W poszukiwaniu optymalnego sposobu wprowadzenia lara kapitałowegoGRAPE
Joanna Tyrowicz i Krzysztof Makarski
oraz Marcin Bielecki, Marcin Waniek i Jan Woznica
Group for Research in Applied Economics
Konferencja D lugoterminowe Oszczedzanie - SGH - 2016
Nigdy nie jest za pózno? Ograniczenie przywilejów emerytalnych w PolsceGRAPE
Oliwia Komada Paweł Strzelecki Joanna Tyrowicz
GRAPE|FAME
Narodowy Bank Polski
Szkoła Główna Handlowa
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Konferencja Długoterminowe Oszczędzanie
Szkoła Główna Handlowa
czerwiec 2016
(Nie)Stabilność polityczna reform systemu emerytalnego.Oliwia Komada
W artykule przeanalizowano stabilność polityczną reformy systemu emerytalnego, polegającej na wprowadzeniu filaru kapitałowego (tzn. prywatyzacji systemu emerytalnego). Analizy dokonano na podstawie modelu nakładających się pokoleń z heterogenicznością w ramach kohorty. Wprowadzenie filaru kapitałowego jest efektywne w sensie Kaldora-Hicksa i ma poparcie polityczne. W kolejnych okresach konsumenci głosują nad cofnięciem prywatyzacji systemu emerytalnego. Rozważane scenariusze to: przechwycenie zgromadzonych już aktywów, przeniesienie przyszłych składek do filaru repartycyjnego lub połączenie obu polityk. Pokazano, że nawet jeśli taka reforma obniża dobrobyt w długim okresie, to rozkład korzyści pomiędzy kohortami przekłada się na poparcie polityczne dla rozważanej zmiany systemu emerytalnego. Prawidłowa cesja praw majątkowych do aktywów zebranych w systemie emerytalnym może mieć kluczowe znaczenie dla stabilności politycznej filaru kapitałowego.
W poszukiwaniu optymalnego sposobu wprowadzenia lara kapitałowegoGRAPE
Joanna Tyrowicz i Krzysztof Makarski
oraz Marcin Bielecki, Marcin Waniek i Jan Woznica
Group for Research in Applied Economics
Konferencja D lugoterminowe Oszczedzanie - SGH - 2016
Nigdy nie jest za pózno? Ograniczenie przywilejów emerytalnych w PolsceGRAPE
Oliwia Komada Paweł Strzelecki Joanna Tyrowicz
GRAPE|FAME
Narodowy Bank Polski
Szkoła Główna Handlowa
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Konferencja Długoterminowe Oszczędzanie
Szkoła Główna Handlowa
czerwiec 2016
(Nie)Stabilność polityczna reform systemu emerytalnego.Oliwia Komada
W artykule przeanalizowano stabilność polityczną reformy systemu emerytalnego, polegającej na wprowadzeniu filaru kapitałowego (tzn. prywatyzacji systemu emerytalnego). Analizy dokonano na podstawie modelu nakładających się pokoleń z heterogenicznością w ramach kohorty. Wprowadzenie filaru kapitałowego jest efektywne w sensie Kaldora-Hicksa i ma poparcie polityczne. W kolejnych okresach konsumenci głosują nad cofnięciem prywatyzacji systemu emerytalnego. Rozważane scenariusze to: przechwycenie zgromadzonych już aktywów, przeniesienie przyszłych składek do filaru repartycyjnego lub połączenie obu polityk. Pokazano, że nawet jeśli taka reforma obniża dobrobyt w długim okresie, to rozkład korzyści pomiędzy kohortami przekłada się na poparcie polityczne dla rozważanej zmiany systemu emerytalnego. Prawidłowa cesja praw majątkowych do aktywów zebranych w systemie emerytalnym może mieć kluczowe znaczenie dla stabilności politycznej filaru kapitałowego.
Efficiency of the pension reform: The welfare effects of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
- The document discusses modeling the welfare effects of various fiscal closures (ways of financing) for a pension reform in Poland that moves from a defined benefit to a partially funded defined contribution system.
- It develops an overlapping generations model to compare steady states before and after the reform under different fiscal closures like lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, and debt.
- Preliminary results show the pension reform leads to small net welfare gains of around 0.5-1% of permanent income depending on the fiscal closure and degree of time inconsistency in preferences. Lump sum taxes have among the highest welfare gains.
Economic consequences of changing fertility. Insights from an OLG modelGRAPE
We want to use macro models to evaluate effects of differenet demographic scenarios
Demographics drives majority of the macroeconomic changes in the foreseeable future
Fiscal effects will be large and unavoidable but larger TFR can mitigate them
Strong (political) discussions about ways to prevent demographic catastrophe...
...but what is the adequate cost of family policy - even if successful?
Figures we obtain go beyond the simple calculations in Excel (forward looking agents)
Starzenie się społeczeństwa w Polsce jest faktem i system ubezpieczeń społecznych musiał w związku z tym zostać zreformowany. W 1999 roku system emerytalny zdefiniowanego świadczenia został zmieniony na system zdefiniowanej składki - czy w tej sytuacji podniesienie wieku emerytalnego wciąż jest konieczne?
Is the retirement age increase in Poland still necessary given the 1999 reform of the pension system? EmerytGRAPE analysis with the use of OLG model answers this question.
Does social security reform reduce gains from higher retirement age?GRAPE
Increasing the minimum eligibility retirement age was evaluated under different pension systems: defined benefit (DB), notional defined contribution (NDC), and fully funded defined contribution (FDC). Raising the retirement age was found to increase welfare in all systems. Under DB, leisure decreased and taxes fell. Under NDC and FDC, leisure decreased but pensions increased. Labor supply adjusted downward for individual workers but increased in aggregate due to longer careers. Capital decreased primarily from lower precautionary savings rather than changes in productivity. Overall, retirement age increases were found to have economy-wide benefits regardless of pension system design.
The Sooner The Better - The Welfare Effects of the Retirement Age Increase Un...GRAPE
This document summarizes a study that analyzes the macroeconomic and welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension systems (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution). It finds that increasing the retirement age has universally positive welfare effects and increases aggregate labor supply. These effects are largest under a funded defined contribution system and enhanced when productivity increases with age. Various robustness checks considering alternative demographic and productivity assumptions confirm these overall conclusions.
This document summarizes a study that examines the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution) using overlapping generations models. It finds that increasing the retirement age leads to overall welfare gains in all schemes. The mechanisms through which welfare increases differ across schemes, with labor supply, pensions, taxes, and other macroeconomic variables changing to different degrees depending on the pension design. The study aims to better understand how macroeconomic effects and welfare impacts may vary when the retirement age is increased under different existing pension-benefit linkages.
This document summarizes a study on the welfare effects of Poland's 1999 pension reform, which introduced a three-pillar pension system including a notional defined contribution scheme and a fully funded defined contribution scheme. The study uses an overlapping generations model to assess the aggregate efficiency of the reform, the effects across generations, and the importance of different fiscal closure approaches used to finance the transition. The results show that the reform improved welfare and most gains came from reduced pension benefits rather than pre-funding. The choice of fiscal closure, such as using public debt, also significantly impacted welfare and the distribution of costs across generations.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
1) A pension system reform from defined benefit to defined contribution in Poland would likely increase consumption inequalities but decrease wealth inequalities.
2) The demographic transition alone would increase consumption inequalities more than the pension reform.
3) Minimum pensions could reduce the rise in consumption inequality from the pension reform by around 40% by targeting those with lower incomes, but would slightly increase consumption by reducing savings incentives. The effects of contribution caps would be negligible.
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This document discusses modeling pension reforms in Poland using an overlapping generations model. It aims to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures used to finance gaps in the social insurance fund resulting from pension reforms. The model will examine five potential fiscal closures: lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, debt financing plus labor taxes, and debt financing plus consumption taxes. The results will help determine which fiscal closure has the best or worst effects on welfare, savings, labor supply, and economic output.
This document analyzes the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and fully funded) using overlapping generations models. The key findings are:
1) Increasing the retirement age leads to welfare gains for all cohorts under all pension schemes by increasing aggregate labor supply and lifetime earnings.
2) The sources of gains differ by pension scheme, for example in fully funded schemes it decreases capital per worker and increases interest rates.
3) Raising the retirement age reduces pension deficits, lowers taxes, and boosts pensions and welfare compared to baseline projections.
Effiency of the pension reform: the welfare effetcs of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
This document describes a model developed to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures (ways of financing) for pension reforms in Poland. The model is an overlapping generations model that considers household optimization of consumption and leisure over a lifetime, as well as a production sector. The document outlines the baseline scenario, pension reform scenario, and three fiscal closure options analyzed: labor tax increases, lump sum taxes, and debt accumulation. Preliminary results suggest that while all reforms increase long run GDP and capital, a labor tax increase leads to the smallest reduction in labor supply and is most efficient according to a lump sum redistribution analysis.
Inequality in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
The document analyzes how inequality changes in an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systems. It finds that wealth and consumption inequalities increase due to demographic transitions and a pension reform from defined benefit to defined contribution systems. Minimum pensions can reduce inequality increases from the reform by 40-50% by raising incomes at the bottom, but have little effect on preferences. Contribution caps have a negligible impact on inequality. Overall, demographic changes contribute more to rising inequalities than the pension system reform.
This document discusses using an overlapping generations model to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closure options for financing the pension reform in Poland in 1999. The reform transitioned the pension system from a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system to a combination of notional defined contribution and funded defined contribution systems. The model will compare the welfare effects across generations and over time for five different fiscal closure options to finance the gap created by contributions staying in the pay-as-you-go system. The analysis will provide insight into which fiscal closure option has the best effects on savings, labor supply, output, and overall welfare.
Political (In)Stability of Pension System ReformsGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Efficiency of the pension reform: The welfare effects of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
- The document discusses modeling the welfare effects of various fiscal closures (ways of financing) for a pension reform in Poland that moves from a defined benefit to a partially funded defined contribution system.
- It develops an overlapping generations model to compare steady states before and after the reform under different fiscal closures like lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, and debt.
- Preliminary results show the pension reform leads to small net welfare gains of around 0.5-1% of permanent income depending on the fiscal closure and degree of time inconsistency in preferences. Lump sum taxes have among the highest welfare gains.
Economic consequences of changing fertility. Insights from an OLG modelGRAPE
We want to use macro models to evaluate effects of differenet demographic scenarios
Demographics drives majority of the macroeconomic changes in the foreseeable future
Fiscal effects will be large and unavoidable but larger TFR can mitigate them
Strong (political) discussions about ways to prevent demographic catastrophe...
...but what is the adequate cost of family policy - even if successful?
Figures we obtain go beyond the simple calculations in Excel (forward looking agents)
Starzenie się społeczeństwa w Polsce jest faktem i system ubezpieczeń społecznych musiał w związku z tym zostać zreformowany. W 1999 roku system emerytalny zdefiniowanego świadczenia został zmieniony na system zdefiniowanej składki - czy w tej sytuacji podniesienie wieku emerytalnego wciąż jest konieczne?
Is the retirement age increase in Poland still necessary given the 1999 reform of the pension system? EmerytGRAPE analysis with the use of OLG model answers this question.
Does social security reform reduce gains from higher retirement age?GRAPE
Increasing the minimum eligibility retirement age was evaluated under different pension systems: defined benefit (DB), notional defined contribution (NDC), and fully funded defined contribution (FDC). Raising the retirement age was found to increase welfare in all systems. Under DB, leisure decreased and taxes fell. Under NDC and FDC, leisure decreased but pensions increased. Labor supply adjusted downward for individual workers but increased in aggregate due to longer careers. Capital decreased primarily from lower precautionary savings rather than changes in productivity. Overall, retirement age increases were found to have economy-wide benefits regardless of pension system design.
The Sooner The Better - The Welfare Effects of the Retirement Age Increase Un...GRAPE
This document summarizes a study that analyzes the macroeconomic and welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension systems (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution). It finds that increasing the retirement age has universally positive welfare effects and increases aggregate labor supply. These effects are largest under a funded defined contribution system and enhanced when productivity increases with age. Various robustness checks considering alternative demographic and productivity assumptions confirm these overall conclusions.
This document summarizes a study that examines the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution) using overlapping generations models. It finds that increasing the retirement age leads to overall welfare gains in all schemes. The mechanisms through which welfare increases differ across schemes, with labor supply, pensions, taxes, and other macroeconomic variables changing to different degrees depending on the pension design. The study aims to better understand how macroeconomic effects and welfare impacts may vary when the retirement age is increased under different existing pension-benefit linkages.
This document summarizes a study on the welfare effects of Poland's 1999 pension reform, which introduced a three-pillar pension system including a notional defined contribution scheme and a fully funded defined contribution scheme. The study uses an overlapping generations model to assess the aggregate efficiency of the reform, the effects across generations, and the importance of different fiscal closure approaches used to finance the transition. The results show that the reform improved welfare and most gains came from reduced pension benefits rather than pre-funding. The choice of fiscal closure, such as using public debt, also significantly impacted welfare and the distribution of costs across generations.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
1) A pension system reform from defined benefit to defined contribution in Poland would likely increase consumption inequalities but decrease wealth inequalities.
2) The demographic transition alone would increase consumption inequalities more than the pension reform.
3) Minimum pensions could reduce the rise in consumption inequality from the pension reform by around 40% by targeting those with lower incomes, but would slightly increase consumption by reducing savings incentives. The effects of contribution caps would be negligible.
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This document discusses modeling pension reforms in Poland using an overlapping generations model. It aims to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures used to finance gaps in the social insurance fund resulting from pension reforms. The model will examine five potential fiscal closures: lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, debt financing plus labor taxes, and debt financing plus consumption taxes. The results will help determine which fiscal closure has the best or worst effects on welfare, savings, labor supply, and economic output.
This document analyzes the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and fully funded) using overlapping generations models. The key findings are:
1) Increasing the retirement age leads to welfare gains for all cohorts under all pension schemes by increasing aggregate labor supply and lifetime earnings.
2) The sources of gains differ by pension scheme, for example in fully funded schemes it decreases capital per worker and increases interest rates.
3) Raising the retirement age reduces pension deficits, lowers taxes, and boosts pensions and welfare compared to baseline projections.
Effiency of the pension reform: the welfare effetcs of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
This document describes a model developed to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures (ways of financing) for pension reforms in Poland. The model is an overlapping generations model that considers household optimization of consumption and leisure over a lifetime, as well as a production sector. The document outlines the baseline scenario, pension reform scenario, and three fiscal closure options analyzed: labor tax increases, lump sum taxes, and debt accumulation. Preliminary results suggest that while all reforms increase long run GDP and capital, a labor tax increase leads to the smallest reduction in labor supply and is most efficient according to a lump sum redistribution analysis.
Inequality in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
The document analyzes how inequality changes in an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systems. It finds that wealth and consumption inequalities increase due to demographic transitions and a pension reform from defined benefit to defined contribution systems. Minimum pensions can reduce inequality increases from the reform by 40-50% by raising incomes at the bottom, but have little effect on preferences. Contribution caps have a negligible impact on inequality. Overall, demographic changes contribute more to rising inequalities than the pension system reform.
This document discusses using an overlapping generations model to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closure options for financing the pension reform in Poland in 1999. The reform transitioned the pension system from a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system to a combination of notional defined contribution and funded defined contribution systems. The model will compare the welfare effects across generations and over time for five different fiscal closure options to finance the gap created by contributions staying in the pay-as-you-go system. The analysis will provide insight into which fiscal closure option has the best effects on savings, labor supply, output, and overall welfare.
Political (In)Stability of Pension System ReformsGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Revisiting gender board diversity and firm performanceGRAPE
Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki.
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
We study the contribution of rising longevity to the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last seventy years. We construct an OLG model with multiple sources of inequality, closely calibrated to the data. Our main finding is that improvements in old-age longevity explain about 30% of the observed rise in wealth inequality. This magnitude is similar to previously emphasized channels associated with income inequality and the tax system. The contribution of demographics is bound to raise wealth inequality further in the decades to come.
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
This document introduces a framework for analyzing contracts between a principal and multiple agents who have interdependent preferences. It begins with a simple example involving two agents who can choose between working and shirking, and whose outputs are either success or failure. The agents have interdependent utility that depends on both their own material payoff and their conjecture of the other agent's utility.
The document then outlines the research agenda, which is to characterize optimal contracts when agents have interdependent preferences and to provide recommendations for contract design based on whether preferences are positively or negatively interdependent. Finally, it presents some general results, finding that independent contracts are no longer optimal when preferences are interdependent, and that contracts should incorporate both individual performance bonuses and team
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large New Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economies, we use this model to provide comparative statics across past and contemporaneous age structures of the working population. Thus, we quantify the extent to which the response of labor markets to adverse TFP shocks and monetary policy shocks becomes muted with the aging of the working population. Our findings have important policy implications for European labor markets and beyond. For example, the working population is expected to further age in Europe, whereas the share of young workers will remain robust in the US. Our results suggest a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle. Furthermore, with the aging population, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy should be more hawkish in the older society.
This document discusses how labor market inequality may push disadvantaged groups like women into entrepreneurship out of necessity. It presents a theoretical framework showing how greater gender employment gaps could increase the prevalence of female self-employment. The authors test this using data on gender wage and employment gaps matched with survey data on entrepreneurship. Their results show a robust positive effect of gender employment gaps on necessity-driven female entrepreneurship but little effect of wage gaps. This provides empirical support that labor market discrimination can push disadvantaged groups into self-employment when other employment options are limited.
Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
- The document discusses the optimal assignment of property rights when a social planner cannot commit to future trading mechanisms. This lack of commitment results in ex-post inefficiency and inefficient investment decisions due to hold-up problems.
- The social planner chooses property rights to alleviate these frictions. The paper proposes a framework to characterize the optimal property right using a mechanism design approach. The main result is that the optimal property right is simple but flexible, often featuring an option to own the property.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights using mechanism design. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when the social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors analyze how to design property rights to alleviate these frictions in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power. A key result is that the optimal property right is often simple but flexible, featuring an option to own the resource.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when a social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors' contribution is characterizing the optimal property right from a non-parametric class in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power, finding that flexible rights featuring an option to own are often optimal.
Redystrybucja wewnatrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
1. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Magda Malec
GRAPE|FAME & Szkoła Główna Handlowa
Konferencja Długoterminowe Oszczędzanie
20-21 czerwca 2016
2. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Redystrybucja w ramach systemu emerytalnego
Ekonomia polityczna - redystrybucja dochodu funkcją państwa dobrobytu
3. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Redystrybucja w ramach systemu emerytalnego
Ekonomia polityczna - redystrybucja dochodu funkcją państwa dobrobytu
Forster (2003), Mulligan (2004), Barr (2006), Fehr (2013):
redystrybucyjny charakter systemów emerytalnych
4. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Redystrybucja w ramach systemu emerytalnego
Ekonomia polityczna - redystrybucja dochodu funkcją państwa dobrobytu
Forster (2003), Mulligan (2004), Barr (2006), Fehr (2013):
redystrybucyjny charakter systemów emerytalnych
Redystrybucja w ramach kohorty (vs pomiędzy kohortami)
5. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Redystrybucja wewnątrz kohorty: kobiety i mężczyźni
Emerytury wyliczane na podstawie uniwersalnych tablic średniego dalszego
trwania życia (OECD, 2013)
7. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Cel i metoda badania
Podstawowe pytania o skalę
Redystrybucja od (krócej żyjących) mężczyzn do (dłużej żyjących) kobiet
8. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Cel i metoda badania
Podstawowe pytania o skalę
Redystrybucja od (krócej żyjących) mężczyzn do (dłużej żyjących) kobiet
Efekty wydłużania się życia
9. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Cel i metoda badania
Podstawowe pytania o skalę
Redystrybucja od (krócej żyjących) mężczyzn do (dłużej żyjących) kobiet
Efekty wydłużania się życia
Narzędzia i metoda
Pięciookresowy model OLG
z heterogenicznością: płeć ⇒ różna długość życia kobiet i mężczyzn
pracuje od i = 1 do i = 3, emerytura od i > 4
niezerowe prawdopodobieństwo śmierci między i = 4 oraz i = 5
10. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Motywacja
Cel i metoda badania
Podstawowe pytania o skalę
Redystrybucja od (krócej żyjących) mężczyzn do (dłużej żyjących) kobiet
Efekty wydłużania się życia
Narzędzia i metoda
Pięciookresowy model OLG
z heterogenicznością: płeć ⇒ różna długość życia kobiet i mężczyzn
pracuje od i = 1 do i = 3, emerytura od i > 4
niezerowe prawdopodobieństwo śmierci między i = 4 oraz i = 5
system PAYG DC
11. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - firma i system emerytalny
Firmy rozwiązują problem maksymalizacyjny:
max
(Yt ,Kt ,Lt )
Yt − wt Lt − (rt + δ)Kt (1)
s.t. Yt = Kα
t L1−α
t
zbilansowany system emerytalny PAYG DC ∀t
budżet rządu zbilansowany ∀t ⇒ nie generuje długu publicznego
12. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - dwa typy agentów
Różnica w płacach (ψ): luka płacowa kobiet i mężczyzn
13. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - dwa typy agentów
Różnica w płacach (ψ): luka płacowa kobiet i mężczyzn
zagregowana podaż pracy w gospodarce:
L=
t
3
j=1
(1 −
1
2
ψ)Nj
t (2)
to samo prawdopodobieństwo narodzin
stabilna populacja (brak wzrostu populacji), ale różne
prawdopodobieństwa przeżycia
Prawdopodobieństwa przeżycia (θt ), zmienne w czasie (2005-2095)
14. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - dwa typy agentów
Różnica w płacach (ψ): luka płacowa kobiet i mężczyzn
zagregowana podaż pracy w gospodarce:
L=
t
3
j=1
(1 −
1
2
ψ)Nj
t (2)
to samo prawdopodobieństwo narodzin
stabilna populacja (brak wzrostu populacji), ale różne
prawdopodobieństwa przeżycia
Prawdopodobieństwa przeżycia (θt ), zmienne w czasie (2005-2095)
15. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - kobiety
Koszt wychowania dzieci (τc ), w pierwszym okresie życia (mniejszy udział
w rynku pracy)
16. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - kobiety
Koszt wychowania dzieci (τc ), w pierwszym okresie życia (mniejszy udział
w rynku pracy)
rozwiązują problem maksymalizacji użyteczności, którą czerpią z
konsumpcji:
max logc1
t + θ2βlogc2
t+1 + θ3β2
logc3
t+2 + θ4β3
logc4
t+3 + θ5β4
logc5
t+4 (3)
mając zadane ograniczenie budżetowe:
c1
t + s1
t = ψwt (1 − τt )(1 − τt
c )
c2
t+1 + s2
t+1 = ψwt+1(1 − τt+1) + (1 + rt+1)s1
t
c3
t+2 + s3
t+2 = ψwt+2(1 − τt+2) + (1 + rt+2)s2
t+1
c4
t+3 + s4
t+3 = (1 + rt+3)s3
t+3 + bt+3
c5
t+4 = (1 + rt+4)s4
t+4 + bt+4
17. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Struktura modelu - mężczyźni
rozwiązują problem maksymalizacji użyteczności, którą czerpią z
konsumpcji:
max logc1
t + θ2βlogc2
t+1 + θ3β2
logc3
t+2 + θ4β3
logc4
t+3 + θ5β4
logc5
t+4 (4)
mając zadane ograniczenie budżetowe:
c1
t + s1
t = wt (1 − τt )
c2
t+1 + s2
t+1 = wt+1(1 − τt+1) + (1 + rt+1)s1
t
c3
t+2 + s3
t+2 = wt+2(1 − τt+2) + (1 + rt+2)s2
t+1
c4
t+3 + s4
t+3 = (1 + rt+3)s3
t+3 + bt+3
c5
t+4 = (1 + rt+4)s4
t+4 + bt+4
19. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Scenariusze symulacji: mężczyźni żyją krócej
Baseline: system używa wspólnych tablic + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety
+ płace kobiet niższe
Warianty symulacji: zawsze PAYG DC
1 tablice trwania życia specyficzne dla płci
20. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Scenariusze symulacji: mężczyźni żyją krócej
Baseline: system używa wspólnych tablic + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety
+ płace kobiet niższe
Warianty symulacji: zawsze PAYG DC
1 tablice trwania życia specyficzne dla płci
2 ⇑ + równe płace i równe koszty dzietności
21. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Opis modelu
Scenariusze symulacji: mężczyźni żyją krócej
Baseline: system używa wspólnych tablic + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety
+ płace kobiet niższe
Warianty symulacji: zawsze PAYG DC
1 tablice trwania życia specyficzne dla płci
2 ⇑ + równe płace i równe koszty dzietności
3 tablice wspólne, ale równe płace i równe koszty dzietności
22. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile “zapłacę”, by nie zmieniać baseline
Porównuję do baseline: wspólne tablice + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety +
płace kobiet niższe
23. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile “zapłacę”, by nie zmieniać baseline
Porównuję do baseline: wspólne tablice + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety +
płace kobiet niższe
Porównuję w jednostkach konsumpcji w cyklu życia (tzw. ekwiwalent
konsumpcji)
24. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile “zapłacę”, by nie zmieniać baseline
Porównuję do baseline: wspólne tablice + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety +
płace kobiet niższe
Porównuję w jednostkach konsumpcji w cyklu życia (tzw. ekwiwalent
konsumpcji)
Redystrybucja (od mężczyzn do kobiet): 0.5% and 0.7% ekwiwalentu
konsumpcji
25. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile “zapłacę”, by nie zmieniać baseline
Porównuję do baseline: wspólne tablice + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety +
płace kobiet niższe
Porównuję w jednostkach konsumpcji w cyklu życia (tzw. ekwiwalent
konsumpcji)
Redystrybucja (od mężczyzn do kobiet): 0.5% and 0.7% ekwiwalentu
konsumpcji
Efekt głównie z powodu emerytury:
Baseline Tablice specyficzne
Kobiety Mężczyźni Kobiety Mężczyźni
Pierwszy stan ustalony 6.82% 8.34% 6.32% 8.90%
... wydarza się przejście demograficzne ...
26. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile “zapłacę”, by nie zmieniać baseline
Porównuję do baseline: wspólne tablice + koszty dzietności obciążają kobiety +
płace kobiet niższe
Porównuję w jednostkach konsumpcji w cyklu życia (tzw. ekwiwalent
konsumpcji)
Redystrybucja (od mężczyzn do kobiet): 0.5% and 0.7% ekwiwalentu
konsumpcji
Efekt głównie z powodu emerytury:
Baseline Tablice specyficzne
Kobiety Mężczyźni Kobiety Mężczyźni
Pierwszy stan ustalony 6.82% 8.34% 6.32% 8.90%
... wydarza się przejście demograficzne ...
Drugi stan ustalony 5.10% 6.32% 4.60% 6.86%
Nierówne płace są równoważone wyższymi emeryturami
27. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile zmienia rynek pracy?
Równe płace i równe koszty dzietności: +18.34% (statycznie)
28. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile zmienia rynek pracy?
Równe płace i równe koszty dzietności: +18.34% (statycznie) i +18.86%
(dynamicznie)
29. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wyniki
Ile zmienia rynek pracy?
Równe płace i równe koszty dzietności: +18.34% (statycznie) i +18.86%
(dynamicznie)
⇑ + specyficzne tablice: +19.18% (+19.98% dynamicznie)
30. Redystrybucja wewnątrzpokoleniowa w systemie emerytalnym
Wnioski
Jaki z tego morał?
zróżnicowanie wieku emerytalnego między kobietami i mężczyznami w
systemie emerytalnym pogłębia nierówności
sama skala redystrybucji umiarkowana (eliminacja wahań koniunktury ≡
1% ekwiwalentu konsumpcji)