This chapter outlines the analytical framework and hypotheses for the study. It constructs a framework that synthesizes speech act theory, echoic theory, and theories of incongruity and superiority to analyze verbal irony. A key contribution is introducing a new classification of speech act called "performative speech acts", which are used to depict character construction through verbal irony. The chapter discusses how performative speech acts address limitations of previous speech act classifications. Hypotheses are formulated and methods for testing the framework are presented.

1. Chapter 3 Analytical Framework and Hypotheses
Chapter 3 constructs the analytical framework for this study and its contributions to
discourse analysis of verbal irony. Speech act theory and its connection with verbal irony
has been discussed in full and its strengths confirm the significance of the framework;
however its shortcomings will now be addressed with an introduction of a new
classification of speech act—performative, with an explanation of how performative
speech acts construct character identity. On the basis of modified speech act theory and
echoic theory, the three echoic groupings of verbal irony are created as the contribution
of this study to accentuate characterization. Afterward we discuss the synthesis of echoic,
incongruity and superiority theories for the interpretation of verbal irony as the analytical
framework. Included are the formulated hypotheses and the methods utilized to test the
validity of the analytical framework.
3.1 Theoretical Basis: A Delimitation of Verbal Irony for this Study
This study defines verbal irony by echoic theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2012),
incongruity theory (e.g. Norrick, 2003) and superiority theory (e.g. Morreall, 2009).
Based on echoic theory, verbal irony encompasses an echoic allusion to a prior thought or
occurrence, and can be present either as a direct echo of someone’s thought or a vague
reference to perceptions of societal norms (see section 2.4.2 for the echoic theory). We
claim that incongruity is always apparent within verbal irony, and can be identified from
the discrepancy in figurative and literal meanings; the duality may be evident even in two
different points of view between the ironist and the object of irony (Leech & Short,
2007). The concept of superiority, including the banter principle, is also found within
verbal irony, as the S identifies a target of his or her irony in a display of dominance (see
section 2.4.3.3 for superiority theory). Our assertion that incongruity and superiority
theories work in unison for the explication of verbal irony receives support from Dynel:
“The incongruity-resolution theory may be combined with the superiority approach, each
accounting for distinct sources of humor which coincide in sarcastic irony” (Dynel, 2013:
313). The amalgamation of these three concepts forms the definition of verbal irony for
the purposes of this study in the data analysis. We define verbal irony as such: when an
1

2. ironist attempts to display supremacy over another through an echoic allusion which aims
to convey a duality (Juez, 1995), its intended meaning belies its literal meaning or the S
aims to highlight a contrast in views. The ironist dissociates himself from the idea, either
deceptively or covertly, believing it to be untruthful, unsuitable or ridiculous (Wilson,
2006).
The study highlights how verbal irony occurs through the machinations of speech
act theory (Searle, 2001b [1979])—that unconventional and infelicitous speech acts can
still exemplify working utterances in the context of conversation. Scholars (e.g. Kumon-
Nakamura et. al., 1995; Cai, 2010) have used speech act theory in the identification of
ironical statements, yet they have not shown how this method exhibits irony’s execution.
Our analysis of modified speech act theory gives a comprehensive view, incorporating
Butler’s (2002) [1990] performative speech act expressed through verbal irony to portray
characterization. Conversational analysis explicates how the recognition of the verbal
irony in Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy’s exchanges infers its use. Using a modified speech act
theory in conjunction with echoic theory identifies how verbal irony is found in
discourse, which is the method used to verify the data collection. The adopted approach is
two-tiered to include both the modified speech act taxonomy and echoic allusion. The
ironical utterances are classified through the modified speech act taxonomy for the S’s
intent, and the irony is verified through the echoic allusion within the utterance for the
H’s uptake. From the echoic allusions of each ironical utterance, this study introduces the
concept of echoic groupings to depict characterization. The incongruity and superiority
theories are utilized to analyze the ironical utterances. Incongruity theory accentuates
infelicity, i.e. the discrepancy between the utterance’s literal meaning and the intended
meaning veiled behind irony. According to this research, incongruity is observed as a
necessary component in verbal irony and complements the explication of the echoic
allusion. Superiority theory entails that the S has an intended target of his or her verbal
irony, which emphasizes Mr. Darcy’s and Elizabeth’s dissociative attitudes towards each
other and society within their ironical exchange. Because superiority theory incorporates
the banter principle, superiority theory is also useful to explicate ironical utterances
which are civil or friendly.
The subsections below explain the logic behind the analytical framework, and how
the theories utilized in the analysis are tied together to offer an approach for depicting
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3. characterization through ironical performative speech acts. The discussion introduces a
new classification of speech act according to Butler’s (2002) [1990] theory. The new
classification of performative speech act replaces Searle’s (2001b) [1979] declarations to
provide an innovative model which includes a wider variety of utterances than
declarations. The following section discusses the connection between performative
speech acts and characterization.
3.1.1 Performative Speech Acts and Characterization
According to Searle’s classification of illocutionary acts, if the propositional content
refers to real things and predicates something true then it must be an all-encompassing
truth verifiably agreed upon in any case to allow the illocutionary point to be classified as
assertive (Searle, 1976: 10). Not all assertions can amount to such genuine truth; so
reasonably, the speech act taxonomy is not sufficient, for declarations do not address the
role of institutional authority well. Therefore, we call for an expansion of speech act
theory on the distinctions of Searle’s illocutionary point, which he calls declaration. A
declaration, according to Searle, requires some institutional right of authority (Searle,
2001b [1979]: 19) (refer to section 2.2.2 for Searle’s declarations). This study finds that
Searle’s definition does not classify declarations for which the S may have no authority,
and the declaration classification of speech acts has not been well supported or received
by other scholars (e.g. Kumon-Nakamura et al, 1995; Strawson, 1964). For example a S
gives a H an idea about X, but the idea is opinionated, subjective, or even wrong,
although the S may believe it to be a true assertion: John and Mary just met and
immediately he relayed his opinion to Mary’s good friend Amy saying “Mary is not a fun
person to be friends with.” This is not an assertive speech act; rather this study contends it
is a performative because John imposed a new assumption to the world declaring Mary is
not a fun person to be friends with when Mary has at least one friend Amy to prove that
she could be friendly enough to have friends (see section 2.2.2 for directional fit of
speech acts). Perhaps these utterances are “more complex types” of expressions that
Searle overlooked in his explanation of proposition (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 33). Therefore
it is essential to successfully classify this type of utterance, which is found pervasively in
Pride and Prejudice.
Strawson (1964) attempted to remedy the role of authority unaddressed by Searle in
3

4. relation to the illocutionary act of declarations. Unlike Austin (2002) [1962], Strawson
claimed that not all illocutionary acts could be classified as “essentially conventional”
(1964: 457). Although agreeing that all illocutionary acts by a S must contain an overt
intention behind them and be subject to uptake by the H, Strawson claimed that if the S’s
intention could be frustrated without any break in rules or conventions, then the act itself
was not conventional. For example, if a doctor greets his patient saying, “Hello, how are
you today?” and the patient refuses to answer, the doctor’s intention has been frustrated
but no rule has been broken because the patient is not obligated to answer the question.
Strawson’s critique of Austin’s theory claims that convention is not essential for
performance to occur (Yoshitake, 2004: 33). This is exemplified through his explanation
that the frustration of a conventional illocutionary act could only occur with some break
of rules or conventions. Strawson’s account suggests that even when there is no authority
behind the act, such as in a non-conventional illocutionary act, the act may still work to
alter the context in which the utterance takes place. Therefore, based on Strawson’s
argument this study can be further extended to suggest that an utterance, provided the
illocutionary intention is allowed to come to pass, explains how a person’s utterance
defines identity with respect to character construction. In Pride and Prejudice, this formal
analysis is important to determine the essential links between the style of the novel’s
characterization and verbal irony, the linguistic basis for that style.
Scholars such as Strawson (1964) and Yoshitake (2004) provide groundwork for this
study to fill the gap left by prior studies on the effectiveness of Searle’s (2001a) [1969]
speech act theory. Especially using Strawson’s rationale as a foundation for this research,
the introduction of the performative speech act in the speech act taxonomy addresses the
insufficiencies left by declaration’s inability to include utterances without backing
institutional authority. This study adopts the concept of Butler’s (2002) [1990]
performative speech act, which is distinct from Austin’s (1979) performative speech act.
The use of the term performative as an illocutionary force or point should not be
confused with Austin’s use of the term in the performative-constative spectrum (see
section 2.2.1 for Austin’s performative), but as a new illocutionary act to enable character
construction via speech act. In this discussion, a performative speech act is a new
classification of speech act and is a contribution of this study, which counts as an
undertaking to identify a character as possessing some quality. Performative speech acts
4

5. are necessary because declarations cannot properly portray characterization due to their
rigidity; declarations are decidedly more restrictive than performative speech acts and the
constructions put forth by declarations are more difficult to reverse.
Butler intended the performative speech act to construct identity, and she interpreted
that “gender is performative” (2002 [1999]: xv). Thus it can be concluded that character
construction is also a “performative act” (Butler, 2002 [1990]: xxix). Butler’s (1997)
concept of subjection also supports the use of performative speech acts for character
construction, for subjection is the process of creating the subject’s identity and is a
performative process. Subjection can only be performed through power, and in turn the
act of subjection relinquishes power to the newly-created subject (1997: 13-15). Taking
into account theories from Foucault and Althusser, the process of subjection occurs
through language, and the subject is not only created through the power of discourse but
persists under the subordination of that power which creates it (Butler, 1997: 5-9). For
example, if John continually claims Mary is unfriendly, this will begin to create her new
identity to others. The power of John’s words will influence the way others form their
opinions of Mary’s character if they choose to have their preexisting assumptions about
Mary replaced by John’s performative speech acts. In addition, Butler’s (1997) concept of
subjection allows for the fluidity of identity creation, for a subject can influence his own
identity by his opposition or submission to the power which creates him and thus his
identity may be perpetuated or altered. In this same example Mary, as John’s subject for
character construction, could be influenced by John’s performative speech acts; therefore
Mary, subordinated under John’s power of discourse may perpetuate John’s new
assumption or alter her personal identify if she wishes to do so.
From the logic of our research, we claim that institutional authority is not a
necessary component for identity construction, therefore Butler’s performative makes an
ideal replacement for declarations. In performative speech acts, the premise of subjection
fundamentally explains that the words carry their own authority, therefore subjection
offers a replacement for institutional authority, rendering performative speech acts
functional. Taking Butler’s theories into account, we define character construction as the
act of identity creation through subjection. This conception of character construction is
derived from Butler’s notion of subjection, therefore the performative speech act is
delimited according to her deductions from the theories synthesized in this section. It is
5

6. crucial to note that although a H may pass judgment on the S himself in addition to the
subject of the S’s utterance, the S does not construct his own character in an utterance
referencing another person unless the S also directly or indirectly references himself in
the utterance. This effect is to emphasize that the H(s) can readjust a character
construction based on the S’s opinion about someone; however the H(s) does not directly
construct the S’s own character when the H only refers to a third person. To illustrate the
effectiveness of performative speech acts to replace declarations, take the example of a
baby being named. The hospital which provides a birth certificate is an institutional
authority, and thus when claiming, “Her name is Maria” the speech act is a declaration
because it is backed by the authority of the hospital. The utterance is also a performative
speech act, as it creates the identity of the baby. Therefore, performative speech acts
successfully classify declarations backed by institutional authority and those not backed
by some authority as in the case of John, Mary and Amy. Performative speech acts and
declarations both have the same illocutionary point to bring something into existence
according to the S’s intention, e.g. naming Maria and calling Mary an unfriendly person.
The illocutionary force of the act of portrayal, of one character to verbally
demonstrate the personality and behaviors of another, is performative. It empowers the S
to be the master of a constructed identity, the artist who creates “a specific vision of
social order” in which character identities arise (Worthen, 1998: 1097). The illocutionary
force derives its power from textually conceived “regimes” of socialization, i.e. the
societal construction has given the creators of identity some substance with which they
can demonstrate their portrayals (Worthen, 1998: 1097). Furthermore, the illocutionary
force can gain validity and influence via the interaction of the preconceived text and the
character’s portrayal from within its own contextual web of circumstance (Worthen,
1998: 1097). Performative speech acts are the foundational basis for this presentation
because character formations are not assertive speech acts but performative constructs
brought about by both physical and verbal actions to bring a truth into existence.
The substance of character construction is often manifest in the thought of some
beholder (i.e. the S), meaning the portrayal is made according to the observation of some
exhibitions of a particular personality (i.e. the character being portrayed). Therefore, the
character’s identity is linked to Austin’s performativity (Cameron, 2006 [1997]: 420);
Butler points out those gender identity actions are fabrications made and perpetuated via
6

7. discourse (2002 [1990]: 136). When an actor or S depicts a characteristic, either of the
actor’s self or of another, the utterance in effect is not truly representative of something
verifiably existent in the world—it constitutes a reality which functions to provide an
audience (H) with a character brought into existence through the act of the S’s utterance
(Cameron, 2006 [1997]: 420; Geisdorfer Feal, 2001: 5). As such, any comments one
makes upon someone’s demeanor become the material for that person’s identity.
Butler (2002) [1990] developed her concepts from two prominent figures before her,
Beauvoir and Foucault, which emphasize how character construction is inseparable from
the performative speech act itself. The idea of character construction of the individuals in
the plot through their performative speech acts is in purport with performative speech
acts and gender identity construction. Butler draws again from Beauvoir’s thoughts in her
theory of gender construction, defining performativity as “that reiterative power of
discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler, 1993: 2).
Essentially, Butler contends that gender is constructed through discourse, which brings
identity into existence. Beauvoir’s theories of this gender construction are also drawn
from early Foucault when he developed his pattern of words creating reality. For
instance, he posited that language, gestures, and performances have meanings that are
dependent on who speaks/acts them and the context in which they are enacted. Hall
addresses Foucault’s concept of discourse, claiming “a discourse is a group of statements
which provide a language for . . . a particular topic” (Hall, 1992: 291). Discourse
constructs the topic, based upon Foucault’s definition. Through such public discourse,
knowledge about the topic acquires authority, infusing a “truth” about it (Hall, 1992:
293).
The discourse is what constructs the individual character. According to Foucault’s
theory, discourse takes shape as knowledge with the words carrying their own power.
Butler’s notion of identity and actions are essentially productions made and perpetuated
via discourse (2002 [1990]: 136). Beauvoir shared similar views that Butler reiterates in
her theory of identity construction: “When we are discussing gender, we are talking about
ways that we can change societal understanding of women, men, and women and men,”
(Beauvoir, 1976: 3). Performative speech acts facilitate the construction of characters,
specifically in this study the development of identity. They enable a S to produce
representations of identity by designating his host according to descriptive language,
7

8. which in turn builds a H’s indexical knowledge of that host. This study of Pride and
Prejudice will show that the act of character construction is undertaken by the characters’
verbal irony—they interpret and contrast each other’s character identity through
propositions of performative speech acts. As mentioned above, characterization is fluid
and has the ability to constantly change when new assumptions are put forth by the
characters. While the context within the plot alters, the ironical utterances tend to reflect
new perceptions based upon those changed contexts.
Characterization is inferred through the dialogue between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy.
These dialogues incorporate many ironical utterances, which impact the expression of
that character construction. Austin posits performativity in literature to “be in a peculiar
way hollow or void if said” by a character or performer (in Worthen, 1998: 1095). As in
theater, dramatic performance may seem such a hollow sign of social workings, but these
structures are nevertheless “reproduced through a conventional apparatus of visibility (the
proscenium and the realistic modes of dramatic narrative and audience interaction it
shapes)” (Worthen, 1998: 1095); in this understanding the structure of character occurs
within a dominating social influence. Worthen’s study asserts that performative speech
acts construct identity despite their mode of communication (1998: 1095).
We assert that through performative utterances, one actually embodies his own
existence and the things you say can be what you do; they form and construct who you
are. Butler states that gender is distinguished by choice and by social construction (2002
[1990]: 147-152). Butler’s theory of social construction was influenced by Beauvoir:
“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or
economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society”
(Beauvoir, 1976: 267). Ultimately, culture frames appropriate some way of behaving or
believing. As such, cultural conditions play an important role in the manufacturing of
performative speech acts. On the basis of these concepts from Butler and Beauvoir, this
study argues that Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth construct each other’s and their own personal
identities.
Characterization through performative speech acts is prominent throughout Pride
and Prejudice. This provides a challenge to both Elizabeth and the readership as the
novel continually remodels Mr. Darcy according to hearsay about his past, and the direct
witness of both the readership and the novel’s characters of his concurrent actions at each
8

9. step. The utilization of performative speech acts in characterization is one of the
contributions of this study.
The illocutionary force of a performative speech act, which is the essence of our
argument, is not assertive, because character construction is a performance which is
manifest in its act, so the directional fit of words-to-world is inappropriate. Identity
construction through discourse occurs simultaneously with the act in saying; it forms a
new world of understanding rather than describing something already existent. However,
these performative speech acts of identity construction are not just declarations because a
S who acts to construct identity does not necessarily have any institutional authority to
appropriate their position to this work. In a broader context, the performative illocution
then also works when the S makes character judgments of himself and others, whether he
or she has authority. If a S proposes himself or herself to be in some qualitative state or
condition, the S holds a right of subjection to make that claim of character self-portrayal.
Also, when the S makes some claim regarding another person’s character, the claim can
be projected as a new assumption about someone or something on the H, who then
assesses the effect of that utterance upon his or her preexisting notions.
Furthermore, characterization is not static; it can be reiterated or undone through any
subsequent performances by the individual or another upon that person’s behalf. That is
to say, performative speech acts are not necessarily as sturdy as declarations. We contend
that character construction is the act of bringing into existence specific attributes of
character at a time, rather than creating a whole identity in one instance. Characterization
is an entire process that occurs over time, a piecemeal creation through individual
utterances of a single identity through the amalgamation of multiple personality traits.
For example, over the course of a lifetime a person may have many different personality
phases, and opinions are adjusted as a person leaves one phase and enters another,
constructing identity.
While the S’s utterances are according to cultural conditions, she, in the execution of
performative speech acts, certainly intends the utterance to form an extended world of
meaning according to her idea. However, when the S’s speech act is infelicitous and
breaks with convention, the utterance should be further examined for evidence of
figurative language, such as verbal irony for its frequent recourse recognized in this
study. In our spoken conversational analysis of Pride and Prejudice, utterances perceived
9

10. as ironical in the discourse between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy will be identified and
examined under our analytical framework. Utterances that depict characterization are
found in performative speech acts, which are not included in Searle’s speech act
taxonomy. Character construction occurring via figurative language such as verbal irony
may only be classified using performative speech acts, therefore necessitating its
inclusion into the taxonomy to replace declarations. In addition to modified speech act
taxonomy, this study has also adapted the echoic account to classify echoic groupings of
characterization through verbal irony.
3.1.2 Echoic Groupings: An Original Contribution to Echoic Theory
This study formulates an original contribution to echoic theory by identifying three
echoic groupings of verbal irony through which characterization is seen. These groupings
are formed based on the echoic allusions of the ironical utterances, which emphasizes
echoic theory’s importance for this study. Not only is echoic theory used to verify the
data, but it also aids to form echoic groupings to identify characterization. The three
echoic groupings are based on the echoic allusions when Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth are in
disagreement, display neutral civility, or are in agreement. This study contends that these
echoic groupings are not necessarily found chronologically within Pride and Prejudice.
However, based on the echoic grouping dominance, this study generates three echoic
grouping dominance phases depicting Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth’s characterization.
Echoic groupings are based on echoic theory’s allusion, that the ironical utterance is
echoing a preexisting thought or idea. Echoic allusions found in each utterance verify the
perlocutionary act that is for the H’s uptake of the verbal irony, intended by the S. The
echoic allusion verifies the irony by confirming the infelicity, or incongruity, within the
utterance. The figurative meaning is hidden behind the literal meaning, revealing the
irony within the utterance. The S’s intended illocution of an ironical performative speech
act works to construct a character’s identity.
To conclude this section, we have described the theoretical basis on which we
construct the analytical framework. The concept of performative speech acts borrowed
from Butler (2002) [1990] works to replace the restrictive declarations to modify Searle’s
(2001b) [1979] speech act theory, which we combine with echoic groupings to classify
our data. From Butler we claim performative speech acts depict characterization, and thus
10

11. our analytical framework features both ironical performative speech acts and echoic
groupings. Below we describe how the theories form the analytical framework, which is
the basis for the data analysis in Chapter 5.
3.2 Analytical Framework: Towards a New Model for Verbal Irony
The diagram below is an illustration of our analytical framework. The logic is that
character construction stems from performativity. Performativity is the concept that
verbal and non-verbal actions construct the identity of a person or character (refer to
section 3.1.1). Performativity occurring through discourse can be both figurative and
literal, but this study centers on the figurative use through verbal irony.
In order to classify all the ironical utterances between Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth, this
study uses a framework which incorporates both the modified speech act theory (see
section 2.2 for Searle’s speech act theory and 3.1.1 for the inclusion of performative
speech acts into Searle’s taxonomy) and the echoic theory’s allusion (see section 2.4.2 for
echoic theory). Ironical utterances are developed under the auspices of unconventional
speech acts which successfully work despite simultaneously demonstrating infelicity.
Searle’s (2001b) [1979] and Austin’s (2002) [1962] felicity conditions are the basis for
determining violations of speech acts. Figurative language is a device for characters to
express their opinions in an innocuous way. The verbal irony works in the sense that a
speech act is indirectly conveying an intended illocutionary act by way of pragmatically
framing the utterance in a context for an intended H to embark upon an uptake that an
utterance be evaluated as ironical. According to our framework, the irony within the
utterance is located in the perlocutionary act when the H resolves the intended meaning
hidden in the S’s literal meaning. The verbal irony is examined through the two-tiered
method of pairing S intent with H uptake intended by the S, within an utterance, two sides
of the same coin: first classifying S intent (illocutionary act) via modified speech act
theory and then further identifying H uptake (perlocutionary act) with echoic allusions of
disagreement, neutral, and agreement echoic groupings.
This study formulates a theoretical framework based on a modification to Searle’s
speech act theory (2001b) [1979], emphasizing the significance of the S’s intent. Speaker
intent is revealed through modified speech act theory, which emphasizes the illocutionary
11

12. act of an utterance. For the occasions where Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts is too
ambiguous to properly categorize an act of identity formation, this study has modified the
previous taxonomy to replace declarations with Butler’s (2002) [1990] performative
speech acts as illocutionary acts. This new taxonomic classification encompasses a
broader approach to Searle’s declaration category to indicate how speaking an utterance
can initiate and alter the identity of an individual or grouped person(s) or thing(s).
Therefore according to Butler’s concept of performative speech acts (refer back to section
3.1.1 for performative speech acts and characterization), we argue in this study that
performative speech acts are the foremost speech act to depict characterization, for the
other four types of speech acts may or may not aid to construct character identity.
However, the other four types of speech acts are necessary for classifying the ironical
utterances in order to objectively determine the echoic grouping dominance phases.
To examine the utterance from the effect of H uptake intended by the S, modified
speech act theory must be supplemented by echoic allusions for objective classification of
ironical utterances. The perlocutionary act, the intended effect upon the H from the S of
the ironical performative utterance, is analyzed according to incongruity and superiority
theories interpreted via echoic allusion. This study finds incongruity and superiority
theories of humor are relevant to the analysis of verbal irony for several reasons. We
contend incongruity is inherent in verbal irony, highlighting the infelicity in the utterance
reveals the duality of the intended meaning and literal meaning. For each ironical
performative speech act analyzed, the divergence in figurative and literal meanings is
described to stress the intention of the S (Mr. Darcy or Elizabeth). Superiority theory,
which incorporates the banter principle, is also found to be an integral part of each
ironical utterance, explaining the use of verbal irony to display perceived inferiority of
the H.
The logical connections of the analytical framework figure are represented by the
lines. For instance, both humor and verbal irony are types of figurative language,
therefore these two concepts fall under the “parent” figurative utterances. The direct
connections between the theories and concepts are represented by solid black lines. The
connection between incongruity and superiority theories and verbal irony are represented
by the dotted lines, because these theories do not fall directly under irony such as echoic
theory, yet their utilization in the explication of verbal irony is supported by the shared
12

13. aspects of humor and irony (e.g. Juez, 1995; Dynel, 2013).
13

14. 14

15. Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework
3.3 Hypotheses
Based upon the analytical framework, this study posits two hypotheses:
1. Characterization through verbal irony is represented via S intent and H
uptake.
2. Echoic groupings depict characterization when utterances are comprised
of
disagreement, neutral, and agreement echoic groupings.
The hypotheses will be tested by first classifying each utterance according to the
modified speech act taxonomy and echoic allusions to verify that the utterance is
ironical. The classification and verification comprise the two-tiered method of pairing S
intent with H uptake within an utterance. Once the utterances are identified as ironical
and classified via modified speech act taxonomy, the analysis can proceed.
15