2. ■ Equating happiness with pleasure does not
aim to describe the utilitarian moral agent
alone and independently from others. This is
not only about our individual pleasures,
regardless of how high, intellectual, or in
other ways noble it is,butit is also about the
pleasure of the greatest number affected by
the consequences of our actions.
3. ■ Mill explains:
■ • I have dwelt on this point, as being part of a perfectly
just conception of utility of happiness, considered as
the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no
means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of
the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the
agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest
amount of happiness altogether, and if it may possibly
be doubted whether a noble character is always the
happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it
makes other people happier, and that the world in
general is immediately a gainer by it
4. ■ Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end
by the general cultivation of nobleness of others,
and his own, so far as happiness is concerned,
were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the
bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last,
renders refutations superfluous.
5. ■ Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish act.It is neither
about our pleasure nor happiness alone; it cannot
be all about us. If we are the only ones satisfied
by our actions, it does not constitute a moral
good. If we are the only ones who are made
happy by our actions, then we cannot be morally
good. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive
or sacrifices that procure more happiness for
others.
6. ■ Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider
everyone's happiness, including our own, as the
standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also,
it implies that utilitarianism is not at all separate
from liberal social practices that aim to improve the
quality of life for all persons. Utilitarianismis
interested with everyone's happiness, in fact,
thegreatest happiness of the greatest number.
7. ■ Mill identifies the eradication of disease, using
technology, and other practical ways as examples
of utilitarianism. Consequently, utilitarianism
maximizes the total amount of pleasure over
displeasure for the greatest number. Because of
the premium given to the consequences of actions,
Mill pushes for the moral irrelevance of motive in
evaluating actions:
8. ■ He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does
what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the
hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the
friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his
object be to serve another friend to whom he is under
greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done
from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to
principle: it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode
of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should
fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or
society at large.
9. ■ The great majority of good actions are intended, not for
the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of
which the good of the world is made up; and the
thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these
occasions travel beyond the particular persons
concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure
himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the
rights-that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations-
of anyone else.
10. ■ Utilitarianism is interested with the best consequence for
the highest number of people. It is not interested with
the intention of the agent. Moral value cannot be
discernible in the intention or motivation of the person
doing the act; it is based solely and exclusively on the
difference it makes on the world's total amount of
pleasure and pain. This leads us to question
utilitarianism's take of moral rights. If actions are based
only on the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is
it justifiable to let go of some rights for the sake of the
benefit of the majority?
