Robert Dujarric: The Myth of Japanese Rearmament

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The Myth of Japanese Rearmament
Maison franco-japonaise
Tokyo 17 March 2017
Robert Dujarric
Director, Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies
Temple University, Japan Campus, Tokyo
www.tuj.ac.jp/icas
Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan

2. Back to Imperial Japan?
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3. Abe: A sheep in wolf’s clothing
(Artist: Kenta Kamei)
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4. Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan
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Defense Spending
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Japan ROK Singapore France Germany
Defense Spending (2016 US$ Billion, IISS adjusted)
Japan
ROK
Singapore
France
Germany

5. % GDP 2016
5
Defense Spending % GDP
(IISS, adjusted)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Japan ROK Singapore France Germany
Defense Spending % GDP
Japan
ROK
Singapore
France
Germany
Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan

6. 6
Defense spending per capita US$
(IISS, adjusted)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Japan ROK Singapore France Germany
Defense Spending per Capita US$
Japan
ROK
Singapore
France
Germany
Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan

7. 0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Japan ROK Singapore France Germany
Armed Services Active
Duty (Japan)
Reservists (Japan)
Armed Services Active
Duty (Others)
Reservists (Others)
7
Armed Forces Active duty/reservists
(in thousands)
Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan

8. 0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Japan Singapore France Germany
Armed Services Active
Duty (Japan)
Reservists (Japan)
Armed Services Active
Duty (Others)
Reservists (Others)
8
Armed Forces Active duty/reservists
(in thousands)
Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan

9. Defense posture index (Deloitte)
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10. Defense Posture Index 2016
(Deloitte)
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11. Data Criteria Japan Singapore
GDP / GDP/capita US$ 4,730 bn / US$ 37,304 US$ 297 bn / US$ 53,053
Population under 30 35.2m 2.4m
Armed forces active duty/ reserve 257,150 / 56,000 72,500 / 312,500
Defense spending/capita US$ 430 US$ 1,773
Conscription No Yes (22-24 months + annual training to
age 40-50).
Forces Abroad Djibouti (170, Gulf Aden/Indian Oc. (2/1
DDG), South Sudan PKO (272, leaving).
Australia, Brunei, France, Qatar, Taiwan,
Thailand, USA (all training units save
Qatar rotation for anti-ISIS war).
Total fixed wing aircraft 906 200
Air-to-air refueling aircraft/UAVs 5 / 0 9 / 37
Submarines 19 (big) 4 (small)
Maritime patrol aircraft 75 (big) 5 (small)
Surface combatants/patrol-coastal craft 47 (big)/368 6 (small)/35
Robert Dujarric - Temple University Japan
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Japan vs. Singapore
(IISS data, adjusted)

12. SDF: What do we have now?
• Potent military – sophisticated, well trained.
• Except for small contingencies not optimized for
autonomous action. Structured for US Alliance.
• Has performed its tasks very well so far.
• Ambitious but very cautious PM.
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13. Caveat
• A day’s trial by battle reveals more of the
nature of an army than a generation of peace.
•
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14. Recent evolution
• Budget:
– Slight increases in the 2% range.
– Continued belief that “fiscal situation is dire.”
– No interest in military Keynesianism.
• Procurement:
– Continued modernization, but not revolutionary.
• Alliance:
– Better interoperability with US, ties with other partners.
– Upgrading of US basing options slow.
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15. Recent evolution
• Legal context.
– Some limited moves to relax Rules of Engagement
(ROEs), re-define self-defense (“collective self-
defense”), provide more support to US, partners.
– Partially aligns Japan with standard operating
procedures of NATO states.
– Moderate upgrades to ROEs viewed as bellicose.
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16. Recent evolution
• Training:
– More overseas training with US and partners.
– Training for new contingencies, developing some
new capabilities (amphibious).
• Deployments:
– Djibouti base, participation in anti-piracy.
– PKO in South Sudan (winding down).
– Engagement w/ Asean, India, Australia, Europe.
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17. Remaining “red lines”
• No involvement in conflict: Zero participation
in anti-ISIS War.
• Reluctance to put SDF at risk: South Sudan.
• No interest in nuclear arsenal.
• No moves towards strategic autonomy.
• Soft approaches to challenges: Senkakus,
South China Sea, North Korea.
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18. Obstacles to radical change.
• If it ain’t broke don’t fix it.
• Voters – including LDP ones – are semi-pacifists.
• Pensions, health/nursing costs rising.
• The elderly vote more. Want medications, not guns.
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19. Over-optimistic cat
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20. Japanese hawks
(Artist: Kimi Kamei, 2017)
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21. Rear-view mirror hawks
• Backward looking: né dans un monde qui
regardait en arrière [où] le passé comptait
plus que l’avenir/born in a backward-looking
world where the past counted more than the
future.
• Waste time on symbolic counter-productive
moves (Yasukuni, Constitution, etc.) rather
than on effective ones.
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22. What could cause “rearmament”?
• War.
• Trump.
• Both.
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23. 2323
Thank you
Don’t hesitate to contact me
Robert Dujarric
Temple University, Japan Campus, Tokyo
www.tuj.ac.jp/icas
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