NIRSAL Presentation at the NSSP Research Conference (Nov. 14, 2012)

Strengthening Agricultural Credit for Value Chain Development: Potential and
Challenge

By Jude Uzonwanne, Head, NIRSAL PIO, Central Bank of Nigeria



All protocols observed

It is a pleasure to share our thoughts today at the NSSP Research Conference on
how to effectively utilize the financial system to unlock agribusiness’s potential.

We shall begin our observations and set the stage by telling you what the status
quo in Nigeria was until about 12 months ago.

    First, agricultural was financed primarily from personal savings, capital
      provided by friends and family, and other non-formal sources.             Bank
      lending to agriculture amounted to about 1% of all formal lending in Nigeria
    Second, banks since they did not lend that much did not pay attention to
      what those loans did or did not do, and assumed they would necessarily go
      bad. Most banks assumed agric loans had a default rate of 15% - 20%.
    Third, lending usually focused on mid tier and large tier food related
      companies, and rarely to small holder farmers
    Fourth, lending was usually backed by landed assets as collateral




It was into this context that NIRSAL emerged. NIRSAL was the output of a review
conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria in partnership with the Bankers
                                      Page 1 of 7
Committee. The Bankers Committee aggregates Nigeria’s commercial banks and
discount houses. The review of 2 decades of agric finance interventions and
schemes, as well as the state of federal policy, behavior by value chains, and
other related elements draw some startling conclusions:

   1. Lending cannot succeed unless it occurs in the context of a well functioning
      value chain. And such effective functioning cannot be assumed; it has to be
      paid for i.e. a public good investment must be made even if the profits are
      partially privatized
   2. The Central Bank’s approach of direct lending has not yielded the results
      sought as it distorts bank incentives to take capital risk, as well as
      exacerbates moral hazard problems. The money at risk does not belong to
      anyone!
   3. Policy failures and inconsistencies are as equally damaging as a consistent
      but wrongheaded policy
   4. Banks have limited institutional memory and capacity regarding lending to
      agribusiness; loan officers have to be trained and processes instituted
   5. Subsidies are not inherently bad; it is the design and delivery of such
      subsidies that have been poor, in the process corrupting incentives and
      behavior e.g. fertilizer racket
   6. The dismantling of the marketing boards went too far as it deprived the
      markets of a well organized mechanism for advocating policy change, as
      well as organizing input supply to farmer groups and marketing farmer
      output.




                                        Page 2 of 7
Based on these insights and others, NIRSAL was designed as a CBN sponsored
private corporation working in the public interest.       NIRSAL which now has
Presidential permission to form a public limited liability corporation began life
with the following key attributes:

    It would prioritize sales of guarantees over making capital available for
      onlending; guarantees will be issued to match loan durations
    It would provide for insurance to cover some of the risks in farming value
      chains
    It would provide technical assistance that would fix the value chains and
      make them less default prone
    It would rate the performance of banks subject to how well they lend
    It would create incentives to reward banks that lend well as well as punish
      those that fail at it, forcing a broad improvement in bank capacity building




Based on that design, in Q4 2011, NIRSAL began work and by April 2012, had
developed a new set of rules for agribusiness lending. Based on those rules,
aggressive marketing and capacity building discussions with farmer groups, state
governments, value chains, banks and MFIs, progress is now emerging. For
example, banks once their own internal governance and evaluation mechanisms
were in place, started accepting NIRSAL type loan applications from their clients.
Where are we today?

    Today, we have issued guaranteed on over N6 billion in loans. We have a
      pipeline of about N20 – N25 billion through end of January 2013. We


                                     Page 3 of 7
expect to see the volumes rise sharply through March 2013 subject to
     market conditions.
   The average lending rate is 18%; NIRSAL also issues an interest rate subsidy
     averaging 30%, bringing our average lending rate down to 12%
   The average duration of loans is 285 days; our guarantees match that
     period; we are currently in final discussion stages for a 7 year guarantee, so
     it is important to understand that NIRSAL matches what the market wants,
     and the markets are becoming more risk seeking each passing quarter
   Loans have been issued for activities such as purchase of sorghum,
     production of cassava chips for export, purchase of equipment for oil palm
     companies, purchase of feedstock for oil mill (soya beans and fresh palm
     fruit bunch), and cassava grits plants

Going forward, what do we see as the opportunity?

   First, we see a market for working capital and loans to agribusiness that is a
     minimum of N600 billion per annum; we expect to be able to guarantee a
     significant portion of that. The proposition is that 1 Naira from NIRSAL is to
     leverage 10 Naira from commercial banks. It is foreseen that out of the 600
     billion Naira needed every planting season, NIRSAL, at its full capacity,
     would be able to provide 450 billion Naira.
   We see opportunity in expanding the international sources of capital
     available to the Nigerian farmer and agribusiness. We intend to enter into
     the market and issue long term debt instruments that can be used to invest
     directly by NIRSAL or provide low cost liquidity to certain class of lenders, as
     well as strengthen NIRSAL’s own balance sheet

                                     Page 4 of 7
 We also anticipate a rapid expansion in our value chain fixing role,
      especially as we rollout our technical assistance offering. That offering will
      ensure that more value chains and its participants are ready to use credit
      responsibly.




What challenges do we foresee? A few have emerged in the past year but are
really variations of tradition challenges. For example:

   1. Identity issues; many banks still complain that the majority of farmers do
       not have proper identification, hence they are not able to lend to them; we
       are discussing a number of biometric based interventions to tackle that
   2. Cost of capital remains high due to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s high
       lending rate (12%), which in itself reflects inflation expectations for the
       economy
   3. Continued policy and financial mixed signals create confusion in the market
       e.g. the periodic offer of free seeds
   4. The speed at which commercial banks are gearing up to lend to agriculture;
       they have made strong progress but we wish they could move faster
   5. A culture in the financial and policy circles that does not seem to
       understand the need for urgency and creativity in problem solving; often
       idea that the way things have always been done is a detriment to progress
       does not seem to sink in
   6. Insufficient levels of innovation in financial services and other supporting
       services for agribusiness e.g. solutions for credit rather than products, and
       emergence of companies such as Oxfam and Technoserve that can

                                      Page 5 of 7
aggregate farmers, find them markets, get inputs to them, and provide
      agronomic advice during the season. That innovation in service design and
      delivery remains sharply missing. Truly, the challenge is not always access
      to credit; ideas and field systems for translating those ideas into profits is
      perhaps more critical to success




Looking forward, we are cautiously optimistic that despite the challenges we see,
progress will continue to be made. The levels of lending are rising as banks and
other financial institutions improve their own institutional capacity to lend and
learn. In addition, we continue to see policy support despite occasional regressive
behavior. What will matter going forward is the level of innovation in action, and
behavior.

Today, what the market may need is not more guarantees but smarter and more
nuanced ways to deliver credit and move output. Credit delivery, whether in kind
or in cash, needs to reach the customer on a timely basis. And in a world with less
predictable rains, that certainty becomes more important to outcomes.

Therefore the future of Nigerian agribusiness will become about what innovations
are we able to develop and deliver to the market that simplifies the essential
challenge of this business. Given that innovation does not recognize borders, it is
vital that we NIRSAL also acknowledge that such innovation will push us to
periodically reinvent our business model as well.        Change cannot be uni-
directional. As the banks and markets evolve, we expect that we must evolve in
order to remain commercially relevant. That is where the real transformation will


                                     Page 6 of 7
occur: how banks, NIRSAL and other investors respond to the demands of the
agribusiness market.

Thank you.

   - End -




                                 Page 7 of 7

Day 2, Session 1, Part 2: Unlocking Agricultural Growth through Technology and Financial Security

  • 1.
    NIRSAL Presentation atthe NSSP Research Conference (Nov. 14, 2012) Strengthening Agricultural Credit for Value Chain Development: Potential and Challenge By Jude Uzonwanne, Head, NIRSAL PIO, Central Bank of Nigeria All protocols observed It is a pleasure to share our thoughts today at the NSSP Research Conference on how to effectively utilize the financial system to unlock agribusiness’s potential. We shall begin our observations and set the stage by telling you what the status quo in Nigeria was until about 12 months ago.  First, agricultural was financed primarily from personal savings, capital provided by friends and family, and other non-formal sources. Bank lending to agriculture amounted to about 1% of all formal lending in Nigeria  Second, banks since they did not lend that much did not pay attention to what those loans did or did not do, and assumed they would necessarily go bad. Most banks assumed agric loans had a default rate of 15% - 20%.  Third, lending usually focused on mid tier and large tier food related companies, and rarely to small holder farmers  Fourth, lending was usually backed by landed assets as collateral It was into this context that NIRSAL emerged. NIRSAL was the output of a review conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria in partnership with the Bankers Page 1 of 7
  • 2.
    Committee. The BankersCommittee aggregates Nigeria’s commercial banks and discount houses. The review of 2 decades of agric finance interventions and schemes, as well as the state of federal policy, behavior by value chains, and other related elements draw some startling conclusions: 1. Lending cannot succeed unless it occurs in the context of a well functioning value chain. And such effective functioning cannot be assumed; it has to be paid for i.e. a public good investment must be made even if the profits are partially privatized 2. The Central Bank’s approach of direct lending has not yielded the results sought as it distorts bank incentives to take capital risk, as well as exacerbates moral hazard problems. The money at risk does not belong to anyone! 3. Policy failures and inconsistencies are as equally damaging as a consistent but wrongheaded policy 4. Banks have limited institutional memory and capacity regarding lending to agribusiness; loan officers have to be trained and processes instituted 5. Subsidies are not inherently bad; it is the design and delivery of such subsidies that have been poor, in the process corrupting incentives and behavior e.g. fertilizer racket 6. The dismantling of the marketing boards went too far as it deprived the markets of a well organized mechanism for advocating policy change, as well as organizing input supply to farmer groups and marketing farmer output. Page 2 of 7
  • 3.
    Based on theseinsights and others, NIRSAL was designed as a CBN sponsored private corporation working in the public interest. NIRSAL which now has Presidential permission to form a public limited liability corporation began life with the following key attributes:  It would prioritize sales of guarantees over making capital available for onlending; guarantees will be issued to match loan durations  It would provide for insurance to cover some of the risks in farming value chains  It would provide technical assistance that would fix the value chains and make them less default prone  It would rate the performance of banks subject to how well they lend  It would create incentives to reward banks that lend well as well as punish those that fail at it, forcing a broad improvement in bank capacity building Based on that design, in Q4 2011, NIRSAL began work and by April 2012, had developed a new set of rules for agribusiness lending. Based on those rules, aggressive marketing and capacity building discussions with farmer groups, state governments, value chains, banks and MFIs, progress is now emerging. For example, banks once their own internal governance and evaluation mechanisms were in place, started accepting NIRSAL type loan applications from their clients. Where are we today?  Today, we have issued guaranteed on over N6 billion in loans. We have a pipeline of about N20 – N25 billion through end of January 2013. We Page 3 of 7
  • 4.
    expect to seethe volumes rise sharply through March 2013 subject to market conditions.  The average lending rate is 18%; NIRSAL also issues an interest rate subsidy averaging 30%, bringing our average lending rate down to 12%  The average duration of loans is 285 days; our guarantees match that period; we are currently in final discussion stages for a 7 year guarantee, so it is important to understand that NIRSAL matches what the market wants, and the markets are becoming more risk seeking each passing quarter  Loans have been issued for activities such as purchase of sorghum, production of cassava chips for export, purchase of equipment for oil palm companies, purchase of feedstock for oil mill (soya beans and fresh palm fruit bunch), and cassava grits plants Going forward, what do we see as the opportunity?  First, we see a market for working capital and loans to agribusiness that is a minimum of N600 billion per annum; we expect to be able to guarantee a significant portion of that. The proposition is that 1 Naira from NIRSAL is to leverage 10 Naira from commercial banks. It is foreseen that out of the 600 billion Naira needed every planting season, NIRSAL, at its full capacity, would be able to provide 450 billion Naira.  We see opportunity in expanding the international sources of capital available to the Nigerian farmer and agribusiness. We intend to enter into the market and issue long term debt instruments that can be used to invest directly by NIRSAL or provide low cost liquidity to certain class of lenders, as well as strengthen NIRSAL’s own balance sheet Page 4 of 7
  • 5.
     We alsoanticipate a rapid expansion in our value chain fixing role, especially as we rollout our technical assistance offering. That offering will ensure that more value chains and its participants are ready to use credit responsibly. What challenges do we foresee? A few have emerged in the past year but are really variations of tradition challenges. For example: 1. Identity issues; many banks still complain that the majority of farmers do not have proper identification, hence they are not able to lend to them; we are discussing a number of biometric based interventions to tackle that 2. Cost of capital remains high due to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s high lending rate (12%), which in itself reflects inflation expectations for the economy 3. Continued policy and financial mixed signals create confusion in the market e.g. the periodic offer of free seeds 4. The speed at which commercial banks are gearing up to lend to agriculture; they have made strong progress but we wish they could move faster 5. A culture in the financial and policy circles that does not seem to understand the need for urgency and creativity in problem solving; often idea that the way things have always been done is a detriment to progress does not seem to sink in 6. Insufficient levels of innovation in financial services and other supporting services for agribusiness e.g. solutions for credit rather than products, and emergence of companies such as Oxfam and Technoserve that can Page 5 of 7
  • 6.
    aggregate farmers, findthem markets, get inputs to them, and provide agronomic advice during the season. That innovation in service design and delivery remains sharply missing. Truly, the challenge is not always access to credit; ideas and field systems for translating those ideas into profits is perhaps more critical to success Looking forward, we are cautiously optimistic that despite the challenges we see, progress will continue to be made. The levels of lending are rising as banks and other financial institutions improve their own institutional capacity to lend and learn. In addition, we continue to see policy support despite occasional regressive behavior. What will matter going forward is the level of innovation in action, and behavior. Today, what the market may need is not more guarantees but smarter and more nuanced ways to deliver credit and move output. Credit delivery, whether in kind or in cash, needs to reach the customer on a timely basis. And in a world with less predictable rains, that certainty becomes more important to outcomes. Therefore the future of Nigerian agribusiness will become about what innovations are we able to develop and deliver to the market that simplifies the essential challenge of this business. Given that innovation does not recognize borders, it is vital that we NIRSAL also acknowledge that such innovation will push us to periodically reinvent our business model as well. Change cannot be uni- directional. As the banks and markets evolve, we expect that we must evolve in order to remain commercially relevant. That is where the real transformation will Page 6 of 7
  • 7.
    occur: how banks,NIRSAL and other investors respond to the demands of the agribusiness market. Thank you. - End - Page 7 of 7