Police Practice and Research,Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2006, pp. .docx

Police Practice and Research,
Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 3–17
ISSN 1561–4263 print/ISSN 1477–271X online © 2006 Taylor
& Francis
DOI: 10.1080/15614260600579508
Proactive Policing: Standing
on the Shoulders of
Community-Based Policing
Curtis Clarke
Taylor and Francis
LtdGPPR_A_157933.sgm10.1080/15614260600579508Police
Practice & Research1561-4263 (print)/1477-271X
(online)Original Article2006Taylor & Francis71000000March
2006Dr [email protected]
This paper examines how Edmonton Police Service has built on
the foundation of
community-based policing and problem solving in an effort to
achieve greater levels of
efficiency and effectiveness. These proposed operational
strategies are closely aligned with
the conceptual framework of proactive policing. Here, proactive
policing, in its original
formulation, ‘refers to the strategic deployment of resources in
order to target criminally
active individuals’ (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5). The paper also
examines the implications
proactive policing has for police management and how
Edmonton has responded to an
organizational environment that requires management of

demand.
Keywords: Proactive Policing; Community Policing; Crime
Management; Intelligence-
Led Policing
Introduction
Recently, police policymakers and strategists have begun to
build on the foundation of
community-based policing and problem solving in an effort to
achieve greater levels of
efficiency and effectiveness. These proposed operational
strategies are closely aligned
with the conceptual framework of proactive policing. Here,
proactive policing, in its
original formulation, ‘refers to the strategic deployment of
resources in order to target
criminally active individuals’ (Stockdale, Whitehead, &
Gresham, 1999, p. 5). Interest-
ingly, proactive policing has a number of implications for
police management in that,
it sets in place an environment that requires management of
demand. These demands
are succinctly stated in the following passage:
Curtis Clarke is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the
Criminal Justice Program at Athabasca University
(Alberta, Canada). He has carried out empirical studies on the
implementation of community-based policing,
police organizational/managerial change, intelligence-led
policing, and the shifting boundaries between private
and public policing. Correspondence to: Dr Curtis Clarke, 10-
26312 Twp. Rd., 514 Spruce Grove, Alberta, Canada
T7Y 1C8. Email: [email protected]

4 C. Clarke
Increased proactivity requires a change in management ethos, as
well as placing more
demands on managers. Higher levels of proactivity assume that
managers are able to elicit
support from all levels in the service, despite cultural
resistance; to deal with a range of
ethical and civil liberties issues; and, in many cases, to take
greater accountability for
resource deployment and outcome. (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5)
Moreover, in this changing environment and adoption of
proactive strategies, police
managers ‘must be prepared to stand away from traditional
police philosophies and
methodologies; to believe that operations can and should be
driven by intelligence; to
act rather than to react’ (RCMP, 2002). From an operational
perspective these initia-
tives require a rapid adaptation from a service model which
‘until relatively recently,
still bore many of the structural characteristics of its
organizational (and operational)
origins in the nineteenth century’ (Savage & Charman, 1996, p.
39).
Defining Proactive Policing (Crime Management/Intelligence-
Led Policing)
If there is indeed a trend toward the adoption of proactive
policing the question of defi-
nition becomes a critical point of clarification. As we can attest
from previous paradigm

shifts corresponding with community-based policing, clarity of
definition is essential
to successful implementation. In the context of this paper and in
light of previous
operational shifts in policing, the question to ask is whether or
not a clear definition of
proactive policing exists. Certainly, a comprehensive definition
is possible based on
research regarding specific actions and goals associated with
existing policing initia-
tives and their implementation. Evaluations undertaken by
numerous policing
academics and practitioners have resulted in a consensus of key
elements and broad
principles associated with Proactive and Intelligence-Led
Policing. A synthesis of these
evaluations suggests the following typology of core
components:
1. A strategic future-oriented and targeted approach to crime
control.
2. A focus upon the identification, analysis, and management of
persisting and devel-
oping problems or risks.
3. A strategy centred on the acquisition of intelligence in order
to facilitate knowl-
edge-based decision making, allowing the targeting of resources
and the disruption
of prolific criminals.
4. An enabling of variability and flexibility of operational
initiatives.
5. A requirement for management of demand, in order to
increase the resources for

proactivity, as well as, the resources made available.
6. A presupposition of a higher status afforded to the
intelligence function.
7. And use of feedback to adjust, expand, abandon, and maintain
initiatives (Amey,
Hale, & Uglow, 1996; Barker-McCardle, 2001; Maguire, 2001;
Read & Tilley, 2000;
Stockdale et al., 1999).
Simply put, in practice proactive policing means
making use of data to establish the existence and extent of a
problem, to analyse its nature
and source, to plan intervention measures to reduce it, and to
monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of the selected responses. (Read & Tilley, 2000, p.
3)
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 5
Previous evaluations of proactive policing have articulated clear
criteria for success-
ful implementation based upon a police service’s ability to
achieve key crime manage-
ment concepts (Amey et al., 1996; Read & Tilley, 2000;
Stockdale et al., 1999; Tilley &
Laycock, 2002). These concepts are outlined in Table 1.
While it is essential to define what is meant by Proactive or
Intelligence-Led
Policing it is also important to evaluate both the effectiveness
and the degree to

which these concepts are in fact operationalized. With this
objective in mind the
remainder of this paper analyses Edmonton Police Service’s
(EPS’s) efforts to imple-
ment a model of proactive policing. The following sections
offer first a brief over-
view of the socio-political drivers guiding the EPS’s operational
shift toward
proactive policing and secondly an examination of the current
implementation
process, best practices, and efforts EPS has undertaken to
ensure proactive policing
strategies are effective.
The Socio-political Context: Responding to an Era of Fiscal
Restraint
Edmonton’s evolution toward a model of proactive policing has
been driven, in part,
by a decade of Provincial and Municipal fiscal restraint. The
trend of fiscal conserva-
tism had begun with the 1993 election of Premier Ralph Klein’s
Conservative Party.
Under the stewardship of the Klein government, policing, like
other municipal
services, was swept into the vortex of budget restraint and
restructuring. The Klein
revolution (a phrase frequently utilized when referring to the
Klein policy platforms)
would deliver two direct policy hits to municipal policing. The
first came from the
Ministry of Justice in its attempt to set in place its required
three-year business plan.
In Alberta Justice’s 1994–95 annual report Deputy Minister of
Justice Neil McCrank
set out 11 business functions all of which had a number of goals

attached, ‘some of
[which] are related to budget, while others are related to
increased efficiency or
improvement of service’ (Alberta Justice, Annual Report, 1994–
95, p. ii). Topping the
list of business functions was that of ‘reducing crime through
policing and prevention
programs’ and the first goal related to this function was ‘to
provide high quality cost
Table 1 Crime Management Concepts.
Concept 1 Proactivity is given a higher priority over reactivity.
Concept 2 Divisional management teams direct all operational
work and manage resources
according to force and divisional priorities.
Concept 3 Intelligence unit is central to the working of the
Division and produces targeted
intelligence files and quality information to support policing
functions.
Intelligence is used to target criminals and to inform crime
prevention activities.
Concept 4 Reactive response is decreased by use of an
appropriate call dispatch distribution
strategy.
Concept 5 The primary output of each team/individual initiative
should be identified and
made the subject of team performance indicators for both
quantity and quality.
This will ensure accountability, as well as create a pool of best
practices.

Source: Amey et al. (1996).
6 C. Clarke
effective programs to prevent and control crime’ (ibid., p. 2). In
order to achieve this
goal municipal policing grants were reduced by 50% ($16
million) over the three
years of the business plan (ibid.). The achievement of this
restraint was well under
way within the first year of the business plan and by April 1,
1994, Alberta Justice no
longer awarded municipal policing grants, relinquishing this
responsibility to the
Ministry of Municipal Affairs. It was at this point that
municipal policing was to take
its second hit.
Municipal Affairs’ disbursement and administration of
municipal policing grants
would prove problematic in that they were included in the lump
sum grants allocated
to the municipalities. The situation became even more
precarious when the 1994–95
budget set out a $59 million cut in municipal grants. Further to
this ‘the 1995/96
budget would see this grant reduced by 10 percent to $169
million and outlined plans
to cut this grant in half again by 1996–97’ (Lisac, 1995, p. 196).
Limited municipal
grants nurtured a competitive relationship between municipal
agencies and services
as they vied for shrinking pieces of the budgetary pie. As with
other municipalities,

Edmontonians would take on increased responsibility for order
maintenance as a
function of the Service’s fiscal constraints and adoption of
community-based
policing.
One early solution to Edmonton’s increased fiscal restraint and
demands for
efficient service took shape in the guise of the ‘Edmonton
Police Plan.’ The police plan
was conceived as a guide by which Edmonton would set out
clear Service goals, bound-
aries of accountability, and methods of evaluation. As noted in
the Police Plan’s
strategic vision:
The creation of the Edmonton Police Plan is the first step in
establishing a mutual and
collective vision which guides the Service in the delivery of
quality policing in this city for
the next three years. The Edmonton Police Plan will evolve to
include the principal compo-
nents ordinarily associated with separate plans devoted to
strategic issues, technology,
communications, facilities, finances, and operations. It will not
be shelf material. (Edmon-
ton Police Service, 1996, p. 1)
The underlying premise of this process was the objective of
implementing a decentral-
ized service structure, whereby the responsibility for service
could be downloaded to
the Division and thus to the community.
The operational premise of the Police Plan corresponded to
Osborne and Gaebler’s

(1993) concept of steering and rowing in which the executive
sets the objective or goal
for the organization (steering) and empowers those who are
most capable of deliver-
ing the service (rowing). Similarly Edmonton’s Police Plan
outlined a process of
service delivery that required a bottom-up process wherein
frontline officers, supervi-
sors, and managers synthesized service-wide plans into actions
and standards. These
Divisional actions and standards would be ‘negotiated with the
Chief’s Committee for
the purpose of planning, performance evaluation and
accountability’ (Memorandum
from Chief Lindsay, April 8, 1997, cited in Edmonton Police
Service, 1997e). The
criteria by which these would be measured were based on
whether or not they
supported the goals of the EPS. By way of comparison one can
readily note the simi-
larity between the Police Plans’ underlying managerial thrust
and a key concept of
proactive policing which states: Divisional management teams
direct all operational
work and manage resources according to force and divisional
priorities. And yet, the
Police Plan would serve only as a skeletal framework for future
strategic and tactical
steps in Edmonton’s effort to implement a solid proactive
policing model.

Developing a Tactical Management Tool for Edmonton:
Building on a Foundation
of Proactive Policing
In response to an ongoing environment of increased demand and
decreased resources,
the EPS further sought to develop a refined model of policing;
one that would build on
its strengths and enable the service to identify crime patterns
and thus effectively imple-
ment strategies to reduce crime (Clarke, Weissling, &
Montgomerie, 2002). The new
model was to also facilitate a process wherein the EPS could
‘add structure and
accountability to the current business practices of the service’
(Thue & Alston, 2002, p.
1). Furthermore, Edmonton’s model was to incorporate the
concepts of proactive
policing with the operational elements of Intelligence-Led
Policing (ILP). In this
context, ILP was to become an operational tool for tactical
management. And while the
development and institutionalization of a strategic model of
intelligence-led policing
continues to unfold, EPS has benefited from a strong foundation
of both community-
based policing and proactive policing. In its early stages EPS
undertook an assessment
of best practices and existing gaps in an effort to identify
operational elements that
would either support or undermine the implementation of ILP.
Throughout the early
stages of assessment there were numerous concerns regarding
both tactical and strate-
gic structures. And yet, there was a clear sense throughout the
assessment process that

the Service had a strong institutional understanding of
community policing, as well as,
operationalizing numerous concepts of proactive policing.
Perhaps one of the most difficult concepts for any police service
to articulate or
accurately assess is that of proactivity. This was a particular
concern for EPS, particu-
larly when data suggested that the EPS patrol workload status
exceeded the Service
objective of maintaining 10% of each shift for police officers to
organize crime preven-
tion initiatives (Edmonton Police Service, 1998). And yet, if we
return to the definition
of proactive policing we can see that a measure of proactivity is
much more than merely
a measure of patrol workload status. Proactivity ‘refers to the
strategic deployment of
resources in order to target criminally active individuals’ and
community disorder
(Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5). Working from this definition EPS
could readily locate a
number of initiatives and practices that matched this concept.
The linking of strategic resource deployment and criminal
activity had become
common practice for some EPS Divisions prior to the shift to
ILP. In fact, prior to the
service-wide assessment, Divisional tactical meetings were
consistent practice within
three of the four Divisions (North, South, and West). While
each of these Divisions has
specific procedures they all have a common characteristic in
that they implement a
formalized process for the purposes of intelligence sharing,
resource allocation, and

problem solving. Both North and South Division utilize tactical
meetings on a daily
basis while West Division tactical meetings occur once per
week. In the context of the
8 C. Clarke
North Division’s daily tactical meetings, management staff
(Patrol, CIS, Traffic,
Superintendent, and Divisional Intelligence Officer) formalize
both daily and long-
term strategies based on identified Divisional problems and
broad service objectives.
The tactical meeting begins with the Divisional Intelligence
Officer (DIO) outlining
particular hot spots and intelligence data. Guided by this
information, managers artic-
ulate particular strategies and coordinate resource allocation
based on available
manpower. The tactical objectives are placed on a white board
in the ops/report room
outlining the specific problems and operational directions.
Overall, the tactical process
is layered in a manner that facilitates both daily strategies and
broad Division
initiatives, but more importantly, allows management to focus
resources at the imme-
diate needs of the Division. It is a process that reflects a well-
defined understanding of
decentralized operations and autonomous tactical management.
West Division approaches the process of tactical management
from the understand-
ing that the Division cannot be all things to all people.

Priorities must be set based on
resources guided by a range of information used to identify
particular problems. Here,
the tactical management team sets out a ‘do’ and ‘do not’ matrix
to problem solving
based on two-week projections of available resources. While
this process does not differ
dramatically from the other Divisions it does enable the
management team to set
objectives for problem resolution, targeting, etc. based on
weekly resources. Moreover,
it articulates the necessity of long-range resource allocation and
deployment during a
period of limited resources.
There is little doubt that increased proactivity places new
demands upon the
Divisional management structure. Greater proactivity requires
managers to elicit the
support from a range of service members, as well as, be
accountable for resource
deployment. Subsequently, the management focus becomes one
of freeing ‘resources
that were being used in a predominantly reactive and
unproductive way and use them
to bring proactive strategies centre stage’ (Amey et al., 1996, p.
vi). This does not
suggest that proactivity and reactivity are separate approaches
to operational work but
should be considered in terms of overlapping, interdependent
methods to achieve
divisional priorities. In turn, this requires an operational model
that allows flexible
deployment of resources, problem solving, and
accountability/performance assess-
ment, while enabling management teams to guide operational

priorities.
An exemplar of how this might be achieved is illustrated by
Downtown Division’s
operational model. Downtown Division had instituted a
community response model
that enabled the Division to maintain the flexibility for problem
solving while address-
ing the need to respond to calls. The Community Response
Model combines the
concept of empowerment with defined functions and duties for
designated officers
(Response, District, Community, and Beats). Shifting to this
model has also required a
more equitable distribution of workload through the S/Sgt and
Sgts facilitated, in part,
by the following management team structure: Superintendent,
Inspector, Admin S/
Sgt, S/Sgts for (beats, community stations, front desk, and CIS),
and platoon Sgts.1
From a tactical/operational stance, the Division utilizes the
Community Response
Model in setting a clear hierarchy of ownership of calls for
service. Embedded in this
operational model is the requirement of problem solving and in
an effort to facilitate
this requirement the Divisional management team has
formalized the use of Strategic
Operational Projects (SOPs). In the fall of 2001 the SOPs
became entrenched in the

Divisional business due to the loss of the special project teams.
With the demise of the
special project teams, SOPs have become a useful tool in the
development of problem-
solving projects. Officers identify particular issues and put
forward an SOP that
outlines (using a SARA model) the issue, response, etc. Once it
has been approved by
the command, a team is formed and divisional resources shifted
to address the SOP.
The basic managerial concept behind this process is that of
empowerment. If a
member identifies a problem, the member will stay involved as
the driver of the initia-
tive or at least be a team member.
Integral to the success of this model is the Service’s
commitment to the concept of
ownership. Ownership is understood in the following manner:
Ownership applies to the structure of the organization.
Ownership is built into all areas
and levels of the organization. Ownership and empowerment has
de-emphasized the chain
of command and encouraged decision making at the lowest
possible level. Management
has given members increased latitude, autonomy and trust.
(Edmonton Police Service,
1997a, p. 35)
From an operational standpoint, the implementation of
ownership is the responsibility
of each Division and is customized to fit the Divisional
Objectives. This requires Divi-
sional Superintendents to tailor the concept of ownership based
on manpower, divi-

sional demographics, and current problems. An example of the
use of ownership can
be noted in North Division’s service delivery model. The
Division is divided into zones
that have designated ownership/turf officers that are tasked with
problem resolution in
the zone. The shift structure is split into primary and secondary
response teams with
ownership/turf officers being within the secondary category.
While they must continue
to respond to high priority calls in their zones, they are released
from minor call
response in order to address identified problem-solving tasks.
This division of labour,
coupled with the reallocation of resources occurring at the daily
tactical meetings
creates a multi-layered approach to problem solving and
proactivity.2
The premise supporting this concept is that the responsibility
for providing local
policing is devolved to the level of the Divisional Command.
The Divisional
Command must manage all resources (patrol, CIS, etc.)
‘proactively in accordance
with intelligence-led objectives rather than allowing them
simply to react’ (Gill, 2000,
p. 82). As the above examples indicate, Edmonton’s
decentralized model enables
Divisions to respond to the need for proactive and reactive
strategies in a manner that
best suits the needs of their Divisional boundaries and
resources.
And while it is important to facilitate a decentralized approach
it is also necessary to

ensure that the Service’s reactive response is decreased by use
of an appropriate call
dispatch distribution strategy. A large number of calls for
service are minor and do not
require the attendance of a police officer and as such should be
dealt with in a more
effective manner than the traditional practice of dispatching
officers to all calls for
service. Therefore, if a shift to proactivity is to be successful,
there must be a mechanism
that facilitates a freeing of resources; one that can reduce the
reactive demands placed
on existing resources.
10 C. Clarke
During the mid-1990s, Service-wide brainstorming resulted in
the position that if
EPS was to implement a more efficient service model, it would
need to be responsive
to community needs, increase public access, decrease the
number of police responses
to calls, and improve the effectiveness of overall call
management. To facilitate these
outcomes the EPS formulated a model consisting of four service
components, each
inclusive of a set of guiding principles and a strategy for
implementation. These four
service components were:
● Receiving: How the public accesses police service.
● Responding: How the police make themselves available and
attend to public needs.
● Recording: How the police capture information.

● Resolving: How the police work to identify problems and
develop solutions.
Each of these components is connected with a common
objective of improved service
delivery. And while there is an assumed interplay between each
component, receiving
is considered the stage at which service delivery is first
negotiated.
The operational component of receiving necessitates effective
management of calls
for service. This first requires the diversion of calls to
appropriate levels of service.
Edmonton’s initial response was the development of a call path
chart with the
underlying rationale of reducing calls for service. If the number
of calls could be
diminished, officers would have less committed time, enabling
them to execute
problem-solving initiatives. While the call path chart was an
important initiative,
diverting calls was only part of the solution. Call management
would also be
achieved through the application of response criteria and
effective application of the
call path chart.
The synthesis of these components resulted in the Service’s
development of a two-
tier response strategy: primary and ownership. Primary response
officers respond to all
emergency and service level calls. Ownership officers respond
to emergency calls,
priority response calls close to their ownership turf, and all
service or deferred level calls

in their community. Calls not fitting these criteria are diverted
to community stations
or other non-emergency services (this process has been
highlighted in the previous
example of ownership).
While ensuring operational characteristics and processes are
appropriately reengi-
neered, it is also incumbent upon police managers to ensure the
central function of
intelligence. As Peter Gill suggests,
intelligence is intended to be used in two main ways, first, to
target specific criminally
active people with a view to developing the evidence necessary
for a conviction and,
second, to inform crime prevention strategies via the analysis of
problems. (2000, p. 83)
In this context, ‘the intelligence unit is central to any proactive
model … and that it is
responsible not only for generating intelligence itself but also
for developing strategies
and tactics for other teams within the Division’ (Amey et al.,
1996, p. 4). Others have
suggested that the intelligence units are the linchpin in ensuring
that resources are
effectively allocated and that problem-solving initiatives are
directed in the most
efficient manner.
Management of intelligence is central to facilitating the

effective dissemination and
use of the knowledge resident in different units of EPS. As a
concept, intelligence
management is complex and goes beyond the mere management
of information.
Intelligence consists of two basic components: data and
information. Data are identi-
fiable, objective facts about events, while knowledge is created
by adding context,
providing analysis, ensuring accuracy, and summarizing data
into concise and under-
standable forms. There is no shortage of data and information at
EPS—crime statistics,
response times, hot spots, crime mapping, etc. However, it is
only when they are inter-
preted, analysed, and used as a tool to proactively guide tactical
manoeuvres leading to
crime prevention and other goals of EPS, that data and
information become intelli-
gence. The task, then, becomes one of empowering officers at
all levels of EPS to
identify what data and information are most useful and effective
to develop into intel-
ligence. Certainly Edmonton had recognized these very issues
and as the following
examples suggest the Service had indeed acknowledged the
proactive value of intelli-
gence in its efforts to implement a model of proactive policing.
Divisional Intelligence Officers (DIOs)
Each Division has one intelligence officer (an exception to this
is Downtown Division
which has two). Divisional Intelligence Officers (DIOs) serve a
range of functions but
more importantly they peel away the various layers of

information entering the
Division’s intelligence hopper, such as CAD data, reports from
community stations,
Street Information Reports (SIRs), Central Crime Analyst
reports, etc. The end result
is a snapshot of Divisional trends, hot spots, and high-risk
individuals from which
tactical strategies can be mounted and appropriate resources
allocated. The DIO plays
an integral role in the daily tactical meetings, platoon/squad
parades, CIS intelligence
packaging, and inter-divisional intelligence sharing. An
example of the latter is the
numerous collaborative relations DIOs are associated with:
weekly DIO conference
call, monthly multi-agency property meetings, shared data with
Alberta Justice (re:
release dates for YOA and adult offenders), etc. At a micro
level DIOs collect and
correlate data as they pertain to specific SOPs, investigations,
etc. Here, the DIO devel-
ops an intelligence package that relates to a specific project or
member request. In this
function the DIO supplies a consistent layer of information and
management of infor-
mation related to a range of Divisional projects.
Community Program Coordinators, D Division
This position has traditionally been located in the crime
prevention unit but has
recently moved to the Divisions. On a day-to-day basis the
Community Program
Coordinator (CPCO) works with the DIOs comparing and
deconstructing weekly
statistics in an effort to identify trends specific to the

Divisional districts. This has
enabled the Division management to both direct and identify
particular projects at the
micro level of the district. Moreover, the CPCO is able to
develop intelligence packages
that support problem-solving initiatives. Under this tactical
format, problems and
12 C. Clarke
resolution strategies are generated in two ways. (1) An officer
will approach the CPCO
and identify a problem at which point a file is opened. (2) The
CPCO may note partic-
ular trends from their daily analysis of statistics. At this point,
the CPCO will notify the
district officers of the trend/problem who will then direct the
problem resolution.
There is a two-month diary date that is set for each internal file
at which time the
officer/team should have submitted a follow-up report.
An essential concern for implementing this level of proactive
policing is the flow of
intelligence both in terms of internal and external inputs. The
success of proactive
policing is directly reliant upon pertinent and complete data
(often referred to as
robust data). Good data on crime and intelligence on criminals
are prerequisites to
effective crime control (Tilley & Laycock, 2002). This suggests
the need for a service-
wide tactical structure that ensures a coordinated synthesis of
both operational

approaches and intelligence. Unfortunately, the current tactical
structure of EPS is
defined by autonomous (Divisional) operational approaches
loosely linked by
fragmented networks of intelligence and tactical coordination,
as illustrated in Figure
1. One of the challenges that currently confronts EPS is how it
will address these
identified gaps and fragmented networks so that the service can
achieve an effective
coordination of resources.
Figure 1 Tactical Structure and Identifying Gaps.
Finally, if a Service is to successfully achieve proactive
policing outcomes there must
be a mechanism whereby the primary output of each
team/individual initiative can be
identified and made the subject of team performance indicators
for both quantity and
quality. Unfortunately, as Read and Tilley (2000) suggest,
dependable outcome evalu-
ations of problem-solving initiatives have been less than
consistent throughout police
organizations. And yet, evaluations are in fact valuable methods
of encouraging a crit-
ical assessment of successful, as well as, unsuccessful practices.
Moreover, consistent
evaluation of initiatives assists in the process of replicating best
practices. Tilley and
Laycock (2002, p. 18) note, ‘it is through replication that
successful interventions are
disseminated more widely. The payoff from hard-won evidence
that a given response
Reactive

Resolution PredictingProactive
Fragmented
Network
Fragmented
Network
Fragmented
Network
Fragmented
Network
Prevention
Figure 1 Tactical Structure and Identifying Gaps.
has been effective is its successful application elsewhere.’
While there is a sense that
intelligence-led policing is solely concerned with crime-related
data, it is important to
note that the evaluation of project outcomes is a form of
intelligence that informs
future allocation of resources and operational practices. For
Edmonton the importance
of evaluation was recognized in its earlier shift to community-
based and problem-
oriented policing. As the following ‘Problem Files’
Management process suggests within
EPS there is indeed an institutionalized expectation of how
problem files (problem-

solving initiatives) are identified, tracked, and managed.
EPS Problem Files Management
Problem Identification is determined by one of two ways
1. Information received from frontline officers. They
communicate this information to
the Community Programs Coordinator.
2. Through the Community Programs Coordinator/DIO’s
analysis of repeat calls for
service or other external sources.
Once the existence of a problem has been confirmed it is
assigned to a particular member,
in most cases, members who have ownership in district,
community, or beat where the
problem exists.
Problem Tracking
1. Once the problem has been assigned the problem is added to
the Master List.
2. An electronic folder is created for the particular address and
linked to the appropriate
district, community, beat.
3. A tracking sheet is created containing basic information,
platoon commander,
assigned service member and a diary date for response. The
diary date is forwarded to
the Platoon commander as well. (It is the responsibility of the
assigned member to
respond back through the chain of command on or before the

diary date. This does
not mean that the problem must be resolved by this date but
rather it is an update of
what the member has accomplished to date.)
Concluded or Ongoing Files
If problems are ongoing then new diary dates are assigned and
future updates required. If
the problem is concluded, a Problem Solving (PS-1) form is
completed by the member, the
problem is removed from the master list and placed in to the
completed problems folder
and a hard copy of the information is printed for the District
binder. It is important to note
that the master list and district folders are used not only by
other ownership members
(Beats, Community and District) but also the Divisional
Intelligence officers (DIO), the
management team and others in the Service. The data in these
files provide a snapshot of
what is going on in the Division and what is being done about
it. This information is used
on a regular basis to update members of the community and
Service. (EPS Memorandum,
April 3, 2002)
While this analysis suggests the existence of a strong
foundation for ILP there are a
number of opportunities and practices the Service must evaluate
as it moves forward.
Edmonton must ensure that its model of ILP continues to refine
the concepts of proac-
tive policing. Moreover, it must ensure that intelligence
supports both proactive and
reactive policing activities.

14 C. Clarke
Points of Concern
The model of ILP proposed by EPS certainly offers an
opportunity to propel the service
into a proactive stance wherein resources can be utilized in a
strategic and effective
manner. And yet, it is not as simple as it may appear on the
surface. It does require a
strategic orientation whereby activities are guided and evaluated
in terms of broad
service objectives. Moreover, it is a process that implies a
multi-layered linkage of
information, tactical initiatives, resource allocation, etc. As one
can note from Figure
2, there are numerous points in which the process can break
down.
Figure 2 The Key Elements of the EPS Intelligence-Led
Policing Model. Source: Veitch, Warden, Alston, & Thue
(2004).
Therefore, the evaluation process must remain dynamic in order
to address
dysfunctional elements within the model. In the case of
Edmonton, early analysis
suggested that both tactical and strategic elements of the service
required attention.
For example:
Tactical:
● Develop IT capacity that will enable DIOs to quickly cross-

reference divisional intel-
ligence, share analysis and trends.
● Utilize Community Stations in a more effective manner
(Community Station
personnel should be more active in coordinating problem-
solving initiatives,
funnelling information from the community, serve as a clearing
house of informa-
tion for patrol, beat, and community officers, etc.
Figure 2 The Key Elements of the EPS Intelligence-Led
Policing Model. Source: Veitch,
Warden, Alston, & Thue (2004).
● Insure that middle management play an active role in
informing frontline officers
about why it is important to both input and access intelligence
data.
● Encourage community members to take a more active role in
the dissemination of
intelligence.
Strategic:
● Adopt a fully integrated business planning process for the
purpose of improving:
operational performance, strategic decision making, and
resource allocation and
accountability for the achievement of stated outcomes.

● Implement a quarterly Crime Management Conference in
which Divisions share
information on operational objectives, best practices,
performance measurement,
etc.
● Develop a process for community involvement in identifying
priority areas and
outcomes (Clarke et al., 2002).
Recognition of these shortcomings is only a first step. The
operational and organiza-
tional response to these would require both the coordination and
support of internal
and external stakeholders. As with the earlier examples of
Community-Based Policing
one of the key challenges will be to ensure there is a continued
inclusion of key stake-
holders. All stakeholders must understand both the concepts of
proactive policing and
their role in the successful implementation of proactive
initiatives.
Conclusion
As this case study indicates, prior organizational practices of
community-based policing
have underlined current strategic and operational efforts to
implement an effective
model of proactive policing. More importantly, these examples
suggest that community
policing continues to be a central vehicle for the development
of future operational and
strategic policing initiatives. This is not to say that future
trends will be confined by the
concept of community policing but that community policing

offers a foundation by
which innovation can evolve. Edmonton’s operational shift to
proactive policing repre-
sents a logical transition from the earlier operationalization of
community policing and
problem-oriented policing. More succinctly, proactive policing
is a maturing or refine-
ment of these. Furthermore, returning to the basic definition of
proactive policing,
‘making use of data to establish the existence and extent of a
problem, to analyse its
nature and source, to plan intervention measures to reduce it,
and to monitor and eval-
uate the effectiveness of the selected responses’ one can easily
see how this concept
parallels the central theme of problem-solving models such as
SARA, CAPRA, and
PARE (Read & Tilley, 2000, p. 3). Perhaps the central
difference is that proactive polic-
ing is a broad strategic application which guides service-wide
operations.
Notes
1
[1] This management structure characterizes Divisional
governance throughout the Service.
2
16 C. Clarke
[2] It should be noted that while the above examples focus on
North and Downtown Divisions,
there are new operational models being implemented in the

remaining two divisions. As of
May 1, 2002, South Division had implemented a team-policing
model that would support
greater sharing of resources, linkage of events, and continuity.
Recently, West Division has
undergone a structural reorganization implementing a change
from nine squads to 12. The
objective of this model is to allow greater overlap of manpower,
enabling the Division to
implement a priorities-based management model. Moreover, this
model will support an
operational shift currently focused on crime-related issues to
one that is inclusive of all
disorder issues.
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measurement. Ontario Police
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tool for Edmonton Police Service. Edmonton Police Service.

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intelligence.htm
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solving and crime reduction (Crime
Reduction Research Series Paper 6). London: Home Office.
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Leishman, B. Loveday, & S. Savage (Eds.),
Core issues in policing. Harlow, Essex: Longman.
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ity (Police Research Series Paper 103). London: Home Office.
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an intelligence led policing model for
Edmonton Police Service. Edmonton Police Service.
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Evidence-based crime reduction (Crime
Reduction Research Series Paper 11). London: Home Office.
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24(3), 347.
O R I G I N A L P A P E R
Building capability throughout a change effort: leading the
transformation of a police agency to community policing
J. Kevin Ford
Published online: 10 April 2007
� Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Abstract This case describes a change effort to move a
police agency to become a community policing organiza-
tion. The community policing effort was seen as a means to
make a transformational change to become a learning
organization with the goal of improving the delivery of
police services. The case describes the steps taken to meet

the new vision of community policing as well as the steps
taken to deal with the challenges or realities of trying to
make change happen. The lens for this case is the leader-
ship role across the stages of change (exploration, plan-
ning, implementation, monitoring and institutionalization)
in building capacity within the organization to sustain the
change effort. The capacity building focused on incorpo-
rating systems thinking into the mindset of the members of
the organization, breaking down the command and control
mindset by building a new norm around high involvement
of committed teams, and developing skill sets to support
continuous learning and improvement in order to align
organizational systems. A key lesson learned is that
effective leaders do not just prepare an organization prior
to a change effort. They must have the patience to con-
stantly build the capacity for change among organizational
members throughout the various stages of the change
effort.

Keywords Building capability � Transformational change �
Case study � Community policing
Leading-edge organizations are deriving ever increasing
value by tapping into employee and stakeholder insights,
expertise and capability (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).
Knowledge driven work systems are helping to transform
workplaces to become more effective and to better meet
customer needs (Kermally, 2002). This transformation to
knowledge driven work systems has begun to move beyond
the private sector to the public sector (Tan & Heracleous,
2001).
Police organizations are often described as having a para-
military organizational hierarchy that is status quo oriented
(Goldstein, 1990; Greene & Mastrofski, 1988). Community
policing is an organizational strategy that emerged in the
1980s and 90s for dramatically improving the delivery of
police services (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). The
strategy requires greater emphasis on knowledge manage-

ment, teamwork, and partnerships with the community in
order for the police agency to become more proactive and
adaptable in dealing with crime as well becoming more
focused on enhancing the quality of life for the community
(Mastrofski, 1999; Morash & Ford, 2002; Wycoff, 1994).
Although much has been written about the overall phi-
losophy of community policing, fewer efforts have been
directed towards understanding the strategies needed to
build capabilities for change. This case describes a seven
year effort by one police department to become a com-
munity policing organization. In this case, the Chief of the
Jackson Police Department (JPD) in Michigan had a vision
of transforming the whole organization rather than just
adding specialized patrols units whose job responsibilities
would involve more interaction with the community. In
essence, everyone’s job was to become community polic-
ing oriented.
Systems change involves the consideration of the

interdependency, interconnectedness, and interrelatedness
J. K. Ford (&)
Department of Psychology, Psychology Building, Michigan
State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1116, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
123
Am J Community Psychol (2007) 39:321–334
DOI 10.1007/s10464-007-9115-2
of the parts within the organization that constitutes the
whole. In this police context, we viewed the systems
change effort as frame breaking or transformational as
everything about how the agency is structured, managed,
and how it interacts with the external world is ‘‘on the
table’’ to improve organizational effectiveness. Systems
change recognizes that transforming an organization takes
years to accomplish. The alignment of parts must lead to
changes in mindsets and skillsets so that the new ways of
organizing can lead to changes in how people behave.

These changes take a commitment by leadership to be
patient and methodical in building capability while
exploring, committing, planning, implementing, and
revising plans with the goal of institutionalizing the
principles of community policing.
Systems change must deal simultaneously with two
aspects of the organizational culture––the ‘‘apparent’’
organization and the ‘‘below the surface’’ organization
(Scholtes, 1998). The apparent organization refers to the
visible or more formal version of the organization such as the
hierarchical structure and chain of command, the official
roles, functions, and job descriptions; the facilities and
equipment used and the policies, goals, and standards. The
below the surface organization refers to the informal com-
ponents of the department that are shaped by the styles and
values of its leaders and by its history. This less visible (and
often not discussed) aspect of the organization includes the
values, beliefs and assumptions that drive organizational

decision making and work behavior (e.g., Argyris, 1999;
Schein, 1992). It is this below the surface organization that
most often frames how individuals feel about their work-
place. Therefore, our efforts were focused on an integrative
approach that linked what was being done at the apparent
level with changes desired at the below the surface level.
In this case, the leadership team felt that a major
structural change needed to drive this transformational ef-
fort was the move to a team based policing strategy based
on the distribution of officers to geographically defined
sectors in the city (Alley, Bonello, & Schafer, 2002). The
efforts also focused on the leader’s efforts to incorporate
process issues such as systems thinking, high involvement,
and a focus on learning in order to change the underlying
assumptions and beliefs about police work (e.g., police can
play a role in improving quality of life issues), how deci-
sions can be made (i.e., quality decisions can be made by
those closest to the issues rather than always through the

command and control structure) and how police can
interact with the community (e.g., there can be more trust
and mutual respect developed between police and various
community groups that lead to more permanent solutions to
on-going problems).
An action research model was employed in which we
facilitated the change effort while at the same time docu-
menting it. We facilitated committee meetings, worked
with the leadership team on identifying key challenges,
became a sounding board for ideas for moving the change
process forward, provided just in time training (e.g., how to
run team meetings effectively), helped identify training
needs, trained the trainer (e.g., problem solving training),
as well as gathered, analyzed, and fed back data on the
process of change.
What makes this case distinct from other community
policing case studies is the emphasis on what the leadership
did to build the capacity for challenging the underlying

assumptions and beliefs of the below the surface organi-
zation throughout the change process. Most case studies
take place after the change process has emerged and the
department has already been labeled a ‘‘success.’’ We
began this journey in 1998 without any foreknowledge of
whether this ‘‘case’’ would be a success or a failure. Case
studies on community policing have focused on changes in
the apparent organization rather than dealing with capacity
building to change the below the surface organization. The
cases also tend not to discuss the continual struggles to
make change happen as the change process continues to
unfold over time.
Background
The Jackson Police Department is comprised of about 70
sworn officers and 24 civilians that serve a citizen popu-
lation of 37,000. Each year, they handle approximately
38,000 social order and/or criminal incidents, 96,000 walk-
in or telephone citizen contacts, and at least 10,000 records,

licensing, evidence management and other citizen requests
for information. Moreover, they stop approximately 18,000
traffic violators per year.
In our initial meetings with the Chief, we emphasized
our orientation as action researchers and that we would be
documenting the reality of change—the good and the bad.
We explained our focus would take into account both the
apparent and below the surface issues. We took a learning
perspective to change with the focus on the development of
a cyclical model of data gathering, shared knowledge, ac-
tion and feedback around the bold vision for the change
(e.g., see French & Bell, 1999). The goal is for the police
agency to learn how to work more effectively together and
to learn how to make change happen (Argyris, 1983)
through creating positive cycles of learning about and
working on improving systems (e.g., see Alarid, 2000;
Geller, 1997). As noted by Senge (1990), through learning,
organizations can do things they were never able to do and

thus expand the organization’s capacity to create its future.
We saw the community policing strategy as a means to an
end not an end in and of itself. The key question throughout
322 Am J Community Psychol (2007) 39:321–334
123
the change effort was whether the police agency was cre-
ating greater capacity to create its future by becoming more
of a learning organization.
In addition, our working assumption was that change
requires looking at and simultaneously working on how to
create systems to support the vision for change and at the
same time to identify and deal with the realities, which
poses challenges for the change effort. Pushing on a vision
is often overvalued by leaders who would like to assume
almost a ‘‘clean slate’’ in their organization. From our
perspective, one must enhance the value of knowing where
the current system is and how it got there through creating

the space and time for dialog on how one can move from
that current reality to the vision. This takes a sincere effort
to set up ways to learn from and act with full knowledge of
the reality of the where the organization is currently (both
apparent and below the surface) and where it has been
(e.g., see Bridges, 1991).
In essence, we took a dialectic approach to
change—putting issues ‘‘on the table’’ about the apparent
and below the surface and the link between current realities
and the vision. The vision was the thesis and the current
reality the antithesis. Reality is often fraught with discon-
nects where the aims of a change effort are not meeting the
reality. They point to underlying differences and deep se-
ated dilemmas that the organization needs to address. The
synthesis is simultaneously working towards the vision
while being rooted in reality. This framework is dialectical
as it forces the identification of issues that people need to
grapple with in order to develop shared understanding to

drive effective action for change.
Organizational change stages
While the process of change is never ending and is clearly
not linear (e.g., see Crossan, Cunha, Vera, & Cunha, 2005;
Gersick, 1991; Wheatley, 1992), it can be examined in
terms of distinct phases or stages (Berger, Sikora, & Ber-
ger, 1993; French & Bell, 1999; Rothwell, McLean, &
Sullivan, 1995; Serverance & Passino, 2002). By dividing
up ‘‘time’’ by stages, one can distribute the flow of the
change process into meaningful segments. Our model
consists of five stages: Exploration, Commitment, Plan-
ning, Implementation, and Monitoring/Revising with the
ultimate goal being the institutionalization of the change
effort. For the current paper, the emphasis is on the dialog
around the vision and reality that was the focus at each
stage as well as the strategy employed by the leadership to
build the capacity for change.
Exploration involves the investigation of alternative

approaches to the current system. In the commitment stage,
the leader makes the decision to move forward and
challenge the status quo by creating a new vision. Strategic
Planning is an effort to take a new vision and develop a
strategy for achieving it. The Implementation stage is
perhaps the most visible component of the change process
as it involves the implementation of action plans and the
transition from the ‘‘old’’ ways of doing things to the
‘‘new’’ way of doing things. Monitoring and Revising is a
system to evaluate the change effort and quantify progress,
identify gaps, and develop new action plans. Institution-
alization occurs when new procedures, policies and sys-
tems formally replace the old methods. From an action
research perspective, there were important drivers and
restraining forces that emerged at each stage. How the
leaders addressed these issues to build capacity for change
spoke volumes about the success of this effort.
Exploration

Starting in 1990, the JPD began performing basic com-
munity policing activities such as assigning officers to live
in city-owned houses in troubled neighborhoods. However,
activities such as these were independent of the traditional
police services and this effort did not have a far reaching
impact on the police agency. As noted by one member of
the command staff ‘‘I did not think we were very customer-
oriented...we were still like the 60s and 70s as a paramil-
itary organization ... we were not too concerned about what
the community wanted.’’
In 1996, a new city manager was hired and immediately
was faced with a problem. The police department was
plagued with disciplinary problems and citizen complaints.
The city manager wanted a police chief who was not afraid
to make tough decisions and who would build a police
force that could reconnect with citizens. There was also
pressure from external stakeholders like city council and
church groups to ‘‘do something different’’ within the JPD.

In 1996, the city manager chose Chief Portis as the new
police chief at the JPD.
As described by the new Chief ‘‘from the moment a new
police chief is announced, folks want to know what the
chief is going to change...everyone expects the new guy to
do something different than his/her predecessor.’’ While
there was pressure for change, a key restraining force was
apathy. Many experienced police personnel felt that the
department had been unfairly fingered by external stake-
holders as a problem and thus an ‘‘us’’ versus ‘‘them’’
perspective reigned. Another key restraining force was that
past change efforts within the department were viewed as
failures. In interviews with the top four command staff
members early in the change process, no member could
provide us with a success story. As one member succinctly
Am J Community Psychol (2007) 39:321–334 323
123

concluded ‘‘Here we go again...I don’t have time to screw
with this. I do not have the interest.’’
The dilemma, then, was how to generate enthusiasm for
a major transformational change effort when the perception
was that change efforts are doomed to fail. The Chief was
convinced that one key barrier was the prevalent command
and control mindset. The command staff felt it was their
job to make decisions. Change was seen as decided by and
dictated from above with sergeants and officers determin-
ing how to comply or get around those decisions. In the
face of external pressure, the internal apathy to stay status
quo, and the strong command and control mindset, the
Chief rightly chose not to immediately begin the move to
community policing. In fact, he waited two years to better
understand the organization and community perceptions of
the department, deal with current hot issues (such as
disciplinary issues) and to build capacity for change by
beginning to break down the command and control mindset

by increasing confidence that change was possible with the
concerted effort of people closest to the ‘‘problem’’ or
issue.
To impact this mindset, he realized that the department
needed a process for getting employees involved and for
giving them not only a voice but also decision making
power. He chose as the first key project the 192 general
orders—orders that had been developed by various top
leaders over the years. These orders provide the ‘‘rules’’
for officer conduct. The various multi-page general orders
had not been reviewed for many years, and there were a
number of inconsistencies in the orders. The Chief formed
a committee of people from various levels of the organi-
zation (mostly sergeants and officers) to review the docu-
ments. This high involvement strategy was met with
resistance from the members of his own top level command
staff. The committee was charged with reducing the
excessive number of general orders to a more value-based

set of policies. The committee’s recommendations to
reduce the number of general orders were agreed to and
fully implemented without any changes by top manage-
ment—this was an important step to say that there was a
new way of doing things—teams of empowered individuals
could succeed in changing the department without top
management micromanaging the process—an important
precursor to the larger community policing change that was
coming.
Commitment
The next step was to develop a new vision for the
department. It was important to the Chief that the new
vision be developed by multiple members from throughout
the department to broaden commitment. Prior to working
on a new vision, we suggested the need to complete a
facilitated assessment process to discuss what measurable
outcomes police personnel could see by moving to com-
munity policing as well as the challenges that would need

to be addressed. Perhaps more importantly, the process
would begin the push to expand the time horizons of police
personnel. Police personnel are very focused on the current
day to day realities. A capacity needed to be built where
police personnel would expand their time horizons to better
prepare them for full scale planning that would be needed
later in the change effort.
The facilitated assessment was a 4 hours meeting with
14 department members (the Chief, Deputy Chief, two
lieutenants, four sergeants, five officers and one non-sworn
employee). These individuals had attended a basic course
on community policing principles. Participants were asked
to identify future indicators that would demonstrate that a
move to community policing was successful. Then, each
individual was asked to provide an image of what ‘‘vic-
tory’’ would look like in two to three years. For example,
one officer stated a desire for ‘‘a majority of the citizens
will know the names of the officers assigned to their area’’.

The participants were also asked to record what they
thought were organizational drivers and barriers for the
change. This information was used to identify the impor-
tant things that needed to be done to achieve the victory.
They were asked ‘‘Considering the assets and obstacles,
what does your department need to do to achieve the
victory?’’ An informal brainstorming discussion ensued,
followed by attempts to categorize the information into
manageable pieces to drive action such as the need to
establish a planning process that identified the change
goals.
The facilitated assessment helped the organization begin
to visualize a new future. There was dialog not only of
what a future could be but also the challenges of trying to
make change happen. Some individuals were also begin-
ning to appreciate the longer term nature of this proposed
change effort––it was not just about visioning and it was
not something that the command and control structure was

going to decide quickly and dictate to them. The organi-
zation was in a better position, now, to work together on a
new vision for the department.
The leadership team (the Chief and his command staff)
put together a visioning team of 19 individuals from all
ranks and functions. Almost all of the 19 had volunteered
from the team that had changed the general orders and/or
from those who attended the facilitated assessment. Others
were hand picked to ensure that all ranks and functions
were incorporated into the vision process. The team used
the data from the facilitated assessment to discuss the
future goals of the department. A number of three-hour
sessions eventually led to the identification of eight core
123
values and a vision and mission statement that was focused
on community policing. The vision statement read ‘‘The

JPD collaborates in a team effort, with community stake-
holders to prevent crime and solve community problems
for a safe, secure, and healthy environment.’’
Many participants reported enjoying the process and
appreciating having the opportunity to take part in deter-
mining the direction of the department. Some asked to be
part of any subsequent committee work. Other individuals
commented on being frustrated at times with how long the
process took. As one officer noted ‘‘I thought it was very
democratic...which added to the length of time it took.’’
Rather than seeing this frustration as a ‘‘bad sign,’’ the
leadership team saw this as a sign that mindsets about the
command and control structure and how decisions can be
made as well as the time horizons of police personnel
regarding what it takes to make transformational change
happen was changing.
Planning
By the beginning of 2000, there was sufficient energy and

commitment among a core group of police personnel to the
new vision to move to a planning phase. The key task was
to broaden that enthusiasm and guide the process of
developing a realistic plan. A major restraining force was
the attitude of many within the department. An officer
stated that community policing ‘‘is just kissing babies and
shaking hands and not really enforcing the law.’’ This
viewpoint has consequences. As noted by one sergeant ‘‘I
see first hand a lot of sergeants’ joke about community
policing. If they are joking about it you are not going to get
buy-in.’’ Thus, some police personnel were seeing this
effort as an attempt to change where officers spend their
time rather than seeing this as a transformational change
effort throughout the organization.
The experiences with the general orders and the
visioning process convinced the top leadership and many
of the participants that the best way to plan for change was
to do it with high involvement of many police personnel.

The leadership team asked for volunteers and hand picked
some individuals to ensure that there was divergence on the
team with regard to those who were enthusiastic about
community policing and those who were not convinced in
order to begin to address that restraining force. Twenty-
four people (approximately 25% of the department) ended
up being included on the planning team.
The planning team met for about one year. The team
was divided into three groups to examine: (a) the move to a
team based concept of policing where officers would be
assigned to geographic areas, (b) the development of a plan
for increasing partnerships, and (c) the creation of a more
proactive, problem solving approach. Each group chose
one person to lead the group—with the boundary being that
no lieutenant or above could be a group leader (to reinforce
the desire to make this more of a ground up process). The
group investigating team based policing benchmarked
other police agencies. The problem solving group attended

training on problem solving approaches. The partnership
group identified current partnerships, interviewed com-
munity members about the quality of those partnerships,
and discussed how to increase partnerships. Many officers
commented that the process allowed them to determine
what community policing was about and how it could lead
to improvement in the delivery of police services. As one
sergeant said ‘‘we were in a process where we were
actually defining how the things were going to be ... these
things were actually going to go into effect.’’
Prior to starting the planning process, the capacity for
change was being enhanced through efforts to introduce
systems thinking into the organization. Police personnel
needed to see the change as part of a large scale effort to
transform the agency and not as a narrow focus on officer
behavior. Top leaders in the department attended two dif-
ferent multi-day workshops on organizational transforma-
tion that emphasized the concepts of systems thinking and

the issues of the apparent and below the surface organi-
zation. The Chief was quite interested in his command staff
having a long-range view of change and the systems that
needed to be aligned to be consistent with the philosophy
behind the community policing approach. As noted by
Senge (1990) systems thinking is a discipline for seeing the
wholes and therefore seeing interrelationships and patterns
rather than viewing the world through static snapshots.
This notion of interconnectedness was continually rein-
forced by the Chief. As he noted ‘‘what one system does
affects all other systems, particularly internally to the
organization.’’
The second effort was to engage the planning team in a
discussion of systems thinking prior to beginning the
planning process. Rather than jumping into the charge gi-
ven to them by the Chief, at the initial meeting of this
group, the elements of systems thinking were presented in
relation to a ‘‘roadmap for change.’’ The roadmap was

developed by our action research team based on examining
successful change efforts in community policing. It in-
cluded five basic areas that must change for community
policing to be effective: (a) enhancing partnerships; (b)
re-engineering the internal operating systems; (c) restruc-
turing the organizational hierarchy; (d) better managing
human resources, and (e) adopting a problem-solving
approach. Across the five areas, the roadmap identified 22
organizational systems that needed to be aligned to be
consistent with the vision for community policing at the
JPD. The roadmap compared the traditional approach to
123
policing for each of these systems with the new approach
needed to be consistent with community policing. For
example, as seen in Table 1, traditional policing focuses on
individual officers as specialists within a tightly controlled

organizational hierarchy. A community policing perspec-
tive requires the officer to be a generalist, with realignment
of resources for geographical areas of responsibility and a
team work emphasis.
This roadmap was used to stimulate dialog around what
needed to be changed and what priority to give to the
various systems that needed to be aligned. It helped the
planning team to see that all systems are intrinsically
linked such that the change process had to be viewed as a
long term strategy for realignment. In addition, the facili-
tators emphasized the need to link across the three groups
(team based policing, partnerships, problem solving) dur-
ing the planning process. The group leaders began to meet
to discuss issues that cut across the three teams. Police
personnel begin to seen the planning as not just about an
‘‘event’’ or program that had a specific ‘‘clock-time’’
(Crossan et al., 2005) but as a planning process on trans-
formational change. As one administrative staff member

said ‘‘you actually had to train your mind to think differ-
ently.’’ A command staff member stated that ‘‘it is
becoming clearer that there are a lot of ‘parts’ that go into
the ‘whole’...Each part has an impact on other parts so
change is a living concept constantly morphing requiring a
workforce that is flexible and adaptable as changes occur.’’
Bringing so many people into the planning team cer-
tainly posed some logistical and resource problems (e.g., it
depleted funds for overtime pay). Taking the time to focus
on systems thinking concepts and the roadmap for change
was done in face of the pressure to start working imme-
diately on the planning tasks. The three groups struggled at
the beginning—not knowing exactly what to do (in fact we
incorporated a just in time training on how to run group
meetings). Yet, the time investment and the high involve-
ment were seem by the Chief as worth it for its potential
dividends in the efforts to break down the command and
control mindset, expand time horizons, and develop more

systems thinking capability. As noted by one sergeant
‘‘This was kind of a new focus...partnering with everyone,
bringing in different people (patrol, detectives, and
administrative staff). Getting everyone’s input instead of
just saying this is what we are going to do.’’ Another
sergeant stressed that ‘‘they (the command staff) were a
part of the group; they were not the group ... there was no
rank in these meetings.’’
Table 1 A roadmap for systems change
Organizational structure
Explore Commit/plan Implement Monitor
Roles and
responsibilities
Blend specialist into overall patrol units.
Define those task areas requiring
specialization department wide and train
accordingly. Develop teams utilizing a
combination of specialists whenever

possible.
Redo job descriptions Identify key ‘‘generalist’’ roles and
evaluate
the number of personnel who participate in
this role
Review other best practices. Redefine relationships
across functions and
work groups
Track the efficiency of services/systems likely
to be affected by a more generalist role and
evaluate whether improvements are made as
a result of new roles
Reduce reporting lines Evaluate the amount of extra work that
is
avoided through generalist approach (fewer
call backs, fewer referrals, etc.)
Divisional
alignment
Geographic subdivisions developed, with

internal and external input for assignment
of personnel. Reporting lines tailored to
activity and geographic area of
accountability, rather than function.
Assign areas of geographic
responsibility for all
personnel
Evaluate departmental effectiveness in key
roles/geographical areas and note
improvements as well as areas of weakness
Review other best practices. Study feasibility of
organization for better
accountability
Identify key problems unique to each area and
track improvements over time (e.g. less
crime, fewer complaints, quality of life
issues)
Decentralize organization

into geographic areas as
appropriate
Assign cross functional
teams to areas
123
Implementation
Once the plan was developed, the key leadership challenge
was how to develop an implement strategy that did not
cause too much disruption to day to day operations. The
planning teams had given the leadership team a blueprint
for the change. As an officer stated ‘‘the work of the
planning team is somewhat of the nucleus or hub of how
this whole organizational change was to be implemented.’’
The leadership team could have taken this information and
mapped out the tasks to be completed, the timeframe for
implementing the change, and dictated the responsibilities

for making the change happen. It was now about four years
since the Chief had taken office. By having his leadership
team take over, this would have sped up the process of
making the change happen and thus become visible to
internal and external stakeholders.
Instead, the leadership team continued its focus on
building more capability in the organization around change
by having police personnel create the implementation
process. The Chief described it this way ‘‘I could lay this
out for everyone and hand it down but if I want it to stick
long-term, others needed to be involved’’. There was value
placed on empowering police to make it more likely that
the change would have staying power. Importantly, the city
manager backed the Chief on this point of not rushing into
the implementation of community policing.
An implementation team was formed to translate the
recommendations from the planning team into action.
Many of the 12 members of the implementation team

(across rank and function) had already participated on one
or more of the past committees; however, there were also
three new members. Anyone who wanted to participate was
given a chance to volunteer. A sergeant stated that ‘‘it is no
hidden secret––if you want to get anywhere you have to
know what is going on in the department. If you are not
volunteering for committees and putting in your time in
and an attempt to understand what is going on––it is pretty
hard to move along.’’
By now, police personnel were in the words of one
sergeant ‘‘becoming more comfortable providing their in-
put.’’ The effort placed into high involvement of people for
four years of exploring, planning, and implementing the
change was beginning to pay off. More people were
becoming used to this new way of working together as a
team––a critical component in the philosophy of commu-
nity policing. To build implementation team readiness to
take on this responsibility, the team’s first meeting was a

day-long retreat. During the retreat, team members
reviewed the recommendations from the various planning
teams, participated in exercises to sharpen their systems
thinking, and clarified the implementation team charge:
1. Finalize plans for a geographical team based policing
system.
2. Develop a staffing/scheduling plan for geographical,
team based policing.
3. Develop a system for communicating progress.
4. Create a three-year training plan to support the
implementation plan.
5. Align departmental systems (e.g., reporting system,
dispatch) to support the change.
6. Develop monitoring and evaluation criteria.
The implementation team prioritized the tasks that
needed to be completed. They divided themselves into
subteams to work on one of the key tasks. For example, a
restraining force that could affect the transition was the

lack of understanding by officers and sergeants of what to
do when the move to geographic based teams was imple-
mented. A goal of the transition was to build high perfor-
mance police teams (officers and sergeants) divided across
four geographic areas in the city. A key issue for the
implementation team was role clarification (e.g., what does
it mean to be on a team?). As one officer stated ‘‘Quite
frankly, I do not have a concept of how the individual
patrol officer is going to find the time to put the effort into
problem solving and building community partnerships and
still handle the calls for service.’’
The implementation team put energy into dialoging
about what the roles and responsibilities should be for
lieutenants, sergeants and officers. For example, one new
role expectation was the need to hold monthly team
meetings (with all members present across shifts) to discuss
issues in their geographic area and encourage officers to
increase their partnership activities. This was seen as

necessary to eliminate possible disconnects of officers
across shifts not knowing where to prioritize their time to
support each other’s actions. The implementation team
created action plans for preparing people for the move to
community policing. Training was developed on commu-
nity policing and problem solving. Teams were created and
placed on the street without any major disruption. Internal
and external stakeholders were kept informed about the
changes in the department. Attempts were being made to
align internal systems such as improving the dispatch ser-
vice. These efforts were all driven by police personnel
across the various functions and rank within the organi-
zation rather than through the command and control
structure. The change was now becoming a reality.
Monitoring and revising
The visible manifestations of community policing were
seen by all employees and the community starting in

123
February 2002 with the move to geographically-based
teams. Police personnel had a choice of what sector of the
city they wanted to be assigned. Approximately one year
after this move to teams, the department began to gather
data to understand the extent of the changes and to deter-
mine what more needed to be done to support the com-
munity policing initiative. Police personnel often see the
gathering of data as leading to a focus on individual per-
formance. A key change in mindset would be to begin the
process of seeing that data could be generated to monitor
and assess systems and how well they are working relevant
to the goals of the change effort and to learn from those
experiences to improve or better align those systems.
One of the hallmarks of the efforts of various planning
and implementation teams was the need to gather the
appropriate data in order to come up with viable and

credible strategies or options. This focus on learning before
action was a conscious effort to ingrain a more systems
rather than the prevalent individual oriented perspective to
data gathering and analysis. This building of capacity for
learning could now pay dividends during the monitoring
and revision phase. More individuals were comfortable
with the need to be more disciplined in terms of data col-
lection and analysis so as to draw out reasonable solutions
to problems. Everyone in the department had been trained
in problem solving approaches. From a systems perspec-
tive, mindsets were changing that data could be produc-
tively gathered to assess system issues rather than being
gathered solely to assign blame to individuals (a below the
surface assumption).
For example, after one year it became clear that certain
geographical areas were receiving a disproportional num-
ber of calls for service. Calls for service were analyzed by a
team of police personnel rather than the command and

control system and an adjustment to the number of indi-
viduals in each team was made as well as redrawing the
geographical lines to make the work load more equitable.
This showed that the department was responsive to the
challenges that had arisen with this transition and that the
police personnel who were closest to the problem were the
ones to gather the right data about system alignment in
order to drive action.
The leadership was also concerned about the level of
problem solving going on in the field. This led to efforts to
improve the accessibility and accuracy of crime data so
that information could be in the hands of the police per-
sonnel in a timelier manner. To keep the momentum going,
a training committee and a technology committee were
formed to develop a three year training plan and to deter-
mine what was needed to improve departmental data
mining and crime mapping. It became apparent, though,
that there was a lack of documentation of efforts since the

implementation. As noted by the Chief ‘‘partnerships—we
are not doing a very good job tracking what we are doing
externally.’’ This made it difficult to learn from past efforts
or to pinpoint where efforts needed to be focused to keep
the momentum of change going.
The leadership focused much attention during the
monitoring and revising phase to addressing the issue of
documenting what was happening in the community. The
focus was not on individual performance but on how the
various ‘‘systems’’ were performing. In addition, it was
hoped that showing that the department was interested in
learning about itself would have a positive impact on
individuals not completely sold on the change effort.
A ‘‘learning team’’ was created (see Roth & Kleiner,
2000 for an example of a learning history approach to
documenting and facilitating organizational change) that
was made up of six members of the department—the chief,
deputy chief, lieutenant, sergeant, an officer, and a non-

sworn administrative staff person. The purpose of the
learning team was to collect data on the change effort and
to review past committee recommendations to determine
whether or not the recommendations had been acted upon.
This meant going back to the recommendations from all of
the committees. A worksheet was used to document the
tasks outlined in each of the committee charges, the spe-
cific recommendations offered to address each task, the
decisions made within the department relevant to those
recommendations, the current progress on implementing
the recommendation, evidence that the recommendation
was followed, and next steps for the recommendation (e.g.,
how high a priority to making sure a recommendation is
enacted). Table 2 presents one of the completed work-
sheets.
The process took over 9 months and many two- to three-
hour meetings to examine the over 120 recommendations
that had been made by the various committees and sub-

groups. The results indicated a large majority (over 80%)
of the recommendations had been enacted in some form
(the learning team had to produce evidence that recom-
mendation had actually been enacted to be placed into that
category). As one member of the team concluded from this
exercise ‘‘successes tend to get lost in the change process
as we continue to press forward making it difficult to cel-
ebrate wins and to recognize how far the department has
actually come.’’ A few recommendations were not enacted
and the learning team came to a consensus that the rec-
ommendation was no longer feasible or was no longer
needed to be done. Most of the recommendations that
needed further work fit into three major categories: incor-
porating new technology, the evaluation of performance of
police personnel, and the need to expand police-community
partnerships. Given the technology team was already in
progress, the learning team concluded that two new teams
were needed to address gaps in the change process. One

123
officer echoed this concern and said ‘‘there is still confu-
sion about the evaluation process...and what you need to do
so you don’t get into trouble for bad performance’’ The
learning team also shared with the members of the
department their findings of what had been done and what
still needed to be done to ensure that police personnel could
recognize progress.
A key restraining force identified through interviews
with police personnel was variance in teams relevant to
enacting community policing. Some teams were seen as
moving quite quickly into working with community
groups and identifying community problems. Officers
were using email to communicate with other officers and
community members, some sergeants were proactively
asking for crime data, and some sergeants were not

assigning officers to calls for service if they had neigh-
borhood issues to address. As one officer stated ‘‘without
a doubt, more of my hopes about community policing has
been realized. It has been successful change to this point.
Officers’ styles of policing have changed and I think that
is for the better.’’ Other teams were not taking as much
responsibility for engaging the community. As noted by
one member of the command staff ‘‘some sergeants are
not modeling good community policing or are performing
typical community policing duties with no good reason
such as forming neighborhood watches because that is
what you are supposed to do rather than being committed
to the process.’’ Concerns were raised that some officers
were not talking to citizen about non-crime issues, some
sergeants were not following through on problem solving
plans, some officers were not requesting time to work on
neighborhood issues, and some teams were not meeting
regularly to review progress and identify next steps. As

one sergeant said ‘‘getting everyone on board to the
desired level that is acceptable hasn’t been spelled out
yet. The majority of people in our department are not
even near that level.’’
Rather than ignoring this divergence or having the
command structure push harder on sergeants to comply, the
leadership team asked us to conduct in-depth interviews
with each sergeant to learn more about this divergence. The
data from the interviews were compiled by our action re-
search team and given to the sergeants for review. All
sergeants then met for a series of two-hour meetings to
discuss the ‘‘data,’’ come to a consensus of what the data
was telling them about themselves (as a group of sergeants)
and to then move to actions that would reduce the diver-
gence across sergeants. The group decided to focus atten-
tion to the problem solving process as there was much
divergence across sergeants on how this process was being
enacted. After this series of meetings, a subgroup of ser-

geants was assigned to examine the current system around
problem solving and to come back with a more simplified
system that all sergeants could use in a more consistent
fashion. The group met and came back with recommen-
dations for changes to the procedures to follow and the
complete team of sergeants agreed to the recommenda-
tions.
Table 2 Example of monitoring/revising worksheet for
implementation team recommendations
Tasks Recommendations Decisions Current progress
0 = none;
1 = some;
2 = much;
3 = completed
Documentation/
evidence that work
on recommendation
has occurred
Next steps

0 = not relevant
1 = low priority
2 = moderate
3 = high priority
Develop monitoring
and evaluation
criteria and
strategies
Identify what
information is
needed from the
community as
baseline
information
Current collected
information is
sufficient for baseline
data to drive

problem-solving
efforts.
3 Technology
Committee charge
and
recommendations
1 = lots of baseline data
is currently present;
see Technology
Committee
recommendations
Finalize plans for
geographical team
based policing
system
Identify referral
agencies and how
to partner with

these agencies
Use list compiled for
Field Training Officer
(FTO) training. Add
to list as needed.
2 = List exists in
FTO manual,
currently being
turned into a book
for officers to use
FTO manual 2 = New book needs to
be distributed soon
Develop and
implement a
system for
communicating
progress toward
goal of

geographically
based system
Educate public/
officers/
government
agencies through
communication
Through press releases
and public
presentations as well
as at beginning of
shifts to patrol
officers.
1 = press releases
posted on website;
presentations
given
Website 3 = need to do a better

job of tracking
presentations (who,
what, where); this
needs to be
communicated and
stressed
123
The movement toward institutionalization
Institutionalization is a dynamic process that signals that a
change effort has taken root. (French & Bell, 1999). The
tangible aspects that people might ‘‘see’’ are the changes in
procedures, policies and various organizational systems
that were changed. Changes in the below the surface
organization in terms of beliefs and attitudes are such that
it becomes more and more difficult for people within the
organization to recall ‘‘how things used to work around

here.’’
Community policing entails an expansion of the roles
and responsibilities of police. Police officers are not only
‘‘crime fighters’’ but also problem solvers, community
organizers, planners, and mediators (Mastrofski, Willis, &
Snipes, 2002; Rosenbaum, 1994). It has now been seven
years since the decision was made to become a community
policing department. It took four years to move from the
exploration phase to where police and citizens could see a
visible change in the department with the move to geo-
graphically based police teams. The next sections discuss
the level of success at institutionalizing the change effort,
next steps that are being taken to further move the change
effort forward and the lessons learned from this case.
Level of success
Has the change been successful? As with any complex
organizational change, success is not clear cut. Those who
champion the change point to objective data to support

their claim of success. Before the community policing
initiative, the department was experiencing 20 employee
grievances per year and in 2004 experienced two griev-
ances. There has also been a 70% decrease in formal citi-
zen complaints against officers from the pre 1998 levels.
Clearly, while the results are encouraging, this is not just a
function of the move to community policing as the Chief
put restoring discipline as a key component during the
exploration phases. Yet, from the perspective of building
capacity, this emphasis of getting control over the
grievance rates and citizen complaints was important for
providing more ‘‘breathing’’ room by showing key stake-
holders that progress was being made. Part I crime is at the
lowest in 30 years with a 30% decrease in the last three
years. Yet, this decrease in crime is consistent with trends
throughout the country therefore making it difficult to draw
clear conclusions about the impact of the change program
in Jackson.

While the objective data is not adequate to show the
impact of the change effort, an examination of police
records and the interviews with key stakeholder groups
indicate that change has occurred. For example, there are
clearly more partnerships among officers and schools,
governmental agencies, and community groups than before
the change initiative. As noted by a pastor ‘‘I see the
neighborhood thing as a good thing—trying to bridge the
many differences that there can be among people in
neighborhoods. They have increased their participation
with our neighborhood association...it seems to be an ever
increasing participation.’’ A community member described
the change this way—‘‘it is more hands on—they are
actually out there. They’re involved with us—not just an
entity...they are actually becoming part of the commu-
nity.’’ In addition, partnerships developed between police
and stakeholder groups such as landlords and local busi-
nesses that have led to successful interventions such as

ridding housing units of drugs, crime, and disorderly con-
duct. There is much more of an emphasis on using data
such as calls for service to direct police efforts to repeat
offenders or problem issues. There is now a ‘‘top 10’’
monthly sergeant meetings in which key areas of concern
are identified and strategies discussed. Citizen letters and
emails to the department have extolled the efforts of
individual officers and teams of officers that have helped
address a community issue. As noted by one sergeant
‘‘comments from the community continue to pour in
thanking officers for their efforts in solving crime, giving
presentations, and working towards an all around suc-
cessful relationship. These comments show change is
occurring.’’ The increased enthusiasm for police efforts in
some sections of the city has had an impact. Success stories
have led to firm support from the city manager and the city
council for the move to community policing. While budget
cuts have been made in other departments in the city, the

police budget has remained untouched.
Perceptual data from an organizational survey given in
1999 and again in 2003 point to some success in changing
attitudes among police personnel (Plamondon & Ford,
1999; Ford & Davis, 2003). For 10 of the 18 dimensions on
the survey (see Table 3), police personnel (officer and
sergeants) ratings have become more favorable with in-
creased ratings on dimensions relevant to the strategic
change initiative itself (top management support, align-
ment of systems, management of the change process) and
key process issues (rewards, support, partnerships, problem
solving, empowerment, community ownership, and com-
munity orientation of police personnel) For example, 2003
ratings by police personnel regarding top management
support (‘‘Top management displays a commitment to
community policing ideals), problem solving (‘‘Officers
are taking preventative actions by focus on root causes of
crime’’), and partnerships (‘‘Officers regularly form part-

nerships with non police agencies’’) were significantly
higher than the responses in 1999. Outcome variables such
as perceptions of the effectiveness of the department,
123
individual job satisfaction, and commitment to the orga-
nization remained relatively high and did not change.
Interestingly, there were no significant changes for police
personnel on the dimension of commitment to community
policing (e.g., ‘‘I am committed to the idea of community
oriented policing’’), perceptions of first line supervision
support for community policing, or for the dimension of
police viewpoint of whether community members are
willing to work hard to improve their neighborhoods.
The survey results show some reasons for celebration as
well as cause for concerns. Clearly, the move to institu-
tionalization does not mean that everyone within the

organization is at the same level of understanding of
community policing or acts in accordance to its principles.
As one member of the command staff reflecting on the
change process stated: ‘‘we are close but have not yet
achieved what the vision of the end product will be. My
perception of the process has changesd since the start. I no
longer see this as a final product that we achieve through
implementation, I see it as a constantly improving product
that we continually modify and adjust to make us
better....We are more effective and efficient deparment but
we are not done.’’
There is also some indication of burnout issues. As
noted by a learning team member ‘‘changing a culture is a
huge task that is never ending.’’ While the benefits of
committee work is acknowledged after years of committee
work and high involvement, others are getting tired. One
officer stated the problems as ‘‘we committee-ed ourselves
to death I think. People started getting tired of all the

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