vacation places,
they have distinct goals of prevention and promotion, influenced by different considerations,
and the different goals influenced the two friends on making their choices.
Although a large body of the research regarding regulatory focus has focused on its
effect or influences, little research has studied its cognitive mechanism that underlies
regulatory focus effects. The purpose of this article is to investigate the underlying cognitive
mechanism of regulatory focus and another factor that may moderate the reliance on the self-
regulation tendencies, which is a negatively/positively framed outcome.
This study reviews research on how ideals and oughts operate and discuss how
regulatory focus is related to cognitive systems. Then, it reports on three studies. The results
suggest that: (a) Promotion-focused consumers rely more on cognitive System 1 rather than
System 2, and prevention-focused consumers rely more on cognitive System 2 rather than
System 1, when they form an evaluation, ;(b) the relations between regulatory focus and
cognitive system is replicated in a more consumer-relevant context, and ;(c) attribute framing
effects (positive or negative) influence consumers’ tendency toward oughts or ideals as well
as their reliance on Cognitive Systems.

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BACKGROUND RESEARCH
Regulatory focus and Cognitive Systems
Higgins (1997) proposed that individuals are broadly categorized into two classes in
relation to ideals versus oughts. Ideals refer to desired end-states represent their own or
significant others’ hopes, wishes, and aspirations while oughts denote their own or significant
others’ beliefs about their duties, obligations, and responsibilities. In general, ideal self-
regulation involves a promotion focus, while ought self-regulation involves a prevention
focus. Individuals who follow a promotion focus perceive their goals as hopes and aspirations,
and therefore sensitive to the presence or absence of such positive outcomes. On the whole,
the natural tendency of promotion-focused individuals is to approach matches to their goals.
On the other hand, individuals who pursue a prevention focus perceive their goals as duties
and obligations and thus they are sensitive to the absence or presence of negative outcomes.
Overall, the natural tendency of prevention-focused individuals is to avoid mismatches to
their goals.
Individuals who hold alternative regulatory focus demonstrate that they are in different
psychological states during the process of goal attainment (Crowe and Higgins 1997), and it
induces the following assumption; the individuals rely on different cognitive mechanisms as
well as different psychological states during the process of goal attainment. Crowe and
Higgins (1997) found that the promotion and prevention modes of self-regulation foster
different patterns of exploration and different attitude toward risk. According to them,
promotion centers on approaching matches to desired end states, therefore it seems to trigger
a drive to capture as many existing opportunities as possible, and this drive fosters a more
eager form of exploration. On the other hands, they said that prevention centers on avoiding
mismatches to desired end states, thus it seems to trigger a drive to protect against potential

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threats, and this drive fosters a more vigilant form of exploration. Several researches have
shown that vigilant reliance on substantive information in persuasion (Bless, Mackie, and
Schwarz 1992; Gray 1971; Friedman and Forster 2000), whereas an eager form of exploration
should encourage the reliance on affective information in persuasion (Friedman and Forster
2000; Epstein 1990; Bless et al. 1992).
As for the reliance on substance and affection, two kinds of cognitive systems were
suggested. Stanovich and West (2000) proposed System 1 and System 2, which are two kinds
of distinguished cognitive processes. According to them, the operations of System 1 are fast,
automatic, effortless, associative, and emotionally charged, while the operation of System 2
are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled. As proved in the previous research
about the ideals and oughts and the reliance on affect versus substance in persuasion, if it is
likely that promotion (prevention) - focused consumers rely more on affective (substantive)
information than substantive (affective) information, it can be assumed that promotion versus
prevention- focused consumers rely more on Cognitive System 1 versus Cognitive System 2
than Cognitive System 2 versus Cognitive System 1.
The effects of framed information
Research attests that the regulatory focus a person assumes in a given instance can be the
result of either chronic tendencies or situational influences that temporarily encourage a
particular focus (Higgins et al. 1994). That is, not only can regulatory focus vary across
individuals with their chronic individual differences, but can situation induce promotion or
prevention focus by making individuals think about their hope and aspirations versus think
about their duties and obligations, respectively.
Research performed within the framework of regulatory focus theory studied the results
of promotion and prevention focus for diverse moderators or outcomes related to memory,
mood, task enjoyment, creativity, justification, motivation, and preferences for stability versus

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change. For example, Idson et al. (2007) showed that positive outcomes fits a promotion
focus more than a prevention focus, whereas the reverse is true for negative outcomes, and
that anticipating a desirable choice is more intensely positive for promotion than prevention,
and anticipating an undesirable choice is more intensely negative for prevention than
promotion.
Based on the previous research about the effects of various moderators and especially the
effects of positive and negative outcomes on promotion and prevention focuses, it can be
assumed that negative or positive information is related to regulatory focus or it can have
influence on individuals’ regulatory focus.
MODEL
FIGURE 1
RERULATORY FOCUS AND COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
STUDY 1
Regulatory focus & Cognitive Negatively framed attribute
Promotion System System
Focused 1 1
Consumers
Prevention System System
Focused 2 2
Consumers
Positively framed attribute
STUDY 3
Attributes framing effects

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HYPOTHESES
Study 1
This study will focus on understanding the underlying mechanism which influences the
judgment, thought, and behavior of promotion- and prevention-focused self-regulation.
Kahneman suggests two Cognitive Systems, which are System 1 and System 2. According to
him, the individuals relying more on System 1 are more likely to use intuition whose
operations are fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged, whereas
the individuals depending more on System 2 are more likely to use reasoning whose
operations are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled.
The distinction between promotion- and prevention-focused self-regulation, which ideals
and oughts tap into, appears to be a strong predictor of judgment, thought, and behavior (e.g.,
Aaker and Lee 2001; Kardes and Cronley 2000). For instance, Aaker and Lee (2001) revealed
that consumers with an independent self view, who tend to be promotion-focused, are more
persuaded by message focusing on positive outcomes, whereas people with an interdependent
self view, who tend to be prevention-focused, are more persuaded by messages emphasizing
negative outcomes. Pham and Avnet (2004) showed that in persuasion the accessibility of
ideals increases consumers’ reliance on their subjective affective responses to the ad relative
to the substance of the message, whereas the accessibility of oughts increases consumers’
reliance on the substance of the message relative to their subjective affective responses.
Several lines of argument have shown that vigilant (and risk-averse) form of exploration
to which prevention-focused individuals more depend on should encourage the reliance on
substantive information in persuasion and eager form of exploration to which promotion-
focused individuals more depend on should encourage the reliance on affective information in
persuasion. Based on these previous findings, following hypotheses have been created.

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H1a: Promotion-focused consumers rely more on cognitive System 1 rather than System 2,
when they form an evaluation.
H1b: Prevention-focused consumers rely more on cognitive System 2 rather than System 1,
when they form an evaluation.
Study 2
Study 1 provides the evidence that individuals who adopt a promotion versus prevention
focus rely more on Cognitive System 1 versus Cognitive System 2. Study 2 addresses this
issue under a more consumer-relevant context. To conduct this study, two kinds of ads which
will be used to prime participants as promotion- and prevention focus are utilized. After
manipulated, the participants will be asked to imagine that they are in product purchasing
situations and which Cognitive Systems they rely on when they make a purchase decision.
Study 3
Study 3 will seek to offer the evidence regulatory focus as the result of situational
influences that temporarily encourage a particular focus. Research attests that the regulatory
focus a person assumes in a given instance can be the result of either chronic tendencies or
situational influences that temporarily encourage a particular focus (Higgins et al. 1994).
This study will explore if consumers’ regulatory focuses are influenced by information
traits (negative or positive). Negative constructs predominating in memory could serve as an
indicator that danger is possible, and therefore, guide our attention to negative information.
Alternatively, positive constructs predominating could indicate that there is little risk of
danger and that negative information need not be weighted or attended to as heavily (Smith et
al. 2006). Higgins (1987) attests that individuals who pursue a promotion focus perceive their
goals as hopes and aspirations, and thus they are sensitive to the presence or absence of such

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positive outcomes. In contrast, individuals who adopt a prevention focus perceive the same
goals as duties and obligations, making them sensitive to the absence or presence of negative
outcomes. Idson et al. (2004) showed that positive outcome fits a promotion focus more than
a prevention focus, whereas the reverse is true for negative outcomes.
Based on the studies above, it can be assumed that negative information decreases a
promotion focus, while positive information decreases a prevention focus. In addition, it can
be also suggested that the information traits influence consumers’ Cognitive Systems which
closely relate to the regulatory focus.
H2: Attribute framing effects (positive or negative) influence consumers’ tendency toward
oughts or ideals as well as their reliance on Cognitive Systems.
More specifically,
H2a: Negatively framed outcomes will increase promotion-focused consumers’ reliance on
Cognitive System 2.
H2b: Positively framed outcomes will increase prevention-focused consumers’ reliance on
Cognitive System 1.
PRETEST
Pretest 1
This pretest examines a priming manipulation of ideals versus oughts which would be
used in studies 1 and 3. This manipulation was on the basis of a procedure developed by
Higgins and his colleagues. Even though this manipulation method was not clearly verified to
influence judgment and behavior in a manner consistent with the activation of promotion
versus prevention orientations, Higgins et al. (1987, 1994) and Liberman et al. (1999)

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reported that the procedure does manipulate the relative accessibility of ideals versus oughts.
SUBJECTS and PROCEDURES
Twenty undergraduate and graduate students recruited from Seoul National University
were randomly assigned to either a primed-ideals or a primed-oughts condition. The subjects
in both groups are asked to complete several tasks unrelated to the present study, and then an
experimental priming manipulation was used to induce in participants a promotion focus and
prevention focus (see Higgins et al., 1994). In a primed-ideals condition, subjects were asked
to think about their current and past hopes, aspirations, and hopes, dream, and to list two of
them. In the primed-oughts condition, participants were asked to think about their current and
past duties, obligations, and responsibilities, and to list two of them. Participants completed
this part at their own pace. After manipulation, participants were introduced to a supposedly
unrelated study on decision making. All of the participants were presented with the following
scenario:
Imagine that you and your roommate have just moved into a new apartment.
Your friends come to visit your at your new place and give each of you a gift.
They give you a Seoul National University coffee mug [pen]. The mug [pen]
Sell for 5,000won at the bookstore. They give your roommate a pen [a coffee
mug], that also sells for 5,000won at the bookstore. Suppose your roommate
offers you the chance to exchange the mug [pen] you were given for the pen
[mug]. Would you accept the offer?
At the end of the study, all participants were fully debriefed and thanked for taking part.
METHODOLOGY
Study 1
SUBJECTS and PROCEDURES

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About one hundred undergraduates and graduates students will be recruited from subject
pool at Seoul National University for this study. When the subjects arrive at the experimental
session they will be told that the purpose of this study is to see how people perceive various
life events and their values in their life. Then, all the participants in the subject pool are asked
to fill out the experimental questionnaires for manipulation of regulatory focus. Half of the
students will be randomly assigned to a primed-ideals condition, and half assigned to a
primed-oughts condition. Finally, they will be requested to answer to the questionnaire for
checking Cognitive Systems. After completing the two questionnaires, the subjects will be
thanked for taking part with small present for the participation.
FIGURE 2
COGNITIVE SYSTEMS PROPOSED TO UNDERLIE REGULATORY FOCUS EFFECTS
Regulatory Focus Type of Cognitive Systems Characteristics of
Consumer Decisions
Promotion Focus Cognitive Automatic, Effortless,
System 1 Associative, and
Emotionally charged
Promotion Focus Cognitive Slower, Serial,
System 2 Effortful, and
Deliberately controlled
MATERIALS
Following measurement will be used to check subjects’ Cognitive Systems, which are
intuitional thinking (Cognitive System 1) and reasoning thinking (Cognitive System 2):

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1. Short version of Rational-experimental Inventory (REI) Items modified into
contextual items. Subjects will rate themselves on 7-point scales, where 1 is very
unlikely and 7 very likely. Half of the items are to check intuitional thinking and half
are to check reasoning thinking. In these items, reverse items are included.
Study 2
SUBJECTS and PROCEDURES
About 100 undergraduate and graduate students at Seoul National University will be
employed for this study. Two kinds of print ads, which will be used to prime promotion focus
and prevention focus, will be selected. Half of the subjects will be randomly assigned to a
primed-ideals condition, and half assigned to a primed-oughts condition using print
advertising. Following procedures will be the same as Study 1. Then, they will be asked to fill
out the questionnaire for checking Cognitive Systems, and thanked for taking part with small
present for the participation at the end of this study.
Study 3
SUBJECTS and PROCEDURES
In this study, about 100 undergraduate and graduate students at Seoul National University
will be recruited for this study as well. Two kinds of print ads which would be used in Study 2
also employed to manipulate regulatory focuses. Half of the subjects will be assigned to a
primed-ideals condition, and half assigned to a primed-oughts condition using print
advertising. After that, the participants will be asked to fill out the short version of Rational-
Experimental Inventory to check which Cognitive Systems they rely on shortly after the
manipulation of regulatory focus. Then, discount framing/ penalty framing will be sued in this
study as positively/negatively framed outcomes. This study about the effect of discount and
penalty framing was modeled on a well-known example from Thaler (1980). He pointed out

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that “[the credit card lobby] preferred that any difference between cash and credit card
customers take the form of a cash discount rather than a credit card surcharge” (p.45). This is
because giving up a discount is experienced as a forgone gain or nongain, whereas a surcharge
or penalty experienced as a loss, which is more intense according to prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In this study, the discount framing and penalty framing will be
used as opposed to previous research. That is, if previous studies employ the framing study to
know whether discount/ penalty framing fits or intensifies promotion/ prevention focus, in
this study it is used to recognize whether it decreases promotion/prevention focus,
diminishing the reliance on Cognitive System 1 & 2. Therefore, the discount framing and
penalty framing will be used in this study reversely; that is to say, discount framing will be
applied for prevention-focused consumers to identify if it diminishes their reliance on
Cognitive System 2 and penalty framing for promotion-focused consumer to know it is
reduces their reliance on Cognitive System 1. Specifically, within discount condition,
preventionally manipulated participants will evaluate either the choice of getting a discount
{gain}or giving up a discount {nongain}. And within the penalty condition, promotionally
manipulated participants will evaluate either the choice of avoiding a penalty (nonloss} or
paying a penalty (loss). After the evaluation, all the participants in this study will be asked
again which Cognitive Systems (intuitional or reasonable) they will depend on in a
purchasing situation.
MATERIALS
Following scenario taken from Thaler (1980) study will be used as positively/negatively
framed outcomes:
For prevention- focused participants
“The book’s price is $65. As you wait in line to pay for it, you realize that the store
offers a $5 discount for paying in cash. Of course you would like to pay $60 for the
book. You have both cash and a credit card and have to choose between them.”

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After reading the scenario, half of the participants answered on a scale from -9
(very bad) to 9 (very good) the following question:
“How would it feel paying in cash and getting the $5 discount?” (gain), and the other
half answered, on the same scale, the question “How would if feel using your credit
card and giving up the $5 discount?” (nongain)
For promotion- focused participants
“The book’s price is $60. As you wait in line to pay for it, you realize that the store
offers a $5 penalty for paying in credit. Of course you would like to pay $60 for the
book. You have both cash and a credit card and have to choose between them.”
After reading the scenario, half of the participants answered on a scale from -9
(very bad) to 9 (very good) the following question:
“How would it feel paying in cash and avoiding the $5 penalty?” (nonloss), and
the other half answered, on the same scale, the question “How would if feel using
your credit card and paying the $5 penalty?” (loss).
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