1. Trust and U.S.-Iran Relations
The implementation of nuclear capabilities during the Cold War period introduced
unprecedented means of conducting warfare, in turn, further escalating the tensions between
international actors, particularly those states engaged in conflicting and hostile relationships.
The struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to peacefully obtain an effective balance of
power between the states without utilizing military force to alter the political ambitions of the
other characterized an era effecting international politics on a global scale. Parallels have been
drawn, regarding the race to arms and the dynamics of arms control, between the rivalry of the
U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, which was further exacerbated by possession of
nuclear arms and the inability of each state to predict the intentions of the other and present U.S.-
Iran relations, which remains a frequent source of controversy and debate amongst scholars of
international affairs. Drawing from the realist perspective and evaluating each state’s attitudes
when applied to the prisoner’s dilemma and assurance game, this study explores the importance
of the concept of trust in terms of international relations and its role in shaping nuclear
negotiations between states. It is contended that trust is the primary factor contributing to the
tensions in U.S.-Iran relations and efforts to overcome the trust obstacles that exist between the
U.S. and Iran, rather than continually erecting barriers which impede positive interaction, would
contribute to a more effective means of approaching Iran’s ambition to implement a nuclear
program.
The body of literature produced concerning Iran’s nuclear initiatives typically focuses on
three areas of interest. First, determine whether Iran has offensive or deterrent purposes for
implementing a nuclear program. Second, insist on the prevention of Iranian nuclear endeavors
for the best interest of the international community due to its history of human rights, association
with terrorism, and relationship to regional neighbors. Third, highlight the reasoning which
promotes the United States’ fervent attempts to deny Iran’s request to the international
community for consent to a nuclear program based on the international non-proliferation treaty’s
objective to prevent the spread of nuclear technology as well as eventual complete disarmament,
despite the U.S.’s own possession of nuclear weapons and history of usage. While it is beyond
the scope of this study to analyze Iran’s relationship to the international community as a whole or
what consequences proliferation would have for Iran based on the response from its regional
neighbors, it must be noted that typical regulations set forth by organizations existing for the
purposes of limiting nuclear technology and ensuring peaceful compliance with non-proliferation
agreements, such as the IAEA, do not directly apply to Iran, made evident by continual rejection
of Iranian requests despite cooperation with the IAEA, including the ratification and
implementation of additional protocol and modified code 3.1 (39). According to Hadi Dedmehr,
“The IAEA is yet to provide any good legal justification for its double standards towards Iran.
Taking a comparative approach, any non- partisan can easily recognize that the IAEA has not
acted upon principles of justice and equity” (Dadmehr, 2013). Judged by the criteria typically
set forth by non-proliferation organizations, the U.S. has also neglected to base its responses to
Iran’s initiatives on Iranian failure to comply with these standards. Within the context of this
study, it is important to note that actions taken by Iran to demonstrate cooperation with nuclear
international regulations will not suffice in altering the attitudes of the U.S. concerning Iran or its
nuclear program initiatives. Rather, there are various factors including the state’s reputation,
credibility, relationship with other states, past and present record of international and domestic

2. politics, ideologies, and belief and values system, in addition to its geopolitics and historical
relationship with the U.S., which contribute to a foundational mistrust that exists between the
U.S. and Iran.
Aaron Hoffman argued, “Trust involves a willingness to take the risk of relinquishing
control over one’s interests; Trust involves the belief that the other side will not harm or
undermine these interests; Trust varies in levels of intensity” –how much and for how long do
you trust the other side to not harm your interest?; Trust involves prediction about future
behavior” (Hoffman, 2002). Two international relations theories –the prisoner’s dilemma and
the assurance game- illustrate the trust dynamics that exist between the U.S. and Iran. The
prisoner’s dilemma acts as the predominant theory as the probability of mutual abandonment of
allegiance is elevated due to the lack of trust that the other side will comply with the expected
behavior. The propensity of each to attribute unamiable qualities to the opponent is common in
the prisoner’s dilemma. While each state desires peace, they are not able to achieve the best
outcome simultaneously, as one side is constantly risking the possibility of the other seizing the
greatest outcome for itself, thus, directly resulting in the worst outcome for the former. The
assurance game requires a state to express a willingness to relinquish trust in order to obtain trust
in reciprocity. Thus, it participates in costly signaling by cooperating on particular matters
without a guarantee that cooperation or compromise will be reciprocated. In order to protect
one’s own interests in the anarchical international system, it is necessary to proceed cautiously
when developing foreign policy. Thus, a state’s tendency to remain distrustful in terms of their
interactions with other states inevitably affects a state’s compulsion to participate in cooperation
or negotiation with foreign entities. In addition to the differences existing in terms of degree of
power in the international scene, states differ in a host of other ways, which directly contribute to
the security dilemma and influence its probability of positive interaction and cooperation with
other states including ideologies, identity, and reputation. Lack of trust in these key areas, then,
has convinced the United States that Iranian possession of nuclear weapons or materials would
prove detrimental to the Persian Gulf region and create increasing security concerns for the
United States, as well as its interests and allies, particularly Israel.
States that share commonalities in terms of ideologies, interests, and the way in which
their identities are socially constructed are more likely to support or cooperate with each other’s
initiatives. A state’s identity and objectives, then, has a direct influence on whether they will be
viewed as rivals or friends, thus resulting in whether their interests will converge or diverge with
the interests of other states. Democracies, then, would behave more peacefully with other
democracies than with countries that vary in governmental structure due to the common norms
and ideas shared between the two. The outcome for one would also benefit the outcome for the
other, rather than two states that struggle over the balance of power. While technologically or
militaristically speaking, Iran does not pose a threat to the ontological power of the United
States, an Iranian nuclear program would not only pose possible ramifications to U.S. interests,
but would also create a shift in the distribution of power in the Persian Gulf region, thus,
effecting the international community as a whole as other states could then potentially be
pressurized to respond or obtain nuclear arms to counter Iranian power. Iran and America
differentiate in their most basic and fundamental beliefs, values, and structure, both domestically
and internationally. While the U.S. prides itself on the freedom and equality afforded to its
citizens, as well as the opportunity for active political participation in which the government is

3. bound by the people, Iran is an Islamic regime that justifies autocratic rule by appealing to their
belief that democracy contradicts their religion by giving the people the authority to legislate,
which is not prohibited by Islamists, as they believe this authority is exclusive to God and those
appointed by him. When two states differ to such an extensive degree like that of the U.S. and
Iran, it is necessary for the protection and preservation of the state to question the intention and
objectives of the other concerning their international initiatives. When posed with the question
of implementation of an Iranian nuclear state, the U.S. finds itself in a position in which it is
imperative to determine Iranian grounds for obtaining nuclear arms and whether or not it is
admissible to engage in costly signaling and support or encourage acceptance of Iranian requests.
Clifton Sherrill argued, “The potential value of nuclear weapons encompasses both a
defensive deterrent component that protects a state from another state’s aggressive acts, and an
offensive coercive component that permits a state to carry out its own aggressive designs”
(Sherill, 2012). A state’s ability to acquire and maintain sovereignty is measured by
demonstration of the capabilities to establish, as well as defend, the borders of the state. Power
is often attributed to the material capabilities of a country including its military strength,
resources, economic capacities, and political stability (Nau, 2012). Therefore, a state’s
inclination to arm to the fullest capacity does not directly correspond to a state’s predilection to
utilize nuclear arms for offensive purposes. While rejection of Iranian nuclear initiatives is often
associated with international goals for complete nonproliferation and disarmament, it is evident
that declared nuclear states have no intention of disarming, thus arguments for complete
disarmament are not relevant to dismissal of Iranian objectives, despite compliance with
international proliferation regulations. Rather, U.S. efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program
is directly correlated to the inability of the U.S. to eliminate threat of Iranian offensive ambitions
towards itself or its regional neighbors in the Persian Gulf, due to the trust factor between the
two states. U.S. cooperation with Iranian nuclear initiatives would require costly signaling and,
thus, acceptance of Iran and their international and domestic policies. Despite a state’s natural
inclination to be viewed as a powerful and capable international actor or any common or rational
justification for the objective to obtain nuclear arms, the risk associated with Iran’s initiatives
would be great, regardless of its compliance with international protocol, as it would place Iran in
a position to deter against offensive initiatives of other states and counter American power. This,
in turn, would increase the security dilemma as one state gains more power, it inevitably
threatens other states as they must consider how the power will be used, defensively or
offensively. As states cannot be certain of the intentions of the others, it creates a scenario, like
that of the prisoner’s dilemma, in which a state must assess the intentions of the others based on
certain criteria in order to determine which action would result in the best possible outcome for
themselves and create a margin of safety, while maintaining that both states cannot secure the
best outcome simultaneously.
When evaluating the potential intentions or ambitions of another state, there are certain
factors that must be taken into account, which together determine if a level of trust can exist
between the two entities. Past encounters with the state in question, its relationship with other
states, its domestic ideologies and politics, which inevitably affect its international policies and
initiatives, as well as its reputation as an international actor are also considered when developing
relations with other states. If a primary indicator of future behavior depends upon past conduct,

4. it is necessary to understand the historical relationship of the U.S. and Iran, as well as its
relations with other states.
“The greater a state’s reputation, the more credibly it can commit to a particular course of
action, the easier it is for it to enter into cooperative arrangements, the more it can extract from
other states as part of a bargain, and more likely it is that it can find other states to cooperate”
(Dadmehr, 2013). A complete history of U.S.-Iran relations or an Iranian interpretation of
international affairs specific to the United States in order to determine whether implementation
of a nuclear program would have security implications for the U.S. is beyond the scope of this
particular study. However, there are certain significant events and actions, which have
culminated in a mistrust that exists as the foundational element of their international relationship.
When judged by the attitudes, behavior, and events of the past, certain questions arise, which are
critical in examining the trust factor between the U.S. and Iran. Is there reason to believe that
Iran or the U.S. could engage in a trusting relationship with one another? If not, are there any
existing indicators which contribute to the need for either state to arm or have cause to arm now
or in the future in the event of successful implementation of an Iranian nuclear program?
It must be noted that Iran has engaged in costly signaling with the United States, despite
the consistent rejection of reciprocity, as well as U.S. support for Iraq’s use of chemical weapons
during the Iran-Iraq War. Although, the U.S. has a large presence in the Middle East, whose
western influence could be viewed as a threat to their interests and ideologies and relations with
the U.S. are perceived as contrary to the domestic, and thus, religious beliefs, of Iran, it has
demonstrated the role of the assurance game in its international policies by cooperating with the
U.S. on several occasions including support during the first Gulf War, Afghanistan invasion,
Lebanon hostage crisis, and conflict with Iraq following September 11. While Iran had the
option to remain neutral, it acquiesced to American requests for cooperation, thus exhibiting that
Iran attempted to initiate a process of confidence building, as well as earn trust and gratitude
from the U.S. in order to initiate progress in developing a relationship which would foster
cooperation from the U.S. for Iranian initiatives as well. Scholars and analysts have determined
that Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear arms, despite the negative response and preventative
measures taken by the U.S. and international community, is directly correlated with Iran’s
ambitions to utilize nuclear arms for offensive purposes or increase its flexibility in the Middle
East and allow for aggressive policies by giving it a deterrent against threats from other states
seeking to maintain equilibrium in the distribution of power in the region. (Author) conducted
an analysis on Iran’s declared foreign policy doctrine and found that the three foundational
principles are “ezzat” (esteem/honor/respect), “maslahat” (expediency/advisable), and “hekmat”
(wisdom). He concluded, “Iran’s military doctrine and deployment reflects deterrence and
retaliation, rather than preemption and projection” (Mesbahi, 2013). However, when considering
Iran’s engagement in costly signaling and it’s declared foreign policy doctrine, is there
significant justification for the U.S. to engage in a trusting relationship with Iran and negotiate its
nuclear initiatives or permanent realignment of foreign policy relations with Iran?
U.S. consent to Iranian nuclear initiatives would require the U.S. to trust that Iran’s
intentions were solely defensive and would pose no threat, direct or otherwise, to the U.S., its
allies, or its interests. Before considering Iran and its specific record of domestic and
international policies and behavior, its geopolitics must be incorporated into an analysis

5. concerning grounds for negotiating the nuclear issue. Iran’s location in the structurally unstable
Persian Gulf region, in which terrorists are known to operate, further complicate Iranian requests
and the ability of either state to peacefully engage in a trusting relationship. If Iran successfully
implemented a nuclear program, it would immediately result in a disruption of the distribution of
power in the region, in which a race to nuclear or conventional arms has the potential to ensue,
thus effecting American allies. The United States also remains uncertain regarding possible or
potential aid to terrorist groups operating in the region. Additionally, Iran’s record of human
rights and domestic ideologies, which contrast to an immense degree with that of the U.S.,
culminate in a scenario in which the risk associated with American acceptance of an Iranian
nuclear program could create a security dilemma which could result in global ramifications.
Although Iran has cooperated with the U.S. on various international initiatives, the inability of
the U.S. to predict the intent and behavior of Iran upon obtaining nuclear arms coupled with
Iran’s degree of difference from the fundamental and core values of U.S. society and location in
the Middle East the U.S. has sufficient cause to believe that Iran’s interests could result in direct
or indirect security concerns for the United States.
America’s core values support equality and justice, thus, if Iran continues to abide by
international regulations set forth by the IAEA, NATO, etc., then U.S. rejection of Iranian
initiatives could be conveyed as a breach of the fundamental values that serve as the core of U.S.
domestic politics. When these concepts are applied to international affairs, however, the
uncertainties associated with establishing and maintaining interstate relationships forces trust to
become a critical component in conducting relations and negotiations. While legal justification
for rejection of Iranian requests may not exist and continues to be portrayed as a prejudiced
response in order to maintain western dominance by suppressing a state with differing ideals, the
prisoner’s dilemma illustrates that trust is the primary factor contributing to tensions between
U.S. and Iran, and thus preventing any nuclear negotiations or long-term alterations to current
relations. Due to the tendency of each state engaged in the prisoner’s dilemma to expect the
most unfavorable response and intentions from the other state, each state must also employ
efforts to obtain a balance in which to separate analysis from presumption. While it is essential
to consider all the possible consequences that could potentially result from the actions of other
international actors, it is also imperative to develop policy by analyzing if the worst possible
presumptions are the probable, or even possible, outcome. For instance, Iran’s geopolitics is a
primary source of concern regarding the Iranian nuclear program in terms of a potential arms
race to counter Iranian power. However, if Israel is considered a precedent for proliferation of a
Middle Eastern state, then the response of the regional neighbors to Israel’s nuclear program
could serve as a legitimate counter to American arguments for potential Iranian threat. …wrote,
“…the record of nuclear proliferation that has already occurred around the globe does not
support the notion that nuclear weapons are game-changers that facilitate regional bullying or
adventurism” (Pillar, 2013). The U.S. is faced with limited possibilities for approaching an
Iranian nuclear state; however, damaging sanctions and an international rewards and
punishments system that further disadvantages Iran does not provide an environment that
promotes positive interaction which could bolster trust in U.S.-Iran relations. It would be more
productive, then, for U.S. policy makers to accept and begin preparing and strategizing for the
potential nuclear Iranian state while supporting efforts to effectively analyze the potential threat
in order to obtain a peaceful solution or commence efforts and resources to alter Iranian policies,
which likewise could result in increased security implications for American interests.

6. References
Dadmehr, H. (2013). Reputation and Iranian Nuclear Program: 1997-2013. Iranian Review of
Foreign Affairs, 37.
Mohiaddin, M. (2013). Trust and U.S.-Iran Relations: Between the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the
Assurance Game . Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 17-18.
Nau, H. (2012). Perspectives on International Relations. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
Pillar, P. (2013). The Role of Villain: Iran and US Foreign Policy. The Journal of Political and
International Affairs , 214.
Sherill, C. W. (2012). Why Iran Wants the Bomb and what it Means for US Policy.
Nonproliferation Review, 34-35.