International Relations Week 5: The Changing Character of War
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International Relations Week 5: The Changing Character of War
- 1. International Relations Week 5 [read Baylis et. al. (2008) chapter 12] Brendon Tagg [email_address]
Editor's Notes
- http://video.ias.edu/Terrorism-and-Just-War Michael Walzer , Professor Emeritus, School of Social Science. This lecture attempts to answer multiple questions: First, what is wrong with terrorism? The question may seem easy, but it is often answered badly. Second, how is terrorism chosen - picked out of all the possible political strategies? And third, how ought we to fight against terrorism? Or better, what are the moral limits that anti-terrorists ought to recognize? ------------------------------------------------------ http://filmsforthehumanities.com/PreviewClip.aspx?id=5875 http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2004_fall/wills.htm http://video.ias.edu/Terrorism-and-Just-War http://video.ias.edu/Justice-Culture-and-Tradition-Session5 1
- Today’s lecture based on ch. 12 of the textbook -also look at part of ch. 11 that deals with ‘Just War Doctrine’ -and I’m going to provide one or two extra readings on this as well ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- War has always been a central focus of the study of international relations Since the end of cold war, some argue the nature of war changed fundamentally -in some parts of the world, war is becoming obsolete -economic interdependence through globalisation, spread of democracy -some states formed security communities (NATO); war between them unlikely Elsewhere, war continues to exist, and has taken very different forms But first, let’s step back …
- War is fluid concept – there have been many contradictory definitions Quincy Wright: ‘a violent contact between distinct but similar entities’ (p.213) -also describes gang warfare; also unreasonable assumptions about nature of combatants -violent crime is important (kills more than war + terrorism), but it is not war Clausewitz: ‘an act of force intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will’ -a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means’ (p.213) -assumption that this means large-scale military confrontations between states Also Webster’s dictionary: ‘usually open and declared hostile conflict between states’ However in the current era, we can’t assume that is only between state actors: -Hedley Bull suggests: ‘organised violence carried on by political units against each other’ -key is that violence is not war unless it is directed from one political unit to another It is possible to argue that war is simply armed violence between two groups -but it’s also important to think about what sorts of goals are involved -and how much violence is used Consider a clash between two street gangs where a few people are killed -is that really same as inter-state military conflict where millions killed? Choosing a threshold seems arbitrary -Singer and small define this at least 1000 battles deaths per year -in this case the Falklands War / Malvinas War between UK and Argentina barely qualifies This takes us back to a more general definition (last one on slide)
- It’s even harder to think about the nature of war than it is to define ‘war’ -it’s easy to recognise a war when it involves states and a great deal of resources -but at lower end overlaps with other forms of violence; terrorism, insurgency, criminals -’war always involves violence, but not all violence can be described as war’ (p.214) From a Western perspective, war -represents a conscious decision, for a rational political purpose - is a form of social and political behaviour ; but we should be flexible with defining politics - globalisation eroded the economic, political and cultural autonomy of the state -non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations , media now play a part -‘war fatigue’ weakens legal, moral, political constraints against use of force Are many paradoxes of war; activity involves intense violence but also great co-operation -Francis- war “made up of acts of enmity rather than co-operation, of imposition rather than negotiation, of summary killing rather than due process, of destruction rather than creation” (p.215) -but war also requires society to cooperate to perform large, complex tasks -societies can only fight wars when can cooperate internally; rally behind external enemy -a state at war externally often = state of peace internally (although wars sometimes highly unpopular) The machinery of the first states derived historically from organisational demands of war -many states were formed as a result of earlier wars -this peaked during the Thirty Years War in Europe 1618-48 -this led to the development of modernity (up until the late 20thC)
- The pattern of warfare typical to modernity -the rise of nationalism - centralised , bureaucratic states with rapidly rising populations -scientific and industrial revolutions -secular ideologies, intolerance of opposing meta-narratives, broad, overarching ideologies (e.g. Marxism) -modern warfare; massive armies mobilised through centralised bureaucracies, using power of nationalism -armed with products of industrialisation, sacrifice for state expected; civilian populations became targets -cumulated in nuclear attacks on Japan 1945 Another feature of modern warfare was that it was governed by rules -large body of international law developed to constrain/regulate violence in war -this is what distinguished it from more fighting, even organised fighting And the requirement to defeat the opposition may lead to advances in technologies -transportation, food manufacture/storage, communications etc. -and can lead to states centralising power and strengthening the state -but the high demands can also lead to the weakening/disintegration of the state (South Vietnam 1975, USSR 1991) -however technological or even political modernisation need not imply moral progress
- Since the end of the cold war -the annual number of wars, battle deaths, war-related massacres declined rapidly -1989-1992 nearly 100 wars ended; the 1990s least violent decade since end WWII Some argue since the end of the cold war = dramatic change in international system -traditional inter-state rivalry not driving accumulation of military power in rich countries -response to less clearly defined threats; terrorism, insurgencies, internal crises overseas -also major changes in the domestic structures of many states -notable rise in the number of democratic political systems -but others disintegrated into civil war, insurgency Due to US hegemony -many see process of globalisation as essentially Americanisation -for many there is fierce cultural and political resistance to this Also, the tangible capacity for war-making is increasing -more and more states have weapons of mass destruction -and conventional military technology is more widespread At the end of the cold war there was great disarmament -much of this surplus flooded onto global arms market - was sold off relatively cheaply Communications technologies have led to new forms of warfare -non-state actors moved to transform cyberspace / global media into crucial battlegrounds -in addition to regular military and terrorist operations -so war is simultaneously fought on different planes of reality -reality itself is subverted through informational and electronic deception
- Some argue although nature of war remains same, character of war changing -one argument for this is the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ -popular after dramatic and almost effortless US victory in 1991 Gulf War -could future wars be decided through using superior technology (satellites, guided weapons)? RMA proponents argue: -military technology will allow operations to be fast, precise and selective -and that this will allow the whole character of war to change -targets can be destroyed without inflicting unnecessary civilian causalities -although absolute precision / reliability impossible However -emphasis on technology and tactics risks oversimplifying complexities of war -non-technological factors play a critical role in the outcome of wars There is less talk about how unconventional or asymmetric responses my play a role -if two sides have very different capabilities, both will try get other to fight on their terms -asymmetry allowed US easy initial military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq -but also resulted in later unconventional guerilla conflict Indeed some combatants may not even try to defeat the enemies armed forces -but just manipulate violence to demoralise them to try and get concessions RMA also assumes state-centred model -yet intra-state insurgency warfare has been prevalent since 1991
- Many argue global society is moving from the modern to the postmodern age -economic, cultural, social and political changes -alter notions about what me mean by the state and the nation -a shift from production to information as core output of industrialised nations -some states transfer functions (incl. military functions) to private authorities / company -globalisation weakens national identities; other identities revived - religious /ethnic / clan Media increasingly shapes, even constructs, how we see different conflicts -journalists less observers, increasingly active participants (reporting helps shape outcome) ‘ Modernity’ was based on mode of production; ‘Post-modernity’ reflects mode of information Another post-modern development = increased ‘outsourcing’ of war -since end cold war hundreds of Privatised Military Firms (PMF) operate in 50+ countries -especially in logistical and security roles (less so in active combat) -reflects a global trend of privatising public assets Some writers in the 1990s talked about casualty-free or ‘virtual wars’ -1999 NATO war in Yugoslavia reflected some of these ideas -technological superiority led to reduced casualties -warfare about controlling cyberspace and airwaves - reduced use of deadly force Criticisms of ‘postmodern war’ -no ‘virtual war’ for Kosovan/ Serbian victims of ethnic violence; Serbian victims air attacks -information not the only thing that matters – war is intensely physical -predictions of ‘virtual war’ seem utopian given carnage of 2003 US War in Iraq -recent increase in very savage local wars, esp. Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia Others have argued that many post-cold war wars are extremely barbaric -driven by irrationality and primordial hatreds that were suppressed during cold war
- Mary Kaldor has suggested that ‘new wars’ emerged since the 1980s -typically based around disintegration of states; opposing group’s struggle for power Over past decade 95% of armed conflict has taken place inside states; not between them -economy performs badly -> poor tax take -> criminality/corruption -> private groups access weapons -> political legitimacy collapses -factions tend to form around ideas of identity -indeed, national self-determination a driving force of wars since 1990 Islamic fundamentalists not fight to control territory / political authority in state-centric view -but defending/expanding cultural autonomy vs. globalisation / Westernisation / secularism Gender and age also play new roles -women as auxiliaries in late modern period -front line roles in post-modern period (uniformed military, female suicide bombers) -child soldiers – 70% combatants in Sierra Leone >18yrs -nearly 1/3 of armies using child soldiers include girls In DR Congo, Sudan and Bosnia state monopoly of the use of violence challenged by -militias, paramilitary, warlord army, criminal gang, private security firms, tribal groupings But also challenged from outside - increased role of humanitarian intervention -if economic development is a deterrent to war, increased aid agencies, UN agencies, armed forces and private security firms Many features of ‘new wars’ not new - were common in earlier periods of history -e.g. brutal ethnic/religious wars, looting, plunder, low-intensity conflicts -but initiators empowered by globalisation – weakened states, parallel economies, rise of private protection -states do not fund the wars through taxation -fighting units fund themselves through black market; theft and extortion of foreign aid, hostage taking, money laundering, trafficking weapons, drugs and people In some ways economic rationale drives ‘new wars’; ‘war is economics by other means’ -war is therefore the end rather than the means
- Can the use of violence through war ever be justified? Many conventions and agreements regarding the acceptable waging of war have been written These rules have been codified in international law The underpinning of these are at least partially based in the philosophy of the just war tradition They are practiced in the United Nations Charter and the Nuremburg war crimes tribunal (Germany after WWII) The rules are not always followed -but most states have affirmed them as prudent and reasonable standards -they provide appropriate criteria for judgement A key premise underlying the tradition -human nature is unchanging -good and evil co-exist in everyone
- All human beings commit immoral acts during their lives -this includes killing other human beings Because of this unfortunate situation -it is necessary for individuals and states to protect themselves from aggression This requirement has led to the development of rules for conduct – the principles of just war Latin! The principles are usually divided into two sections the first is Jus ad bellum - This translates to “just recourse to war” - What are the conditions you must meet before you can conduct a just war? (2) the second is Jus in bello - or just conduct in war - Ethical rules governing the conduct of a just war
- JUST CAUSE Means having justifiable reasons for conducting the war -generally relates to the idea that you have the right to self-defence against unjustified aggressive actions Self defence is the only just cause that is formally recognised in formal international law This principle is also the basis for the idea of collective security -this is where other states can come to the aid of a state that has been subject to aggression from third state LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY This refers to the lawfully constituted government of a sovereign state (already discussed) -only the primary authority of the state has the power to commit its citizens to war
- JUST INTENTIONS St Thomas Aquanis, who based just war theory on natural law, was the first in Western thought to outline this at length -revenge is not a morally acceptable basis for conducting war -the war must be conducted with reluctance and restraint -there must be a willingness to accept peace when the objectives that justified the war have been met Just intentions also have major influence on the conduct of war -this is especially relevant to the individual soldier in the conduct of war -the requirement that non-combatants should be protected -the requirement that surrender is accepted and that prisoners of war will be treated humanely Aquanis also developed the theory of double effect...
- DOUBLE EFFECT -organised to reconcile an evil act (killing) with a good act (resisting aggression) -killing an attacker is acceptable as long as it is not desired in its own right -must merely be an unavoidable consequence of achieving the lawful objective Double effect was later extended -permitted military actions which caused collateral harm to civilians and their property -but providing all the other criteria for just war be met This is now a rationale for violating the principle of non-combatant immunity -but it has many safeguards -evil effects must not be intended -all reasonable efforts must be made to achieve the desired military goal without undesired non-combatant effects -the total good that is achieved must be greater than the harm that accidently occurs
- PUBLIC DECLARATION -it is important that the case for the war is clearly made -also the terms upon which the peace might be restored -also serves to inform state’s citizens of the cause of the call to the arms that will risk the citizens PROPORTIONALITY -must have a reasonable relationship between the goals and objectives and the means used to achieve them LAST RESORT -this principle recognises the destructive consequences of war -war must be avoided if at all possible, as defined by the legitimate interests of the state -negotiations -compromise -economic sanctions -appeals to higher authority (e.g. UN) -etc. -must be pursued first to redress grievances before the resort to war is justified REASONABLE HOPE OF SUCCESS -the state must not squander the lives and property of its citizens in a hopeless effort
- Jus in bello (just conduct) -in additions to the key requirements for going to war -just war tradition contains two crucial principles for evaluating ways in which war should be conducted DISCRIMINATION (non-combatant immunity) -essentially this requirement states that non-combatants must be immune from attack -these are organised into two groups – based on class and function (1) Class -the class of non-combatants refers to people who are considered not acceptable as military targets this includes: -medical personal and clergy (whether in uniform or not) -infants and small children (usually all children) -the aged, wounded and sick; and all others otherwise helpless to protect themselves (2) Function -there are also non-combatants by function -this includes farmers, merchants and others not directly involved in the war effort -but this does not include civilians that either (1) make war decisions or (2) produce war materials -they are generally considered combatants because they are making a direct contribution to the war effort People are not considered combatants if they provide services or produce goods that are necessary for living as non-combatants -this even if military personnel also use their services or goods
- PROPORTIONALITY (amount and type of force used) Proportionality is a principle for both Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello -proportionality is relevant to both the ethics of the reason for the war and for the proportionality of the conduct of the war -so the amount and type of force used must be reasonable and must not cause more unjust consequences than legitimate objectives
- SUMMARY Over time the just war tradition has evolved -no longer just a set of principles to cover relations between Christian princes -there are now more secular versions that rely on forming a consensus among states -this is so their continued independence cannot be overturned by force In recent years there has been an increase in interest in debating the practicality of just war principles Some of the following issues have arisen (next slide) -and the continued relevance of the tradition depends on its ability to adapt to changes in the practice of war