The first section of this article examines the three
most important themes of the book: the
relationship between power and interdependence,
the ideal type of complex interdependence, and
explanations of changes in international regimes.
In the second section we critique our concepts
and theories, and examine which elements of our
arguments have been most fruitful for later work.
The third and fourth sections raise questions
about concepts, such as those of “systemic
political process” and “learning”, that we did
not explicate clearly in power and
interdependence but which we think suggest
fruitful directions for future research.
Principal themes of power and interdependence
In Power and interdependence we identified
“political realism” with acceptance of view that
state behavior is dominated by the constant
danger of military conflict, and we ARGUED
that “during the 1960s, many otherwise keen
observers who accepted REALIST
APPROACHES were slow to perceive the
development of NEW ISSUES that did not
center on military security concerns ”
We pointed out to the IMPORTANCE of “today`s
multidimensional economic, social, and ecological
interdependence”.
We did argue that the use of force has become
increasingly costly for major states as a result of
FOUR CONDITIONS:
1, Risk of nuclear escalation
2, Resistance by people in poor or weak countries
3, Uncertain and possibly negative effects on the
achievement of economic goals and
4, Domestic opinion opposed to the human costs
of the use of force.
But we also noted that four conditions had little
impact on the policies of totalitarian or
authoritarian governments and we warned that
“lesser states involved in regional rivalries and
non state terrorist group may find it easier to
use force than before.
The NET EFFECT on these contrary trends in
the role of force is to ERODE HIERARCY
BASED ON MILITARY POWER”
Our argument about constraints on the use of
military force laid the basis for our analysis of
the politics of economic interdependence. This
analysis contained three principal themes,
which we did not explicitly distinguish from
one another:
1, A power-orientated analysis of the politics of
interdependence , drawing on bargaining theory
2, An analysis of an ideal type that we call
“Complex interdependence” and impact of the
Processes that it encompassed
3, An attempts to explain changes in
International Regimes –which we defined as
“set of governing arrangements that effect
relationships of interdependence”.
We regarded the two (Realism and Liberalism)
as necessary complements to one another.
Because Liberalism and Realism both have
their roots in a UTILITARIAN view of the
world in which individual actors pursue their
own interests by responding to incentives
The Research Program of Power and
Interdependence : A Critique
In power and interdependence, we sought to
integrate realism and liberalism by using a
conception of interdependence which focused
on bargaining.
Interdependence and Bargain
Complex Interdependence
International Regimes Changes
Limitation of Structural theory: Systemic
Political Process
Although we acknowledged the importance f
domestic politics, POWER and
INTERDEPENDENCE assumed that we could
learn a good deal about world politics by
having more subtle and sophisticated
understanding of international system. We
argued that system have two dimensions:
STRUCTURE and PROCESS
We used the term
“STRUCTURE”
in the neorealist sense to refer principally to the
distribution of capabilities among units.
PROCESS
refers to Patterns of interactions: the ways in
which the units relate to each other.
Perception and Learning
States choices reflect elites perceptions of
interest, which may change in several ways.
The most obvious is political change. An
election, coup, or general evolution can lead to
replacement of leaders which one set of beliefs
by leaders with quite different perceptions of
national interests. Interest may also be
redefined through normative change. Changed
view of slavery or colonialism are examples.
National Interest may also change through
LEARNING. In its most basic sense, to learn is
to alter one`s beliefs as a result of new
information; to develop knowledge or skill by
study or experience.
Learning is slippery concept because it has
many meanings.
Improving moral quality, learn to do evil as
well as good: to devise blitzkrieg strategies, to
build and deploy offensive nuclear weapons, to
commit genocide.
In conducing research on LEARNING I-Rs, we
must specify which definition of learning we
are using.
A key concept for future research concerns the
impact of international political process on
learning.
Conclusion
It is now conventional to ANALYZE
interdependence as a political, as well as an
economic, phenomenon, and to examine
patterns of interdependence by issue-arena.
The concept of International Regimes has
fostered research on the evolution of rules and
institutions in world politics and, to some
extent, on the impact of such rules and
institutions on the state behavior.
Q & A?

Power and interdependence

  • 1.
    The first sectionof this article examines the three most important themes of the book: the relationship between power and interdependence, the ideal type of complex interdependence, and explanations of changes in international regimes. In the second section we critique our concepts and theories, and examine which elements of our arguments have been most fruitful for later work.
  • 2.
    The third andfourth sections raise questions about concepts, such as those of “systemic political process” and “learning”, that we did not explicate clearly in power and interdependence but which we think suggest fruitful directions for future research.
  • 3.
    Principal themes ofpower and interdependence In Power and interdependence we identified “political realism” with acceptance of view that state behavior is dominated by the constant danger of military conflict, and we ARGUED that “during the 1960s, many otherwise keen observers who accepted REALIST APPROACHES were slow to perceive the development of NEW ISSUES that did not center on military security concerns ”
  • 4.
    We pointed outto the IMPORTANCE of “today`s multidimensional economic, social, and ecological interdependence”. We did argue that the use of force has become increasingly costly for major states as a result of FOUR CONDITIONS: 1, Risk of nuclear escalation 2, Resistance by people in poor or weak countries 3, Uncertain and possibly negative effects on the achievement of economic goals and 4, Domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force.
  • 5.
    But we alsonoted that four conditions had little impact on the policies of totalitarian or authoritarian governments and we warned that “lesser states involved in regional rivalries and non state terrorist group may find it easier to use force than before. The NET EFFECT on these contrary trends in the role of force is to ERODE HIERARCY BASED ON MILITARY POWER”
  • 6.
    Our argument aboutconstraints on the use of military force laid the basis for our analysis of the politics of economic interdependence. This analysis contained three principal themes, which we did not explicitly distinguish from one another: 1, A power-orientated analysis of the politics of interdependence , drawing on bargaining theory 2, An analysis of an ideal type that we call “Complex interdependence” and impact of the
  • 7.
    Processes that itencompassed 3, An attempts to explain changes in International Regimes –which we defined as “set of governing arrangements that effect relationships of interdependence”.
  • 8.
    We regarded thetwo (Realism and Liberalism) as necessary complements to one another. Because Liberalism and Realism both have their roots in a UTILITARIAN view of the world in which individual actors pursue their own interests by responding to incentives
  • 9.
    The Research Programof Power and Interdependence : A Critique In power and interdependence, we sought to integrate realism and liberalism by using a conception of interdependence which focused on bargaining. Interdependence and Bargain Complex Interdependence International Regimes Changes
  • 10.
    Limitation of Structuraltheory: Systemic Political Process Although we acknowledged the importance f domestic politics, POWER and INTERDEPENDENCE assumed that we could learn a good deal about world politics by having more subtle and sophisticated understanding of international system. We argued that system have two dimensions: STRUCTURE and PROCESS
  • 11.
    We used theterm “STRUCTURE” in the neorealist sense to refer principally to the distribution of capabilities among units. PROCESS refers to Patterns of interactions: the ways in which the units relate to each other.
  • 12.
    Perception and Learning Stateschoices reflect elites perceptions of interest, which may change in several ways. The most obvious is political change. An election, coup, or general evolution can lead to replacement of leaders which one set of beliefs by leaders with quite different perceptions of national interests. Interest may also be redefined through normative change. Changed view of slavery or colonialism are examples.
  • 13.
    National Interest mayalso change through LEARNING. In its most basic sense, to learn is to alter one`s beliefs as a result of new information; to develop knowledge or skill by study or experience. Learning is slippery concept because it has many meanings. Improving moral quality, learn to do evil as well as good: to devise blitzkrieg strategies, to build and deploy offensive nuclear weapons, to commit genocide.
  • 14.
    In conducing researchon LEARNING I-Rs, we must specify which definition of learning we are using. A key concept for future research concerns the impact of international political process on learning.
  • 15.
    Conclusion It is nowconventional to ANALYZE interdependence as a political, as well as an economic, phenomenon, and to examine patterns of interdependence by issue-arena. The concept of International Regimes has fostered research on the evolution of rules and institutions in world politics and, to some extent, on the impact of such rules and institutions on the state behavior.
  • 16.