PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Peter Brown, CSA Group
PROFINET Security Concept
Safety over OPC UA
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
PROFINET Security today
Use of Defense-in-Depth Concept:
Network segmentation und network
access control via security modules
Physical access protection for complete
network / security zone
Communication robustness tests for
PROFINET components
© 2019
Security
Module
Controller
Drive
I/O Module
Separated
network segment
Supervisor
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
PROFINET Security – under consideration
Planned Approach
Extension of security measures
according to the „Defense in Depth“
concept
Integrated security in PROFINET
components
End-to-End security for PROFINET
communication as configuration option
Security
Module
Controller
Drive
I/O Module
Supervisor
Secured PROFINET Communication
Operator specific key material
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Protection goals Relevance for
PROFINET
Details
Integrity High
Message packets must not be falsified as this could e.g. lead to unintentional
activation of actuators or the recording of incorrect measured values
Authenticity High
Messages packets must be uniquely assignable to its source. The components
must “identify” themselves and have a counterfeit-proof digital identify
Authorization High Only authorized components / users may have access to the automation system
Availability High
Depending on the production process, there are generally high to very high
availability requirements.
Confidentiality Low
The confidentiality of IO data is estimated as low as long as no conclusions can be
drawn with regard to company secrets (e.g., recipes)
Non-repudiation Medium When an event occurs, the initiating person/device should be identifiable.
Refers to installations where traceability of user intervention is required
© 2019
Security Objectives / Security Measures
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
PROFINET Security Requirements
© 2019
Category Details
Secured End-to-End-
Communication
Secured End-to-End-Communication between Controller and associated Devices as well
as optional integration of Supervisor- / Diagnostic systems
Configuration option
Security extension is a configuration option for machines with higher security
requirements (different security profiles)
Parallel Operation
Parallel operation of secured and unsecured connections in one IO-System and also with
existing network infrastructure (e.g. switches) must be possible
Transparency for PN-
Functions / -Profiles
Support and protection for existing PROFINET Profiles / functions as transparent as
possible (for example PROFIsafe)
Performance
Integrity and authenticity checks must not have any qualitative impact to the PROFINET
performance characteristics
Note: Creation / check of security information in protocol extension in general leads to
increased component resources
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
PROFINET Security Requirements
© 2019
Category Details
Crypto Algorithms &
Protocols
Security concept based on well-known and commonly accepted cryptographic algorithms
and protocols
Operator specific keys
Protection based on machine / plant specific key material
→ Individual for each PROFINET component
LifeCycle Management
for crypto functions
Support of a flexible LifeCycle Management for security functions
→ Preparation for the case, when cryptographic algorithms once must be assumed as
unsecure or vulnerabilities in the concept will be detected
Crypto Hardware Support of optional cryptographic hardware accelerator and / or key store
Manufacurer
certificates
Support of optional device identifiers integrated by device manufactures
(Manufacturer certificates)
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Secure communication establishment in 2 phases
© 2019
Asymmetric
key pair
Phase 1
Authentication +
Key exchange
Phase 2
Device Configuration +
Communication
……
IO Controller
IO Supervisor IO Device
Asymmetric
methods
Symmetric
methods
IO Sup.
Symmetric
key
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Phase 1: Authentication
Exchange of Operator Certificates
Exchange of public keys
Check of certificates
Establish a secure connection
IO DeviceIO Controller /
IO Supervisor
IO Sup.
Asymmetric
key pair
Asymmetric
key pair
Relatively slow method
Only for connection establishment
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Phase 2: Secured Communication
Protection of subsequent real-time
communication
Usage of a symmetric method
Shared key per AR
Negotiated via key exchange mechanism
Usage of Message Authentication Code
mechanism → Protection of Integrity
Optionally usage of data encryption
→ Protection of confidentiality
Protection of real-time as well as non-real-
time communication
Secured Communication
IO Device
IO Controller /
IO Supervisor
IO Sup.
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
PROFINET Security Classes
Class Class Name Definition Area of application
1 Robustness Network robustness according to NetLoad
specification and additionally :
•
•
•
Changeable SNMP community name
DCP Read-Only mode
Integrity protection for GSD files
System is separated into zones and has
limited external communication;
** Introduction of class in Discussion **
2 Integrity +
Authenticity
Additionally to class1):
Integrity and authenticity• of
communication relations between
IOC / Supervisor and IOD
Confidentiality of configuration data
communication
•
System can not or not easily be
separated into zones; Access can not be
secured (e.g. outdoor installations).
Application places no requirements with
respect to confidentiality of IO data.
3 Confidentiality Additionally to class2):
• Confidentiality of IO data
communication
System like 2),in which information about
company secretscan be obtained from the
IO data of the system
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
More information in PROFINET Security Whitepaper
- available on PI Website
Summary
In future more consistent communication
across network zones will become the norm
– this will increase security risks.
Integrated Security Extensions for PROFINET
will enhance the existing cell protection concept.
Security Extensions will future proof
PROFINET communication.
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Plant-wide functional safety
Controller A Controller B Controller C
Feldebene
Safety
over
OPC UA
Safety
over
OPC UA
PROFIsafe Safety-Profile XXX PROFIsafe
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Network Layers
OPC UA Stack
Safety over
OPC UA
Safety-Application
“Black Channel”:
Changes do not require a
Re-Certification
Certified according:
IEC 61508
IEC 61784-3
…
OPC UA - Mapper
Scope of
“Safety over
OPC UA”
e.g. OPC RMI
Industry Specific Interface
(Companion Specification)
OPC UA Stack
Safety over
OPC UA
Safety-Application
OPC UA - Mapper
Industry Specific Interface
(Companion Specification)
Safety PDU
Application PDU
Protocol Data
Unit
Remote Method
Invocation
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Key features of “Safety over OPC UA”
uses either OPC UA client/server or OPC UA pub/sub (with or without TSN)
unidirectional, bidirectional, and multicast communication patterns
arbitrary network-topology: line, tree, star, ring, mesh, …
arbitrary structured user data, length: 1-1500 bytes
dynamic establishment of safe connections during runtime
no requirements on regular (i.e. non-safe) network participants
no need for synchronized clocks
unlimited number of network components and terminals
unlimited data rate
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Safety case
Based on IEC61784-3-3 (“PROFIsafe”)
Fault model follows IEC61784-3 (functional safety for fieldbus)
Cyclic watchdog (local clock of the consumer suffices)
32-Bit CRC-polynomial:
“Properness” shown for all data length between 1-1500 bytes
calculated PFH-value suffices for SIL4
IDs are used to detected authenticity errors such as misdirected telegrams
A Monitoring Number (MNR) is used to detected timeliness errors
The arguments are essentially identical to the arguments for PROFIsafe V2.6
© 2019
PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI)
Connection Types
Unidirectional connection
Bidirectional connection
Multicast
Controller A Controller B
Safety-
App
Provider
Safety-
App
Consumer
Controller A Controller B
Safety-
App
Provider Safety-
App
Consumer
Consumer Provider
Controller A
Safety-
App
Provider 1
Provider 2
Provider N
Controller
B1
Safety-AppConsumer
Controller
B2
Safety-AppConsumer
Controller
BN
Safety-AppConsumer
…
…
© 2019
Thank you.
Peter Brown
Technical Oversight Specialist
Unit 6 Hawarden Industrial Estate, Hawarden
CH5 3US, United Kingdom
+44 7501 494545
peter.brown@csagroup.org

Profinet security and safety update - Peter Brown

  • 1.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Peter Brown, CSA Group PROFINET Security Concept Safety over OPC UA
  • 2.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) PROFINET Security today Use of Defense-in-Depth Concept: Network segmentation und network access control via security modules Physical access protection for complete network / security zone Communication robustness tests for PROFINET components © 2019 Security Module Controller Drive I/O Module Separated network segment Supervisor
  • 3.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) PROFINET Security – under consideration Planned Approach Extension of security measures according to the „Defense in Depth“ concept Integrated security in PROFINET components End-to-End security for PROFINET communication as configuration option Security Module Controller Drive I/O Module Supervisor Secured PROFINET Communication Operator specific key material © 2019
  • 4.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Protection goals Relevance for PROFINET Details Integrity High Message packets must not be falsified as this could e.g. lead to unintentional activation of actuators or the recording of incorrect measured values Authenticity High Messages packets must be uniquely assignable to its source. The components must “identify” themselves and have a counterfeit-proof digital identify Authorization High Only authorized components / users may have access to the automation system Availability High Depending on the production process, there are generally high to very high availability requirements. Confidentiality Low The confidentiality of IO data is estimated as low as long as no conclusions can be drawn with regard to company secrets (e.g., recipes) Non-repudiation Medium When an event occurs, the initiating person/device should be identifiable. Refers to installations where traceability of user intervention is required © 2019 Security Objectives / Security Measures
  • 5.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) PROFINET Security Requirements © 2019 Category Details Secured End-to-End- Communication Secured End-to-End-Communication between Controller and associated Devices as well as optional integration of Supervisor- / Diagnostic systems Configuration option Security extension is a configuration option for machines with higher security requirements (different security profiles) Parallel Operation Parallel operation of secured and unsecured connections in one IO-System and also with existing network infrastructure (e.g. switches) must be possible Transparency for PN- Functions / -Profiles Support and protection for existing PROFINET Profiles / functions as transparent as possible (for example PROFIsafe) Performance Integrity and authenticity checks must not have any qualitative impact to the PROFINET performance characteristics Note: Creation / check of security information in protocol extension in general leads to increased component resources
  • 6.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) PROFINET Security Requirements © 2019 Category Details Crypto Algorithms & Protocols Security concept based on well-known and commonly accepted cryptographic algorithms and protocols Operator specific keys Protection based on machine / plant specific key material → Individual for each PROFINET component LifeCycle Management for crypto functions Support of a flexible LifeCycle Management for security functions → Preparation for the case, when cryptographic algorithms once must be assumed as unsecure or vulnerabilities in the concept will be detected Crypto Hardware Support of optional cryptographic hardware accelerator and / or key store Manufacurer certificates Support of optional device identifiers integrated by device manufactures (Manufacturer certificates)
  • 7.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Secure communication establishment in 2 phases © 2019 Asymmetric key pair Phase 1 Authentication + Key exchange Phase 2 Device Configuration + Communication …… IO Controller IO Supervisor IO Device Asymmetric methods Symmetric methods IO Sup. Symmetric key
  • 8.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Phase 1: Authentication Exchange of Operator Certificates Exchange of public keys Check of certificates Establish a secure connection IO DeviceIO Controller / IO Supervisor IO Sup. Asymmetric key pair Asymmetric key pair Relatively slow method Only for connection establishment © 2019
  • 9.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Phase 2: Secured Communication Protection of subsequent real-time communication Usage of a symmetric method Shared key per AR Negotiated via key exchange mechanism Usage of Message Authentication Code mechanism → Protection of Integrity Optionally usage of data encryption → Protection of confidentiality Protection of real-time as well as non-real- time communication Secured Communication IO Device IO Controller / IO Supervisor IO Sup. © 2019
  • 10.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) PROFINET Security Classes Class Class Name Definition Area of application 1 Robustness Network robustness according to NetLoad specification and additionally : • • • Changeable SNMP community name DCP Read-Only mode Integrity protection for GSD files System is separated into zones and has limited external communication; ** Introduction of class in Discussion ** 2 Integrity + Authenticity Additionally to class1): Integrity and authenticity• of communication relations between IOC / Supervisor and IOD Confidentiality of configuration data communication • System can not or not easily be separated into zones; Access can not be secured (e.g. outdoor installations). Application places no requirements with respect to confidentiality of IO data. 3 Confidentiality Additionally to class2): • Confidentiality of IO data communication System like 2),in which information about company secretscan be obtained from the IO data of the system © 2019
  • 11.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) More information in PROFINET Security Whitepaper - available on PI Website Summary In future more consistent communication across network zones will become the norm – this will increase security risks. Integrated Security Extensions for PROFINET will enhance the existing cell protection concept. Security Extensions will future proof PROFINET communication. © 2019
  • 12.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Plant-wide functional safety Controller A Controller B Controller C Feldebene Safety over OPC UA Safety over OPC UA PROFIsafe Safety-Profile XXX PROFIsafe © 2019
  • 13.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Network Layers OPC UA Stack Safety over OPC UA Safety-Application “Black Channel”: Changes do not require a Re-Certification Certified according: IEC 61508 IEC 61784-3 … OPC UA - Mapper Scope of “Safety over OPC UA” e.g. OPC RMI Industry Specific Interface (Companion Specification) OPC UA Stack Safety over OPC UA Safety-Application OPC UA - Mapper Industry Specific Interface (Companion Specification) Safety PDU Application PDU Protocol Data Unit Remote Method Invocation © 2019
  • 14.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Key features of “Safety over OPC UA” uses either OPC UA client/server or OPC UA pub/sub (with or without TSN) unidirectional, bidirectional, and multicast communication patterns arbitrary network-topology: line, tree, star, ring, mesh, … arbitrary structured user data, length: 1-1500 bytes dynamic establishment of safe connections during runtime no requirements on regular (i.e. non-safe) network participants no need for synchronized clocks unlimited number of network components and terminals unlimited data rate © 2019
  • 15.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Safety case Based on IEC61784-3-3 (“PROFIsafe”) Fault model follows IEC61784-3 (functional safety for fieldbus) Cyclic watchdog (local clock of the consumer suffices) 32-Bit CRC-polynomial: “Properness” shown for all data length between 1-1500 bytes calculated PFH-value suffices for SIL4 IDs are used to detected authenticity errors such as misdirected telegrams A Monitoring Number (MNR) is used to detected timeliness errors The arguments are essentially identical to the arguments for PROFIsafe V2.6 © 2019
  • 16.
    PROFIBUS & PROFINETInternational (PI) Connection Types Unidirectional connection Bidirectional connection Multicast Controller A Controller B Safety- App Provider Safety- App Consumer Controller A Controller B Safety- App Provider Safety- App Consumer Consumer Provider Controller A Safety- App Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider N Controller B1 Safety-AppConsumer Controller B2 Safety-AppConsumer Controller BN Safety-AppConsumer … … © 2019
  • 17.
    Thank you. Peter Brown TechnicalOversight Specialist Unit 6 Hawarden Industrial Estate, Hawarden CH5 3US, United Kingdom +44 7501 494545 peter.brown@csagroup.org