SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Quantum Games and Quantum 
        Strategies
  The Future of Decision Making ?
Quantum Games !!!
●   Can principles of Quantum communication be
    used to develop efficient and unbiased marketing
    strategies ?

●   Quantum communication and Quantum
    cryptography can be regarded as Games
    played between 2 legal players Alice and Bob and
    the illegal players in between them trying to decrypt
    the secret message.
What is a Game ?
●   We have a set of players i


●   a strategy set Si for each player i.


●   Pay-off for each player Pi(s1,s2,....), where siSi.
Where does “Quantum” comes into
                “play”?

●   Game theory does not explicitly concern itself with
    how the information is transmitted once a decision is
    taken. Bearing in mind that a game is also about
    the transfer of information, it becomes legitimate
    to ask what happens if these carriers of
    information are taken to be quantum systems,
    quantum information being a fundamental notion of
    information.
Strategies and Equilibriums
●   A quantum strategy sA is called dominant strategy of
    Alice if PA (sA,s'B) ≥ PA (s′A, s′B )
    for all s′A ∈ SA , s′B ∈ SB


●   A pair ( sA , sB ) is said to be an equilibrium in
    dominant strategies if sA and sB are the players’
    respective dominant strategies
Strategies and Equilibriums

●   A combination of strategies ( sA , sB ) is called a
    Nash equilibrium if PA (sA,sB) ≥ PA (s′A, sB ) and
    PB (sA,sB) ≥ PB (sA, s′B )for all s′A ∈ SA , s′B ∈ SB .
●   A pair of strategies ( sA , sB ) is called Pareto
    optimal, if it is not possible to increase one player’s
    pay-off without lessening the pay-off of the other
    player.
Nash Equilibrium

●   A Nash equilibrium implies that neither player has a
    motivation to unilaterally alter his or her strategy
    from this equilibrium solution, as this action will
    lessen his or her pay-off. Given that the other player
    will stick to the strategy corresponding to the
    equilibrium, the best result is achieved by also
    playing the equilibrium solution.
The Prisoner's Dilemma

●   Two prisoners are being questioned by the police.
    They are held in separate cells and cannot talk to
    each other. The police make the following offer to
    both the prisoners: if one confesses that both
    committed the crime then the confessor will be set
    free and the other will spend 5 years in jail; if both
    confess then they will each get 4 yr jail term: if
    neither confess, then they will each spend 2 yrs in
    jail
The Prisoner's Dilemma
●   Table of Pay-offs :

        P1          Cooperation Defection
        P2
    Cooperation           (3,3)   (0,5)

    Defection             (5,0)   (1,1)
The Prisoner's Dilemma

●   If both the prisoners co-operate with each other then
    they are each awarded 3 yrs of freedom, if none of
    them co-operate with each other then each will be
    awarded 1 yr of freedom and if one of them has
    conscience and the other is defected then the 'good'
    prisoner has to serve full 5 yr in jail while the 'bad'
    one will be set free immediately i.e. Full 5 yrs of
    freedom for the 'bad' prisoner. So what is the optimal
    strategy that both of them apply here?
Nash Equilibrium
●   In the Prisoner's dilemma problem if the dominant
    strategy is (D,D) with pay-offs (1,1) for Alice and
    Bob. Now if Alice changes her strategy while Bob
    sticks to his strategy, i.e. Alice decides to become
    'good' then she pays the price with 0 pay-off or in
    this case a complete 5yr jail sentence. Same is true
    for Bob, thus if either of them decides to become
    'good' while the other stays 'bad', the his/her pay-off
    decreases, hence (D,D) is in Nash equilibrium. But
    (D,D) is not Pareto optimal because (C,C) has better
    pay-offs than (D,D).
Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
●   In traditional 2 × 2 games where each player has just
    a single move, creating a superposition by utilizing a
    quantum strategy will give the same results as a
    mixed classical strategy. In order to see non-
    classical results it is necessary to produce
    entanglement between the players’ moves

●   Initial state is the maximally entangled state
              |> = (|00> + i|11>)/√2
Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
●   The final state is represented as following :
             |ψf> = J†(UA ⊗UB) J |CC>
    where J=exp(iγD' ⊗ D'/2), γ ∈ [0, π/2] is a real
    parameter, UA and UB are respective strategies for
    Alice and Bob.

●   Expected Pay-off for Alice :
    <$> = ACC|<ψf |CC>|2 + ACD|<ψf |CD>|2 + ADC|
    <ψf |DC>|2 + ADD|<ψf |DD>|2
Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
●   The matrix representation of operators
    corresponding to quantum strategies from this set is
    given by U(,) = {( eicos(/2), sin(/2) ),
    ( -sin(/2), e-icos(/2) )}

●   The strategies are :
    C={(1,0),(0,1)} and D={(0,1),(-1,0)}

●   γ is a measure for the game’s entanglement
Pay-Offs is what matters !!

●   Alice's expected pay-off with the quantum
    strategies:
    PA (θA , φA , θB , φB ) = 3 |cos(φA + φB ) cos(θA /2)
    cos(θB /2)|2 + 5 |sin(φA ) cos(θA /2) sin(θB /2) −
    cos(φB ) cos(θB /2) sin(θA /2)| 2 + |sin(φA + φB )
    cos(θA /2) cos(θB /2) + sin(θA /2) sin(θB /2)|2 .
Pay-Offs is what matters !!

●   Bob's expected pay-off with the quantum strategies:


    PB (θA , φA , θB , φB ) = 3 |cos(φA + φB ) cos(θA /2)
    cos(θB /2)|2 + 5 |sin(φB ) cos(θB /2) sin(θA /2) −
    cos(φA ) cos(θA /2) sin(θB /2)| 2 + |sin(φA + φB )
    cos(θA /2) cos(θB /2) + sin(θA /2) sin(θB /2)|2 .
Pay-Offs is what matters !!
●   Assuming Bob chooses D'= U (π, 0), then
    PA (θA , φA ,  , 0 ) = 5 |sin(φA ) cos(θA /2)| 2 +
    |sin(θA /2)|2 <= 5 for θA = 0 and φA = /2
●   Thus Alice’s best reply would be Q = U(0, /2) =
    {(i,0),(0,-i)}
●   While assuming Bob plays C'= U (0, 0) Alice’s best
    strategy would be defection D'. Thus, there is no
    dominant strategy left for Alice. The game being
    symmetric, the same holds for Bob, i.e., D' ⊗ D' is
    no longer an equilibrium in dominant strategies
Quantum Nash Equilibrium
●   PA (θA , φA , 0 , /2 ) = 3 |sin(φA) cos(θA /2) |2 +
    |cos(φA) cos(θA /2)|2 <= 3 for θA = 0, φA = /2 thus
    PA (U(θA , φA ) , Q ) <= PA (Q, Q )
●   PB (0 , /2, θB , φB ) = 3 |sin(φB)cos(θB /2)|2 +
    |cos(φB) cos(θB /2)|2 <= 3 for θB = 0, φB = /2 thus
    PB (Q, U(θB , φB ) ) <= PB (Q, Q )


●   Hence (Q,Q) is the new Nash Equilibrium.
Does the Prisoners escape the dilemma?

●   It is interesting to see that Q ⊗ Q has the property to
    be Pareto optimal , that is, by deviating from this
    pair of strategies it is not possible to increase the
    pay-off of one player without lessening the pay-off
    of the other player. In the classical game only
    mutual cooperation is Pareto optimal, but it is not an
    equilibrium solution. One could say that by
    allowing for quantum strategies the players
    escape the dilemma .
Real Life Dilemmas !!
●   Nuclear proliferation among nations: When a
    nation tries to up its nuclear armory and sources
    with the help of its more powerful allies, its rival
    nations feels threatened and they too power up their
    nuclear warfares and sources with powerful allies,
    thus increasing tension between nations and
    increasing possibility of nuclear war. Thus one
    might speculate that Governments of nations using
    Quantum strategies might even end the possibility of
    a nuclear disaster in near future, but then
    “everything” needs to be “Quantum” !!!
Real Life Dilemmas !!
This one's from “Batman-Dark Knight” : Joker
planted bombs on the 2 ferries where the triggers for
the bombs were given to the opposite parties. The
classical Nash equilibrium strategy would lead the 2
parties to trigger the bombs simulteneously thus
killing everybody. But in the movie they might have
figured out the “Quantum strategy” to co-operate
thus saving all of them. One might think “Quantum
strategies” as the most “socially acceptable” or
“near conscience” but wait till you have seen the
opposite face of the “coin”.
Real Life Dilemmas !!
●   Breakdown of talks at the Climate change Summit at
    Copenhagen: Rich nations having larger number of
    industries are emmitting larger amount of CO2 in the
    atmosphere. But only developing nations trying to build up
    its commercial and industrial economy are asked to cut
    down CO2 emmision. Such nations felt that the rich are
    trying to suppress them down and they deny to decrease
    CO2 emmision from factories etc. and thus talks broke
    down. Defection( increased release of CO2 by all nations)
    seemed the Nash equilibrium strategy compared to
    Cooperation(decreased release of CO2 by all nations). Thus
    a “Quantum World” should be the paradise or the heaven to
    live in.
Let's Make A Deal !!
Should you exchange doors ?


●   The answer is yes if you are a rational person !
●   You win 2/3 of the time you exchange the doors and
    lose 1/3 of the time !!
●   From an information theoretic point of view, by
    opening a door without a prize Monty has given
    information about where the prize is. Let's see how?
Should you exchange doors ?

●   The probability of originally choosing a goat is 2/3
    and the probability of originally choosing the car is
    1/3. Once Monty Hall has removed a "goat door,"
    the contestant who chose the door with a goat
    behind it will necessarily win the car, and the
    contestant who originally chose the car will
    necessarily "win" the goat. Because the chances are
    2/3 of being a contestant who originally chose a
    goat, probability will always favor switching
    choices.
Should you exchange doors ?
Quantum Monty Hall !!
●   In our quantum version of the game let us call the
    host as Alice and player as Bob.
●   There is one quantum particle and three boxes |0 > ,
    |1> , and |2>
●   The state of the system can be expressed as
            |> = |oba>
    where a = Alice’s choice of box( prize door ),
    b =Bob’s choice of box, and o = the box that has
    been opened
Quantum Monty Hall !!

●   The final state of the system is
    |f> = (S' cos  + N' sin )O'(I'  B'  A')|i>
●   Where A' Alice’s choice operator or strategy, B'
    Bob’s initial choice operator or initial strategy, O'
    the opening box operator, S' Bob’s switching
    operator, N' Bob’s not switching operator, I' the
    identity operator, and  = [0,/2]
Quantum Monty Hall !!
    The open box operator is a unitary operator that can
    be written as :
      O' = ∑ijkl |∈ijk| |njk><ljk| + ∑jk |mjj><ljj|
●   where |∈ijk| = 1 if i,j,k are different else 0.
    m = (j+l+1) (mod 3) and n = (i+l)(mod 3).
●   The first term considers the cases where Bob
    chooses the door not having the car behind it and the
    second term considers the cases where Bob initially
    chooses the door having the car inside it
Quantum Monty Hall !!
●   The possible cases are :
    |010> ⇒|210>, |020> ⇒|120>, |001> ⇒|201>,            |
    021> ⇒|021>, |002> ⇒|102>, |012> ⇒|012>

●   Thus the operator should be |210>< 010| +
    |120>< 020| + |201>< 001| + |021>< 021| +
    |102>< 002| + |012><012| to introduce unitarity we
    use the complete operator ∑ijkl |∈ijk| |njk><ljk|
Quantum Monty Hall !!

●   Bob's switch operator can be written as :
    S' = ∑ijkl |∈ijk| |ikk><ijk| + ∑ji |imj><ijj| m=(3-i-j)
●   The possible transformations we consider as
    probable :
    |120> ⇒|100>, |100> ⇒|120>, |011> ⇒|021>, |201>
    ⇒|211>, |021> ⇒|011>, |122> ⇒|102>,             |
    022> ⇒|012>, |012> ⇒|022>, |102> ⇒|122>, |200>
    ⇒|210>, |210> ⇒|200>, |211> ⇒|201>.
“Expectation”

●   Bob wins if his choice of door is same as the door
    Alice chooses to keep the car. Thus expectation
    value of Bob's win = <$B> = ∑ij |<ijj|f>|2


●   Alice wins if Bob is incorrect, so
          <$A> = 1 - ∑ij |<ijj|f>|2
Quantum Monty Hall !!

●   Without entanglement and one of Alice or Bob
    applying the identity operator we get back the
    classical case where Bob wins with 2/3 probability if
    he switches doors.
●   Consider the case with maximum entanglement
    The initial state is
        |i> = |0>  (1/3)(|00> + |11> + |22>)
Quantum Monty Hall !!

●   O'(IB'A')|i> = (1/3) ∑ijkl |∈ijk| bljalk|ijk> +
       (1/3) ∑jl bljalj|mjj>
●   S'O'(IB'A')|i> = (1/3) ∑ijkl |∈ijk| bljalk|ikk> +
    (1/3) ∑jkl |∈jkm| bljalj|mkj>
●   If B'=I then <$B> = (1/3)sin2 (|a00|2 + |a11|2 + |a22|2) +
    (1/3)cos2 (|a01|2 + |a02|2 + |a10|2 + |a12|2 + |a20|2 + |a21|2)
Quantum Monty Hall !!

●   If now Alice chooses an unitary operator whose
    diagonal element all have absolute value (1/ 2) and
    off-diagonal elements have absolute value (1⁄2)
    then :
    <$B> = (1⁄2) sin2 + (1⁄2) cos2 hence payoff for
    Bob if he switches = 1⁄2 .
Is the Game Fair Now ?
●   For the Monty Hall game where both participants
    have access to quantum strategies, maximal
    entanglement of the initial states produces the same
    payoffs as the classical game. That is, for the Nash
    equilibrium strategy the player, Bob, wins two-thirds
    of the time by switching boxes. If the host, Alice,
    has access to a quantum strategy while Bob does
    not, the game is fair, since Alice can adopt a strategy
    with an expected payoff of 1/2 for each person,
    while if Bob has access to a quantum strategy and
    Alice does not he can win all the time.
Simple Penny Flipover
●   There are 2 players involved in the penny flip game.
    Let's name them P and Q. P is to place a penny, head
    up, in a box, whereupon they will take turns (Q, then
    P, then Q) flipping the penny over (or not), without
    being able to see it. Q wins if the penny is head up
    when they open the box
●              Q
              ----   NN    NF    FN     FF
               P

               N     -1     1     1     -1

               F      1    -1    -1     1
Simple Penny Flipover

●   Suppose P doesn’t flip the penny over. Then if Q
    flips it over an even number of times, P loses.
    Similarly, if P flips the penny over, then if Q flips it
    over only once, P loses. Thus PQ penny flipover has
    no deterministic solution , no deterministic Nash
    equilibrium : there is no pair of pure strategies, one
    for each player, such that neither player improves
    his result by changing his strategy while the other
    player does not.
Simple Penny Flipover
●   Since this is a two-person zero-sum strategic game
    with only a finite number of strategies, there is a
    probabilistic solution: It is easy to check that the
    pair of mixed strategies consisting of P flipping the
    penny over with probability 1⁄2 and Q playing each
    of his four strategies with probability 1⁄4 is a
    probabilistic Nash equilibrium: Neither player can
    improve his expected payoff (which is 0 in this case)
    by changing the probabilities with which he plays
    each of his pure strategies while the other player
    does not.
Simple Penny Flipover
●   In the classical case both P and Q has a 1⁄2
    probability of winning the game but if Q adopts a
    quantum strategy then she will win with a
    probability of 1
●   |0> = |H> then
    Q: |1> = H|0> = (1/2)(|H> +|T>) then
    P(mixed classical strategy) : U= pF + (1-p)N,
    |2> = U|1> = (1/2)(|H> + |T>), then again
    Q: |3> = H|2> = |H>
Penny Flipover Applications

●   This strategy is same as that of the game between
    the oracle and the Grover's algorithm:
●   In the problem of searching a database of size N, the
    locations in the database correspond to pure
    strategies. The oracle can be thought of as the player
    P in the game who uses a mixed strategy to frustate
    our search for an item at some specified location.
    While the Grover's algorithm represents the player
    Q who uses quantum strategy.
Penny Flipover Applications

●   Even the Shor's algorithm can be interpreted as a
    penny flipover game between a Quantum player and
    a classical mixed strategist. After we apply the
    inverse Quantum Fourier Transform, we measure a
    certain value as the output measurement, then we
    use classical continued fraction to find out the
    period accurately with some probability. The
    continued fraction implementation can be thought of
    as the player P who uses mixed strategy to produce a
    correct result with some probability.
Penny Flipover

●   One might ask what if player P also uses a Quantum
    strategy?
●   In the penny flipover game P using the Quantum
    operator U = √p X + ie- (1-p) Z where X is the
    Pauli NOT gate and  is the phase, would produce
    the same result as before with Q winning with
    probability of 1.
Penny Flipover
●   Theorem : A two person zero sum game need not
    have a (quantum, quantum) equilibrium.
●   Proof : Let us assume that the quantum strategies
    [(U2),(U1,U3)] is a (quantum, quantum) equilibrium.
    Suppose that U3 U2 U1 |H>  |H>. Then Q can
    improve his expected payoff to 1 by changing his
    strategy U3 to U1-1U2-1 which is unitary. Also suppose
    U3 U2 U1 |H>  |T> then P can improve his
    expected payoff to 1 by changing his strategy U 2 to
    U3-1XU1-1 which is also unitary.
Concluding Remarks


●   One might speculate that game theoretic perspective
    will suggest new possibilities for efficient quantum
    algorithms.
Concluding Remarks

●   It may be too soon to say that Quantum game theory
    and quantum strategies are going to be the future of
    decision making in fields like Finance, Marketing,
    Adminstrative Policies, Quantum Algorithms,
    Quantum communication(cryptography) and
    everyday life decision processess, given that
    efficient hardware implementation of quantum
    computation is still an uphill task with the noise and
    decoherence effects playing their parts
Still a Hope !!

●   The day when the Quantum error correction codes
    becomes so efficient that all noises and
    decoherences can be cancelled out, “Quantum” will
    be the order of the day, and the world will take the
    next leap forward changing gears from the
    “Classical” to “Quantum”. I strongly believe that the
    day is not far away and it will change the whole
    world, “Logic and reasoning will dominate over
    emotions and feelings”.
Thank you !

More Related Content

What's hot

Ndc12 이창희 render_pipeline
Ndc12 이창희 render_pipelineNdc12 이창희 render_pipeline
Ndc12 이창희 render_pipeline
changehee lee
 
영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험
영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험
영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험
jdo
 
이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011
이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011
이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011devCAT Studio, NEXON
 
2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료
2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료
2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료
Lee Jungmin
 
Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3
Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3
Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3
Guerrilla
 
레벨디자인 특강 이동훈
레벨디자인 특강 이동훈레벨디자인 특강 이동훈
레벨디자인 특강 이동훈
Donghun Lee
 
AI algorithm in game playing
AI algorithm in game playingAI algorithm in game playing
AI algorithm in game playing
Vicky Tyagi
 
Game Programming 07 - Procedural Content Generation
Game Programming 07 - Procedural Content GenerationGame Programming 07 - Procedural Content Generation
Game Programming 07 - Procedural Content Generation
Nick Pruehs
 
[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희
[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희
[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희
changehee lee
 
Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)
Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)
Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)
MdAhasanulAlam
 
[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현
[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현
[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현
강 민우
 
Recast Detour.pptx
Recast Detour.pptxRecast Detour.pptx
Recast Detour.pptx
MUUMUMUMU
 
2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성
2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성
2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성
Gunho Shin
 
10.kompresi citra
10.kompresi citra10.kompresi citra
10.kompresi citra
Rakhmi Khalida, M.M.S.I
 
[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법
[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법
[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법
강 민우
 
Page Object in XCUITest
Page Object in XCUITestPage Object in XCUITest
Page Object in XCUITest
Jz Chang
 
Level design in 11 points
Level design in 11 pointsLevel design in 11 points
Level design in 11 points용태 이
 
딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템
딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템
딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템
ChoDae
 
06_게임엔진구성
06_게임엔진구성06_게임엔진구성
06_게임엔진구성noerror
 

What's hot (20)

Ndc12 이창희 render_pipeline
Ndc12 이창희 render_pipelineNdc12 이창희 render_pipeline
Ndc12 이창희 render_pipeline
 
영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험
영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험
영상 기반 SLAM 알고리즘 시험
 
이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011
이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011
이원, 절차적 지형과 월드 머신, NDC2011
 
2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료
2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료
2 D게임 프로그래밍 발표 자료
 
Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3
Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3
Practical Occlusion Culling in Killzone 3
 
레벨디자인 특강 이동훈
레벨디자인 특강 이동훈레벨디자인 특강 이동훈
레벨디자인 특강 이동훈
 
AI algorithm in game playing
AI algorithm in game playingAI algorithm in game playing
AI algorithm in game playing
 
Game Programming 07 - Procedural Content Generation
Game Programming 07 - Procedural Content GenerationGame Programming 07 - Procedural Content Generation
Game Programming 07 - Procedural Content Generation
 
[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희
[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희
[Kgc2012] deferred forward 이창희
 
Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)
Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)
Multi Agent Path Finding (MAPF)
 
[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현
[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현
[IGC] 엔씨소프트 이경종 - 강화 학습을 이용한 NPC AI 구현
 
Recast Detour.pptx
Recast Detour.pptxRecast Detour.pptx
Recast Detour.pptx
 
2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성
2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성
2009-2016 기본기(손맵)의 중요성
 
10.kompresi citra
10.kompresi citra10.kompresi citra
10.kompresi citra
 
카툰 렌더링
카툰 렌더링카툰 렌더링
카툰 렌더링
 
[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법
[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법
[IGC2018] 펄어비스 김광삼 - 대면 커뮤니케이션 주도의 게임 디자인과 게임 개발법
 
Page Object in XCUITest
Page Object in XCUITestPage Object in XCUITest
Page Object in XCUITest
 
Level design in 11 points
Level design in 11 pointsLevel design in 11 points
Level design in 11 points
 
딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템
딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템
딥러닝으로 구현한 이상거래탐지시스템
 
06_게임엔진구성
06_게임엔진구성06_게임엔진구성
06_게임엔진구성
 

Viewers also liked

OpenStack Quantum
OpenStack QuantumOpenStack Quantum
OpenStack Quantum
Sumit Naiksatam
 
Presentation
PresentationPresentation
Presentation
fmoldoveanu
 
OpenStack Quantum Network Service
OpenStack Quantum Network ServiceOpenStack Quantum Network Service
OpenStack Quantum Network Service
Lew Tucker
 
Quantum communication in space
Quantum communication in spaceQuantum communication in space
Quantum communication in space
Swapnil Gourkar
 
Transactional Interpretation of QM
Transactional Interpretation of QMTransactional Interpretation of QM
Transactional Interpretation of QM
amruth
 
Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?
Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?
Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?
Chad Orzel
 
The Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPS
The Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPSThe Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPS
The Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPS
inside-BigData.com
 
Quantum Computing: Welcome to the Future
Quantum Computing: Welcome to the FutureQuantum Computing: Welcome to the Future
Quantum Computing: Welcome to the Future
VernBrownell
 
Quantum computer ppt
Quantum computer pptQuantum computer ppt
Quantum computer ppt
Nisarg Bhagavantanavar
 
Turing machine by_deep
Turing machine by_deepTuring machine by_deep
Turing machine by_deep
Deepjyoti Kalita
 
Me, Myself, and Facebook
Me, Myself, and FacebookMe, Myself, and Facebook
Me, Myself, and Facebook
Caitlin Leahy
 
Test
TestTest
Test
hussain56
 
Discussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekow
Discussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekowDiscussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekow
Discussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekow
Xplore Health
 
Power Notes Atomic Structure
Power Notes   Atomic StructurePower Notes   Atomic Structure
Power Notes Atomic Structure
jmori1
 
直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ
直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ
直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ
長野市議会議員小泉一真
 
Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1
Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1 Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1
Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1
jmori1
 
Ofício Lava Jato no STF, contra Lula
Ofício Lava Jato no STF, contra LulaOfício Lava Jato no STF, contra Lula
Ofício Lava Jato no STF, contra Lula
Miguel Rosario
 
Students
StudentsStudents
Cn usen cases 2011
Cn usen cases 2011Cn usen cases 2011
Cn usen cases 2011
ocurtis1
 
Tia project ii
Tia project iiTia project ii
Tia project ii
tararhone
 

Viewers also liked (20)

OpenStack Quantum
OpenStack QuantumOpenStack Quantum
OpenStack Quantum
 
Presentation
PresentationPresentation
Presentation
 
OpenStack Quantum Network Service
OpenStack Quantum Network ServiceOpenStack Quantum Network Service
OpenStack Quantum Network Service
 
Quantum communication in space
Quantum communication in spaceQuantum communication in space
Quantum communication in space
 
Transactional Interpretation of QM
Transactional Interpretation of QMTransactional Interpretation of QM
Transactional Interpretation of QM
 
Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?
Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?
Quantum Physics for Dogs: Many Worlds, Many Treats?
 
The Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPS
The Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPSThe Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPS
The Quantum Effect: HPC without FLOPS
 
Quantum Computing: Welcome to the Future
Quantum Computing: Welcome to the FutureQuantum Computing: Welcome to the Future
Quantum Computing: Welcome to the Future
 
Quantum computer ppt
Quantum computer pptQuantum computer ppt
Quantum computer ppt
 
Turing machine by_deep
Turing machine by_deepTuring machine by_deep
Turing machine by_deep
 
Me, Myself, and Facebook
Me, Myself, and FacebookMe, Myself, and Facebook
Me, Myself, and Facebook
 
Test
TestTest
Test
 
Discussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekow
Discussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekowDiscussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekow
Discussion continuum - Kto placi za rozwoj lekow
 
Power Notes Atomic Structure
Power Notes   Atomic StructurePower Notes   Atomic Structure
Power Notes Atomic Structure
 
直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ
直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ
直接照会により公開された芸術監督データ
 
Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1
Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1 Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1
Electrons and Chemical Bonding 2012 Day 1
 
Ofício Lava Jato no STF, contra Lula
Ofício Lava Jato no STF, contra LulaOfício Lava Jato no STF, contra Lula
Ofício Lava Jato no STF, contra Lula
 
Students
StudentsStudents
Students
 
Cn usen cases 2011
Cn usen cases 2011Cn usen cases 2011
Cn usen cases 2011
 
Tia project ii
Tia project iiTia project ii
Tia project ii
 

Similar to Quantum games

Game theory
Game theoryGame theory
Solutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docx
Solutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docxSolutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docx
Solutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docx
rafbolet0
 
Ch 5 Game theory.ppt
Ch 5  Game theory.pptCh 5  Game theory.ppt
Ch 5 Game theory.ppt
EphremChernet2
 
lect1207
lect1207lect1207
lect1207
webuploader
 
Computer Network Assignment Help.pptx
Computer Network Assignment Help.pptxComputer Network Assignment Help.pptx
Computer Network Assignment Help.pptx
Computer Network Assignment Help
 
Lecture 2 - Probability
Lecture 2 - ProbabilityLecture 2 - Probability
Lecture 2 - Probability
Luke Dicken
 
CAGT-IST Student Presentations
CAGT-IST Student Presentations CAGT-IST Student Presentations
CAGT-IST Student Presentations
Prithviraj (Raj) Dasgupta
 
Game theory (1)
Game theory (1)Game theory (1)
Game theory (1)
COLLEGE COLLEGE
 
Algorithmic Game Theory and TFNP
Algorithmic Game Theory and TFNPAlgorithmic Game Theory and TFNP
Algorithmic Game Theory and TFNP
Samuel Schlesinger
 
Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]
Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]
Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]
evamstrauss
 
mingdraft2.doc
mingdraft2.docmingdraft2.doc
mingdraft2.doc
butest
 
game theory
game theorygame theory
game theory
ayesha zaheer
 
Quantum Evolutionary Game Theory
Quantum Evolutionary Game TheoryQuantum Evolutionary Game Theory
Quantum Evolutionary Game Theory
sitric
 
Free AI Kit - Game Theory
Free AI Kit - Game TheoryFree AI Kit - Game Theory
Free AI Kit - Game Theory
Fariz Darari
 
Computer Network Assignment Help
Computer Network Assignment HelpComputer Network Assignment Help
Computer Network Assignment Help
Computer Network Assignment Help
 
Game theory project
Game theory projectGame theory project
Game theory project
Aagam Shah
 
Nash equilibrium and applications
Nash equilibrium and applicationsNash equilibrium and applications
Nash equilibrium and applications
Alyaa Muhi
 
Equivariance
EquivarianceEquivariance
Equivariance
mustafa sarac
 
GameTheory_popular.ppt
GameTheory_popular.pptGameTheory_popular.ppt
GameTheory_popular.ppt
AMRITRANJAN30
 
GameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearch
GameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearchGameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearch
GameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearch
ssuser96912f1
 

Similar to Quantum games (20)

Game theory
Game theoryGame theory
Game theory
 
Solutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docx
Solutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docxSolutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docx
Solutions to Problem Set 2 The following note was very i.docx
 
Ch 5 Game theory.ppt
Ch 5  Game theory.pptCh 5  Game theory.ppt
Ch 5 Game theory.ppt
 
lect1207
lect1207lect1207
lect1207
 
Computer Network Assignment Help.pptx
Computer Network Assignment Help.pptxComputer Network Assignment Help.pptx
Computer Network Assignment Help.pptx
 
Lecture 2 - Probability
Lecture 2 - ProbabilityLecture 2 - Probability
Lecture 2 - Probability
 
CAGT-IST Student Presentations
CAGT-IST Student Presentations CAGT-IST Student Presentations
CAGT-IST Student Presentations
 
Game theory (1)
Game theory (1)Game theory (1)
Game theory (1)
 
Algorithmic Game Theory and TFNP
Algorithmic Game Theory and TFNPAlgorithmic Game Theory and TFNP
Algorithmic Game Theory and TFNP
 
Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]
Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]
Game theory intro_and_questions_2009[1]
 
mingdraft2.doc
mingdraft2.docmingdraft2.doc
mingdraft2.doc
 
game theory
game theorygame theory
game theory
 
Quantum Evolutionary Game Theory
Quantum Evolutionary Game TheoryQuantum Evolutionary Game Theory
Quantum Evolutionary Game Theory
 
Free AI Kit - Game Theory
Free AI Kit - Game TheoryFree AI Kit - Game Theory
Free AI Kit - Game Theory
 
Computer Network Assignment Help
Computer Network Assignment HelpComputer Network Assignment Help
Computer Network Assignment Help
 
Game theory project
Game theory projectGame theory project
Game theory project
 
Nash equilibrium and applications
Nash equilibrium and applicationsNash equilibrium and applications
Nash equilibrium and applications
 
Equivariance
EquivarianceEquivariance
Equivariance
 
GameTheory_popular.ppt
GameTheory_popular.pptGameTheory_popular.ppt
GameTheory_popular.ppt
 
GameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearch
GameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearchGameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearch
GameTheory_popular.ppt in the operations reearch
 

More from Abhijit Mondal

Pagerank
PagerankPagerank
Pagerank
Abhijit Mondal
 
Poster Presentation
Poster PresentationPoster Presentation
Poster Presentation
Abhijit Mondal
 
Mysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data Structures
Mysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data StructuresMysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data Structures
Mysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data Structures
Abhijit Mondal
 
MySQL Performance Optimization
MySQL Performance OptimizationMySQL Performance Optimization
MySQL Performance Optimization
Abhijit Mondal
 
My MSc. Project
My MSc. ProjectMy MSc. Project
My MSc. Project
Abhijit Mondal
 
Security protocols
Security protocolsSecurity protocols
Security protocols
Abhijit Mondal
 
Public Key Cryptography
Public Key CryptographyPublic Key Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography
Abhijit Mondal
 
Number Theory for Security
Number Theory for SecurityNumber Theory for Security
Number Theory for Security
Abhijit Mondal
 

More from Abhijit Mondal (8)

Pagerank
PagerankPagerank
Pagerank
 
Poster Presentation
Poster PresentationPoster Presentation
Poster Presentation
 
Mysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data Structures
Mysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data StructuresMysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data Structures
Mysql Performance Optimization Indexing Algorithms and Data Structures
 
MySQL Performance Optimization
MySQL Performance OptimizationMySQL Performance Optimization
MySQL Performance Optimization
 
My MSc. Project
My MSc. ProjectMy MSc. Project
My MSc. Project
 
Security protocols
Security protocolsSecurity protocols
Security protocols
 
Public Key Cryptography
Public Key CryptographyPublic Key Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography
 
Number Theory for Security
Number Theory for SecurityNumber Theory for Security
Number Theory for Security
 

Recently uploaded

Liberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdf
Liberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdfLiberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdf
Liberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdf
WaniBasim
 
The basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptxThe basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptx
heathfieldcps1
 
Azure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHat
Azure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHatAzure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHat
Azure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHat
Scholarhat
 
Pengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptx
Pengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptxPengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptx
Pengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptx
Fajar Baskoro
 
The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...
The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...
The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...
RitikBhardwaj56
 
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...
PECB
 
Smart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICT
Smart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICTSmart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICT
Smart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICT
simonomuemu
 
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UP
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UPLAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UP
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UP
RAHUL
 
C1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptx
C1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptxC1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptx
C1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptx
mulvey2
 
PIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf Islamabad
PIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf IslamabadPIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf Islamabad
PIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf Islamabad
AyyanKhan40
 
Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5
Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5
Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5
sayalidalavi006
 
World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024
World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024
World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024
ak6969907
 
Hindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdf
Hindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdfHindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdf
Hindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdf
Dr. Mulla Adam Ali
 
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17
Celine George
 
S1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptx
S1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptxS1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptx
S1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptx
tarandeep35
 
How to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP Module
How to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP ModuleHow to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP Module
How to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP Module
Celine George
 
RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3
RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3
RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3
IreneSebastianRueco1
 
বাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdf
বাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdfবাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdf
বাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdf
eBook.com.bd (প্রয়োজনীয় বাংলা বই)
 
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17
Celine George
 
clinical examination of hip joint (1).pdf
clinical examination of hip joint (1).pdfclinical examination of hip joint (1).pdf
clinical examination of hip joint (1).pdf
Priyankaranawat4
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Liberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdf
Liberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdfLiberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdf
Liberal Approach to the Study of Indian Politics.pdf
 
The basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptxThe basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 6pptx.pptx
 
Azure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHat
Azure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHatAzure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHat
Azure Interview Questions and Answers PDF By ScholarHat
 
Pengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptx
Pengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptxPengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptx
Pengantar Penggunaan Flutter - Dart programming language1.pptx
 
The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...
The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...
The simplified electron and muon model, Oscillating Spacetime: The Foundation...
 
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...
 
Smart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICT
Smart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICTSmart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICT
Smart-Money for SMC traders good time and ICT
 
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UP
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UPLAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UP
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UP
 
C1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptx
C1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptxC1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptx
C1 Rubenstein AP HuG xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.pptx
 
PIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf Islamabad
PIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf IslamabadPIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf Islamabad
PIMS Job Advertisement 2024.pdf Islamabad
 
Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5
Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5
Community pharmacy- Social and preventive pharmacy UNIT 5
 
World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024
World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024
World environment day ppt For 5 June 2024
 
Hindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdf
Hindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdfHindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdf
Hindi varnamala | hindi alphabet PPT.pdf
 
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17
 
S1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptx
S1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptxS1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptx
S1-Introduction-Biopesticides in ICM.pptx
 
How to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP Module
How to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP ModuleHow to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP Module
How to Add Chatter in the odoo 17 ERP Module
 
RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3
RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3
RPMS TEMPLATE FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2023-2024 FOR TEACHER 1 TO TEACHER 3
 
বাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdf
বাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdfবাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdf
বাংলাদেশ অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা (Economic Review) ২০২৪ UJS App.pdf
 
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17
 
clinical examination of hip joint (1).pdf
clinical examination of hip joint (1).pdfclinical examination of hip joint (1).pdf
clinical examination of hip joint (1).pdf
 

Quantum games

  • 1. Quantum Games and Quantum  Strategies The Future of Decision Making ?
  • 2. Quantum Games !!! ● Can principles of Quantum communication be used to develop efficient and unbiased marketing strategies ? ● Quantum communication and Quantum cryptography can be regarded as Games played between 2 legal players Alice and Bob and the illegal players in between them trying to decrypt the secret message.
  • 3. What is a Game ? ● We have a set of players i ● a strategy set Si for each player i. ● Pay-off for each player Pi(s1,s2,....), where siSi.
  • 4. Where does “Quantum” comes into “play”? ● Game theory does not explicitly concern itself with how the information is transmitted once a decision is taken. Bearing in mind that a game is also about the transfer of information, it becomes legitimate to ask what happens if these carriers of information are taken to be quantum systems, quantum information being a fundamental notion of information.
  • 5. Strategies and Equilibriums ● A quantum strategy sA is called dominant strategy of Alice if PA (sA,s'B) ≥ PA (s′A, s′B ) for all s′A ∈ SA , s′B ∈ SB ● A pair ( sA , sB ) is said to be an equilibrium in dominant strategies if sA and sB are the players’ respective dominant strategies
  • 6. Strategies and Equilibriums ● A combination of strategies ( sA , sB ) is called a Nash equilibrium if PA (sA,sB) ≥ PA (s′A, sB ) and PB (sA,sB) ≥ PB (sA, s′B )for all s′A ∈ SA , s′B ∈ SB . ● A pair of strategies ( sA , sB ) is called Pareto optimal, if it is not possible to increase one player’s pay-off without lessening the pay-off of the other player.
  • 7. Nash Equilibrium ● A Nash equilibrium implies that neither player has a motivation to unilaterally alter his or her strategy from this equilibrium solution, as this action will lessen his or her pay-off. Given that the other player will stick to the strategy corresponding to the equilibrium, the best result is achieved by also playing the equilibrium solution.
  • 8. The Prisoner's Dilemma ● Two prisoners are being questioned by the police. They are held in separate cells and cannot talk to each other. The police make the following offer to both the prisoners: if one confesses that both committed the crime then the confessor will be set free and the other will spend 5 years in jail; if both confess then they will each get 4 yr jail term: if neither confess, then they will each spend 2 yrs in jail
  • 9. The Prisoner's Dilemma ● Table of Pay-offs : P1 Cooperation Defection P2 Cooperation (3,3) (0,5) Defection (5,0) (1,1)
  • 10. The Prisoner's Dilemma ● If both the prisoners co-operate with each other then they are each awarded 3 yrs of freedom, if none of them co-operate with each other then each will be awarded 1 yr of freedom and if one of them has conscience and the other is defected then the 'good' prisoner has to serve full 5 yr in jail while the 'bad' one will be set free immediately i.e. Full 5 yrs of freedom for the 'bad' prisoner. So what is the optimal strategy that both of them apply here?
  • 11. Nash Equilibrium ● In the Prisoner's dilemma problem if the dominant strategy is (D,D) with pay-offs (1,1) for Alice and Bob. Now if Alice changes her strategy while Bob sticks to his strategy, i.e. Alice decides to become 'good' then she pays the price with 0 pay-off or in this case a complete 5yr jail sentence. Same is true for Bob, thus if either of them decides to become 'good' while the other stays 'bad', the his/her pay-off decreases, hence (D,D) is in Nash equilibrium. But (D,D) is not Pareto optimal because (C,C) has better pay-offs than (D,D).
  • 12. Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma ● In traditional 2 × 2 games where each player has just a single move, creating a superposition by utilizing a quantum strategy will give the same results as a mixed classical strategy. In order to see non- classical results it is necessary to produce entanglement between the players’ moves ● Initial state is the maximally entangled state |> = (|00> + i|11>)/√2
  • 13. Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma ● The final state is represented as following : |ψf> = J†(UA ⊗UB) J |CC> where J=exp(iγD' ⊗ D'/2), γ ∈ [0, π/2] is a real parameter, UA and UB are respective strategies for Alice and Bob. ● Expected Pay-off for Alice : <$> = ACC|<ψf |CC>|2 + ACD|<ψf |CD>|2 + ADC| <ψf |DC>|2 + ADD|<ψf |DD>|2
  • 14. Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma ● The matrix representation of operators corresponding to quantum strategies from this set is given by U(,) = {( eicos(/2), sin(/2) ), ( -sin(/2), e-icos(/2) )} ● The strategies are : C={(1,0),(0,1)} and D={(0,1),(-1,0)} ● γ is a measure for the game’s entanglement
  • 15. Pay-Offs is what matters !! ● Alice's expected pay-off with the quantum strategies: PA (θA , φA , θB , φB ) = 3 |cos(φA + φB ) cos(θA /2) cos(θB /2)|2 + 5 |sin(φA ) cos(θA /2) sin(θB /2) − cos(φB ) cos(θB /2) sin(θA /2)| 2 + |sin(φA + φB ) cos(θA /2) cos(θB /2) + sin(θA /2) sin(θB /2)|2 .
  • 16. Pay-Offs is what matters !! ● Bob's expected pay-off with the quantum strategies: PB (θA , φA , θB , φB ) = 3 |cos(φA + φB ) cos(θA /2) cos(θB /2)|2 + 5 |sin(φB ) cos(θB /2) sin(θA /2) − cos(φA ) cos(θA /2) sin(θB /2)| 2 + |sin(φA + φB ) cos(θA /2) cos(θB /2) + sin(θA /2) sin(θB /2)|2 .
  • 17. Pay-Offs is what matters !! ● Assuming Bob chooses D'= U (π, 0), then PA (θA , φA ,  , 0 ) = 5 |sin(φA ) cos(θA /2)| 2 + |sin(θA /2)|2 <= 5 for θA = 0 and φA = /2 ● Thus Alice’s best reply would be Q = U(0, /2) = {(i,0),(0,-i)} ● While assuming Bob plays C'= U (0, 0) Alice’s best strategy would be defection D'. Thus, there is no dominant strategy left for Alice. The game being symmetric, the same holds for Bob, i.e., D' ⊗ D' is no longer an equilibrium in dominant strategies
  • 18. Quantum Nash Equilibrium ● PA (θA , φA , 0 , /2 ) = 3 |sin(φA) cos(θA /2) |2 + |cos(φA) cos(θA /2)|2 <= 3 for θA = 0, φA = /2 thus PA (U(θA , φA ) , Q ) <= PA (Q, Q ) ● PB (0 , /2, θB , φB ) = 3 |sin(φB)cos(θB /2)|2 + |cos(φB) cos(θB /2)|2 <= 3 for θB = 0, φB = /2 thus PB (Q, U(θB , φB ) ) <= PB (Q, Q ) ● Hence (Q,Q) is the new Nash Equilibrium.
  • 19. Does the Prisoners escape the dilemma? ● It is interesting to see that Q ⊗ Q has the property to be Pareto optimal , that is, by deviating from this pair of strategies it is not possible to increase the pay-off of one player without lessening the pay-off of the other player. In the classical game only mutual cooperation is Pareto optimal, but it is not an equilibrium solution. One could say that by allowing for quantum strategies the players escape the dilemma .
  • 20. Real Life Dilemmas !! ● Nuclear proliferation among nations: When a nation tries to up its nuclear armory and sources with the help of its more powerful allies, its rival nations feels threatened and they too power up their nuclear warfares and sources with powerful allies, thus increasing tension between nations and increasing possibility of nuclear war. Thus one might speculate that Governments of nations using Quantum strategies might even end the possibility of a nuclear disaster in near future, but then “everything” needs to be “Quantum” !!!
  • 21. Real Life Dilemmas !! This one's from “Batman-Dark Knight” : Joker planted bombs on the 2 ferries where the triggers for the bombs were given to the opposite parties. The classical Nash equilibrium strategy would lead the 2 parties to trigger the bombs simulteneously thus killing everybody. But in the movie they might have figured out the “Quantum strategy” to co-operate thus saving all of them. One might think “Quantum strategies” as the most “socially acceptable” or “near conscience” but wait till you have seen the opposite face of the “coin”.
  • 22. Real Life Dilemmas !! ● Breakdown of talks at the Climate change Summit at Copenhagen: Rich nations having larger number of industries are emmitting larger amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. But only developing nations trying to build up its commercial and industrial economy are asked to cut down CO2 emmision. Such nations felt that the rich are trying to suppress them down and they deny to decrease CO2 emmision from factories etc. and thus talks broke down. Defection( increased release of CO2 by all nations) seemed the Nash equilibrium strategy compared to Cooperation(decreased release of CO2 by all nations). Thus a “Quantum World” should be the paradise or the heaven to live in.
  • 23. Let's Make A Deal !!
  • 24. Should you exchange doors ? ● The answer is yes if you are a rational person ! ● You win 2/3 of the time you exchange the doors and lose 1/3 of the time !! ● From an information theoretic point of view, by opening a door without a prize Monty has given information about where the prize is. Let's see how?
  • 25. Should you exchange doors ? ● The probability of originally choosing a goat is 2/3 and the probability of originally choosing the car is 1/3. Once Monty Hall has removed a "goat door," the contestant who chose the door with a goat behind it will necessarily win the car, and the contestant who originally chose the car will necessarily "win" the goat. Because the chances are 2/3 of being a contestant who originally chose a goat, probability will always favor switching choices.
  • 27. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● In our quantum version of the game let us call the host as Alice and player as Bob. ● There is one quantum particle and three boxes |0 > , |1> , and |2> ● The state of the system can be expressed as |> = |oba> where a = Alice’s choice of box( prize door ), b =Bob’s choice of box, and o = the box that has been opened
  • 28. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● The final state of the system is |f> = (S' cos  + N' sin )O'(I'  B'  A')|i> ● Where A' Alice’s choice operator or strategy, B' Bob’s initial choice operator or initial strategy, O' the opening box operator, S' Bob’s switching operator, N' Bob’s not switching operator, I' the identity operator, and  = [0,/2]
  • 29. Quantum Monty Hall !! The open box operator is a unitary operator that can be written as : O' = ∑ijkl |∈ijk| |njk><ljk| + ∑jk |mjj><ljj| ● where |∈ijk| = 1 if i,j,k are different else 0. m = (j+l+1) (mod 3) and n = (i+l)(mod 3). ● The first term considers the cases where Bob chooses the door not having the car behind it and the second term considers the cases where Bob initially chooses the door having the car inside it
  • 30. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● The possible cases are : |010> ⇒|210>, |020> ⇒|120>, |001> ⇒|201>, | 021> ⇒|021>, |002> ⇒|102>, |012> ⇒|012> ● Thus the operator should be |210>< 010| + |120>< 020| + |201>< 001| + |021>< 021| + |102>< 002| + |012><012| to introduce unitarity we use the complete operator ∑ijkl |∈ijk| |njk><ljk|
  • 31. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● Bob's switch operator can be written as : S' = ∑ijkl |∈ijk| |ikk><ijk| + ∑ji |imj><ijj| m=(3-i-j) ● The possible transformations we consider as probable : |120> ⇒|100>, |100> ⇒|120>, |011> ⇒|021>, |201> ⇒|211>, |021> ⇒|011>, |122> ⇒|102>, | 022> ⇒|012>, |012> ⇒|022>, |102> ⇒|122>, |200> ⇒|210>, |210> ⇒|200>, |211> ⇒|201>.
  • 32. “Expectation” ● Bob wins if his choice of door is same as the door Alice chooses to keep the car. Thus expectation value of Bob's win = <$B> = ∑ij |<ijj|f>|2 ● Alice wins if Bob is incorrect, so <$A> = 1 - ∑ij |<ijj|f>|2
  • 33. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● Without entanglement and one of Alice or Bob applying the identity operator we get back the classical case where Bob wins with 2/3 probability if he switches doors. ● Consider the case with maximum entanglement The initial state is |i> = |0>  (1/3)(|00> + |11> + |22>)
  • 34. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● O'(IB'A')|i> = (1/3) ∑ijkl |∈ijk| bljalk|ijk> + (1/3) ∑jl bljalj|mjj> ● S'O'(IB'A')|i> = (1/3) ∑ijkl |∈ijk| bljalk|ikk> + (1/3) ∑jkl |∈jkm| bljalj|mkj> ● If B'=I then <$B> = (1/3)sin2 (|a00|2 + |a11|2 + |a22|2) + (1/3)cos2 (|a01|2 + |a02|2 + |a10|2 + |a12|2 + |a20|2 + |a21|2)
  • 35. Quantum Monty Hall !! ● If now Alice chooses an unitary operator whose diagonal element all have absolute value (1/ 2) and off-diagonal elements have absolute value (1⁄2) then : <$B> = (1⁄2) sin2 + (1⁄2) cos2 hence payoff for Bob if he switches = 1⁄2 .
  • 36. Is the Game Fair Now ? ● For the Monty Hall game where both participants have access to quantum strategies, maximal entanglement of the initial states produces the same payoffs as the classical game. That is, for the Nash equilibrium strategy the player, Bob, wins two-thirds of the time by switching boxes. If the host, Alice, has access to a quantum strategy while Bob does not, the game is fair, since Alice can adopt a strategy with an expected payoff of 1/2 for each person, while if Bob has access to a quantum strategy and Alice does not he can win all the time.
  • 37. Simple Penny Flipover ● There are 2 players involved in the penny flip game. Let's name them P and Q. P is to place a penny, head up, in a box, whereupon they will take turns (Q, then P, then Q) flipping the penny over (or not), without being able to see it. Q wins if the penny is head up when they open the box ● Q ---- NN NF FN FF P N -1 1 1 -1 F 1 -1 -1 1
  • 38. Simple Penny Flipover ● Suppose P doesn’t flip the penny over. Then if Q flips it over an even number of times, P loses. Similarly, if P flips the penny over, then if Q flips it over only once, P loses. Thus PQ penny flipover has no deterministic solution , no deterministic Nash equilibrium : there is no pair of pure strategies, one for each player, such that neither player improves his result by changing his strategy while the other player does not.
  • 39. Simple Penny Flipover ● Since this is a two-person zero-sum strategic game with only a finite number of strategies, there is a probabilistic solution: It is easy to check that the pair of mixed strategies consisting of P flipping the penny over with probability 1⁄2 and Q playing each of his four strategies with probability 1⁄4 is a probabilistic Nash equilibrium: Neither player can improve his expected payoff (which is 0 in this case) by changing the probabilities with which he plays each of his pure strategies while the other player does not.
  • 40. Simple Penny Flipover ● In the classical case both P and Q has a 1⁄2 probability of winning the game but if Q adopts a quantum strategy then she will win with a probability of 1 ● |0> = |H> then Q: |1> = H|0> = (1/2)(|H> +|T>) then P(mixed classical strategy) : U= pF + (1-p)N, |2> = U|1> = (1/2)(|H> + |T>), then again Q: |3> = H|2> = |H>
  • 41. Penny Flipover Applications ● This strategy is same as that of the game between the oracle and the Grover's algorithm: ● In the problem of searching a database of size N, the locations in the database correspond to pure strategies. The oracle can be thought of as the player P in the game who uses a mixed strategy to frustate our search for an item at some specified location. While the Grover's algorithm represents the player Q who uses quantum strategy.
  • 42. Penny Flipover Applications ● Even the Shor's algorithm can be interpreted as a penny flipover game between a Quantum player and a classical mixed strategist. After we apply the inverse Quantum Fourier Transform, we measure a certain value as the output measurement, then we use classical continued fraction to find out the period accurately with some probability. The continued fraction implementation can be thought of as the player P who uses mixed strategy to produce a correct result with some probability.
  • 43. Penny Flipover ● One might ask what if player P also uses a Quantum strategy? ● In the penny flipover game P using the Quantum operator U = √p X + ie- (1-p) Z where X is the Pauli NOT gate and  is the phase, would produce the same result as before with Q winning with probability of 1.
  • 44. Penny Flipover ● Theorem : A two person zero sum game need not have a (quantum, quantum) equilibrium. ● Proof : Let us assume that the quantum strategies [(U2),(U1,U3)] is a (quantum, quantum) equilibrium. Suppose that U3 U2 U1 |H>  |H>. Then Q can improve his expected payoff to 1 by changing his strategy U3 to U1-1U2-1 which is unitary. Also suppose U3 U2 U1 |H>  |T> then P can improve his expected payoff to 1 by changing his strategy U 2 to U3-1XU1-1 which is also unitary.
  • 45. Concluding Remarks ● One might speculate that game theoretic perspective will suggest new possibilities for efficient quantum algorithms.
  • 46. Concluding Remarks ● It may be too soon to say that Quantum game theory and quantum strategies are going to be the future of decision making in fields like Finance, Marketing, Adminstrative Policies, Quantum Algorithms, Quantum communication(cryptography) and everyday life decision processess, given that efficient hardware implementation of quantum computation is still an uphill task with the noise and decoherence effects playing their parts
  • 47. Still a Hope !! ● The day when the Quantum error correction codes becomes so efficient that all noises and decoherences can be cancelled out, “Quantum” will be the order of the day, and the world will take the next leap forward changing gears from the “Classical” to “Quantum”. I strongly believe that the day is not far away and it will change the whole world, “Logic and reasoning will dominate over emotions and feelings”.