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#NoMoreAdFraud
Brandon Miller, Carmichael Lynch
Michael Tiffany, White Ops
The Problem
The Criminals
The Solution
The Bot World
The Problem
The Criminals
The Solution
The Bot World
In 2014, The Bot
Baseline found fraud
in every kind of
campaign we studied.
The average loss to
bots was 11%.
Bots are infecting the system.
Fake web browsers go to real (or fake) sites, view real ads,
and demand payment for the service
How big is the problem?
$6,300,000,000
$ $
$
The honest truth is…
…it’s worse than this.
$6.3 billion is a conservative estimate, but that’s more than bad enough.
More significant is…
Who
Where
It’s coming from inside the house
Why you care:
Your money gets home users hacked.
You are being tricked into tracking bots.
1
2
Why hack home users?
Hint: not to rob their digital funds and identities
(not that they don’t)
If you want to get targeted, you (often) need a consumer’s identity.
That can be arranged.
False assumptions:
Bots are afraid of tracking (nope: hacked
goods make them seem legitimate)
Optimizing for performance, or
viewability, or conversions squeezes out
the bots automatically (nope)
x
x
…our findings show otherwise.
Bot fraud is the
scalable ad fraud
Yes, you should probably care about pixel stuffing,
ad clutter, ad collision, etc. etc. etc. But those things
don’t happen on expensive placements. Those
things don’t add up to $6.3 billion dollars. Those
things don’t funnel money to organized crime. Your
CFO cares about stopping money going to
organized crime. He may not care about ad clutter.
The Problem
The Criminals
The Solution
The Bot World
Ad fraud is not evenly distributed
(Neither is tuberculosis)
Video is (on average):
2.1 times bottier than display
Almost a quarter of video advertisement goes to nobody
Display Programmatic Retargeting
54%
bottier
73%
bottier
Programmatic
(buy at your own risk)
X X33% Bots 3% Bots
Exchange 1 Exchange 2
News Junkie
Targeting (and Retargeting)
Missed.
Fake profiles and
stolen cookies =
retargeted campaigns
had more bots, not
less
Premium sites are “safer” but…
When publishers get a portion of
their visitors from other sites on the
web, they get bot traffic, too.
The Problem
The Criminals
The Solution
The Bot World
$
Advertiser
Agency
Exchanges
Publisher
Who’s the bad guy?
Not these guys
Advertiser
Agency
Exchanges
Publisher
Who’s the bad guy?
The real bad guys are
the ones breaking into
everyone’s computers
How do the bad guys make money?
…with fake sites.
…with fake sites.
…when real sites
need more traffic.
&
Fake Sites
 Awful content
 Scraped or copied
content
 Objectively measurable
 Hosts ads
 Makes money
Doesn’t matter; humans don’t visit
Sourced Traffic
$
One site paying another to send more traffic
Sourced Traffic
$
Sourced traffic is usually botty traffic (even for premium sites)
especially
The attackers adapt Here they come.
Turn the bots
off!
They’re leaving.
Turn the bots
back on.
We have a
complaint. Clean
it up.
Here they
come again…
There are some interesting patterns…
When advertisers demand more
traffic, the differential between
available humans and advertiser
demand for traffic can be made up
with bots.
Bots will often supply traffic as
needed in bursts – in this case,
every Saturday
There are some interesting patterns…
Not all botnets are run by geniuses: some bots are too
dumb to keep daylight hours:
Old Browsers Are Bot Browsers
Bots both:
Cycle through many
fake user-agents
(browsers) to hide in
the noise
Provide real user-
agents, but don’t get
auto-updated
Why are we still
supporting old
browsers?!
But patterns are not evidence.
• Taking on all the botnets at once requires
hardcore malware reverse-engineering and
major intelligence operations.
• We’re in an arms race against the world’s
best cybercriminals.
• It’s fun to point out these patterns, but if all
we had to do was find the patterns, this
problem would have been solved already.
The Problem
The Criminals
The Victims
The Solution
We all need to work together
to solve the problem of ad fraud.
On the Sell Side,
real can’t compete with fake
If the Buy Side
can’t tell the difference
In December 2014, on behalf of a large brand,
the ad agency Carmichael Lynch
decided to make an above-average campaign even better.
Carmichael Lynch’s
Anti-Fraud Formula:
 Monitor for fraud in all the brand’s campaigns
 Use continuous monitoring (Detection) to hold all supply
partners accountable and to reward great ones
 Take proactive steps (Prevention) only where it makes
sense for the buyer to take that burden
1. Top volume
campaigns had
expensive bot problems
Top bot problems:
Solution: Protect high value media investment –
reduce fraud where it hits the hardest by dollars
Campaign Human Bots Bots %
1* 350M 20M 5%
2* 260M 20M 7%
3* 190M 14M 7%
4 76M 3M 4%
5* 63M 10M 13%
1. Top volume campaigns had
expensive bot problems
2. Small but significant bot
percentages across too many
placements to address manually
Top bot problems:
Solution: Anti-targeting!
5.90%
7.80%
6.70%
3.80% 3.40%
2/22, 13 MM 2/23, 15 MM 2/24, 16 MM 2/25, 14 MM 2/26, 13 MM
Bot % of total
Solution: Anti-targeting!
In one day, Carmichael Lynch
cut the brand’s bot percentage
by 43%.
5.90%
7.80%
6.70%
3.80% 3.40%
2/22, 13 MM 2/23, 15 MM 2/24, 16 MM 2/25, 14 MM 2/26, 13 MM
Bot % of total
1. Top volume campaigns had expensive
bot problems
2. Small but significant bot percentages
across too many placements to address
manually
3. Bot fraud varied by placement by time:
being clean today didn’t guarantee being
clean tomorrow
Top bot problems:
In ongoing fraud-cutting activities, Carmichael Lynch
improved traffic by cutting or repairing the worst offenders
Solution: Continuous monitoring
Authorize and approve third-party traffic validation technology
Be aware and involved
Use third-party monitoring
Budget for security
Protect yourself, your users, and your media from ad fraud
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
To defend against sophisticated
and basic ad fraud attacks,
Thank You!

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The Many Faces of Ad Fraud

  • 1. #NoMoreAdFraud Brandon Miller, Carmichael Lynch Michael Tiffany, White Ops The Problem The Criminals The Solution The Bot World
  • 2. The Problem The Criminals The Solution The Bot World
  • 3. In 2014, The Bot Baseline found fraud in every kind of campaign we studied. The average loss to bots was 11%.
  • 4. Bots are infecting the system. Fake web browsers go to real (or fake) sites, view real ads, and demand payment for the service
  • 5. How big is the problem?
  • 8. …it’s worse than this. $6.3 billion is a conservative estimate, but that’s more than bad enough.
  • 10. It’s coming from inside the house
  • 11. Why you care: Your money gets home users hacked. You are being tricked into tracking bots. 1 2
  • 12. Why hack home users? Hint: not to rob their digital funds and identities (not that they don’t)
  • 13. If you want to get targeted, you (often) need a consumer’s identity. That can be arranged.
  • 14. False assumptions: Bots are afraid of tracking (nope: hacked goods make them seem legitimate) Optimizing for performance, or viewability, or conversions squeezes out the bots automatically (nope) x x …our findings show otherwise.
  • 15. Bot fraud is the scalable ad fraud Yes, you should probably care about pixel stuffing, ad clutter, ad collision, etc. etc. etc. But those things don’t happen on expensive placements. Those things don’t add up to $6.3 billion dollars. Those things don’t funnel money to organized crime. Your CFO cares about stopping money going to organized crime. He may not care about ad clutter.
  • 16. The Problem The Criminals The Solution The Bot World
  • 17. Ad fraud is not evenly distributed (Neither is tuberculosis)
  • 18. Video is (on average): 2.1 times bottier than display
  • 19. Almost a quarter of video advertisement goes to nobody
  • 21. Programmatic (buy at your own risk) X X33% Bots 3% Bots Exchange 1 Exchange 2
  • 22. News Junkie Targeting (and Retargeting) Missed. Fake profiles and stolen cookies = retargeted campaigns had more bots, not less
  • 23. Premium sites are “safer” but…
  • 24. When publishers get a portion of their visitors from other sites on the web, they get bot traffic, too.
  • 25. The Problem The Criminals The Solution The Bot World $
  • 27. Advertiser Agency Exchanges Publisher Who’s the bad guy? The real bad guys are the ones breaking into everyone’s computers
  • 28. How do the bad guys make money?
  • 30. …with fake sites. …when real sites need more traffic. &
  • 31. Fake Sites  Awful content  Scraped or copied content  Objectively measurable  Hosts ads  Makes money Doesn’t matter; humans don’t visit
  • 32. Sourced Traffic $ One site paying another to send more traffic
  • 33. Sourced Traffic $ Sourced traffic is usually botty traffic (even for premium sites) especially
  • 34.
  • 35. The attackers adapt Here they come. Turn the bots off! They’re leaving. Turn the bots back on. We have a complaint. Clean it up. Here they come again…
  • 36. There are some interesting patterns… When advertisers demand more traffic, the differential between available humans and advertiser demand for traffic can be made up with bots. Bots will often supply traffic as needed in bursts – in this case, every Saturday
  • 37. There are some interesting patterns… Not all botnets are run by geniuses: some bots are too dumb to keep daylight hours:
  • 38. Old Browsers Are Bot Browsers Bots both: Cycle through many fake user-agents (browsers) to hide in the noise Provide real user- agents, but don’t get auto-updated Why are we still supporting old browsers?!
  • 39. But patterns are not evidence.
  • 40. • Taking on all the botnets at once requires hardcore malware reverse-engineering and major intelligence operations. • We’re in an arms race against the world’s best cybercriminals. • It’s fun to point out these patterns, but if all we had to do was find the patterns, this problem would have been solved already.
  • 41. The Problem The Criminals The Victims The Solution
  • 42. We all need to work together to solve the problem of ad fraud.
  • 43. On the Sell Side, real can’t compete with fake If the Buy Side can’t tell the difference
  • 44. In December 2014, on behalf of a large brand, the ad agency Carmichael Lynch decided to make an above-average campaign even better.
  • 45.
  • 46. Carmichael Lynch’s Anti-Fraud Formula:  Monitor for fraud in all the brand’s campaigns  Use continuous monitoring (Detection) to hold all supply partners accountable and to reward great ones  Take proactive steps (Prevention) only where it makes sense for the buyer to take that burden
  • 47.
  • 48. 1. Top volume campaigns had expensive bot problems Top bot problems:
  • 49. Solution: Protect high value media investment – reduce fraud where it hits the hardest by dollars Campaign Human Bots Bots % 1* 350M 20M 5% 2* 260M 20M 7% 3* 190M 14M 7% 4 76M 3M 4% 5* 63M 10M 13%
  • 50. 1. Top volume campaigns had expensive bot problems 2. Small but significant bot percentages across too many placements to address manually Top bot problems:
  • 51. Solution: Anti-targeting! 5.90% 7.80% 6.70% 3.80% 3.40% 2/22, 13 MM 2/23, 15 MM 2/24, 16 MM 2/25, 14 MM 2/26, 13 MM Bot % of total
  • 52. Solution: Anti-targeting! In one day, Carmichael Lynch cut the brand’s bot percentage by 43%. 5.90% 7.80% 6.70% 3.80% 3.40% 2/22, 13 MM 2/23, 15 MM 2/24, 16 MM 2/25, 14 MM 2/26, 13 MM Bot % of total
  • 53. 1. Top volume campaigns had expensive bot problems 2. Small but significant bot percentages across too many placements to address manually 3. Bot fraud varied by placement by time: being clean today didn’t guarantee being clean tomorrow Top bot problems:
  • 54. In ongoing fraud-cutting activities, Carmichael Lynch improved traffic by cutting or repairing the worst offenders Solution: Continuous monitoring
  • 55. Authorize and approve third-party traffic validation technology Be aware and involved Use third-party monitoring Budget for security Protect yourself, your users, and your media from ad fraud ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ To defend against sophisticated and basic ad fraud attacks,

Editor's Notes

  1. Very effective, clearly very profitable “Playing with fire” (but not always burning)
  2. They’re called bots, they’ve always been something of a problem, they’ve become something more: Fake web browsers, going to real (or fake) sites, “viewing” real advertisements and demanding payment for the service
  3. It’s worse than this. We are highly conservative scientist hackers The $6.3B we’re asserting is based on the smokiest of guns That’s OK. $6.3B in yearly losses is bad enough even as an understatement What’s more significant is Who Where
  4. We are highly conservative scientist hackers The $6.3B we’re asserting is based on the smokiest of guns That’s OK. $6.3B in yearly losses is bad enough even as an understatement
  5. What’s more significant is Who Where
  6. 1) This is not a victimless crime Criminal networks are being paid to hack home users…with your money Why home users? Besides the fact that, as long as you’re there, might as well look around for $$$ 2) Targeting is getting hacked too They hack home users because ads don’t target Amazon EC2 It’s not just about the IPs – when you hack a machine, you get its cookies Intel: When we see sites that exist purely to host advertisements to bots, they sign up for every tracking scheme they can The worst bot sites run 4x tracking of legitimate/popular sites They’re not afraid of tracking – they have the goods from the legitimate user Many significant systems think they’re safe because they assume bots lack magic cookies The data does not support that.
  7. Why home users? Besides the fact that, as long as you’re there, might as well look around for $$$
  8. 2) Targeting is getting hacked too They hack home users because ads don’t target Amazon EC2 It’s not just about the IPs – when you hack a machine, you get its cookies Intel: When we see sites that exist purely to host advertisements to bots, they sign up for every tracking scheme they can The worst bot sites run 4x tracking of legitimate/popular sites They’re not afraid of tracking – they have the goods from the legitimate user Many significant systems think they’re safe because they assume bots lack magic cookies The data does not support that.
  9. Fraud is not evenly distributed. Neither is tuberculosis. Video is (on average) almost 2.5x as botty as display Almost a quarter of video advertisement went to nobody Programmatic is 50% bottier, retargeting is 75% bottier than average “Premium sites” are safer – only 25% of fraud lived on them – but bots make their way to them too Huge variance in bottiness according to domain categories Finance/Family/Food: 16-22% Sport/Science/Info: 2-3%
  10. Video is (on average) almost 2.5x as botty as display
  11. Almost a quarter of video advertisement went to nobody
  12. Programmatic is 50% bottier, retargeting is 75% bottier than average
  13. Programmatic buys can be OK, but are often risky One of the largest exchanges consistently yielded about 33% bots We did see programmatic buys sometimes down at the 3% bot level, though, so it’s not universally bad DSPs allow some really crazy stunts One publisher funneled over 90% bot traffic through DSPs to half of study participants Remember, we also have a selection bias in that our 36 participants are some of the largest advertisers in the world Their ads were still showing up on sites no human would ever visit or appreciate Very effective, clearly very profitable “Playing with fire” (but not always burning)
  14. You can’t just target users, let alone “retarget” them “Oh, I know you’re somebody who browses CNN, I’ll advertise on fakesite” Almost twice as many bots when retargeting One case study: 17% bot on overall traffic, 55% bot on the retargeted campaign Remember, these are where we’re seeing smoking guns, and the numbers are still severe.
  15. “Premium sites” are safer – only 25% of fraud lived on them – but bots make their way to them too
  16. We are able to detect traffic sourcing – when a site pays another site to “send it traffic” The majority of sourced traffic that we witnessed was obviously botty, even/especially for premium publishers Actually our single strongest predictor of bottiness One direct buy, premium set of 60 campaigns was “shuffled”: 30 highly human placements 30 highly botty placements, varying between 16% and 64% bot Active campaign to “play the game of averages” (17% bot total) One direct video buy at an unambiguously premium publisher yielded 98% bottiness How does this happens? 1) There was money on the table 2) They didn’t think they’d get caught
  17. The bad guy is not the advertiser, the agency, the exchanges, or the publishers (usually) The bad guy is the hacker. Everybody needs to work together to trace where the hacker is.
  18. Surprisingly, the most common question: “How do the bad guys make money?” 1) Fake sites 2) Real sites that need a little more traffic Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites Definitely a dominant paradigm… …but does this mean the real sites are cleaner? …are there real sites?
  19. Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue
  20. We are able to detect traffic sourcing – when a site pays another site to “send it traffic” The majority of sourced traffic that we witnessed was obviously botty, even/especially for premium publishers Actually our single strongest predictor of bottiness
  21. 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites
  22. Difficulties: It’s a huge ecosystem, and everyone profits from bigger numbers but you
  23. They knew we were coming, and turned off the bots They thought we were leaving, and turned the bots back on We lied about when we were coming and going We get to do that We watched ‘em come and go (For one particular study participant) Also watched significant adaptation to complaints If we called out an ad flow as botty, suddenly it’d be less botty Somebody knows
  24. Annoying, we sure spend a lot to make sure we’re compatible with old browsers… Bots either: A) Fake their user-agent to be some old/random value, so they can’t easily be identified B) Don’t fake their user-agent, but also don’t get autoupdated by OS/real user browser
  25. Surprisingly, the most common question: “How do the bad guys make money?” 1) Fake sites 2) Real sites that need a little more traffic Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites Definitely a dominant paradigm… …but does this mean the real sites are cleaner? …are there real sites?
  26. Surprisingly, the most common question: “How do the bad guys make money?” 1) Fake sites 2) Real sites that need a little more traffic Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites Definitely a dominant paradigm… …but does this mean the real sites are cleaner? …are there real sites?
  27. Surprisingly, the most common question: “How do the bad guys make money?” 1) Fake sites 2) Real sites that need a little more traffic Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites Definitely a dominant paradigm… …but does this mean the real sites are cleaner? …are there real sites?
  28. Surprisingly, the most common question: “How do the bad guys make money?” 1) Fake sites 2) Real sites that need a little more traffic Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites Definitely a dominant paradigm… …but does this mean the real sites are cleaner? …are there real sites?
  29. Surprisingly, the most common question: “How do the bad guys make money?” 1) Fake sites 2) Real sites that need a little more traffic Fake sites Objectively and measurably awful content Scraped or copied from other sites wholesale Doesn’t matter, nobody human goes there anyway Sites host ads, ads generate revenue 75% of bot traffic went to non-premium, mostly fake sites Definitely a dominant paradigm… …but does this mean the real sites are cleaner? …are there real sites?
  30. One direct video buy at an unambiguously premium publisher yielded 98% bottiness How does this happen? 1) There was money on the table 2) They didn’t think they’d get caught