(2008) Martin Heidegger's pallid lack of Love: answering Nihilism

Sonja Grussendorf, 2007-08 – SEP-FEP Conference Paper
HEIDEGGER’S PALLID LACK OF LOVE: ANSWERING NIHILISM
Abstract:
Martin Heidegger neglected the concept of love in his work, favouring fear, angst, technology,
nihilism. His response to the problem of modern technology was to urge us to turn towards the
poetic and Gelassenheit. I argue that a more convincing, and ultimately more ethical response can be
found in a turn to love. The threat that resides within technology is nihilism, or Seinsvergessenheit,
which gives rise to the “pallid lack of mood – indifference”, Heidegger suggests. In this pallid lack of
mood, things no longer address or concern us, the nothing does not differentiate. Love however is the
recognition of difference; it allows things to ek-sist, i.e. to stand out in difference. Love allows ‘things’,
i.e. das Seiende to address us again.
***
Love, Plato states in the Phaedrus, clearly belongs to the class of debatable words.1
Love, explains Diotima to Socrates, is a great demon, a spirit which both mediates between the divine
and the mortal, and resides within this between.2
Love in accordance with the laws of God, St.
Augustine preaches, is the love which dictates that we “will not hate a man because of this vice nor
love the vice because of a man, but will hate the vice and love the man.”3
Hannah Arendt comments
that this means we love our “neighbour in sublime indifference regardless of what or who he is.”4
Love, she insists in her turn by 1958, “by its very nature is unworldly and it is for this reason rather
than its rarity that it is not only a-political but anti-political, perhaps the most powerful of all anti-
political human forces.”5
“[…] daß ich noch nicht stark genug bin für Deine Liebe”, writes Martin Heidegger to his young
student in 1925, “[…] that I am not yet strong enough for your love”, and he adds, “die Liebe gibt es ja
nicht”. 6
1
Phaedrus 263b.
2
Symposium 202e
3
St Augustine, The City of God, Book IV, chapter 6
4
Arendt, Hannah, Love and Saint Augustine, trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996 (1929)).
5
Arendt, Hannah, The human condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958). p.242
6
Arendt, Hannah and Heidegger, Martin, Briefe 1925 - 1975, 3rd 2003 ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1998). P.38
Page 1 of 10

“Love as such does not exist of course”, stipulates Heidegger, the private man, suggesting that love,
like death, is always “je dein” or “je mein”, in each case yours, in each case mine. We read this
statement in his private correspondence. “Love as such” does not exist in his public work.
This absence of love is curious. The concept of love is quintessentially philosophical; it is there at the
very beginning, in its very name. The phenomenon of love is quintessentially human. Yet, Martin
Heidegger does not ask “what or where is the essence of love”, das Wesen der Liebe.
This is unfortunate, for love, I suggest, is key to dealing with the challenge posed by modern
technology – and technology is very much a dominant theme in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.
Technology, whether in its kinship to art or through its relationship with nihilism, as a power which
poses a threat to us, exercises his thinking throughout.
My claim is that love, by its very nature, can negotiate the threat that resides in modern technology in
a more convincing manner than Heidegger’s own call for a turn to poetry and Gelassenheit, because it
opens up an ethical dimension.
It is now almost commonplace to point out that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is
disproportionately biased towards the despairing, the terrible, and death, and that his Dasein, the
human being distinguished ontologically by its curiosity about Being, is oddly sexless, heartless and
loveless. Early on, Emmanuel Levinas criticised Heidegger’s insistence on the priority of ontology
before ethics. Hinting at Heidegger’s fixation with the Seinsfrage, the question about the meaning of
Being, Levinas asserts that “[t]he love of life does not resemble the care for Being, reducible to the
comprehension of Being, or ontology. The love of life does not love Being, but loves the happiness of
being.”7
More recently philosophers have been concerned to point out that Dasein is an abstract
construct, devoid of human, biological features. Thus, Jacques Derrida questioned Dasein’s curious
gender neutrality8
, John D. Caputo indicted Heidegger’s “aggressive, able-bodied ontology”9
and Frank
Schalow noted the rare instance in which Heidegger ascribes to Dasein a heart10
. Assessing the entire
Heideggerian corpus, David Farrell Krell finds simply that there is “precious little on love” in
Heidegger’s oeuvre. He explains that even where Heidegger “does refer to the joy experienced in a
beloved human being”, it is explicitly a joy in the presence of that person as Dasein, abstracted as it
were, and thus “a presence that remains ethereal, estranged, ghostlike – in a word, transcendental-
metaphysical.” He concludes “the ‘nearness to Being’ remains exposed to the misinterpretation that it
is an angelic hovering, dreamy and disembodied, among the outermost spheres.”11
Attempts to put
some flesh on the anaemic construct Dasein, and to endow it with politics or indeed love, and above
7
Levinas, Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1995 (1969)). P.145
8
Derrida, Jacques, "Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference (1983)," in Feminist Interpretations of
Martin Heidegger, ed. Nancy Holland and Patricia Huntington, Re-reading the Canon (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).
9
Caputo, John D., Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993). P.71
10
Schalow, F, Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred: from thought to the sanctuary of faith (Springer, 2001).
P.40
11
Krell, David Farrell, Intimations of Mortality:Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being
(Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1986). P.173
Page 2 of 10

all to root it in this world, rather than a different, transcendental one, have been made by various
authors, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre among others.
However, Heidegger is not “absolutely” silent on love. He refers to it in the Letter on Humanism, in
What is Philosophy and What is called Thinking, albeit only within the discussion of the essence of a
person, the meaning of the word philosophy for Heraclitus and the meaning of deep thinking,
respectively. The concept appears in his lectures of the 30s, albeit as part of the wider exegeses of
other philosophies, Plato’s for example, and Schelling’s, hence one might say that Heidegger could
not but mention that both Plato and Schelling use the term in their works. From the evidence of Being
and Time certainly, one may assume that Heidegger considers love to be nothing more than an affect,
a pathos, a mood, one amongst many such modes of Befindlichkeit, of state-of-mind. One may only
assume this, since the concept is not explicitly discussed. Love, unlike the dominant phenomena fear
and anxiety is not mentioned in Being and Time, except in two footnotes, in which the word appears
but is not discussed. Does this not seem at odds with that work’s central analysis of the meaning of
our Being as care (Sorge)? Heidegger asserts an obvious ontological relationship between fear and
anxiety, based on our common habit of interchanging these two, of treating them as synonyms.
(SZ185) By a similar logic love could be said to be ontologically related to care, but we are not told of
this relationship. It is clear that love has no privileged function in the fundamental analysis of Dasein.
It is significant that Heidegger displayed such a reluctance to engage with love, but what does it
signify? Is it a shortcoming in his overall philosophy, is it indicative of shortcomings in his method, or
is its absence symptomatic of personal preferences? Being and Time displays a noticeable emphasis
on death, fear, anxiety, boredom, and guilt, all of which are undoubtedly essential experiences, and
part of the human condition. But we might still ask if it is necessary for the analysis of Dasein to
privilege these concepts at the expense of love, jubilation, and ecstasy. Are birth and love not equally
essential to the human condition? Perhaps his leaning towards the end as opposed to the beginning is
in part due to the accident of his particular character. Friedrich Nietzsche mused, “[g]radually it has
become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of
its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoires.”12
Is this the case with Heidegger,
too? Interestingly, Hannah Arendt provides an example of how a different perspective yields a
different kind of philosophy. Her philosophy of natality, i.e. of beginning, is based on Heidegger’s
temporal analysis of Dasein in Being and Time.13
Heidegger’s temporal focus is firmly on the concept
of death, that is, he makes central to the analysis of Dasein its inevitable end – we are to understand
ourselves throughout as inescapably finite. Arendt answers, qua dialectical echo, by focusing her
philosophical gaze in the opposite direction, namely birth. We must also understand ourselves, that is,
the possibility of our Dasein, as being possible only within the horizon of beginning.
On the other hand, the thinking of later Heidegger, especially his concern with the autonomy and
fragility of being, bears a certain resemblance to loving, and occasionally Heidegger nods in that
12
Allmählich hat sich mir herausgestellt, was jede grosse Philosophie bisher war: nämlich das Selbstbekenntnis
ihres Urhebers und eine Art ungewollter und unvermerkter memoires;” F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse
p.14-15 (Nietzsche, Friedrich, Werke 3: Jenseits von Gut und Böse und andere Schriften, ed. Rolf Toman, 3 vols.,
vol. 3, Werke in Drei Bänden (Köln: Könemann, 1994).)
13
Cp. Villa, Dana R., Arendt and Heidegger - The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996).
Page 3 of 10

direction. However, he did not see the potential of love as a creative force to stand up to nihilism. I
suggest that Heidegger’s lack of love, his failure to recognise its potential for answering nihilism, is in
part due to a reductive understanding of love as a mere emotion.
I will outline Heidegger’s position on technology and nihilism and explain how he proposes to meet
them. I will then propose that love is connected to technology as a creative force, on a par with
poetry as the saving power; and that it is ideally suited to answer nihilism because it is something we
all have a spontaneous capacity to do.14
HEIDEGGER ON TECHNOLOGY
Heidegger’s treatment of the question concerning technology is well known, his famous essay being a
commonly discussed piece.15
Jean-Luc Nancy remarked of it that Heidegger is “less original there than
almost anywhere else in his work.” 16
I would further note a lack of subtlety – the essay is a
showpiece, a showing-off piece, of Heidegger style, in form and content. As such it has, if such a thing
were sought, pedagogical value. Here, he crystallises his thinking about our technical age, and in so
doing delivers a unique entry point both into his method of thinking and the (very modern) problem
of modern technology.
We encounter classic Heideggerian moves. He relates plausibly the distinction between the essence of
an “x” and an instance of that “x”, i.e. “that which pervades every tree […], is not itself a tree […]
among all the other trees.”17
He proposes that we return to the origins of our current definition of a
concept. This means we must re-read Aristotle for a fuller understanding of the term technology via
his use of the term technê. We receive a lesson in Greek-to-German translation. This includes in
particular the reminder that we side-step Latin terminology in favour of the original Greek. For, as he
explains, Latin causa, English cause, German Ursache, names a different thing from Aristotle’s aition.
Further, there is his idiosyncratic insistence on nounifying verbs which serves to emphasise that
something is being done, that there is something at work. With this grammatical idiosyncrasy
Heidegger evokes the duality of the denominative of the noun and the active of the verb. Hence he
speaks of “a challenging”, rather than a challenge (ein Herausfordern, not eine Herausforderung), a
revealing, a destining (Geschick). Finally, he leaves us with a familiar hint at the possibility of the
higher essence of the fine arts to bring about “poetic revealing”– without, and this too, is classic, any
final commitment of his to an either or an or.
The ultimate purpose of his thinking about technology is to establish a free relation with it. This
introduces his –and presumably his audience’s – suspicion that modern technology is holding us in its
grip, its strangling ubiquity dominating our lives, taking over our world. It should be stressed that we
14
On the idea that love and hate are best understood as activities, rather than mere emotions (Gemütszustande),
see Scheler, Max, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1985).; also Fromm, Erich, Die Kunst
des Liebens, trans. Günter Eichel, 1st ed. (Frankfurt/Main - Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1963).
15
Die Frage nach der Technik, in: Heidegger, Martin, Vorträge und Aufsätze, vol. GA7, Gesamtausgabe (Stuttgart:
Verlag Günther Neske, 1954)., hereafter referred to as QcT.
16
Nancy, Jean-Luc, A Finite Thinking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
17
QcT, p.4
Page 4 of 10

are concerned with modern technology – unease with technology does not arise from a spoon, or a
panpipe, instruments though both are. Motorised agriculture; nuclear proliferation; gene
manipulation … these give rise to unease about technology, a sense of unease which may resonate
with many of us today. Yet it may not resonate with many others, who might rather sneer at the
former for being scaremongering technophobes. In Heidegger’s analysis, exactly this type of polarised
positioning towards technology, [“it’s strangling!”/ “it’s fabulous!”] chains us to it; this kind of
positioning of our thinking prohibits us from being free with it.
We are chained to technology because we do not understand it essentially.
We do have an understanding of it, of course; we have a definition. Technology is the purposeful
application of tools, i.e. it is both a means to ends and something that we humans do. This
instrumental and anthropological conception of technology determines how and that we master it.
“That we master it” – this needs the instrumental definition to be wholly true. The ‘that we master it’
taunts us. Do we master it? No. Not, if technology turns out not only to be ‘mere means’ and a human
activity. The purpose of the first part of the essay is to challenge our conviction that technology is ‘in
our hands’. Heidegger shows that it is rather the other way round, and that it is naïve to consider this
one aspect of the truth about technology as definitive. The larger truth about modern technology is
that it itself is a mode of truth as revealing. As such revealing it exercises a rule, and it does this as
enframing, as Gestell. The term “enframing” captures that technology makes us face the world and
ourselves in a particular way. It captures that we project ourselves into the world within a particular
framework. It captures that under the sway of technology we understand and think, and receive the
world technologically.
However, this cannot mean that in order to “climb out” of this framework, we must avoid technology.
Who of us is willing to give up our instruments, our time-, labour- and life-saving machinery, our
ability to explore the depths of the oceans, to maintain global relationships via communication
technologies, to monitor the heartbeat of an unborn child? Heidegger agrees. He fears that we may
fall in bondage to technical devices, but he is also clear that we can act otherwise.
We can act otherwise if we do not allow calculative thinking to become the law – that type of thinking
that is concerned with reckoning, but not with meaning, he reminds us in Gelassenheit.18
We can turn
towards the poetic, the creative, to ‘save us’ from technology’s deadly indifference, he suggests in the
Technology essay. We can face the flat, one-dimensional and mercantile rule of technology with a
resolute contemplation of art. This is a possibility granted by our willingness to think meditatively.
Heidegger is a keen critic of the levelling dominance of technology, but he does not peddle
unreconstructed technological fatalism. Heidegger raises possibilities. There is the possibility of being
free with technology, but there is also the very real possibility of us being swept into the abyss of
Seinsvergessenheit, our forgetting of Being.
18
Heidegger, Martin, Discourse on Thinking - A Translation of Gelassenheit, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans
Freund (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1966).
Page 5 of 10

One thing above all should be clear: “technology is not the enemy”. We do not need to condemn
technology (indeed it would be quite futile to do so). Of course, Heidegger would not tell us what to
do, since that is not what he, as philosopher, considers his task. Heidegger’s lack of concreteness, his
unwillingness to answer concretely the critical question “what is to be done?” is often at the heart of
what irks his readers. As if it were not enough to have prised open and revealed a larger truth about
technology, they demand that he tell us what to do. But that is not our fundamental concern.
HEIDEGGER ON NIHILISM
What concerns us here is our stance towards ourselves: do we, in our thinking, meditate on the Being
of our being, are we thus fully and essentially ourselves? Or does technology distract us from this
essential contemplation? “The issue” he writes, “is the saving of man’s essential nature.”19
The issue is calculative thinking, technological thinking, which is the thinking of metaphysics, the
essence of which is nihilism. This nihilism, this “exhaustion of meaning” expresses itself as the oblivion
of Being (Seinsvergessenheit).20
Not technology, but nihilism is “the enemy”.
Technology constitutes what Dreyfus calls a “nihilistic cultural paradigm.”21
Nihilism of course began with Plato. For, if nihilism begins with an insistence on the inherent
worthlessness of this world, then nihilism began when Plato removed all highest values, such as truth,
beauty, and goodness, from this world to another, rendering this one meaningless.22
The nothing, the nihil itself is a deserving locus of philosophical interest. The nothing belongs
essentially to an understanding and questioning of Being, and Heidegger rebukes philosophical
attempts to deny its “possibility” as a dogmatic obeisance to science and technology thinking.23
The
nothing is disclosed to us in anxiety, and this experience is phenomenologically valuable in that it, in
its turn, reveals more than any other state-of-mind Dasein as a being-in-the-world.
Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. (SZ187)24
19
Ibid. p.56
20
Villa. P.87
21
Guignon, Charles, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
P.301
22
Villa. P.98
23
Heidegger, Martin, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 6th ed., vol. GA40 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953).
Pp.18, 19
24
„Das Sichängsten erschliesst urspruenglich und direkt die Welt als Welt.“
Page 6 of 10

In anxiety, the nothing is experienced by way of everything becoming indifferent. This “fear of
nothing,” he depicts as “[a]ll things and we ourselves sink into an indifference”, and he clarifies later
“das Seiende spricht nicht mehr an”, beings are no longer of concern; they no longer address us with
their Being.25
In Being and Time too, indifference expresses the forgetting of being in the everyday:
Furthermore, the pallid lack of mood - indifference - (die fahle Ungestimmtheit der
Gleichgültigkeit) which is addicted to nothing and has no urge for anything, and which
abandons itself to whatever the day may bring, yet in so doing takes everything along
with it in a certain manner, demonstrates most penetratingly the power of forgetting in
the everyday mode of that concern which is closest to us. (SZ345)26
What is notable about nihilism is its “ism”; it indicates an undue focus on the nihil, the nothing, as a
doctrine, and as a practice. Nihilism crystallises and fetishises the nothing. That is, the “ism” elevates
and celebrates the nihil, paradoxically, for it is of course at once the impossibility to celebrate
anything, for it is that in which nothing at all can be celebrated. Nihilism is the elevation of
indifference. Heidegger’s thinking is driven by the desire to meet with fitting force this undesirable,
and paradoxical, elevation of indifference.
How does Heidegger propose to counter our fall into indifference?
Hearing and heeding the words of poets, especially of Hölderlin, who reminds us that we dwell on
earth poetically. Pondering the saving power of the poetic. Practicing meditative thinking, which
anyone can do, “in his own manner and within his own limits”, because humans are thinking,
meditating beings.27
Above all, “exercising” Gelassenheit, a serenity that is all about a forceful letting-
be. Gelassenheit is the essence of meditative thinking. Its essence is a waiting, a collected, thoughtful
resting, which is the sojourn (der Aufenthalt) between “yes” and “no”. Gelassenheit encapsulates the
unthinkable risk of thinking.28
25
„Alle Dinge und wir selbst versinken in eine Gleichgueltigkeit“ (footnote: „das Seiende spricht nicht mehr an.“)
Heidegger, Martin, Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, 3rd ed., vol. GA9, Gesamtausgabe
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996). (“Was ist Metaphysik”) p.111 (my transl.)
26
“Die fahle Ungestimmtheit der Gleichgültigkeit vollends, die an nichts haengt und zu nichts draengt und sich
dem ueberlaesst, was je der Tag bringt, und dabei in gewisser Weise doch alles mitnimmt, demonstriert am
eindringlichsten die Macht des Vergessens in den alltaeglichen Stimmungen des naechsten Besorgens.” (original
emphasis)
27
Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking - A Translation of Gelassenheit. P.47
28
Heidegger, Martin, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, vol. GA13, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 2002). P.57
Page 7 of 10

LOVE
Unfortunately, this type of thinking about thinking is couched in terms that are difficult to relate to a
larger audience and as such, the thinking of Gelassenheit displays a certain middle class bias that is
difficult to reconcile with the problem of technology which concerns us all.
If we are concerned about technology and how it determines each of us in our essential nature, then
the ethical response must be one that is accessible to all of us. The terror of nihilism reigns as the
failure to discriminate, to distinguish, or to differentiate. Gleichgültigkeit, indifference, transliterates
to equal validity: all things being equal. The word indifference says this same thing by prefixing
difference with the privative “in-“. Indifference denotes sameness, absolute sameness, the total
absence of otherness. Love is the antonym, the antidote to this “pallid lack of mood”, because love is
the recognition of difference; it brings back an addiction to something, it allows for things to ek-sist:
to stand out in difference. Love is that which allows the thing that is (das Seiende) to address us again.
In love we can not fail to discriminate. In love, we evaluate, we bestow the gift of value to the persons
that we love. In love, one cannot be indifferent. The nothing is not a possibility when you love. In one
of his rare references to love, in the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger says of it:
To accept, receive, or concern oneself with a ‘thing’ or a ‘person’ in their essence, that
means to love them, to favour them. Thought in a more primordially way, this favouring
(mögen) means to give essence as a gift.29
In contrast, nihilism is the devaluation of values. Its terror is the lack of love.
Thus, love is uniquely able to answer nihilism, because love means this: I want that you are. “Amo:
volo ut sis”30
. I want that you are, I want your being, and I do not want your annihilation. Love is also
creative, because I want that you are means that I create you. If to love, to favour a person is to give
them their essence, then to love is to be creative, for in love I create the other. I want being, I create
being, I bestow being.
Love, as a creative activity, is furthermore kindred to technology, in as far as it too, is a form of
poiesis. It may not be the saving power itself, but it may at the very least help us reflect on what that
saving power might be.
29
Heidegger, Martin, "Brief über den "Humanismus"," in Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996). p.316 “Sich einer ‘Sache’ oder einer ‘Person’ annehmen, das
heist: sie lieben: sie moegen. Dieses Moegen bedeutet, urspruenglicher gedacht: das Wesen schenken.“ (my
transl.)
30
Heidegger and others have credited Saint Augustine with this definition of love, though it cannot be found like
this in Saint Augustine’s texts. Heidegger wrote it to Hannah Arendt as early as 1925, and it became a guiding
quotation for her, possible the reason why she chose Aquinas’ on love as her doctoral dissertation topic. It is
more likely that the definition was formulated by John Duns Scotus.
Page 8 of 10

Love resembles what Heidegger calls Gelassenheit, letting-be, but it is more firmly rooted in our
experiences, it is more “universally” accessible, and it is less obscure and opaque than this “sojourn”
(der Aufenthalt) between the “yes” and the “no”.31
Gelassenheit is by no means a call to passivity, but it is also not a call to actively be towards the other.
Love, understood as an essential activity, an art which can be learnt, is more concerned about the
other than about Being.
Arendt, Hannah. The human condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958.
———. Love and Saint Augustine. Translated by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 (1929).
Arendt, Hannah, and Martin Heidegger. Briefe 1925 - 1975. 3rd 2003 ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1998.
Caputo, John D. Demythologizing Heidegger. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1993.
Derrida, Jacques. "Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference (1983)." In Feminist
Interpretations of Martin Heidegger, edited by Nancy Holland and Patricia Huntington, 53-72.
University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.
Fromm, Erich. Die Kunst des Liebens. Translated by Günter Eichel. 1st ed. Frankfurt/Main - Berlin:
Ullstein Verlag, 1963.
Guignon, Charles, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993.
Heidegger, Martin. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Vol. GA13, Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.
———. "Brief über den "Humanismus"." In Wegmarken, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996.
———. Discourse on Thinking - A Translation of Gelassenheit. Translated by John M. Anderson and E.
Hans Freund. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1966.
———. Einführung in die Metaphysik. 6th ed. Vol. GA40. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953.
———. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Vol. GA7, Gesamtausgabe. Stuttgart: Verlag Günther Neske, 1954.
———. Wegmarken. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann. 3rd ed. Vol. GA9, Gesamtausgabe.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996.
31
See: Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. P.57
Page 9 of 10

Krell, David Farrell. Intimations of Mortality:Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being.
Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1986.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1995 (1969).
Nancy, Jean-Luc. A Finite Thinking. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Werke 3: Jenseits von Gut und Böse und andere Schriften. Edited by Rolf Toman.
3 vols. Vol. 3, Werke in Drei Bänden. Köln: Könemann, 1994.
Schalow, F. Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred: from thought to the sanctuary of faith: Springer,
2001.
Scheler, Max. Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1985.
Villa, Dana R. Arendt and Heidegger - The Fate of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996.
Page 10 of 10

(2008) Martin Heidegger's pallid lack of Love: answering Nihilism

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(2008) Martin Heidegger's pallid lack of Love: answering Nihilism