The document summarizes the findings of a media monitoring project that evaluated the objectivity and balance of information provided by major Russian TV channels in Eastern Partnership countries from March 1-31, 2015. The monitoring analyzed news coverage of international and local issues on channels like Russia 1, First Channel, and NTV. It found these channels showed a very limited range of views, devoted extensive coverage to Russian government authorities, and lacked meaningful debates on issues. Their coverage of the Ukraine conflict demonized Ukrainian authorities and portrayed Russia positively. Overall, the channels were found to breach media ethics and function as propaganda instruments rather than facilitating objective discussion.
Journalists and media in Ukraine - Reporters Without Borders - 2016DonbassFullAccess
The Ukrainians’ trust in the media increased slightly in 2015 compared to 2014. A survey carried out by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences in 2015 showed that 32.3 percent of Ukrainians trusted the media while 38.9 percent didn’t. The survey from the previous year showed that only 25.2 percent trusted the media while 45.4 percent said they didn’t.
During the research for this report most of the people Reporters Without Borders (RSF) talked to expressed concern that faced with the triple challenge of the war in the east of the country, the economic crisis and the digitization of mass media.
This report is based on approximately 30 interviews conducted by RSF Germany board member Gemma Pörzgen in January/February 2016 with journalists, media experts and observers in Kiev, Lviv and Odessa. It deals with the situation of journalists and the media in those areas of Ukraine over which the Ukrainian government has sovereignty. The situation in Crimea, annexed by Russia in March 2014, and in the separatist-controlled areas of Eastern Ukraine is not dealt with here. It deserves its own separate report, particularly since access to these areas is extremely difficult for foreign observers at present.
One of the possible tools for achieving this goal should be a new TV channel for non-controlled and annexed territories, which will be based on the platform of broadcasting in a foreign language
Journalists and media in Ukraine - Reporters Without Borders - 2016DonbassFullAccess
The Ukrainians’ trust in the media increased slightly in 2015 compared to 2014. A survey carried out by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences in 2015 showed that 32.3 percent of Ukrainians trusted the media while 38.9 percent didn’t. The survey from the previous year showed that only 25.2 percent trusted the media while 45.4 percent said they didn’t.
During the research for this report most of the people Reporters Without Borders (RSF) talked to expressed concern that faced with the triple challenge of the war in the east of the country, the economic crisis and the digitization of mass media.
This report is based on approximately 30 interviews conducted by RSF Germany board member Gemma Pörzgen in January/February 2016 with journalists, media experts and observers in Kiev, Lviv and Odessa. It deals with the situation of journalists and the media in those areas of Ukraine over which the Ukrainian government has sovereignty. The situation in Crimea, annexed by Russia in March 2014, and in the separatist-controlled areas of Eastern Ukraine is not dealt with here. It deserves its own separate report, particularly since access to these areas is extremely difficult for foreign observers at present.
One of the possible tools for achieving this goal should be a new TV channel for non-controlled and annexed territories, which will be based on the platform of broadcasting in a foreign language
The Ukrainian power has gradually been restoring the TV broadcast infrastructure in the Donetsk region. On December 5, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko opened the restored TV tower on Mount Karachun in Slovyansk. The tower was destroyed during battles for the town in the summer of 2014. The coverage of the tower signal will make it possible to improve analog broadcasting on the territory of the Donetsk region controlled by the Ukrainian government. In addition, the tower will provide a signal of a better quality in the areas along the frontline, for example, in Torestk (Dzerzhinsk) which is located on the demarcation line. We would like to remind the readers that when the conflict in the Donbas began, the areas controlled by the Russian Federation were left without Ukrainian TV broadcasting as a number of TV broadcasting facilities were seized and destroyed.
claimed that the launching of this tower would allow to watch Ukrainian TV even in
Horlivka.
The authors have thoroughly studied newscasts and political talk-shows on three biggest Russian national TV channels for the period of 3,5 years July 1, 2014 - December 31, 2017. Based on that monitoring data the research provides unique and profound summary of key six narratives about Europe in top Russian TV.
A set of recommendations for combating Russian propaganda in the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries, which has been distributed among the Members of the European Parliament and the EU officials with regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2015 calling for preparation of an action plan to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns.
Putin’s Brexit? The influence of Kremlin media & bots during the 2016 UK EU r...89up
Russian media interference in EU referendum worth up to £4 million
- Report submitted to the Culture, Media and Sport select committee by digital agency 89up lays bare extent of Russian media interference
- Kremlin-backed outlets RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote Leave or Leave.EU
- Call for parliament to investigate role of UK-based Russian propaganda outlets
- Russian bots reach during EU referendum was significant - equivalent to 29% of total reach of both Vote Leave and Leave.EU Twitter activity
This op-ed article by Moritz Gathmann from Cicero (https://www.cicero.de/; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicero_(magazine)) entered my e-mail account a couple of days ago. Cicero is a German-language magazine with a “liberal conservative” political orientation—essentially “classical liberal” (in present-day U.S.-American political parlance: libertarian). I don’t share Cicero’s political outlook, but I try to follow sources I disagree with. I also thought I’d translate this essay given its aptness in relation to how Russia, or rather stereotyped, propagandistic, and chauvinist perspectives on Russian politics and government, has appeared in U.S.-American political discourse since the 2016 presidential election.
Cicero published another op-ed today that is critical of Putin. I’ll see about translating it. For now, readers may peruse this translation. The original German-language article is linked here: https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/verfassungsreferendum-russland-wladimir-putin/plus
All errors and misunderstandings are, of course, mine.
Stephen Cheng
Saturday, July 4, 2020
Monitoring "What is happening to freedom of speech in Ukraine. State censorship and crackdown on dissent"
In Ukraine, people are judged for dissent.
You can get acquainted with the situation with freedom of speech in Ukraine, state censorship and crackdown on dissent, which was prepared by a human rights group "Uspishna Varta".
Authors’ note:
A lot is happening parallel since Russia started its invasion of Ukraine on the 24th February 2022. In my bulletin I aim to conclude and share the information what I have gathered either through the support of the European Cyber Community or through my discussions with current and former members of armed forces in Europe. As my main profession – raising cyber resilience for organizations and nations to resist large scale cyber and hybrid incidents – requires me to holistically analyze the impact of multiple events happening parallel, I will not only focus on the cyber space aspect, but on all aspects that I find important to analyze and gain situational awareness with. For the strictly military movement timeline and events or ongoing fights there are many trustworthy resources out there, hence I will not put focus on that, same with each individual topics. This is not a study, I will not provide links and references. Many of the information you can simply search for, some are relying on personal discussions with subject matter experts.
In March 2018, another presidential election took place in the Russian
Federation. For the fourth time Vladimir Putin won the election by a large majority of
votes. Alexei Navalny – an opposition candidate who had been preparing his election
campaign since the end of 2016 – was not allowed to stand in the election. Regardless
of his elimination from the election, Navalny remained an active member of Russian
political life before and after the election; he carried out a boycott of the election,
and organized post-election protests. Without a doubt, despite the ban on running in
the election, Navalny was one of the main figures in the electoral process. Thus, the
aim of this article is a detailed analysis of Navalny’s preparations for the campaign
– the authors focused not only on the candidate’s opposition activity, but also on his
unique measures and methods of running a campaign (Internet, social media, crowdfunding). The article examines the campaign preparations, as well as the reasons for
the rejection of Navalny’s registration as an election candidate, social support index,
relationships with other candidates and the change of strategy after the Central Election Commission’s decision. The analysis is based on Russian law, Central Election
Commission’s decisions, opinion poll results and information from the Russian and
international media.
Signs of hate speech are detected in the print media on both sides of the demarcation line. However, the monitored “DPR” public editions use this speech much more often. At present, these are just isolated cases on the territory controlled by Ukrainian government.
The absolute leader in using hate speech is Novorossiya edition. Its material is extremely saturated with words, which experts attributed to those who show signs of hate speech or hostility. The publications of the “DPR” organization claiming to have an “official” status use such speech much less and formally.
The limited use of hate speech from Ukrainian regional media may be a consequence of the journalists’ and editors’ position; while working on the conflict area, they are trying to use non-conflictual vocabulary. One more factor is the owners’ of these media influence and their vision of ways to stop the conflict. Trends in the limited use of hate speech in regional Ukrainian media in the Donetsk region may not correspond to the situation at the national level.
Overcoming Barriers: Media in Covering Conflict-Sensitive IssuesDonbassFullAccess
The Special Reports is prepared by within “Supporting Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Ukraine” project under financial support of Embassy of Great Britain in Ukraine. Opinions reflected in the Report may not correlate with those of the Government of Great Britain or OSCE PCU.
The Special Report consists of:
the Report on the results of monitoring of TV content in November 2015 due to conflict sensitivity;
the Report on the results of research among the journalists in February-March 2016 that clarifies the roots and causes of the detected problems;
the review of the international practices of involvement of media into reconciliation in the societies, and recommendations regarding their possible implementation (adaptation) in Ukraine. For journalists, editors, representatives of educational establishments and technical assistance projects, media experts and other persons searching for the better solutions to increase the role of Ukrainian media in reconciliation and challenge the social barriers caused by the military conflict.
Credence to Media, Influence of Russian Propaganda, And Media Literacy in Ukr...Mariana Zakusylo
The poll was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2018, as requested by NGO “Detector Media”, financed by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US National Endowment for Democracy. The fieldwork lasted from Feb. 5 to Feb. 21, 2018.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The report outlines main trends in the coverage of socio-political news by Ukrainian TV-channels, including those undergoing the reform into public broadcasters, along with the impact on the newsroom editorial policy by the political environment and interests of media owners. Special attention was paid to the assessment of Russian propaganda media and main trends in their reporting about the events in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian power has gradually been restoring the TV broadcast infrastructure in the Donetsk region. On December 5, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko opened the restored TV tower on Mount Karachun in Slovyansk. The tower was destroyed during battles for the town in the summer of 2014. The coverage of the tower signal will make it possible to improve analog broadcasting on the territory of the Donetsk region controlled by the Ukrainian government. In addition, the tower will provide a signal of a better quality in the areas along the frontline, for example, in Torestk (Dzerzhinsk) which is located on the demarcation line. We would like to remind the readers that when the conflict in the Donbas began, the areas controlled by the Russian Federation were left without Ukrainian TV broadcasting as a number of TV broadcasting facilities were seized and destroyed.
claimed that the launching of this tower would allow to watch Ukrainian TV even in
Horlivka.
The authors have thoroughly studied newscasts and political talk-shows on three biggest Russian national TV channels for the period of 3,5 years July 1, 2014 - December 31, 2017. Based on that monitoring data the research provides unique and profound summary of key six narratives about Europe in top Russian TV.
A set of recommendations for combating Russian propaganda in the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries, which has been distributed among the Members of the European Parliament and the EU officials with regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2015 calling for preparation of an action plan to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns.
Putin’s Brexit? The influence of Kremlin media & bots during the 2016 UK EU r...89up
Russian media interference in EU referendum worth up to £4 million
- Report submitted to the Culture, Media and Sport select committee by digital agency 89up lays bare extent of Russian media interference
- Kremlin-backed outlets RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote Leave or Leave.EU
- Call for parliament to investigate role of UK-based Russian propaganda outlets
- Russian bots reach during EU referendum was significant - equivalent to 29% of total reach of both Vote Leave and Leave.EU Twitter activity
This op-ed article by Moritz Gathmann from Cicero (https://www.cicero.de/; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicero_(magazine)) entered my e-mail account a couple of days ago. Cicero is a German-language magazine with a “liberal conservative” political orientation—essentially “classical liberal” (in present-day U.S.-American political parlance: libertarian). I don’t share Cicero’s political outlook, but I try to follow sources I disagree with. I also thought I’d translate this essay given its aptness in relation to how Russia, or rather stereotyped, propagandistic, and chauvinist perspectives on Russian politics and government, has appeared in U.S.-American political discourse since the 2016 presidential election.
Cicero published another op-ed today that is critical of Putin. I’ll see about translating it. For now, readers may peruse this translation. The original German-language article is linked here: https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/verfassungsreferendum-russland-wladimir-putin/plus
All errors and misunderstandings are, of course, mine.
Stephen Cheng
Saturday, July 4, 2020
Monitoring "What is happening to freedom of speech in Ukraine. State censorship and crackdown on dissent"
In Ukraine, people are judged for dissent.
You can get acquainted with the situation with freedom of speech in Ukraine, state censorship and crackdown on dissent, which was prepared by a human rights group "Uspishna Varta".
Authors’ note:
A lot is happening parallel since Russia started its invasion of Ukraine on the 24th February 2022. In my bulletin I aim to conclude and share the information what I have gathered either through the support of the European Cyber Community or through my discussions with current and former members of armed forces in Europe. As my main profession – raising cyber resilience for organizations and nations to resist large scale cyber and hybrid incidents – requires me to holistically analyze the impact of multiple events happening parallel, I will not only focus on the cyber space aspect, but on all aspects that I find important to analyze and gain situational awareness with. For the strictly military movement timeline and events or ongoing fights there are many trustworthy resources out there, hence I will not put focus on that, same with each individual topics. This is not a study, I will not provide links and references. Many of the information you can simply search for, some are relying on personal discussions with subject matter experts.
In March 2018, another presidential election took place in the Russian
Federation. For the fourth time Vladimir Putin won the election by a large majority of
votes. Alexei Navalny – an opposition candidate who had been preparing his election
campaign since the end of 2016 – was not allowed to stand in the election. Regardless
of his elimination from the election, Navalny remained an active member of Russian
political life before and after the election; he carried out a boycott of the election,
and organized post-election protests. Without a doubt, despite the ban on running in
the election, Navalny was one of the main figures in the electoral process. Thus, the
aim of this article is a detailed analysis of Navalny’s preparations for the campaign
– the authors focused not only on the candidate’s opposition activity, but also on his
unique measures and methods of running a campaign (Internet, social media, crowdfunding). The article examines the campaign preparations, as well as the reasons for
the rejection of Navalny’s registration as an election candidate, social support index,
relationships with other candidates and the change of strategy after the Central Election Commission’s decision. The analysis is based on Russian law, Central Election
Commission’s decisions, opinion poll results and information from the Russian and
international media.
Signs of hate speech are detected in the print media on both sides of the demarcation line. However, the monitored “DPR” public editions use this speech much more often. At present, these are just isolated cases on the territory controlled by Ukrainian government.
The absolute leader in using hate speech is Novorossiya edition. Its material is extremely saturated with words, which experts attributed to those who show signs of hate speech or hostility. The publications of the “DPR” organization claiming to have an “official” status use such speech much less and formally.
The limited use of hate speech from Ukrainian regional media may be a consequence of the journalists’ and editors’ position; while working on the conflict area, they are trying to use non-conflictual vocabulary. One more factor is the owners’ of these media influence and their vision of ways to stop the conflict. Trends in the limited use of hate speech in regional Ukrainian media in the Donetsk region may not correspond to the situation at the national level.
Overcoming Barriers: Media in Covering Conflict-Sensitive IssuesDonbassFullAccess
The Special Reports is prepared by within “Supporting Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Ukraine” project under financial support of Embassy of Great Britain in Ukraine. Opinions reflected in the Report may not correlate with those of the Government of Great Britain or OSCE PCU.
The Special Report consists of:
the Report on the results of monitoring of TV content in November 2015 due to conflict sensitivity;
the Report on the results of research among the journalists in February-March 2016 that clarifies the roots and causes of the detected problems;
the review of the international practices of involvement of media into reconciliation in the societies, and recommendations regarding their possible implementation (adaptation) in Ukraine. For journalists, editors, representatives of educational establishments and technical assistance projects, media experts and other persons searching for the better solutions to increase the role of Ukrainian media in reconciliation and challenge the social barriers caused by the military conflict.
Credence to Media, Influence of Russian Propaganda, And Media Literacy in Ukr...Mariana Zakusylo
The poll was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2018, as requested by NGO “Detector Media”, financed by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US National Endowment for Democracy. The fieldwork lasted from Feb. 5 to Feb. 21, 2018.
MAIN TRENDS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE IN 2014-...DonbassFullAccess
The report outlines main trends in the coverage of socio-political news by Ukrainian TV-channels, including those undergoing the reform into public broadcasters, along with the impact on the newsroom editorial policy by the political environment and interests of media owners. Special attention was paid to the assessment of Russian propaganda media and main trends in their reporting about the events in Ukraine.
Dutch Referendum on 6 April on the EU-Ukraine Association AgreementTaras Kuzio
Lecture entitled ‘The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Why Voting the Right Way in the Dutch Referendum Matters' given to students at the Studievereniging voor Politicologen In Leiden, University of Leiden on 3 March 2016.
Results of the research conducted by the Gorshenin Institute with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Edited by Matthes Buhbe, director of FES for Ukraine? Belarus and Moldova.
Fighting in the “Grey Zone”: Lessons from Russian Influence Operations in Ukr...Alireza Ghahrood
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, members of the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, thank you for the opportunity to speak about the lessons learned from
Russian influence operations in Ukraine.
Russia’s unconventional war against Ukraine has revealed a formidable toolkit of measures for
fighting in the so-called “grey zone,” from world-class cyber and electronic warfare capabilities
to sophisticated covert action and disinformation operations. Russia has used propaganda,
sabotage, assassination, bribery, proxy fronts, and false-flag operations to supplement its
considerable conventional force posture in eastern Ukraine, where several thousand Russian
military intelligence advisors, unit commanders, and flag officers exercise command and control
over a separatist force consisting of roughly 30,000-40,000 troops.
Moscow has been doing its homework. Recognizing that Russia’s conventional military
capabilities lag behind those of NATO, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov
called in 2013 for investing in asymmetric capabilities to enable Russia to fight and win against
conventionally superior Western militaries. Gerasimov’s call for more emphasis on
unconventional warfare also coincided with a subtle but important shift in Russian foreign
policy. After Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, Moscow dispensed with its post-Cold
War foreign policy of cooperating with the West where possible and competing where necessary.
Instead, the Kremlin now actively seeks to corrode the institutions of Western democracy,
undermine the transatlantic alliance, and delegitimize the liberal international order through a
continuous and sustained competition short of conflict that takes place across all domains.
However, even with Russia’s well-honed unconventional warfare capabilities, the United States
and its NATO Allies can prevail in this competition if we recognize the Kremlin’s goals for what
they are, develop smart strategies to counter them, properly align our institutional structures, and
invest in the right capabilities.
I will briefly discuss six areas where Russia has invested in significant unconventional or “new
generation warfare” capabilities, and suggest some responses the United States should consider.
All of the capabilities I will highlight were used during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and
remain on display as Russia continues to wage its unconventional war against the government in
Kyiv.
The Ukrainian power has gradually been restoring the TV broadcast infrastructure in the Donetsk region. On December 5, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko opened the restored TV tower on Mount Karachun in Slovyansk. The tower was destroyed during battles for the town in the summer of 2014. The coverage of the tower signal will make it possible to improve analog broadcasting on the territory of the Donetsk region controlled by the Ukrainian government. In addition, the tower will provide a signal of a better quality in the areas along the frontline, for example, in Torestk (Dzerzhinsk) which is located on the demarcation line. We would like to remind the readers that when the conflict in the Donbas began, the areas controlled by the Russian Federation were left without Ukrainian TV broadcasting as a number of TV broadcasting facilities were seized and destroyed. Ukrainian Minister of Information Policy
Yuriy Stets claimed that the launching of this tower would allow to watch Ukrainian TV even in Horlivka.
The Polish EU presidency in the Polish press: Did we actually notice it?Agnieszka Stępińska
The aim of this paper is to present the findings of a quantitative content analysis of the Polish print media. Sharing the codebook and procedures with an international team, we were able to gain a broad perspective on the media coverage of the first Polish EU presidency. In particular, we focused on: (1) the number of items covering events
related to the presidency, (2) the prominence of the topic, (3) genres, (4) main topics, (5) authors of news, (6) authors of opinions, and (7) the way Polish journalists evaluated Poland’s performance during the EU presidency. The findings showed that although Polish print press reported the first Polish EU presidency, the topic’s
prominence was not very high. Media organizations rather rarely presented the topic on the front page and they did not change their regular editorial policy. Most of the news items, as well as opinions and comments, were written by staff members. Furthermore, journalists seemed to be more interested in the opinions of national politicians, rather than experts. As a result, the framework of the coverage was predominantly domestic. Journalists working for daily newspapers focused mostly on providing news and their own interpretations of the reported events. On the contrary weekly magazines provided comments and interviews, but again, most of the opinions were expressed by their own journalists and editors.
Similar to Monitoring of Russian propaganda on TV (20)
Minimizing cyber security risks – Digital Security School DSS380Internews Ukraine
Suggesting digital security trainings and audits for organizations, media and CSOs in Ukraine and Eastern Europe
site: http://dss380.org
FB: https://www.facebook.com/dss380org/
Monitoring report відкритість та usability урядових сайтів Internews Ukraine
Моніторинг провела ГО "Інтерньюз-Україна" у 2015 році шляхом оцінки відкритості роботи трьох міністерств та включає такі аспекти:
1. Оцінка технічної та візуальної зручності доступу до інформації користувачами (usability);
2. Оцінка інтерактивності роботи з користувачами сайту;
3. Аналіз опитування «Як журналісти оцінюють сайти українських міністерств?»
Prevention campaigns. How to reach target audiences? IOM in Ukraine Internews Ukraine
How to inform target audiences to prevent human trafficking?
Learning from International non-profits and experience in Ukraine - informational campaign led by Internews Ukraine
Як журналісту працювати з інфопотоками в епоху соцмедіа?Internews Ukraine
Забути догму про унікальний контент - як керуввати контентом соцмереж, реагувати на гарячі теми, доповнюючи традиційні способи роботи журналіста. Водночас, унікальний контент - це й унікальне перепакування наявного контенту
Presentation about Russian government supporters in Twitter. They are called "vatniki"
Urban dictionary:
Vatnik - A Russian jingoist and a supporter of Putin's politics. Exhibits stereotypical traits of a Russian jingoist: alcoholism, slovenliness, poverty and unconditional support of any decision of the Russian government.
(presentation in Ukrainian) What are the challenges of informational war and manipulations for civil society in Ukraine? And how to counteract Russia? How to use humor to undermine the influence of propaganda from Russian media?
23 липня 2014 в Інтерньюз-Україна відбувався СyberCamp - баркемп на тему цифрової та інформаційної безпеки. Баркемп відбувся в рамках проекту «У-Медіа» міжнародної організації Інтерньюз за фінансової підтримки АМР США.
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
23 липня 2014 в Інтерньюз-Україна відбувався СyberCamp - баркемп на тему цифрової та інформаційної безпеки. Баркемп відбувся в рамках проекту «У-Медіа» міжнародної організації Інтерньюз за фінансової підтримки АМР США.
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
Dmytro Snopchenko - Zahyst saitiv vid DDoS i lyudskyi faktorInternews Ukraine
23 липня 2014 в Інтерньюз-Україна відбувався СyberCamp - баркемп на тему цифрової та інформаційної безпеки. Баркемп відбувся в рамках проекту «У-Медіа» міжнародної організації Інтерньюз за фінансової підтримки АМР США.
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
Dmytro Gorshkov - Bezpeka informaciynogo prostoru ta protydiya manipulyaciyamInternews Ukraine
23 липня 2014 в Інтерньюз-Україна відбувався СyberCamp - баркемп на тему цифрової та інформаційної безпеки. Баркемп відбувся в рамках проекту «У-Медіа» міжнародної організації Інтерньюз за фінансової підтримки АМР США.
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
23 липня 2014 в Інтерньюз-Україна відбувався СyberCamp - баркемп на тему цифрової та інформаційної безпеки. Баркемп відбувся в рамках проекту «У-Медіа» міжнародної організації Інтерньюз за фінансової підтримки АМР США.
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
#cybercamp, #medianext_ua, цифрова безпека, кібер-безпека
Ukraine in Transit: From Digital Resistance to Digital RenaissanceInternews Ukraine
The presentation explores the digital dimension of Ukrainians protests Euromaidan and the digital challenges for Ukrainian non-profits and news organizations
Explore our comprehensive data analysis project presentation on predicting product ad campaign performance. Learn how data-driven insights can optimize your marketing strategies and enhance campaign effectiveness. Perfect for professionals and students looking to understand the power of data analysis in advertising. for more details visit: https://bostoninstituteofanalytics.org/data-science-and-artificial-intelligence/
Techniques to optimize the pagerank algorithm usually fall in two categories. One is to try reducing the work per iteration, and the other is to try reducing the number of iterations. These goals are often at odds with one another. Skipping computation on vertices which have already converged has the potential to save iteration time. Skipping in-identical vertices, with the same in-links, helps reduce duplicate computations and thus could help reduce iteration time. Road networks often have chains which can be short-circuited before pagerank computation to improve performance. Final ranks of chain nodes can be easily calculated. This could reduce both the iteration time, and the number of iterations. If a graph has no dangling nodes, pagerank of each strongly connected component can be computed in topological order. This could help reduce the iteration time, no. of iterations, and also enable multi-iteration concurrency in pagerank computation. The combination of all of the above methods is the STICD algorithm. [sticd] For dynamic graphs, unchanged components whose ranks are unaffected can be skipped altogether.
Opendatabay - Open Data Marketplace.pptxOpendatabay
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1. Supported by:
Impact of Russian TV
propaganda in the
EaP countries
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
2. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
The main goal was to evaluate if the Russian TV channels provide their
viewers with objective and balanced information about important international
and local issues. As such, the outcome of the monitoring is a detailed analysis
of the quality of selected Russian TV channels’ news programming.
3. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
WHO?
4. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
WHEN? From 1 – 31 March 2015
The methodology for the media monitoring was developed by MEMO 98 which has
carried out similar monitoring projects in some 50 countries in the last 16 years. It
included:
1) quantitative analysis of the coverage, which focused on the amount of time
allocated to each subject, as well as the tone of the coverage in which the relevant
political subjects were portrayed: positive, neutral or negative.
2) Qualitative analysis assessed the performance of the media against specific
principles or benchmarks – such as ethical or professional standards – that cannot be
easily quantified.
5. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
WHAT?
First Channel
Russia 1
NTV
Russia Today
TV Dozhd
Euronews (Russian Service)
RBK
First Baltic Channel (Latvia)
6. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
7. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
8. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Impact to EaP counties
TV is the most efficient method of influencing public opinion.
The role of the main RU TV:
- more significant in Armenia, Belarus and Moldova,
- limited in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, where the role of these channels is
more limited.
In Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russian channels are only available through cable
television, satellite antenna or Internet. In Ukraine, a number of measures
restricting Russian media have been introduced recently, including a ban on the
selected Russian channels from the cable packages.
9. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
The main RU TV channels remain available also through terrestrial
transmitters and are the most important sources of information in Crimea
and “DNR” and “LNR”.
RU TV channels are generally very popular, particularly in Armenia,
Belarus and Moldova.
By contrast, the popularity of these channels in Georgia and Ukraine has been
affected by the armed conflicts in 2008 and 2014 - 15 respectively. In
Azerbaijan, only a small segment of the population favors Russian TV
channels as their information source.
10. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
The national broadcasters in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova strive to
provide an alternative to the Russian propaganda and to reduce its impact.
The current situation with the freedom of media in Belarus and Armenia
prevents the national broadcasters from serving as such alternative.
Moreover, Russian-speaking media – TV Dozhd and RTVI - which have
potential to provide alternative information to the main Russian channels face
certain restrictions in these countries and are available only via Internet. In
Azerbaijan, the impact of the Russian channels is limited.
The media in the EaP countries are reluctant to use the same aggressive
style of propaganda currently used by the main Russian channels.
11. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Monitoring results
The main Russian TV channels showed very limited range of views in
their reporting of international and local topics and issues, thus depriving
their viewers of receiving objective and balanced coverage.
The principal general trend - an exceptionally limited range of
diversity of political actors in the main Russian TV channels. This was
visible in the coverage of both international and local topics.
The three main Russian channels (First channel, Russia 1, and NTV)
devoted extensive prime time news coverage to the activities of the
authorities, focusing primarily on the activities of the president and the
government.
12. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Clear tendency to cover the activities of state officials extensively,
pointing out achievements and successes and neglecting to offer
any independent and alternative views or critical reporting
challenging the performance of the authorities.
The primetime programs on the 3 channels lacked meaningful
agenda setting debates involving genuine public discussions over
some pressing economic, social or policy issues.
Example: such as the falling price of oil and its impact on the Russian
economy. If mentioned, then it was presented in a way that no
sanctions and no decrease of the crude oil prices could get Russia on
her knees, as these are only temporary difficulties that will make the
country stronger and consolidate Russian people.
13. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Main Russian channels have been used as instruments of
propaganda in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, diverting
attention from important domestic issues and challenges and
instead focusing on the conflict in Ukraine.
Instead of serving as facilitator of discussion on public policy issues,
the three channels openly demonstrated bias in breach of media
ethics and principles of impartial and objective reporting, showing
explicit sympathy for one side and distaste for the others.
50% of coverage on the three channels was devoted to foreign
affairs (primarily Ukraine) whereas topics such as social issues
received only a very limited coverage.
14. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Representatives of “DNR” and “LNR” obtained extensive and
overwhelmingly positive and neutral coverage on the three
channels. In sharp contrast, official Ukrainian authorities and
institutions were portrayed in a very negative way.
As a rule, only to the representatives of separatists had
opportunity to speak directly on camera while official Ukrainian
representatives were almost completely ignored. Even in those reports
wich were said to be prepared from Kiev, there was no diversity of
opinions, as virtually all interviews were done with experts or politicans
loyal to Russia.
15. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
A significant level of hostility towards specific actors was
perpetuated invariably on the 3 channels and Russia Today.
In particular, the Ukrainian authorities were presented as the ones
guilty of the disastrous situation in the Eastern part of Ukraine while the
US administration was presented as being interested in maintaining
the conflict in the region and trying to persuade the Western Europe
and EU to sanction Russia.
Russian media attempted to show Ukraine = failed state.
They wanted to expose “the aggressive plans of the West, particularly
of the USA,” and tried to justify the struggle of Russians in Ukraine for
the "ancestral Russian lands”.
16. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
A significant coverage was devoted to speculations on a possible
Western plot against Russia with viewers being presented with a
picture of the West trying to attack Russia.
Example: The story of World War II was also used to stigmatize the
population with the possibility of a war and the need of Russia to
protect itself against the enemy.
The main channels conducted an information campaign against US
and Ukraine with the aim to demonize US and Ukrainian authorities
and to portray Russia as a protector of Russian citizens in the
conflict zone. Almost all materials covering US and Ukraine included
statements or reporting prejudicial against the US and Ukrainian
administrations.
17. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
18. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
The conflict in Ukraine was an omnipresent topic not only in the news
programs but also in the selected other information programs. Talk show
hosts and presenters were heavily biased which was obvious from their
views, body language and gestures.
In the coverage of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia is presented as a
peacemaker, and the message of the need of Russia on permanent basis in
the region is propagated. In addition to Ukraine, other Eastern partnership
countries (EaP) were mentioned too, but to a much more limited extent.
19. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Almost all reports promoted the idea of legitimacy of
separatist regions. The same cannot be said about the
Ukrainian authorities that were sometimes referred as a
fascist junta that came to power thanks to a coup
organized by the West (primarily by USA).
20. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
manipulations techniques used by the main RU TV :
manipulative use of images and sound,
pseudo-diversity of opinions,
mixing comments and opinions,
appeals to fear,
scapegoating,
demonizing the enemy,
lack of transparency and credibility of sources,
selective coverage,
omission of information,
manipulative search for sympathizers,
labeling and stereotyping,
vagueness,
repetition and exaggeration,
inaccurate reporting and lies etc.
21. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Russia Today case
demonstrated a pattern of political favoritism towards the incumbent
Russian authorities, but showed a slightly different approach to that of
the three above-mentioned channels. This is due to the fact that it
Russia Today mainly targets international viewers, particularly in USA
and in the European Union. As such, the bulk of the channel’s
coverage was devoted to the above-mentioned international topics and
subjects, primarily USA and EU that were heavily criticized. BUT
Ukraine did not receive as much coverage as on the main Russian
channels but the tone of the coverage was also critical towards the
Ukrainian authorities.
22. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
TV Dozhd case
showed a very different approach to that of the four above-mentioned channels
controlled by the Russian authorities as it was more focused on the local
Russian affairs than on the conflict in Ukraine or the Russia-West relations.
Moreover, the coverage of topics and subjects related to Ukraine was
generally balanced.
23. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
The one-month long monitoring confirmed that the identified problems in the
main Russian channels were not results of short-term anomalies but reflect
real trends. In particular, such a problem includes the fact that the interests of
the current Russian authorities and not the interests of the readers or viewers
determine the editorial policy of these channels.
24. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Recommendations
PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
The existence of independent, vibrant and competitive media landscape is
essential for providing a variety of news and views in different languages coming
from different countries but with a priority given to a high quality programs
produced in national languages. The national media enjoying high level of trust
and popularity in the EaP countries would serve as a good tool against the Russian
media propaganda. In this respect, the existence of truly independent public
service broadcasters that would develop impartial editorial practices is essential.
It is therefore important for the authorities in the EaP countries to strengthen
mandate by public service broadcasters so it reflects public interest and it is based
on independence, editorial freedom and non-interference by authorities or
political parties. The reporting by these broadcasters should be balanced and
factual, including when covering activities of the authorities, in line with international
good practice.
25. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ACTORS
Given the overall lack of high-quality reporting in the EaP countries,
consideration should be given to supporting activities aimed at raising
professional standards, including adherence to internationally
recognized ethical codes and standards for balanced and objective
reporting and news presentation. This should include support to
already existing media outlets (both local and foreign) that
provide alternative information to the one presented by the main
Russian channels.
Existing international and local media outlets transmitting via
cable, satellite or Internet should receive more support to provide
high-quality reporting in languages more accessible to viewers and
listeners in the EaP countries.
26. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
a direct exchange of a high-quality media content between
broadcasters in the EaP countries.
strengthening protection of national airways against hate speech
and state propaganda that breaches the law. At the same time, if
applied, restrictions to the freedom of expression should not be
disproportional in scope and should not be arbitrary and politically
motivated to limit the expression of alternative positions.
27. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) should play a more
active role in monitoring compliance by its members with the
EBU’s statutes, particularly promoting and developing the concept of
public service media and their values such as universality,
independence, excellence, diversity, accountability and innovation, as
referred to in the EBU Declaration on the Core Values of the Public
Service Media
28. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
PROFESSIONALISM & MEDIA LITERACY
further enhancing the existing and creating new platforms for discussion,
trainings, studies and self-reflection on the media, including in the regions,
to enhance the current level of journalistic profession and explain the unhealthy
aspects of journalism, such as propaganda
To prevent monopolization of the media market by improving competition,
using motivation tools for the old players to get rid of excess concentration, and
to encouraging new players to invest.
29. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
MEDIA REGULATION
Media regulators should monitor ex officio broadcasters’
compliance with legislation and contractual license conditions and in
case of their non-compliance they should apply appropriate sanctions.
Sanctions should be clearly defined and commensurate with the
gravity of the violation committed. The establishment of systematic
media monitoring based on credible methodology would assist the
regulators in identification of legal violations (including hate speech &
propaganda) and in taking prompt and adequate corrective action.
30. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Authorities in the EaP countries should ensure (both in legislation
and in practice) the political and operational independence of the
broadcast media regulators, in line with the OSCE, EU and Council
of Europe’s recommendations.
31. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
Followin-up Reflections of UA experts
32. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
33. Точки зору, виражені в цій публікації, не обов'язково відображають погляди і думки
Європейського Союзу
ENP East Media Freedom Watch Project
THANK YOU
Andriy Kulakov
Program Director
akulakov@internews.ua
Report is available at:
internews.ua
memo98.sk