People are the cause of many security problems, but people are also the most effective resource for combating them. Technology is critical, but without trained professionals, it is ineffective. In the context two case studies, the presenter will describe specific instances where human creativity and skill overcame technical deficiencies. The presenter believes this topic to be particularly relevant for the Packet Hacking Village, as many techniques used are the same that are pertinent for Capture the Packet and Packet Detective.
Technical details will include the specific tools used, screenshots of captured data, and analysis of the malware and the malicious user’s activity. The goal of the presentation is show the importance of technical ability and critical thinking, and to demonstrate that skilled people are the most important tool in an information security program.
Offloading Linux LAG Devices Via Open vSwitch and TCNetronome
Converting Open vSwitch (OVS) kernel rules to TC Flower rules has become the standard way to offload the datapath to SmartNICs and other hardware devices. Binding such TC rules to 'offloadable' ports (such as SmartNIC representers) has been shown to enable the acceleration of packet processing while saving CPU resources on the hosting server. However, one scenario not yet well defined is the case where offloadable ports are bound to a higher level Link Aggregation (LAG) netdev, such as a Linux Bond or Team device, and where this netdev is added to an OVS bridge.
This talk describes an implementation that offloads rules that either ingress or egress to a LAG device. It highlights changes made to OVS (included in v2.9) as well as to core TC code and the driver layer in the Linux kernel. Rather than introduce new features into the kernel to handle LAG offload, the design expands upon recent, independently added kernel features including the concept of TC blocks. It is shown how, with slight modification, TC blocks can be used by OVS to represent LAG devices.
A scenario on basic incident response and showing how Microsoft uses a service that automatically creates a Man in the Middle incident. It also covers an overview on some inherent tools and how to use them for security operations
Offloading Linux LAG Devices Via Open vSwitch and TCNetronome
Converting Open vSwitch (OVS) kernel rules to TC Flower rules has become the standard way to offload the datapath to SmartNICs and other hardware devices. Binding such TC rules to 'offloadable' ports (such as SmartNIC representers) has been shown to enable the acceleration of packet processing while saving CPU resources on the hosting server. However, one scenario not yet well defined is the case where offloadable ports are bound to a higher level Link Aggregation (LAG) netdev, such as a Linux Bond or Team device, and where this netdev is added to an OVS bridge.
This talk describes an implementation that offloads rules that either ingress or egress to a LAG device. It highlights changes made to OVS (included in v2.9) as well as to core TC code and the driver layer in the Linux kernel. Rather than introduce new features into the kernel to handle LAG offload, the design expands upon recent, independently added kernel features including the concept of TC blocks. It is shown how, with slight modification, TC blocks can be used by OVS to represent LAG devices.
A scenario on basic incident response and showing how Microsoft uses a service that automatically creates a Man in the Middle incident. It also covers an overview on some inherent tools and how to use them for security operations
More on security visualization: http://secviz.org
In the network security world, event graphs are evolving into a useful data analysis tool, providing a powerful alternative to reading raw log data. By visually outlining relationships among security events, analysts are given a tool to intuitively draw conclusions about the current state of their network and to respond quickly to emerging issues.
I will be showing a myriad of graphs generated with data from various sources, such as Web servers, firewalls, network based intrusion detection systems, mail servers, and operating system logs. Each of the graphs will be used to show a certain property of the dataset analyzed. They will show anomalous behavior, misconfigurations and simply help document activities in a network.
As part of this talk, I will release a tool tool that can be used to experiment with generating event graphs. A quick tutorial will show how easy it is to generate graphs from security data of your own environment.
Video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GK8mYumn6Q
The presentation covers information about basic and advanced ddos attacks; the tools, techniques and methods to perform them and how to prevent them using the methods present in TCP/IP. Given the different network and application protocols for tcp/ip; we tried to describe where ddos attacks are made possible in the communication process . Each attack is seperately analyzed and described and defense technique is described using the same analogy. Our motto: If there is a ddos case, there was a way to defend it.
Derevolutionizing OS Fingerprinting: The cat and mouse gameJaime Sánchez
With the explosive growth and distributed nature of computer networks, it has become progressively more difficult to manage, secure, and identify Internet devices. An outsider has the capability to discover general information, such as which operating system a host is running, by searching for default stack parameters, ambiguities in IETF RFCs or non-compliant TCP/IP implementations in responses to malformed requests. By pinpointing the exact OS of a host, an attacker can launch an educated and precise attack against a target machine.
There are lot of reasons to hide your OS to the entire world:
Revealing your OS makes things easier to find and successfully run an exploit against any of your devices.
Having and unpatched or antique OS version is not very convenient for your company prestige. Imagine that your company is a bank and some users notice that you are running an unpatched box. They won't trust you any longer! In addition, these kind of 'bad' news are always sent to the public opinion.
Knowing your OS can also become more dangerous, because people can guess which applications are you running in that OS (data inference). For example if your system is a MS Windows, and you are running a database, it's highly likely that you are running MS-SQL.
It could be convenient for other software companies, to offer you a new OS environment (because they know which you are running).
And finally, privacy; nobody needs to know the systems you've got running.
This talk aims to present well-known methods that perform classification using application-layer traffic (TCP/IP/UDP headers, ICMP packets, or some combination thereof), old style approaches to defeat remote OS fingerprinting (like tweaking Windows registry or implement patches to the Linux kernel) and why this doesn't work with nowadays and could affect TCP/IP stack performance. We'll also present a new approach to detect and defeat both active/passive OS fingerprint with OSfooler-NG, a completely rewritten tool, highly portable, completely undetectable for the attackers and capable of detecting and defeating famous tools like nmap, p0f, Xprobe, pfsense and many commercial engines.
Sorry guys, OS fingerprinting is over...
25 years of firewalls and network filtering - From antiquity to the cloudshira koper
The first commercial firewall shipped in 1992. 25 years later the firewall is still the core building block of enterprises’ security infrastructures. Please join Prof. Avishai Wool, AlgoSec’s CTO, for an educational webinar on the history of the firewall. He will take you through a riveting 25-year journey of the evolution of the firewall - from the ancient world of the host-based firewalls of the 90s, to today’s cloud-based firewalls, and will explain how each type of firewall works, its advantages and limitations, and provide some tips and best practices for effective network filtering.
In this highly informational, and entertaining webinar Professor Wool will cover:
• The Early 90s: Host vs. Network
• Late 90s: Keeping State
• 2003: Zone-Based firewalls
• 2010: Next-Gen firewalls
• 2015: Virtualized and cloud firewalls
More on security visualization: http://secviz.org
In the network security world, event graphs are evolving into a useful data analysis tool, providing a powerful alternative to reading raw log data. By visually outlining relationships among security events, analysts are given a tool to intuitively draw conclusions about the current state of their network and to respond quickly to emerging issues.
I will be showing a myriad of graphs generated with data from various sources, such as Web servers, firewalls, network based intrusion detection systems, mail servers, and operating system logs. Each of the graphs will be used to show a certain property of the dataset analyzed. They will show anomalous behavior, misconfigurations and simply help document activities in a network.
As part of this talk, I will release a tool tool that can be used to experiment with generating event graphs. A quick tutorial will show how easy it is to generate graphs from security data of your own environment.
Video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GK8mYumn6Q
The presentation covers information about basic and advanced ddos attacks; the tools, techniques and methods to perform them and how to prevent them using the methods present in TCP/IP. Given the different network and application protocols for tcp/ip; we tried to describe where ddos attacks are made possible in the communication process . Each attack is seperately analyzed and described and defense technique is described using the same analogy. Our motto: If there is a ddos case, there was a way to defend it.
Derevolutionizing OS Fingerprinting: The cat and mouse gameJaime Sánchez
With the explosive growth and distributed nature of computer networks, it has become progressively more difficult to manage, secure, and identify Internet devices. An outsider has the capability to discover general information, such as which operating system a host is running, by searching for default stack parameters, ambiguities in IETF RFCs or non-compliant TCP/IP implementations in responses to malformed requests. By pinpointing the exact OS of a host, an attacker can launch an educated and precise attack against a target machine.
There are lot of reasons to hide your OS to the entire world:
Revealing your OS makes things easier to find and successfully run an exploit against any of your devices.
Having and unpatched or antique OS version is not very convenient for your company prestige. Imagine that your company is a bank and some users notice that you are running an unpatched box. They won't trust you any longer! In addition, these kind of 'bad' news are always sent to the public opinion.
Knowing your OS can also become more dangerous, because people can guess which applications are you running in that OS (data inference). For example if your system is a MS Windows, and you are running a database, it's highly likely that you are running MS-SQL.
It could be convenient for other software companies, to offer you a new OS environment (because they know which you are running).
And finally, privacy; nobody needs to know the systems you've got running.
This talk aims to present well-known methods that perform classification using application-layer traffic (TCP/IP/UDP headers, ICMP packets, or some combination thereof), old style approaches to defeat remote OS fingerprinting (like tweaking Windows registry or implement patches to the Linux kernel) and why this doesn't work with nowadays and could affect TCP/IP stack performance. We'll also present a new approach to detect and defeat both active/passive OS fingerprint with OSfooler-NG, a completely rewritten tool, highly portable, completely undetectable for the attackers and capable of detecting and defeating famous tools like nmap, p0f, Xprobe, pfsense and many commercial engines.
Sorry guys, OS fingerprinting is over...
25 years of firewalls and network filtering - From antiquity to the cloudshira koper
The first commercial firewall shipped in 1992. 25 years later the firewall is still the core building block of enterprises’ security infrastructures. Please join Prof. Avishai Wool, AlgoSec’s CTO, for an educational webinar on the history of the firewall. He will take you through a riveting 25-year journey of the evolution of the firewall - from the ancient world of the host-based firewalls of the 90s, to today’s cloud-based firewalls, and will explain how each type of firewall works, its advantages and limitations, and provide some tips and best practices for effective network filtering.
In this highly informational, and entertaining webinar Professor Wool will cover:
• The Early 90s: Host vs. Network
• Late 90s: Keeping State
• 2003: Zone-Based firewalls
• 2010: Next-Gen firewalls
• 2015: Virtualized and cloud firewalls
This document provides a complete report on a penetration test using Kali Linux with a vulnerable machine available on Vulnhub.com. The Game of Thrones CTF: 1 (Capture The Flag) contains 11 flags in total (7 kingdom flags, 3 secret flags and one battle flag). The first chapter introduces a short description about cyber-risks and general IT security nowadays. The second chapter contains the setting for the laboratory in Oracle Virtual Box software to virtualize the attacker machine and the target machine. Furthermore, the subchapters are about the attack narrative, each one according to a specific
step-by-step location. Please notice that this walkthrough might contain spoilers to the actual TV series.
Ultimately, a comment about the vulnerabilities found in this challenge, some recommendations and the major consulted resources and used tools.
APNIC Senior Security Specialist Adli Wahid presented on the APNIC Honeynet Project, interesting observations, mitigation and multistakeholder collaboration at Threat Con 2021, held online from 8 to 11 September 2021.
The Bot Stops Here: Removing the BotNet Threat - Public and Higher Ed Securit...Eric Vanderburg
Eric Vanderburg, Director of Information Systems and Security at JurInnov, presents "The Bot Stops Here: Removing the BotNet Threat" at the Public and Higher Ed Security Summit.
Similar to Layer 8 and Why People are the Most Important Security Tool (20)
Search and Society: Reimagining Information Access for Radical FuturesBhaskar Mitra
The field of Information retrieval (IR) is currently undergoing a transformative shift, at least partly due to the emerging applications of generative AI to information access. In this talk, we will deliberate on the sociotechnical implications of generative AI for information access. We will argue that there is both a critical necessity and an exciting opportunity for the IR community to re-center our research agendas on societal needs while dismantling the artificial separation between the work on fairness, accountability, transparency, and ethics in IR and the rest of IR research. Instead of adopting a reactionary strategy of trying to mitigate potential social harms from emerging technologies, the community should aim to proactively set the research agenda for the kinds of systems we should build inspired by diverse explicitly stated sociotechnical imaginaries. The sociotechnical imaginaries that underpin the design and development of information access technologies needs to be explicitly articulated, and we need to develop theories of change in context of these diverse perspectives. Our guiding future imaginaries must be informed by other academic fields, such as democratic theory and critical theory, and should be co-developed with social science scholars, legal scholars, civil rights and social justice activists, and artists, among others.
Let's dive deeper into the world of ODC! Ricardo Alves (OutSystems) will join us to tell all about the new Data Fabric. After that, Sezen de Bruijn (OutSystems) will get into the details on how to best design a sturdy architecture within ODC.
Connector Corner: Automate dynamic content and events by pushing a buttonDianaGray10
Here is something new! In our next Connector Corner webinar, we will demonstrate how you can use a single workflow to:
Create a campaign using Mailchimp with merge tags/fields
Send an interactive Slack channel message (using buttons)
Have the message received by managers and peers along with a test email for review
But there’s more:
In a second workflow supporting the same use case, you’ll see:
Your campaign sent to target colleagues for approval
If the “Approve” button is clicked, a Jira/Zendesk ticket is created for the marketing design team
But—if the “Reject” button is pushed, colleagues will be alerted via Slack message
Join us to learn more about this new, human-in-the-loop capability, brought to you by Integration Service connectors.
And...
Speakers:
Akshay Agnihotri, Product Manager
Charlie Greenberg, Host
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024Tobias Schneck
As AI technology is pushing into IT I was wondering myself, as an “infrastructure container kubernetes guy”, how get this fancy AI technology get managed from an infrastructure operational view? Is it possible to apply our lovely cloud native principals as well? What benefit’s both technologies could bring to each other?
Let me take this questions and provide you a short journey through existing deployment models and use cases for AI software. On practical examples, we discuss what cloud/on-premise strategy we may need for applying it to our own infrastructure to get it to work from an enterprise perspective. I want to give an overview about infrastructure requirements and technologies, what could be beneficial or limiting your AI use cases in an enterprise environment. An interactive Demo will give you some insides, what approaches I got already working for real.
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder – active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...UiPathCommunity
💥 Speed, accuracy, and scaling – discover the superpowers of GenAI in action with UiPath Document Understanding and Communications Mining™:
See how to accelerate model training and optimize model performance with active learning
Learn about the latest enhancements to out-of-the-box document processing – with little to no training required
Get an exclusive demo of the new family of UiPath LLMs – GenAI models specialized for processing different types of documents and messages
This is a hands-on session specifically designed for automation developers and AI enthusiasts seeking to enhance their knowledge in leveraging the latest intelligent document processing capabilities offered by UiPath.
Speakers:
👨🏫 Andras Palfi, Senior Product Manager, UiPath
👩🏫 Lenka Dulovicova, Product Program Manager, UiPath
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor TurskyiFwdays
I have heard many times that architecture is not important for the front-end. Also, many times I have seen how developers implement features on the front-end just following the standard rules for a framework and think that this is enough to successfully launch the project, and then the project fails. How to prevent this and what approach to choose? I have launched dozens of complex projects and during the talk we will analyze which approaches have worked for me and which have not.
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Jeffrey Haguewood
Sidekick Solutions uses Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apricot) and automation solutions to integrate data for business workflows.
We believe integration and automation are essential to user experience and the promise of efficient work through technology. Automation is the critical ingredient to realizing that full vision. We develop integration products and services for Bonterra Case Management software to support the deployment of automations for a variety of use cases.
This video focuses on the notifications, alerts, and approval requests using Slack for Bonterra Impact Management. The solutions covered in this webinar can also be deployed for Microsoft Teams.
Interested in deploying notification automations for Bonterra Impact Management? Contact us at sales@sidekicksolutionsllc.com to discuss next steps.
5. Office Locations
Europe
Manchester - Head Office
Basingstoke
Belgium
Cheltenham
Denmark
Edinburgh
Germany
Glasgow
Leatherhead
Leeds
Lithuania
London
Luxembourg
Milton Keynes
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
The Netherlands
USA
Atlanta, GA
Austin, TX
Chicago, IL
New York, NY
San Francisco, CA
Seattle, WA
Sunnyvale, CA
Australia
Sydney
Canada
Kitchener, ON
Middle East
Dubai
6. About ch3f
Damon J. Small, Technical Director, NCC Group North America
• In IT since 1995; Infosec since 2001
• Louisiana native – Geaux Tigers!
• Studied music at LSU; grad school in 2005 for Information Assurance (Norwich University)
• Blue Team Infosec
• Healthcare
• Department of Defense
• Aerospace (Johnson Space Center)
• Oil & Gas
7. How This Slide Deck Came to be
• I am a digital pack-rat
• Found a couple of old whitepapers
• Was shocked that they were still relevant (thanks, Wall of Sheep)
• Techniques described are simple and old, but remain useful
• I love telling stories
• Coincidentally, WannaCry self-propagating ransomware happened
Audience Poll
8. Introduction
• IT departments face myriad security-related products
• Businesses need to remain fiscally responsible
• Are we overlooking the value of human ingenuity and the skills of our
practitioners?
9. Finding the Needle
December 9, 2004
• Primary firewall failed
• Large volume of tcp/135 traffic
• Periodic bursts of Internet-bound traffic on ephemeral ports
10. Escalation
• Malicious software suspected
• Barriers
• Spoofed source IP Addresses
• Third-party-supported systems
• 8,000 workstations
• Networking team had protocol analyzers, but not the ability to monitor traffic in
real-time
• Due to these limitations, they could proceed no further
• Network team (begrudgingly?) engaged the infosec team
11. We Needed to Know…
• From where the traffic came
• To where the traffic was going
• What was causing it
• How to get rid of it
13. Identification Begins
• Desktop team ran manual AV scans
• Found various self-propagating worms
• RPC/DCOM
• LSASS buffer overflow
• Looked like Blaster and Sasser
• Patches existed, but recall that it was 2004
14. Botnet Worms
• Command & Control via Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
• Worm logs into IRC channel & receives instructions from the bad guy
• Attacker can then use these “zombie” computers for other malicious activities
• NOTE TO SELF – enable egress filtering rules!
• Traffic from the worm propagating and logging into IRC channel crippled the
network
15. Gathering More Data
• AV continued to be of limited value
• Security team enabled IRC login event rules on the IPS
• Found 3 malicious IRC channels
• xxx.xxx.xxx.189
• xxx.xxx.xxx.94
• xxx.xxx.xxx.228
• Blocked IRC login events but this created another problem – we couldn’t see
the RFC1918 addresses
16. Why Architecture Matters
• IPS existed on the “dirty side” of the firewall
• IPS could only see NAT’d IP Addresses once we started blocking
• Was useful for stopping the infected hosts but couldn’t help us find them
• NOTE TO SELF – put the IPS inside the firewall
17. Windump to the Rescue Again
windump -qn host xxx.xxx.xxx.189
or host xxx.xxx.xxx.94 or host
xxx.xxx.xxx.228
Simply capturing traffic provided invaluable information, but was difficult to parse
18. Snort to the Rescue
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $BOTNET any (msg:"BOTNET traffic
detected"; rev:1;)
Where $BOTNET = xxx.xxx.xxx.189, xxx.xxx.xxx.94, xxx.xxx.xxx.228
19. NICK [UL]987199
USER fvxtkcav 0 0 :[UL]987199
:0wnd.us 001 [UL]987199 :Welcome to the hi
IRC Network [UL]987199!
fvxtkcav@172.16.21.50
:0wnd.us 002 [UL]987199 :Your host is
0wnd.us, running version Unreal3.2.1
:0wnd.us 003 [UL]987199 :This server was
created Fri Nov 19 2004 at 05:01:26 MST
:0wnd.us 004 [UL]987199 0wnd.us
Unreal3.2.1 iowghraAsORTVSxNCWqBzvdHtGp
lvhopsmntikrRcaqOALQbSeKVfMCuzNT
20. :0wnd.us 005 [UL]987199 MAP KNOCK SAFELIST
HCN MAXCHANNELS=10 MAXBANS=60 NICKLEN=30
TOPICLEN=307 KICKLEN=307 MAXTARGETS=20
AWAYLEN=307:are supported by this server
:0wnd.us 005 [UL]987199 WALLCHOPS
WATCH=128 SILENCE=15 MODES=12 CHANTYPES=#
PREFIX=(ohv)@%+
CHANMODES=beqa,kfL,l,psmntirRcOAQKVGCuzNSM
T NETWORK=hi CASEMAPPING=ascii
EXTBAN=~,cqnr ELIST=MNUCT :are supported
by this server
21. :0wnd.us 251 [UL]987199 :There are 1 users
and 4253 invisible on 1 servers
:0wnd.us 252 [UL]987199 3 :operator(s)
online
:0wnd.us 253 [UL]987199 5 :unknown
connection(s)
:0wnd.us 254 [UL]987199 24 :channels
formed
:0wnd.us 255 [UL]987199 :I have 4254
clients and 0 servers:0wnd.us 265
[UL]987199 :Current Local Users: 4254 Max:
7852
22. :0wnd.us 332 [UL]987199 #UL# :.asc
lsass_445 100 5 99999 –b
PRIVMSG #UL# :[SCAN]: Sequential Port Scan
started on 10.32.0.0:445 with a delay of 5
seconds for 99999 minutes using 100
threads.
25. Mitigation/Cleanup Process
• Anti-Virus was ineffective
• Non-functional
• Third-party-supported devices
• Biomedical devices (don’t get me started on FDA 510K)
26. Sniff for the C&C IRC Channels
• We knew to where the infected hosts were phoning home
• We knew which hosts were infected
• We knew which port the infected host was using
23:24:46.665481 10.11.3.134.1303 >
192.168.163.189.18067: tcp 0 (DF)
27. Finding the Offending Process
• Use fport to find which process is using which port
FPort v2.0 - TCP/IP Process to Port Mapper
Copyright 2000 by Foundstone, Inc.
http://www.foundstone.com
Pid Process Port Proto Path
[…]
1292 AClntUsr -> 1132 TCP C:Program
FilesAltirisAClientAClntUsr.EXE
664 shellker -> 1133 TCP C:Program
FilesAltirisCarbonCopyshellker.exe
8 System -> 1295 TCP
232 lsass -> 1300 TCP C:WINNTsystem32lsass.exe
1420 w32usb2 -> 1303 TCP C:
WINNTsystem32w32usb2.exe
8 System -> 1306 TCP
28. Stopping the Malicious Process
• In those days, removing involved simply deleting the file
• You can’t delete files that are in use
• We stopped the process remotely using PSKill
C:toolsforensicspstools>pskill 10.11.3.134 w32usb2
PsKill v1.03 - local and remote process killer
Copyright (C) 2000 Mark Russinovich
http://www.sysinternals.com
Process w32usb2 killed on 10.11.3.134.
29. Botnets Discovered
In all, we found at least 4 different botnet worms
• Spybot or Wootbot10
• Infected file: w32usb2.exe
• Randex, Spybot, Rbot, or SDBot11
• Infected file: bling.exe
• SDBot, Rbot, or Spybot12
• Infected file: crsss.exe
• Rbot.JP13
• Infected file: mswctl32.exe
30. Lesson
“Knowing which screw to turn.”
• None of what we did was difficult
• Most of what we did relied on basic tools
• Understanding the nature of the problem in the context of the incident, based
on decades of collective experience by talented infosec staffers, resulted in the
malware being eradicated
• These years-old techniques are still relevant
31. WebDAV
DMZ Server got pwned on July 5, 2003
• Rogue FTP site
• Disks filled
• Patches applied by hacker
33. Nmap to the Rescue
# nmap (V. 3.00) scan initiated Sat Jul 05 10:19:26 2003 as: nmap -O -oN d:
nmap.complete.log -p 1-65535 <IP address deleted>
Interesting ports on <IP address deleted>:
(The 65521 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
Port State Service
21/tcp open ftp
23/tcp open telnet
135/tcp open loc-srv
137/tcp filtered netbios-ns
138/tcp filtered netbios-dgm
139/tcp filtered netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
[…]
1978/tcp filtered unknown
2003/tcp open cfingerd
3372/tcp open msdtc
3389/tcp open ms-term-serv
3460/tcp open unknown
34. Fport Again
• Showed port 2003 being used by “winmgnt”
• Not to be confused with the legitimate process “winmgmt”
35. Telnet to port 2003 (1 of 2)
.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:..:..:..:..:..:..:.
:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°::°::°::°::°::°::
-= Welcome To =-
-= Antoher Raz Stros =-
.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..
:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°::°::°::°::°::°::°
-=PERSONAL INFORMATION=-
¤ Your login is : ................................. %Name
¤ You are connected from the address ip : .... %IP
¤ Your current repertoire : ......................... %Dir
¤ You are connected since : ........................... %TconM Min
.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..
:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°:°::°::°::°::°::°::°
36. Telnet to port 2003 (2 of 2)
-=SERVER STATISTICS=-
¤ Hour and local date : .................. %time at %date
¤ This server is up since:.............. %ServerDays Days, %ServerHours Hours,
%ServerMins Mins, %ServerSecs Secs
¤ Times since the last revival : ..... %ServerDays days,%serverHours hours,
%serverMins mins and %serverSecs secs
¤ Usage since the last ones 24 H : .................. %U24h
¤ Users since the beginning : ..................... %UAll
¤ Current users : ............................. %UNow
¤ Files transferred : ............................. %ServerFilesDown files
¤ Total transferred in Kbytes : ....................... %ServerKbDown
¤ Files uploaded : ................................ %ServerFilesUp files
¤ Total uploaded in kbytes : .......................... %ServerKbUp
¤ Actual bandwidth : .......................... %ServerKBps Kb/sec
¤ Average bandwidth : ........................... %ServerAvg Kb/sec
¤ Free space on CD : .............................. %Dfree
37. RB.bat – install script for FTP Site
SET MXHOME=C:winntsystem32wins
SET MXBIN=C:winntsystem32wins
C:winntsystem32winsfiredaemon -i servU "C:winntsystem32wins" "C:
winntsystem32winswinmgnt.exe" "" Y 0 0 0 Y
C:winntsystem32winsfiredaemon -i secureNt "C:winntsystem32wins" "C:
winntsystem32winsSecureNetbios.exe" "" Y 0 0 0 Y
C:winntsystem32winsfiredaemon -i secureBT "C:winntsystem32wins" "C:
winntsystem32winssecure.bat" "" Y 0 0 0 Y
net start iroffer
net start servU
net start secureNt
net start secureBT
38. Hacker Patched our System…
echo --------------------------------------------------------------
echo This Tools Disable The W3SVC / IISADMIN / ISSRESET
echo (c) 2003 by Granny Smith // Admin of DarkStormFXP
echo --------------------------------------------------------------
echo.
echo Disabling Services...
echo.
net stop w3svc
net stop iisadmin
IISRESET.EXE /STOP
IISRESET.EXE /DISABLE
echo.
echo Creating Reg-Entry for Disable the WebDav...
echo.
echo Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 > protect.reg
echo [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetServi
cesW3SVCParameters] >> protect.reg
echo "DisableWebDAV"=dword:00000001 >> protect.reg
regedit /s protect.reg
reg.exe IMPORT protect.reg
del protect.reg
echo.
echo All Done ... Enjoy It ...
echo
pause
echo on
41. Several technological challenges conspired against the
team during these incidents. Using both commercial and
freely obtainable tools the team was able to overcome
these obstacles in a resourceful and cost-efficient manner.
The analysts’ actions demonstrate that problems can be
solved creatively using limited resources. While companies
must regularly evaluate commercial products, properly
trained personnel can be more valuable to an organization
than any hardware or software device.
42. What Can We Do?
As information security professionals…
• Spend on people first, technology second
• When ready to spend on technology, consider the skills of the people you
already have
• Identify gaps
• Spend on training first, hiring second
• Work outside of your organizational silos