Thank you for reading.
Our “Quantum Resistant Cryptography” , “Quantum Resistant Blockchain” and “Multivariable n(n≧2) Blockchain“ are can help your business.
We are now looking for a licensing partner who can innovate with this technology. We believe that your product and our technology are very compatible.
Details of our invention can be found on our website below.
https://meteora-system.com/
We would appreciate it if you could discuss whether our technology would be useful for your product.
I'm really looking forward to your reply.
QSM Chap 10 Service Culture in Tourism and Hospitality Industry.pptx
Our invention “Quantum Resistant Cryptography”
1. December 2020
To all industries
Quantum-resistant blockchain
Potential of industrial innovation
Looking back, Japan had many world-class inventions such as the Walkman and iMode.
Unfortunately, however, it is now a country behind iPhone, Android and Huawei. Please take
advantage of the fact that I, as a Japanese, have secured a number of patents and copyrights
that support the quantum-resistant blockchains and its mathematical basis.
[Developer biography]
Eiji Watanabe
After graduating from the Department of Electronic Engineering, Tokyo Denki University in
1964, he joined JEOL Ltd. After that, he was enrolled in Fujimic Inc.(Think Tank) until 1972.
Established Meteora-System Co., Ltd. in 1979, and formed a capital tie-up with Amada Co.,
Ltd. in July 1982 (the capital tie-up was dissolved in March 2005). Established Post Quantum
Bit Co., Ltd. in 2018 with a patent in-kind investment. As an inventor, I have established 1) A
technology that interrupts the establishment of a connection at the subnet TCP / IP layer when
any unknown backdoor (setup is past tense) is activated. 2) Technology that applies non-
commutative algorithms.
[Post-quantum cryptography and commutative algorithms]
On October 24, 2020, NIST entered Round 3 of the post-quantum cryptography standardization
process and announced the finalists. ☞ https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-
cryptography/round-3-submissions. The current public key scheme is commutative between
encryption process and decryption process (commutative algorithm). Techniques for making
this commutative relationship stable quantum-resistant are usually difficult to achieve (with one
exception). Therefore, NIST decided to divide the public key scheme into three schemes: (1)
Public-key encryption scheme, (2) Key establishment scheme, (3) Digital signature scheme, and
proceed with the standardization process for each of the three schemes (let it referred to as
NIST standard scheme). This means that the quantum-resistant of the commutative algorithm
is difficult to achieve.
[Expectations for non-commutative algorithms]
On the other hand, the title is a new blockchain that integrates the feature of key management
METEORA SYSTEM Co., Ltd
2. based on a non-commutative algorithm and the feature of the NIST standard scheme. The non-
commutative algorithm-based key management is a technology (Mathematical defense) that
specializes in information-theoretic defense rather than the current computational difficulty.
There is no need for standardization because the only attack that breaks the information-
theoretic defense is to roll the dice. This is a feature of non-commutative algorithms.
[The title = Key management by the non-commutative algorithm + NIST standard scheme]
For example, when we assume digital financial assets, I think we should seek perfect consumer
protection. The title solved this challenge by "Integrating Key Management with Non-
Commutative Algorithms and NIST Standard Schemes". This has made it possible to protect
user privacy, neutralize cyberattacks, and implement protocols to stop money laundering (illegal
remittances). I posted this logic in "Multivariable Digital Currency" on the same site.
[Image from the consumer's perspective]
A wallet is also required for digital financial assets. Your smartphone becomes a hard wallet. In
the quantum resistant blockchain, while smartphones become wallets, their "deposit accounts"
can also be managed. The management method is a device different from the wallet. For now,
we are assuming a "wristband".
Blockchain (guaranteeing anonymity) does not allow you to temporarily close your "deposit
account". This is why consumers cannot be protected. This is also the reason why money
laundering cannot be stopped. On the other hand, the private key can be erased by the non-
commutative algorithm. This establishes a line of defense that protects the private key from the
unspecified. This made it possible to remotely close the "deposit account". In fact, let's move
on to the non-commutative algorithm.
[In fact, when moving to the non-commutative algorithm ... even if confidential
information is leaked ...]
It is impossible to stop the information leakage itself. When the leaked information B is used,
the system does not distinguish it from the original information A. Whichever is used first gives
Your smartphone is your wallet and your wristband is your “deposit
account”: In an emergency such as when you lose your smartphone,
your wristband closes your "deposit account", i.e., no password.
”Euro watch”, ”Apple watch”, ”Libra watch”, and …
3. the same result: the original information A and the leaked information B are commutative, i.e.,
AB = BA. Now let's move on to non-commutative algorithms. It is assumed that the key
information A is leaked and the cyberattack obtains the information B. An attacker wants to
use information B on the net as a user of key information A. When it is the commutative
algorithm, AB = BA, so the attacker can also be a user (the attack succeeds). However, in non-
commutative algorithm, since AB ≠ BA, so the leaked information B is useless. For this reason,
the non-commutative algorithms provide a line of defense that protects consumers from various
crimes. Consider the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that implements this
line of defense. If you are an ambitious entrepreneur, you will feel that you have a once-in-a-
millennium opportunity.
Specific example of ICT that implements this defense line
1) When it comes to finance, it protects our privacy and financial assets. The same logic makes
it difficult to forge currency and protects the trust of currency issuance. And we will have a
protocol to stop money laundering (☞Multi-variable digital currencies), that is, the system can
closes the "deposit account" as well.
There are authentication technologies related to the above:
2) In the non-commutative algorithm, even if the secret ID1 is leaked from the user or the secret
ID2 is leaked from the service side, this implementation(ID1ID2≠ID2ID1) has a protocol to stop
the attacker's access. A set of wristband and smartphone is good for this device. This
authentication technology is not in the common sense of IT.
In the above context, you don't need a password anymore, it's time to say goodbye to your
password. It is safer not to have it. Cyberattacks are also annihilated. ICT will be simpler and
transform our lifestyle into a calm environment. This is logic, not business model.
[Potential of industrial innovation]
Quantum-resistant blockchain updates existing industries. It can also be applied to the financial
field as "multivariable digital currencies". There is no day when we do not see wallets and
banknotes (fiat money). Banknotes have the characteristics of being "visible," "not having a user
ID," "payable by hand," and "not limiting the freedom of people."
Digital currencies can be given the same characteristics as banknotes above. That is,
multivariable digital currencies are compatible with banknotes. Central banks should have no
objection to "compatibility with banknotes" (see Table 1).
4. Character visible not having a
user ID
payable by
hand
not limiting
the freedom
A chest of
deposit
Fiat money ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Gold ○ ○ Stop double
payment
○ ○
Multivariable
DC
✕ ○ Stop double
payment
○
Note 3
○
Bitcoin
Use password
✕ ○ Stop double
payment
○ ○
デジタル人民元
Use password
✕ ✕ ○ ✕
Note 2
✕
CBDC
Use password
✕ ✕ ○ ✕ ✕
Note 1
Table 1: The non-commutative algorithms can close "deposit accounts".
Note 1: Japanese people trust cash because banknotes guarantee anonymity. Since there is
anonymity, it is possible to make deposit in a chest of drawers. This is one of the reasons why
cashless payments are not widespread in Japan. The ongoing CBDC could also be a means of
collecting deposit in a chest of drawers, with interest rates. The possible CBDC, which
guarantees anonymity, will be widely loved for a long time. we would like to expect such CBDC
from the central bank.
Note 2: In general, it tends to be designed based on the logic of the issuer, but multivariable
digital currencies are in the position of consumer protection, to protect privacy and financial
assets, as well as to have protocols to block money laundering. The logic of the issuer is "mere
IT", but the logic of multivariable digital currencies is "Money". It is possible to operate that
"mere IT" can be used for daily shopping, but not for purchasing airline tickets.
Note 3: Gold, banknotes, and multivariable digital currencies do not limit human freedom. Also,
no password is required. This is the reason why "money" becomes current.
[Global innovation caused by Japan]
Looking back, Japan had many world-class inventions such as the Walkman and iMode.
Unfortunately, however, it is now a country behind iPhone, Android and Huawei. Please take
advantage of the fact that I, as a Japanese, have secured a number of patents and copyrights
that support the quantum-resistant blockchains. I am convinced that Japan has a chance to take
the lead again. If Japan does not take the leadership, "Euro watch", "Apple watch" and "Libra
6. Memo
1
Fatal problems of blockchain
Problem 1:
Since the public key does not have the quantum resistant, it is possible to calculate the private
key data. The computing power of quantum computers can steal the crypto assets of others and
turn them into their own.
Background:
Satoshi Nakamoto used an anonymous public key as a means of cutting off the flow of
information.
Problem 2:
Hackers can steal online private keys directly without using the huge computing power.
Background:
A password limits access, but cannot cut off the flow of online private key information.
Verification
Satoshi Nakamoto used a public key without an X.509 certificate to allow recipients to verify
the chain of ownership. Quoting (10. Privacy) from his treatise:
The figure below is the New Privacy Model quoted from "10. Privacy". The blue text and lines
in the figure are what I added. By making the public key anonymous, the flow of information
from "Identities" to "Public" is cut off at the boundary defense line (bitcoin address).
New Privacy Model
Identities Public
Transactions
by keeping public keys anonymous
Boundary defense line
10. Privacy
The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the
parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly
precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in
another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending
an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone.
Flow of information
Fig.1: Boundary Defense Line = Anonymous Public Key = Bitcoin Address
7. Memo
2
The “Identities” of the public key with a certificate are certificate authorities. The “Identities”
of public keys that do not have a certificate are “Private keys” data. This cryptographic scheme
allows the recipient to verify the signature and verify the ownership chain. ☞Fig.2
Fig.2: A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership.
However, there are two factors that break the ownership privacy of electronic coins. One is that
the public key is not quantum resistant: The other is that online “Private key” data is leaked.
This is the same as a bank account whose ownership cannot be guaranteed.
Verification of problem 1
Since the commutative algorithm type public key does not have the quantum resistant, Fig. 2
becomes Fig. 3.
Fig.3: Ownership privacy of electronic coins is broken.
Verification of problem 2
ID password is used when operating the blockchain. The password originally limits access to
information, and does not cut off information flow of the key data. The serious thing is that a
password flows information from the definition itself. As shown in the figure below:
Private keys Public
Transactions
Private keys Public
Transactions
No quantum-resistant
The Key data falls into the hands of "Public".
by keeping public keys anonymous
A payee can verify the chain of ownership.
8. Memo
3
Fig.4: Ownership privacy of electronic coins is broken.
Overlapping part of problems 1 & 2
Fig.3 and Fig.4 express that they are the same in that "the flow of information from" Private
keys "to" Public "is not interrupted." That is, Fig.3 = Fig.4. This means that even if the public
key is made quantum resistant, the Key data will still fall into the hands of "Public".
What is the real challenge?
If the only challenge is to make the public key quantum-resistant, expecting the NIST Digital
signature scheme will solve it: ☞ https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-3-
submissions. However, even if the public key is made quantum resistant, since Fig.3 = Fig.4, the
Key data will still fall into the hands of "Public". The challenge is password-independent key
management. Logically pursuing this requirement: while the system has no key data online or
offline, it can be used when signing. This is a mysterious scenario.
Non-commutative algorithm that implements key data extinction and
resurrection
Definition 1:
Do not require password registration; according to this definition, the flow of information from
the password is cut off.
Definition 2:
The private key data is "burned" as soon as it is generated.
Definition 3:
This implementation is also quantum resistant.
Private keys Public
Transactions
Information flows from the definition
of the password itself.
The Key data falls into the hands of "Public".
Online
9. Memo
4
Non-commutative algorithm formalism
There is a realistic algorithm that covers all three definitions: the non-commutative algorithm.
The format of this non-commutative algorithm is noted in Appendix 1. Here, the function Y ()
corresponding to the cryptographic function and the collision function Y-1
() corresponding to
the decryption function are cited and applied to Satoshi Nakamoto's New Privacy Model. As
follows.
Private key data is "burned".
Apply the function Y () to Private key to "burn" the key data. Since the key data no longer
exists anywhere, the information flow itself disappears. That is, there is no target for limiting
access.
Fig.5: There is no target to limit access.
After burning the Private key data, three code IDs appear in the output of the function Y ().
This will erase the key data from any memory, leaving only the signing task.
Fig.6: Privacy model with no key data online or offline
Refer to the three codes as multivariable IDs: ≡ {ID1, ID2, ID3}. The multivariable IDs initiate
the signing task.
Signing task Public
Transactions
Boundary
defense line 2
Private keys Public
Transactions
Burn key data
ID1
ID2
ID3
The flow of information disappears.
Online
Boundary
defense line 1
11. Memo
6
Y()≡<Y1(), Y2(), Y3()>
Three code IDs appear in this output (Fig.6). If this (n-1) IDs are leaked, it is difficult to calculate
the secret information from the IDs: because this calculation is a probability calculation, and the
probability of hitting the secret information is 1/2256
. This means that the dice are thrown 2256
times on the net, not inside the quantum computer.
On the other hand, there is a function named "collision function" as a function corresponding to
the decoding process K2(). This is also represented by the unique form Y-1
():
Y-1
()≡<Y1
-1
(), Y2
-1
(), Y3
-1
()>
Thus, there is no key equivalent to the public key. However, as a convenience instead of the public
key, even if (n-1) code IDs are leaked, the calculation of the collision function Y-1
() cannot be
deceived. The event of collision itself is supposed to be a brute force attack, so it cannot be deceived.
In this sense, the collision function Y-1
() corresponds to the public key. Similarly, the function Y ()
corresponds to the private key. This shows the existence and characteristics of non-commutative
algorithms.
There is a model that implements the functions Y () and Y-1 () on the server. In this case, it is a
Static function. When applied to the blockchain, the function Y () is used for One-time, while the
collision function Y-1
() has no limit on the number of times it can be used. Expressing K1K2 ≠K2K1
as K1K2 - K2K1=Δ, this is a form of quantum mechanics.
//
12. 1
Multivariable digital currencies
This article is the story of "an invention that prevents digital currencies from becoming money
laundering and terrorist financing."
In honor of the pioneer Satoshi Nakamoto....
Think deeply about bank accounts and banknotes. According to Japanese customs, a
"conditional withdrawal" is performed with two IDs, a passbook and password, or a bank card
and password. Here the two IDs are random variables: we will denote them by ID1 and ID2. It
is difficult to determine ID2.from ID1, and vice versa. So the two variables are independent. We
know "conditional withdrawals": if you enter ID1 and ID2 "in line" at an ATM, the banknote
will come out. The important thing is to "enter the two together".
Fig.1: Multivariable IDs n=2
If two events happen to meet accidentally, it becomes a "complex problem" of conditional
probability: However, ID1 and ID2 here are promised to be "two in one". Such a promise
(protocol) is called multivariable IDs n = 2.
The incident happens when the ID is stolen: it also happens when it gets lost. So if Alice
withdraws a lot of money, the bank may ask for a "confirmation of Alice's identity". This is the
third ID ≡ ID3. Now control the withdrawal by aligning the three. This is the multivariable
IDs n = 3.
Fig.2: Multivariable IDs n=3 that aligns three IDs
Here, let's confirm the definition of electronic coins designed by Satoshi Nakamoto (☞ This link
is on the Hypertext screen): “We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures.” (Cited
ID1
ID2
Conditional
withdrawal
Wad of bills
Consumer Alice
ID1
ID2
Wad of bills
Conditional
withdrawal
ID3 A confirmation of Alice's identity
Consumer Alice
13. 2
from 2 Transactions). Let's project this definition on Fig. 2: The light of the signature chain
shines on the "wad of bills". Then "conditional withdrawal" would be "conditional signing
procedure". The projection is as follows:
Fig.3: Conditional signature procedure
The signing process begins when all three IDs are complete: Conversely, if the IDs are not
complete, nothing starts. Such a conditional signing procedure is not described in Satoshi
Nakamoto's paper.
New definition of digital currency
There is no protocol that conditions "transfer of money" in the design of Satoshi Nakamoto (☞
This link is on the Hypertext screen). Introduce a new definition of digital currency: Conditionally
execute the following signatures:
Withdrawal = Remittance = Currency issuance
What are the conditions? As Fig. 3 shows, 1) ID1, ID2 and ID3 are each owned by Consumer,
Xchange, and a third party respectively: 2) Three parties (Consumer, Xchange, a third party)
agrees to sign the above process. There is cryptographic mathematics to verify this consent:
_Collision function that verifies the consent of the three parties_
The verification of consent of the three parties is divided into "no objection" / "with objection".
"There is an objection" is when any one of the multivariable IDs n = 3 is missing, or when any
two are missing. In this case, the key data for signing is not reproduced (the signing procedure
is interrupted). This interruption is fail-safe. Continue the following status:
Freeze remittance = Freeze money laundering assets = Stop issuing currency
Note that privacy is protected here and no one's "face" can be seen. This is an important
criterion for distinguishing between "money" design and "mere IT". Since "mere IT" requires
the registration of personal information, the authorities can see the "face" of the user. The
above is the prologue.
A chain of signature
ID1
ID2
Private key
[Balance sheet]
Conditional signing
procedure
ID3
Consumer
Alice
Xchange
A third party
14. 3
Ⅰ. Key management innovations
Multivariable digital currencies have a number of innovations: 1) The signing key exists as a
function, but is not implemented: 2) Cyberattacks are neutralized: 3) Money laundering and
normal money transfer are separated: 4) Instead of mining, there are digital currency issuers:
5) It is difficult to forge digital currency(Attacks on the issuer of currency from inside and
outside is not successful). Since there is only one technology base that supports these
innovations, I will introduce it.
1. Function to burn a private key_ remaining ashes_ multivariable digital IDs n = 3
Needless to say, the private key is a key for signing. Satoshi Nakamoto defined Bitcoin as a
signature chain (cited from 2 Transactions). The theme I am presenting now is not Bitcoin, but
multivariable digital currencies. Multivariable digital currencies are also signature chains like
Bitcoin, but they are signature chains based on the "conditional signature procedure" shown in
the prologue. This technology base is unique. First, the function Y () that burns Private key
data, what remains after burning is "ashes", and this concept is illustrated below.
The remaining ashes are multivariable digital IDs (ID1, ID2 and ID3). Ash has the following
relationship: ID1 ≠ ID2 ≠ ID3. This inequality means that it is difficult to calculate and
determine each other. There is also a vertical calculation as opposed to this horizontal
calculation. That is, even if I calculate the private key data from ID1 ≠ ID2 ≠ ID3, the answer
"This is it" is not returned.
The above function Y () is expressed in a unique form: Y()≡<Y1(), Y2(), Y3()>
2. Collision function
There is an inverse function of the function Y (): it is the "collision function Y-1
()". The function
Y-1
() restores the key data from the ashes. It is expressed as: Y-1
()≡<Y1
-1
(), Y2
-1
(), Y3
-1
()>
The illustration below shows the function that burns Private key data on the left and the
ID1 ≠ ID2 ≠ ID3
Y () to Burn key data
Private key
data
Y (), which burns Key data.
After inputting the key data in the function Y (), delete the key
data.
Multivariable digital IDs (ID1, ID2 and ID3) appear in the output
of the function Y ().
15. 4
function that restores key data from ashes on the right. The two functions relate to my patent.
Add these functions to Satoshi Nakamoto's paper, which is Blueprint for the multivariable
blockchain: (☞ This link is on the Hypertext screen)
Ⅱ. Compatibility with fiat money
1. Satoshi Nakamoto's New Privacy Model
Originally, the blockchain was designed so that there was no central authority. So money
laundering is possible. In this case, money laundering can be tracked but the "face" is not visible
One thing to note here is that money laundering can be tracked. ➡ It is possible to track the
transfer records of money, but the "face" is not visible. Satoshi Nakamoto (paper) named this
mechanism the New Privacy Model. Let's look at the illustration he drew.
New Privacy Model
The blue line in the above figure shows that the privacy drawn on the left side is protected and
all transactions on the right side are open to the Internet. Then, "Privacy is not interfered by
the government (power organization), but the remittance record is made public." Isn't fiat
money the same?
_New Privacy Model is compatible with fiat money_
Now, assuming a "digital currency?" that ignores the New Privacy Model, you'll find that it's
just "IT," not compatible with banknotes.
IT that requires the registration of personal information and passwords, this is not "money".
A "digital currency" that acts as "money" in a surveillance society or a country is able to deceive
the people with "mere IT." However, the currencies handled by Xchange move freely across
borders. What happens if other currencies compete with "multivariable digital currencies" here?
Private key
データ
ID1 ≠ ID2 ≠ ID3 ID1 ≠ ID2 ≠ ID3
<Y1(), Y2(), Y3()> <Y1
-1
(), Y2
-1
(), Y3
-1
()>
Private key
データ
Identities Transactions Public
16. 5
There is a case like this: Let's say you went to cover a new kind of "xxx coin" as a magazine
reporter. You asked the following question in the middle of the explanation: "What if the
smartphone is stolen?" ... "No, don't worry, look, you're safe because you have a password,
right?" the answer came back. You asked more questions: "That means the authorities know
the flow of money. It's also convenient for tax collection, right?". I would like to ask another
question: "Can passwords prevent cyberattacks?"
2. Current because it protects privacy:
At the beginning, "Dear Friend," I asked, "Why is fiat money just printed on paper current?"
The answer lies in the "New Privacy Model": "Fiat money is current because it protects privacy."
Bitcoin shares the same formula:
Bitcoin = New Privacy Model
So why did Bitcoin become a financial product and not a currency? There are two reasons. One
is that it does not have a mechanism to meet the demand for money. The other is below.
3. Anonymous variable and private variable
The New Privacy Model can be likened to an armored car: anyone can see the cargo, but not
who goes to whom. About this car Satoshi Nakamoto (paper) [10 Privacy] says: “The public
can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking
the transaction to anyone.”. Further on: “privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow
of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous.”.
Explain: The public key here doesn't have an X.509 certificate, ➡ I don't know who the public
key is, ➡ So I don't know who the Bitcoin address is, so it's an anonymous variable. There is
another one, secret variable: Private key. Since the number of variables is one each, it is
expressed as n = 1. Project these facts into the "money function M ()":
M (anonymous variable n=1, secret variable n=1) = New Privacy Model
This is a formula that privacy is protected if the secret variable is not leaked.
Initial public offering of Bitcoin company!
Service designers, however, design to register passwords somewhere. When a password works
with an anonymous or private variable, the variable becomes "visible."
Bitcoin ≠ New Privacy Model
This makes Bitcoin incompatible with banknotes. This incompatible Bitcoin is an initial public
offering of Bitcoin Co., Ltd., and is by no means a currency. In fact, Bitcoin today is found in
the portfolio.
17. 6
Ⅲ. Cryptocurrency freezing protocol against money laundering
1. Restrict the use of Bitcoin addresses _does not sacrifice privacy_
When the digital yuan makes a remittance, it is a conditional remittance: If the authorities like
Alice, make a money transfer: If the authorities do not like Alice, limit Alice's freedom and stop
the remittance: That is, the digital yuan(RMB) limits Alice's freedom. On the other hand,
multivariable digital currencies restrict the use of Bitcoin addresses rather than specific person
Alice. So don't sacrifice privacy. A conditional signature is required for this.
The New Privacy Model does not show a "face", but provides a mechanism to verify the flow
of remittances from the past to the present: Verify the ownership chain. However, until now,
there was no way to control this remittance flow even if it was known to be fraudulent. In other
words, we can see the fraudulent money transfer chain, but until now there was no way to
control it. But this time it's different:
Collision function to verify the consent of the three
Now suppose the reader wants to break the fraudulent money transfer chain at this moment.
However, at this stage, it is still undecided whether it is fraudulent or not. That wish is easily
fulfilled: Restricting the use of Bitcoin addresses in fraudulent chains: That's all.
Therefore, one of the multivariable IDs combined with the Bitcoin address is moved off from
online operation. In this way, the system interrupts the signing process. The protocol says: One
of the IDs n = 3 does not collect at the entrance to the "collision function" so the key data for
signature cannot be reproduced: ➡ Remittance is interrupted:
Suspension of remittance = Suspension of money laundering assets
The issue now emerges: how to associate the Bitcoin address with the multivariable IDs.
2. Link the Bitcoin address with the ID2 of the Xchange:
Normally, Alice keeps ID1 at hand, transfers the second ID2 to the Xchange, and transfers the
third ID3 to a third party. This is the "social implementation of multivariable IDs n = 3".
Combining a Bitcoin address with one of the multivariable digital IDs is easy: it can be done at
the hands of Alice. This is because both Bitcoin addresses and multivariable digital IDs are
based on Private key data. Since Alice is the only person who has the original material, Alice
can link the two: a third party cannot. The process is:
18. 7
[Public key <--------- Private key] <--- the original seed
| |
| |-----v-----|
v v v
[Coin address ID2 ID1
The direction of the arrows is easy to calculate: right-to-left arrows are used for signatures: top-
to-bottom arrows are used for verification of an ownership chain. Here, the number of
multivariable IDs is set to n = 2: The bitcoin address is written as Coin address.
[Public key <--------- Private key] <--- the original seed
| |
| |-----v-----|<--- IDs
v v v
[Coin address <-----> ID2 ID1
The address and ID2 are paired. | |
v v
Xchange Alice
Make a pair of ID2 and Coin address at Alice's hand. Deliver this pair to the Xchange: The
Xchange stores this pair in the DB. Here the Xchange does not know who the pair is: Alice's
privacy is thus maintained.
3. Money laundering freeze protocol.
Introducing a protocol that uses ID2,(one of the multivariable digital IDs) as a control variable:
The protocol moves ID2 off from online operation. This alone interrupts the remittance.
Now suppose a report comes to the Xchange that the Bitcoin address (Bob) and the Bitcoin
address (Oscar) may be dark side addresses: The judge is usually a third party with ID3. This
third party usually monitors money laundering. Alternatively, the Xchange may have determined
that the remittance flow is suspicious.
Conditional signatures, Public call and Failsafe, this set is a money laundering solution
When such a report came, the Xchange stopped the online operation of ID2 and made the
following public announcement on the net ... We stopped the operation of the coin address
(Bob) and the coin address (Oscar). If you have any objections to this, please contact me ...The
second variable ID2 will not return online without any contact in response to the call. ➡ Money
19. 8
laundering assets are automatically frozen (Fail-safe based on the nature of the blockchain).
The freeze protocol above is fail-safe based on the nature of the blockchain. If the intention of
money laundering responds to the "public call", the "face" of that intention will be revealed: If there
is no response, the "remittance procedure interruption" cannot be canceled. ➡ It can be said that
it is an automatic asset freeze. This protocol can be applied not only to money laundering, but
also to insider trading, market manipulation, and court asset conservation orders.
Basis for financial sanctions
The legality of the surveillance society is the basis for the financial sanctions imposed by the
digital yuan. My invention is not based on centralized power, but on the basis of public calls
and fail-safes for financial sanctions.
Ⅳ. CBDC matter, Conditional issuance of digital currencies, Fair price control
Conditional currency issuance _Solution different from mining_
1. Are you relieved if you have a password?
Banknotes are real: the process of picking, touching, and handing is real. No one wants to
register a password on banknotes. In comparison, cryptocurrencies are more airy: I don't have
"this" to say "this is mine". Can you protest when one day you are told, "It's an incident, your
crypto assets have disappeared!" So when you are asked to register a password, do you feel
relieved? But if anyone wants to steal, the password can be stolen.
Multivariable digital currencies do not require password registration. There is no object that
you want to protect with a password. The private key is required for signing, but its key data is
not implemented. Therefore, there is no reason to ask for password or biometric registration.
"It's an incident, your crypto assets have disappeared!", This can only be joked.
One day, Alice realizes she doesn't have a wallet: she may have misplaced it somewhere, or she
may have dropped it. When you drop your wallet, the bills usually don't come back. You might
think that multivariable digital currencies have the same fate as banknotes because the
multivariable does not have any password. That's right, it's the same as banknotes.
I think multivariable digital currencies should have the same fate as banknotes, but Alice wants
to protect all of her crypto assets. How about the following wristbands for such people?
20. 9
Alice realizes that she does not have a smartphone and immediately notifies the Xchange (or a
third party) with the second variable ID2. This variable ID2 has a CIM parameter, ➡ The
Xchange turns off the operation of variable ID2 from online ➡ The remittance procedure is
interrupted. The problem here is to notify the exchange (or a third party) immediately. how?
Since the backup device stores the multivariable digital IDs, urgent messages fly from here to
the Xchange via the nearest base: the message has variable ID2 and a CIM parameter. Imagine
a backup device: a wristband comes out.
For wealthy Alice
2. Privacy-to-privacy transfer chain
Multivariable Digital Currency (MDC), Bitcoin, Digital RMB were projected onto the money
function M () and rated: ☞ Digital currency rating (☞ This link is on the Hypertext screen). The
functional form of multivariable digital currency is as follows:
MDC = M (anonymous variable n=1, multivariable IDs n=3, forgery probability=1/2256
)
There is an anonymous variable n = 1 here: there is no secret variable n = 1. Therefore, no Key
data is leaked: Multivariable digital currencies chain from privacy to privacy. This is different
from IT, which sacrifices privacy. It is also different from "xx coins" and digital yuan, which
sacrifice privacy for convenience. The figure below shows time progressing from left to right:
Fig.4: Privacy-to-privacy transfer chain
How to form a chain is described in Satoshi Nakamoto (paper) [3. Timestamp Server].
3. Three party-consent verification, "trust of money" instead of mining
Forming a chain,
Privacy
Backup of IDs
Privacy
Backup of IDs
"Wristband" and smartphone make up Alice’s wallet. The
device has only a transmission function. The Xchange has a
procedure to cancel the remittance interruption.
21. 10
Overview
Normally, when consumer Alice registers with a Xchange, Alice has ID1, while transferring the
second ID2 to the Xchange and the third ID3 to a third party: the Xchange or the third party
identifies smartphones with CIM parameters: Each of the three is independent of each other.
This is the "social implementation of the number of variables n=3". Two fruits can be harvested
from this social implementation: 1) crime deterrence (brake role) and 2) money trust
(accelerator role).
1) No remittances will be made without the consent of the three parties: this will fail-safe
against accidents and crimes. This is the braking role.
2) Having a collision function that verifies the consent of the three parties is more reliable than
a settlement made by a single will. This is the accelerator role.
Fig.5: Three-party consent verification = Digital currency issuer
Figure 5 shows a diagram of the consent verification of the three parties. Applying this to
CBDC, the issuance of digital currencies naturally should be based on the will of the central
bank, but the behavior of IT at the time of issuance is not a single-will protocol. Originally,
there is no issuer in blockchain mining. The mechanism for verifying the consent of the three
parties is the issuer of digital currency.
Mathematical-based third party
The third party in Fig.5, even if it simply receives a third ID3 and monitors fraudulent
remittances, can make a significant contribution to the reliability of payments. Mathematical
science is more reliable than a centralized payment and remittance system that costs a lot of
money. There is a case where this mathematically based third party makes a great contribution:
One of the embodiments is "Swift coin". Appendix (☞ This link is on the Hypertext screen).
Three-party consent verification chain
In Fig.5, the social implementation of the number of variables n=3 is represented by a triangle,
and the arrows represent how the variables ID1, ID2, and ID3 are gathered in the "collision
function". Key data for signature is reproduced in the output of "collision function" ➡ The
ID3 a third party
ID2 Xchange
1/2256
ID1 Payment or Issuance
Mathematical-based third party
22. 11
currency issuer updates the signature chain (remittance).
Satoshi Nakamoto defined Bitcoin as a chain of digital signatures. "We define an electronic coin
as a chain of digital signatures." (Cited from 2 Transactions). Following this, multivariable
digital currencies are also defined as " Three-party consent verification chain". An illustration
of this definition is Fig. 6: Time advances from left to right.
Fig.6: Three-party consent verification chain
Description of the figure:
Conditional currency issuance sends money to Alice's Bitcoin address: (left ➡ right): Alice
sends money to the next user's Bitcoin address. If the currency issuer is a central bank, it may
transfer an electronic coin to consumer Alice via a Xchange (private bank) or a third party. In
any case, Alice validates the ownership chain and sends money to the next user's Bitcoin address.
This is a chain of conditional currency issuance.
Anyone would instinctively believe that a three-party consent verification chain is more reliable
than a single-will signature chain. Let's calculate how reliable it is. I will calculate the difficulty
of creating a fake coin. Before that, there is something the reader wants to know.
How would the current blockchain issue the CBDC?
1) Mining cannot meet the demand for money. There is no entity responsible for issuing
currency. If you forcibly put it on the market, as you know, it becomes a financial product.
2) Assuming that the central bank and government bonds have credit, if a remittance of 1
million yen is recorded on the blockchain, does it mean that 1 million yen has been issued?
That is not the case. Because the key data that signed 1 million yen may be the leaked key data:
No one notices the leak of the key data. Authorities must have a history of distribution to
distinguish between counterfeit money and legitimate money: This is a surveillance society. My
ID3 a third party
Coin address
ID2 ID1
Alice’s coin address
Conditional currency issuance
ID3 a third party
Next user’s
Coin address
ID2 ID1
Consumer Alice
23. 12
patent is the only way to stop the leak of the secret variable n = 1. ☞ Section I
3) In the olden days, authorities tried to meet demand by mixing gold with copper. Assuming
that the mining solution is solved by the same method, passwords and biometric information
are combined with anonymous variables and secret variables in operation. If so, would you want
to have a "xx coin" at the expense of privacy? I'm sure you will go to a Xchange office. If you
meet with a multivariable digital currency app, you can sell "xx coins" without hesitation.
Difficulty of making fake coins, overwhelming reliability and stability
The world still doesn't know a clear solution to the problem of key management. Let's look at
digital currency ratings again: ☞Digital currency rating (This link is on the Hypertext screen)
MDC = M (anonymous variable n=1, multivariable IDs n=3, forgery probability=1/2256
)
Since IDs n=3 is the "ash" that remains after burning the Private key data, no Key data is
leaked from the function M (). The reader cannot make a counterfeit money.
So ... let me create a counterfeit money for multivariable digital currencies. Counterfeit money
is to steal Alice's key data, make coins, and send them to someone's Bitcoin address. The
collision function was introduced on page 3: where when multivariable digital ID1≠ID2≠ID3 is
input to the collision function, a collision occurs and the key data is reproduced in the output.
An attacker with this knowledge draws the following scenario: Hijacking any one of the
communication paths of ID1≠ID2≠ID3, throwing an arbitrary random number to cause a
collision, and stealing the output data from the inside or outside:
How many attacks will cause a collision? Of the 2256
times, one collision occurs and the key data
is reproduced. This is a brute force attack. The probability of a collision = 1/2256
. In fact, can
2256
attacks be allowed on the net? I think it's very difficult to make a counterfeit money.
Timestamp required for payments made by a single will
The current signature chain is updated with a single will, so a time stamp is needed. ☞ Satoshi
Nakamoto [3. Timestamp Server]. The current bank online system also completes payment with
a time stamp.
On the other hand, the three-party consent verification chain is irreversible in itself: the
following reasoning. As mentioned above, the probability of making counterfeit money for
multivariable digital currencies is = 1/2256
. There is no distinction between this counterfeit
money and regular coins. The probability that the next user will succeed in making a counterfeit
24. 13
money from the counterfeit money is = (1/2256
) * (1/2256
). This chain is a time stamp: the same
reasoning as Satoshi Nakamoto’s [3. Timestamp Server]. Therefore, it turns out that it is more
reliable than the settlement made by a single will.
4. If you have a multivariable digital currency, you will get a bonus!
This is a bonus article: The content of the article gives the private sector a lever to launch a
multivariable digital currency. Useful in the future.
We have identified multivariable digital currencies as “Three-party consent verification chain”.
This entity is not the single will of the currency issuer, but a system consisting of the currency
issuer, the Xchange and a third party. Key data for signing is not implemented here, but the
currency issuer can perform digital signatures. The following effects can be expected.
Now suppose Alice sent money from her bank account to my account: it charges a fee. I will
bear the fee; then I will get a negative bonus.
If Alice sends money in multivariable digital currencies, it comes with a positive bonus for me.
The reason is as follows: When Alice sends me money, Alice buys multivariable digital
currencies on the Xchange; the seller is an unspecified person, including the issuer of that
currency. The three-party consent verification chain is responsible for maintaining a fair price.
The currency issuer adjusts the fair price according to the rules and sells. When I receive the
multivariable digital currency, I can exchange it for banknotes, or keep it as it is, my freedom,
my privacy. This currency guarantees my privacy by mathematics, not by the legal system:
probability theory guarantees my freedom.
If I don't exchange, I'll keep my multivariable digital currency, just like the banknotes I keep at
home: because multivariable digital currencies are compatible with banknotes. I'm willing to
sell if it's above the price I received: this is a bonus. Since there is an issuer (three-party consent
verification), it is possible to control price declines and surges: It allows a gradual price increase
such as S & P500.
Appendix (☞ This link is on the Hypertext screen)
Swift coin, super-profitable interbank remittance, future image of key currency
25. 14
Summary
Issuance of fiat money is a credit item (liability) of a central bank. The mechanism is a single
will of the central bank. Blockchain mining is not a single will and cannot meet the demand for
money. So the CBDC has no choice but to abandon mining and become a "domestic digital
currency" operating in a closed network: assigns a unique ID to consumers and requires
password registration during retail payments: As a result, like the digital yuan (RMB), it
becomes a "money-like" of a fine surveillance society. The rating calculation is 0 + 0 = 0 ➡
"Rating=0". ☞ Digital currency rating (This link is on the Hypertext screen). "Rating=0" has a fatal
weakness: There is no reason for people to buy the "money-like" of the surveillance society.
However, it exerts a mysterious power in a democratic society.
The People's Bank of China "sees" all cashless payments under the law 1)
. There is no such
legal system in Japan, but when the "Rating=0" CBDC is implemented in society, it will become
a surveillance society and will be finished as a "big government" against the background of tax
collection power. It is magic that the Chinese Communist Party's surveillance society will be
realized in this way in a democratic country. I don't want to see such a "carriage-carriage
connection show". I want to see a train. The train is the issuance of a digital currency with a
"rating = 5".
I pay tribute to Satoshi Nakamoto: he defined electronic coins as a chain of digital signatures,
yet made all participants anonymous variables. Following his insight, I was able to define a
"three-party consent verification chain": No password registration is required. It treats
consumers as anonymous variables from start to finish, protects privacy, separates money
laundering and normal remittances, operates on the Internet. No key data is implemented in
this program. Therefore, this is the definitive methodology for making blockchain quantum
resistant: it is also an implementation means.
At the end
I am 80 years old now. I don't know when it will end. It may be in the countdown. I want to
disclose the whole invention within five years, for posterity. I estimated the duration of the
disclosure work to be 5 years: I decided to ask someone to buy my disclosure work. I can't bring
money to "heaven", so I entrust contracts and votive money (license fees) to investment in
posterity. That is, set up a foundation to invest in your countries.
The disclosure work will help drive your business. It includes "license agreement" and
27. Table 1
1
Multivariable digital currencies
Invention to prevent digital currency from becoming
money laundering and terrorist financing
Table 1: Currency convenience comparison
Exchange means
(money)
Convenience No need to trust
government: no
need to trust a
single will.
Privacy
integrity*
Ability to issue
currencies to
meet economic
demand
Gold, platinum, silver ✖ ◎ ◎ ✖
Bitcoin
✖ ◎ △
＊
✖
Fiat money , $
◎ ✖ ✖
**
◎
Central bank DC
◎ ✖ ✖ ◎
Multivariable digital
currency
◎ ◎ ◎ ◎
Compare with La valeur d'être (cells of ◎) of Gold
The result of social implementation of multivariable blockchain.
* Since the design of Bitcoin lacks key management, I made privacy integrity △.
** Fiat money is marked ✖ because its account could be monitored by authorities with "My ID".
Social implementation of multivariable blockchain n=3
In multivariable digital currencies, the key for signing (a private key) is "burned" and there is
no key data: the key exists only as a function. The ash that remains after burning is called the
multivariable digital IDs n = 3: The equation n = 3 means three variables.
Each of the three variables is implemented in society (user, exchange, third party), but any key
data is not implemented.
29. Digital currency rating
The multivariable n (n ≧ 2) blockchain is the prototype of “money”: represented by the function
M ().
"money"=M (secret var n=1, anonymous var n=1, multi-variables n=3, forgery probability)
Here, the multivariable IDs n=3 of M () represents three digital ID1≠ID2≠ID3, and n
represents the number of random variables: secret variable≡a private key, anonymous variable
≡a bitcoin-address.
This prototype is the mother body of Bitcoin, stable coin, peg currency, CBDC, multivariable
digital currency, etc. The mother's body knows various "money" ratings. Let's count the number
of prototype variables: 1 + 1 + 3 = 5, ➡ Rating = 5. The smaller the number of variables, the
lower the rating. Conversely, the system becomes more stable as the number of variables
increases. It's easy to imagine that two variables will be more stable and controllable than one.
1) Satoshi Nakamoto’s New Privacy Model
New Privacy Model=M (secret var n=1, anonymous var n=1, forgery probability≒0)
The New Privacy Model is the prototype of Bitcoin. Here the number of variables is 2 in total,
so Rating = 2. However, in actual operation, a password is allowed to access the secret variable.
So the variable is not a random variable, but just visible data (anyone can see it when they have
the password). Therefore, the New Privacy Model is destroyed as follows:
"money"=M (secret var n=1➡n=0, anonymous var n=1➡n=0, forgery probability≒0)
Since 0 + 0 = 0 here, Rating = 0. The computational relationship is a secret variable ➡ a public
variable ➡ an anonymous variable. If the secret variable changes to "visible data", the currency
forgery probability is likely to be 1, but Bitcoin is not. Since it is mining, the probability of
counterfeiting≒0. Although it deviates from the main subject here, the mining cannot meet the
demand for money.
2) mere IT_ "money-like" of surveillance society_
To the eyes of the CCP authorities, both anonymous and secret variables are just "visible data."
One key for digital signature A bitcoin-address
If the variable turns into visible data, it becomes the
target of cyberattacks and internal crimes.
31. Appendix
1
Swift coin, Cross-border payments, Next key currency
In the main text, I disclosed that the verification of the consent of the three parties is the issuer
of the currency. Just as an electronic coin is defined as a chain of digital signatures (☞Satoshi
Nakamoto), a three-party consent verification chain is an electronic coin that prevents money
laundering. Here, the three are user ID1, Xchange ID2, and any third party ID3. The solution of
money laundering is a feature of the three-party consent verification.
There is one centralization and no two: it stabilizes settlement. The current Swift also means a
centralized authority. On the other hand, I designed a system that stabilizes interbank
settlement by verifying the consent of the three parties. This principle is mathematical (☞
1/2256
), not a human organization. Its marginal cost is zero. It is "New Swift" that commits to
this mathematics as the third party.
1. Swift coin and Escrow feature
Since Swift coin is a coin with a "rating = 5", Alice can make cross-border payments. Not only
that, she may buy Swift coins to store her financial assets. Now suppose Alice is a small
shopkeeper living in Japan: Bob is a farmer in Oregon. Alice and Bob are not acquainted with
each other, but trust each other's deals. The foundation of this trust is the escrow feature of
Swift coin. The three-party consent verification chain consists of a deposit part and a withdrawal
part as follows:
Fig.1: Escrow feature
Alice has an account at Bank A and Bob has an account at Bank B. Alice and Bob, Bank A and
Bank B are all users of multivariable digital currencies. Since multivariable digital currencies
are coins with a rating of 5, Swift coin also needs to keep a rating of 5 at I / F: with the banks:
What this means is that Alice and Bob have registered their personal information with their
Rating = 5
digital currency
New Swift
ID3
A deposit-part
New Swift
id3
A withdrawal-part
Cash
|
v
Bank A
Account
Bank B
account
^
|
New Swift
Address id2
Alice’s
operator
Bob’s
operator
Bank B
Bitcoin address
ID2 ID1
id2 id1
id2 address
32. Appendix
2
respective banks, but "don't show" their anonymous variables to the banks. This mission is
achieved by a "new Swift address."
A deposit part in Fig.1
At the beginning of the procedure, Alice purchases Swift coin using an operator (smartphone):
This Swift coin is transferred to Bank B's Bitcoin address (signature procedure): Include Bob's
second variable id2 in this record: at the same time, Bob is notified. This procedure is the
deposit part in Fig. 1 (the coin purchase procedure is omitted).
The escrow feature of Swift coin
When the package from Bob arrives, Alice informs Bank B that it has been picked up. Then,
this Swift coin itself is an escrow; because the signing process which was performed by Alice is
irreversible. So the bank B will be responsible for handling the escrow. This is the withdrawal
part.
The withdrawal section in Fig.1
When the package receipt notification arrives, the bank B extends the signature chain from the
above Bitcoin address to Bob's second variable id2. This is the withdrawal part. Here Bob has
two selectors: one transfers from the second variable id2 to Bob's account in Bank B: in fact,
this account number in Bank B is the same with Bob's second variable id2 (see Fig.1): The
other is to transfer to Bob's Bitcoin address. The signature procedure is responsible for both.
2. Swift coin in the application layer of "Rating = 5" digital currency
The above disclosure has shown that anonymous variables and personal information (registered
with banks) are not linked, although some parts have been omitted. There is a more important
issue. Initially Alice and Bob were users of the "rated = 5" digital currencies. In other words,
the "rating = 5" digital currency turned out to be the flowering ground for a wide variety of
applications: Swift coin is one of them. Let's look at this horizon.
3. Hegemony of the next key currency
The digital currency "rating = 5" has as many as five variables. Based on this, various
applications can be implemented on the Internet. There is no dispute that the person who
developed this "rating = 5" source code will get the hegemony or leadership of "Next key
currency" (click Advantages on the top screen). Furthermore, if the source code is opened under
some rules, the private sector will also work on issuing the "rating = 5", and the world will be
on the path of prosperity. This is the reason I seek ambitious entrepreneurs and leaders.
☞
34. Character visible not having a
user ID
payable by
hand
not limiting
the freedom
A chest of
deposit
Fiat money ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Gold ○ ○ Stop double
payment
○ ○
Multivariable
digital currency
✕ ○ Stop double
payment
○
Note 3
○
Bitcoin
Use passwords
✕ ○ Stop double
payment
○ ○
デジタル人民元
Use passwords
✕ ✕ ○ ✕
Note 2
✕
CBDC
Use passwords
✕ ✕ ○ ✕ ✕
Note 1
Table 1: The non-commutative algorithms can close "deposit accounts".
Note 1: Japanese people trust cash because banknotes guarantee anonymity. Since there is
anonymity, it is possible to make deposit in a chest of drawers. This is one of the reasons why
cashless payments are not widespread in Japan. The ongoing CBDC could also be a means of
collecting deposit in a chest of drawers, with interest rates. The possible CBDC, which
guarantees anonymity, will be widely loved for a long time. we would like to expect such CBDC
from the central bank.
Note 2: In general, it tends to be designed based on the logic of the issuer, but multivariable
digital currencies are in the position of consumer protection, to protect privacy and financial
assets, as well as to have protocols to block money laundering. The logic of the issuer is "mere
IT", but the logic of multivariable digital currencies is "Money". It is possible to operate that
"mere IT" can be used for daily shopping, but not for purchasing airline tickets.
Note 3: Gold, banknotes, and multivariable digital currencies do not limit human freedom. Also,
no password is required. This is the reason why "money" becomes current.
Currency
Mere IT
35. 1
Additional license information
METEORA SYSTEM products are patent-based materials. There are two materials. One of
them is the quantum resistant blockchain. Table 1 was created to discuss what this secondary
product is and what it looks like. There is a cell colored in yellow there. It claims that the
"visible gold ○" has hidden the "invisible gold ✕" behind it: this "invisible gold ✕" was named
digital gold.
Character visible not having a
user ID
payable by hand not limiting
the freedom
a chest of
deposit
Fiat money ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Gold,
Gold coin
○ ○ ○
No double payment
○ ○
Multivariable
digital currency
✕
digital gold
○ ○
No double payment
○
Note 3
○
Bitcoin
Use passwords
✕ ○ ○
No double payment
○ ○
Digital RMB
Use passwords
✕ ✕ ○ ✕
Note 2
✕
CBDC
Use passwords
✕ ✕ ○ ✕ ✕
Note 1
Table 1: The non-commutative algorithm can temporarily close a digital gold " deposit account".
☞Quantum_resistant_Blockchain_article_ENG.pdf (meteora-system.com)
A lot of manpower is put in and gold becomes visible. On the other hand, the digital gold will
be instantly born on the net as long as the consent of the three parties is verified. ☞Multivariable
Digital Currencies | METEORA SYSTEM (meteora-system.com). What kind of work does such digital gold do?
We have not yet seen the answer to what role the digital gold will play. However, it is thought
that there are three financial fields that are likely to give jobs to this.
The three fields are the international gold standard, the domestic gold standard, and the
financial initiative implemented by the private sector. It is still unknown what role the digital
gold will play in each field. For example, I don't know if it will replace gold.
At least the following can be said: The digital gold should solve the problem around here, as
Currency
Mere IT
![December 2020
To all industries
Quantum-resistant blockchain
Potential of industrial innovation
Looking back, Japan had many world-class inventions such as the Walkman and iMode.
Unfortunately, however, it is now a country behind iPhone, Android and Huawei. Please take
advantage of the fact that I, as a Japanese, have secured a number of patents and copyrights
that support the quantum-resistant blockchains and its mathematical basis.
[Developer biography]
Eiji Watanabe
After graduating from the Department of Electronic Engineering, Tokyo Denki University in
1964, he joined JEOL Ltd. After that, he was enrolled in Fujimic Inc.(Think Tank) until 1972.
Established Meteora-System Co., Ltd. in 1979, and formed a capital tie-up with Amada Co.,
Ltd. in July 1982 (the capital tie-up was dissolved in March 2005). Established Post Quantum
Bit Co., Ltd. in 2018 with a patent in-kind investment. As an inventor, I have established 1) A
technology that interrupts the establishment of a connection at the subnet TCP / IP layer when
any unknown backdoor (setup is past tense) is activated. 2) Technology that applies non-
commutative algorithms.
[Post-quantum cryptography and commutative algorithms]
On October 24, 2020, NIST entered Round 3 of the post-quantum cryptography standardization
process and announced the finalists. ☞ https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-
cryptography/round-3-submissions. The current public key scheme is commutative between
encryption process and decryption process (commutative algorithm). Techniques for making
this commutative relationship stable quantum-resistant are usually difficult to achieve (with one
exception). Therefore, NIST decided to divide the public key scheme into three schemes: (1)
Public-key encryption scheme, (2) Key establishment scheme, (3) Digital signature scheme, and
proceed with the standardization process for each of the three schemes (let it referred to as
NIST standard scheme). This means that the quantum-resistant of the commutative algorithm
is difficult to achieve.
[Expectations for non-commutative algorithms]
On the other hand, the title is a new blockchain that integrates the feature of key management
METEORA SYSTEM Co., Ltd](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/quantumresistantblockchain-210302064156/85/Our-invention-Quantum-Resistant-Cryptography-1-320.jpg)
![based on a non-commutative algorithm and the feature of the NIST standard scheme. The non-
commutative algorithm-based key management is a technology (Mathematical defense) that
specializes in information-theoretic defense rather than the current computational difficulty.
There is no need for standardization because the only attack that breaks the information-
theoretic defense is to roll the dice. This is a feature of non-commutative algorithms.
[The title = Key management by the non-commutative algorithm + NIST standard scheme]
For example, when we assume digital financial assets, I think we should seek perfect consumer
protection. The title solved this challenge by "Integrating Key Management with Non-
Commutative Algorithms and NIST Standard Schemes". This has made it possible to protect
user privacy, neutralize cyberattacks, and implement protocols to stop money laundering (illegal
remittances). I posted this logic in "Multivariable Digital Currency" on the same site.
[Image from the consumer's perspective]
A wallet is also required for digital financial assets. Your smartphone becomes a hard wallet. In
the quantum resistant blockchain, while smartphones become wallets, their "deposit accounts"
can also be managed. The management method is a device different from the wallet. For now,
we are assuming a "wristband".
Blockchain (guaranteeing anonymity) does not allow you to temporarily close your "deposit
account". This is why consumers cannot be protected. This is also the reason why money
laundering cannot be stopped. On the other hand, the private key can be erased by the non-
commutative algorithm. This establishes a line of defense that protects the private key from the
unspecified. This made it possible to remotely close the "deposit account". In fact, let's move
on to the non-commutative algorithm.
[In fact, when moving to the non-commutative algorithm ... even if confidential
information is leaked ...]
It is impossible to stop the information leakage itself. When the leaked information B is used,
the system does not distinguish it from the original information A. Whichever is used first gives
Your smartphone is your wallet and your wristband is your “deposit
account”: In an emergency such as when you lose your smartphone,
your wristband closes your "deposit account", i.e., no password.
”Euro watch”, ”Apple watch”, ”Libra watch”, and …]()