Chapter 11: Challenges for the future Intelligence-Led Policing (2nd Edition) Jerry H. Ratcliffe © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe ACPO marketing study Young people and working adults lower on the socio-economic spectrum favoured proactive, targeted, solution-oriented policing. Midlife adults in the middle to higher socio-economic groups, older men, and ethnic groups naturally identified with visible patrolling; however, they could be readily convinced through logical argument that proactive and targeted activities are the most effective and beneficial. It was only older women and the retired that retained a connection with visible patrolling as a symbol of reassurance, relating visible patrolling to perceptions of safety. © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe Challenges for using covert information How do we know that informants are telling the truth? How do we place covert information into a wider context of criminality, especially when we may not have confidential sources in other areas? How do we manage the wider strategic responsibilities and avoid degenerating into an informant-led policing model? © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe Wood Royal Commission Wide-ranging investigation of the New South Wales Police Force Arthur ‘Neddy’ Smith, Sydney heroin dealer and underworld figure Detective Sergeant Roger Rogerson, eventually convicted of perverting the course of justice and lying to a Police Integrity Commission inquiry Also suspected of involvement in the shooting of a fellow police officer, Detective Mick Drury © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe Principle of proportionality The principle of proportionality involves ‘balancing the seriousness of the intrusion into the privacy of the subject of the operation (or any other person who may be affected) against the need for the activity in investigative and operational terms’ (UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000). Tactics that the public may deem acceptable for organised crime families may not be viewed as appropriate when used to target the shoplifter on the next street. © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe Surveillance creep? Marx (1988) argues that we have seen an increasing acceptance of intrusive surveillance in the name of crime control. The principle of proportionality is therefore a balance of the apposite tactics applied to the appropriate offenders and should be a tenet of intelligence-led policing. © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe 28CFR23 Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 The purpose of 28CFR23 is to ensure that criminal intelligence systems are operated and maintained so that individual privacy and rights are not violated unless in accordance with the law. All information must be reviewed at a minimum of every five years, and any individual, business or group named in a criminal intelligence information system must be suspected of criminal activity. © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe UK Data Protection Act 1998 The Data Protection Act 1998 applies eight principles to the retention .

1. Chapter 11:
Challenges for the future
Intelligence-Led Policing (2nd Edition)
Jerry H. Ratcliffe
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
ACPO marketing study
Young people and working adults lower on the socio-economic
spectrum favoured proactive, targeted, solution-oriented
policing.
Midlife adults in the middle to higher socio-economic groups,
older men, and ethnic groups naturally identified with visible
patrolling; however, they could be readily convinced through
logical argument that proactive and targeted activities are the
most effective and beneficial.
It was only older women and the retired that retained a
connection with visible patrolling as a symbol of reassurance,
relating visible patrolling to perceptions of safety.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Challenges for using covert information
How do we know that informants are telling the truth?
How do we place covert information into a wider context of
criminality, especially when we may not have confidential
sources in other areas?
How do we manage the wider strategic responsibilities and
avoid degenerating into an informant-led policing model?
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe

2. Wood Royal Commission
Wide-ranging investigation of the New South Wales Police
Force
Arthur ‘Neddy’ Smith, Sydney heroin dealer and underworld
figure
Detective Sergeant Roger Rogerson, eventually convicted of
perverting the course of justice and lying to a Police Integrity
Commission inquiry
Also suspected of involvement in the shooting of a fellow
police officer, Detective Mick Drury
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality involves ‘balancing the
seriousness of the intrusion into the privacy of the subject of
the operation (or any other person who may be affected) against
the need for the activity in investigative and operational terms’
(UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000).
Tactics that the public may deem acceptable for organised crime
families may not be viewed as appropriate when used to target
the shoplifter on the next street.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Surveillance creep?
Marx (1988) argues that we have seen an increasing acceptance
of intrusive surveillance in the name of crime control.
The principle of proportionality is therefore a balance of the
apposite tactics applied to the appropriate offenders and should
be a tenet of intelligence-led policing.

3. © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
28CFR23
Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23
The purpose of 28CFR23 is to ensure that criminal intelligence
systems are operated and maintained so that individual privacy
and rights are not violated unless in accordance with the law.
All information must be reviewed at a minimum of every five
years, and any individual, business or group named in a
criminal intelligence information system must be suspected of
criminal activity.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
UK Data Protection Act 1998
The Data Protection Act 1998 applies eight principles to the
retention of personal information. The information must:
Be fairly and lawfully processed.
Be processed for limited purposes and not in any manner
incompatible with those purposes.
Be adequate, relevant and not excessive.
Be accurate and where necessary, up to date.
Not be kept for longer than is necessary.
Be processed in accordance with individual rights.
Be stored securely.
Not be transferred to countries outside the EU without adequate
protection.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Human rights and police surveillance
Is a minor and localised infringement of perceived liberties an
acceptable trade-off and tolerable if it creates a safer
environment and (through a diffusion of benefits) extends the

4. social benefits to surrounding areas?
Weatherburn points out, ‘If police are to create a credible threat
of apprehension for carrying a prohibited weapon they are
bound to conduct searches of a large number of people who, it
will turn out, are not in possession of a weapon’ (Weatherburn
2004: 98).
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
The future policing environment
In 2005 a UK government report predicted that the future
policing environment would be characterised by
Widespread enterprising organised criminality, proliferating
international terrorism and domestic extremism;
A premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of capacity;
and
An increasingly risk-concerned public and intrusive media.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Four P framework for prevention
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Emerging national security areas
Emerging areas of risk include
Corrections intelligence and the growth of gangs in prisons;
The environment; and
Biosecurity.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe

5. Training issues
A third of large police departments in the US do not offer GIS
or crime-mapping training, and about half of the smaller
departments (with less than 100 sworn officers) do not offer any
crime-analysis training.
‘ILP richly integrates existing strategies and technologies into a
coherent “game-plan” approach in allocating resources
efficiently. Currently, without a national strategy, or a place
where police executives can learn how to implement ILP, it is
sitting on the shelf unused’ (Bratton 2007: 7–8).
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Setting of crime-control priorities
Weatherburn (2004) suggests that criteria for setting of crime-
control priorities include
The level of public concern;
The prevalence of a particular crime;
Attention to crime types that are becoming more prevalent;
The level of harm caused by a problem to individuals or society;
and
The potential harm of a problem if left unchecked.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
10 yardsticks for intelligence-led policing
There is a supportive and informed command structure.
Intelligence-led policing is the heart of an organisation-wide
approach.
Crime analysis and criminal intelligence functions are
integrated.
The focus is on crime hot spots, repeat victims, prolific
offenders and criminal groups.
Analytical and executive training is available.

6. © 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
10 yardsticks for intelligence-led policing
Both tactical and strategic tasking meetings take place.
Much routine investigation is screened out.
Data are sufficiently complete, reliable and available to support
quality products that influence decision-making.
Management structures exist to action intelligence products.
There is appropriate use of prevention, disruption and
enforcement.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
Summary
Making the shift to intelligence-led policing requires
organisational and cultural changes that some in policing will
resist.
Both police executives and analysts will have to demonstrate
leadership, ownership and understanding of the tenets of
intelligence-led policing for it to succeed.
© 2016 Jerry H. Ratcliffe
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Investigative Intelligence- Chapter 9 Lecture Notes
EVALUATION CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

7. •
Evaluation of attempts to control crime is generally
forgotten in the rush to address the next big issue, but is
essential if practitioners are to learn what works, and what
doesn’t to reduce crime.
a. What are we evaluating?
•
This is often the most difficult point for practitioners to
grasp. Intelligence‐led policing is a business model and as such
can be largely successful when analysts interpret the criminal
environment effectively, and use that intelligence to influence
decision‐makers. If decision‐makers then choose an appropriate
crime reduction strategy, but officers in the field fail to
implement it correctly, does this mean that the business model
of intelligence‐led policing fails?
b. Types of evaluations
• Outcome evaluations
tell you whether a crime reduction initiative worked or
not. If not, a process evaluation
can often tell you why.
c. Operation Vendas and Operation Safe Streets
•
The process evaluation of Operation Vendas is
immensely useful because it helps to show that the strategy may
still be viable, but the implementation was flawed.
•
The Safe Streets evaluation by Lawton et al is
quantitatively strong, but the more‐process evaluation type

8. writing of Giannetti helps to understand the actual street
implementation of the policy across the whole city. Both
evaluations work in tandem to provide a fuller picture of the
operation.
d. Evaluation skills
•
Of all the analytical skills required for analysis, spatial
statistics and crime mapping may be the most important for
police analysts.
•
Spatial skills will have address perennial questions that
come up about displacement of crime, and the impact of crime
around criminogenic facilities such as bars and nightclubs.
•
The weighted displacement quotient helps address many
of these questions.
e. Pure evaluations and realistic evaluations
•
Both scientific and scientific realist approached have
merit in understanding the outcome of attempts to reduce crime
and to better organize the flow of information and criminal
intelligence around a police department.
•
These approaches to evaluation are not mutually
exclusive.

9. f. Case study: Operation Anchorage
•
A degree of latitude is required to accept a fixed value
for the societal impact of a residential or non‐residential
burglary. Obviously each burglary is different in terms of the
impact and cost of the crime, but the attempt by staff at the
Australian Institute of Criminology to place a value based on
aggregate impacts is still valuable.
•
per burglary = US $2,240
•
per residential burglary = US $1,800
•
per non‐residential burglary = US $4,200
•
during Anchorage = US $1.17m
•
benefit after Anchorage = US $5.5m
MEASURING SUCCESS IN DIFFERENT WAYS
a. The cost‐benefit of surveillance and confidential informants
•
The cost of informant handling is disputed, and centers
along whether more abstract societal costs (impact on police
legitimacy, for example) can be incorporated into a cost
evaluation. Furthermore, the true costs of training officers,

10. meeting time and so on are rarely factored into a cost estimate.
b. Measuring disruption
•
Disruption is poorly defined and loosely applied.
•
Some agencies take considerable liberties in how they
apply disruption as a measure of their success. Others under
value the importance of their activities.
•
The Disruption Attributes Tool is relatively new, and
further details will becoming in the second edition of the book
Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence.
c. Measuring success in changing business practice
•
Hybrid governance is a relatively new term, but is a
good description of where security governance is going.
•
In New Zealand, I found that assessing each component
of the three‐i model was a good way to examine the health of
intelligence processes in police departments.
d. Measuring success in performance indicators
•
Generally, the approach is often be careful what you
wish for. By setting performance indicators, police executives
can often drive commanders in ways that they never intended.

11. This is especially the case with Compstat driving short‐term
thinking about long‐term crime problems.